Direction des Études et Synthèses Économiques

G 2016 / 01

Time to smell the roses? Risk aversion, the timing of inheritance receipt,

and retirement

Bertrand Garbinti et Simon Georges-Kot

Document de travail

Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques

INSTITUT NATIONAL DE LA STATISTIQUE ET DES ÉTUDES ÉCONOMIQUES

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JANVIER 2016

Nous remercions Didier BLANCHET, Carole BONNET, Yves DUBOIS, Xavier D'HAULTFOEUILLE, Malik KOUBI, Olivier LOISEL, Anthony MARINO, Julien PRAT, Corinne PROST, Muriel ROGER et les participants du séminaire D2E/Insee.

_____________________________________________

* Insee Crest - Banque de France

** Département des Études Économiques - Division « Redistribution et Politiques Sociales » Timbre G210 - 15, bd Gabriel Péri - BP 100 - 92244 MALAKOFF CEDEX

Département des Études Économiques - Timbre G201 - 15, bd Gabriel Péri - BP 100 - 92244 MALAKOFF CEDEX - France - Tél. : 33 (1) 41 17 60 68 - Fax : 33 (1) 41 17 60 45 - CEDEX - E-mail : d3e-dg@insee.fr - Site Web Insee : http://www.insee.fr

Ces documents de travail ne reflètent pas la position de l’Insee et n'engagent que leurs auteurs. Working papers do not reflect the position of INSEE but only their author's views.

G 2016 / 01

Time to smell the roses? Risk aversion, the timing of inheritance receipt,

and retirement

Bertrand GARBINTI* et Simon GEORGES-KOT**

2

Time to smell the roses? Risk aversion, the timing of inheritance receipt,

and retirement

Abstract

Understanding when workers choose to retire is key for the design of public pensions and labor market policies. Private wealth may play a substantial role in retirement decisions, but little is still known on the link between the two. In this paper, we explore a new way to leverage the receipt of an inheritance as a plausible exogenous wealth shock, by relying on the precise timing of receipt. Using retrospective calendars from the French wealth survey, we find that, at any age between 55 and 65, chances of current labor market exit are 40% higher among individuals who inherit at that age than among those who inherit in the next few years. To go further in understanding the effect of inheritance receipt on labor force participation, we develop a model of retirement choice with risk aversion and an endogenous replacement rate and we test its predictions. We find that inheritance receipt triggers current labor force exit because risk averse individuals plan their retirement date according to the certainty equivalent of their bequest, not its expected value.

Keywords: Retirement, inheritance, labor supply, risk aversion

L’effet de l’héritage sur le départ à la retraite

Résumé

Pourquoi et quand part-on à la retraite ? Les réformes du système de retraite reposent souvent sur des réponses implicites à cette question. S’il est clair que les paramètres du système (durée de cotisation, taux de remplacement, décote, …) ont un fort effet sur la décision de départ à la retraite, les connaissances sur le lien entre retrait de la vie active et patrimoine privé sont faibles.

Notre travail tente d’éclairer ce lien en utilisant le fait de recevoir un héritage et le moment exact où l’héritage est reçu comme sources de variation du patrimoine des individus. Nous utilisons plusieurs millésimes de l’enquête Patrimoine de l’Insee (1992, 1998, 2003 et 2009) en mettant à profit la description chronologique précise tant du parcours professionnel des individus que de leurs héritages.

En centrant notre analyse sur les personnes de 55 à 65 ans qui ont reçu un héritage, nous montrons que la probabilité de départ à la retraite augmente de 40 % l’année de réception de l’héritage, comparée à une réception plus tardive. Afin de mieux comprendre les mécanismes sous-jacents, nous développons et testons les prédictions d’un modèle théorique de choix de départ à la retraite qui prend en compte l’aversion au risque et le fait que le taux de remplacement dépend de la date de départ. Nous montrons que l’effet de l’héritage sur le départ à la retraite peut s’expliquer par le fait que les individus averses au risque se basent sur l’ « équivalent certain » et non pas la valeur anticipée de leur héritage.

Mots-clés : Retraite, héritage, offre de travail, aversion au risque

Classification JEL : J14, J26

1 Introduction

Understanding when people choose to retire is key for the design of public pensions and labor

market policies. It has been the focus of an extensive literature investigating the effect of factors

as diverse as health status, longevity, private and public pensions, or health insurance.1 While

there has been much theoretical work on the retirement effect of individual wealth, be it in the

form of private assets or Social Security entitlements,2 empirical work has often failed to provide

causal evidence of this link, or found contradictory results.3 Wealthy individuals typically have

distinct preferences, for example regarding leisure or time, both of which can in turn influence

labor market participation. Finding truly exogenous sources of variation of private wealth is

difficult, particularly if one requires these variations to take place around ages where individuals

might prefer to completely withdraw from the labor market rather than to make adjustments at

the intensive margin. In this paper, we explore a new way to leverage the receipt of an inheritance

as a plausible exogenous wealth shock, by relying on the precise timing of receipt. We build on

the fact that, conditionally on receiving an inheritance within a few years, the exact moment of

receipt is largely random.4 Using retrospective calendars from the French Wealth Survey, we find

that, for any age between 55 and 65, chances of current labor market exit are 40% higher among

individuals who inherit at that age than among individuals who inherit in the next few years.

To go further in understanding the effect of inheritance receipt on labor force participation, we

develop a model of retirement choice with risk aversion and an endogenous replacement rate.

We find that inheritance receipt triggers current labor force exit because risk averse individuals

plan their retirement date according to the certainty equivalent of their bequest, not its expected

value.

As in many countries, public pensions make up most of retirees’ financial resources in France,

providing them with 75% of their pre-retirement income on average (COR (2013)). In order to

unlock their pension, individuals must work until the legal retirement age. In addition, they must

contribute to the pension system for a given number of years in order to retire with full benefits.

In case of early retirement, an individual’s pension is scaled down in proportion of the number of1See among many others Bloom, Canning, Mansfield, and Moore (2007), Bloom, Canning, and Moore (2014),

Burtless (1986), Gruber and Madrian (1995), Bloemen (2011).2Examples include Kingston (2000) or Stock and Wise (1990).3See for example Samwick (1998) for a survey of the literature on the effects of Social Security, and a re-

examination of some of the evidence.4There are some reasons to doubt that the receipt of an inheritance itself is completely exogenous and inde-

pendent of workers’ characteristics (see e.g. Hurst and Lusardi (2004)). Our strategy enables us to overcomethe usual issue that inheritors and other individuals are not comparable due to unobservable characteristics (cf.section 2).

3

missing years. Considering the importance of public pensions in France, we investigate whether

the effect of inheritance receipt on retirement depends on an individual’s pension entitlement

status. We find that the increase in exit rates among individuals who happen to inherit before

or after the legal retirement age is very comparable. This increase is also very similar among

individuals who happen to inherit before or after having reached the necessary contribution

length. The main effect of inheritance receipt seems to be instantaneous rather than delayed

labor market exit, regardless of whether individuals face a high cost of exit or not. This suggests

that some individuals are willing to give up a substantial part of their benefits in order to exit

the labor market a few years earlier, when they can afford to do so.

Previous work has highlighted the fact that, when individuals anticipate the receipt of an

inheritance, adjustments of their labor force participation might have already occurred at the

date of receipt. In this scenario, only inheritances representing a higher amount than expected

can have an impact on current retirement probability. We explore an alternative interpretation

of our results. Building on a simple model of retirement decision under uncertainty, we show

that, when individuals are risk averse and bear the risk associated with their own inheritance,

the receipt of an inheritance can have labor supply effects even when the amount received was

perfectly anticipated. This is because individuals make their lifetime labor supply decisions with

respect to the certainty equivalent of the inheritance rather than its expected value.5 Using

multiple measures of risk aversion available in our data, we are able to test the validity of

this framework. Consistent with our model, we show that the receipt of an inheritance has a

particularly large effect on current retirement rates for the most risk averse individuals.

Despite the existence of an important literature investigating the effects of private wealth on

labor supply decisions, direct evidence of an impact on retirement behavior is still scarce. Kaplan

(1987) and Imbens, Rubin, and Sacerdote (2001) studied lottery players, and both showed that

lottery winners’ labor earnings were significantly reduced, all the more so as they were close

to the retirement age. Using the bull market of the 1990s, Coronado and Perozek (2003) and

Sevak (2002) both found that households who benefited from unanticipated capital gains ended

up retiring earlier than others. However, with the same strategy, Coile and Levine (2006) found

no evidence of changes in labor supply due to variations in stock market. Earlier studies also

leveraged the receipt of an inheritance as a credible exogenous wealth shock, but with similarly

ambiguous conclusions. Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian, and Rosen (1992) showed that a single person

who inherits about $150,000 is four times more likely to leave the labor market than one who5This was one of the interpretation suggested by Brown, Coile, and Weisbenner (2010).

4

inherits less than $25,000. Joulfaian (2006) and Bo, Halvorsen, and Thoresen (2013) also both

found significant effects, but much smaller in magnitude. On the other hand, Joulfaian and Wil-

helm (1994) found inconclusive results on older workers in the Panel Study of Income Dynamics.

The papers closest to ours are Brown, Coile, and Weisbenner (2010) and Blau and Goodstein

(2015), who concentrate exclusively on retirement decisions following the receipt of an inheri-

tance. Using data from the Health and Retirement Survey (HRS), Brown, Coile, and Weisbenner

(2010) show that individuals who inherit between two waves of the survey are also more likely to

exit the labor market during that time. Using information on inheritance expectations, they are

also able to test whether the effect is entirely concentrated on workers receiving more than they

expected, but find effects of similar magnitudes for individuals receiving more than expected and

exactly what they anticipated. While Brown, Coile, and Weisbenner (2010) study households

behavior, Blau and Goodstein (2015) focus on married individuals. They show that the receipt

of an inheritance has a negative effect on own labor force participation, but no effect on that of

the spouse.

Our study differs from previous work in a number of ways. We explore a new source of

randomness associated with inheritance by focusing on the precise timing of receipt among heirs,

namely by comparing individuals who receive an inheritance at a given age with individuals who

receive one in the next few years rather than with all individuals. We also clarify the theoretical

status of risk aversion using a simple lifecycle model. Empirically, we find that individuals behave

in a way that is consistent with our model, where the most risk averse individuals are also those

for whom the labor market response of inheritance receipt is the strongest. This sheds new light

on why workers might adjust their labor supply after the receipt of an inheritance, including

in the case where they perfectly anticipated it. The rest of the paper is organized as follows.

Section 2 describe our empirical strategy more in details, section 3 presents the data used in the

analysis, sections 4 to 6 present our results, and section 7 concludes.

2 Empirical strategy

Multiple studies have used the receipt of an inheritance as a plausible exogenous wealth shock.

However, there are some reasons to doubt that receiving an inheritance is actually a clear random

event. Individuals who inherit may differ from those who do not, be it in their education,

occupation, personal wealth, or other characteristics (sometimes unobservable and so hardly

possible to control for), in particular because of important intergenerational correlations in all

5

those variables. For instance, in their study of entrepreneurship, Hurst and Lusardi (2004)

found that both past and future inheritances predict current business entry, suggesting that

individuals who inherit at some point are just fundamentally different than those who do not.6

In this paper, we attempt to go beyond this limit by leveraging the precise timing of inheritance

receipt. Concentrating on individuals who do receive an inheritance over their life, we propose

to use the timing of inheritance receipt as a more exogenous wealth shock. Specifically, at any

age, we propose to compare individuals who receive an inheritance at that age with individuals

who receive an inheritance in the next few years. The assumption behind this strategy is that,

conditionally on inheriting within a restricted time range, the exact time at which individuals

receive that inheritance is essentially random.

Econometrically, we build on the tools of duration analysis. We consider the standard Cox

proportional hazard model:

hi(t) = h0(t) exp(αInhit +Xitβ) (1)

where hi(t) denotes the hazard rate for individual i at age t, i.e. the instantaneous retirement

probability of i conditional on still being employed at t. Inhit is a dummy with value 1 if i

receives an inheritance at t, and 0 if i receives an inheritance in a given time interval after t, say

]t, t+T [. If we denote tbi the time at which i inherits, Inhit takes value 1 when t = tbi and 0 when

t is in ]tbi − T ; tbi [. Xit is a vector of individual and potentially time-varying covariates. In this

model, the parameter of interest is α: the probability of labor market exit at t is multiplied by

exp(α) when an inheritance is received at t.

The estimation of model (1) requires information in continuous time, which is not available

in our data. Instead, we observe events grouped in 1-year intervals. In this context, it can be

shown that model (1) can be rewritten as a binary model with a complementary log-log link

function to accommodate interval data.7 We use this model to estimate the parameters α and

β.

In practice, we estimate the parameters of model (1) using the following specification:

y∗it = µt + αInhit +Xitβ + εit (2)

where y∗it is the latent variable such that yit = 1{y∗it≥0} with yit a dummy indicating that

6They do not control for parents’ characteristics.7See for example Garbinti (2014)

6

individual i retired during interval [t, t+ 1[. µt is an age-specific effect,8 and the error term

εit follows a complementary extreme value type I distribution (specifically, P (ε > x) = 1 −

exp (− exp (−x))). Inhit is a dummy with value 1 if individual i received an inheritance between

[t, t + 1[, and 0 if she receives an inheritance between [t + 1, t + T [. The parameters α and β

identified by model (2) are the same as those in model (1).

Before continuing, we should make it clear that, even though we use tools from duration

analysis, our approach differs slightly from traditional survival models. In these models, all

individuals are followed until they either retire, or exit the sample for possibly unknown reasons

(censorship). Here, we do not follow individuals until their exit from the labor market as this

would be fundamentally incompatible with our empirical strategy. We want to compare inheritors

with similar characteristics who differ only by the timing of their inheritance. A natural way

of doing so is to compare the behavior of the individuals who receive their inheritance between

[t, t+ 1[ with the one of those who receive their inheritance slightly latter. For this purpose, we

only keep observations corresponding to individuals who either receive an inheritance between

[t, t+ 1[ or do not receive their inheritance between [t, t+ 1[ but receive it between [t+ 1, t+ T [.

Had we used a standard survival model set up, all non-retired individuals would have been kept

in the sample at every time t, even when they have not received an inheritance between t and

t + T . However, there is no reason why individuals who have already received an inheritance

at t0 < t should be compared with people who have not yet received any inheritance. In a

policy evaluation setup, the first group of individuals would be considered as already treated,

and would thus not be eligible to be part of the control group.9 In addition, those individuals are

non-compliers since they stayed in the labor force even after having received the "treatment".

Put differently, they probably constitute a selected subsample of the individuals who inherited

at t0. They potentially have a stronger attachment to the labor market. Including them in the

control group at t would lead to an underestimation of the baseline retirement probability of

individuals at t, and an overestimation of the effect of inheritance on retirement.10 Therefore,

for each age, we do not include observations corresponding to these situations. This approach

is essentially similar to assuming a frailty model, except that we only care about obtaining

unbiased estimates of the treatment variable, not about recovering the parameters associated

with the frailty distribution.8The legal retirement age is constant over our period of analysis.9Later in the paper, we investigate the lagged effect of inheritance receipt. When we do so, we also keep

observations corresponding to individuals who have received an inheritance in the previous few years, i.e. between]t− T, t− 1].

10We confirm this point in section 4.2.

7

3 Data

We use data from the Enquête Patrimoine (EP), the French wealth survey. The EP is conducted

by the French statistical office every 6 years on a sample of about 15,000 households in which

wealthier households are overrepresented. We pool data from the years 1998, 2004 and 2010.

Those surveys provide detailed information on the main socio-economic characteristics of the

households, and on the composition of their assets. For the 2004 and 2010 waves, a fraction

of the individuals were also asked specific questions on their attitude towards risk. Specifically,

individuals had to rank themselves on a scale from 0 (very careful) to 10 (likes to take risks),

and were proposed a simple lottery detailed in Appendix C. In all waves, respondents are asked

to report their main career changes over their life, such as any interruption of activity, change

of labor force status (e.g. from employed to self-employed), or retirement decision, along with

the year at which these changes occurred. Individuals are also asked whether they received any

inheritance at some point in their lives. For each inheritance received, they are then asked the

year at which they received it, as well as who they received it from (parents, distant relatives,

. . . ), the amount and the nature of the inheritance (cash, real estate, . . . ).

From these retrospective calendars, we build a database containing one observation for each

year lived by each individual (i.e. for each individual, years between the reported birth year and

the year of the interview). This new database contains time-invariant variables (e.g. household

socio-demographic variables at the time of the interview) as well as time-varying variables such

as the labor force status of each individual at each year, a dummy variable indicating inheritance

receipt in that year, and the number of years left to reach full pension rights.11 Since most

workers exit the labor market between 55 and 65, we concentrate on individuals aged within this

bracket at the time of the interview. In line with our empirical strategy, for each age a between

55 and 65, we keep observations corresponding to individuals employed or actively looking for

a job between [a − 1, a[.12 Active job seekers might be expected to respond to the receipt of

an inheritance in much the same way as employed individuals. Receiving an inheritance might

push them to exit the labor market completely rather than to keep looking for a job.13 We

consider that an individual has exited the labor market when she self-defines as either inactive

or retired.14 In the rest of the paper, we use the term retirement as a synonym for labor market11See Appendix B for a description of French pension regulations and of how we build this variable.12In particular, the self-employed are excluded from our sample.13The unemployed make up slightly less than 10% of our sample. We tested that our results do not change

much when they are excluded. The basic results are reported in Table 6 in appendix D.14In 2008, the possibility was introduced for employers and employees to mutually agree on a conventional

termination of the work contract between them. For employees, this can be an alternative to submitting their

8

exit.

4 Inheritance receipt and retirement

4.1 Graphical Evidence

Before moving on to the econometric analysis, we provide simple graphical evidence on the effect

of inheritance receipt on labor market withdrawal. We compute for each age a ∈ [55, 65] the

proportion of individuals who leave the labor market at any time between [a, a+ 1[ among those

still employed at a. Figure 1 reports this proportion computed separately for individuals who

happen to receive an inheritance between [a, a+ 1[ (dashed line), and for individuals who have

not yet received an inheritance but will receive one within the next two years, i.e. between

[a+ 1, a+ 3[.

The figure first shows that the probability to leave the labor market varies significantly across

ages. Individuals who are still employed at ages 60 and 65 have a 50% to 60% chance to retire

at that age when no inheritance is received, whereas this conditional probability is quite stable

outside those ages, around 10% between [55, 60[ and 20% between ]60, 65[. As described in

appendix B, 60 is the age at which most workers can start to cash out their pension and 65 is

the age at which discounts are canceled, and consequently, many individuals wait until those

ages to retire. This pattern is roughly unchanged when the proportion of labor market exits is

computed among those who receive an inheritance at the age under consideration.

Figure 1 also shows that at most ages a, the proportion of individuals who withdraw from the

labor market is higher among those who receive an inheritance at exactly a than among those

who have not yet received an inheritance. The degree to which this is the case varies substantially

with age. For example, the probability to retire doubles when an inheritance is received at ages

55 and 64, but it is roughly unchanged at ages 58 and 60. Overall, these results are indicative

that receiving an inheritance at any age between 55 and 65 is associated with an increase in the

probability to retire at that age.

resignation (which does not give rights to unemployment insurance), while for employers it is cheaper and easierthan a normal layoff. As workers who benefit from such a contractual termination are entitled to unemploymentinsurance, it is unclear whether they would self-declare as unemployed, retired or inactive. This could be a sourceof bias if individuals choose this particular channel to exit the labor market after the receipt of an inheritance.To be sure, we tested that restricting our sample to observations made before 2008, when contractual terminationwas not possible, does not change our results.

9

4.2 Econometric results

To go one step further, we turn to the econometric analysis described in section 2, which builds on

the intuitions from Figure 1. The first two columns of Table 1 show the results of the estimation

of model 2 on our sample. For any age a between 55 and 65, we detect a very significant impact

of receiving an inheritance at that age on the instantaneous probability to retire. Specifically,

column (1) reveals that individuals who receive an inheritance at a are 39% (exp(.326)) more

likely to exit the labor market at a than those who have not yet received an inheritance, but

who will receive one in the next 2 years. Column (2) of Table 1 shows that this estimate is

virtually unchanged by the introduction of a full set of controls for individual characteristics,

including socio-economic status, gender, and education. This suggests that timing of inheritance

receipt over a short period of time is indeed only weakly correlated with workers’ characteristics,

including those affecting retirement age. In Table 3, we estimate the same model for several

socio-demographic subgroups. We find that the effects are generally larger for individuals of

lower SES or lower education.

Columns (3) and (4) of Table 1 report the results of the estimation of the same model as

in columns (1) and (2), but comparing individuals who receive an inheritance at t with all

other individuals employed at t. If inheritance receipt is correlated with unobserved workers’

characteristics influencing retirement age, this strategy should yield biased results. Those results

may then also depend on the extent to which individual heterogeneity can be accounted for in

the model. When excluding all controls, we find that individuals who receive an inheritance at

t are 32% more likely to retire that year than any other individual still employed at t. This

figure is slightly less than the result from column (1). However, when controls are included, we

find results that are very similar to the ones obtained with our previous strategy. Specifically,

when controlling for basic socio-economic characteristics of the individuals, we find that workers

who receive an inheritance at t are 38% (exp(.333)) more likely to retire that year than other

workers. Overall, this indicates that comparing inheritors with other individuals may lead to a

small downward bias in the estimation of the effect of inheritance receipt of retirement. It also

suggests that this bias can be largely eliminated by controlling for the basic socio-demographic

characteristics of individuals.

These results are in line with those of previous American studies, although not directly compa-

rable. Previous works have reported estimates based on logit or linear probability specifications,

whereas our model directly estimates multiplicative effects. When we rescale our estimates taking

10

into account the mean retirement probability in our sample, we get a marginal effect equivalent

to a 5 percentage point decline in labor force participation following inheritance receipt.15 This

figure is slightly higher than Brown, Coile, and Weisbenner (2010) (2.3 percentage point decline)

but clearly in line with Blau and Goodstein (2015), with effects ranging from a 3.8 to a 6.5

percentage point decline (depending on whether men or women are considered). The main dif-

ference with Blau and Goodstein (2015) turns out to be that they find a lower effect for women

while our estimates are of the same order of magnitude whatever the gender.

As it has been pointed out by a number of studies (e.g. Brown, Coile, and Weisbenner

(2010)), the results from Table 1 could be driven by the fact that the death of a relative has a

direct effect on the labor market participation of an individual. For instance, some individuals

might stop working after the death of one of their parents to have more time to take care of their

surviving parent. In that case, our results would overestimate the effect of inheritance receipt on

retirement. Since inheritance is by essence associated with the death of an individual, these two

effects are hard to disentangle.16 A way to shed some light on this issue is to explore whether the

labor market response of individuals who inherit a given year varies whether they receive their

inheritance from their parents or from more distant relatives or friends. Under the assumption

that the death of a parent has a direct negative effect on labor market participation, we would

expect inheritances received from parents to be associated with a higher probability to withdraw

from the labor market. To test this, column (2) of Table 2 reports the results obtained for

the estimation of model (2), distinguishing between bequests17 received from parents or grand-

parents and bequests received from other family members of friends. Those results first confirm

that workers who inherit in a given year from a close parent are more likely to exit the labor

force that year than individuals who inherit in the next couple of years. As it turns out, this

effect is not less important and not statistically different when the inheritance comes from a more

distant relative or from a friend. Overall this result is suggestive that labor market responses to

the death of a parent cannot be entirely driving the estimates of Table 1.

A related concern is that some individuals might exit the labor force a few years before the

death of a parent. This could happen for example when some individuals take time off work

to care for a parent suffering from a severe illness. If this is the case, at any given age a, the15The mean retirement probability in our sample is 13%. We multiply our multiplicative effect (39%) by this

sample mean in order to get closer to the way Blau and Goodstein (2015) compare results across studies. Totake into account the fact that the probability of exit is increasing with age, our multiplicative effect is relative tothe time changing baseline retirement probability of non-inheritors and not to the sample mean of the dependentvariable. It explains an important part of the difference in the comparison.

16We do not have information on the death of parents in our data.17To avoid repetitions, we use “bequest” as a synonym for “inheritance”.

11

retirement probability of individuals who will inherit in the next few years will overestimate

the baseline retirement probability at a, and our results will be biased towards 0. A way to

test whether these effects are substantial is to compare our results with those obtained when

considering a control group composed of individuals who receive an inheritance over a longer

time horizon. Workers who inherit at a + 5 should be less likely to exit the labor market at

a to take care of their parent than workers who inherit at a + 2. If these effects are large, we

should find that the impact of inheritance on current retirement increases when we consider an

extended time horizon. In columns (3) to (5) of Table 2, we investigate how the results of Table 1

change when we consider inheritances received over a longer period of time. We estimate the

same model as for column of Table 1, but this time comparing the retirement probability in a

given year for individuals who inherit that year and for those who inherit in the next 3 years

(column 3), in the next 5 years (column 4), or in the next 10 year (column 5). The estimates do

not increase, and actually change very little when we extend the time horizon considered. Our

results are not driven by our choice to consider inheritances received in a two-year window.

5 Retirement and the timing of inheritance

Receiving an inheritance at any age between 55 and 65 is associated with a substantial increase

in the probability of retiring at that age. However, the costs of leaving the labor market vary

significantly across those ages.18 In order to get their full benefits, individuals must work until

they reach the necessary contribution length. In addition, most workers need to wait until they

turn 60 to be able to unlock their public pension. At this stage, it could well be that receiving

an inheritance leads an individual to leave the labor market only when he has the possibility to

do so at very little costs. The opposite would indicate that individuals are ready to sacrifice a

substantial part of their pension to retire earlier when they can afford to do so, which could have

deep implication for the design of public pensions.

To investigate this, Table 4 shows the results of estimating model (2) when the inheritance

dummy is interacted with an indicator that the individual under consideration is older than 60

(column 1), or with an indicator that she has fulfilled the necessary contribution length (column

2). First, column (1) reveals that the effect of inheritance receipt on labor force participation

is not lower when individuals happen to inherit before 60. Receiving an inheritance after 60 in-

creases the probability of instantaneous labor market exit by about 22% with respect to receiving18French pensions are explained in more details in Appendix B.

12

an inheritance in the following couple of years, but it is not significant. As it happens, this figure

actually almost triples, to a 65% increase, when the inheritance is received before 60. This result

suggests that the labor market impact of inheritance receipt is not lower when individuals cannot

yet cash out their public pension. Column (2) of Table 4 then shows that this also holds true

when considering pension rights rather than the possibility to unlock the pension. Specifically,

individuals who happen to inherit when they have already reached their full contribution length,

and have therefore earned their full benefits, are 44% more likely to exit the labor market at that

point than those who receive their inheritance in the next couple of years. This effect is only

slightly smaller (30%) when individuals happen to receive their inheritance when they have not

yet worked enough to earn their full pension rights.

As described in Appendix B, the entitlement cost of an early labor market exit can be quite

large, even with just a few missing years of contribution. When workers are too far away from

earning their full benefits, receiving an inheritance might not be enough to compensate the loss

of pension money associated with an early exit, even if an individual has a strong disutility for

work. To test this idea, we investigate whether the effect of inheritance receipt on retirement

decreases when individuals are missing more than a certain number of years of contribution.

Specifically, we estimate the same type of model as for column (2) of Table 4, but distinguishing

whether individuals are missing more or less than 2 years of contribution. Column (3) reports

the results of this estimation. As it turns out, individuals who have not yet earned their rights to

full benefits but who are close to having done so are also those for whom receiving an inheritance

is associated with the strongest probability to retire. When an individual happens to receive an

inheritance while he is less than two years away from earning full retirement rights, his probability

of exiting the labor market increases by 53%. By contrast, if he happens to receive an inheritance

while being more than two years away from earning full benefits, he is not more likely to exit

the labor market than a comparable individual who did not yet receive any inheritance. Some

individuals suffer from a strong disutility from work. For them, receiving an inheritance is a way

to finance their early retirement, as long as the cost of doing so is not too high.

So far we have only considered the possibility of instantaneous exit. The next question is

whether the conclusions of this section hold true when also considering the possibility of delayed

exit. It could very well be that some individuals who receive an inheritance when exit is costly

wait until they have acquired their full rights to retire, or until they can unlock their pension.

We therefore investigate whether inheritance receipt has a lagged effect on retirement. To do

so, at any age a between 55 and 65, we compare the probability of labor market withdrawal

13

for individuals who inherited in the last two years and for those who will inherit in the next

two years. The results of this regression are reported in column (4) of Table 4. As it happens,

among individuals still employed at a certain age, the likelihood of exiting the labor market

is similar for those who inherited in the past couple of years and for those who have not yet

inherited. This suggests that inheritance receipt only has an instantaneous effect on retirement:

if an individual chooses to keep on working during the year the inheritance is received, she

will not be more likely to retire at any point in the future than if she had not received that

inheritance. An interpretation of this could be that workers differ greatly in their attachment to

the labor market. Some workers wish to cease their activity as soon as possible, and receiving

an inheritance enables them to do so right away. Other workers have stronger ties to the labor

market, and care little about whether they suddenly have the possibility to leave their job. A

few year after the receipt of an inheritance, all workers of the first type have exited, leaving only

workers of the second type in the sample.

6 Inheritance, retirement, and risk aversion

The previous sections have shown that the receipt of an inheritance has a substantial effect on

labor market participation. At this stage, it is not entirely clear why that should be the case.

Previous studies have highlighted the fact that, in a classical framework, inheritance receipt

should have an impact on labor supply decisions only to the extent that inheritances are not

anticipated. Intuitively, agents integrate the receipt of an inheritance in their intertemporal

budget constraint, and choose their lifetime supply of labor, and in particular their date of

retirement, accordingly. In the case where an individual receives exactly the amount that she

expected to receive, her labor supply decisions should not be affected. In this context, only

the part of an inheritance that exceeds individuals’ expectations can be taken as an exogenous

wealth shock, not the receipt of an inheritance in general.

However, in a related contribution, Brown, Coile, and Weisbenner (2010) found that this

was not entirely true.19 According to their estimates, individuals who receive an inheritance in

line with their expectations are not less likely to exit the labor market than those who receive

more than they expected. An interpretation of this result could be that individuals face some

uncertainty about the amount that they will inherit, and therefore plan their lifetime labor

supply according to the certainty equivalent of their inheritance rather than according to their19This point was also confirmed by Blau and Goodstein (2015).

14

expectations.20 In this section, we take this idea one step further by building on a simple model

of intertemporal labor supply, where agents are risk averse and bear the risk associated with

their own inheritance. We show that, in this context, the receipt of an inheritance can have an

impact on their date of retirement, even in the case where individuals receive exactly the amount

that they expected, and that this impact is all the more important as individuals are risk averse.

We then test and confirm this prediction using multiple measures of risk aversion available in

our data.

6.1 A model of lifetime labor supply with inheritance and risk aversion

We present here intuitions and main results from the model developed in Appendix A. There

exists several models that take into account optimal consumption and endogenous decision to

withdraw from the labor market. Here, we introduce the dependence of the replacement rate

of pension to the date of retirement to take into account the fact that pensions depend on the

number of years of contribution. As far as we know, no theoretical model has been developed to

analyze the effect of realized bequest (versus anticipated one) and how risk aversion shapes this

effect on the decision of withdrawal. A model close to ours is Bloom, Canning, Mansfield, and

Moore (2007) and Ljungqvist and Sargent (2012) (chapter 29, pp 1203-1208). We add pensions

with an endogenous replacement rate, bequests, and we focus on the role of bequest and risk

aversion.

The basic set up is the one of an agent who plans her optimal consumption path and with-

drawal from the labor market. To do so, she maximizes her lifetime utility from the beginning

of her working life t0 to the age of death T :

U =

∫ T

t0

e−δ(t−t0)u(ct, R)dt

under the budget constraint

∫ T

t0

e−r(t−t0)ctdt =

∫ R

t0

e−r(t−t0)wdt+

∫ T

R

e−r(t−t0)λ(R)wdt+ B +Wt0 (3)

u is the instantaneous utility function. It depends on ct, the level of consumption at time t, and

on the date of retirement R. The date of retirement plays a direct role because of the disutility

from working that is taken into account (cf. appendix A). δ is the discount factor, r the interest20Although this is mentioned by Brown, Coile, and Weisbenner (2010), it is not detailed in their paper.

15

rate, w is the wage and λ(R) the replacement rate applied to wages to compute pensions. It

depends on the age of retirement R. Wt0 stands for the non inherited assets at time t0. B is the

actualized bequest that the agent expects to receive. It is uncertain because of uncertainty on

the exact amount that will be received.21 Since consumption and retirement date both depend

on the uncertain amount of inheritance, the agent indeed maximizes EB [U(B)].

We assume that the agent bears the risk of not receiving the exact expected amount. Risk

aversion then plays an important role in the way she plans her future consumption path and

retirement date. Facing uncertainty (and without liquidity constraints), risk-neutral agents base

their budget constraint on the expected amount of bequest E(B). Risk averse ones don’t. Intu-

itively, the more risk averse an agent is, the smaller the amount taken into account in her budget

constraint. In the extreme case of infinite risk aversion, an agent is expected to draw her plan

as if she would not plan to receive any inheritance. By contrast, the less risk averse and the

more risk neutral the agent is, the closer to the expectation of bequest the amount taken into

account in her budget constraint. Under uncertainty, the expected lifetime utility of an agent

EB [U(B)] is lower than the one she would reach if she receives the guarantee bequest expecta-

tion U(E(B)). Indeed this expected lifetime utility corresponds to the utility of the so-called

“certainty equivalent” of the expected amount BCE .22 Under uncertainty, the agent solves:

maxc,R

EB [U(B)] = maxc,RU(BCE) (4)

Let’s recall that, for a risk averse agent, BCE < E(B), which means that the budget constraint

is lower with risk aversion than what it would be for risk neutral agents.23 When the received

bequest is higher than the certainty equivalent, we show in appendix A that the agent adjusts

her plan on consumption and labor force exit. Specifically, when the received amount is higher

than the certainty equivalent, the agent decides to withdraw earlier than initially scheduled.

A first consequence of this simple set up concerns the receipt of the exact expected amount

of bequest. Since for risk averse agents it is necessarily higher than the certainty equivalent21The uncertainty on the date of receipt may also play a role and be related to the uncertainty on amount.

Several factors may be here at stake. If there are some liquidity constraints, an earlier bequest will unbind themand a later one maintain them longer than expected. The timing may also be related to the exact amount received:if parents consume their wealth, the sooner the date of receipt, the higher the amount received.

22By definition, BCE is the guarantee value of bequest that equalizes the agent’s utility with her utility underuncertainty (cf. for instance Laffont (1989)). The difference between U(E(B)) and U(BCE) depends on the levelof risk aversion.

23Furthermore, using a bequest in an intertemporal budget constraint may imply some liquidity constraints.In this case, the agent would borrow less then her certainty equivalent amount, and we would still have that thebequest amount taken into account in the budget constraint is lower than the bequest expectation.

16

amount, it will bring forward the date of retirement. This result may shed a light on results by

Brown, Coile, and Weisbenner (2010) and Blau and Goodstein (2015). They find that the receipt

of the exact expected amount of bequest has a non-significant but positive effect on retirement.

Their point estimate, though imprecise, turns out to have the same order of magnitude (even a

bit higher) than the one obtained for the effect of an amount higher than expected. Our model

may explain both this effect and the imprecision. This imprecision may then come from the

heterogeneity of answers due to non-risk averse agents. For risk-neutral agents, there would be

no effect and for risk-lover ones, there would be a negative effect.

A second consequence is that the more risk averse an agent is, the later she forecasts her

retirement date. This is due to the fact that the amount of bequest taken into account in her

budget constraint is lower than the one of a less risk averse agent (cf. appendix A). A third

consequence is that the effect of the receipt of a bequest whose amount differs from the certainty

equivalent will be higher for the most risk averse agents. It means for instance that when they

receive an amount of bequest higher than the certainty equivalent amount, all agents will retire

earlier, but the most risk averse ones are those who will advance the most their retirement date.

We test and confirm empirically these last two predictions in the next section.

6.2 Risk aversion and the impact of inheritance receipt on retirement

In the context of the model presented in section 6.1, the impact of inheritance on labor market

withdrawal should be more important for agents who are more risk averse, assuming that agents

are bearing the risk associated with their own inheritance. We now test this prediction using

multiple measures of risk aversion. In the EP waves that took place in 2004 and 2010, about

half of the individuals were asked questions about their attitude towards risk. Individuals had

to position themselves on a scale from 0 (very carefull individual) to 10 (person who likes to

take risks), and were also presented with a simple lottery that we detail in Appendix C. These

questions provide us with two measures of risk aversion, which we label respectively subjective

risk aversion and lottery risk aversion. In addition, we use stock market participation as a third

measure of risk aversion. We estimate a model similar to model (2), in which the inheritance

indicator is interacted with an indicator of low or high risk aversion constructed from one of our

three measures. The results of these estimations are reported in Table 5.

The Table first reveals that, for all three measures, inheritance receipt does not have a

statistically significant impact on labor market exit for individuals with a low risk aversion.

These individuals do not seem to be more likely to exit the labor market when they receive an

17

inheritance than individuals who inherit in the next few years. In contrast, for individuals with

a high risk aversion, the impact of inheritance receipt on labor market withdrawal is significant,

at least for the lottery and stock market participation measures. For each of these measures

respectively, those individuals are about 68% and 73% more likely to exit the labor market when

they receive an inheritance than individuals who will receive an inheritance in the next couple

of years. Generally, for all three risk aversion measures, the point estimates reported in Table 5

are always lower for individuals with low risk aversion than for those with a high risk aversion.

A possible interpretation of these findings is that individuals plan their retirement according

to the certainty equivalent of their inheritance rather than its expected value, as explained in

section 6.1. In this context, the receipt of an inheritance is always associated with an exogenous

wealth shock for risk averse individuals, even when they make perfect predictions on the size of

their inheritance. This exogenous wealth shock leads individuals to exit the labor market earlier

than they planed to.

7 Conclusion

In this paper, we take advantage of the fact that the timing of inheritance receipt generates an

exogenous shift of the intertemporal budget constraint of the recipient. Comparing individuals

who inherit in a given year with those who inherit in the next couple of years, we find that the

receipt of an inheritance is associated with a strong increase in the probability of current labor

market exit. This increase is higher when an individual happens to inherit in the few years before

reaching full pension entitlement, when an early labor market exit is moderately costly. This

suggests that many agents have a strong disutility for work, and contemplate leaving the labor

market as soon as they can afford to do so, even when it is costly. Social security reforms that

modify pension wealth induce changes in workers’ assets that are very similar to the variations

we use in this paper. Our results suggest that reforms affecting social security wealth may

quickly influence individuals’ retirement decisions, although the magnitude of these shifts might

not be similar to our estimates based on private wealth, as there is evidence that individuals are

sensitive to the type of wealth they hold (see e.g. Blau (2015)).

The receipt of an inheritance may alleviate an individual’s intertemporal budget constraint for

multiple reasons. Agents may face liquidity constraints and might not be able to borrow against

a future inheritance, or they could be reluctant to draw future plans on their parents’ death.

An alternative explanation is that they face some uncertainty on when and how much they will

18

inherit. We build on a simple model of intertemporal labor supply in which agents bear the risk

associated with their own inheritance to explore this specific channel. Risk averse individuals

plan their retirement according to the certainty equivalent of their inheritance rather than its

expected value. As a result, the receipt of an inheritance can have an impact on individuals’

date of retirement, even when they received exactly the anticipated amounts. We find support

for this explanation in our data.

19

Figures and Tables

Figure 1: Retirement probability by age and inheritance receipt

0

.2

.4

.6

.8

1

55 60 65Age

Note: for each age a ∈ [55, 65], the figure shows the proportion of individuals employed (or unemployed) between[a − 1, a[ who exit the labor market between [a, a + 1[. The dotted line shows this proportion computed amongindividuals who receive an inheritance between [a, a+1[, whereas the dashed line shows this proportion computedamong individuals who receive an inheritance between [a+ 1, a+ 3[.Source: Enquête Patrimoine, Insee, 1998-2010.

20

Table 1: Effect of inheritance receipt on instantaneous retirement

2 years Non heirs

(1) (2) (3) (4)

Inheritance received at t 0.326*** 0.328*** 0.278*** 0.333***(0.102) (0.103) (0.0785) (0.0784)

Additional controls No Yes No Yes

Observations 2783 2783 72708 72708Individuals 1225 1225 14337 14337

Note: the table shows the results of the estimation of a complementary log-log model, where aindicator of current labor force exit is regressed on an indicator of current inheritance receipt,and a full set of age dummies (11 levels, for ages 55 to 65). Controls in columns (2) and (4)include 3 SES levels, 3 relative diploma levels, a gender dummy, and an indicator of public/ private sector. In columns (1) and (2), the sample is defined by keeping, at each age a,individuals who receive an inheritance between [a, a+ 3[. In columns (3) and (4), we keep allindividuals. Standard errors clustered at the individual level are reported in parentheses. *,**, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively.Source: Enquête Patrimoine, Insee, 1998-2010.

21

Table 2: Effect of inheritance receipt on instantaneous retirement: some robustness checks

2 years Other controls

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)3 years 5 years 10 years

Inheritance received at t 0.328*** 0.287*** 0.241*** 0.274***(0.103) (0.0979) (0.0915) (0.0876)

Received from parents 0.274**(0.112)

Other 0.523**(0.244)

Additional controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

Observations 2783 2783 3538 4901 7236Individuals 1225 1225 1321 1528 1796

Note: the table shows the results of the estimation of a complementary log-log model, where aindicator of current labor force exit is regressed on an indicator of current inheritance receipt(columns 1, 3, 4 and 5) or an indicator that the individual is receiving the inheritance from(i) his parents or (ii) other individuals (column 2). All regressions include a full set of agedummies (11 levels, for ages 55 to 65), and controls for 3 SES levels, 3 relative diploma levels,a gender dummy, and an indicator of public / private sector. We also control for individuals’net worth in column (2). In columns (1) and (2), the sample is defined by keeping, at eachage a, individuals who either receive an inheritance between [a, a + 3[. In columns (3), (4)and (5), we keep at each age individuals who receive and inheritance respectively between[a, a+4[,[a, a+6[, and [a, a+11[. Standard errors clustered at the individual level are reportedin parentheses. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively.Source: Enquête Patrimoine, Insee, 1998-2010.

22

Table 3: Effect of inheritance receipt on instantaneous retirement for various demographic sub-groups

Education Sex SES

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)Low High Men Women Low High

Inheritance received at t 0.547*** 0.0846 0.344** 0.338** 0.413*** 0.175(0.137) (0.164) (0.141) (0.153) (0.129) (0.184)

Additional controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

Observations 1502 1281 1489 1294 1680 1103Individuals 674 551 658 567 749 476

Note: the table shows the results of the same regression as in the column (2) of Table 1for various demographic subgroups. Specifically, columns (1) and (2) respectively investigateindividuals below and above the median relative diploma, and colummns (3) and (4) concen-trate on men / women. Columns (5) and (6) study respectively blue collar to middle-levelworkers, and executives. Standard errors clustered at the individual level are reported inparentheses. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively.Source: Enquête Patrimoine, Insee, 1998-2010.

23

Table 4: Retirement rights and the effect of inheritance receipt

(1) (2) (3) (4)Inheritance * age at tBelow 60 0.502***

(0.157)60 or above 0.200

(0.138)Inheritance * contribution duration at tIncomplete 0.256

(0.168)More than 2 years missing -0.0454

(0.248)Less than 2 years missing 0.424**

(0.197)Complete 0.368*** 0.368***

(0.132) (0.132)Inheritance received before t 0.0192

(0.0910)Additional controls Yes Yes Yes YesObservations 2783 2783 2783 3714Individuals 1225 1225 1225 1537

Note: columns (1) to (3) estimate the same model as in column (2) of Table 1. In column (1),the inheritance indicator is replaced by two dummies indicating current inheritance receiptwhile an individual is aged below / above 60. In column (2), the inheritance dummy is replacedby two indicators of current inheritance receipt while having (resp. not having) earned fullretirement benefits (see appendix B for details). In column (3), the indicator for inheritancereceipt while not having earned full benefits is further broken down in two separate indicatorsfor current inheritance receipt while being more / less than two years away from full benefits.Colums (2) and (3) also include respectively 1 and 2 controls for contribution status. Column(4) reports the estimation of a similar model, where a retirement indicator is regressed on anindicator of inheritance receipt in the last two years (excluding the year of observation). Forthis regression, the sample comprises individuals who either inherited in the last two years,or in the next two years (but not in the year under consideration). Standard errors clusteredat the individual level are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%,5%, and 1% levels respectively.Source: Enquête Patrimoine, Insee, 1998-2010.

24

Table 5: Risk aversion and the effect of inheritance receipt on retirement

(1) (2) (3)Subjective scale Lottery Owns stocks

Inheritance * risk aversion

High 0.417 0.519** 0.546***(0.276) (0.262) (0.140)

Low 0.259 -0.0655 0.0929(0.362) (0.501) (0.152)

Additional controls Yes Yes YesObservations 635 597 2783Individuals 276 262 1225

Note: the table shows the results of the estimation of the same model as in Table 1, wherethe inheritance indicator is replaced by two dummies indicating current inheritance receiptfor individuals with high / low risk aversion. In column (1), risk aversion is defined usinga subjective scale from 0 to 10, in column (2) it is defined using a simple lottery describedin appendix C, and in column (3) low risk aversion is proxied by an indicator for whetheran individual own stocks. All regressions include a control for high risk aversion, and theindividual’s net worth. Standard errors clustered at the individual level are reported inparentheses. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively.Source: Enquête Patrimoine, Insee, 1998-2010.

25

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27

A A model with endogenous retirement, inheritance and

risk aversion

Here we develop a simple model with endogenous retirement, inheritance and risk aversion.

Conclusions from this model directly derives from the fact that the more risk-averse the agent

is, the less amount of inheritance she takes into account in her budget contraint. The amount

taken into account in the budget contraint is the uncertainty equivalent (cf. infra.). For a risk

averse agent, it is always lower than the expect value. It is all the lower as the agent is risk

averse. A first result is then that the more risk averse an agent is, the later she forecasts her

retirement date. A second result is that, once the inheritance received, the difference between

what she receives and the uncertainty equivalent she based her plan on, represents a windfall

gain that modifies her budget contraint. This windfall gain is then all the larger as the agent is

risk averse.

A.1 Set up

There exists several models that take into account optimal consumption and endogenous decision

to withdraw for the labor market. We introduce the dependence of the replacement rate of

pension to the date of retirement to take into account the fact that pensions depend on the

number of years of contribution. Some models use a CRRA function but, as far a we know,

none has been used to study the effect of realized bequest (versus anticipated one) and how

risk aversion shapes this effect on the decision of withdrawal. A model close to ours is Bloom,

Canning, Mansfield, and Moore (2007) and Ljungqvist and Sargent (2012) (chapter 29, pp 1203-

1208). Computations for the Hamiltonian are directly derived from their models. We add

pensions with an endogenous replacement rate, bequests and focus on the role of bequest and

risk aversion. The agent utility fonction is given by:

U =

∫ T

t0

e−δ(t−t0)u(ct)dt (5)

The beginning of the observation period is t0. T stands for the age at death. We take into

account disutility from work thanks to a constant term γ that does not depend on age. The

instantaneous utility function is given by a standard CRRA utility function with α > 0. Iwt is

an indicator whose value is 1 if the agent is working in time t and 0 otherwise (ie Iwt = 1(t<R)

28

where R stands for the time of withdrawal or retirement) .

u(c) =c1−α

1− α− γIwt

Such as

u(c) =

c1−α

1−α − γ if she is working (with γ > 0)c1−α

1−α if she is retired

So:

U =

∫ T

t0

e−δ(t−t0)(c1−αt

1− α− γIwt )dt

Her budget constraint is:

∫ T

t0

e−r(t−t0)ctdt =

∫ T

t0

e−r(t−t0)wtdt+ B +Wt0

=

∫ R

t0

e−r(t−t0)wdt+

∫ T

R

e−r(t−t0)λ(R)wdt+ B +Wt0

where Wt0 stands for the non inherited assets at time t0, wt = w if the agent is working (w

stands for the annual wage) while wt = λ(R)w if she is retired with λ(R) is the replacement rate

used to compute the pension. λ(R) depends on the date when the retirement occurs.

B is the present value of the expected bequest. It is uncertain because of uncertainty on the

exact amount that will be received24. Since consumption and retirement date both depend on

the amount of bequest through the budget constraint, the agent maximizes indeed EB [U(B)].

We assume that the agent bears the risk of not receiving the exact expected amount. Risk

aversion plays then an important role in the way she plans her future consumption path and

retirement date. Facing uncertainty (and without liquidity constraints), risk-neutral agents base

their budget constraint on the expected amount of bequest EB . Risk averse ones don’t. Intu-

itively, the more risk averse an agent is, the smaller the amount taken into account in her budget

constraint. In the extreme case of infinite risk aversion, an agent is expected to draw her plan24If the date of receipt tB and the amount B received were perfectly known, the budget constraint would be:∫ Tt0e−r(t−t0)ctdt =

∫ Tt0e−r(t−t0)wtdt+e−r(tB−t0)B+Wt0 . We note B the present value of the uncertain amount

that takes into account both uncertainty on date and on amount. The uncertainty on the date of receipt mayplay a role and be related to the uncertainty on amount. Several factors may be here at stake. If there are someliquidity constraints, an earlier bequest will unbind them and a later one maintain them longer than expected.The timing may also be related with the exact amount received: if parents consume their wealth, the sooner thedate of receipt, the higher the amount received.

29

as if she would not plan to received any bequest. On contrast, the less risk averse and the more

risk neutral the agent is, the closer to the expectation of bequest the amount taken into account

in her budget constraint.

Under uncertainty, the expected lifetime utility of an agent EB [U(B)] is lower than the one she

would reach if she receives the guarantee bequest expectation U(E(B)). Indeed this expected

lifetime utility corresponds to the utility of the so-called “certainty equivalent” of the expected

amount BCE25.

Under uncertainty, the agent solves:

maxc,R

EB [U(B)] = maxc,RU(BCE) (6)

Let’s recall that, for a risk averse agent, BCE < E(B), which means that the budget constraint is

lower with risk aversion than what it would be for risk neutral agents 26. The budget constraint

for this maximisation program thus writes:

∫ T

t0

e−r(t−t0)ctdt =

∫ T

t0

e−r(t−t0)wtdt+ B +Wt0

=

∫ R

t0

e−r(t−t0)wdt+

∫ T

R

e−r(t−t0)λ(R)wdt+BCE +Wt0 (7)

=

∫ R

t0

e−r(t−t0)wdt+

∫ T

R

e−r(t−t0)λ(R)wdt+At0 (8)

where At stands for assets at time t.

To write the Hamiltonian of the problem, we re-write the budget constraint as:

dAtdt

= wt + rAt − ct

= Iwt w + (1− Iwt )λ(R)w + rAt − ct

= Iwt w(1− λ(R)) + λ(R)w + rAt − ct

25By definition, BCE is the guarantee value of bequest that equalizes the agent’s utility with her utility underuncertainty. Cf. for instance Laffont (1989).

26Furthermore, using a bequest in an intertemporal budget constraint may imply some liquidity constraints.In this case, the agent would borrow less then her certainty equivalent amount, and we would still have that thebequest amount taken into account in the budget constraint is lower than the bequest expectation.

30

The Hamiltonian writes:

Ht = e−δ(t−t0)[c1−αt

1− α− Iwt γ] + µt[I

wt (1− λ(R))w + λ(R)w + rAt − ct]

The first order conditions are:

µt = −∂Ht∂A

= −rµt∂Ht∂ct

= e−δ(t−t0)u′(ct)− µt (9)

= 0

−e−δ(t−t0)γ + µt(1− λ(R))w

> 0 if Iwt = 1

= 0 if indifferent to Iwt ∈ {0; 1}

−e−δ(t−t0)γ + µt(1− λ(R))w < 0 if Iwt = 0

(10)

then we get the Euler equation27

ctct

=r − δα

To compute the level of consumption in ct, we use the budget constraint 8.27

µt = e−δ(t−t0)u′(ct)

µt = −δµt + cte−δ(t−t0)u′′(ct)

−rµt = −δµt + cte−δ(t−t0)u′′(ct)

(δ − r)µt = cte−δ(t−t0)u′′(ct)

(δ − r)e−δ(t−t0)u′(ct) = cte−δ(t−t0)u′′(ct)

(δ − r)u′(ct) = ctu′′(ct)

ct = (δ − r)u′(ct)

u′′(ct)

ct = (δ − r)ct

−α

31

∫ T

t0

e−r(t−t0)ctdt =w

r[1− e−r(R−t0)] + λ(R)

w

r[e−r(R−t0) − e−r(T−t0)] +A0 +BCE

αc0r(1− α)− δ

[er(1−α)−δ

α (T−t0) − 1] =w

r([1− e−r(R−t0)] + λ(R)[e−r(R−t0) − e−r(T−t0)]) +A0 +BCE

αc0r(1− α)− δ

[er(1−α)−δ

α (T−t0) − 1] = Φ(A0, BCE)

with Φ(A0, BCE) = w

r ([1− e−r(R−t0)] + λ(R)[e−r(R−t0) − e−r(T−t0)]) +A0 +BCE .

Thus

c0 =δ − r(1− α)

α[1− er(1−α)−δ

α (T−t0)]Φ(A0, B

CE) (11)

It then implies δ − r(1− α) > 0.

From equation 10, the optimal age of retirement R is given by:

e−δ(R−t0)u′(cR)[1− λ(R)]w = γe−r(R−t0)

u′(cR)[1− λ(R)]w = γe(δ−r)(R−t0)

c−αR [1− λ(R)] =γ

we(δ−r)(R−t0)

e(δ−r)(R−t0)c−α0 [1− λ(R)] =γ

we(δ−r)(R−t0)

c−α0 [1− λ(R)] =γ

w

c0 = [1− λ(R)

γw

]1α (12)

And

ct = er−δα (t−t0)[

1− λ(R)γw

]1α (13)

A.2 How risk aversion plays a role

For the sake of clarity, from now we assume r = δ. It leads to ct = c0 = [ 1−λ(R)γw

]1α ∀t ≥ 0. To

get simple closed forms from our model, we set r = 0. At time t, equation 11 re-writes, using

the superscript to explict the dependancy to BCE :

32

(T − t)cCE0 = w(RCE − t)[1− λ(RCE)] + w(T − t)λ(RCE) +ACEt (14)

(T − t)cCE0 = w(RCE − t)[1− λ(RCE)] + w(T − t)λ(RCE) +WCEt +BCE

BCE = (T − t)cCE0 − w(RCE − t)[1− λ(RCE)]− w(T − t)λ(RCE)−WCEt

BCE = (T − t)[1− λ(RCE)γw

]1α − w(RCE − t)[1− λ(RCE)]− w(T − t)λ(RCE)−WCE

t

BCE = f(RCE)

The budget constraint above is the one consistent with a bequest BCE and determines WCEt ,

the amount of non-inherited assets accumulated up to time t.

If at time t, the amount received turns out to be B, then the budget contraint moves to:

(T − t)cB0 = w(RB − t)[1− λ(RB)] + w(T − t)λ(RB) +ACEt (15)

(T − t)cB0 = w(RB − t)[1− λ(RB)] + w(T − t)λ(RB) +WCEt +B

B = (T − t)[1− λ(RB)γw

]1α − w(RB − t)[1− λ(RB)]− w(T − t)λ(RB)−WCE

t

B = f(RB)

and the agent can modify her consumption and date of retirement according to the windfall gain

(or loss) B −BCE .

f is a strictly decreasing function28 and so is f−1. Then, for any B ≥ BCE , f−1(B) ≤ f−1(BCE).

It means that for any bequest received higher than the certainty equivalent amount, the agent

will decide to withdraw earlier from the labor market.

Taking into account risk aversion leads to interesting results. If agent 1 si more risk averse than

agent 2, by definition, U1(B) ≤ U2(B), thus EU1(B) ≤ EU2(B)and B1CE ≤ B2

CE . Using the fact

that f is decreasing: R1CE ≥ R2

CE . This results has two strong implications. First, facing the

same uncertainty, a risk averse agent will plan a later retirement. Second, since for any received

bequest B, R1CE − RB ≥ R2

CE − RB . It means that the effect of a received inheritance will be

higher for the most risk averse agents.

28We model λ(R) = λ(R−R0) + λ0. It is consistent with the French retirement system described in appendixB and with the fact that, in our age-window, individuals are old enough to be close to the age of retirement R0

(generally 60) that enables to expect a replacement rate λ0. f ′(R) = −w(T−t)λαγ

[1−λ(R)

γw

]1α−1 − w[1 − λ(R)] −

wλ(T −R), so f ′(R) < 0 because λ(R) < 1, λ > 0 and T ≥ R.

33

B Retirement in France

We describe here the main features of the French retirement system which we build on in the

paper. In France, contributing to a public pension fund is mandatory, and in turn public pensions

constitute most of the pension income of retired individuals.29 For our period of analysis, the

legal retirement age, that is the age at which it becomes possible for one to cash out her pension,

is set at 60. The monthly pension for retired workers is then computed on the basis of both past

wages and years contributed to the system. Specifically, it obeys the following formula:

p = w × τ × ρ

τ = min(1,n

n0)

λ = λ0 + d(n, n0, a, a0)

where w represents the base wage, τ represents the pro rata coefficient, and λ is the replacement

rate that encompasses possible discounts or premiums. n is the number of years contributed

to the system, and n0 is fixed by the law.30 λ0 is the base replacement rate applicable to the

individual, which is usually 50% (75% for public sector employees). d is a discount or premium

term that depends on how the number of contributed years n compares to the legally set threshold

n0, and also on how the age a of the individual compares to the legally fixed age threshold a0. It

is increasing in n, positive if n ≥ n0 and negative if n ≤ n0, but cannot be negative if a ≥ a0 (in

other words, discounts do not apply after a0, but potential premiums still apply). For example

the current law specifies that d(n, n0) = 0.05∗ (n−n0) with |d| ≤ 0.25, that is a 5% discount per

year missing limited to 25% off, or a 5% premium per additional year limited to a 25% increase.

This makes discounts and premiums far from negligible, since retiring 5 years earlier than the

legal threshold n0 cuts one’s pension by at least half. Of particular interest is the legal number

of contribution years n0, and in particular whether the number of contributed years n of an

individual is above or below that threshold. When n ≥ n0, τ = 1 so the pension gains of working

one additional year only work through λ. On the other hand when n ≤ n0, the pension gains

of working one additional year can be substantial because the additional year increases both τ29In addition, private sector employees must contribute to complementary pension funds, which rules are differ-

ent from that of main public funds. However they follow the same patterns of premiums and discounts as publicpensions, so that the conclusions of this paragraph still apply.

30The number of years contributed is technically different from the number of years worked. For exampledispositions exist which enable women who stopped working to raise children to have a part of this time lapsecounted as contribution years even though they were not working nor paying retirement contributions. Using allavailable information, we do our best to account for these special cases in the data.

34

and λ. Overall, an individual has more to lose if she retires before having completed the legal

number of contribution years n0.31 In the data, we are able to reconstitute the number of years

an individual has contributed to the pension system using retrospective calendars. The calendars

contain information on periods of activity, as well as on periods of unemployment and military

service, both of which are taken into account when computing the total number of contribution

years.

31This all the more significant as the premium was only progressively introduced in 2003, and therefore onlyconcerns a small part of our sample. Most of the time, there is very little incentive to work past the legal numberof contribution years, whereas there are considerable incentives to work up to having contributed n0 years.

35

C Measures of risk aversion

In the EP waves of 2004 and 2010, a fraction of the respondents were asked questions relative to

their perception of risk. In particular, they were successively made to choose between to of the

following contracts, ordered from safer to riskier:

• Contract A: yields w with certainty

• Contract B: yields 2w with a 50% chance, and 45w with a 50% chance

• Contract C: yields 2w with a 50% chance, and 23w with a 50% chance

• Contract D: yields 2w with a 50% chance, and 12w with a 50% chance

First, respondents were asked to choose between A and C. If they chose A, then they were

asked to choose between A and B; otherwise, they were asked to choose between A and D. This

experiment allows us to classify individuals among four levels of risk aversion, from most risk

averse to least risk averse:

• A � B: 70% of individuals

• B � A � C: 16% of individuals

• C � A � D: 9% of individuals

• D � A: 5% of individuals

Individuals with a high risk aversion are those from the first category, and individuals with a low

risk aversion are those from any of the other three categories.

36

D Further results

Table 6: Effect of inheritance receipt on instantaneous retirement, without the unemployed

2 years Non heirs

(1) (2) (3) (4)

Inheritance received at t 0.373*** 0.369*** 0.280*** 0.342***(0.107) (0.107) (0.0805) (0.0805)

Additional controls No Yes No Yes

Observations 2576 2576 65978 65978Individuals 1143 1143 13459 13459

Note: the table replicates Table 1, but excluding unemployed individuals from the sample.Standard errors clustered at the individual level are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** denotesignificance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively.Source: Enquête Patrimoine, Insee, 1998-2010.

37

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oprié

tés

des

prin

cipa

ux m

o-dè

les

mac

roéc

onom

ique

s du

Ser

vice

Pub

lic

G 9

314

B

. C

RE

PO

N -

E. D

UG

UE

T

Res

earc

h &

Dev

elop

men

t, co

mpe

titio

n an

d in

nova

tion

G 9

315

B

. D

OR

MO

NT

Q

uelle

est

l'in

fluen

ce d

u co

ût d

u tr

avai

l sur

l'e

mpl

oi ?

G 9

316

D

. BL

AN

CH

ET

- C

. BR

OU

SS

E

Deu

x ét

udes

sur

l'âg

e de

la r

etra

ite

G 9

317

D. B

LAN

CH

ET

R

épar

titio

n du

trav

ail d

ans

une

popu

latio

n hé

té-

rogè

ne :

deu

x no

tes

G 9

318

D

. EY

SS

AR

TIE

R -

N.

PO

NT

Y

AM

AD

EU

S -

an

annu

al m

acro

-eco

nom

ic m

odel

fo

r th

e m

ediu

m a

nd

lon

g te

rm

G 9

319

G

. C

ET

TE

- P

h. C

UN

ÉO

- D

. E

YS

SA

RT

IER

-J.

GA

UT

IÉ

Les

effe

ts s

ur l'

empl

oi d

'un

abai

ssem

ent

du c

oût

du t

rava

il de

s je

unes

G 9

401

D. B

LAN

CH

ET

Le

s st

ruct

ures

par

âge

impo

rten

t-el

les

?

G 9

402

J.

GA

UT

IÉ

Le c

hôm

age

des

jeun

es e

n F

ranc

e :

prob

lèm

e de

fo

rmat

ion

ou p

héno

mèn

e de

file

d'a

ttent

e ?

Que

lque

s él

émen

ts d

u dé

bat

G 9

403

P.

QU

IRIO

N

Les

déch

ets

en F

ranc

e :

élém

ents

sta

tistiq

ues

et

écon

omiq

ues

G 9

404

D. L

AD

IRA

Y -

M.

GR

UN

-RE

HO

MM

E

Liss

age

par

moy

enne

s m

obile

s -

Le p

robl

ème

des

extr

émité

s de

sér

ie

G 9

405

V.

MA

ILLA

RD

T

héor

ie e

t pra

tique

de

la c

orre

ctio

n de

s ef

fets

de

jour

s ou

vrab

les

G 9

406

F

. R

OS

EN

WA

LD

La d

écis

ion

d'in

vest

ir

G 9

407

S

. JA

CO

BZ

ON

E

Les

appo

rts

de l'

écon

omie

indu

strie

lle p

our

défin

ir la

str

atég

ie é

cono

miq

ue d

e l'h

ôpita

l pub

lic

G 9

408

L.

BLO

CH

, J.

BO

UR

DIE

U,

B.

CO

LIN

-SE

DIL

LOT

, G. L

ON

GU

EV

ILLE

D

u dé

faut

de

paie

men

t au

dépô

t de

bila

n :

les

banq

uier

s fa

ce a

ux P

ME

en

diff

icul

té

G 9

409

D

. EY

SS

AR

TIE

R,

P.

MA

IRE

Im

pact

s m

acro

-éco

nom

ique

s de

mes

ures

d'a

ide

au lo

gem

ent

- qu

elqu

es é

lém

ents

d'é

valu

atio

n

G 9

410

F

. R

OS

EN

WA

LD

Sui

vi c

onjo

nctu

rel d

e l'i

nves

tisse

men

t

G 9

411

C

. DE

FE

UIL

LEY

- P

h. Q

UIR

ION

Le

s dé

chet

s d'

emba

llage

s m

énag

ers

: une

anal

yse

écon

omiq

ue d

es p

oliti

ques

fran

çais

e et

al

lem

ande

G 9

412

J. B

OU

RD

IEU

- B

. C

ŒU

RÉ

-

B.

CO

LIN

-SE

DIL

LOT

In

vest

isse

men

t, in

cert

itude

et i

rrév

ersi

bilit

é Q

uelq

ues

déve

lopp

emen

ts r

écen

ts d

e la

thé

orie

de

l'in

vest

isse

men

t

G 9

413

B.

DO

RM

ON

T -

M. P

AU

CH

ET

L'

éval

uatio

n de

l'él

astic

ité e

mpl

oi-s

alai

re d

épen

d-el

le d

es s

truc

ture

s de

qua

lific

atio

n ?

G 9

414

I.

KA

BLA

Le

Cho

ix d

e br

evet

er u

ne in

vent

ion

G 9

501

J.

BO

UR

DIE

U -

B.

CŒ

UR

É -

B. S

ED

ILL

OT

Ir

reve

rsib

le In

vest

men

t an

d U

ncer

tain

ty:

Whe

n is

the

re a

Val

ue o

f Wai

ting?

G 9

502

L.

BLO

CH

- B

. CŒ

UR

É

Impe

rfec

tions

du

mar

ché

du c

rédi

t, in

vest

isse

-m

ent

des

entr

epris

es e

t cyc

le é

cono

miq

ue

G 9

503

D. G

OU

X -

E.

MA

UR

IN

Les

tran

sfor

mat

ions

de

la d

eman

de d

e tr

avai

l par

qu

alifi

catio

n en

Fra

nce

U

ne é

tude

sur

la p

ério

de 1

970-

1993

G 9

504

N

. GR

EE

NA

N

Tec

hnol

ogie

, ch

ange

men

t org

anis

atio

nnel

, qua

-lif

icat

ions

et

empl

oi :

une

étu

de e

mpi

rique

sur

l'i

ndus

trie

man

ufac

turiè

re

G 9

505

D. G

OU

X -

E.

MA

UR

IN

Per

sist

ance

des

hié

rarc

hies

sec

torie

lles

de s

a-la

ires:

un

réex

amen

sur

don

nées

fran

çais

es

G 9

505

D. G

OU

X -

E.

MA

UR

IN

B

is

Per

sist

ence

of i

nter

-ind

ustr

y w

age

s d

iffer

entia

ls: a

re

exam

inat

ion

on m

atch

ed w

orke

r-fir

m p

anel

dat

a

G 9

506

S

. JA

CO

BZ

ON

E

Les

liens

ent

re R

MI

et c

hôm

age,

une

mis

e en

pe

rspe

ctiv

e N

ON

PA

RU

- ar

ticle

sor

ti da

ns É

cono

mie

et

Prév

isio

n n°

122

(199

6) -

page

s 95

à 1

13

G 9

507

G

. C

ET

TE

- S

. M

AH

FO

UZ

Le

par

tage

prim

aire

du

reve

nu

Con

stat

des

crip

tif s

ur lo

ngue

pér

iode

G 9

601

Ban

que

de F

ranc

e -

CE

PR

EM

AP

- D

irect

ion

de la

P

révi

sion

- É

rasm

e -

INS

EE

- O

FC

E

Str

uctu

res

et p

ropr

iété

s de

cin

q m

odèl

es m

acro

-éc

onom

ique

s fr

ança

is

G 9

602

R

app

ort

d’a

ctiv

ité d

e la

DE

SE

de

l’ann

ée

199

5

G 9

603

J.

BO

UR

DIE

U -

A.

DR

AZ

NIE

KS

L’

octr

oi d

e cr

édit

aux

PM

E :

une

ana

lyse

à p

artir

d’

info

rmat

ions

ban

caire

s

G 9

604

A

. T

OP

IOL

-BE

NS

AÏD

Le

s im

plan

tatio

ns ja

pona

ises

en

Fra

nce

G 9

605

P

. G

EN

IER

- S

. JA

CO

BZ

ON

E

Com

port

emen

ts d

e pr

éven

tion,

con

som

mat

ion

d’al

cool

et

taba

gie

: pe

ut-o

n pa

rler

d’un

e ge

stio

n gl

obal

e du

cap

ital s

anté

?

Une

mod

élis

atio

n m

icro

écon

omét

rique

em

piriq

ue

G 9

606

C. D

OZ

- F

. LE

NG

LAR

T

Fac

tor

anal

ysis

and

uno

bser

ved

com

pone

nt

mod

els:

an

appl

icat

ion

to t

he s

tudy

of

Fre

nch

busi

ness

sur

veys

G 9

607

N

. GR

EE

NA

N -

D. G

UE

LLE

C

La t

héor

ie c

oopé

rativ

e de

la f

irme

iii

G 9

608

N

. GR

EE

NA

N -

D. G

UE

LLE

C

Tec

hnol

ogic

al in

nova

tion

and

empl

oym

ent

real

loca

tion

G 9

609

P

h. C

OU

R -

F. R

UP

PR

EC

HT

L’

inté

grat

ion

asym

étriq

ue a

u se

in d

u co

ntin

ent

amér

icai

n :

un e

ssai

de

mod

élis

atio

n

G 9

610

S.

DU

CH

EN

E -

G. F

OR

GE

OT

- A

. JA

CQ

UO

T

Ana

lyse

des

évo

lutio

ns r

écen

tes

de la

pro

duct

i-vi

té a

ppar

ente

du

trav

ail

G 9

611

X

. BO

NN

ET

- S

. MA

HF

OU

Z

The

influ

ence

of

diff

eren

t sp

ecifi

catio

ns o

f w

ages

-pr

ices

spi

rals

on

the

mea

sure

of

the

NA

IRU

: the

ca

se o

f F

ranc

e

G 9

612

P

H. C

OU

R -

E. D

UB

OIS

, S. M

AH

FO

UZ

,

J. P

ISA

NI-

FE

RR

Y

The

cos

t of f

isca

l ret

renc

hmen

t re

visi

ted:

how

st

rong

is th

e ev

iden

ce?

G 9

613

A

. JA

CQ

UO

T

Les

flexi

ons

des

taux

d’a

ctiv

ité s

ont-

elle

s se

ule-

men

t co

njon

ctur

elle

s ?

G 9

614

ZH

AN

G Y

ingx

iang

- S

ON

G X

ueqi

ng

Lexi

que

mac

roéc

onom

ique

Fra

nçai

s-C

hino

is

G 9

701

J.L.

SC

HN

EID

ER

La

tax

e pr

ofes

sion

nelle

: él

émen

ts d

e ca

drag

e éc

onom

ique

G 9

702

J.L.

SC

HN

EID

ER

T

rans

ition

et s

tabi

lité

polit

ique

d’u

n sy

stèm

e re

dist

ribut

if

G 9

703

D. G

OU

X -

E.

MA

UR

IN

Tra

in o

r P

ay: D

oes

it R

educ

e In

equa

litie

s to

En-

cour

age

Firm

s to

Tra

in t

heir

Wor

kers

?

G 9

704

P

. G

EN

IER

D

eux

cont

ribut

ions

sur

dép

enda

nce

et é

quité

G 9

705

E.

DU

GU

ET

- N

. IU

NG

R

& D

Inv

estm

ent,

Pa

ten

t Life

and

Pat

ent V

alu

e A

n E

cono

met

ric A

naly

sis

at t

he F

irm L

evel

G 9

706

M

. HO

UD

EB

INE

- A

. T

OP

IOL

-BE

NS

AÏD

Le

s en

trep

rises

inte

rnat

iona

les

en F

ranc

e :

une

anal

yse

à pa

rtir

de d

onné

es in

divi

duel

les

G 9

707

M

. HO

UD

EB

INE

P

olar

isat

ion

des

activ

ités

et s

péci

alis

atio

n de

s dé

part

emen

ts e

n F

ranc

e

G 9

708

E

. D

UG

UE

T -

N. G

RE

EN

AN

Le

bia

is te

chno

logi

que

: un

e an

alys

e su

r do

nnée

s in

divi

duel

les

G 9

709

J.L.

BR

ILLE

T

Ana

lyzi

ng a

sm

all F

renc

h E

CM

Mod

el

G 9

710

J.L.

BR

ILLE

T

For

mal

izin

g th

e tr

ansi

tion

proc

ess:

sce

nario

s fo

r ca

pita

l acc

umul

atio

n

G 9

711

G

. F

OR

GE

OT

- J

. G

AU

TIÉ

In

sert

ion

prof

essi

onne

lle d

es je

unes

et p

roce

ssus

de

déc

lass

emen

t

G 9

712

E

. D

UB

OIS

H

igh

Rea

l Int

eres

t R

ates

: th

e C

onse

quen

ce o

f a

Sav

ing

Inve

stm

ent

Dis

equi

libriu

m o

r of

an

in-

suff

icie

nt C

redi

bilit

y of

Mon

etar

y A

utho

ritie

s?

G 9

713

Bila

n de

s ac

tivité

s de

la D

irect

ion

des

Étu

des

et S

ynth

èses

Éco

nom

ique

s -

1996

G 9

714

F

. L

EQ

UIL

LER

D

oes

the

Fre

nch

Con

sum

er P

rice

Inde

x O

ver-

sta

te I

nfla

tion?

G 9

715

X

. BO

NN

ET

P

eut-

on m

ettr

e en

évi

denc

e le

s rig

idité

s à

la

bais

se d

es s

alai

res

nom

inau

x ?

U

ne é

tude

sur

que

lque

s gr

ands

pay

s de

l’O

CD

E

G 9

716

N

. IU

NG

- F

. RU

PP

RE

CH

T

Pro

duct

ivité

de

la r

eche

rche

et r

ende

men

ts

d’éc

helle

dan

s le

sec

teur

pha

rmac

eutiq

ue

fran

çais

G 9

717

E

. D

UG

UE

T -

I. K

AB

LA

A

ppro

pria

tion

stra

tegy

and

the

mot

ivat

ions

to u

se

the

pate

nt s

yste

m in

Fra

nce

- A

n ec

on

omet

ric

ana

lysi

s at

th

e fi

rm le

vel

G 9

718

L.

P. P

EL

É -

P. R

AL

LE

Â

ge d

e la

ret

raite

: le

s as

pect

s in

cita

tifs

du r

égim

e gé

néra

l

G 9

719

ZH

AN

G Y

ingx

iang

- S

ON

G X

ueqi

ng

Lexi

que

mac

roéc

onom

ique

fra

nçai

s-ch

inoi

s,

chin

ois-

fran

çais

G 9

720

M

. HO

UD

EB

INE

- J

.L. S

CH

NE

IDE

R

Mes

urer

l’in

fluen

ce d

e la

fis

calit

é su

r la

loca

li-sa

tion

des

entr

epris

es

G 9

721

A

. M

OU

RO

UG

AN

E

Cré

dibi

lité,

indé

pend

ance

et

polit

ique

mon

étai

re

Une

rev

ue d

e la

litt

érat

ure

G 9

722

P.

AU

GE

RA

UD

- L

. BR

IOT

Le

s do

nnée

s co

mpt

able

s d’

entr

epris

es

Le s

ystè

me

inte

rméd

iair

e d’

entr

epris

es

Pas

sage

des

don

nées

indi

vidu

elle

s au

x do

nnée

s se

ctor

ielle

s

G 9

723

P.

AU

GE

RA

UD

- J

.E. C

HA

PR

ON

U

sing

Bus

ines

s A

ccou

nts

for

Com

pilin

g N

atio

nal

Acc

ount

s: th

e F

renc

h E

xper

ienc

e

G 9

724

P.

AU

GE

RA

UD

Le

s co

mpt

es d

’ent

repr

ise

par

activ

ités

- Le

pas

-sa

ge a

ux c

ompt

es -

De

la c

ompt

abili

té

d’en

trep

rise

à la

com

ptab

ilité

nat

iona

le -

A

para

ître

G 9

801

H. M

ICH

AU

DO

N -

C.

PR

IGE

NT

P

rése

ntat

ion

du m

odèl

e A

MA

DE

US

G 9

802

J. A

CC

AR

DO

U

ne é

tude

de

com

ptab

ilité

gén

érat

ionn

elle

po

ur la

Fra

nce

en 1

996

G 9

803

X. B

ON

NE

T -

S. D

UC

HÊ

NE

A

ppor

ts e

t lim

ites

de la

mod

élis

atio

n «

Rea

l Bus

ines

s C

ycle

s »

G 9

804

C. B

AR

LET

- C

. DU

GU

ET

-

D. E

NC

AO

UA

- J

. PR

AD

EL

The

Com

mer

cial

Suc

cess

of

Inno

vatio

ns

An

econ

omet

ric a

naly

sis

at t

he f

irm le

vel i

n F

renc

h m

anuf

actu

ring

G 9

805

P.

CA

HU

C -

Ch.

GIA

NE

LLA

-

D. G

OU

X -

A.

ZIL

BE

RB

ER

G

Equ

aliz

ing

Wag

e D

iffer

ence

s an

d B

arga

inin

g P

ower

- E

vide

nce

form

a P

anel

of

Fre

nch

Firm

s

G 9

806

J.

AC

CA

RD

O -

M.

JLA

SS

I La

pro

duct

ivité

glo

bale

des

fact

eurs

ent

re 1

975

et

1996

iv

G 9

807

Bila

n de

s ac

tivité

s de

la D

irect

ion

des

Étu

des

et

Syn

thès

es É

cono

miq

ues

- 19

97

G 9

808

A

. M

OU

RO

UG

AN

E

Can

a C

onse

rvat

ive

Gov

erno

r C

ondu

ct a

n A

c-co

mod

ativ

e M

onet

ary

Pol

icy?

G 9

809

X

. BO

NN

ET

- E

. DU

BO

IS -

L. F

AU

VE

T

Asy

mét

rie d

es in

flatio

ns r

elat

ives

et m

enus

cos

ts

: te

sts

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n fr

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ise

G 9

810

E.

DU

GU

ET

- N

. IU

NG

S

ales

and

Adv

ertis

ing

with

Spi

llove

rs a

t the

firm

le

vel:

Est

imat

ion

of a

Dyn

amic

Str

uctu

ral M

odel

on

Pa

nel

Dat

a

G 9

811

J.

P. B

ER

TH

IER

C

onge

stio

n ur

bain

e :

un m

odèl

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traf

ic d

e po

inte

à c

ourb

e dé

bit-

vite

sse

et d

eman

de

élas

tique

G 9

812

C

. PR

IGE

NT

La

par

t de

s sa

laire

s da

ns la

val

eur

ajou

tée

: une

ap

proc

he m

acro

écon

omiq

ue

G 9

813

A

.Th.

AE

RT

S

L’év

olut

ion

de la

par

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sal

aire

s da

ns la

val

eur

ajou

tée

en F

ranc

e re

flète

-t-e

lle le

s év

olut

ions

in

divi

duel

les

sur

la p

ério

de 1

979-

1994

?

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814

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SA

LAN

IÉ

Gui

de p

ratiq

ue d

es s

érie

s no

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atio

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res

G 9

901

S.

DU

CH

ÊN

E -

A. J

AC

QU

OT

U

ne c

rois

sanc

e pl

us r

iche

en

empl

ois

depu

is le

dé

but

de la

déc

enni

e ?

Une

ana

lyse

en

com

pa-

rais

on in

tern

atio

nale

G 9

902

Ch.

CO

LIN

M

odél

isat

ion

des

carr

ière

s da

ns D

estin

ie

G 9

903

Ch.

CO

LIN

É

volu

tion

de la

dis

pers

ion

des

sala

ires

: un

essa

i de

pro

spec

tive

par

mic

rosi

mul

atio

n

G 9

904

B

. C

RE

PO

N -

N.

IUN

G

Inno

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n, e

mpl

oi e

t per

form

ance

s

G 9

905

B

. C

RE

PO

N -

Ch.

GIA

NE

LLA

W

ages

ineq

ualit

ies

in F

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e 19

69-1

992

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appl

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of q

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ile r

egre

ssio

n te

chni

ques

G 9

906

C. B

ON

NE

T -

R. M

AH

IEU

M

icro

sim

ulat

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tech

niqu

es a

pplie

d to

inte

r-ge

nera

tiona

l tra

nsfe

rs -

Pen

sion

s in

a d

ynam

ic

fram

ewor

k: t

he c

ase

of F

ranc

e

G 9

907

F

. R

OS

EN

WA

LD

L’im

pact

des

con

trai

ntes

fin

anci

ères

dan

s la

dé-

cisi

on d

’inve

stis

sem

ent

G 9

908

Bila

n de

s ac

tivité

s de

la D

ES

E -

199

8

G 9

909

J.P

. ZO

YE

M

Con

trat

d’in

sert

ion

et s

ortie

du

RM

I É

valu

atio

n de

s ef

fets

d’u

ne p

oliti

que

soci

ale

G 9

910

C

h. C

OLI

N -

Fl.

LEG

RO

S -

R.

MA

HIE

U

Bila

ns c

ontr

ibut

ifs c

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des

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mes

de

retr

aite

du

sect

eur

priv

é et

de

la fo

nctio

n pu

bliq

ue

G 9

911

G

. LA

RO

QU

E -

B. S

ALA

NIÉ

U

ne d

écom

posi

tion

du n

on-e

mpl

oi e

n F

ranc

e

G 9

912

B.

SA

LAN

IÉ

Une

maq

uett

e an

alyt

ique

de

long

ter

me

du

mar

ché

du t

rava

il

G 9

912

Ch.

GIA

NE

LLA

B

is

Une

est

imat

ion

de l’

élas

ticité

de

l’em

ploi

peu

qu

alifi

é à

son

coût

G 9

913

Div

isio

n «

Red

istr

ibut

ion

et P

oliti

ques

Soc

iale

s »

Le m

odèl

e de

mic

rosi

mul

atio

n dy

nam

ique

D

ES

TIN

IE

G 9

914

E.

DU

GU

ET

M

acro

-com

man

des

SA

S p

our

l’éco

nom

étrie

des

pa

nels

et d

es v

aria

bles

qua

litat

ives

G 9

915

R. D

UH

AU

TO

IS

Évo

lutio

n de

s flu

x d’

empl

ois

en F

ranc

e en

tre

1990

et

1996

: un

e ét

ude

empi

rique

à p

artir

du

fichi

er d

es b

énéf

ices

rée

ls n

orm

aux

(BR

N)

G 9

916

J.Y

. FO

UR

NIE

R

Ext

ract

ion

du c

ycle

des

aff

aire

s : l

a m

étho

de d

e B

axte

r et

Kin

g

G 9

917

B

. C

RÉ

PO

N -

R. D

ES

PL

AT

Z -

J. M

AIR

ES

SE

E

stim

atin

g pr

ice

cost

mar

gins

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le e

cono

mie

s an

d w

orke

rs’ b

arga

inin

g po

wer

at

the

firm

leve

l

G 9

918

C

h. G

IAN

EL

LA -

Ph.

LA

GA

RD

E

Pro

duct

ivity

of

hour

s in

the

agg

rega

te p

rodu

ctio

n fu

nctio

n: a

n ev

alua

tion

on a

pan

el o

f Fre

nch

firm

s fr

om th

e m

anuf

actu

ring

sect

or

G 9

919

S.

AU

DR

IC -

P. G

IVO

RD

- C

. P

RO

ST

É

volu

tion

de l’

empl

oi e

t de

s co

ûts

par

qual

i-fic

atio

n en

tre

1982

et 1

996

G 2

000/

01

R. M

AH

IEU

Le

s dé

term

inan

ts d

es d

épen

ses

de s

anté

: un

e ap

proc

he m

acro

écon

omiq

ue

G 2

000/

02

C. A

LLA

RD

-PR

IGE

NT

- H

. GU

ILM

EA

U -

A

. Q

UIN

ET

T

he r

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xcha

nge

rate

as

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rela

tive

pric

e of

no

ntra

bles

in te

rms

of t

rada

bles

: th

eore

tical

in

vest

igat

ion

and

empi

rical

stu

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n F

renc

h da

ta

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000

/03

J.

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FO

UR

NIE

R

L’ap

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pas

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pro

posé

e pa

r C

hris

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et F

itzge

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000/

04

Bila

n de

s ac

tivité

s de

la D

ES

E -

199

9

G 2

000/

05

B.

CR

EP

ON

- F

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OS

EN

WA

LD

Inve

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sem

ent e

t con

trai

ntes

de

finan

cem

ent

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poid

s du

cyc

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Une

est

imat

ion

sur

donn

ées

fran

çais

es

G 2

000

/06

A

. F

LIP

O

Les

com

port

emen

ts m

atrim

onia

ux d

e fa

it

G 2

000

/07

R

. MA

HIE

U -

B. S

ÉD

ILL

OT

M

icro

sim

ulat

ions

of

the

retir

emen

t dec

isio

n: a

su

pply

sid

e ap

proa

ch

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000

/08

C

. AU

DE

NIS

- C

. PR

OS

T

Déf

icit

conj

onct

urel

: u

ne p

rise

en c

ompt

e de

s co

njon

ctur

es p

assé

es

G 2

000

/09

R

. MA

HIE

U -

B. S

ÉD

ILL

OT

É

quiv

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10

R. D

UH

AU

TO

IS

Ral

entis

sem

ent

de l’

inve

stis

sem

ent

: pe

tites

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indu

strie

ou

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iaire

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000

/11

G

. LA

RO

QU

E -

B. S

ALA

NIÉ

T

emps

par

tiel f

émin

in e

t inc

itatio

ns f

inan

cièr

es à

l’e

mpl

oi

G20

00/1

2 C

h. G

IAN

ELL

A

Loca

l une

mpl

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ent

and

wag

es

v

G20

00/1

3 B

. C

RE

PO

N -

Th.

HE

CK

EL

- In

form

atis

atio

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Fra

nce

: un

e év

alua

tion

à pa

rtir

de d

onné

es in

divi

duel

les

- C

ompu

teriz

atio

n in

Fra

nce:

an

eval

uatio

n ba

sed

on in

divi

dual

com

pany

dat

a

G20

01/0

1 F

. LE

QU

ILLE

R

- La

nou

velle

éco

nom

ie e

t la

mes

ure

de

la c

rois

sanc

e du

PIB

-

The

new

eco

nom

y an

d th

e m

easu

re

m

ent

of G

DP

gro

wth

G20

01/0

2 S

. A

UD

RIC

La

rep

rise

de l

a cr

oiss

ance

de

l’em

ploi

pro

fite-

t-el

le a

ussi

aux

non

-dip

lôm

és ?

G20

01/0

3 I.

BR

AU

N-L

EM

AIR

E

Évo

lutio

n et

rép

artit

ion

du s

urpl

us d

e pr

oduc

tivité

G20

01/0

4 A

. B

EA

UD

U -

Th.

HE

CK

EL

Le c

anal

du

créd

it fo

nctio

nne-

t-il

en E

urop

e ?

Une

ét

ude

de

l’hét

érog

énéi

té

des

com

port

emen

ts

d’in

vest

isse

men

t à

part

ir de

do

nnée

s de

bi

lan

agré

gées

G20

01/0

5 C

. AU

DE

NIS

- P

. B

ISC

OU

RP

-

N. F

OU

RC

AD

E -

O. L

OIS

EL

Tes

ting

the

augm

ente

d S

olow

gro

wth

mod

el:

An

empi

rical

rea

sses

smen

t usi

ng p

anel

dat

a

G20

01/0

6 R

. MA

HIE

U -

B. S

ÉD

ILL

OT

D

épar

t à

la r

etra

ite, i

rrév

ersi

bilit

é et

ince

rtitu

de

G20

01/0

7 B

ilan

des

activ

ités

de la

DE

SE

- 2

000

G20

01/0

8 J.

Ph.

GA

UD

EM

ET

Le

s di

spos

itifs

d’

acqu

isiti

on

à tit

re

facu

ltatif

d’

annu

ités

viag

ères

de

retr

aite

G20

01/0

9 B

. C

RÉ

PO

N -

Ch.

GIA

NE

LLA

F

isca

lité,

coû

t d’

usag

e du

cap

ital

et d

eman

de d

e fa

cteu

rs :

une

ana

lyse

sur

don

nées

indi

vidu

elle

s

G20

01/1

0 B

. C

RÉ

PO

N -

R. D

ES

PL

AT

Z

Éva

luat

ion

des

effe

ts

des

disp

ositi

fs

d’al

lége

men

ts

de c

harg

es s

ocia

les

sur

les

bas

sala

ires

G20

01/1

1 J.

-Y.

FO

UR

NIE

R

Com

para

ison

des

sal

aire

s de

s se

cteu

rs p

ublic

et

priv

é

G20

01/1

2 J.

-P.

BE

RT

HIE

R -

C. J

AU

LEN

T

R. C

ON

VE

NE

VO

LE

- S

. PIS

AN

I U

ne

mét

hodo

logi

e de

co

mpa

rais

on

entr

e co

nsom

mat

ions

int

erm

édia

ires

de s

ourc

e fis

cale

et

de

com

ptab

ilité

nat

iona

le

G20

01/1

3 P

. B

ISC

OU

RP

- C

h. G

IAN

EL

LA

Sub

stitu

tion

and

com

plem

enta

rity

betw

een

capi

tal,

skill

ed

and

less

sk

illed

w

orke

rs:

an

anal

ysis

at

th

e fir

m

leve

l in

th

e F

renc

h m

anuf

actu

ring

indu

stry

G20

01/1

4 I.

RO

BE

RT

-BO

BE

E

Mod

ellin

g de

mog

raph

ic b

ehav

iour

s in

the

Fre

nch

mic

rosi

mul

atio

n m

odel

D

estin

ie:

An

anal

ysis

of

fu

ture

cha

nge

in c

ompl

ete

d fe

rtili

ty

G20

01/1

5 J.

-P.

ZO

YE

M

Dia

gnos

tic

sur

la

pauv

reté

et

ca

lend

rier

de

reve

nus

: le

ca

s du

“P

anel

eu

ropé

en

des

mén

ages

»

G20

01/1

6 J.

-Y.

FO

UR

NIE

R -

P.

GIV

OR

D

La

rédu

ctio

n de

s ta

ux

d’ac

tivité

au

x âg

es

extr

êmes

, un

e sp

écifi

cité

fran

çais

e ?

G20

01/1

7 C

. AU

DE

NIS

- P

. B

ISC

OU

RP

- N

. RIE

DIN

GE

R

Exi

ste-

t-il

une

asym

étrie

dan

s la

tra

nsm

issi

on d

u pr

ix d

u br

ut a

ux p

rix d

es c

arbu

rant

s ?

G20

02/0

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. MA

GN

IEN

- J

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TA

VE

RN

IER

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. T

HE

SM

AR

Le

s st

atis

tique

s in

tern

atio

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IB

par

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en

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anda

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de

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oir

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e an

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s ré

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ts

G20

02/0

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ilan

des

activ

ités

de la

DE

SE

- 2

001

G20

02/0

3 B

. S

ÉD

ILLO

T -

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ALR

AE

T

La c

essa

tion

d’ac

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au

sein

des

cou

ples

: y

a-t-

il in

terd

épen

danc

e de

s ch

oix

?

G20

02/0

4 G

. B

RIL

HA

ULT

-

Rét

ropo

latio

n de

s sé

ries

de F

BC

F e

t ca

lcul

du

capi

tal

fixe

en

SE

C-9

5 da

ns

les

com

ptes

na

tiona

ux f

ranç

ais

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etro

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tion

of t

he i

nves

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ries

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FC

F)

and

estim

atio

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apita

l st

ocks

on

the

E

SA

-95

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s fo

r th

e F

renc

h ba

lanc

e sh

eets

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02/0

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ISC

OU

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RÉ

PO

N -

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HE

CK

EL

- N

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IED

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ER

H

ow

do

firm

s re

spon

d to

ch

eape

r co

mpu

ters

? M

icro

econ

omet

ric e

vide

nce

for

Fra

nce

base

d on

a

prod

uctio

n fu

nctio

n ap

proa

ch

G20

02/0

6 C

. AU

DE

NIS

- J

. DE

RO

YO

N -

N. F

OU

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AD

E

L’im

pact

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s no

uvel

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tech

nolo

gies

de

l’i

nfor

mat

ion

et

de

la

com

mun

icat

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sur

l’éco

nom

ie

fran

çais

e -

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bouc

lage

m

acro

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onom

ique

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02/0

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BA

RD

AJI

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DIL

LOT

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. W

ALR

AE

T

Éva

luat

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de t

rois

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orm

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énér

al

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lless

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m

odèl

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m

icro

sim

ulat

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DE

ST

INIE

G20

02/0

8 J.

-P.

BE

RT

HIE

R

Réf

lexi

ons

sur

les

diffé

rent

es n

otio

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e vo

lum

e da

ns l

es c

ompt

es n

atio

naux

: co

mpt

es a

ux p

rix

d’un

e an

née

fixe

ou

aux

prix

de

l’a

nnée

pr

écéd

ente

, sé

ries

chaî

nées

G20

02/0

9 F

. H

ILD

Le

s so

ldes

d’o

pini

on r

ésum

ent-

ils a

u m

ieux

les

ré

pons

es

des

entr

epris

es

aux

enqu

êtes

de

co

njon

ctur

e ?

G20

02/1

0 I.

RO

BE

RT

-BO

BÉ

E

Les

com

port

emen

ts

dém

ogra

phiq

ues

dans

le

m

odèl

e de

m

icro

sim

ulat

ion

Des

tinie

-

Une

co

mpa

rais

on

des

estim

atio

ns

issu

es

des

enqu

êtes

Je

unes

et

C

arriè

res

1997

et

His

toire

F

amili

ale

1999

G20

02/1

1 J.

-P.

ZO

YE

M

La d

ynam

ique

des

bas

rev

enus

: u

ne a

naly

se d

es

entr

ées-

sort

ies

de p

auvr

eté

G20

02/1

2 F

. H

ILD

P

révi

sion

s d’

infla

tion

pour

la F

ranc

e

G20

02/1

3 M

. LE

CLA

IR

Réd

uctio

n du

tem

ps d

e tr

avai

l et

ten

sion

s su

r le

s fa

cteu

rs d

e pr

oduc

tion

G20

02/1

4 E

. W

ALR

AE

T -

A. V

INC

EN

T

- A

naly

se d

e la

red

istr

ibut

ion

intr

agén

érat

ionn

elle

da

ns le

sys

tèm

e de

ret

raite

des

sal

arié

s du

priv

é -

Une

app

roch

e pa

r m

icro

sim

ulat

ion

- In

trag

ener

atio

nal

dist

ribut

iona

l an

alys

is

in

the

fren

ch

priv

ate

sect

or

pens

ion

sche

me

- A

m

icro

sim

ulat

ion

appr

oach

vi

G20

02/1

5 P

. C

HO

NE

- D

. LE

BLA

NC

- I.

RO

BE

RT

-BO

BE

E

Offr

e de

tr

avai

l fé

min

ine

et

gard

e de

s je

unes

en

fant

s

G20

02/1

6 F

. MA

UR

EL

- S

. G

RE

GO

IR

Les

indi

ces

de

com

pétit

ivité

de

s pa

ys :

in

ter-

prét

atio

n et

lim

ites

G20

03/0

1 N

. RIE

DIN

GE

R -

E.H

AU

VY

Le

coû

t de

dép

ollu

tion

atm

osph

ériq

ue p

our

les

entr

epris

es f

ranç

aise

s :

Une

est

imat

ion

à pa

rtir

de

donn

ées

indi

vidu

elle

s

G20

03/0

2 P

. B

ISC

OU

RP

et

F. K

RA

MA

RZ

C

réat

ion

d’em

ploi

s,

dest

ruct

ion

d’em

ploi

s et

in

tern

atio

nalis

atio

n de

s en

trep

rises

in

dust

rielle

s fr

ança

ises

: un

e an

alys

e su

r la

pé

riode

19

86-

1992

G20

03/0

3 B

ilan

des

activ

ités

de la

DE

SE

- 2

002

G20

03/0

4 P

.-O

. BE

FF

Y -

J. D

ER

OY

ON

-

N. F

OU

RC

AD

E -

S. G

RE

GO

IR -

N.

LAÏB

-

B.

MO

NF

OR

T

Évo

lutio

ns d

émog

raph

ique

s et

cro

issa

nce

: un

e pr

ojec

tion

mac

ro-é

cono

miq

ue à

l’ho

rizon

202

0

G20

03/0

5 P

. A

UB

ER

T

La s

ituat

ion

des

sala

riés

de p

lus

de c

inqu

ante

an

s da

ns le

sec

teur

priv

é

G20

03/0

6 P

. A

UB

ER

T -

B.

CR

ÉP

ON

A

ge,

sala

ire e

t pr

oduc

tivité

La

pro

duct

ivité

des

sal

arié

s dé

clin

e-t-

elle

en

fin

de c

arriè

re ?

G20

03/0

7 H

. B

AR

ON

- P

.O.

BE

FF

Y -

N.

FO

UR

CA

DE

- R

. M

AH

IEU

Le

ral

entis

sem

ent

de l

a pr

oduc

tivité

du

trav

ail

au

cour

s de

s an

nées

199

0

G20

03/0

8 P

.-O

. BE

FF

Y -

B. M

ON

FO

RT

P

atrim

oine

des

mén

ages

, dy

nam

ique

d’a

lloca

tion

et c

ompo

rte

men

t de

con

som

mat

ion

G20

03/0

9 P

. B

ISC

OU

RP

- N

. FO

UR

CA

DE

P

eut-

on

met

tre

en

évid

ence

l’e

xist

ence

de

rig

idité

s à

la

bais

se

des

sala

ires

à pa

rtir

de

donn

ées

indi

vidu

elle

s ?

Le c

as d

e la

Fra

nce

à la

fin

des

ann

ées

90

G20

03/1

0 M

. LE

CLA

IR -

P.

PE

TIT

P

rése

nce

synd

ical

e da

ns l

es f

irmes

: qu

el i

mpa

ct

sur

les

inég

alité

s sa

laria

les

entr

e le

s ho

mm

es e

t le

s fe

mm

es ?

G20

03/1

1 P

.-O

. B

EF

FY

-

X.

BO

NN

ET

-

M.

DA

RR

AC

Q-

PA

RIE

S -

B. M

ON

FO

RT

M

ZE

: a

smal

l mac

ro-m

odel

for

the

euro

are

a

G20

04/0

1 P

. A

UB

ER

T -

M. L

EC

LAIR

La

co

mpé

titiv

ité

expr

imée

da

ns

les

enqu

êtes

tr

imes

trie

lles

sur

la s

ituat

ion

et l

es p

ersp

ectiv

es

dans

l’in

dust

rie

G20

04/0

2 M

. DU

ÉE

- C

. R

EB

ILLA

RD

La

dé

pend

ance

de

s pe

rson

nes

âgée

s :

une

proj

ectio

n à

long

term

e

G20

04/0

3 S

. R

AS

PIL

LE

R -

N. R

IED

ING

ER

R

égul

atio

n en

viro

nnem

enta

le

et

choi

x de

lo

calis

atio

n de

s gr

oupe

s fr

ança

is

G20

04/0

4 A

. N

AB

OU

LET

- S

. RA

SP

ILLE

R

Les

déte

rmin

ants

de

la d

écis

ion

d’in

vest

ir :

une

appr

oche

pa

r le

s pe

rcep

tions

su

bjec

tives

de

s fir

mes

G20

04/0

5 N

. RA

GA

CH

E

La d

écla

ratio

n de

s en

fant

s pa

r le

s co

uple

s no

n m

arié

s es

t-e

lle f

isca

lem

ent

optim

ale

?

G20

04/0

6 M

. DU

ÉE

L’

impa

ct d

u ch

ômag

e de

s pa

rent

s su

r le

dev

enir

scol

aire

des

enf

ants

G20

04/0

7 P

. A

UB

ER

T -

E.

CA

RO

LI -

M. R

OG

ER

N

ew T

echn

olog

ies,

Wor

kpla

ce O

rgan

isat

ion

and

the

Age

Str

uctu

re o

f th

e W

orkf

orce

: F

irm-L

evel

E

vide

nce

G20

04/0

8 E

. D

UG

UE

T -

C.

LE

LA

RG

E

Les

brev

ets

accr

oiss

ent-

ils l

es i

ncita

tions

priv

ées

à in

nove

r ?

Un

exam

en m

icro

écon

omét

rique

G20

04/0

9 S

. R

AS

PIL

LER

- P

. S

ILLA

RD

A

ffili

atin

g ve

rsus

Sub

cont

ract

ing:

th

e C

ase

of M

ultin

atio

nals

G20

04/1

0 J.

BO

ISS

INO

T -

C. L

’AN

GE

VIN

- B

. M

ON

FO

RT

P

ublic

Deb

t S

usta

inab

ility

: S

ome

Res

ults

on

the

Fre

nch

Cas

e

G20

04/1

1 S

. A

NA

NIA

N -

P. A

UB

ER

T

Tra

vaill

eurs

âgé

s, n

ouve

lles

tech

nolo

gies

et

cha

ngem

ents

org

anis

atio

nnel

s :

un r

éexa

men

à

part

ir de

l’en

quêt

e «

RE

PO

NS

E »

G20

04/1

2 X

. BO

NN

ET

- H

. P

ON

CE

T

Str

uctu

res

de r

even

us e

t pr

open

sion

s di

ffér

ente

s à

cons

omm

er

- V

ers

une

équa

tion

de

cons

omm

atio

n de

s m

énag

es

plus

ro

bust

e en

pr

évis

ion

pour

la F

ranc

e

G20

04/1

3 C

. PIC

AR

T

Éva

luer

la r

enta

bilit

é de

s so

ciét

és n

on f

inan

cièr

es

G20

04/1

4 J.

BA

RD

AJI

- B

. SÉ

DIL

LO

T -

E.

WA

LRA

ET

Le

s re

trai

tes

du

sect

eur

publ

ic :

pr

ojec

tions

à

l’hor

izon

20

40

à l’a

ide

du

mod

èle

de

mic

rosi

mul

atio

n D

ES

TIN

IE

G20

05/0

1 S

. B

UF

FE

TE

AU

- P

. GO

DE

FR

OY

C

ondi

tions

de

dépa

rt e

n re

trai

te s

elon

l’âg

e de

fin

d’

étud

es :

anal

yse

pros

pect

ive

pour

le

s gé

néra

tions

194

5 à1

974

G20

05/0

2 C

. AF

SA

- S

. BU

FF

ET

EA

U

L’év

olut

ion

de l’

activ

ité f

émin

ine

en F

ranc

e :

une

appr

oche

par

pse

udo-

pane

l

G20

05/0

3 P

. A

UB

ER

T -

P.

SIL

LAR

D

Dél

ocal

isat

ions

et

rédu

ctio

ns d

’eff

ectif

s

dans

l’in

dust

rie f

ranç

aise

G20

05/0

4 M

. LE

CLA

IR -

S. R

OU

X

Mes

ure

et u

tilis

atio

n de

s em

ploi

s in

stab

les

da

ns le

s en

trep

rises

G20

05/0

5 C

. L’A

NG

EV

IN -

S.

SE

RR

AV

ALL

E

Per

form

ance

s à

l’exp

orta

tion

de la

Fra

nce

et

de

l’Alle

mag

ne -

Une

ana

lyse

par

sec

teur

et

dest

inat

ion

géog

raph

ique

G20

05/0

6 B

ilan

des

activ

ités

de l

a D

irec

tion

des

Étu

des

et

Syn

thès

es É

cono

miq

ues

- 20

04

G20

05/0

7 S

. R

AS

PIL

LE

R

La

conc

urre

nce

fisca

le :

pr

inci

paux

en

seig

ne-

men

ts d

e l’a

naly

se é

cono

miq

ue

G20

05/0

8 C

. L’A

NG

EV

IN -

N. L

AÏB

É

duca

tion

et c

rois

sanc

e en

Fra

nce

et d

ans

un

pane

l de

21 p

ays

de l’

OC

DE

vii

G20

05/0

9 N

. FE

RR

AR

I P

révo

ir l’i

nves

tisse

men

t de

s en

trep

rises

U

n in

dica

teur

de

s ré

visi

ons

dans

l’e

nquê

te

de

conj

onct

ure

sur

les

inve

stis

sem

ents

da

ns

l’ind

ustr

ie.

G20

05/1

0 P

.-O

. BE

FF

Y -

C.

L’A

NG

EV

IN

Chô

mag

e et

bou

cle

prix

-sal

aire

s :

ap

port

d’u

n m

odèl

e «

qual

ifiés

/peu

qua

lifié

s »

G20

05/1

1 B

. H

EIT

Z

A t

wo-

stat

es M

arko

v-sw

itchi

ng m

odel

of

infla

tion

in

Fra

nce

and

the

US

A:

cred

ible

ta

rget

V

S

infla

tion

spira

l

G20

05/1

2 O

. B

IAU

- H

. ER

KE

L-R

OU

SS

E -

N. F

ER

RA

RI

Rép

onse

s in

divi

duel

les

aux

enqu

êtes

de

co

njon

ctur

e et

pré

visi

on m

acro

écon

omiq

ues

: E

xem

ple

de

la

prév

isio

n de

la

pr

oduc

tion

man

ufac

turiè

re

G20

05/1

3 P

. A

UB

ER

T -

D. B

LAN

CH

ET

- D

. BLA

U

The

lab

our

mar

ket

afte

r ag

e 50

: so

me

elem

ents

of

a F

ranc

o-A

mer

ican

com

paris

on

G20

05/1

4 D

. BL

AN

CH

ET

- T

. DE

BR

AN

D -

P

. D

OU

RG

NO

N -

P. P

OLL

ET

L’

enqu

ête

SH

AR

E :

pr

ésen

tatio

n et

pr

emie

rs

résu

ltats

de

l’édi

tion

fran

çais

e

G20

05/1

5 M

. DU

ÉE

La

m

odél

isat

ion

des

com

port

emen

ts

dém

ogra

-ph

ique

s da

ns

le

mod

èle

de

mic

rosi

mul

atio

n D

ES

TIN

IE

G20

05/1

6 H

. RA

OU

I -

S.

RO

UX

É

tude

de

sim

ulat

ion

sur

la p

artic

ipat

ion

vers

ée

aux

sala

riés

par

les

entr

epris

es

G20

06/0

1 C

. BO

NN

ET

- S

. BU

FF

ET

EA

U -

P. G

OD

EF

RO

Y

Dis

parit

és

de

retr

aite

de

dr

oit

dire

ct

entr

e ho

mm

es e

t fem

mes

: qu

elle

s év

olut

ions

?

G20

06/0

2 C

. PIC

AR

T

Les

gaze

lles

en F

ranc

e

G20

06/0

3 P

. A

UB

ER

T -

B.

CR

ÉP

ON

-P

. ZA

MO

RA

Le

ren

dem

ent

appa

rent

de

la f

orm

atio

n co

ntin

ue

dan

s le

s en

tre

pris

es :

effe

ts s

ur l

a pr

oduc

tivité

et

les

sala

ires

G20

06/0

4 J.

-F. O

UV

RA

RD

- R

. R

AT

HE

LOT

D

emog

raph

ic c

hang

e an

d un

empl

oym

ent:

w

hat

do m

acro

econ

omet

ric m

odel

s pr

edic

t?

G20

06/0

5 D

. BLA

NC

HE

T -

J.-

F.

OU

VR

AR

D

Indi

cate

urs

d’en

gage

men

ts

impl

icite

s de

s sy

stè

me

s d

e re

tra

ite :

ch

iffra

ges,

p

rop

riété

s an

alyt

ique

s et

ré

actio

ns

à de

s ch

ocs

dém

ogra

phiq

ues

type

s

G20

06/0

6 G

. B

IAU

- O

. B

IAU

- L

. R

OU

VIE

RE

N

onpa

ram

etric

For

ecas

ting

of t

he M

anuf

actu

ring

Out

put G

row

th w

ith F

irm-le

vel S

urve

y D

ata

G20

06/0

7 C

. AF

SA

- P

. GIV

OR

D

Le

rôle

de

s co

nditi

ons

de

trav

ail

dans

le

s ab

senc

es p

our

mal

adie

G20

06/0

8 P

. S

ILLA

RD

- C

. L’A

NG

EV

IN -

S. S

ER

RA

VA

LL

E

Per

form

ance

s co

mpa

rées

à

l’exp

orta

tion

de

la

Fra

nce

et d

e se

s pr

inci

paux

par

tena

ires

U

ne a

naly

se s

truc

ture

lle s

ur 1

2 an

s

G20

06/0

9 X

. BO

UT

IN -

S. Q

UA

NT

IN

Une

m

étho

dolo

gie

d’év

alua

tion

com

ptab

le

du

coût

du

capi

tal d

es e

ntre

pris

es f

ranç

aise

s :

1984

-20

02

G20

06/1

0 C

. AF

SA

L’

estim

atio

n d’

un c

oût

impl

icite

de

la p

énib

ilité

du

trav

ail c

hez

les

trav

aille

urs

âgés

G20

06/1

1 C

. LE

LAR

GE

Le

s en

trep

rises

(in

dust

rielle

s)

fran

çais

es

sont

-el

les

à la

fron

tière

tec

hnol

ogiq

ue ?

G20

06/1

2 O

. B

IAU

- N

. FE

RR

AR

I T

héor

ie d

e l’o

pini

on

Fau

t-il

pond

érer

les

répo

nses

indi

vidu

elle

s ?

G20

06/1

3 A

. K

OU

BI -

S. R

OU

X

Une

ré

inte

rpré

tatio

n de

la

re

latio

n en

tre

prod

uctiv

ité

et

inég

alité

s sa

laria

les

dans

le

s en

trep

rises

G20

06/1

4 R

. RA

TH

ELO

T -

P.

SIL

LAR

D

The

im

pact

of

lo

cal

taxe

s on

pl

ants

lo

catio

n de

cisi

on

G20

06/1

5 L.

GO

NZ

ALE

Z -

C.

PIC

AR

T

Div

ersi

ficat

ion,

rec

entr

age

et p

oids

des

act

ivité

s de

sup

port

dan

s le

s gr

oupe

s (1

993-

2000

)

G20

07/0

1 D

. SR

AE

R

Allè

gem

ents

de

co

tisat

ions

pa

tron

ales

et

dy

nam

ique

sal

aria

le

G20

07/0

2 V

. A

LBO

UY

- L

. LE

QU

IEN

Le

s re

ndem

ents

non

mon

étai

res

de l

’édu

catio

n :

le c

as d

e la

san

té

G20

07/0

3 D

. BL

AN

CH

ET

- T

. DE

BR

AN

D

Asp

iratio

n à

la r

etra

ite,

sant

é et

sat

isfa

ctio

n au

tr

avai

l : u

ne c

ompa

rais

on e

urop

éenn

e

G20

07/0

4 M

. BA

RLE

T -

L.

CR

US

SO

N

Que

l im

pact

des

var

iatio

ns d

u pr

ix d

u pé

trol

e su

r la

cro

issa

nce

fran

çais

e ?

G20

07/0

5 C

. PIC

AR

T

Flu

x d’

empl

oi e

t de

mai

n-d’

œuv

re e

n F

ranc

e :

un

réex

amen

G20

07/0

6 V

. A

LBO

UY

- C

. T

AV

AN

M

assi

ficat

ion

et

dém

ocra

tisat

ion

de

l’ens

eign

emen

t sup

érie

ur e

n F

ranc

e

G20

07/0

7 T

. LE

BA

RB

AN

CH

ON

T

he

Cha

ngin

g re

spon

se

to

oil

pric

e sh

ocks

in

F

ranc

e: a

DS

GE

typ

e ap

proa

ch

G20

07/0

8 T

. C

HA

NE

Y -

D. S

RA

ER

- D

. TH

ES

MA

R

Col

late

ral V

alue

and

Cor

pora

te I

nves

tmen

t E

vide

nce

from

the

Fre

nch

Rea

l Est

ate

Mar

ket

G20

07/0

9 J.

BO

ISS

INO

T

Con

sum

ptio

n ov

er

the

Life

C

ycle

: F

acts

fo

r F

ranc

e

G20

07/1

0 C

. AF

SA

In

terp

réte

r le

s va

riabl

es

de

satis

fact

ion

: l’e

xem

ple

de la

dur

ée d

u tr

avai

l

G20

07/1

1 R

. RA

TH

ELO

T -

P.

SIL

LAR

D

Zon

es

Fra

nche

s U

rbai

nes

: qu

els

effe

ts

sur

l’em

ploi

sa

larié

et

le

s cr

éatio

ns

d’ét

ablis

sem

ents

?

G20

07/1

2 V

. A

LBO

UY

- B

. CR

ÉP

ON

A

léa

mor

al

en

sant

é :

une

éval

uatio

n da

ns

le

cadr

e du

mod

èle

caus

al d

e R

ubin

G20

08/0

1 C

. PIC

AR

T

Les

PM

E

fran

çais

es :

re

ntab

les

mai

s pe

u dy

nam

ique

s

viii

G20

08/0

2 P

. B

ISC

OU

RP

- X

. BO

UT

IN -

T. V

ER

GÉ

T

he E

ffec

ts o

f Ret

ail R

egul

atio

ns o

n P

rice

s E

vide

nce

form

the

Loi

Gal

land

G20

08/0

3 Y

. B

AR

BE

SO

L -

A. B

RIA

NT

É

cono

mie

s d’

aggl

omér

atio

n et

pr

oduc

tivité

de

s en

trep

rises

: e

stim

atio

n su

r do

nnée

s in

divi

duel

les

fran

çais

es

G20

08/0

4 D

. BL

AN

CH

ET

- F

. LE

GA

LLO

Le

s pr

ojec

tions

dé

mog

raph

ique

s :

prin

cipa

ux

méc

anis

mes

et

reto

ur s

ur l’

expé

rienc

e fr

ança

ise

G20

08/0

5 D

. BLA

NC

HE

T -

F.

TO

UT

LEM

ON

DE

É

volu

tions

dé

mog

raph

ique

s et

dé

form

atio

n du

cy

cle

de v

ie a

ctiv

e :

quel

les

rela

tions

?

G20

08/0

6 M

. BA

RLE

T -

D. B

LAN

CH

ET

- L

. CR

US

SO

N

Inte

rnat

iona

lisat

ion

et f

lux

d’em

ploi

s :

que

dit

une

appr

oche

com

ptab

le ?

G20

08/0

7 C

. LE

LAR

GE

- D

. SR

AE

R -

D. T

HE

SM

AR

E

ntre

pren

eurs

hip

and

Cre

dit

Con

stra

ints

-

Evi

denc

e fr

om

a F

renc

h Lo

an

Gua

rant

ee

Pro

gram

G20

08/0

8 X

. BO

UT

IN -

L. J

AN

IN

Are

Pric

es R

eally

Affe

cted

by

Mer

gers

?

G20

08/0

9 M

. BA

RL

ET

- A

. B

RIA

NT

- L

. C

RU

SS

ON

C

once

ntra

tion

géog

raph

ique

da

ns

l’ind

ustr

ie

man

ufac

turiè

re e

t da

ns l

es s

ervi

ces

en F

ranc

e :

une

appr

oche

par

un

indi

cate

ur e

n co

ntin

u

G20

08/1

0 M

. BE

FF

Y -

É. C

OU

DIN

- R

. RA

TH

ELO

T

Who

is

co

nfro

nted

to

in

secu

re

labo

r m

arke

t hi

stor

ies?

Som

e ev

iden

ce b

ased

on

the

Fre

nch

labo

r m

arke

t tra

nsiti

on

G20

08/1

1 M

. RO

GE

R -

E.

WA

LRA

ET

S

ocia

l Sec

urity

and

Wel

l-Bei

ng o

f th

e E

lder

ly:

the

Cas

e of

Fra

nce

G20

08/1

2 C

. AF

SA

A

naly

ser

les

com

posa

ntes

du

bien

-êtr

e et

de

son

évol

utio

n

Une

ap

proc

he

empi

rique

su

r do

nnée

s in

divi

duel

les

G20

08/1

3 M

. BA

RLE

T -

D. B

LAN

CH

ET

-

T.

LE B

AR

BA

NC

HO

N

Mic

rosi

mul

er le

mar

ché

du tr

avai

l : u

n pr

otot

ype

G20

09/0

1 P

.-A

. PIO

NN

IER

Le

par

tage

de

la v

aleu

r aj

outé

e en

Fra

nce,

19

49-2

007

G20

09/0

2 La

uren

t C

LAV

EL

- C

hris

telle

MIN

OD

IER

A

M

onth

ly

Indi

cato

r of

th

e F

renc

h B

usin

ess

Clim

ate

G20

09/0

3 H

. ER

KE

L-R

OU

SS

E -

C. M

INO

DIE

R

Do

Bus

ines

s T

ende

ncy

Sur

veys

in

Indu

stry

and

S

ervi

ces

Hel

p in

For

ecas

ting

GD

P G

row

th?

A

Rea

l-Tim

e A

naly

sis

on F

renc

h D

ata

G20

09/0

4 P

. G

IVO

RD

- L

. W

ILN

ER

Le

s co

ntra

ts t

empo

raire

s :

trap

pe o

u m

arch

epie

d ve

rs l’

empl

oi s

tabl

e ?

G20

09/0

5 G

. LA

LA

NN

E -

P.-

A. P

ION

NIE

R -

O. S

IMO

N

Le p

arta

ge d

es f

ruits

de

la c

rois

sanc

e de

195

0 à

2008

: u

ne a

ppro

che

par

les

com

ptes

de

surp

lus

G20

09/0

6 L.

DA

VE

ZIE

S -

X. D

’HA

ULT

FO

EU

ILLE

F

aut-

il po

ndér

er ?

…

Ou

l’éte

rnel

le

ques

tion

de

l’éco

nom

ètre

con

fron

té à

des

don

nées

d’e

nquê

te

G20

09/0

7 S

. Q

UA

NT

IN -

S. R

AS

PIL

LER

- S

. SE

RR

AV

AL

LE

Com

mer

ce

intr

agro

upe,

fis

calit

é et

pr

ix

de

tran

sfer

ts :

une

ana

lyse

sur

don

nées

fran

çais

es

G20

09/0

8 M

. CLE

RC

- V

. MA

RC

US

É

last

icité

s-pr

ix d

es c

onso

mm

atio

ns é

nerg

étiq

ues

des

mén

ages

G20

09/0

9 G

. LA

LA

NN

E -

E. P

OU

LIQ

UE

N -

O. S

IMO

N

Prix

du

pétr

ole

et c

rois

sanc

e po

tent

ielle

à l

ong

term

e

G20

09/1

0 D

. BLA

NC

HE

T -

J.

LE C

AC

HE

UX

-

V.

MA

RC

US

A

djus

ted

net

savi

ngs

and

othe

r ap

proa

ches

to

su

stai

nabi

lity:

som

e th

eore

tical

bac

kgro

und

G20

09/1

1 V

. B

ELL

AM

Y -

G.

CO

NS

ALE

S -

M.

FE

SS

EA

U -

S

. LE

LA

IDIE

R -

É. R

AY

NA

UD

U

ne d

écom

posi

tion

du c

ompt

e de

s m

énag

es d

e la

co

mpt

abili

té

natio

nale

pa

r ca

tégo

rie

de

mén

age

en 2

003

G20

09/1

2 J.

BA

RD

AJI

- F

. TA

LLE

T

Det

ectin

g E

cono

mic

R

egim

es

in

Fra

nce:

a

Qua

litat

ive

Mar

kov-

Sw

itchi

ng

Indi

cato

r U

sing

M

ixed

Fre

quen

cy D

ata

G20

09/1

3 R

. A

EB

ER

HA

RD

T

- D

. F

OU

GÈ

RE

-

R. R

AT

HE

LOT

D

iscr

imin

atio

n à

l’em

bauc

he :

com

men

t ex

ploi

ter

les

proc

édur

es d

e te

stin

g ?

G20

09/1

4 Y

. B

AR

BE

SO

L -

P. G

IVO

RD

- S

. QU

AN

TIN

P

arta

ge

de

la

vale

ur

ajou

tée,

ap

proc

he

par

donn

ées

mic

roéc

onom

ique

s

G20

09/1

5 I.

BU

ON

O -

G.

LALA

NN

E

The

Eff

ect

of t

he U

rugu

ay r

ound

on

the

Inte

nsiv

e an

d E

xten

sive

Mar

gins

of

Tra

de

G20

10/0

1 C

. MIN

OD

IER

A

vant

ages

com

paré

s de

s sé

ries

des

prem

ière

s va

leur

s pu

blié

es

et

des

série

s de

s va

leur

s ré

visé

es -

Un

exer

cice

de

prév

isio

n en

tem

ps r

éel

de la

cro

issa

nce

trim

estr

ielle

du

PIB

en

Fra

nce

G20

10/0

2 V

. A

LBO

UY

- L

. DA

VE

ZIE

S -

T. D

EB

RA

ND

H

ealth

Exp

endi

ture

Mod

els:

a C

ompa

rison

of

Fiv

e S

peci

ficat

ions

usi

ng P

anel

Dat

a

G20

10/0

3 C

. KL

EIN

- O

. SIM

ON

Le

mod

èle

MÉ

SA

NG

E r

éest

imé

en b

ase

2000

T

ome

1 –

Ver

sion

ave

c vo

lum

es à

prix

con

stan

ts

G20

10/0

4 M

.-É

. CLE

RC

- É

. CO

UD

IN

L’IP

C,

miro

ir de

l’é

volu

tion

du c

oût

de l

a vi

e en

F

ranc

e ?

Ce

qu’a

ppor

te

l’ana

lyse

de

s co

urbe

s d’

Eng

el

G20

10/0

5 N

. CE

CI-

RE

NA

UD

- P

.-A

. C

HE

VA

LIE

R

Les

seui

ls d

e 10

, 20

et

50 s

alar

iés

: im

pact

sur

la

taill

e de

s en

trep

rises

fra

nçai

ses

G20

10/0

6 R

. AE

BE

RH

AR

DT

- J

. P

OU

GE

T

Nat

iona

l O

rigin

D

iffer

ence

s in

W

ages

an

d H

iera

rchi

cal

Pos

ition

s -

Evi

denc

e on

Fre

nch

Ful

l-T

ime

Mal

e W

orke

rs f

rom

a m

atch

ed E

mpl

oyer

-E

mpl

oye

e D

atas

et

G20

10/0

7 S

. B

LAS

CO

- P

. GIV

OR

D

Les

traj

ecto

ires

prof

essi

onne

lles

en d

ébut

de

vie

activ

e :

quel

impa

ct d

es c

ontr

ats

tem

pora

ires

?

G20

10/0

8 P

. G

IVO

RD

M

étho

des

écon

omét

rique

s po

ur

l’éva

luat

ion

de

polit

ique

s pu

bliq

ues

ix

G20

10/0

9 P

.-Y

. CA

BA

NN

ES

- V

. LA

PÈ

GU

E -

E

. P

OU

LIQ

UE

N -

M. B

EF

FY

- M

. GA

INI

Que

lle

croi

ssan

ce

de

moy

en

term

e ap

rès

la

cris

e ?

G20

10/1

0 I.

BU

ON

O -

G. L

ALA

NN

E

La r

éact

ion

des

entr

epris

es f

ranç

aise

s

à la

bai

sse

des

tarif

s do

uani

ers

étra

nger

s

G20

10/1

1 R

. RA

TH

EL

OT

- P

. S

ILLA

RD

L’

appo

rt d

es m

étho

des

à no

yaux

pou

r m

esur

er la

co

ncen

trat

ion

géog

raph

ique

-

App

licat

ion

à la

co

ncen

trat

ion

des

imm

igré

s en

Fra

nce

de 1

968

à 19

99

G20

10/1

2 M

. BA

RA

TO

N -

M.

BE

FF

Y -

D. F

OU

GÈ

RE

U

ne é

valu

atio

n de

l’e

ffet

de l

a ré

form

e de

200

3 su

r le

s dé

part

s en

re

trai

te

- Le

ca

s de

s en

seig

nant

s du

sec

ond

degr

é pu

blic

G20

10/1

3 D

. B

LA

NC

HE

T -

S.

BU

FF

ET

EA

U -

E.

CR

EN

NE

R

S.

LE M

INE

Z

Le

mod

èle

de

mic

rosi

mul

atio

n D

estin

ie

2 :

prin

cipa

les

cara

ctér

istiq

ues

et p

rem

iers

rés

ulta

ts

G20

10/1

4 D

. BLA

NC

HE

T -

E. C

RE

NN

ER

Le

blo

c re

tra

ites

du

mod

èle

Des

tinie

2 :

gu

ide

de l’

utili

sate

ur

G20

10/1

5 M

. B

AR

LET

-

L.

CR

US

SO

N

- S

. D

UP

UC

H

- F

. PU

EC

H

Des

se

rvic

es

écha

ngés

au

x se

rvic

es

écha

n-ge

able

s : u

ne a

pplic

atio

n su

r do

nnée

s fr

ança

ises

G20

10/1

6 M

. BE

FF

Y -

T. K

AM

ION

KA

P

ublic

-priv

ate

wag

e ga

ps:

is c

ivil-

serv

ant

hum

an

capi

tal s

ecto

r-sp

ecifi

c?

G20

10/1

7 P

.-Y

. C

AB

AN

NE

S

- H

. E

RK

EL

-RO

US

SE

-

G.

LAL

AN

NE

- O

. MO

NS

O -

E.

PO

ULI

QU

EN

Le

mod

èle

Més

ange

rée

stim

é en

bas

e 20

00

Tom

e 2

- V

ersi

on a

vec

volu

mes

à p

rix c

haîn

és

G20

10/1

8 R

. AE

BE

RH

AR

DT

- L

. DA

VE

ZIE

S

Con

ditio

nal

Logi

t w

ith o

ne B

inar

y C

ovar

iate

: Li

nk

betw

een

the

Sta

tic a

nd D

ynam

ic C

ases

G20

11/0

1 T

. LE

BA

RB

AN

CH

ON

- B

. OU

RLI

AC

- O

. S

IMO

N

Les

mar

chés

du

trav

ail f

ranç

ais

et a

mér

icai

n fa

ce

aux

choc

s co

njon

ctur

els

des

anné

es

1986

à

2007

: u

ne m

odél

isat

ion

DS

GE

G20

11/0

2 C

. MA

RB

OT

U

ne

éval

uatio

n de

la

ré

duct

ion

d’im

pôt

pour

l’e

mpl

oi d

e sa

larié

s à

dom

icile

G20

11/0

3 L.

DA

VE

ZIE

S

Mod

èles

à

effe

ts

fixes

, à

ef

fets

al

éato

ires,

m

odèl

es m

ixte

s ou

mul

ti-ni

veau

x :

prop

riété

s et

m

ises

en

œ

uvre

de

s m

odél

isat

ions

de

l’h

étér

ogén

éité

dan

s le

cas

de

donn

ées

grou

pées

G20

11/0

4 M

. RO

GE

R -

M. W

AS

ME

R

Het

erog

enei

ty

mat

ters

: la

bour

pr

oduc

tivity

di

ffere

ntia

ted

by a

ge a

nd s

kills

G20

11/0

5 J.

-C. B

RIC

ON

GN

E -

J.-

M. F

OU

RN

IER

V

. LA

PÈ

GU

E -

O.

MO

NS

O

De

la

cris

e fin

anci

ère

à la

cr

ise

écon

omiq

ue

L’im

pact

des

per

turb

atio

ns f

inan

cièr

es d

e 20

07 e

t 20

08 s

ur la

cro

issa

nce

de s

ept

pays

indu

stria

lisés

G20

11/0

6 P

. C

HA

RN

OZ

- É

. CO

UD

IN -

M. G

AIN

I W

age

ineq

ualit

ies

in F

ranc

e 19

76-2

004:

a

quan

tile

regr

essi

on a

naly

sis

G20

11/0

7 M

. CLE

RC

- M

. GA

INI

- D

. BL

AN

CH

ET

R

ecom

men

datio

ns

of

the

Stig

litz-

Sen

-Fito

ussi

R

epor

t: A

few

illu

stra

tions

G20

11/0

8 M

. BA

CH

ELE

T -

M. B

EF

FY

- D

. B

LAN

CH

ET

P

roje

ter

l’im

pact

des

réf

orm

es d

es r

etra

ites

sur

l’act

ivité

des

55

ans

et p

lus

: un

e co

mpa

rais

on d

e tr

ois

mod

èles

G20

11/0

9 C

. LO

UV

OT

-RU

NA

VO

T

L’év

alua

tion

de

l’act

ivité

di

ssim

ulée

de

s en

tre-

pris

es s

ur l

a ba

se d

es c

ontr

ôles

fis

caux

et

son

inse

rtio

n da

ns le

s co

mpt

es n

atio

naux

G20

11/1

0 A

. S

CH

RE

IBE

R -

A. V

ICA

RD

La

te

rtia

risat

ion

de

l’éco

nom

ie

fran

çais

e et

le

ra

lent

isse

men

t de

la

prod

uctiv

ité e

ntre

197

8 et

20

08

G20

11/1

1 M

.-É

. CLE

RC

- O

. MO

NS

O -

E. P

OU

LIQ

UE

N

Les

inég

alité

s en

tre

géné

ratio

ns d

epui

s le

bab

y-bo

om

G20

11/1

2 C

. MA

RB

OT

- D

. RO

Y

Éva

luat

ion

de l

a tr

ansf

orm

atio

n de

la

rédu

ctio

n d'

impô

t en

cré

dit

d'im

pôt

pour

l'em

ploi

de

sala

riés

à do

mic

ile e

n 20

07

G20

11/1

3 P

. G

IVO

RD

- R

. RA

TH

EL

OT

- P

. SIL

LA

RD

P

lace

-bas

ed

tax

exem

ptio

ns

and

disp

lace

men

t ef

fect

s:

An

eval

uatio

n of

th

e Z

ones

F

ranc

hes

Urb

aine

s pr

ogra

m

G20

11/1

4 X

. D

’HA

ULT

FO

EU

ILL

E

- P

. G

IVO

RD

-

X. B

OU

TIN

T

he E

nviro

nmen

tal

Effe

ct o

f G

ree

n T

axa

tion:

th

e C

ase

of t

he F

renc

h “B

onus

/Mal

us”

G20

11/1

5 M

. B

AR

LET

-

M.

CLE

RC

-

M.

GA

RN

EO

-

V.

LAP

ÈG

UE

- V

. M

AR

CU

S

La

nouv

elle

ve

rsio

n du

m

odèl

e M

ZE

, m

odèl

e m

acro

écon

omét

rique

pou

r la

zon

e eu

ro

G20

11/1

6 R

. AE

BE

RH

AR

DT

- I.

BU

ON

O -

H. F

AD

ING

ER

Le

arni

ng,

Inco

mpl

ete

Con

trac

ts

and

Exp

ort

Dyn

amic

s:

The

ory

and

Evi

denc

e fo

rm

Fre

nch

Firm

s

G20

11/1

7 C

. KE

RD

RA

IN -

V. L

AP

ÈG

UE

R

estr

ictiv

e F

isca

l Pol

icie

s in

Eur

ope:

W

hat

are

the

Like

ly E

ffect

s?

G20

12/0

1 P

. G

IVO

RD

- S

. Q

UA

NT

IN -

C.

TR

EV

IEN

A

Lon

g-T

erm

Eva

luat

ion

of t

he F

irst

Gen

erat

ion

of t

he F

renc

h U

rban

Ent

erpr

ise

Zon

es

G20

12/0

2 N

. CE

CI-

RE

NA

UD

- V

. CO

TT

ET

P

oliti

que

sala

riale

et

perf

orm

ance

des

ent

repr

ises

G20

12/0

3 P

. F

ÉV

RIE

R -

L.

WIL

NE

R

Do

Con

sum

ers

Cor

rect

ly

Exp

ect

Pric

e R

educ

tions

? T

estin

g D

ynam

ic B

ehav

ior

G20

12/0

4 M

. GA

INI

- A

. LE

DU

C -

A. V

ICA

RD

S

choo

l as

a s

helte

r? S

choo

l le

avin

g-ag

e an

d th

e bu

sine

ss c

ycle

in F

ranc

e

G20

12/0

5 M

. GA

INI

- A

. LE

DU

C -

A. V

ICA

RD

A

sca

rred

gen

erat

ion?

Fre

nch

evid

ence

on

youn

g pe

ople

ent

erin

g in

to a

tou

gh la

bour

mar

ket

G20

12/0

6 P

. A

UB

ER

T -

M. B

AC

HE

LET

D

ispa

rités

de

m

onta

nt

de

pens

ion

et

redi

strib

utio

n d

ans

le s

ystè

me

de

retr

aite

fra

nçai

s

G20

12/0

7 R

. AE

BE

RH

AR

DT

- P

GIV

OR

D -

C. M

AR

BO

T

Spi

llove

r E

ffect

of

the

Min

imum

Wag

e in

Fra

nce:

A

n U

ncon

ditio

nal Q

uant

ile R

egre

ssio

n A

ppro

ach

x

G20

12/0

8 A

. E

IDE

LM

AN

- F

. LA

NG

UM

IER

- A

. VIC

AR

D

Pré

lève

men

ts

oblig

atoi

res

repo

sant

su

r le

s m

énag

es :

des

can

aux

redi

strib

utifs

diff

éren

ts e

n 19

90 e

t 20

10

G20

12/0

9 O

. B

AR

GA

IN -

A. V

ICA

RD

L

e R

MI

et s

on s

ucce

sseu

r le

RS

A d

écou

rage

nt-

ils c

erta

ins

jeun

es d

e tr

avai

ller

? U

ne a

naly

se s

ur

les

jeun

es a

utou

r de

25

ans

G20

12/1

0 C

. MA

RB

OT

- D

. RO

Y

Pro

ject

ions

du

co

ût

de

l’AP

A

et

des

cara

ctér

istiq

ues

de s

es b

énéf

icia

ires

à l

’hor

izon

20

40 à

l’ai

de d

u m

odèl

e D

estin

ie

G20

12/1

1 A

. M

AU

RO

UX

Le

cr

édit

d’im

pôt

dédi

é au

dé

velo

ppem

ent

dura

ble

: un

e év

alua

tion

écon

omét

rique

G20

12/1

2 V

. C

OT

TE

T -

S. Q

UA

NT

IN -

V.

RÉ

GN

IER

C

oût

du t

rava

il et

allè

gem

ents

de

char

ges

: un

e es

timat

ion

au

nive

au

étab

lisse

men

t de

19

96

à 20

08

G20

12/1

3 X

. D

’HA

UL

TF

OE

UIL

LE

-

P.

FÉ

VR

IER

-

L. W

ILN

ER

D

eman

d E

stim

atio

n in

the

Pre

senc

e of

Rev

enue

M

anag

emen

t

G20

12/1

4 D

. BLA

NC

HE

T -

S. L

E M

INE

Z

Join

t m

acro

/mic

ro e

valu

atio

ns o

f ac

crue

d-to

-dat

e pe

nsio

n lia

bilit

ies:

an

ap

plic

atio

n to

F

renc

h re

form

s

G20

13/0

1-

T.

DE

RO

YO

N -

A. M

ON

TA

UT

- P

-A P

ION

NIE

R

F13

01

Util

isat

ion

rétr

ospe

ctiv

e de

l’e

nquê

te

Em

ploi

à

une

fréq

uenc

e m

ensu

elle

: ap

port

d’

une

mod

élis

atio

n es

pace

-éta

t

G20

13/0

2-

C. T

RE

VIE

N

F13

02

Hab

iter

en

HLM

: qu

el

avan

tage

m

onét

aire

et

qu

el im

pact

sur

les

cond

ition

s de

loge

men

t ?

G20

13/0

3 A

. P

OIS

SO

NN

IER

Tem

pora

l di

sagg

rega

tion

of s

tock

var

iabl

es -

The

C

how

-Lin

met

hod

ext

end

ed

to d

yna

mic

mod

els

G20

13/0

4 P

. G

IVO

RD

- C

. MA

RB

OT

Doe

s th

e co

st o

f ch

ild c

are

affe

ct f

emal

e la

bor

mar

ket

part

icip

atio

n? A

n ev

alua

tion

of a

Fre

nch

refo

rm o

f chi

ldca

re s

ubsi

dies

G20

13/0

5 G

. LA

ME

- M

. LE

QU

IEN

- P

.-A

. P

ION

NIE

R

In

terp

reta

tion

and

limits

of

sust

aina

bilit

y te

sts

in

publ

ic f

inan

ce

G20

13/0

6 C

. BE

LLE

GO

- V

. D

OR

TE

T-B

ER

NA

DE

T

La

par

ticip

atio

n au

x pô

les

de c

ompé

titiv

ité :

que

lle

inci

denc

e su

r le

s dé

pens

es d

e R

&D

et

l’act

ivité

de

s P

ME

et E

TI

?

G20

13/0

7 P

.-Y

. CA

BA

NN

ES

- A

. MO

NT

AU

T -

P

.-A

. PIO

NN

IER

Éva

luer

la

prod

uctiv

ité g

loba

le d

es f

acte

urs

en

Fra

nce

: l’a

ppor

t d’

une

mes

ure

de l

a qu

alité

du

capi

tal e

t du

trav

ail

G20

13/0

8 R

. AE

BE

RH

AR

DT

- C

. MA

RB

OT

Evo

lutio

n of

In

stab

ility

on

th

e F

renc

h La

bour

M

arke

t D

urin

g th

e La

st T

hirt

y Y

ears

G20

13/0

9 J-

B. B

ER

NA

RD

- G

. CLÉ

AU

D

O

il pr

ice:

the

nat

ure

of t

he s

hock

s an

d th

e im

pact

on

the

Fre

nch

econ

omy

G20

13/1

0 G

. LA

ME

Was

the

re a

« G

reen

span

Con

undr

um »

in

the

Eur

o ar

ea?

G20

13/1

1 P

. C

HO

NÉ

- F

. EV

AIN

- L

. W

ILN

ER

- E

. YIL

MA

Z

In

trod

ucin

g ac

tivity

-bas

ed p

aym

ent

in t

he h

ospi

tal

indu

stry

: E

vide

nce

fro

m F

renc

h da

ta

G20

13/1

2 C

. GR

ISLA

IN-L

ET

RÉ

MY

Nat

ural

Dis

aste

rs: E

xpos

ure

and

Und

erin

sura

nce

G20

13/1

3 P

.-Y

. CA

BA

NN

ES

- V

. CO

TT

ET

- Y

. DU

BO

IS -

C

. LE

LAR

GE

- M

. SIC

SIC

F

renc

h F

irms

in t

he F

ace

of t

he 2

008/

2009

Cris

is

G20

13/1

4 A

. P

OIS

SO

NN

IER

- D

. RO

Y

H

ouse

hold

s S

atel

lite

Acc

ount

for

Fra

nce

in 2

010.

M

etho

dolo

gica

l is

sues

on

th

e as

sess

men

t of

do

mes

tic p

rodu

ctio

n

G20

13/1

5 G

. C

LÉA

UD

- M

. LE

MO

INE

- P

.-A

. PIO

NN

IER

Whi

ch

size

an

d ev

olut

ion

of

the

gove

rnm

ent

expe

nditu

re m

ultip

lier

in F

ranc

e (1

980-

2010

)?

G20

14/0

1 M

. BA

CH

ELE

T -

A.

LED

UC

- A

. M

AR

INO

Les

biog

raph

ies

du m

odèl

e D

estin

ie I

I :

reba

sage

et

pro

ject

ion

G20

14/

02

B.

GA

RB

INT

I

L’ac

hat

de l

a ré

side

nce

prin

cipa

le e

t la

cré

atio

n d’

entr

epris

es s

ont-

ils f

avor

isés

par

les

don

atio

ns

et h

érita

ges

?

G20

14/0

3 N

. CE

CI-

RE

NA

UD

- P

. CH

AR

NO

Z -

M. G

AIN

I

Évo

lutio

n de

la v

olat

ilité

des

rev

enus

sal

aria

ux d

u se

cteu

r pr

ivé

en F

ranc

e de

puis

196

8

G20

14/0

4 P

. A

UB

ER

T

M

odal

ités

d’ap

plic

atio

n de

s ré

form

es d

es r

etra

ites

et p

révi

sibi

lité

du m

onta

nt d

e pe

nsio

n

G20

14/0

5 C

. GR

ISLA

IN-L

ET

RÉ

MY

- A

. KA

TO

SS

KY

The

Im

pact

of

Haz

ardo

us I

ndus

tria

l F

acili

ties

on

Hou

sing

Pric

es:

A C

ompa

rison

of

Par

amet

ric a

nd

Sem

ipar

amet

ric H

edon

ic P

rice

Mod

els

G20

14//0

6 J.

-M. D

AU

SS

IN-B

EN

ICH

OU

- A

. MA

UR

OU

X

Tur

ning

th

e he

at

up.

How

se

nsiti

ve

are

hous

ehol

ds

to

fisca

l in

cent

ives

on

en

ergy

ef

ficie

ncy

inve

stm

ents

?

G20

14/0

7 C

. LA

BO

NN

E -

G.

LAM

É

Cre

dit

Gro

wth

and

Cap

ital R

equi

rem

ents

: B

indi

ng

or N

ot?

G20

14/0

8 C

. GR

ISLA

IN-L

ET

RÉ

MY

et C

. T

RE

VIE

N

The

Im

pact

of

Hou

sing

Sub

sidi

es o

n th

e R

enta

l S

ecto

r: t

he F

renc

h E

xam

ple

G20

14/0

9 M

. LE

QU

IEN

et

A.

MO

NT

AU

T

Cro

issa

nce

pote

ntie

lle

en

Fra

nce

et

en

zone

eu

ro :

un

tour

d’

horiz

on

des

mét

hode

s d’

est

imat

ion

G20

14/1

0 B

. G

AR

BIN

TI -

P. L

AM

AR

CH

E

Les

haut

s re

venu

s ép

argn

ent-

ils d

avan

tage

?

G20

14/1

1 D

. AU

DE

NA

ER

T -

J. B

AR

DA

JI -

R.

LAR

DE

UX

-

M. O

RA

ND

- M

. SIC

SIC

W

age

Res

ilien

ce

in

Fra

nce

sinc

e th

e G

reat

R

eces

sion

G20

14/1

2 F

. A

RN

AU

D -

J.

BO

US

SA

RD

- A

. PO

ISS

ON

NIE

R

- H

. SO

UA

L C

ompu

ting

addi

tive

cont

ribut

ions

to

grow

th a

nd

othe

r is

sues

for

chai

n-lin

ked

quar

terly

agg

rega

tes

G20

14/1

3 H

. FR

AIS

SE

- F

. KR

AM

AR

Z -

C. P

RO

ST

La

bor

Dis

pute

s an

d Jo

b F

low

s

xi

G20

14/1

4 P

. G

IVO

RD

-

C.

GR

ISL

AIN

-LE

TR

ÉM

Y

- H

. NA

EG

ELE

H

ow

does

fu

el

taxa

tion

impa

ct

new

ca

r pu

rcha

ses?

A

n ev

alua

tion

usin

g F

renc

h co

nsum

er-le

vel d

atas

et

G20

14/1

5 P

. A

UB

ER

T -

S.

RA

BA

TÉ

D

urée

pa

ssée

en

ca

rriè

re

et

duré

e de

vi

e en

re

trai

te :

que

l pa

rtag

e de

s ga

ins

d'es

péra

nce

de

vie

?

G20

15/0

1 A

. P

OIS

SO

NN

IER

T

he w

alki

ng d

ead

Eul

er e

quat

ion

Add

ress

ing

a ch

alle

nge

to

mon

etar

y po

licy

mod

els

G20

15/0

2 Y

. D

UB

OIS

- A

. M

AR

INO

In

dica

teur

s de

ren

dem

ent

du s

ystè

me

de r

etra

ite

fran

çais

G20

15/0

3 T

. M

AY

ER

- C

. T

RE

VIE

N

The

im

pact

s of

U

rban

P

ublic

T

rans

port

atio

n:

Evi

denc

e fr

om t

he P

aris

Reg

ion

G20

15/0

4 S

.T. L

Y -

A. R

IEG

ER

T

Mea

surin

g S

ocia

l Env

ironm

ent

Mob

ility

G20

15/0

5 M

. A. B

EN

HA

LIM

A -

V.

HY

AF

IL-S

OLE

LHA

C

M. K

OU

BI -

C.

RE

GA

ER

T

Que

l es

t l’i

mpa

ct

du

syst

ème

d’in

dem

nisa

tion

mal

adie

sur

la

duré

e de

s ar

rêts

de

trav

ail

pour

m

alad

ie ?

G20

15/0

6 Y

. D

UB

OIS

- A

. M

AR

INO

D

ispa

rités

de

rend

emen

t du

sys

tèm

e de

ret

raite

da

ns

le

sect

eur

priv

é :

appr

oche

s in

terg

énér

a-tio

nnel

le e

t int

ragé

néra

tionn

elle

G20

15/0

7 B

. C

AM

PA

GN

E -

V.

ALH

EN

C-G

ELA

S -

J.

-B.

BE

RN

AR

D

No

evid

ence

of

finan

cial

acc

eler

ator

in F

ranc

e

G20

15/0

8 Q

. LA

FF

ÉT

ER

- M

. P

AK

É

last

icité

s de

s re

cett

es

fisca

les

au

cycl

e éc

onom

ique

: é

tude

de

troi

s im

pôts

sur

la p

ério

de

1979

-201

3 en

Fra

nce

G20

15/0

9 J.

-M.

DA

US

SIN

-BE

NIC

HO

U,

S.

IDM

AC

HIC

HE

, A

. LE

DU

C e

t E

. P

OU

LIQ

UE

N

Les

déte

rmin

ants

de

l’attr

activ

ité d

e la

fon

ctio

n pu

bliq

ue d

e l’É

tat

G20

15/1

0 P

. A

UB

ER

T

La m

odul

atio

n du

mon

tant

de

pens

ion

selo

n la

du

rée

de c

arriè

re e

t l’â

ge d

e la

ret

raite

: q

uelle

s di

spar

ités

entr

e as

suré

s ?

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