document of the world bankdocuments.worldbank.org/curated/en/... · approval: 12/19/2013 mid-term...

Document of

The World Bank

Report No: ICR00004100

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT

(IDA-51910, IDA-53410, IDA-57110)

ON A

SERIES OF DEVELOPMENT POLICY CREDITS

IN THE TOTAL AMOUNT OF SDR 91.4 MILLION

(US$135 MILLION EQUIVALENT)

TO THE

REPUBLIC OF SENEGAL

FOR THE

FIRST, SECOND AND THIRD

GOVERNANCE AND GROWTH SUPPORT CREDITS

July 26, 2017

Macroeconomics and Fiscal Management Global Practice

AFCF1Country Management Unit

Africa Region

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SENEGAL GOVERNMENT FISCAL YEAR

January 1 to December 31

CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

(Exchange Rate Effective March 8, 2017)

Currency Unit = CFA Franc

1.00 = US$ 0.00161

US$ 1.00 = 617

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

APIX Agence pour la Promotion de l’Investissement et des Grands Travaux (Agency

for Investment Promotion and Large Projects)

CPS Country Partnership Strategy

DPC Development Policy Credit

DPEE Direction de la Prévision et des Etudes Economiques (Department of Forecasting

and Economic Studies, Ministry of Economy, Finance and Planning)

GDP Gross Domestic Product

GGSC Governance and Growth Support Credit

GWH Gigawatt hours

HOGGY Hôpital Général de Grand Yoff (General Hospital of Greater Yoff)

HR Human resources

ICRR Implementation Completion Report

ICT Information and Communication Technology

IDA International Development Association

LFI Loi des Finances Initiale (initial budget law)

LFR Loi des Finances Rectificative (revised budget law)

MEFP Ministry of the Economy, Finance and Planning

M&E Monitoring and Evaluation

OFNAC Office national pour la Lutte contre la Fraude et la Corruption (National Office

for the Fight against Fraud and Corruption)

PDO Program Development Objective

PRSC Poverty Reduction Support Credit

PSI Policy Support Instrument

SAED Société nationale d’Aménagement et d’Exploitation des Terres du Delta

du Fleuve Sénégal (Company for the Development of the Senegal River

delta.) SDR Special Drawing Rights

SENELEC Société nationale d’Electricité (National Electricity Company)

TTL Task Team Leader

UEMOA/ Union Economique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine/West African Economic and

WAEMU Monetary Union

UK United Kingdom

WB The World Bank

Vice-President: Makhtar Diop

Country Director: Louise Cord

Senior Global Practice Director: Carlos Felipe Jaramillo

Practice Manager: Lars Christian Moller

Project Team Leader: Paolo Zacchia

ICR Team Leader: Julio Ricardo Loayza

ICR Primary Author: Philip English

SENEGAL

FIRST, SECOND AND THIRD

GOVERNANCE AND GROWTH SUPPORT CREDITS

P128284, P126470, P150976

CONTENTS

Data Sheet

A. Basic Information

B. Key Dates

C. Ratings Summary

D. Sector and Theme Codes

E. Bank Staff

F. Results Framework Analysis

G. Ratings of Program Performance in ISRs

H. Restructuring

1. Program Context, Development Objectives and Design ............................................ 1

2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes .............................................. 7

3. Assessment of Outcomes .......................................................................................... 14

4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome ......................................................... 19

5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance ..................................................... 19

6. Lessons Learned........................................................................................................ 22

7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners........... 24

Annex 1: Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes

Annex 2: Beneficiary Survey Results

Annex 3: Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results

Annex 4: Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR

Annex 5: Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Parners/Stakeholders

Annex 6: Prior Actions and their Status

Annex 7: List of Supporting Documents

MAP

A. Basic Information

Program 1

Country Senegal Program Name

SN- First Governance

and Growth Support

Project

Program ID P128284 L/C/TF Number(s) IDA-51910

ICR Date June 30, 2017 ICR Type Core ICR

Lending Instrument DPL Borrower GOVERNMENT OF

SENEGAL

Original Total

Commitment XDR 35.80M Disbursed Amount XDR 35.80M

Implementing Agencies n.a.

Cofinanciers and Other External Partners n.a.

Program 2


SN- Second

Governance and

Growth Support Credit




SENEGAL

Original Total


Program 3


Senegal-Third

Governance and

Growth Support Credit




SENEGAL

Original Total


B. Key Dates

SN- First Governance and Growth Support Project - P128284

Process Date Process Original Date Revised / Actual

Date(s)

Concept Review: 07/24/2012 Effectiveness: 12/28/2012

Appraisal: 11/07/2012 Restructuring(s):

Approval: 12/20/2012 Mid-term Review:

Closing: 03/31/2014 03/31/2014

SN- Second Governance and Growth Support Credit - P126470


Date(s)

Concept Review: 09/25/2013 Effectiveness: 12/23/2013



Closing: 03/31/2015 03/31/2015

Senegal-Third Governance and Growth Support Credit - P150976


Date(s)

Concept Review: 07/16/2014 Effectiveness: 08/15/2015 07/31/2016



Closing: 07/31/2016 07/31/2016

C. Ratings Summary

C.1 Performance Rating by ICR

Overall Program Rating

Outcomes Moderately Unsatisfactory

Risk to Development Outcome Moderately Satisfactory

Bank Performance Moderately Unsatisfactory

Borrower Performance Moderately Unsatisfactory

C.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR)

Overall Program Rating

Bank Ratings Borrower Ratings

Quality at Entry Moderately

unsatisfactory Government:

Moderately

unsatisfactory

Quality of Supervision: Satisfactory Implementing

Agency/Agencies: Moderately Satisfactory

Overall Bank

Performance

Moderately

unsatisfactory

Overall Borrower

Performance

Moderately

unsatisfactory

C.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance Indicators


Implementation

Performance Indicators

QAG Assessments

(if any) Rating:

Potential Problem

Program at any time

(Yes/No):

No Quality at Entry

(QEA) None

Problem Program at any

time (Yes/No): No

Quality of

Supervision (QSA) None

DO rating before

Closing/Inactive status

Moderately

Satisfactory


Implementation


QAG Assessments

(if any) Rating:

Potential Problem

Program at any time

(Yes/No):

No Quality at Entry

(QEA) None


time (Yes/No): No

Quality of


DO rating before

Closing/Inactive status n.a.


Implementation


QAG Assessments

(if any) Rating:

Potential Problem

Program at any time

(Yes/No):

No Quality at Entry

(QEA) None


time (Yes/No): No

Quality of


DO rating before

Closing/Inactive status n.a.

D. Sector and Theme Codes


Original Actual

Major Sector

Public Administration

Central Government (Central Agencies) 29 29

Education

Other Education 14 14

Tertiary Education 14 14

Health

Health 14 14

Energy and Extractives

Energy Transmission and Distribution 29 29

Major Theme/Theme/Sub Theme

Human Development and Gender

Health Systems and Policies 14 14

Health System Strengthening 14 14

Private Sector Development

ICT 22 22

ICT Solutions 22 22

Public Sector Management

Public Administration 22 22

Administrative and Civil Service Reform 14 14

Transparency, Accountability and Good Governance 22 22

Public Finance Management 22 22

Public Expenditure Management 22 22

Urban and Rural Development

Rural Development 7 7

Rural Infrastructure and service delivery 7 7


Original Actual

Major Sector


Central Government (Central Agencies) 38 38

Education

Tertiary Education 12 12

Health

Health 13 13

Energy and Extractives

Other Energy and Extractives 25 25

Industry, Trade and Services

Other Industry, Trade and Services 12 12


Human Development and Gender

Health Systems and Policies 14 14

Health System Strengthening 14 14


Business Enabling Environment 25 25

Regulation and Competition Policy 25 25



Administrative and Civil Service Reform 14 14

Municipal Institution Building 13 13





Original Actual

Major Sector

Agriculture, Fishing and Forestry

Other Agriculture, Fishing and Forestry 10 10


Other Public Administration 30 30

Education

Other Education 20 20

Health

Health 10 10

Industry, Trade and Services

Other Industry, Trade and Services 30 30



Business Enabling Environment 25 25

Investment and Business Climate 30 30

ICT 22 22

ICT Solutions 22 22






E. Bank Staff


Positions At ICR At Approval

Vice President: Makhtar Diop Makhtar Diop

Country Director: Louise Cord Vera Songwe

Practice

Manager/Manager: Lars Christian Moller Miria Pigato

Task Team Leader: Paolo Zacchia Mamadou Ndione and Philip

English







Practice

Manager/Manager: Lars Christian Moller Miria Pigato

Task Team Leader: Paolo Zacchia Philip English







Practice

Manager/Manager: Lars Christian Moller Seynabou Sakho

Task Team Leader: Paolo B. Zacchia Philip English and Jean Michel

Marchat



F. Results Framework Analysis

Program Development Objectives (from Program Document)

The Program Development Objective is to support the Government’s efforts to improve

economic governance, and promote growth through private sector development.

Revised Program Development Objectives (as approved by original approving authority)

No change.

Indicator(s)

SN- First, Second and Third Governance and Growth Support Credits – P128284, P126470,

P150976

Indicator Baseline

Value

Original

Target Values

(from

approval

documents)

Formally

Revised

Target Values

Actual Value

Achieved at

Completion or

Target Years

1. Percentage of holders of public

office defined in the asset

declaration law who have made a

declaration of assets

3 persons 100% 100% 52%

as of May 2016

Comment: Target 52% achieved (Source: OFNAC Annual Report). Unlikely to have exceeded

60% by end 2016.

2. Delay in the publication of the

Audit Court annual report after

the year of the report 34 months 12 months 12 months 18 months

Comment: Target 73% achieved (The 2014 report was only published in June 2016).

3. Budget Credibility for Basic

Education wage and salaries

(Ratio executed to approved

budget)

>110 100 100 108

Comment: Target only 20% achieved (The revised budget in the 2016 LFR has been used to

approximate final spending. The total operating budget has been used since disaggregated data

for wages and salaries was not available and in any case wages account for most operating

expenditures. Note that the LFR operating budget was only 2.3% above the LFI budget in 2015,

so there appears to have been some backsliding. (Source: Ministry of Economy, Finance and

Planning website)).

4. Budget Credibility for

University Education (Ratio

executed to approved budget) 133 110 <105 107.5

Comment: Target 91% achieved (Despite considerable progress. Once again, the 2016 LFR

operating budget was compared to the 2016 LFI operating budget. Investment spending is not

considered since the objective was to improve management of the operating budget. Note,

however, that the 2015 figure was 116.6. Even though the decreasing trend is appropriate, it

would be good to have one more year to confirm that the progress has been sustained. (Source:

Ministry of Economy, Finance and Planning website))

5. Share of girls in the total

number of students receiving

scholarships (percent) 35% 40% 40% 36.7%

Comment: Target 34% achieved. (Source: Education TTL and focal point, based on Ministry

of Education information)

6. Hospital efficiency index 79.54 85 85 90 (2015)

Comment: Target surpassed. (Source : Consultant’s report, Mesure de la Performance des

Ressources Humaines dans le Secteur de la Santé, Dec. 2016)

7. Percentage of assisted births 65% 70% 70% 53% (2015)

Comment: No progress made. (No progress has been made, but the decline is surprising. No

estimate for 2016 was available. (Source: Enquête de la Démographie et la Santé) )

8. Percentage of subsidized

agriculture inputs allocated

through new e-platform

0% 90% 90% 0%

Comment: No progress made. (No progress on the indicator, but work has proceeded on

designing and developing the system, which is ready to be implemented. Minister of Agriculture

received the electronic platform and is currently preparing it to upload the data on allocation

before transfer of subsidies can begin. (Source: WB Agriculture TTL and focal point))

9. Percentage of functioning

agencies with a performance

contract 0% 50% 90% 70%

Comment: Target 70% achieved (The action plan for the rationalization of agencies proposed

to reduce the number from 44 to 30. While there may now be more agencies than this, we

accepted 30 as the appropriate number of agencies needing performance contracts. By end 2015,

13 had such contracts, with another 8 planned for 2016. There should therefore be 21 out of 30

agencies covered by end 2016, or 70%. Note that another 16 organizations were expected to

finalize performance contracts by the end of 2016, and 30 more contracts were scheduled for

2017 – which should cover the remaining agencies. (Source: Technical committee for

restructuring and Directorate for the Para public Sector, Ministry of Finance)

10. The number of government

programs with results framework

approved by the M&E Unit 0 5 10 10

Comment: Achieved (Source: Technical committee for restructuring and Directorate for the Para

public Sector, Ministry of Finance)

11. Undistributed energy due to

load shedding 250GWH 10GWH 10GWH 34GWH

Comment: Target 90% achieved (Source: World Bank energy TTL and focal point)

12. Government Subsidies to the

electricity sector for tariff

compensation

CFAF105

billion

CFAF50

billion

CFAF50

billion CFAF76 bn.

Comment: Target 53% achieved. (Actual subsidies were eliminated by 2016 thanks to the fall

in oil prices. But in order to assess the progress made in reforms, an estimate has been made of

the level of subsidies that would be required if the price of oil had remained at the price of 2012

which was roughly $100/barrel. (Source: World Bank energy team))

13. SENELEC’s debt to equity

ratio 3 <1 <1 0.9

Comment: Achieved. (Source: World Bank energy team)

14. Paying taxes: Number of

payments and time required

59;

666 hours

37;

318 hours

37;

318 hours

58;

441 hours

Comment: No progress on first indicator. Second target was 65% achieved. (Source: 2017

Doing Business Report)

15. Registering Property: Time

required and cost as % of

property value

122 days;

20%

65 days;

12%

65 days;

12%

71 days;

10.2%

Comment: First target 89% achieved; second target surpassed by 22%. (Source: 2017 Doing

Business)

16. Construction permits: Time

required 210 days 150 days 150 days 202 days

Comment: Target only 13% achieved. (Source: 2017 Doing Business)

17. Number of arrivals by air 868,649 875,000 875,000 948,000

Comment: Achieved. (Source : DPEE, Point mensuel de conjoncture)

G. Ratings of Program Performance in ISRs


No. Date ISR

Archived DO IP

Actual

Disbursements

(USD millions)

1 10/28/2013 Moderately Satisfactory Satisfactory 55.18

H. Restructuring (if any)

Not applicable.

1

1. Program Context, Development Objectives and Design

1.1 Context at Appraisal

1. In the decade since 1995, Senegal enjoyed robust per capita GDP growth but,

starting in 2006, the economy was buffeted by a series of domestic and external

shocks. Real annual gross domestic product (GDP) growth stood at only 3.3 percent in

2006-11, down from an average of 4.4 percent in 2000-05. Sharp agriculture decline over

2006-7 was followed by the onset of the global financial crisis in 2008 and its deepening

in 2009. Continued electricity shortages further contributed to the general slowdown of the

country’s economic activity. Real GDP growth slowed again in 2011 to 2.6 percent, due to

energy shortages and a large contraction in agricultural output. Weaknesses in fiscal policy

and public financial management were compounded by the fiscal costs of untargeted

subsidies for electricity and food. As a result, there was a significant increase in borrowing

and the fiscal deficit was projected to rise to 8.1percent of GDP in 2012.

2. After elections judged to be free and fair, a new government under President

Macky Sall took power in April 2012 at the head of a multi-party coalition. President

Sall faced major challenges. These include restoring trust in the state, after repeated

allegations of corruption under the previous regime, as well as urgent popular demand for

action on jobs and the high cost of living. However, having run on a platform of restoring

macroeconomic balances and reinstating good governance, transparency and

accountability, the new president had limited capacity to implement programs due to a

large fiscal deficit including huge electricity subsidies.

3. In order to reduce the deficit without affecting public investment, the

government needed to rationalize recurrent spending. A number of current expenditure

components had increased substantially in past years. For instance, agencies, hospitals and

agricultural subsidies were areas in which spending was growing quickly with limited

control or accountability, and significant leakages. Similarly, education was among the

largest budget expenditure categories, and was consistently overrun during the course of

the year. This was particularly true of the university budget, which often led to delays in

salaries or scholarships, resulting in social unrest. Consequently, the government was keen

to control the growth in current spending and reduce social disturbances. Tackling these

issues would also strengthen governance.

4. The new government wished to improve the rate of economic growth and job

creation through stronger investment from the private sector. Private investment

needed to shift from residential construction and real estate to more productive, job-

creating enterprises. To this end, enhancing the investment climate was a high priority for

the government as Senegal was lowly ranked on the Doing Business scale, in 166th place.

Also, problems in the energy sector were one of the key constraints, as electricity tariffs

were among the highest in Africa – despite substantial subsidies –, and frequent power cuts

had forced many enterprises to invest in expensive generators. In effect, energy was

perceived by most entrepreneurs as one of the major restrictions to investment.

2

5. Finally, there was broad recognition that Senegalese governments have had

trouble implementing their various strategies in the past. Technical capacity did not

seem to be the problem, even if some ministers of the new government had limited

experience in the public sector. In effect, the Senegalese civil service is relatively strong

and turnover was relatively low, as senior officials tend to remain in place even under

government changes. Non-satisfactory implementation seemed to be related to a lack of

accountability which in turn was hampered by the weakness of the monitoring and

evaluation system. The new President was well aware of this shortcoming and announced

measures to promote performance and social accountability. These included enhancing the

linkages between the development strategy and the budget, as well as their transparency1.

Previous World Bank support and Rationale for Continued Intervention

6. The proposed program represented a continuation of budget support provided

over the previous six years. Most recently, a series of two poverty reduction support

credits, PRSC4 (P128284) and PRSC5 (P126470), had supported the government between

2009 and 2011. These had had mixed results but were rated moderately satisfactory in the

Implementation Completion and Results Report (ICRR). There was no Country

Partnership Strategy in place at the time this new series was designed. However, it became

an integral part of the new CPS which was approved in 2013. The new Country Partnership

Strategy (CPS) had two pillars – accelerating inclusive growth and creating employment,

and improving service delivery – and one foundation – strengthening the governance

framework and building resilience. Hence, the Operation was fully aligned with both pillars

and with the one foundation. It was felt that the democratic election of a new government

offered a crucial opportunity to break with the past and promote more ambitious reforms.

In response to the overwhelming demands from civil society for improved governance, the

new president had made important commitments. The long-standing mismanagement of

the electricity sector, the crisis in higher education and health services, the neglect of rural

areas, and the lack of jobs were other prominent themes among voters. The proposed series

would launch the adoption of several critical but overdue reforms and support the

government in the necessary follow-up over the next two years. These reforms would

underpin major projects supported by International Development Association (IDA) in the

energy, education, health and agro-business sectors. At the same time, the operation would

provide badly-needed financial support at a time when the government has been grappling

with unanticipated costs resulting from the 2011 drought.

7. The macroeconomic framework was judged to be adequate at the start of the

program and remained so throughout. After steadily rising fiscal deficits under the

previous regime, the Macky Sall government committed to reversing this trend and in 2012

the deficit was projected to fall to 5.9 percent from 6.7 percent the previous year – and

contrary to the former expectations of a higher deficit. It also continued to implement its

1 In the same sense, President Sall also invited Tony Blair to Senegal to advise him on service

delivery.

3

Policy Support Instrument with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), completing the

fourth review in October 2012. In 2013, the authorities requested an extension of the IMF

program by one year, further demonstrating their commitment to fiscal prudence. The fiscal

deficit was projected to decline to 5.4 percent. The authorities maintained this trend, with

this deficit falling to 4.9 percent in 2014, 4.7 percent in 2015 and a projected 4.2 percent

in 2016. Domestic resource mobilization was the best in the WAEMU region, with taxes

exceeding 19 percent of GDP throughout the period. Meanwhile GDP growth responded

to the improved macroeconomic management and structural reforms, rising steadily from

2.1 percent in 2011 to 4.7 percent in 2014 and a projected 5.1 percent in 2015. Inflation

remained subdued throughout the period. A summary of key economic indicators over the

course of the program, as estimated or projected at the time of appraisal of the third

operation, is provided in Table 1.

Table 1: Senegal: Selected Economic Indicators, 2011-2016

2011 2012 2013 2014

estimated

2015

projected

2016

projected

GDP growth rate (%) 2.1 3.5 3.6 4.7 5.1 5.9

Consumer inflation (%) 2.7 1.3 0.7 -1.1 -0.9 1.5

Fiscal balance/GDP -6.7 -5.9 -5.5 -4.9 -4.7 -4.2

Total revenues/GDP 22.4 23.3 22.7 24.2 24.3 24.2

- Taxes/GDP 18.9 19.2 19.2 19.2 19.3 19.5

Total expenditures/GDP 29.1 29.2 28.2 29.2 29.0 28.4

- Current/GDP 18.1 17.5 17.3 18.1 17.2 16.7

- Capital/GDP 10.5 11.4 11.0 11.1 11.8 11.7

Total public debt/GDP 40.5 43.4 46.6 53.2 55.9 57.6

Source: World Bank Program Documents for GGSC2 and GGSC3.

1.2 Original Program Development Objectives (PDO) and Key Indicators

8. The original overarching objective of the programmatic series was to support

implementation of the new government’s reform agenda. The focus of the series was

on a set of critical policy actions to support the authorities’ efforts to improve economic

governance by strengthening government transparency and accountability, increase public

sector efficiency and effectiveness, and promote growth through private sector

development.

The original PDOs and corresponding indicators were the following:

1a. To improve economic governance by strengthening Government accountability. The

key results to be achieved by 2015 were:

The percentage of holders of public office defined in the asset declaration law that

make a declaration of assets reaches 100percent.

4

Delay in the publication of the Cour des Comptes annual report after submission to

the President decreases to no more than one month.

1b. To increase public sector performance. Key results to be achieved by 2015 were:

Credibility of the budget for wages and salaries in basic education is restored as the

ratio of executed to budget spending decreases from 110 percent in 2011 to 100

percent.

The ratio of the executed university recurrent budget to the approved budget

decreases from 133 percent to 100±5 percent.

The share of girls in the total number of students receiving scholarships increases

from 35 percent in 2011 to 40 percent.

The Hospital efficiency index increases from 74 percent in 2010 to 85 percent.

The percentage of assisted births increases from 65 percent in 2011 to 70 percent.

Percentage of agencies non-compliant (without performance contract) with the

2009 law reduced from 100percent to 50percent.

The number of government programs with results framework approved by the

Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Unit increased from 0 to 5.

2. To promote growth through private sector development. Key results to be achieved by

2015 were:

The undistributed energy due to load shedding decreases from 250 gigawatt hours

(GWH) in 2011 to 10 GWH.

Government subsidies to the energy sector decrease from CFAF99 billion (1.4

percent of GDP) in 2012 to CFAF50 billion (0.6 percent of GDP).

SENELEC’s debt to equity ratio decreases from 3 in 2011 to 1.

Time, cost, and number of procedures in the 3 selected DB indicators reduced:

- Paying taxes: Number of payments reduced from 59 to 37

Time required reduced from 666 hours to 318 hours.

- Registering Property: Time required reduced from 122 days to 65 days.

Cost reduced from 20percent of property value to 12percent.

- Getting Electricity: Number of procedures reduced from 8 to 6.

Time required reduced from 125 days to 100 days.

Cost reduced from 5625percent of per capita income to 4500percent.

Increase in the number of hectares of land classified in the domain privé des

collectivités locales, with baseline and target to be determined.

Increase in the number of hectares provided with irrigation and drainage services,

with baseline and target to be determined.

1.3 Revised PDO and Key Indicators, and Reasons/Justification

9. The Program Development Objective in the Third Governance and Growth

Support Credit (GGSC) was modified to make it more precise and aligned with the

pillars of the operation. The PDO of the Development Policy Credit (DPC) series was as

follows: (i) to support the Government’s efforts to improve economic governance, and (ii)

promote growth through private sector development. The first PDO pillar focused on the

management of public resources and has two parts: government accountability and public

5

sector performance. The second PDO pillar concerned growth and private sector

development. More specifically, the PDO pillars were: 1a) to improve economic

governance by strengthening accountability systems; 1b) to promote better governance and

efficiency in the education, health and agriculture sectors, and within agencies, and

strengthen monitoring and evaluation; and 2) to enhance private sector development

through energy sector reforms, and improvements in the investment climate, including in

the tourism sector.

10. Minor changes in the results framework were made as summarized in Table

2. The end year for targets was pushed back to 2016 to reflect the delay in the approval of

PRSC3 to 2015.

Table 2: Changes in Indicators and Targets

Original Indicator and

Target

Final Indicator and Target Reasons for Change

Pillar 1: Government accountability and public sector performance

Delay in the publication of the

Cour des Comptes annual report

after submission to the President

decreases to no more than one

month

Delay in the publication of the

Audit Court annual report after

the year of the report reduced

from 34 months to 12 months.

The original indicator did not

capture potential delays in

submission to the President.

The Hospital efficiency index

increases from 74 percent in 2010

to 85 percent

The Hospital efficiency index

increases from 79.54 percent in

2012 to 85 percent

New data for 2012 baseline

became available.

Percentage of agencies non-

compliant (without performance

contract) with the 2009 law

reduced from 100percent to

50percent.

Percentage of agencies with a

performance contract increased

from 0 to 90percent.

Made more ambitious to reflect

the fact that the 2009 law

already called for all agencies to

have a performance contract.

The number of government

programs with results framework

approved by the M&E Unit

increased from 0 to 5.

The number of government

programs with results

framework approved by the

M&E Unit increased from 0 to

10.

Target raised to better reflect

progress in the reform.

Increase in the number of hectares

provided with irrigation and

drainage services, with baseline

and target to be determined

Dropped and replaced by:

Percentage of subsidized

agriculture inputs allocated

through new e-platform

increased from 0 to 90 percent

Focus of the World Bank

program was more on input

distribution than on irrigation

and a new prior action was

introduced in this area in

GGSC3.

Increase in the number of hectares

of land classified in the domain

privé des collectivités locales,

with baseline and target to be

determined.

Dropped. It became clear that land reform

was going to take much longer

than expected.

Pillar 2: Private sector development

Getting Electricity: Number of

procedures reduced from 8 to 6.

Time required reduced from 125

days to 100 days.

Cost reduced from 5625percent of

per capita income to 4500percent.

Construction permits: Time

required reduced from 210 days

to 150 days.

Construction permits became a

higher priority for the

government and the private

sector.

6

Number of arrivals by air

increased from 868,649 in 2012

to 875,000.

Added to reflect the addition of

tourism sector reforms in

GGSC3. The number of arrivals

had fallen to 855,602 in 2014

due to Ebola.

1.4 Original Policy Areas Supported by the Program:

11. The original policy areas supported by the DPC series were: a) improving

economic governance by strengthening Government accountability; b) increasing public

sector performance; and c) promoting growth through private sector development. All three

constituted key elements of the National Strategy for Economic and Social Development.

Improving economic governance by strengthening Government

accountability: The reforms supported by the first operation focused on a draft

transparency law consistent with the WAEMU guidelines, and a draft law

strengthening the independence of the general auditor. These were to be followed

by approval and implementation of a law on asset declaration, and further measures

to improve the effectiveness of the general auditor.

Increasing public sector performance: Reforms focused on improving financial

management in education and health, expanding in the second and third operations

to include agency reform and monitoring and evaluation. In basic education, the

emphasis was on personnel management, while in tertiary education, the focus was

on a new financial regime to capture fees being earned through external services.

In the health sector, performance contracts were supported across a growing

number of hospitals. Agency reform concentrated on a rationalization plan and

performance contracts for those not being closed. In M&E, the series supported the

creation of a unit in the President’s office to improve implementation of policy

priorities. These measures were intended to enhance the efficiency, transparency

and performance in key sectors while generating fiscal savings which could be

reallocated to more pro-poor programs and public investment.

Promoting growth through private sector development. The initial focus was

on improving the efficiency and sustainability of the energy sector, by way of a

new Sector Development Policy Letter and Action Plan, and the financial and

operational restructuring of SENELEC, the state-owned electricity company. This

was to be followed by signature and implementation of a performance contract for

SENELEC, and preparation of a new electricity law. Better energy sector

management would improve electricity service delivery and support economic

growth. Subsequent operations in the series were expected to improve the

investment climate by supporting Doing Business reforms in three areas – taxes,

property registration and access to electricity. Agriculture was to be supported

through land reform and irrigation maintenance.

7

1.5 Revised Policy Areas

12. These policy areas were largely maintained throughout the series. However,

land reform was dropped when it was realized that it was going to take much longer than

expected. It was replaced in the final operation with a measure to enhance targeting in

agricultural subsidies in order to increase efficiency in the use of fiscal resources. In the

area of the investment climate, one of the Doing Business reforms was changed from

improving access to electricity to reducing delays in obtaining construction permits, which

emerged as a higher priority for the private sector and the government. In addition, the third

operation added the removal of barriers for tourism, to help the sector cope with the Ebola

shock.

1.6 Other significant changes

13. The final operation was increased by US$20 million at the preparation stage.

This change was introduced in response to the government’s request for help in coping

with the Ebola crisis which had seriously affected the tourism sector. Consequently,

reforms were added in the tourism sector. Approval and disbursement of the third operation

was delayed by six months to allow the authorities time to complete key reforms in asset

declaration and M&E.

2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes

2.1 Program Performance

14. The programmatic series consisted of three single-tranche Development Policy

Credits disbursed upon effectiveness, in the total amount of SDR91.4 million or

US$135 million. GGSC3 was increased by US$20 million to help the authorities cope with

the Ebola crisis.

Table 3: Key Dates of the DPC series

Operation Approval

Date

Effectiveness

Date

Disbursed Amount

SDR millions

Closing

Date

GGSC 1 12/20/2012 12/28/2012 35.8 03/31/2014

GGSC 2 12/19/2013 12/23/2013 19.6 03/31/2015

GGSC 3 7/23/2015 08/15/2015 36.0 07/31/2016

15. Macroeconomic management and performance has improved over the time

period covered by this budget support series. The fiscal deficit fell to 4.2 percent in 2016

as projected. GDP growth exceeded expectations, rising to 6.5 percent in 2015 and

remained above 6 percent in 2016. Debt to GDP continued to rise but the rate of growth

slowed and the risk of debt distress remains low, according to the IMF-WB Debt

Sustainability Analysis. The authorities are committed to further reductions in the fiscal

deficit in order to reach the WAEMU target of 3.0percent of GDP by 2018 and to prevent

8

debt-to-GDP rising above 60 percent. In addition, efforts to control current expenditures

allowed the government to increase public investment, despite the falling overall fiscal

deficit. Governance indicators have also improved (see section 3.2).

16. The program should help control the fiscal deficit in the long-term though its

contribution in the short-term was probably minimal. Improvements in the education

human resources data base helped reallocate teachers and reduced the need for additional

recruits. However, the failure to link this data base to the payroll system at the Ministry of

Finance delayed further gains. Changes in the criteria for scholarships and the financial

regime for universities to incorporate external fee-based services helped control the growth

in the higher education budget. Agency rationalization did not result in short-term savings

due to the limited progress made and the required compensation for laid-off staff. If

pursued, it will have longer-term benefits. Similarly, the gains from the e-platform for the

distribution of subsidized agricultural inputs depend on its implementation. Reforms in the

electricity sector are slowly reducing costs, but the main factor in eliminating subsidies has

been the fall in world oil prices. In general, the IMF program played a major role in

supporting deficit reduction in the short-term.

17. There has been no slippage in the reforms supported by the three operations

so far; however, follow-up implementation has lagged. For example, the system for

managing subsidized agricultural inputs was still not being used in 2016, despite the

sector’s commitment to its eventual application. Rationalization of agencies has proceeded

more slowly than expected. The special accountants deployed in key faculties of the

University of Dakar are still not reporting to the chief financial officer of the university. In

2016, coordination between the monitoring and evaluation unit established at the

Presidency and the finance ministry was still unsatisfactory; the role of the M&E unit

probably needs to be reconsidered. The status of all the prior actions is summarized in

Annex 3 while the changes in triggers are explained in the following tables.

Table 4: Changes in Triggers for GGSC2 GGSC1 Triggers for GGSC2 GGSC2 Prior Actions Explanation

Pilar 1: Government accountability and public sector performance

Establish effective payroll and HR

control in education by linking

HR databases for contractual

agents and civil servants and the

Payroll Database.

Postponed to GGSC3 Reform taking longer than

expected.

Adopt 2013 budget for

universities and others higher

education institutions which are in

compliance with the revised

financial regime of the

universities.

Adopt 2013 budget for the two

largest universities which are in

compliance with the revised

financial regime of the

universities; and adopt new

criteria for scholarships

Limited to two largest

universities given delays in

implementation, but

strengthened to capture

scholarship reforms originally

expected in year three.

Finalize the evaluation of

100percent of the autonomous

agencies; and implement

evaluation recommendations

including closing agencies that are

not considered relevant.

Finalize the evaluation of

autonomous agencies; and

approve an action plan including

the closure and merger of some

agencies

Modified to reflect the need

for political endorsement of an

action plan after the

evaluation.

9


Improve Doing Business

indicators in the area of paying

taxes (reduction in number of

payments and time to fill forms).

Improve business climate by i)

enacting a law simplifying

property registration procedures

and ii) revising its tax code to

reduce property taxes and reduce

the time required for other tax

payments.

Modified to clarify the tax

reform, and strengthened to

include property registration

reform.

Adoption by the Council of

Ministers of a roadmap for land

management reform.

Dropped. Land reform was going to take

much longer than expected.

Table 5: Changes in Triggers for GGSC3 GGSC2 Triggers for

GGSC3

GGSC3 Prior Actions Explanation

Pilar 1: Government accountability and public sector performance

Implementation of the asset

declaration law.

The Recipient has operationalized its asset

declaration system by: (a) approving the related

implementation decree; (b) allocating

appropriate human and financial resources to

the national office for the fight against fraud and

corruption (“Office National pour la Lutte

contre la Fraude et la Corruption”/”OFNAC”);

and (c) ensuring deposition of asset declarations

by ministers holding a portfolio to OFNAC.

Elaborated to

clarify measures

needed for

implementation.

Develop effective follow-up

of recommendations from the

Annual Report of the Audit

Court.

Dropped. Dropped to make

room for other

reforms.

Improve payroll and HR

controls in education by a)

linking databases of the

ministries of education, civil

service and finance; b)

preparing the 2014/15

recruitment plan for education

in consultation with ministry

of finance; and c) eliminating

ghost and double-counted

teachers.

The Recipient has strengthened wage bill

control and human resources in the education

sector by: (a) creating a system connecting data

bases of the ministries in charge of education

and civil service; and (b) preparing the 2015-

2016 recruitment plan for education in

collaboration with the ministry in charge of

finance.

Modified to reflect

delays in linking

database to payroll,

and consequently

also in eliminating

fictitious teachers.

Implement the Presidential

directives to improve the

utilization of own resources

generated by universities by a)

adopting an arrêté defining the

utilization of these resources;

b) preparing a manual of

procedures; and c) creating

secondary accounting offices

in key faculties and schools.

The Recipient has implemented presidential

directives on external revenues earned by

universities through: (a) adoption and

submission to Parliament for enactment of a

draft law reforming universities governance

system; (b) issuance of an Arrêté specifying

resource allocation and use of external

revenues; and (c) appointment of accountants in

key faculties and schools at the University of

Dakar, who report to the chief financial officer.

Strengthened to

include the new

governance law, but

weakened to reflect

the difficulty of

assigning secondary

accountants.

Adopt a decree defining a new

financial regime for hospitals,

along with necessary arrêtés.

The Recipient has adopted a new financial

regime for public agencies and establishments,

and has entered with five additional public

health institutions into performance contracts

whose objectives are to increase service supply,

Strengthened to

include additional

performance

contracts, but

weakened to allow

10

improve billing process and control general

costs.

more time for the

necessary arrêtés.

Adopt a new e-platform and

have 1 million farmers

registered such that at least

half of subsidized agriculture

inputs are allocated through it

to reduce leakages and

improve targeting.

The Recipient has adopted a mobile phone-

based e-platform to distribute subsidized

agricultural inputs in the 2015 crop season.

Weakened to allow

for delays in

implementing the e-

platform but

strengthened to

include an

irrigation measure

as originally

envisaged.

Preparation of a properly

costed, funded and time-

bound action plan for SAED

which clearly defines roles

and responsibilities; sign 2

multi-year maintenance

contracts.

Recipient has obtained approval allowing SAED

to enter into multi-annual maintenance contracts

of hydro-agricultural works with private

contractors and launched a call for bids.

Simplified to

streamline the

policy matrix and

reflect need for

approval from the

finance ministry.

Close and merge some

agencies; and sign a

Performance Agreement

between all remaining

agencies with a budget over

CFAF1 billion and the

Oversight Institution.

The Recipient has launched implementation of

the action plan to restructure autonomous

government-owned agencies, by: (a) merging

certain selected agencies; (b) appointing officers

responsible for the liquidation of certain

selected agencies; and (c) entering with six of

the largest agencies into performance contracts

with the objective of clarifying the financial

commitments of the Recipient’s ministry

responsible for finance and the related

performance targets of agencies concerned

Modified to better

correspond to the

government’s

reform agenda. The

six agencies

covered represented

most of those with

budgets over

CFAF1 billion.


Approval by the Council of

Ministers of the revised

electricity investment plan for

2014-18; separation of

SENELEC’s accounts

between generation,

transmission and distribution:

and a publicly-available

financial model.

The Recipient has amended the performance

contract entered into between the Recipient and

SENELEC on June 11, 2013 to include

performance-based bonuses and sanctions, and

has amended the agreement regularizing cross-

debt entered into between the Recipient and

SENELEC dated November 16, 2012, to

determine the method for the balance allocation.

Modified to focus

on the full

implementation of

previous prior

actions in the

program.

Improve business climate

indicators in the two areas: 1)

Trading across borders

(reduce the number of days

for importing and exporting)

and 2) Dealing with

construction permits (reduce

number of days).

The Recipient has: (a) issued (i) a decree

reducing the number of days and costs to obtain

construction permits through the creation of a

single window and online processing; and (ii) a

decree determining a new fee schedule for

warehouse inspection; and (b) eliminated the

minimum capital requirement for creating a new

company.

Modified and

strengthened to

reflect the

authorities’

priorities in Doing

Business indicators.

The Recipient has offset the impact of Ebola’s

on the tourism sector by: a) removing entry

visas’ fees; b) reducing selected taxes on air

tickets; and c) suspending recovery acts initiated

against hotels with arrears in payment of

patented and land taxes in 2015.

Added to support

the authorities’

request for help in

coping with the

Ebola crisis.

11

2.2 Major Factors Affecting Implementation:

Capacity

18. The program benefited from a strong World Bank field presence and close

linkages to on-going projects and economic and sectoral work. All of the policy areas

were supported by Task Team Leaders (TTLs) in the field during most of the program,

with relatively few changes in personnel. All of the prior actions were related to and

supported by investment projects or technical assistance.

19. On the other hand, capacity limitations within the government constrained the

effectiveness of the operation. Coordination and following up of the program at the

Ministry of Economy, Finance and Planning (MEFP) did not receive full institutional

support2. The MEFP agreed to broaden the support supplying additional human resources

dedicated to monitoring different sectors and following-up on their reform agendas, but

this change did not become effective. World Bank staff were required to make significant

efforts with sector ministries and high-level authorities in order to facilitate completion of

prior actions, but last-minute scrambles still occurred for the first two operations to permit

disbursement before the end of the government’s fiscal year. This persisted over the life of

the operation, despite complaints from several partners whose operations were adversely

affected by this situation.

Design

20. The broad, ambitious design of the program was a key challenge for

implementation. It would have been easier for the MEFP to follow-up on the reform

agenda if it had been concentrated on fewer sectors, emphasizing those where ownership

was stronger, and avoiding sensitive areas where presidential intervention might be

required. Three of the reform areas were especially sensitive: asset declaration for public

servants, agency rationalization, and the establishment of a central unit to monitor policy

priorities. All three were important objectives of the government’s program. But this still

made the coordination effort more difficult for the finance ministry.

21. In at least one case, the reform appears to have design flaws, resulting in delays

and reduced impact. Following World Bank advice, the M&E unit was based in a small,

relatively independent department within the Presidency, an approach partially inspired by

the United Kingdom (UK) example. However, this was implemented with minimal input

from key internal counterparts, notably the MEFP. Then, the Presidency created a parallel

unit monitoring the implementation of the country’s new growth strategy, with an emphasis

on priority projects, which reduced the focus on developing the first unit. Furthermore, in

many sectors the proposed M&E system competed with others, overloading the limited

2 The unit responsible for following up the budget support program was severely understaffed as the task

was primarily the responsibility of a senior advisor, concurrently with other duties.

12

capacity at the ministerial level. 3 Effective systems for monitoring priorities were

implemented in at least five sector ministries, thanks to strong support from the World

Bank. However, its sustainability remains in question. In retrospect, ampler participation

of the MEFP would have helped to strengthen the program design, given its mandate and

human resources.

Background analysis

22. The program was generally well-supported by background analysis with one

notable exception. The reforms in education and health drew on a recent Public

Expenditure Review and considerable sector work. The asset declaration reform was

informed by an analysis of international experience commissioned specifically for this

program. An evaluation of agencies provided the basis for the action plan of agency

rationalization. Electricity sector reforms built on years of experience in Senegal. However,

the M&E proposal was not based on an assessment of the current situation and that may

have contributed to its weak design.

Ownership

23. Reforms could have benefited from stronger ownership in the Ministry of

Economy, Finance and Planning. For instance, application of the new finance regime for

universities was delayed for half a year until a new budget nomenclature was finalized by

the MEFP. The agreement with SENELEC on cross-debts did not come into effect for two

years due to the absence of an agreement on how to utilize the remaining balance. The link

between the education human resource data base and the payroll at the Treasury had to be

dropped from the program objectives at least in part due to delays in the payroll department.

The effectiveness of agency performance contracts was sometimes jeopardized by failure

to live up to the finance ministry’s commitments in terms of budget allocations.

24. Ownership was also an issue in the agriculture and energy sectors. In spite of

strong support from the World Bank, implementation of the new subsidized input platform

has been delayed due partly to low ownership coupled with unexpected technical

challenges. This required weakening the GGSC3 prior action and failure to make any

progress on one of the outcome indicators. The energy sector would have benefited from

stronger leadership in SENELEC, which did improve following changes in its

management.

25. In two areas, where ownership was strong and complexity of reforms was less

demanding, implementation went relatively smoothly. One of these areas was

3 ACT for Performance, Diagnostic des dispositifs de suivi-évaluation des politiques publiques au Sénégal,

June 2016.

13

investment climate reform, which was spearheaded by APIX. This agency enjoyed strong

staff and a clear mandate to improve the country’s Doing Business ranking. It also

benefited from the high profile and rigorous deadlines of the Doing Business exercise

which pushed these reforms quite independently of the budget support program. The other

area of smooth implementation was the health sector where the sector Ministry had an

incentive to complete hospital performance contracts because they received additional

investment financing in return. However, it is also true that in both cases the required

reforms were less technically complex or politically sensitive as other reforms in the

program.

26. Evolving high-level leadership further complicated coordination and

monitoring. The initial strong commitment to the reforms included in the operation

fluctuated over time due to changes of high-level authorities, including the Prime Minister,

the key Ministry of Finance and sector Ministries.

Risk identification and mitigation

27. Risks were clearly identified but mitigation options were limited. Risks

included global economic shocks, regional instability, the challenges posed by maintaining

the political coalition, vested interests and the recent history of poor governance, and

insufficient political and administrative capacity aggravated by the change in government.

It was hoped that electricity sector reforms would mitigate the impact of a spike in oil

prices, while improvements in the investment climate would help diversify the economy

and reduce its vulnerability. Vested interests would be mitigated by the government’s

commitment to a three-year program of reforms and the intensive field-based supervision

by the Bank team. Donor coordination would help maintain political support by providing

a common message to government. The M&E reform was expected to increase

accountability for reforms by focusing the President’s attention on key issues.

28. Mitigation measures were partially effective but might have been given greater

attention. Supervision, both at the technical and strategy level, was indeed intense.

Regular, frequent meetings were held with the key Ministries and communication was

generally good with the Primature and the Presidency. Donor coordination was also given

ample attention, and cooperation with the IMF was particularly useful. A joint donor effort

was made to change the modality for budget support supervision in the finance ministry.

The M&E unit in the Presidency showed initial signs of success. But ultimately the

influence of vested interests was probably underestimated. This might have been better

addressed by more focus on policy areas with high ownership, better design of the M&E

reform, and a willingness to detach disbursement from end-of-year fiscal deadlines.

2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation and Utilization:

Design

Rating: Modest

14

29. Many of the indicators chosen were appropriate, but in some cases it would

have been better to identify output rather than outcome indicators, in order to

strengthen appropriation. This is the case, for instance, for the indicators on gender, basic

education, tourism and some related to the energy sector. In effect, these indicators had

somewhat weaker links to the corresponding reforms as they reflected the broader progress

of the sector. The two gender indicators have the weakest link. Some targets were overly

ambitious given the general pace of reform in Senegal, and the complexity of the task at

hand. This is true of the investment climate reforms. It was probably unrealistic to expect

full compliance with the asset declaration law within 18 months, considering the important

political sensibilities involved. Preparing performance contracts with all agencies was

particularly difficult since each agency was different and faced a different set of challenges.

In addition, each contract had to be negotiated with the corresponding agency. The

authorities appear determined to meet all the targets in these areas but it will take more

time than initially programmed. In other areas, such as agricultural input distribution, the

degree of ownership was lower than initially estimated.

Implementation

Rating: Substantial

30. The M&E framework remained fairly stable over the course of the program.

Of the 17 original indicators, only 3 were dropped (see Table 2). One of those dropped, a

Doing Business indicator, was replaced by a different Doing Business measure to reflect

government priorities. Another one, in agriculture, was replaced by a different agriculture

indicator more aligned with the priorities of the program. The land reform indicator was

dropped when this policy area was eliminated from the program. A tourism indicator was

added to capture the addition of this policy area in the final year. The targets also remained

stable; none were lowered, and two were raised in keeping with the ambitions of the

program.

Utilization

Rating: Negligible

31. There is no indication that the results framework was used as a decision tool.

This is not unusual for a DPC series.

2.4 Expected Next Phase/Follow-up Operation:

32. The World Bank will continue to support the Government of Senegal in some

of the areas of the DPC series. A new DPC series is under preparation with a narrower

focus on energy and ICT, partially building on the energy components of the previous

series. The first operation of the series was approved by the Board in June 2017.

3. Assessment of Outcomes

3.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation

15

Objectives

Rating: Substantial

33. The program was strongly aligned to both the country’s priorities and the

Bank strategy. For the new government, it was important to improve the country’s

governance, its investment climate, and the performance of the energy sector and higher

education. The MEFP was particularly concerned by the high level of energy and

agriculture subsidies. It was also concerned by the conflictual relationship with the

universities which routinely overspent their budgets and required major supplementary

allocations late in the year, with the implicit threat of strikes and social unrest if their

demands were not met. The program addressed all these issues. The focus on

rationalization and performance of agencies supported the government’s PSI program with

the IMF. The addition of the tourism sector in the final year of the program was in direct

response to the government’s request for help to deal with the impact of the Ebola threat.

The program was closely aligned with the Bank’s investment projects and technical

assistance and with the Strategy that has been approved later, which focused on

governance, growth and service delivery.4

34. Promoting reform in the energy sector implied high risks, given past

experience, but neglecting this sector would have been worse. The Bank had worked on

this sector off and on for at least 15 years, with little success. A sector adjustment loan had

been cancelled after its first disbursement due to lack of progress. However, it was clear

that economic progress would be difficult without improvements in the energy sector,

given the importance of the sector for private activity, and the frequency of blackouts. Also,

no other donor was willing to tackle the tough reforms required. As it turned out, progress

was slow but steady, assisted by a large Bank investment project and coordination with

IFC. The eventual change in the leadership of SENELEC also helped. On balance, the

decision to support reforms in the sector seems to have been worthwhile, and the World

Bank proposes to continue this dialogue in the follow-up budget support operation.

Design

Rating: Modest

35. The chosen areas of reform corresponded closely to the Bank Group’s country

strategy, on-going operations, analytical work and technical assistance. The Bank had

projects supporting the energy, agriculture, and basic and higher education sectors, with

important components to promote reforms, including performance contracts for SENELEC

and all universities, as well as changes in financial management. There was also a public

financial management project which included support for agency reform and the creation

of an M&E/service delivery unit. Prior to the program, the Bank had conducted a public

4 The new CPS was approved in early 2013.

16

expenditure review, with a focus on education and health, and during the program’s

implementation the Bank provided technical assistance on asset declaration, and hospital

reform. Both the Bank and IFC assisted with investment climate reform, and the Bank

provided analytical support on tourism in preparation for a new project. Thus, all the prior

actions in this program were informed by and supported parallel investment operations or

technical assistance in the World Bank Group portfolio.

36. An initial choice had to be made between a one-year stand-alone operation and

a programmatic series. A decision was taken to support the new government with a

programmatic series based on the depth of the reforms outlined in the government’s

program. However, the government’s ownership of the program was not strong and seemed

to weaken over time, elements that were not fully assessed by the Bank during preparation.

The government appeared to understand that it did not need to take a more proactive role

in order to secure budget support from its partners. With less than nine months between the

inauguration of the new government and the end of the fiscal year, time was short to

establish priorities and negotiate a full three-year program. In retrospect, it probably would

have been better to start with a stand-alone one-year operation. Waiting one year would

have permitted a deeper engagement with the government on program design, based on a

more mature development strategy, thereby increasing ownership.

37. The program design did start slowly and pursued a consistent three-year logic

in each sector. Almost every sector had a sequence of reforms over the three operations

laid out in the initial program document. In some cases, there was no prior action in the

first year but rather a first procedural step to lay the foundations for deeper reform. Only

in the area of irrigation was this not the case. However, the program eventually covered a

large number of sectors and actors. This reflected the initial vision of the Bank to pursue a

wide-ranging, ambitious reform agenda. A more focused program would have facilitated

government implementation, and allowed the Bank to focus on areas where ownership was

greatest.

38. A few reforms appear to have been poorly designed. The basic education

reforms did not materialize as anticipated. The link between the education human resource

database and the payroll was pushed back from the second operation to the third one, and

even then, it was not achieved. The M&E reform has design flaws and its inclusion in the

program created additional challenges to the coordination among the Bank and the finance

ministry. The decrees produced to satisfy the prior actions did not resolve the underlying

disagreements. The agricultural input distribution platform suffered from lack of

ownership.

Implementation

Rating: Substantial

39. The prior actions remained relatively stable over time. Dropping land reform

was clearly a good idea given the complexity of the issue as borne out but subsequent

delays. This also helped to somewhat reduce the scope of the program. One reform in basic

17

education was pushed back a year to allow more time, while another reform in higher

education was moved forward from year three to reflect faster progress by the authorities.

The addition of an agriculture prior action in the final year of the program was probably

inappropriate and did not prove effective. The changes between triggers and prior actions

are summarized in Tables 4 and 5.

40. The programmatic three-year logic of the design was strengthened in the final

year in order to ensure effective implementation of earlier reforms. Thus, the third-

year governance trigger was adjusted to focus on operationalization of the asset declaration

system. Similarly, in the electricity and higher education sectors, and in M&E, the final

year looked after pending developments from the first and second year reforms. In other

cases, the third-year triggers were adjusted downward to reflect better understanding of the

pace of reform (agencies, hospitals, basic education). However, the third-year action

related to the Auditor General was dropped to provide room for measures in other sectors.

That action would have been useful to encourage implementation of recommendations in

the auditor’s report.

41. The addition of the tourism sector in the final year was justified by the need to

respond to the Ebola crisis. The government asked for extra assistance to deal with the

impact of the Ebola crisis on this sector. The amount of the operation was increased by

US$20 million, and in return it was felt that some reforms were needed. The decision to

drop the cumbersome visa system was an important one since it demonstrated that the new

government was prepared to admit when its policies were not working.

3.2 Achievement of Program Development Objectives

42. Only 5 of the 17 outcome targets were achieved. These were in the areas of

hospitals, M&E, energy, property transfer, and tourism. Another two indicators (university

budget credibility and energy load shedding) reached 90 percent of their targets. Varying

degrees of progress were made on most of the others.

Status of Outcome Targets

Achieved Not achieved Dropped Total

Pillar 1a Government accountability 2 2

Pillar 1b Public sector performance 2 6 8

Pillar 2 Private sector development 3 4 3 10

Total 5 12 3 20

PDO 1a Government accountability

Rating: Modest

43. Modest progress was made on improving economic governance by

strengthening Government accountability. The number of persons submitting an asset

declaration had risen to 52 percent of all those required to comply. As the last available

data dates from May 2016, the situation has probably improved somewhat since then. The

18

target to reduce delays in publication of the general auditor’s annual report has been 73

percent achieved. The situation looks better if we focus on the broader objective of

improved governance. Looking at the Worldwide Governance Indicators, Senegal’s

percentile ranks improved on all six criteria between 2010 and 2015. The largest increase

was for control of corruption where Senegal improved from 28 to 59. The next best was on

voice and accountability where the rank increased from 36 to 57. On the Corruption

Perception Index, Senegal’s score rose from 36 in 2012 to 45 in 2016, and its ranking

improved from 94th to 64th. Progress made on asset declaration probably contributed to

the improved scores on corruption. But many other factors also explain these

improvements.

PDO1b Public sector performance

Rating: Modest

44. Only 2 of 8 targets were achieved in the area of increasing public sector

performance. The most impressive result was achieved in hospital efficiency, though this

would have been influenced by much more than the performance contracts which were the

focus of the DPC series. The M&E target was also achieved, but the reform remains

institutionally weak and may not be sustainable. Progress varied between 20 percent (basic

education) and 91 percent (higher education) for four others. The most disappointing one

was in subsidized agricultural inputs where a new allocative mechanism was still not being

used in 2016 despite intensive support from the World Bank. The fall in assisted births was

also disappointing, though its link to the operation and indeed to the Bank’s overall

program was not strong. This indicator and the one on girl’s scholarships were added

primarily in response to the need for gender content. On the World Governance Indicator

for government effectiveness, Senegal has posted modest improvement, rising from 36 in

2010 to 39 in 2015.

PDO2 Private sector development

Rating: Modest

45. Progress was somewhat better in promoting growth through private sector

development. Three of the seven targets were achieved, a fourth was 90 percent achieved,

and significant progress was made on two others. All the reforms supported under this PDO

appear to be sustainable. Looking at the broader picture, Senegal’s ranking in Doing

Business rose from 166 in 2012 to 147 in 2016. GDP growth has improved from 2.6 percent

to 6.6 percent over the same time period. Prior actions on the investment climate helped

raise the Doing Business ranking and, together with improvements in energy sector

management, will have supported the higher GDP growth.

46. However, the link between the operation and the gains in economic growth are

tenuous. In effect, growth acceleration is linked with many factors, including a rapid

increase of agriculture production and exports (linked to good climate conditions and rising

external demand for groundnuts) or increased consumption (linked to lower oil prices and

19

gains in terms of trade). Public investment also increased, though modestly, thanks to

slightly higher fiscal space due to the cap on current expenditures and lower oil prices.

3.3 Justification of Overall Outcome Rating

Ratings: Moderately unsatisfactory.

47. Although only 30 percent of the targets were met, the operation remains

relevant and significant progress has been achieved in several key areas. It was an

ambitious, multisector nature of the program, but with modest and varying ownership. In

some cases, the choice of indicators was inappropriate choice of indicators, and some

targets were unrealistic. It is worth noting that none of the targets were weakened over the

course of the three operations, and in fact three were strengthened, reflecting the continued

emphasis on ambitious reform. Significant progress was made in some of the most difficult

areas – governance, energy and higher education. Improvements were also achieved in the

investment climate and the tourism sector. Ultimately, the program aimed high and made

some important contributions but fell short.

48. Advances in several areas – even partial – are particularly noteworthy, due to

their political sensibility, technical complexity or the existence of vested interests. For

instance, Senegal was the first WAEMU country to adopt the transparency law and put in

place an asset declaration law and process, despite mixed support from involved civil

servants. Reforms in higher education were significant given the political sensitivity of the

sector, its high conflict potential and its impact in the overall budget. The government could

initiate the process of agency rationalization and performance contracts, but additional

efforts would be needed to ensure that the action plan is fully implemented. Reforms faced

in the energy sector were highly challenging at the technical level and the involved agencies

deserves credit for achieving a number of concrete results. Similarly, reforms concerning

the M&E mechanisms require developing non trivial frameworks and coordination

mechanisms. Key ministries took the reform seriously and began developing them.

Reforms concerning subsidy distribution in agriculture faced both harsh technical

challenges and lack of commitment probably linked with vested interests.

3.4 Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts

(a) Poverty Impacts, Gender Aspects, and Social Development

49. The DPC series was expected to have a positive impact on medium-term

poverty reduction. Strengthened government accountability and institutional capabilities

would ensure greater efficiency and effectiveness of public expenditure and improve the

quality of basic services. The selected actions were expected to create fiscal space for

primary and secondary education and basic health care. The government actions to

restructure the universities and improve quality in the higher education sector and

strengthen accountability in hospitals would impact student conditions and patient care.

The e-platform for agricultural inputs would reduce leakages and help ensure that the

intended beneficiaries – poor farmers – receive seeds and fertilizers which can substantially

20

increase their productivity and incomes. Improvements in irrigation maintenance should

have similar impacts by ensuring more reliable access to water and facilitating a second

harvest during the dry season. ???All this remains true, though the failure to implement the

e-platform to date has delayed potential benefits.

50. Policy reforms on energy, higher education, and autonomous agencies might

affect selected groups. The performance contract for SENELEC may eventually lead to

some reduction in staffing, and the evaluation of agencies will result in the closure of some

agencies. However, to the extent this happens, the persons affected will be the non-poor

and will be covered by the fairly generous provisions of Senegalese law concerning

termination of public employment. The rationalization of scholarships in higher education

will focus on re-establishing the link between performance and funding, including the

removal of students who enroll simply to obtain the scholarship and never actually come

to class.

51. The proposed series was expected to have a positive impact on gender equality.

Reforms promoted in basic and higher education as well as in health care were expected to

facilitate girls’ and women’s access to social services. The hospital reform promoted by

the GGSC series was expected to improve the quality of services and save resources for

better financing of primary health clinics (centres de santé, cases de santé), particularly in

rural areas, and thus improve access to services by women. Unfortunately, the percentage

of women giving birth with professional assistance has dropped for some reason. The

improvement of the universities’ financial situation was expected to have a positive impact

on the quality of education, reducing the drop-out rate and thus encouraging female

completion rates. The application of merit-based criteria for university scholarships may

have contributed to the increased share going to women. Gender equality exists already in

primary education and improvements in secondary education were expected to reduce

girls’ dropout rates at that level. Finally, if the targeted agricultural input delivery system

is eventually introduced, this should enhance access by women farmers to essential inputs

for productivity improvement.

(b) Institutional Change/Strengthening

52. The emphasis on performance contracts, for hospitals, the energy parastatal

(SENELEC) and agencies, should have a significant impact on the performance of all

these institutions. The introduction of penalties and rewards linked to performance in

SENELEC should be particularly helpful in changing the culture of the work place. The

performance contracts for hospitals led to new investment allocations which had been

unavailable for many years. This reportedly improved morale in these institutions. The new

governance law and reforms in the financing of universities should make them more

transparent and accountable. This will be further strengthened once the specialized

accountants in key faculties begin to report to the chief financial officer as envisaged. The

governance reforms have modestly strengthened the mandates of the Cour des Comptes

and the new OFNAC institution.

21

(c) Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts

No unintended negative effects have been identified by the team.

3.5 Summary of Findings of Beneficiary Survey and/or Stakeholder Workshops

There was no beneficiary survey and/or stakeholder workshop.

4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome

53. Ratings: Risks are moderate as the government appears to be committed to

most, if not all, of the objectives pursued in this series. Also, the degree of progress has

been moderate, so there is less likelihood of reversals. There is a risk that the asset

declaration exercise will have limited impact if the organization responsible for receiving

and managing them (OFNAC) is weakened. The removal of their independent President in

2016 can be perceived as a move in this direction. The eventual utilization of the e-platform

for agricultural subsidies remains in doubt. Further rationalization of agencies is also

uncertain. The commitment to performance contracts seems clear, though it remains to be

seen if they will be used effectively.5

5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance

5.1 Bank Performance

(a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry


54. The Bank supported the design of an ambitious program which tackled many

relevant issues, but that was too wide-ranging and paid insufficient attention to

ownership. The programmatic, three-year approach was generally well-designed, with a

systematic progression of reforms in most areas and stability in triggers. However, the

broad and ambitious scope affected monitoring and implementation. Focusing the program

on fewer key sectors, with more mature ongoing reforms, would have helped. Also, the

program could have benefited from greater attention to country ownership both with the

MEFP and sectoral ministries. As mentioned before, the design and location of the

proposed M&E unit generated frictions and inefficiencies. This M&E unit, the proposed

agricultural input distribution platform, and agency rationalization suffered from weak

ownership at the levels of implementing agencies – despite the high relevance for the

Presidency. In general, the Bank had high expectations, but it moved too quickly into a

three-year program, over-estimated the realistic pace of reform and over-estimated the

5 There was some early evidence that the finance ministry was not always budgeting the amounts indicated

in the performance contracts, giving the agencies an excuse for underperforming.

22

strength of the ownership. Starting with a one-year operation before discussing a three-year

program and focusing on fewer sectors would have been a more sensible strategy.

(b) Quality of Supervision

Ratings: Satisfactory.

55. The series benefited from close monitoring as all the relevant sector specialists

were based in the local office in Dakar, and the prior actions were integral parts of

the overall Bank program for Senegal. The World Bank supported the many reforms

with analytical work and technical assistance, and discussed the most difficult issues at the

highest level of government when necessary. The basic education reform involving

changes to the payroll system may have suffered from inadequate attention as the

difficulties seem to have been underestimated, but lack of government commitment may

have been the bigger factor. The Bank’s monitoring capacity was affected due to natural

rotation in the team leadership half way through the second year (2013), but other members

of the team stepped in to continue managing the program, including the support of the team

located in the country office.

(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Bank Performance


56. The Bank was overly ambitious in the variety and depth of reforms pursued,

and in the final outcomes sought. The Bank overestimated the implementation and

coordination capacity of the new government, and its ownership of the program.

Supervision was adequate, with a few exceptions, but results were disappointing. Closer

coordination with involved sectors during design and execution would have helped to

increase ownership.

5.2 Borrower Performance

(a) Government Performance


57. Performance was mixed across the government. The ministries of health, basic

education and higher education showed relatively good commitment, though the last two

were sometimes impeded by weak follow up from the MEFP. For example, the payroll

department in the finance ministry delayed interconnection with the basic education human

resource data base. Delays in defining a new budget nomenclature held up the preparation

of revised university budgets using the new financial regime. The agriculture ministry did

not implement the one reform under its responsibility.

58. Insufficient coordination capacity in the finance ministry due to lack of human

resources compounded the problem. In effect, the unit responsible for following up the

budget support program was severely understaffed. This led to heavy participation by Bank

23

staff; nonetheless, there was often a last-minute crisis atmosphere at the end of the

government’s fiscal year, as incomplete reforms threatened timely disbursement. The Bank

coordinated with other donors to recommend changes in the government’s arrangements

for managing budget support, but these were not implemented.

59. Several of the outcome indicators were missed because of insufficient

commitment to tackle the issue. According to the law, all asset declarations should have

been submitted within three months of approval of the decree, yet two years later only half

of them had been received. A 2009 law stipulated that all agencies should have a

performance contract, an objective still not obtained in 2017. The platform for allocating

subsidized agricultural inputs was still not used in 2017.

60. Once a prior action was met there was often insufficient attention to ensure

proper implementation. The first electricity reform was not implemented until a further

condition was introduced in the third-year operation. Special accountants were assigned to

key faculties but did not report to the chief financial officer as expected. University budgets

were being prepared using a new financial regime, but should have been negotiated before

the national budget was approved. There was little rationalization of agencies after the

action plan was agreed.

(b) Implementing Agency or Agencies Performance

Ratings: Moderately satisfactory.

61. Performance was heterogeneous across involved implementing agencies. The

main responsibility for coordination among executing agencies and tracking

implementation remained at the Ministry of Economy, Finance, and Planning, with overall

modest results. APIX, the agency managing investment climate reform, did a very good

job, demonstrating strong ownership, pursuing Doing Business reforms in a concerted

manner, and generally completing prior actions well ahead of appraisal. SENELEC, the

energy parastatal, did moderately well, implementing prior actions in a timely fashion,

heavily supported by Bank staff. These agencies were responsible for implementing

specific reforms but not the overall program, which remained the responsibility of the

finance ministry.

(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Borrower Performance


62. Government performance was on the whole moderately unsatisfactory, and

many outcome targets were missed. While some ministries and agencies demonstrated

commitment to reform, others did not. Inadequate coordination and cohesion between the

finance ministry and other executing units were particularly problematic both for

monitoring the program and ensuring implementation of reforms.

6. Lessons Learned

63. The trade-off between reform and disbursement needs to be acknowledged

and addressed. The necessity of disbursing before the end of Senegal’s fiscal year caused

24

considerable stress in the first two years of the program, and led to some hasty reform

measures which were not fully owned. These include the agency rationalization action plan

and the adoption of the e-platform for agricultural inputs. The program finally broke its

link to annual disbursement in the third year.

64. The Bank and the Government need to work more effectively to agree on a set

of important reforms, ensuring strong government ownership and reflecting clear

priorities. There needs to be an understanding that budget support is not inevitable but

depends on significant reforms, that success depends on government ownership, and that

ownership depends on the active participation of both parties in defining the policy matrix.

65. The Government of Senegal needs to devote more resources to ensure

adequate follow-up and timely completion of prior actions. Full ownership should be

demonstrated by a robust monitoring unit, with a clear mandate and strong leverage on

implementing ministries and agencies. Complementing this, at the sector level, reforms

need to be owned by implementing agencies. This would lead to strong coordination

mechanisms between sector and central ministries (particularly the MEFP) thus facilitating

the reform implementation.

66. Budget support series should be limited to a smaller number of sectors. This

would permit a better focus on areas of strong government ownership and facilitate

monitoring. The Senegal program covered a wide range of sectors which taxed the

supervisory capacity of the finance ministry as well as Bank staff. Basic education should

probably have been dropped as the sequence of reforms was weak and Bank staff were

focused on higher education. Agriculture could also have been excluded from this series,

as it was added only in the final year, and there was little ownership of the key reform. The

program probably provided little valued added to the investment climate reforms as they

were being driven effectively by the Doing Business process. Such rationalization would

have allowed room for further action in year three related to the Auditor General. Focusing

on fewer sectors would have allowed more comprehensive and meaningful reform

programs in each sector.

67. Both the Bank and the Government need to follow-up after prior actions are

met, to ensure that the reforms are effectively implemented. For example, the cross-

debt agreement approved with SENELEC in 2012 did not come into force until 2014

because a critical annex had not been finalized. Similarly, application of the new financial

regime for universities was delayed for months for lack of attention to the budget

nomenclature. The special accountants assigned to key faculties were still not reporting to

the chief financial officer at the university of Dakar two years after their nomination. The

commitment to use the e-platform for allocating subsidized agricultural inputs has yet to

bear fruit for lack of implementation. And once the Ministers had submitted their asset

declarations, the pressure on others appears to have reduced. The focus on implementation

in the third operation of the series was an important step in the right direction but not

sufficient.

25

68. Targets need to be set more carefully, more tightly linked to prior actions, with

greater emphasis on outputs rather than outcomes, and more attention to the timeline

for implementation. The gender targets were not well-linked to reforms supported in the

program, and the health and tourism outcomes depended on variables beyond the

associated prior actions. The targets for asset declarations and agency performance

contracts were too ambitious.

7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners (a) Borrower/Implementing agencies

69. The main comment from the borrower concerned the importance of

considering partial achievement of targets. This was accommodated by including the

percentage of each target achieved in the revised version.

(b) Cofinanciers: NA

(c) Other partners and stakeholders : NA

26

Annex 1 Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes

(a) Task Team members

P128284, P126470, P150976 - SN- First, Second and Third Governance and Growth

Support Projects

Names Title Unit Responsibility/

Specialty

Lending

Maya Abi Karam Senior Counsel LEGAM Legal

Alexandre Arrobbio Senior Governance Specialist GGO18 Governance

Eric Brintet Lead Financial Management Spec GGO25 Governance

Wolfgang M. T. Chadab Senior Finance Officer WFALA Disbursement

Matthias Cinyabuguma Senior Economist GMFDR Macroeconomics

Linda K. English Program Leader, Human Development GEDDR Education

Edward Philip English Program Leader, Macroeconomics GMFDR TTL

Maimouna Mbow Fam Sr Financial Management Specialist GGO26 Public Finance

Fatouma Toure Ibrahima Wane Operations Adviser GEEDR Energy

Christophe Lemiere Senior Health Specialist GHNDR Health

Khady Fall Lo Program Assistant AFCF1 Program Assistant

Jean Michel Noel Marchat Lead Economist GTC07 Private sector

Mamadou Ndione Senior Economist GMFDR TTL, GGSC1

Aifa Niane Ndoye Agricultural Economist GAGDR Agriculture

Demetrios Papathanasiou Program Leader, Sustainable

Development GEEDR Energy

Atou Seck Senior Education Specialist GEDDR Education

Jean-Philippe Tre Senior Agriculture Economist GFA01 Agriculture

(b) Staff Time and Cost

P128284, P126470, P150976 – Staff Time & Cost

1. SN- First Governance and Growth Support Project – P128284

Stage of Project Cycle

Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only)

Number of staff weeks US$, Thousands (including Travel

and Consultant Costs)

Lending

FY12 40.20 125,494

FY13 49.10 172,861

Total: 89.30 298,355

Supervision/ICR

Total: 0 0

Total lending

&Supervision 89.30 298,355

27

2. SN- Second Governance and Growth Support Credit – P126470





Lending

FY14 11.98 95,167

FY15 1.40 7,074

FY16 0.90 6,673

Total: 14.28 108,914

Supervision/ICR

Total: 0 0

Total lending &

supervision 14.28 108,914

3. Senegal-Third Governance and Growth Support Credit – P150976





Lending

FY15 15.10 112,966

FY16 0 186

Total: 15.10 113,151

Supervision/ICR

FY17 1.96 20,870

Total: 1.96 20,870

Total lending &

supervision 17.06 134,021

28

Annex 2. Beneficiary Survey Results

Not applicable.

29

Annex 3. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results

Not applicable.

30

Annex 4. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR

Following a meeting to revise the draft ICR prepared by the World Bank, the Borrower

proposed only a handful of minor adjustments to text, mostly related to the role of the

Government in the design and implementation of the DPO Series. They were all included

in the final text.

The Borrower also requested to better reflect the partial (and sometimes substantial)

progress in the Indicators of the Program. In effect, the ICR version revised with the

Borrower considered only two options for the results Indicators: Attained or Not

Attained. Hence, some indicators that showed important progress were marked as Not

Attained if its value did not fully reach the objective. This issue has also been discussed

at the QER meeting and the meeting accepted to reflect the degree of accomplishment of

the Indicators to better reflect partial advances.

31

Annex 5. Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/Stakeholders

Not applicable.

32

Annex 6: Prior Actions and their Status

GGSC 1 Prior Actions Status

Pillar 1a: To improve economic governance by strengthening accountability systems

Enhance Budget transparency by submitting to Parliament a draft law

consistent with the WAEMU guidelines for a Code of Transparency

(Directive No1/2009/CM/UEMOA portant Code de Transparence dans

la Gestion des Finances Publiques au Sein de l’UEMOA) by the

Council of Ministers (Prior Action 1)

Done and law was

passed in 2013.

Strengthen the independence of the Audit Court by submitting to

Parliament a draft organic law (projet de loi organique abrogeant et

remplacant la loi organique No 99-70 du 17 février 1999 sur la Cour

des Comptes) (Prior Action 2)

Done and law was

passed in 2013.

Pillar 1b: To promote service delivery through better governance and efficiency in the

education, health and agriculture sectors, rationalization of agencies and strengthening

monitoring and evaluation.

Improve personnel management of the education ministry by adopting

a decree reinforcing the deconcentration process (décret abrogeant et

remplaçant le décret n° 93-789 du 25 juin 1993 portant création des

inspections d’Académie et des inspections départementales de

l’Education nationale, modifié) (Prior Action 3)

Done.

Strengthen financial management of universities by amending the

financial regime (Décret portant régime financier des universités)

(Prior Action 4)

Done.

Sign a performance contract between the HOGGY hospital, the

Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Economy and Finance (Prior

Action 5)

Done.

Pillar 2: To enhance private sector development through energy sector reforms, and

improvements in the investment climate, including in the tourism sector.

Adoption by the Government (signed by the Minister in charge of

Finance and the Minister in charge of Energy) of a new Energy Sector

Development Policy Letter (ESDPL) and action plan 2012-2016 (Prior

Action 6)

Done.

Adoption by the SENELEC Board of directors of SENELEC’s

financial and operational restructuring plan including the agreement of

cross-debts settlement as of July 31 2012 between SENELEC and State

signed by the Ministry in charge of Finance and SENELEC (Prior

Action 7)

Done, though an

annex stipulating

how the balance

would be allocated

was not finalized at

the time, which

delayed the

agreement taking

effect.

33

GGSC II Prior Actions Status

Pillar 1a: To improve economic governance by strengthening accountability systems.

Establish an Asset Declaration System by submitting to Parliament a draft

law making asset declarations mandatory for all Ministers

(Prior Action 1)

Done and law

was passed in

2014.

Publish the 2011 Annual Report on the Cour des Comptes website (Prior

Action 2) Done.

Pillar 1b: To promote service delivery through better governance and efficiency in the

education, health and agriculture sectors, rationalization of agencies and strengthening

monitoring and evaluation.

Adopt 2013 budget for the two largest universities which are in compliance

with the revised financial regime of the universities; and adopt new criteria

for scholarships (Prior Action 3)

Done, although

well after the

2013 national

budget was

approved.

Evaluate existing performance contracts and sign performance contracts

between 5 new public hospitals, the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of

Economy and Finance (Prior Action 4)

Done.

Finalize the evaluation of autonomous agencies; and approve an action plan

including the closure and merger of some agencies

(Prior Action 5)

Done, though the

action plan was

somewhat

modified

thereafter.

Establish an institutional mechanism for regular monitoring of strategic

priorities linked with the budget cycle (Prior Action 6)

Done, though it

remained fairly

vague on the role

of different

central actors.



Signature of a Performance Contract between the State and SENELEC

(Prior Action 7) Done.

Improve business climate by i) enacting a law simplifying property

registration procedures and ii) revising its tax code to reduce property taxes

and reduce the time required for other tax payments.

(Prior Action 8)

Done.

34

GGSC III Prior Actions Status

Pillar 1a: To improve economic governance by strengthening accountability systems.

The Recipient has operationalized its asset declaration system by: (a)

approving the related implementation decree; (b) allocating appropriate

human and financial resources to the national office for the fight

against fraud and corruption (“Office National pour la Lutte contre la

Fraude et la Corruption”/”OFNAC”); and (c) ensuring deposition of

asset declarations by ministers holding a portfolio to OFNAC.

(Prior Action 1)

Done, although the

replacement of the

President of OFNAC

may signal a

weakening of its

independence.

Pillar 1b: To promote better governance and efficiency in the education, health and agriculture

sectors, and within agencies, and strengthen monitoring and evaluation.

The Recipient has strengthened wage bill control and human resources

in the education sector by: (a) creating a system connecting data bases

of the ministries in charge of education and civil service; and (b)

preparing the 2015-2016 recruitment plan for education in collaboration

with the ministry in charge of finance. (Prior Action 2)

Done, though the

original trigger called

for the data base to be

linked to the payroll

as well.

The Recipient has implemented presidential directives on external

revenues earned by universities through: (a) adoption and submission to

Parliament for enactment of a draft law reforming universities

governance system; (b) issuance of an Arrêté specifying resource

allocation and use of external revenues; and (c) appointment of

accountants in key faculties and schools at the University of Dakar,

who report to the chief financial officer. (Prior Action 3)

Done. The law was

approved. The

accountants were

appointed but their

reporting to the chief

financial officer

remains problematic.

The Recipient has adopted a new financial regime for public agencies

and establishments, and has entered with five additional public health

institutions into performance contracts whose objectives are to increase

service supply, improve billing process and control general costs.

(Prior Action 4)

Done. This action

was strengthened with

the addition of a new

financial regime.

The Recipient has adopted a mobile phone-based e-platform to

distribute subsidized agricultural inputs in the 2015 crop season; and

obtained approval allowing SAED to enter into multiannual

maintenance contracts of hydro-agricultural works with private

contractors and launched a call for bids. (Prior Action 5)

The Minister of

Agriculture agreed in

principle to use the

new platform but it

was still not in use

one year later. The

first multi-year

contract has been

issued.

The Recipient has launched implementation of the action plan to

restructure autonomous government-owned agencies, by: (a) merging

certain selected agencies; (b) appointing officers responsible for the

liquidation of certain selected agencies; and (c) entering with six of the

largest agencies into performance contracts with the objective of

clarifying the financial commitments of the Recipient’s ministry

responsible for finance and the related performance targets of agencies

concerned. (Prior Action 6)

Done. Closure of

agencies has been

slow but additional

performance contracts

have been prepared in

the following years.

35

GGSC III Prior Actions Status

The Recipient has issued a decree establishing a comprehensive

monitoring and evaluation system for the government’s policies and

programs, defining the roles and responsibilities of all actors in the

administration. (Prior Action 7)

Done, though tensions

between the different

actors suggest that the

system may have to

be redesigned.



The Recipient has amended the performance contract entered into

between the Recipient and SENELEC on June 11, 2013 to include

performance-based bonuses and sanctions, and has amended the

agreement regularizing cross-debt entered into between the Recipient

and SENELEC dated November 16, 2012, to determine the method for

the balance allocation. (Prior Action 8)

Done. The cross debt-

agreement was finally

applied.

The Recipient has: (a) issued (i) a decree reducing the number of days

and costs to obtain construction permits through the creation of a single

window and online processing; and (ii) a decree determining a new fee

schedule for warehouse inspection; and (b) eliminated the minimum

capital requirement for creating a new company. (Prior Action 9)

Done.

The Recipient has offset the impact of Ebola’s on the tourism sector by:

a) removing entry visas’ fees; b) reducing selected taxes on air tickets;

and c) suspending recovery acts initiated against hotels with arrears in

payment of patented and land taxes in 2015. (Prior Action 10)

Done.

36

Annex 7. List of Supporting Documents

ACT for Performance, Diagnostic des dispositifs de suivi-évaluation des politiques

publiques au Sénégal, June 2016.

Senegal, Ministry of Economy, Finance and Planning, Direction de la Prévision et des

Etudes Economiques (DPEE), various monthly issues of the Point mensuel de

Conjoncture for 2016.

Senegal, Ministry of Economy, Finance and Planning, Direction du Secteur Parapublic,

Rapport 2014-2015 sur le Secteur Parapublic.

Senegal, Ministry of Economy, Finance and Planning, Loi des Finances 2016 and Loi des

Finances rectificative, 2016. Sur le site web www.finances.gouv.sn.

Senegal, Ministry of National Education, Rapport annuel de Performance 2015, April

2016.

Senegal, OFNAC, Rapport annuel 2016.

Sy, A.B., A.B. Diallo, and N.N. Seck. Mesure de la Performance des Ressources

Humaines dans le Secteur de la Santé, Dec. 2016.

World Bank, Doing Business 2017 – Equal Opportunity for All, Economy Profile 2017:

Senegal.

World Bank, Senegal: Program Document for the First Governance and Growth Support

Credit, November 2012.

World Bank, Senegal: Program Document for a Proposed Second Governance and

Growth Support Credit, November 2013.

World Bank, Senegal: Program Document for a Proposed Credit for the Third

Governance and Growth Support Credit, June 2015.

http://www.finances.gouv.sn/