document 1 secret portugal iraq wikileaks

7/27/2019 Document 1 Secret Portugal Iraq Wikileaks

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SECRET MSU/G2 INTSUM Nº 17 17 20 SET 04 1. Generalities a.Primeiro-minister,Allawi, informed/[apprize] that the Judgment of Saddam Hussein, will be able tohave/[bear in mind] beginning in October. b.É almost certain that the attacks that if have

come to verify/[ascertain]/[check] in BASRAH will be the reply to Operation/[surgery]ERITREA. The Leaders da OMS1 /MM2

in BASRAH, they desire to return to the violence, has already some

time, but they have been stopped by AL-SADR, through his commander in

the south zone, Aws AL KHAFAJI of NASIRIYAH. What it is not currently

clear, is the fact of if to know if was the central directorate of

OMS/MM, who commanded the attack on the English Forces, in BASRAH, or

if the share is independent for exclusive initiative dos the

Commanders of BASRAH. If the Central Directorate responds to Operation

ERITREA, to far it because if it cannot give/[impart]/[lavish]/[spoon]

to the luxury to lose/[forfeit] more credibility. Of fact OMS/MM has

kept/[keep abreast of]/[maintain] a strategical position, since NAJAF,

in reason/[ratio] da continuous pressure exerted for the SCIRI/BADR,da evident AL-SISTANI disapproval the AL-SADR and do tax peace accord

almost pressured/[press] for the MNF4/IIG5

. He is thus well-known that OMS/MM did not get no profit politician since that itfinished/[complete]/[end]/[terminate] the NAJAF crisis. If it had, restituted violent,commanded/[collate] for the central direcção, this will have to belimited/[border]/[bound]/[delimit] e, according to its agreement, proportional to that theone that calls/[call out]/[summon], a bankruptcy/[breaking] do agreement of peace. If the reply it will not be proportional, but if it comes to verify/[ascertain]/[check] aconscientious return/[rollback] to the violence, this will have as final intention, the

recovery/[backup] do terrain/[land] that had lost/[forfeit] until the o moment. If thedecision was taken unilaterally, without the permission of OMS/SADR/KHAFAJI, isnatural that inside soon, if they feel isolated, despaired for support/[bracket], especiallylater da robust reply das CF6 . Its necessity of support/[bracket] on the part da CentralDirecção, it will have to be satisfied or then they will be able to look/[seek] thissupport/[bracket] in radical/[radix] not conforming groups. The situation in MND (SE)7 , previously described, reflecte the incapacity das MM, shaving/[scissoring] tosupport/[prop]/[sustain] attacks, after the operation/[surgery] thatcleaned/[scavenge]/[swab]/[wipe] delegation da OMS. It is also evident that nosupport/[bracket] arrived, until the a dates/[date back], at the combatants of BASRAH.Reaction dos the Controllers Central offices/[trunk]? Next the 48-72 hours, to give - to

the a reply if OMS/MM, it intends or not to magnify/[augment]/[bulk] violence, as formto cure its wounded pride. 1

Office of the Martyr SADR

2

MM Milicians

3

SCIRI Supreme Council of Islamic Revolution



4

MNF – Multi National Forces/[ram]/[stress]

5

IIg – Meantime Iraqi Government

6

CF – Colition Forces/[ram]/[stress]

7

MND (SE) – Multi National Division (South East)

INTSUM nº 17 SECRET 1 of 6

SECRET

c.O SCIRI, mattered/[care]/[import], do Irão, more than 1000 American militaryuniforms, with standard do desert. The uniforms to its arrival/[inbound] had beendistributed the loyal soldiers to the SCIRI, das company and NAJAF d.O Minister dosthe Foreign affairses German requested that its compatriots if they removed/[drawoff]/[exit]/[undock]/[withdraw] do Iraq, immediately. The spokesman do GermanGovernment, informed that Iraq one became/[dish]/[hollow]/[roughen]/[weight] toomuch dangerous and inhaled/[inspire] for terrorist feelings. The distrust appears of

possible abductions the citizens German who according to sources/[spring]governmental if they currently find/[meet up with]/[encounter]/[lie] to work/[labor] inIraq (about 100 individuals), the majority in company of specialized security. e.Umcar/[carriage] bomb blew up to the gate/[door]/[porthole] do building da ING in Kirkuk.23 had been verified/[ascertain]/[check] dead e 52 wounded. 2. Provinces a.ALMUTHANNA In 190730SET04 a Dutch patrol was attacked/[mug] the north of theSAMAWAH. They had had 3 decreases (wounded). b.DHI QAR • At aques NSTR •

Threats A extremist group associated with Abu Hilal supposedly instructed itsassociates to load its vehicles with combustibles?, aiming at the preparation of a

possible terrorist attack, during the month of September (half do month). Abu-Hilaldelivered/[give over]/[hand] to them vehicles 5 minutes later das weekly conjuncts.

Each group of 10 mujahadeen received a vehicle. • Terrorism NSTR • Crime NSTR •Tribes NSTR • Religion NSTR • Politics NSTR • Operations/[surgery] • Op

HIGHLAND WAY – Patrolling to the itineraries da TO. • Op GROWING POWER – Security to the high-voltage line/[string] and the power plant. • Op STRONG

DEFENSE II – Aumentar/[augment]/[bulk] the security to the perimeter da base.INTSUM nº 17 SECRET 2 of 6

SECRET

• Op GREEM INSERTION – Support/[bracket] to the convoys da ROK8 . c.MAYSAN• At aques In 180555SET04, she was thundered/[shoot] mortar grenade/[garnet] against

the Field Abu Naji. It did not have low damages nor. d.BASRAH • At aques In171902SET04, they had been thundered/[shoot] simultaneously 1 RPG and a mortar. It



did not have low damages nor. In 171943SET04, a force that if dislocated/[displace]/[offset]/[shift] da Base for the Palace of Basrah, wasattacked/[mug] for SAF9 . It did not have decreases nor damages. In 172158SET04,during an Operation/[surgery] of cleanness, close do OSB10 , in BASRAH, force wasattacked/[mug] by SAF. It did not have decreases nor damages. In 172246SET04 during

an Operation/[surgery] of cleanness, close do OSB they had been discovered/[bare] 2CWIED11 , with an attached battery. A great number was still uncovered/[bare] of theammunition. Between 172123SET04 and 172125SET04, multiple attacks to a Squadhad been efectuados, with SAF and RPG. A vehicle IN12 , it was consumed by the fireand it is possible that they have been wounded two elements das AIF13 . It did not havedecreases nor damages in the MNF. In 172133SET04, it was informed/[apprize] that ithad an explosion, followed of two great ones fogos, that will be able to have/[bear inmind] been originated for a RPG detonation, against a civil vehicle. It did not havedecreases nor damages in the MNF. Between 172140SET04 and 172149SET04, it hadan explosion and multiples attacks of SAF e RPG against the OMS. It did not havedecreases nor damages in the MNF. In 172144SET04, a force was attacked/[mug] by 2

detonations of RPG. The FP14

it was placed/[site] South

do river. a force was attacked/[mug] by Between 172210SET04 and 172235SET04, aforce suffered to multiples attacks from RPG and SAF. It did not have decreases nor damages in the MNF. In 172230SET04, a force was attacked/[mug] by 2 detonations of RPG. It did not have decreases nor damages in the MNF. In 172256SET04, a force wasattacked/[mug] by 1 detonation of RPG. The aggressor thinks itself that he will have

been died for the reply to the fire. He did not have decreases nor damages in the MNF.In 172258SET04, a force was attacked/[mug] by 1 detonation of RPG, that will have

made right in one dos its vehicles. It did not have decreases in the MNF. In172324SEP04, a force was attacked/[mug] by 1 detonation of RPG. It did not havedecreases nor damages in the MNF. 8

ROK – Republic of Korea

9

SAF – Small Arm Fire

10

OSB – Old State Building

11

CWIED Chymical Weapon Improvised Explosive Device

12

Enemy IN

13



The AIF – Anti Iraqi Forces/[ram]/[stress]

14

FP – Fire Point


SECRET

In 172333SET04, a force was attacked/[mug] by 1 detonation of RPG. It did not havedecreases nor damages in the MNF. In 180001SET04, a force was attacked/[mug] byfire of RPG and SAF. It did not have decreases nor damages in the MNF. In180010SET04, a force was attacked/[mug] by a mortar detonation. It did not havedecreases nor damages in the MNF. In 180059SET04, one 1 Squad of reconnaissance/[recognition] was attacked/[mug] by 2 detonations of RPG. They had

had three decreases (wounded). In 180115SET04, a force was attacked/[mug] by 2elements IN. The first one efectuou 1 RPG detonation while As 155mmcarried/[bus]/[haul]/[raft]/[tram]/[transport]/[truck] the ammunition, with electricwires/[thread] coupled/[couple]/[dock]/[engage]/[mate], it is presumed that for a

possible IED15 . They had been the two abated ones. It did not have decreases nor damages in the MNF. In 180257SET04, a force was attacked/[mug] by SAF. Theshooter efectuou the attack do top of a roof and he will have gone off/[shoot]/[thunder]the 20 30 ammunition. He did not have decreases nor damages in MNF. In180627SEP04, a force was attacked/[mug] by HMG16 , RPG and SAF in Basrah. It hadreply the fire and the neutralization do IN. It did not have decreases nor damages in theMNF. In 180627SET04, a force was attacked/[mug] close da delegation da OMS, for

HMG and RPG. It had reply to the fire and the IN was neutralized/[counteract]/[neuter].Between 180637SET04 and 180640SET, a force was attacked/[mug] by 2 RPG andclose da delegation da OMS. It had reply to the fire and the IN wasneutralized/[counteract]/[neuter]. In 180737SET04, this same force again wasattacked/[mug]. It had reply to fire e the IN was neutralized/[counteract]/[neuter]. In0844SET04, a force was attacked/[mug] by 1 detonation of RPG. It did not havedecreases nor damages in the MNF. Between 181034SET04 and 181037SEP04, a forcewas attacked/[mug] by 2 mortar detonations, close da delegation da OMS. In181055SET04, a force was attacked/[mug] by 2 mortar detonations, close da delegationda OMS. Between 181103SET04 and 181111SET04, a force was attacked/[mug] by 3mortar detonations close da delegation da OMS. Uma das garnet reached the OMS

directamente. In 181145SET04, a force was attacked/[mug] by SAF and 1 RPG, closeda delegation da OMS. The FP was not identified. In 181228SET04, a force wasattacked by SAF. The FP was not identified. In 181255SET04, a force was attacked by1 RPG, close da delegation da OMS. Not it had decreases nor damages in the MNF. In181256SET04, a force was become involved in an accident with a civil vehicle. Dosoccupants do civil vehicle, ran away do local do accident. The vehicle was declared as itloses total. In 181333SET04, a force was attacked by 2 RPG and SAF, close dadelegation da OMS. The FP was not identified. In 181445SET04, the ISF assumed thesecurity do OMS. The forces das CF that efectuavam this military duty/[service]/[job],

previously, had disassembled/[demount]/[dismantle]/[dismount]/[unship] the device andhad returned to the base. In 181510SET04, it was informed/[apprize] that km for Southwould have had an explosion the 4 do HQ da MND (SE), next to the perimeter daBASE. 15



IED – Improvised Explosive Device

16

HMG – Heavy Machine Gun


SECRET

In 190005SET04 The Shatt al Arab hotel (SAAH), was attacked by 2 rockets.devices/[sugar plantation] sobrevoaram the Base, having/[bear in mind] oneundo/[impart]/[lavish]/[spoon] they fallen blown up when it was given impact with thecivil installations. Uma QRF was sent/[forward]/[mail] for the place with the intentionof to investigate the FP. They had had two civil decreases. In 191601SET04, a force,saw/[view] a taxi/[taxiing] to circulate it close to BPHQ17 , having/[bear in mind] the

conductor it gave/[impart]/[lavish]/[spoon] to this taxi/[taxiing] drawee of a AK-47, pointing/[aim]/[appoint] the same one to the sentry. The sentry he efectuou 11detonations and he killed the aggressor. In 191728SET04, he was thundered/[shoot] 1RPG against the BPHQ. In 192201SET04, a force was attacked/[mug] by SAF inBASRAH. The FP was not identified. It did not have decreases nor damages in theMNF. Conclusions The agreement for trainings of officers, was set back/[delay],

because the Ministers da France and da Belgium they had raised/[getup]/[arise]/[jack]/[lift]/[rise]/[up] doubts of last hour. Belgium affirms/[assert] that somedo financial details they will have to be clarificados, while the Minister da ProhibitedFrenchman, Michele Alliot-Marie, affirms/[assert] that Paris, still met/[meet upwith]/[encounter]/[lie] to study the task. England meets/[meet up with]/[encounter]/[lie]

ready to send/[forward]/[mail] more troops for Iraq, as form to support/[brace] growingof violence, as well as, to prepare/[prep] the elections of next January. Yesterday someEnglish soldiers had been involved in a fight of 2 hours, after its convoy to beattacked/[mug]. In he has attacked/[mug] a man-bomb, committed suicide itself.Although the American aerial attacks in Fallujah and das Iraqian dos deaths Policias inBAGDAH, the Minister da Prohibited English, informed/[apprize] European itscongéneres, that England she is ready to send/[forward]/[mail] thousand of military for Iraq. Tony BLAIR will have to argue the sending gave/[impart]/[lavish]/[spoon]reinforcements, when to congregate itself/[convene]/[flock]/[mass] with Iyad ALLAWI,Iraqian First-minister. The possibility to send/[forward]/[mail] troops for Iraq appearsafter publication of secret reports, where Tony BLAIR is informed, that to have the one

guarantee regime/[regimen] after steady Sadam-Hussein, will have the necessity of theEnglish troops if to keep in the country during much more time. Concerns with theextension da permanence das CF in Iraq, magnify/[augment]/[bulk]/[increase], with therecent one growing of violence and for some reports presented for the SECRET militaryduties/[service]/[job], foreseeing/[forecast] a substantial increase of attacks to the CF,the ISF, as well as the attempt dos the rebels to sabotage the elections. The finaldecision do reinforcement of 9,000 men for Iraq, will be taken later da meeting withMajor-General Bill Rollo, British Commander da MND (SE). A source/[spring] doMinistry da British defense affirmed/[assert] that “they had been elaborated Flat/[plain]of Contingency, contends acknowledgments of one growing da aggressiveness withapproaching/[approximate]/[near] das elections, that consider/[regard] as verynecessary, the military reinforcement ". Sabe today that Tony Blair was informed, one

possible year before da invasion, das consequências, da removal of Saddam HUSSEIN



do to be able. Nobody could affirm/[assert] that situation wouldimprove/[ameliorate]/[better], a time that Iraq never had democratic traditions. Thecurrent situation in Iraq is sufficiently serious, but the country hopes that the electionstake place according to the set schedule. However, although to know that the nextgovernment goes to be democratically elect, some distrusts exist, that this after to reach

the power, if comes to verify/[ascertain]/[check] the situation da exchange/[swap] of adictator for another one. The violent attacks das MM to the CF, the ISF or ING, or samethe infrastructures that serve populations in its basic necessities aim at the followingobjectivos: • Set back/[delay] the reconstruction process do Iraq; • To wreck the efforts

das MNF, in the reconstruction das Iraqian infrastructures; • To get/[obtain]/[procure]

personal profits through threats and lootings; 17

BPHQ – Border Police Head Quarters

• To destroy/[tine]/[wreck] the credibility do IIG and das MNF, in the support/[bracket]

to the populations; • To weaken the Iraqian economy, highly dependant das oil

exportations; • To isolate/[insulate] BAGHDAD, through interruption do su pply energyto the capital. Do Ramadam is foreseen/[forecast] that with the approach,increases/[augment]/[bulk]/[magnify] the attacks to infrastructures, implying/[implicate]consequent one to discredit in the intentions and capacities do IIG, being able itself toarrive at the situation of new popular revolts, demonstrating its dissatisfaction. Nassíria,20 of September of 2004 The Officer da GNR in the G2 Cell da MSU Hugo TelmoRebelo Marques/[asterisk]/[brand]/[dial]/[rib]/[score]/[tablet] de Faria Captain of Cavalry SECRET

Katana0182 01:15, 19 June 2008 (GMT)

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SECRET MSU/G2 INTSUM Nº 6 29 and 30AGO 04 1. Generalities The information, propagated exists for measured them, that 4 more important you lead Shiitas in Iraq willhave affirmed/[assert], that the resistance armed will not be the way more correcta to

protest against the permanence das Forces da Coligação (CF), in Iraq. However, oneyou gave/[impart]/[lavish]/[spoon] these leaders, Sheikh Ali NAJAFI, affirms/[assert]

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that if the troops da coalition if to keep for too much time in the country, then the pacific resolution will not be possible. The leaders had met/[meet upwith]/[encounter]/[lie] in the residence do Grande Ayatollah Ali SISTANI, in NAJAF.However the information are dúbias, therefore a spokesman da higher Shiita authoritydenies/[negate] these news and deny/[negate] that they have opponent/[opposite] to the

seted/[arm]/[cock] resistance, against the occupation American do country.Speaking/[talk] for the Aljazeera, Hamid al-KHAFAF, the spokesman do GrandeAyatollah Ali al-SISTANI, denied/[negate] that in the meeting that occurred/[take

place] in the past Saturday, if it has boarded at least any referring subject to theresistance armed. Cofirmou however that not no agreement exists enters/[log on] theshiitas religious leaders not to resist the MNF. Ali Bashir al-NAJAFI, the spokesman doGrande Ayatollah Bashir al-NAJAFI, tambe denied/[negate] the same, affirming/[assert]of followed that the meeting had for intention to only visit al-SISTANI, to know itshealth state, to review/[rereview] what it was obtained/[achieve] with its initiative tofinish/[complete]/[end]/[terminate] with the crisis in NAJAF and to express/[utter] theconcern on the current situation in NAJAF and KUFA. As complement do what before

it affirmed/[assert], has been remembered/[recall]/[recollect] that this Saturday, was plus one day of violence in such a way in zones of shiita domain as of sunnita. Althoughthe NAJAF city if to have/[bear in mind] kept/[keep abreast of]/[maintain] calm, in thecity of SADR, MM they had been become involved/[entail]/[wrap] in confrontationswith forces the USA. They had had 3 died and 25 wounded in the skirmishes. InBAGHDAD-This, rebels had thundered/[shoot]/[go off] some mortars for a populationquarter, killing two children, who if found/[meet up with]/[encounter]/[lie] towash/[launder] carriages/[car]. Identified aggressors had not killed at least 5 PoliciasIraqian, in the BAQUBA city, the NE of BAGHDAD. One notices that this city isinhabited in such a way by sunnitas as for shiitas. The USA marines had been becomeinvolved/[entail]/[wrap] in confrontations with rebels in the FALLUJA city, had died atleast 3 people. A video in an Islamic website was passed dos the 12 Nepaleses hostages,one gave/[impart]/[lavish]/[spoon] these hostages read a declaration affirming/[assert]that they had been misled to work/[labor] for the lies Americans. However a comitiva of ministers do Iraqian Temporary Government (IIG), it wasdislocated/[displace]/[offset]/[shift] NAJAF to meet/[meet up with]/[encounter]/[lie]with Ayatollah SISTANI, for form to be argued in set, the plans for the reconstructionda city. 2. Commentary The path/[way] does not exist a clear indication of which thatAl-Sadr and its followers, will be able to take in a next future. Still if a certainespectante optimismo lives in as it will go great Shiita family to understand itself, on themoral authority do Grande Ayatollah `Ali SISTANI allied to the great desire of peace,

emanated for the result/[remaining portion] da shiita community. It is now certain thatAl-SISTANI, not only looks/[seek] to the peace for all the areas and for NAJAF. It isalso very early to affirm/[assert] if the present situation conflict is the beginning of theend do, or a realinhamento and the claim do to only be able for one das shiitas factionsin detriment da another one. Al-SADR is militarily weak and is politically to beconstrangido, but although factors, never we will have to subestimar which its futureintentions. The IIG opened/[gap] a window that economically legitimizes to politics andthe current/[chain]/[stream] of Al-Sadr, giving/[impart]/[lavish]/[spoon] to understandthat this could be the solution to obtain/[achieve] the stabilization in the areasmaioritariamente Shiitas. However if it will not be able to forget that for historicalratios/[reason] INTSUM nº 6 1 of 6 PRIVATE PRIVATE SADR

current/[chain]/[stream], always was greater that the proper Al-SADR, or the OMS or the JAM, being here that the true threat for the MNF inhabits.



Although today, all the BASRAH area if to have/[bear in mind] kept/[keep abreastof]/[maintain] sufficiently calm, runs the picture/[image] of that the JAM tries/[attempt]to keep/[keep abreast of]/[maintain] a defensive position and that it will go to violentlyregir to the patrolling das MNF. Only an analysis dos the next days, will

process/[reveal] to which the verdadeoras intentions do JAM. The conjuncts do Sheikh

Assad Al-BASRI, had clarified that no order was given/[impart]/[lavish]/[spoon] to theJAM in that it concerns to its disarmament. AL-BASRI exactly arrived to affirm/[assert]that the JAM would have to continue/[carry on] to resist the patrulhamentos das MNF inBASRAH, a time that the battle still it did not finish/[complete]/[end]/[terminate].Although this seems that the peace accord found/[meet up with]/[encounter]/[lie] in

NAJAF will be extensive BASRAH. This does not remove/[purge] the possibility of theSADR current/[chain]/[stream] to spread groups with intention to inciarem the violence.Iraqian Policia (IPS) and Guarda/[guard]/[sentinel] Iraqian Nacional (ING), haveefectuado patrulhamentos sets for all the city and the daily one seem to return/[recur] tothe perpendicular/[normal] one. The reaction da population in relation to the IPS, thelast weeks is difficult to file a suit. It has who if it feels disappointed by the well-known

incapacity of actuação before innumerable situations, but also it has who demonstratesto affection for the difficult situation da IPS, therefore its shares can to beinterpreted/[construe] as attempts of derramear Shiita blood.

Beyond everything this, exists the dos information of that a great

part the Iraqis, is felt/[sit]

apreensivos how much to the elections that will be become fullfilled/[carryout]/[accomplish]/[realize] in 05JAN05, affirming/[assert] that these will not beimpartial. The feeling is of that the IIG will be a corrupt dictatorship, that will exert toomuch contrlo on the elections, adulterating and conditioning the will and the popular

freedom. Of equal it forms/[fashion] the Iraqian population, will not accept thesupervision United Nations das (UN), not to be that this organization if demonstratesttalmente impartial. The previous references in it swims warrant itscompetence/[ability]. The UN had failed/[misfire] in guaranteeing free elections inAfeganistão and in Venezuela. The dos UN are considered/[regard] marioneta the USA.In addition the Iraqis start/[start at]/[begin]/[commence]/[get] to feel necessiade tochange/[change] the government. He exists, in population, a feeling of frustação andimpatience when verifying/[ascertain]/[check] that its protests they are inefficacious,what it will be able to provoke/[trigger], from moment, a scaling of violence. 3. Currentthreat: JUPITER 2 (the threat level is substantial). 4. Verified/[ascertain]/[check] attacksProvince of AL MUTHANNA In 272242AGO04, when a Dutch patrol left da Base Air

Rumaythah was attacked/[mug] for 3 mortar detonations. Grenades/[garnet] had fallenand blown up 150m for West da entered/[log on] da Base. It did not have decreases indamages. Province of DHI QAR In 290900AGO04, a squad the USA wasattacked/[mug] by the 5 SAF km for This do RP10 in the itinerary Cover. 1 element dasthe AIF was withheld and the same squad came back to be attacked/[mug] in the returnBase. It did not have decreases. In 291033AGO04, do had a shunting line attemptconvoy escorted for troops the USA, 10 km IF do RP7 throughout the itinerary Cover.The attempt was unfruitful. It did not have decreases. In 300015AGO04, it had a IEDattack, to an armored vehicle Italian the sw of An Nasiriyah. The IED consisted of Granada of 122mm and another one of 155mm. It did not have decreases nor damages.Province of MAYSAN INTSUM nº 6 2 of 6 PRIVATE PRIVATE Das 290135AGO04to 290138AGO04, had had two distinct attacks to the Headquarters da Cimic in AlAmarah. Grenades/[garnet] had fallen and blown up da outside Base. The FP



placed/[site] it 600m for NE. Not it had decreases. In 292050AGO04, da wasthundered/[shoot] 1 RPG against the main input/[entrance] Headquarters da Cimic in AlAmarah. It did not have decreases. In 292143AGO04, 2 patrols had beenattacked/[mug] by SAF in Al Amarah. It did not have decreases. Province of BASRAHDas 280015AGO04 to 280119AGO04, 1 Parulha de CHESHIRE, being one part

operração anti mortar, was attacked/[mug] in three distinct occasions for fire of heavyweapons HMG, RPGs and fire of fast weapons (SAF) close (IVO) south Da Ponte doriver SAA. 2 elements da IPS had been withheld by suspicion of envolvement in theattack. It did not have decreases.

In 280720AGO04, a dismounted patrol was attacked/[mug] by SAF IVO do building of state in Basrah. It did not have decreases. In 281810AGO04, a vehicle hadconfrontations envolvedo do Danish Battalion the 5 km IF of Al Faw. They had had 2wounded, that they had been evcuados. In 300505AGO04, it had an attack with a IEDto a convoy, that travelled/[journey]/[voyage] course/[route]/[manner of proceeding] theAbu Naji, 20 km the NW of Basrah throughout itinerárioTopeka. The device/[sugar

plantation] was imprisoned to a pole of illumination. It did not have decreases. 5.Threats The elements do old regime/[regimen] (FRE), are the main threat to the securityand stability do country. Consituindo as multifaceted, but not coesa organization, theytry/[attempt] through half military and politicians, to gain/[gain]/[win] some power,

being its organization, leadership, consolidation and experience its trunfos greaters. Theexternal bracket/[support], da mainly Syria, is the key da its existence. It has come tocooperate/[to co-operate] with other forces anti-iraqis, as form to get/[obtain]/[procure]some resultaods, these normamlente centered in forcing/[ram]/[stress] thedesestabilizção do IIG and the output/[exit] das MNF, do country. A confidentialsource/[spring] informed/[apprize] the MSU, that in ASH SHATRAH Policia Local(LP) was seen/[view] to jointly control/[automonitor]/[manage]/[rein] the area with theMM. Another source/[spring] informed/[apprize] the MSU, that throughout therefuel/[restocking] itineraries (MSR) “BISMARK”, “TUSCOLANA” and

“OSTIENSE”, that they turn on/[bond]/[link] ASH SHATRAH and AD

DAWWAYAH, exist check-point that alternatingly they are provided by elements daLP and das MM. Previous reports give to knowledge of temporary cooperações betweenthe LP and the MM, that if they had fortified the recent events after. The extremistasopponents, will be able to develop shares to try/[attempt] to denigrate MNF e toinvalidate the cease-fire. The combatants/terrorist foreigners will be able to benefit withthe situation and to use to advantage/[avail] stops/[halt]/[quit]/[stall] to destabilizar current, sensible, the very equlibrio one. The trace/[risk] of attacks appealing/[resort]

IED, RCIED and VBIED, is remained/[keep abreast of]/[maintain] high. INTSUM nº 63 of 6 PRIVATE PRIVATE In 250924AGOG04 it was communicated that HameedMuqalla Mahmood (to see/[view] photo) escaped/[leak] do prisional establishmentwhere if it found/[meet up with]/[encounter]/[lie] withheld. Which is not known itsfinishes residence, nor its current paradeiro. Rebels da area of Fallujah planeiam anattack to the prisional establishment of Baghdad (BCCF) in Abu Ghurayb. The attack will be materialize, with the coordination of two groups being first who attacks/[mug]do exterior, through detonations of SAF to the guards das towers main and of indirectosfogos for the remaining area, as the group, consisting of inmates, will actuarásimultaneously, against Military Policia, with the intention of them to remove/[drawoff]/[exit]/[undock]/[withdraw] das its defensive position. The withheld ones are led by

Fahd Khamis (Najim) the 'Azawi, that will have been withheld in 22 April of 2004 for illegal ownership of weapons. They are involved in the flat/[plain] one about the 30 40



inmates. He mentions myself despite this is not the first one has attacked/[mug] thisestablishment, that he has received innumerable threats. 4 exist VBIEDs that could beused/[overutilize]/[utilize] against the Interior Minister do (MOI). The VBIEDs theywill have the following features/[characteristic]: Blue Mark 2 - School registration of Baghdad (37048) White Mazda - School registration of Baghdad (25180) Silver-plated

Mercedes - School registration of Baghdad (46164) Da does not exist any descriptionfourth viatura. One foresees/[forecast] that the viaturas could beused/[overutilize]/[utilize] in Baghdad. In 22AGO04, Najim Al (Takhi)

bought/[purchase]/[shop] some viaturas the Raddom Amhed (Khalaf), pertaining to theold Body of Defesa Iraqian Civil (ICDC), NFI, and Sami Amhed Khalaf, in Samarra.The collected/[take in]/[gather]/[glean] information says the ones that some dessas theseviaturas will be Camiões, that they will have to be careados with explosives, aiming atan attack to the installations da ING in Samarra e in other moved away/[fend] basesmore (FOB) in Brassfield-Culpable delay, the night of 27AUG04 or day 28AUG04. Theconductors das viaturas, will be dresses with fardas da ING and will try/[attempt] tolead camiões for inside das installations da ING. Najim Al (Takhi) is described as

having/[bear in mind] short hair chestnut, surrounds/[belt]/[fence]/[hurdle]/[rail] and1,80 cm of height, with pear and mustache. This attack already is not new, having/[bear in mind] appeared an identical situation previously, where fardado conductor of ING,obtained/[achieve] to introduce the viatura in the instalaões after da ING and this thecharge/[load] despolotou. The other viaturas could be used/[overutilize]/[utilize] inother areas that not this. In the night of 23AGO04, a meeting in the headquarters hadseat/[place] da Organization dos the Mártires of SADR in Al Amarah. During themeeting some misunderstandings between the Sheikh Majid Al- exitiram ASA'ADI,leader das MM in Al Amarah, and Diyar Taleb ADAI, a leader das MM da part north dacity. Al-ASA'ADI accused/[impeach] to ADAI to be a corrupt member das MM, that itdid not accept orders e actuava its exempts/[free]/[rid] criterion. Al-ASA'ADIcontinued/[carry on] the accusations affirming/[assert] that those that its followers are

bad Muslen, because they use drugs and they drink alcohol. Those that they follow Al-ASA'ADI face the fight against the MNF as being a Jihad, however aqules that theyfollow ADAI they are simply criminal.

The meeting finished/[complete]/[end]/[terminate] with physical aggressions betweenAl-ASA'ADI and ADAI. ADAI left/[draw off]/[exit]/[undock]/[withdraw] anddislocated if for its installations, with its followers. Al-ASA'ADI, pasado some minutesleft da headquarters da OMS, folloied/[accompany] for its followers and attacked/[mug]with SAF the ADAI building. Al- ASA'ADI's returned of followed to the Headquarters

da OMS. Here ADAI, decided jointly with its followers to attack/[mug] theheadquarters da OMS with SAF as retaliation form. Here one demonstrates one moretime that some factions exist inside das MM and that these they concur between itself for obtaining/[achieve] a prominence seat/[place], what he

becomes/[dish]/[hollow]/[roughen]/[weight] its control much more difficult. In the nightof 24AGO04, it was collected/[take in]/[gather]/[glean] information that two cells dasthe AIF, will be transferred of Fallujah for Air Ramadi. The ratio/[reason]gives/[impart]/[lavish]/[spoon] - for the fact to have itself been discovered/[bare] for theMNF. INTSUM nº 6 4 of 6 PRIVATE PRIVATE Both the groups areconsidered/[regard] very dangerous and specialists in abductions. In DHI QAR thesituation is remained/[keep abreast of]/[maintain] calm and describes as steady, but

uncertain. It exists strong possibility of rebels/combantes foreigners, to try/[attempt] toexplore/[exploit] the current situation stirring up/[urge] to the violence or to arrive



exactly to appeal/[resort] the terrorist acts. They have been found/[meet upwith]/[encounter]/[lie] the ammunition in you vary/[range] ambulances. The use of ambulances for ammunition carrier/[transport], appears now as one practical commonone, as much das MM, as das The AIF. 6. Against Information A Opel Blue Ómega,four portholes/[door]/[gate], without glasses, with unknown school registration and a

Opel Omega (station wagon), four portholes/[door]/[gate], with transparent glasses,circulate habtualmente in Auto-road 8 between 15H30 and 17H00. The carriages/[car]circulate in alternated days, filming e photographing, the operations/[surgery] and theworkers da Ferrin-Huggins. They circulate in the inward/[interior] dos vehicles 3individuals, This is not the only story of operations/[surgery] of monitoring on the partdas MM to the MNF or the companies or places key das Iraqian infrastructures.INTSUM nº 6 5 of 6 PRIVATE PRIVATE 7. Operations/[surgery] Italian brigade Op.ARCHIMEDE - patrolling throughout the high-voltage string/[line] (400 KW) close to

Nasiriyah; Op. BIG BROTHER – patrolling do itinerary Cover in bracket/[support] tothe maneuvers/[displacement]/[shift]/[luxation] das troops The USA; Op. STRONGSURVEILLANCE - to magnify/[augment]/[bulk] the security and patrolling the

stroll/[return]/[rollback] das bases das CF (attacks are waited/[await]/[expect]/[hope]das the AIF). OP HOT DOG – to control/[automonitor]/[manage]/[rein] the freedom of movements the South of Nasiriyah. To keep/[keep abreast of]/[maintain] the security inthe itinerary Da Ponte Tampa on Rio Eufrates. Nassíria, 29 of August of 2004 TheOfficer da GNR in the G2 Cell da MSU Hugo Telmo RebeloMarques/[asterisk]/[brand]/[dial]/[rib]/[score]/[tablet] de Faria Captain of CavalryINTSUM nº 6 6 of 6 PRIVATE 1.0.22.53 01:18, 19 June 2008 (GMT)

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PRIVATE MSU/G2 INTSUM Nº 8 02 and 03 SET 04 1. Generalities The Leader daOrganization dos the Mártires de Sadr (OMS) in AL MAJARR AL KABIR (MAK) hewill have given/[impart]/[lavish]/[spoon] orders so that the MM, if dressed withuniforms da Policia Nacional Iraqi (ING) while the operations/[surgery] efectuam atnight. Sabe, for safe source/[spring], that enters/[log on] 31AGO04 and 06SET04, Rafid“Abu Rafia” GHANIM member do Hizb Al Auda, intends to lead a group of 75 the 100

apoiantes, with intention to effect some ambushes, against the MNF, in FALLUJAH. Itwas gotten recently information, that a substantial number of parties Islamic, da currentof SADR, opposes to accept the nomination to it of Abu Amhed Al- RASHID, for Governor da Province of BASRAH. Some you gave/[impart]/[lavish]/[spoon] these

parties had been identified as being: Jami'at Al-Fadilah (JAF), OMS and the 17

Movement of March. The Sheikh Assad AL-BASRI, Head da OMS of BASRAH,commanded/[collate] that they ceased all military operations/[surgery] against the MNFand Forças Iraqian Governamentais (IGF). This as reply to the decision of Muqtada Al-SADR's to finish with the combats in Iraq. BASRI is confident that the leadership dasMM in BASRAH, goes to adhere to cease-fire. Later das still recent hostilities of AN

NAJAF, the MM had decided to opt/[default] to one solution politics for Iraq. MuqtadaAl-SADR believes/[accredit] that if the fight to continue/[carry on] its credibility will beafectada, therefore in any dos the cases it will not obtain/[achieve] to keep/[keep abreastof]/[maintain] level of fight, which had/[owe] to the strong decreases that suffered,either for share das MNF, either for defection dos the proper MM. Concomitantly dosAL- SADR look for/[seek] now to get/[obtain]/[procure] bracket/[support] the tribal

leaders, for form to be recognized as graphic representation/[figure] politics. This will be the first one and basic pacing/[step] ploughs/[plow] if to be able to candidatar, in

http://www.wikileaks.org/wiki/User:1.0.22.53






process politician. 2. Commentary Short-term the MM will be incapable to attack/[mug]in force. However, the threat, of attacks in small scale, it is remained/[keep abreastof]/[maintain] effective. The MM, intend to magnify/[augment]/[bulk] the popularity of Al-SADR, aiming at the input/[entrance] you gave/[impart]/[lavish]/[spoon] in thescene politics, efectuando campaigns of information (propaganda/[advertising]) in an

effort to rehabilitate the current one minus/[negative] picture/[image], with that it was,after the NAJAF incidents. It is probable that it stops/[halt]/[quit]/[stall] tomagnify/[augment]/[bulk] the capacities das MM, these appeal/[resort] the external

bracket/[support]. The Saiita community prepares itself/[prep] now, for the celebration,do 10º anniversary da death do 7º Imam de Kadhimiyah; Its Mausoleum is placed/[site]in BAGHDAD. It foresees if the displacement of a wide number of pilgrims, Iraqis andforeigners, who if they will dislocate/[displace]/[offset]/[shift] through the Area of Operations/[surgery] (TO) da MND (SE). These pilgrims can

become/[dish]/[hollow]/[roughen]/[weight] in a target, for the Forces Anti-Iraqis (theAIF) to initiate campaigns of incitement to the violence. They are also, these pilgrims,INTSUM nº 8 PRIVATE 1 of 6

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a white potential for the extremistas Sunnitas/Wahabbi, represented for groupsconsisting of elements do Antigo Regime/[regimen] (FRE). You finish theminformation gotten/[obtain]/[procure] on the FRE, describe that in it I finish month, hadan activity increase dos its groups especially the associates ZARQAWI. Theforeground/[preferential] targets you gave/[impart]/[lavish]/[spoon] groups will be theactuais members do IIG, INC., squadrons of policy and installations das MNF. The FREare understood/[comprehend]/[comprize] as soon as they are currently the main threat tothe security and stability and that the network/[net] of ZARQAWI, although to put into

motion itself/[jog] in an environment that it is favorable, will have to be had/[bear inmind] as a permanent threat, very especially during all e any religious festival.

The majority dos the parties and organizations politics, do not agree/[agreeupon]/[accord]/[covenant] to the methods practised/[practice] for the majority dos the

parties and organizations politics, in BASRAH, not they agree/[agreeupon]/[accord]/[covenant] to the methods practised/[practice] for Muqtada Al-SADR and the OMS. Moreover, all agree/[agree upon]/[accord]/[covenant] that violence is notthe best form to decide/[hammer out]/[resolve]/[solve] the differences existing betweenIIG/MNF and the OMS. However something exists in common, is that as much the

parties as the OMS, they agree/[agree upon]/[accord]/[covenant] that the MF will haveto leave NAJAF. The most important members da OMS in BASRAH, accept that theMNF they remain in Iraqian territory. However they wait/[await]/[expect]/[hope] thatthe IIG, elect in Next January, finishes for deciding to remove/[purge] the MNF docountry. If this not to be come close to verify/[ascertain]/[check], then the OMS, willmake use da force and da violence against the MNF. E for what if it knows theorganization of Al-Sadr already is started/[start at]/[begin]/[commence]/[get] to

prepare/[prep] for the fact. The future intentions da Organization of SADR althoughuncertain, they raise/[get up]/[arise]/[jack]/[lift]/[rise]/[up] more a question: “What it

will make this organization if finds/[meet up with]/[encounter]/[lie] a success politicianlimited/[border]/[bound]/[delimit] “ Reports have that they define the unpleasantness

feeling, on the part da population, it stops/[halt]/[quit]/[stall] with the generality dos the political parties, very especially the ones that are conotados with Iranian



bracket/[support] the population it fears/[dread] these parties (SCIRI and the BADR)therefore they feel/[sit] that they do not pass of marionetas do Irão. 3. Current threat:JUPITER 2 (the threat level is substantial). 4. Verified/[ascertain]/[check] attacksProvince of AL MUTHANNA NTR Province of DHI QAR NTR Province of MAYSAN NTR Province of BASRAH INTSUM nº 8 PRIVATE 2 of 6

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In 020840SET04, the ammunition was found/[meet up with]/[encounter]/[lie] (UXO)155mm in the neighborhood (IVO) dos post offices of Basrah. The INGremoved/[purge] the UXO. In 021230SET04, he had a shunting line attempt of a camiãoKBR, in the IVO of Safwan, escorted for a force the USA. Force the USAobtained/[achieve] to decide/[hammer out]/[resolve]/[solve] the situation without havingappeal/[resource]/[feature] the firearms. 5. Threats 1. The Hizb Al Auda meets/[meet upwith]/[encounter]/[lie] to put into motion/[jog] it forces for FALLUJAH in the intentionof to attack/[mug] American forces. Its members to dislocate/[displace]/[offset]/[shift] it

for FALLUJAH, in its personal vehicles. The indication that these members hadreceived, was to exhaust/[disperse]/[scatter] e to wait new orders. Previous reports relatethreats of attacks to the MNF and everything leads/[give way] to believe that cell incause, will be able to have/[bear in mind] deep knowledge on the movements das MNF,which its locations/[localization], which the itineraries habituallyused/[overutilize]/[utilize] and which way operandi das MNF, for form to get themaximum success in the waited/[await]/[expect]/[hope] ones attacks. This exactly reportrelates that Hizb Al Auda (HAA) will have 10 cells, in a total of the 600 700 members,in BASRAH and that they wait/[await]/[expect]/[hope] a reinforcement of combatantswho it will have to arrive of FALLUJAH, with originary armament do Irão. The groupwill be able already to have/[bear in mind] in its power RPG-9 73mm. One another

information relates that the group seleccionou following targets as with priority:

(1) the Palace of Al-RAMADI, that lodges/[bed] elements da Forces da Coligação (CF).(2) armored, placed/[lay down]/[put down]/[apprentice]/[lay] Vehicles in fixed

positions, throughout the itineraries main. (3) Other situated bases da coalition betweenAl-RAMADI and Al-FALLUJAH. The fact of this organization togive/[impart]/[lavish]/[spoon] to understand that it knows the movements well das MF,it is preoccupying, but it will not be the fact of now uncovering/[bare] that a fort existsconnector link between the radix/[radical] FRE and Shitas groups. 2.Membros das MMof MOQTADA AL-SADR, had been dislocated/[displace]/[offset]/[shift] for BAQUBAH with intention to effect diverse attacks against Iraqian Policia (IPS), theING, Governmental installations, civil MNF and employees das MNF. Numbers of MMthey go up to around the 1000. The attacks are programmed/[schedule] to be initiated inthe first days of September. The MM are equipped/[man]/[outfit]/[rig] with rockets andsnipers. The MM of MUQTADA AL-SADR are to lead some shares of monitoring todisplacement of vehicles das CF, and for the installations da Air base of Talil, mainly inthe alternative itinerary INDY. One is unaware of exactamente what they intend theMM to observe/[notice]/[remark]. Probably they will be to study the best places for rank of Explosive Devices/[sugar plantation] Improvised (IED). The possibility to be to be

prepared/[prep] assaults and attempts of shunting line (hijackings) of viaturas it will not be to relinquish. Through collected/[take in]/[gather]/[glean] information, it was

possible to detect an ammunition deposit e explosives, the southwest of AN



NASSIRIYAH. Some the recouped/[reclaim]/[recover]/[retrieve] ammunition had been photographed. INTSUM nº 8 PRIVATE 3 of 6

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6. Against Information NTR 7. Operations/[surgery] Italian brigade Op. Archimede - patrolling throughout the high-voltage string/[line] (400 KW) close to Nasiriyah; Op.Big Brother – patrolling do itinerary Cover in bracket/[support] to themaneuvers/[displacement]/[shift]/[luxation] das troops the USA; Op. StrongSURVEILLANCE - to magnify/[augment]/[bulk] the security and patrolling to thestroll/[return]/[rollback] das bases das CF (attacks are waited/[await]/[expect]/[hope]das the AIF). OP HOT DOG – to control/[automonitor]/[manage]/[rein] the freedom of movements the South of Nasiriyah. To keep/[keep abreast of]/[maintain] the security inthe itinerary Da Ponte Tampa on Rio Eufrates. Nassíria, 03 of September of 2004 TheOfficer da GNR in the G2 Cell da MSU Hugo Telmo RebeloMarques/[asterisk]/[brand]/[dial]/[rib]/[score]/[tablet] de Faria Captain of CavalryINTSUM nº 8 PRIVATE 6 of 6

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xMSU/G2 INTSUM Nº 35 06 10NOV04 1. Generalities • The World-wideOrganization Medical Without Borders abandons/[relinquish] all its activities in Iraqdue to security lack. The organization met/[meet up with]/[encounter]/[lie] to operate itin Iraq since January of 2002, establishing 3 clinics in TAWRA and offering its

bracket/[support] to the Hospitals places. The constant abandonment das ONG do Iraq,

will be deeply harmful all reconstruction process do Country. The coordination and thehumanitarian assistance on the part das GO/NGO/IGO is essential for an efficientreconstruction and a pass/[ticket]/[passage] of being able to all Iraqian ministries. Withthe abandonments das ONG, concludes that the improvement do been/[stand] of security will not be for briefing, will be able to get worse if the politics if also tomodify/[alter]/[tamper] and will have one greater taken by being able on the part dos theUSA. • Do is intention Iranian Government, through its Tala'at, Intelligence service, to

boycott Iraqian elections in January of 2005. This boycotting will take the form of terrorist attacks that they will be executed/[implement]/[perform]/[reexecute] in theweeks that precede the elections. The intention do Government Iranian in perpetuatingthe violence must itself it the fact not be desired/[hunger]/[wish] to be neighboring of acountry democratic and he exempts/[free]/[rid]. Iraqian Policia andGuarda/[guard]/[sentinel] Iraqian Nacional, will have a preponderant paper in the act






electoral, having/[owe] to disponibilizar high number of elements that will actuarãoespecially next to the vote places, for form to oppose any type of sabotage share. • The

Leader do Broken/[depart]/[part] AD DAWA and the Vice-president do IIG, IbrahimJA'AFARI, had affirmed/[assert] that IECI decided to carry through/[carryout]/[accomplish]/[realize] the elections 27JAN04. However the spokesman do IECI,

Farid Ayar, it contradicted/[disclaim] explaining/[account] that the date not yet had beendetermined/[set forth], knowing only that they must happen until 31JAN04. • The

electoral and partisan census already had been initiated and with it the first ones hadappeared problems. The provinces of Al-ANBAR and NINEVA, now try/[attempt] toreport difficulties e to retake the activity with normality. 04NOV04 7 lesser Partiesefectuaram its register and in this same 250 date had had order of certifyd/[make sure]for register of different parties. The IECI approved/[okay] the regulation for theProvincial Elections, determining/[set forth] 41 seats/[place], in the maximum, theProvincial Advice (51 for the Province of Baghdad). Although the Electoral Regulationto be now public, the short space of time for the register dos the Political parties go torestrict the registrations to the organized Parties already. The red tape/[preparation] for

the electoral act it is “to walk the good vapor”, however the time attributed to partisancensus and registers, leave/[let] a margin/[edge] of very short maneuver to the Comité,it does not have seat/[place] for delays. The security in FALLUJA, RAMADI andMOSUL will be able set back/[delay] or to make impracticable the census in areas. Thefrank possibility of that exists the Regional Elections Kurdas, that are set appointmentsstop/[halt]/[quit]/[stall] to happen the same in day that the National Elections, come to

be postponed/[defer], therefore the rules electoral still they meet/[meet upwith]/[encounter]/[lie] in debate. Another debate occurs/[take place] at the moment, asto get/[obtain]/[procure] expatriated or dos dos votes the National Iraqis emigrated inother countries. This process it is become involved/[entail]/[wrap] of bigger complexitytherefore raises/[get up]/[arise]/[jack]/[lift]/[rise]/[up] problems technician of explanation e concretion of all the census process. Although all these situations of thedifficult most preoccupying resolution continue/[carry on] to be security, in a firststage/[phase] dos the elements, in one second stage/[phase] do electoral act. • One

lists/[streak] unified of all the Shiitas candidates is to be concluded. Thisstripe/[list]/[stack] includes SCIRI, the Da ' wa, the Current/[chain]/[stream] of Sadr andthe representatives do Iraqian National Congress, as well as one without number of independent. The partisan alliances and the coalition ones of Parties still are to benegotiated/[bargain]/[deal], a time that the political parties still study which its influenceand which its possibility to get/[obtain]/[procure] a satisfactory result in elections. Other Tribal confederations and Unions had expressed/[utter] its will to participate but to the

lack of information of which the proceedings/[procedure] to take they will be able tomake it difficult its organization and to make impracticable its registration in usefultime. However they appear since already two stripes/[list]/[stack], the first oneconsisting of the Da Party ' wa, the SCIRI and one number, not specified/[itemize] of other Islamic Parties, second will be represented by INTSUM nº 35 PRIVATE 1 of 11

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Advice Shiita Politician, associate to the Leader do Iraqian National Congress, AhmadCHALABI, for the Party Fadilah (possibly associated the Shaykh Muhammad al-YAQUBI) e al-MUDARRISI'S Organizador is still presumed that with Muhammad

Taqi-al-Din das shares Islamic. A done study recently it indicates/[pointout]/[display]/[state] that the independent candidates withhold a quota of 35%



bracket/[support] being remainders/[remain] 65% attributed to the Parties. • In

accordance with information collected/[take in]/[gather]/[glean] in the beginning of November, the Mahdi Army of BAGADAD, will have transferred all to its armament todiverse places in the area das cities e SHAAB JURANI, KAMALIYAH, UR and Al-HUSAYNIYAH, knowing itself that it will be in red tape/[preparation] attacks not

specified/[itemize] that will occur/[take place] later do Eid a-Fitr, that it will occur/[take place] between 14 and 16 November of 2004. • Approximately 150 200 MM with 40

Syrians and Iranians had jointly returned e they are concentrated now in the cemetary of AN NAJAF. Organization BADR, that supports/[brace] financier e logistically the MM,commanded/[collate] the retraction and carrier/[transport] of armament do Irão that will

be to be stored/[stow]/[warehouse] in tunnels and criptas in the cemetary of AN NAJAF. A tunnel in special exists that it turns on/[bond]/[link] the cemetary to theMosque of KUFA, where they currently inhabit a wide number of MM, jointly withstocks of armament. • In the Website do Islamic Army in Iraq, available inwww.newiai.8m.com, was verified/[ascertain]/[check] the following acknowledgment:General mobilization “Fight-in and the Allah punizá them for your hands, cover-in the

ones of shame, they assist (for the victory) against them, cure the anguish dos the believers. “[verse do Al Corão] “Praised either dos Allah, guard and sustentáculo the

worlds, the magnificent one.” Who is not secret for nobody is the enemies

gave/[impart]/[lavish]/[spoon] country, admittedly Americans and its allies. Thesehypocritical and apostates, who magnify/[augment]/[bulk]/[increase] the violencekilling innocent people without apparent ratio/[reason] not to be the defense da itsreligion e honor. According to these circumstances, the Commando/[command] doIslamic Army in Iraq it commands/[collate] to all its forces that restart theoperations/[surgery] looking for/[seek] to carry through/[carryout]/[accomplish]/[realize] them with the maximum frequency and intensity. Thenecessity also appears that all mujahidin declares the general mobilization withholds themalignant infidel and its apoiantes. “And they fight/[combat]

matched/[attach]/[band]/[unite]/[yoke] the heathen ones as well as them fight/[combat]in union. But they know that Allah is who restrains them. “ [verse do Al Corão] Also weclamamos/[clamour] to all mujahidin that they foquem its activity in the places of vitalvalue/[importance] for the Enemy. That the effort is directed in the bigger acquisition do

possible number of hostages and arrest-in the good and yours are made sure/[ensure]that operations/[surgery] are filmed, therefore they will represent in the future history docountry, that not if she will be able to lose/[forfeit]. The filmings will also serve tofrighten next enemy e afastado1 and to process/[reveal] to its lies and falsenesses. TheHeroes mujahidin (Lion) magnificent and espiritual/[witty] arise themselves/[get

up]/[arise]/[jack]/[lift]/[rise]/[up] and fight/[combat] with Huge God. That God guidesyour fight, pardons/[forgive] your sins and guarantees your victory on its and your enemy. God is great praised e is Allah.

[Signed/[undersign]] the Islamic Army in Iraq

• The Iranian Government is of moment to give/[minister] a route/[course] of 3 months

for the Ansar Al Eslam e the Al Qaeda, in a city of name ZAHIDAN, next to the border with the Pakistan. trainees will be essentially Arabic/[Arab], Afghan and Iraqian. Whento finish/[complete]/[end]/[terminate] the route/[course] they will bedislocated/[displace]/[offset]/[shift] for a place camouflaged under the name of

Maktabhay Quran, to culminate its trainings. Later they will continue under the disguiseof clergymen, where they will nail in the Mosques in South do Iraq, spreading out the



message anti-MNF while also they stimulate/[encourage] the alliance enters/[log on]Iraq and Irão. 1

Here it is inferred that the moved away/[fend] enemy will be the

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• 26 Ulemas Saudis had directed a letter to the Iraqian people where they affirm/[assert]the legitimacy of to resist the MNF and forbid the cooperation with themforce/[ram]/[stress] occupants. They had determined/[set forth] one fatwa, where thefight against the occupants is obligator for all affirming/[assert] that this is one jihaddefensive. The Saudi Ulema still determined/[set forth] that interest is do do Islão that isnot directed attacks to the elements of countries that do not participate in the coalition

one, such as of organizations humanitarians, or others of carácter not military. The letter was signed/[undersign] by Shaykh Safar al- Hawali; Shaykh Nasir to al-Umar; ShaykhSalman al-Awdah; Shaykh Sharif Hatim al-Awni; Shaykh Awad al-Qarni; ShaykhSu'ud al-Funaysan; among others. The Dr. Awad al-Qarni, old professor of principles of

jurisprudence in the Islamic University do Imam Muhammad Bin- Su'ud, commentedthat the Saudi Ulema determined/[set forth] this fatwa, where if he

becomes/[dish]/[hollow]/[roughen]/[weight] obligator the fight against the occupationforces. Da explained/[account] the value/[importance] union of all the Iraqis, of all thesectors in intention to prevent/[keep off]/[avoid]/[dodge] the civil War. He stillwrote/[ghostwrite]/[stencil] that although to be obligator all the forms of resistance, thedeath of Iraqis in name da resistance religiously is forbidden, exactly that the crime is

committed under excuse that if had confused with the Enemy. ” This is not the momentto raise/[rear]/[tower] the conflicts. All will have to be patient and to forget pain e thewounds do passed. That the resistance in Palestine serves of lesson and as example tofollow. “ (Words da writing do Dr. Awad al-Qarni) 2. Provinces a. AL MUTHANNA •

Generalities Activity IN in the Province of AL MUTHANA remains/[keep abreastof]/[maintain] it low level. • Attacks NSTR • Threats NSTR • Terrorism NSTR •

Irregular forces NSTR • Crime NSTR • ING and LP NSTR • Tribes NSTR • Religion

NSTR • Politics NSTR • Operations/[surgery] NSTR b. BASRAH • Generalities

Activity IN remains/[keep abreast of]/[maintain] it a low level. • Attacks INTSUM nº 35

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In 042100NOV04, it was informed/[apprize] that 30 mortar grenades/[garnet] hadmet/[meet up with]/[encounter]/[lie] (120mm e 82 mm) in Itinerary AL TAWNY. TheING collected/[take in]/[gather]/[glean] the ammunition. In 051810NOV04 throughoutItinerary 6, he happens diverse tribal combats. Danish battalion remained itself far fromthe place of where he observed/[notice]/[remark] the situation. In 051810NOV04 hewas informed/[apprize] that he withheld it a stranger who if suspicion to belong toIranian Intelligence. Later he came to be identified as a Syria citizen e hecontinues/[carry on] withheld in the Squadron of AL JAMEAT. In 060500NOV04 hewas informed/[apprize] that he will have been found/[meet up with]/[encounter]/[lie] a

IED close to YELLOW 3. IPS assembled/[assemble]/[ride]/[mount] a lace of security inthe place and had been attacked/[mug] by armed men. IPS captured 2 strangers, who



were in the ownership of weapons and a city council. Others 4 strangers hadescaped/[leak] with the IED. In 061444COCT04 a black boat to sail in Rio SAAopened/[gap] fire against the sentry do Palace of Basrah. The sentryanswered/[reply]/[respond] to the fire and thinks that she will have reached dos the twooccupants. The other occupant will have shown a flag of truce. The IPS was called/[call

out]/[summon] e da withheld dos the suspicious one having/[bear in mind] freedmoments later the proprietor boat. In 061952NOV04, a force will have heard somedetonations and SAF, close to yellow 6. Moments later had been attacked/[mug] byeffective fire IN. It had reply to the fire. The force it continued under fire

pursuing/[hound] force IN until yellow. The QRF and air support had beensent/[forward]/[mail] to the place. The IPS also was sent/[forward]/[mail] to the place. Itdid not have decreases nor damages in forces friends. He was died an element IN. In070845NOV04, a company of civil security (Olive Security), was attacked/[mug] byone IED, in Itinerary HEART. Da SLB had two decreasescarried/[bus]/[haul]/[raft]/[tram]/[transport]/[truck] to the Hospital. Dos wounded cameto falecer later. In 071910NOV04, one was informed/[apprize] that pipeline

located/[localize]/[pinpoint] between AZ ZUBAYR and SAFWAN if it found/[meet upwith]/[encounter]/[lie] in flames. The IPS and the Military duty/[service]/[job] of Iraqian Firemen had fought/[combat] the fire that it was given/[impart]/[lavish]/[spoon]as extinct by 21H21. The IPS continues the inquiries. In 072008NOV04, it wasinformed/[apprize] by the English Real Riflemen, who had been attacked/[mug] by aIED in the Itinerary CAP. Two vehicles had been damaged/[impair] and had had 3decreases. The force it returned to the SLB. The decreases had been treated and quicklythey had had high do medical center. In 072149NOV04, it had a mortar attack that felland blew up do inside perimeter do SAAH. It left air support and for 21H55 newdetonation. The QRF advanced/[inch] and obtained/[achieve] white interceptor onecarinha with 4 suspected. It did not have low damages nor. In 072215NOV04, the Forceof Protecção informed/[apprize] that they had been thundered/[shoot] 6 gusts of SAF inthe area da station/[season] of water handling/[treatment]. A stranger was sighted to runaway do local. He did not have low damages nor. In 080130NOV04, a Danish forceobserved/[notice]/[remark] an one detonation rocket approximately 6500 meters, impact

place will have been concerning 4000 meters. In 082135NOV04, a vehicle da IPS wasattacked/[mug] by an explosion that if it presumes of a IED, the 200 meters for the

Northwest do Field Stephen. The explosion was heard in SAAH e it it will be QRF wasdislocated/[displace]/[offset]/[shift] until the local o. The IPS informed/[apprize] threedecreases that will have been carried/[bus]/[haul]/[raft]/[tram]/[transport]/[truck] andattended in the Local Hospital. Also two had been withheld suspected for IPS. The press

dislocated/[displace]/[offset]/[shift] it the place where da interviewed some dos the localcommanders IPS. In 091335NOV04, 107mm had been detected 3 rockets thatmet/[meet up with]/[encounter]/[lie] pointed/[aim]/[appoint], on the timers, against thetowers da SLB. 4 elements had been withheld in the place das The AIF and youdeliver/[give over]/[hand] in the Squadron da LP in Al Arab. Also it will be withheldthe 2 vehicles involved in the attack. It equips/[man]/[outfit]/[rig] it of inactivação wassent/[forward]/[mail] to the place to desactivar R ockets. • Threats NSTR • Terrorism

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NSTR • Crime The Commander/[head] da Squadron of AT TANNUMAH, has revealedworried about the traffic of fuel in the Shatt Al Arab. In the night of 02NOV04



members da IPS of AT TANNUMAH, they had been come close/[approximate]/[near]to some small boats that escorted barges for the river. Some dos strangers hadopened/[gap] fire from the small boats. Da IPS did not have wounded elements. THEIPS it is prepared/[prep] now to effect an operation/[surgery], joint with the MNF,against fuel contraband using/[overutilize]/[utilize] the river as half of actuação. • ING

and LP • In date he does not need/[precize] Chocolate candy/[Brigadier General]Kadhim MUHAMMADAWI, was pointed/[aim]/[appoint] as the newCommander/[head] da Policia of BASRAH. Its nomination appears the removal shortlyafter do Colonel Mohammad Kadhim Al Ali Al-TIMIMI (known by Brig. THERE).The Brig. ALI one meets/[meet up with]/[encounter]/[lie] dismissed currently and itwaits/[await]/[expect]/[hope] new educations/[instruction] do Minister doInward/[interior]. It has few days was efectuada an attempt of murder to the Brig ALI,through da rank of a IED in the berm da road between AL Tuwaysa and Al Jazair. TheBrig. ALI it was not wounded, but some dos the members da itsequip/[man]/[outfit]/[rig] of protecção had suffered light wounds. The truecauses/[reason] are not known do removal do Brig. THERE, but it has who it

suspects/[inkle] that for envolvement in fuel contraband. Also not if they know youmotivate them do attack, suspecting itself/[inkle] of a extremista group Sunnita that ittries/[attempt] to destabilizar the security in BASRAH. • It has some a few days ago,

had detected members da ING, that operate/[perform surgery] in dos the PVCP inItinerary Al Qibla – Abu Al Khasib in BASRA, to receive bribes on the part dosconductors of weighed, that they carry/[bus]/[haul]/[raft]/[tram]/[transport]/[truck]smuggled fuel. The bribe it allows the vehicles to be dislocated/[displace]/[offset]/[shift]freely for BASRAH. The force in the PVCP is perpendicularly constituted of sevenelements da ING. The some highest dos responsible for the ING also they meet/[meetup with]/[encounter]/[lie] involved in illegal activity, that it happens daily. It is the firsttime that it was had to speak/[talk] of bribes in the ING, what is new subject that itrequires a fast reaction, being unaware of for already the total extension do fenómeno ewhich the involved companies. • Tribes NSTR • Religion NSTR • Politics The Comité

dos Representantes Sunnitas (CSRE) (Hiyat Alama Almuslimin) and the OMS inBASRA meet/[meet up with]/[encounter]/[lie] to work/[labor] it in set, in the attempt todissuade the local population in participating in the elections. Although the religiousdifferences, the two organizations they cooperate/[to co-operate] in a commonobjectivo. The Sheikh Yusef SNU, leader do CSRE, keeps/[keep abreast of]/[maintain]contact strait with the Sheikh Assad Al-BASRI, leader da OMS. This informationappears in one moment that if feels/[sit] some tension between the etnia Sunnita.However some exists care on the part da OMS, therefore to receive bracket/[support]

from a Sunnita faction will be able to create inimizades in the seio da Shiita majority.One thinks that the CSRE represents the terrorist groups Wahabbis when these intend tonegotiate/[bargain]/[deal] with members do Government. • Operations/[surgery] NSTR

c. DHI QAR • Generalities Activity IN remains/[keep abreast of]/[maintain] it a lowlevel. • At aques INTSUM nº 35 PRIVATE 5 of 11

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In 061925NOV04, a Rumanian patrol was attacked/[mug] by SAF when it returned of Al Chabaysh directing itself for Al Hamar, during the Operation/[surgery] Iron Gate.They had been thundered/[shoot] six gusts against the patrol. It did not have reply to the

fire. It did not have decreases or damages. In 081405NOV04, an Italian patrolinformed/[apprize] a possible VBIED, in the south area of An Nasiriyah. Portuguese of



IEEI equips/[man]/[outfit]/[rig] it was sent/[forward]/[mail] to the place to investigate.The vehicle was confirmed as being a VBIED and it was desactivado andremoved/[draw off]/[exit]/[undock]/[withdraw] all the explosives. In 081900NOV04, anItalian force was attacked/[mug] by SAF close Da Ponte ALPHA. It had reply to thefire. It did not have decreases nor damages. In 090015NOV04, an Italian force was

attacked/[mug] by SAF in Itinerary BISMARK. patrol was attacked/[mug] by strangerswho if made to dislocate/[displace]/[offset]/[shift] in a vehicle. The patrol itanswered/[reply]/[respond] to the fire. It did not have decreases nor damages. • Threats

At the beginning of November elements I impart/lavish/spoon Jaysh al-Mahdiorganized attacks against Italian contingent and the Police Forces of An NASIRIYAH,as retaliation to the recent ones repressive operations/[surgery] taken/[give way] thecorporal/[handle]/[cable]/[cabo] for the LP and the Carabinieri Italian. The sharesterrorists against the Italian patrols, will involve/[entail]/[wrap] the use of automaticweapons e IEDs, placed/[lay down]/[put down]/[apprentice]/[lay] in the main Itinerariesused/[overutilize]/[utilize] for the different forces. Equally in beginning of November,60 extremistas had approximately congregated/[convene]/[flock]/[mass] in the

Headquarters do Left/[depart]/[part] of Muqtada Al-SADR. Other groups hadlocated/[index]/[position] close das Bridges Alpha and Brave. • Terrorism In 06NOV04

confidential source/[spring] informed/[apprize] that the presence of AL KAFAJI in ANexpected/[await]/[expect]/[hope] NASIRIYAH, where Ice Plant would make aspeech/[discourse] close da., on the substitution of Commander da LP. AL KAFAJI,spoke/[talk] in favor of the inactive Commander, Colonel ABU NOOR, estimulated/[encourage] the population to reveal/[manifest] its unpleasantness for thissubstitution. The source/[spring] it thinks that members do JAISH AL MAHADY(JAM) will be able to initiate a new period of violence in AN NASSIRIYAH, notexcluding aggressive activities against the CFs. In 07NOV04, confidentialsource/[spring] informed/[apprize] that a joint operation/[surgery] between the LP andthe ING it led/[give way] to the detention of two important elements, SAHAD ABUMUSTAFAH and MEHEDI, pertaining to the organization of AL ZARQAWI. Theseelements will have fond of carriage/[car] AN NASIRIYAH, last week and met/[meet upwith]/[encounter]/[lie] to collect/[take in]/[gather]/[glean] it information on refinery andthe Headquarters da ERGIFE, AS WELL AS PHOTOGRAPHING BOTH. They hadaffirmed/[assert] in moment da detention that if had dislocated/[displace]/[offset]/[shift]AN NASSIRIYAH to try/[attempt] to get/[obtain]/[procure] job in CompanyANNUKBA. They meet/[meet up with]/[encounter]/[lie] withheld in the Jail/[arrest] of AN NASIRIYAH, but if no evidence will be found/[meet up with]/[encounter]/[lie] willhave that to be freed. The LP tries/[attempt] to know who them it supplied the logistic

bracket/[support]. Recent reports demonstrate the displacement of elements come of Fallujah with the intention to get/[obtain]/[procure] useful information, on the CF totry/[attempt] to open/[gap] a new front of crisis in the South do Iraq. • Irregular forces

In 05NOV04, in AL GHARRAF elements da MSU had been informed/[apprize] byLieutenant AKIL JASSIM AL HAMAMI, responsible for the Squadron da LP, that inthe population dos headquarters exist two movements OMS, on MUQTADA AL SADR and AL DAWA, on to the father and an uncle of MUQTADA AL SADR. According tosource/[spring] exists a bad relationship between the two groups, that have its proper MM seted/[arm]/[cock] and will have both to receive bracket/[support] do Irão. About ahundred of people she is enrolled in the local OMS and the majority youundo/[impart]/[lavish]/[spoon] they will have in its ownership weapons of average bore

and weighed, demonstrating a special hatred for the CFs. notice of monetary andlogistic bracket/[support] to the MM on the part do Irão, continue/[carry on] to be daily



e neighboring country in destabilizar the area evidences the attempt do. In 06NOV04,confidential source/[spring] informed/[apprize] that in 062100NOV04, itfinished/[finalize] a meeting do JAISH AL MAHADY enters/[log on] 8 members inHotel JANUBI in AN NASSIRIYAH. The meeting was presided over for AL KAFAJIand the subject do was the substitution Commander/[head] da LP of AN NASIRIYAH.

source/[spring] informed/[apprize] despite AL KAFAJI, decided to speak/[talk]directamente with Governor SABRI, in 07NOV04, as bracket/[support] form ABU NOOR. The notice da substitution of ABU NOOR, involve/[entail]/[wrap] the mainones appear/[figure] da Province of DHI QAR. It can be that AL KAFAJI if is totry/[attempt] to use to advantage/[avail] da situation, probably to get/[obtain]/[procure]again the previous one bracket/[support], lost, inside da OMS. INTSUM nº 35PRIVATE 6 of 11

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• Crime In 08NOV04, confidential source/[spring] informed/[apprize] that in SUQ ASH

SHUYUKH, still one exists delicate situation for the CFs. Some das you appear/[figure]excellent da population will be

invoking the raised/[rear]/[tower] unemployment, the lack of ways and communication,sewers and water potable canalized/[channel] and the perpetual subjects of security,arriving to affirm/[assert] that criminals have to each day that passes more freedom of actuação. • ING and LP • As form to clarify the substitution do Commander/[head] da

LP (CoP) of AN NASSIRYAH, one inquires/[apprize] that the new CoP, Gen.XENOPHANES KHALAF is deriving of SUQ ASH SHUYUKH but that it alwaysinhabited in AN NASSIRIYAH. Do reached the Rank of Major Iraqian army, during the

previous Regime/[regimen] and was transferred has eight years for the area of AL

DIWANIYA, where its family lives currently. Later da old fall do regime/[regimen],KHALAF was transferred to the LP, keeping/[keep abreast of]/[maintain] the sameRank. The substitution worries some corporations/[entity] of AN NASSIRYAH,therefore Colonel ABU NOOR it has great influence on Party BADR, as well as anyanother group that it intends to keep/[keep abreast of]/[maintain] the tension in the city.At moment these groups will be able to use to advantage/[avail] tomagnify/[augment]/[bulk] its power, influencing the elections of January of 2005. • In06NOV04, the Gen. MOHAMMED KHALAF ABBUDI, new CoP of AN

NASIRIYAH, it informed/[apprize] that Colonel HAMID ABDULLAH IBRAIM ALHUSSEINI (known by ABU NOOR), destitute do position of CoP, personallyinformed/[apprize] it that if not to retake its previous functions, will be able to haveserious consequências for the Italian Forces, being these the indications directas of MUQTADA AL SADR. In accordance with its assay/[evaluation] (Gen. KHALAF) its

predecessor will have organized several operations/[surgery], in different areas, allmoved away/[fend] from where they have interests, allowing as soon as the weaponscontinued/[carry on] to arrive at MM da OMS. • Colonel MOHAMMED TAAHR

KADEM, representative do CoP da Province of DHI QAR in AN NASIRIYAH, herelated that in 07NOV04, in a session do Provincial Advice, 39 members had voted infavor of the elaboration of a petition directed to the Minister do Inward/[interior],expressing/[utter] its concern for the substitution do CoP. They affirm/[assert] thatmeasure is not legal therefore wounds the article 71º do Code of Administrative

proceeding. rule establishes that the nominations cannot be imposed by the Interior Minister do, having/[owe] this to point/[aim]/[appoint] more than a candidate, being the



final decision do Advice Provincial. This is a demonstration of unpleasantness doProvincial Advice to the Minister do Interior that not fulfilling the stipulated onelegally, it disrespects the members daquele that Advice. • Tribes NSTR • Religion

NSTR • Politics • In 07NOV04, confidential source/[spring] informed/[apprize] that the

substitution do Colonel ABU NOOR, da LP pleased/[tickle] to the generality dos the

elements, therefore that one had for habit to humiliate/[demean] e to use of ahandling/[treatment] I infuriate stops/[halt]/[quit]/[stall] with its subordinate. Thesource/[spring] still related that the removal of ABU NOOR was not appreciated/[enjoy]

by the sector politician, in particular for OMS and SCIRI. Both the parties felt theindifference do old CoP how much to its shares and for this ratio/[reason] prefer it to itwho to any another substitute. • 08NOV04, confidential source/[spring]

informed/[apprize] the presence of elements da Intelligence Iranian in AN NASIRIYAH. In the last dos days the Political parties had visited the majority Islamic.The ratio/[reason] da visit makes look like to be the payment of wages to the bodiescontrollers you gave/[impart]/[lavish]/[spoon] to parties and the promise of financial

bracket/[support] for elections and 2005. source/[spring] informed/[apprize] despite the

Islamic Parties will efectuarão the payment of 100 USD all those that if theyinscribe/[enface] as members. • Operations/[surgery] INTSUM nº 35 PRIVATE 7 of 11

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NSTR • Other information A new type of mortars is to be, drawn/[crayon],constructed/[build] and tested for a mechanic of BAGHDAD, for the Mujahideen. Thegarnet device is created to thunder/[shoot] bore 82 mm without appealing/[resort] to theuse do habitual tube/[pipe]. The new weapon consists of a simple tube/[pipe] (pipe) of 60 cm of size/[length] with a diameter of 19 24 mm, with the charge/[load] zone with 50cm of depth and 12 mm of diameter. The tube/[pipe] has 24 mm diameter in one das

extremities e 19 mm to the mouth. The base do tube/[pipe] has 6 cm of thickness. Asmall orifice of 6 still exists mm, that it turns on/[bond]/[link] the base to the exterior.The device divides in three parts of 20 cm each with twisteds roll/[thread] female andmale in the extremities, being exactamente equal to one any pipe. This device wassuccessfully tested by three times in TARMIYAH 29OUT04. This new weapon allowsto direct shot and indirecto. If the tests successfully to continue/[carry on] theMujahideen they will receive 1000 you gave/[impart]/[lavish]/[spoon] devices. If thisdevice if to show efficient in the attacks in the BAGDAD zone, can be that it comes to

be used/[overutilize]/[utilize] in all Iraq. Its advantages are sufficient, such as thereduced ones costs, its easy production and the simple concealment/[dissimulation]. Thegreat disadvantage sets in shot indirecto, therefore grenade/[garnet] of 82mmloses/[forfeit] stability and reach. This new weapon can to come to substitute the RPGsin the direct shot, therefore is of more flexible and fast manuseamento. d. MAYSAN •

Generalities Activity IN remains/[keep abreast of]/[maintain] it a low level. • Attacks In

092215NOV04, it was attacked/[mug] by a SAF gust, close to AL AMARRAH,thundered/[shoot] 30 meters to the front do vehicle. It was not possible to identify theaggressor. For 22H17, they had been again attacked/[mug] for 3 gusts of SAF. They haddislocated/[displace]/[offset]/[shift] 500m for North and they had thundered/[shoot]/[gooff] a Very light but was not sighted no aggressive element. It did not have decreasesnor damages. • Threats NSTR • Terrorism NSTR INTSUM nº 35 PRIVATE 8 of 11

Tube/[pipe] of 24mm of diameter with 19 mm of diameter 6 cm after the mouth with adiameter of 12 mm in the charge/[load] area. Charge/[load] area with 50 cm 60cm



Aperture/[opening] of 6mm System of assembly not identified Numbers 1, 2 and 3, theyrepresent the three parts where if it divides the PRIVATE tube/[pipe] • Irregular forces

A Group established/[found] for Iranian Intelligence is to develop operations/[surgery]of HUMINT in some Governmental Departments, Groups Politicians, IraqianCorporations/[entity] and MNF in Province of Maysan. The Group has about 72

elements almost in the totality Iraqian e meets/[meet up with]/[encounter]/[lie] centeredin Al AMARAH and Al MAJARR Al KABIR (AL MAK), with others elements inBASRAH and BAGHDAD. The Group is independent, but it operates/[performsurgery] coordinate with the MIRI (Movement of the Mujahideen of IslamicRevolutionaries in Iraq). The group develops operations/[surgery] of monitoring and

passes the information collected/[take in]/[gather]/[glean] for They will go. The namedo group is unknown, as well as the place where if theycongregate/[convene]/[flock]/[mass], but knows that its objectivo is the informationretraction, aiming at to study the best forms to create breakdowns/[rupture] in thesociety, provoking/[trigger] instability in the Province. Common knowledge is alreadydo that the Iranian Government intends to create destabilização enough to make

impracticable elections of January of 2005. • Crime NSTR • ING and LP TheLieutenant – Colonel HIKMET, Commander da 606ª Brigade da ING, situated inQALAT SALIH, was despromovido to the Rank of Major and transferred to BASRAH.The ratio/[reason] da its despromoção gives/[impart]/[lavish]/[spoon] - for itscontribution and is helped/[aid]/[assist] to the MM in attacks against the MNF inBAGHDAD. It is presumed that also he will have been apanhado to steal/[rob]armament. It will have been substituted for Lieutenant-Colonel RIKHIM of BASRAH,that it intends it withhold its predecessor. • Tribes NSTR • Religion NSTR • Politics

NSTR • Operations/[surgery] NSTR 2. Elections Lições gotten/[obtain]/[procure] in the

Afghan Elections A detailed study was published recently where if they describe roomlições to learn with the Afghan elections and that they have application in Iraq. 1) Thestudy it demonstrates that the vital elections are an instrument of change and for itssuccess. In Iraq the tribal envolvement is the key to reach/[access]/[attain]/[overtake]successfully domestic bracket/[support]. 2) The study it cites/[quote] the predispositionto accept the trace/[risk] as essential ingredient. Uma conclusion will be that to

postpone/[defer] das Iraqian elections, as form to assure/[ensure] justice das same or asform to obtain/[achieve] to educate/[school] the population for the electoral act, thetrace/[risk] could be valid. 3) The authors had noticed that the Afghan elections hadallowed the Afghans to exceed/[overdrive] ethical divisions and the predefined sectorsda society. In Iraq an envolvement deeper da ONU could be necessary to reach the sameresults. 4) Shares that supported/[brace] those that had not accepted the authority do

Temporary Government, developed for the proper Afghan Government, they haddemonstrated to all, that the Government if it worried all about the country and with onealone it has not left/[depart]/[part]. Fallujah could be the “guineapig” so that the IIG if

demonstrates more worried about all (with the country) and not only with the particular interests of each Province. 3. Conclusions INTSUM nº 35 PRIVATE 9 of 11

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• Part da Sunnita aggressiveness in the Center do Iraq probably is explained/[account]

by reaction of fear developed for the population that if feels/[sit] threatened/[menace] bythe majority Shiita. The violence does not pass thus of a defensive reply and this

attitude is supported/[back]/[bracket]/[buttress]/[shore]/[strut]/[timber]/[withstand] for the high Sunnitas instances, the same ones that of moment they develop the negotiations



in Fallujah and if they relate/[interrelate] with the IIG. The biggest Sunnita threat is led by the old members do Broken/[depart]/[part] Ba'ath, that if they had reorganized andthey reorganized, now having/[bear in mind] diverse bases and bracket/[support] of neighboring countries, such as the Matched/[attach]/[band]/[unite]/[yoke] Syrian andArabic/[Arab] Emirates. The experience seats/[bottom]/[reseat] in loops/[bow]

transnational they make you gave/[impart]/[lavish]/[spoon] to groups a force detainer of an extraordinary power, although the existing differences between the diverse groups.The local level, the rebels they will use/[overutilize]/[utilize] the common enemy(MNF) to develop and to keep/[keep abreast of]/[maintain] the alliances, so far impensáveis, between fundamentalist radix/[radical] groups, as form to bemagnified/[augment]/[bulk] capacity and power of combat. These rebels willcontinue/[carry on] to use/[overutilize]/[utilize] the intimidation and coercion as form tokeep the control in places where the presence das ISF not if it makes of efficient formand of equal form it does not have a solid presence das MNF. Recent reportsinform/[apprize] that the Sunnitas de Al-Anbar had started/[startat]/[begin]/[commence]/[get] to organize itself stops/[halt]/[quit]/[stall] the elections,

creating one strong opposition for form to boycott the electoral act. The Groups IraqianRebellious nationalists Sunnitas, where if they include the Ba'athists, willform/[fashion] fronts Politics that will present Stripes/[list]/[stack] of Candidates, whilethey continue with its shares against the IIG and the MNF. Contrarily what they makelook like, these groups they intend to keep/[keep abreast of]/[maintain] the opposition of violent form, to the presence das MNF and the attempts do IIG in projector its authority.• Recent indications indicate/[point out]/[display]/[state] that an increment in the dos

activities will exist the elements do Antigo Regime/[regimen] (FRE) in the AOR daMND (SE). The reports, describing this situation, they

become/[dish]/[hollow]/[roughen]/[weight] now habitual and they appear dos the mostdiverse places (An Nasiriyah, Basrah and Az Zubayr). Not yet it hasgiven/[impart]/[lavish]/[spoon] enough in reports so that if it obtains/[achieve] toclarificar which the safe ones you gave/[impart]/[lavish]/[spoon] groups. The greatquestion that if raises/[get up]/[arise]/[jack]/[lift]/[rise]/[up], for MND (SE), will be ableit has attacked/[mug] the Fallujah to be the detonator of new and bigger activitiesdeveloped for these groups? Also if it knows that, in the past, some dos the attacksefectuados for these groups, had been camouflaged as being Shiitas revolts, being thusimpossible to quantify which its real capacities. Its intentions will be supported/[brace]

by rebels of Fallujah. The militarized minds more, you gave/[impart]/[lavish]/[spoon]groups, will look for/[seek] to attack/[mug] e to damage/[impair] the jail/[chain]/[string]logistic that crosses/[traverse] the AOR da MND (SE), the points keys desta

jail/[chain]/[string], infrastructures such as bridges, as well as any Unit that the rebelsthey suspect/[inkle] to dislocate itself/[displace]/[offset]/[shift] for North tosupport/[brace] the shares das MNF. The elements more desperate extremistas and will

be able to attack/[mug] civil targets, with the intention to cause/[give rise to] the chaos ethe terror, influencing in the end the public opinion of minus/[negative] form. • They

now appear information that indicate/[point out]/[display]/[state] the intention of rollback/[return] to the violence on the part of some dos the most radix/[radical]members das MM da OMS, but not yet have clear signs/[signal] of Cease-fireagreement breaks/[shatter] do. Perhaps this attitude is better described as one tension dowhat as a breakdown/[rupture], especially when one knows that Al SADR willform/[fashion] one lists/[streak] the Advice on the basis of Shiita Politician jointly with

the Chalabi, the Hizbollah Iraqi and other parties of lesser representation. Thesedevelopments will not have to be considered/[regard] as the local prelude do beginning



da violence, if Religious Leaders to decide to return to violence, or same if AL SADR or others as it decide to instigate to the practical one of some attacks as form to

pressure/[press] the process politician. main concern presents when the LebaneseHizbollah and other external forces gifts in Iraq, to decide to stir up/[urge] the groups of lesser dimension to the violence, jointly with the members more grumblers das MM.

The groups in question they will be: the Thar Allah, 15º Sh'aban, the Islamic Vanguard,the MIRI, etc. The attack the Fallujah it will be able to provide the chance of thesegroups if to become/[dish]/[hollow]/[roughen]/[weight] active more, as form to boycottthe electoral process. As repair notices that the situation indicates/[pointout]/[display]/[state] that in NAJAF between Sadristas and axle SCIRI/BADR, remains“acid” and that everything leads/[give way] to believe that the MM could be/[stand] to

planear to assassinate/[murder] appear/[figure] influential of NAJAF as well asmembers do IIG, including Allawi. Nassíria, 10 of November of 2004 The Officer daGNR in the G2 Cell da MSU INTSUM nº 35 PRIVATE 10 of 11

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Hugo Telmo Rebelo Marques/[asterisk]/[brand]/[dial]/[rib]/[score]/[tablet] de FariaCaptain of Cavalry INTSUM nº 35 PRIVATE 11 of 11

Katana0182 01:22, 19 June 2008 (GMT)

#5

PRIVATE MSU/G2 INTSUM Nº 13 13 15 SET 04 1. Generalities The officialconfirmation exists now, that the Local Commander da Policia da Province of DHIQAR, Colonel AB NOOR, was not dismissed for the Minister do Interior Iraqi. Asresult da great affluence of pilgrims to the city, has already some days, markets of AN

NASIRIYAH, meet/[meet up with]/[encounter]/[lie] sobrelotados of people, especiallyof weapons, located/[localize]/[pinpoint] between squares HABOUBI and ALSHATRAH. In this circumstance, in 10SET04, was detected the presence do ColonelAB NOOR, folloied/[accompany] of some members da Policia Local (LP), that they

policed the Market and they fiscalized vendas of weapons. Between the purchasers, whoin a first stage/[phase] they had been suspicious the presence da polices, quickly it

passed the information that these swim would have made and the Market and venda of weapons it continued/[carry on] with normality. The contraband of weapons is the main

prescription source/[spring] for the bandos of criminals (gang). Da LP exists a collusion

stops/[halt]/[quit]/[stall] with these gangs, either for distrust either for I benefit. A verycold relation (moved away/[fend]) between Guarda/[guard]/[sentinel] Iraqian Nacionalalso exists (ING) and Iraqian Policia (IPS) 1. In accordance with some sources/[spring]the ING actuou e he continues/[carry on] to actuar repressively against gangs. When hehas detentions and According to prescribed in the law, the ING, he will have to requestto the LP, to continue with the process of inquiry, proceeding to all you endeavour them

procedural. Soon, it will be easy of to understand/[comprehend]/[comprize] that the LP,nothing makes to taste/[sample]/[taste] the dos illicit activities the dos elements gangswithheld by the ING and that after a good pledge/payment, these elements they finishfor leaving in freedom without having seat/[place] to any punishment. This behavior will be able to bring serious problems to the ING, therefore this Force will be

seen/[view] as the only one that it intervenes and it fights against the organized crime.Confidential source/[spring] informed/[apprize] that about 250 natural people of AN





NASSIRIYAH they had participated in the events of AN NAJAF. Sabe that 56 dessasthese people they faleceram and that many (I number stranger) had been wounded. Inmemory dos the deceased of SUQ ASH SHUYUKH, ASH SHATRA, AIR RIFAI,

NASSER and AL FUHUD, they had been placed/[lay down]/[putdown]/[apprentice]/[lay] 12 black hinges/[plate]/[board] to the input/[entrance] da

delegation of AL SADR. In AN NASIRIYAH, three roads exist that areconsidered/[regard] of high trace/[risk]: • Baghdad avenue: IED threat. • Street dos the

Parties: probable trace/[risk]. • Street da Mosque of AL CIDER -APPLE: probabletrace/[risk]. 2. Provinces . AL MUTHANNA NSTR b. DHI QAR • Attacks 1

Considerase that IPS (Irakian Police Service) is Policia Local (LP)


PRIVATE

A patrol of security to the itinerary Cover, informed/[apprize] the shunting line(robbery) of a viatura. The patrol found/[meet up with]/[encounter]/[lie] two individualsthat had affirmed/[assert] to have/[bear in mind] been assaulted and that the vehiclewhere if they dislocated/[displace]/[offset]/[shift] was removed/[drawoff]/[exit]/[undock]/[withdraw] to them, for 8 individuals that if made tocarry/[bus]/[haul]/[raft]/[tram]/[transport]/[truck] in 2 NISSAN PICKUP. Thestolen/[rob] vehicle would be a camião of the charge/[load]marks/[asterisk]/[brand]/[dial]/[rib]/[score]/[tablet] KIA, and wasdislocated/[displace]/[offset]/[shift] for BASRAH. The type of weapons is unaware of that the assailants carried/[bus]/[haul]/[raft]/[tram]/[transport]/[truck] or charge/[load]do vehicle. • Threats The military services (MM), planeiam to place/[lay down]/[put

down]/[apprentice]/[lay] Engenhos/[sugar plantation] Explosivos Improvisados (IED),for form to attack/[mug] the Forces da Coligação (CF), in the South do Iraq.MUSTAFA (GHALLY), member das MM, it complains the responsibility for the rank of two IED in the string/[line] of path-of-iron e in the south part of AN NASIRIYAH,that had reached Italian Forças (IJTF). GHALLY informed/[apprize] that the IED werecomposite/[composed] of TNT, detonation for remote control and that it are activatedaquando da pass/[ticket]/[passage] das ITJF in the level pass/[ticket]/[passage]. In boththe acts exist a first person who verifies/[ascertain]/[check] the pass/[ticket]/[passage]and that she informs as an element that, hiding itself/[conceal] in one the explosivedevice/[sugar plantation] has been valid at a distance close do local, active. GHALLY

planeia to place/[lay down]/[put down]/[apprentice]/[lay] other devices/[sugar

plantation] close da Base to Tallil thus attacking/[mug] vehicles das CF. GHALLY hascome to acediar resident of TLAB, it to assist in the rank dos the IEDs. GHALLYinhabits in the area of AL-SHOALA, “clientele” of AN NASIR IYAH. Das MM ismember, but it is not leader. GHALLY would like/[fancy] to attack/[mug] theAmericans, but the Italians are white more easy. In 13SET04 confidentialsource/[spring] informed/[apprize] that itinerary BISMARK, that turns on/[bond]/[link]AN NASSIRYIA AIR RIFAI, will be safe and burst/[controlled] for the LP. Thesource/[spring] still informed/[apprize] that close to AIR RIFAI, throughout itineraryBISMARK, the 4 km of AN NASIRIYAH, exists a crater, where criminals if congregate/[convene]/[flock]/[mass]. They use/[overutilize]/[utilize] cinereousSUBARU for had taken/[give way] the corporal/[handle]/[cable]/[cabo] the assaults initinerary BISMARK. The information informs/[apprize] despite exists other dangerousroads, such as: • “SAID HAMMED AIR RIFAI”, (itinerary RORKE) for the 4 AIR



RIFAI km later da population. • “AL DAWAI”, (itinerary AURELIA) the 20 km after

AIR RIFAI. • Others gangs actuam in itineraries. • New gang actua, at night, close to a

bridge about 5/6 km ASH SHATRAH in itinerary BISMARK. Two elements yougave/[impart]/[lavish]/[spoon] gang could be BAASIM HUMAIED and ALI NAHIM. •

Terrorism Confidential source/[spring] informed/[apprize] that a shipment of 500

mortars, will be carried/[bus]/[haul]/[raft]/[tram]/[transport]/[truck] from AN NASSIRIYAH for BAGHDAD. ABU ADIL, member da ANSAR AL SUNNAmeets/[meet up with]/[encounter]/[lie] in AN NASSIRIYAH efectuando dos paymentsand treating do carrier/[transport] mortars. ABU ADIL is Iraqian. ABU ADILuses/[overutilize]/[utilize] the word fish (fish) as code for mortar. ABU ADIL asmember da ANSAR AL SUNNA is made use gratuitously to offer mortars to the MMthat they meet/[meet up with]/[encounter]/[lie] in FALLUJAH. The contact of ABUADIL in AN NASSIRIYAH will be HAYDAR MNU LNU AKA ABU MOHAMMAD.

25,000 ABU ADIL are to pay dinares for mortar. The camião that it

will carry/[bus]/[haul]/[raft]/[tram]/[transport]/[truck]

mortars will have food or vegetables to cover mortars. Information exist that MAHDIARMY, harnessed its techniques of attack with RPGs, magnifying/[augment]/[bulk] theeffectiveness das same. Members do MAHDI army (or JAYSH AL-MAHDI) annexTNT to the stroll/[return]/[rollback] da the RPG ammunition. When thundered/[shoot],the modification caused/[give rise to] for it I add do TNT, allows tomagnify/[augment]/[bulk] capacity of penetration against the armor/[shield] das viaturasdas CF. This new táctica was adoptee, who had/[owe] to the little result that the MMhave come to get/[obtain]/[procure] with the RPG attacks, that little or no actual damagein the armored viaturas. This new weapon will appear short term, however will be alsoto consider/[regard] that the feature/[characteristic] of propulsion and of INTSUM nº 13

PRIVATE 2 of 5

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garnet flight da will be afectadas by these acrescentos of TNT, diminishing to them inthe distance e the accuracy/[precision]. • Crminalidade Sabe that an enormous number of available weapons in the black market exists. This it is verified/[ascertain]/[check]

because currently the Jash Al Mahdy not purchase armament and the population ingenerality is to vender/[sell] its personal weapons, for form to get/[obtain]/[procure]money to survive. These weapons are available for purchase essentially to the fridays inthe market, that da occurs/[take place] generally morning part das 08H00 to 12H00 and

the made transactions sã in a local bar. In 11SET04, the military da MSU had beeninformed/[apprize] by an element da LP of AL QUADAH - AN NASIRIYAH, that 10%dos the agents are toxicodependentes. The drug traffic happens perpendicularly of nightin Square HABOUBI, costing the 5 10 USD each dose. The dealers they see/[view] of BAGHDAD. These policies consume drugs with alcohol jointly. desta confirmationinformation led/[give way] to conclude that the fenómeno da toxicodependência if it isto spread quickly in AN NASIRIYAH. • Tribes In 13SET04, the military da MSU had

been informed/[apprize] by the Sheik NASSER HUSEIN AL DHAKILL,Commander/[head] da Tribe of SUQ ASH SHUYUKH, that in the next days willorganize one meeting with the Sheik HAZEM, leader da MM da area, to wakeup/[awake]/[wake] a plan of peace e security for all the area. The area of unstabler SUQASH SHUYUKH is one das da responsibility area da ITJTF. Sheik NASSER HUSEINAL DHAKILL desires/[hunger]/[wish] to guarantee the order and security in the area,



stops/[halt]/[quit]/[stall] later this to make possible the distribution and the humanitarian bracket/[support]. • Religion SAYIED KATHEM AL HUSSEIN AL A'HERIN is a

Imam do Supreme Advice for Islamic revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), of Iraqian origin,refugee in Irão during regime/[regimen] of SADDAM HUSSEIN. Do has strong

pluggings/[linking]/[connection] with the conservatives Government Iranian and with

the radices/[radical] Iraqian do SCIRI. It is considered/[regard] as the connector link between the Iranian regime/[regimen] and Imam MOQTADA AL SADR. • Other

information In AIR RIFAI, Mr. RAZI come of HAI, on to movement WAHABI, willhave fond in one pickup, as intention to compare/[liken] and tocarry/[bus]/[haul]/[raft]/[tram]/[transport]/[truck] armament and the ammunition, thatwill be able to come to be used/[overutilize]/[utilize] in FALLUJA. An only Bank existsto work in AIR RIFAI, Bank AL RAFIDEEN. Efectua loans people who dêm someguarantees. Thus, as very few people only present monetary capacity to guarantee thissecurity, this type of attitude discourages economy retakes da. At moment 40% dos theAIR inhabitants RIFAI meet/[meet up with]/[encounter]/[lie] unemployeds. Anatmosphere of expectation with respect to the elections exists of Next January. Mr.

ABD AL AZIZ AL AKIM, leader do AL DAWA AL ISLAMI, dos the political party/[depart]/[part] greaters do south do Iraq and that during the regime/[regimen] of SADDAM he had an important paper in resistance, but later, will havegiven/[impart]/[lavish]/[spoon] orders so that the movement unrigged/[disarm] and hada position mere politics. That is plus an indication that the crime will

become/[dish]/[hollow]/[roughen]/[weight] in priority to decide/[hammer out]/[resolve]/[solve], for the attainment da stabilization da Province of DHI QAR. Sabethat also it will have pluggings/[linking]/[connection] to movement JAISH AL ISLAMI,that has as center of share FALLUJA. E whose main activity will be the abduction of foreigners and reporters, for posterior attainment of rescues. This movement, althoughthe name, does not have any religious inspiration, but it knows that da AL QAEDAthrough AL ZARQAWI receives brackets/[support]. INTSUM nº 13 PRIVATE 3 of 5

PRIVATE

In 13SET04, the military da MSU had met/[meet up with]/[encounter]/[lie] with therepresentatives do concelho municipal theatre of AL HAMMAR in the squadron da LP.These representatives had presented one without number of claims, against theGovernor da Province of DHI QAR, for the fact of this to only disponibilizar the deepones for the cities of AN NASIRIYAH, SUQ ASH SHUYUKH, ASH SHATRA andAIR RIFAI, not demonstrating to no interest for the necessities das small neighboring

populations, such as AL HAMMAR. The members do concelho municipal theycomplain essentially apio the medical, alimentary and structural level, for form toconstruct/[build] some essential buildings. In 131200SET04, during areconnaissance/[recognition] and AL FUHUD efectuado for the CARPATIAN HAWK (Rumanian), was communicated that the telefónica string/[line] serves 100 numbers and12 pluggings/[linking]/[connection] to Internet (since 1963).

The local authorities had still informed/[apprize] that the area is

insurance, with the intention to get/[obtain]/[procure]

humanitarian bracket/[support]. The population meets/[meet up with]/[encounter]/[lie]little receptive currently to the CF, and feels itself/[sit] insulted when these deliver/[giveover]/[hand] to water and foods/[feeding], exactly for the children. c. MAYSAN NSTR d. BASRAH • Attacks In 122021SET04 they had been thundered/[shoot] 2 RPGs,



against the Building do Been/[stand] in Basrah. Both grenades/[garnet] hadfailed/[misfire] the target. It did not have damages in decreases. In 122105SET04 theBuilding do Been/[stand] in Basrah, was attacked/[mug] by 1 RPG and the sentry itanswered/[reply]/[respond] to the fire. Grenade/[garnet] failed/[misfire] the target. It didnot have decreases nor damages. In 122137SET04 they had been thundered/[shoot] 4

mortars against the Quarter-general da Policia Iraqi (IPS) in Basrah. Grenades/[garnet]had fallen and blown up da outside area. The aggressors they had been visos in a Nissan pickup with a lateral red scratch. He did not have decreases. In 121855SET04, doBeen/[stand] in Basrah had an attack of rocket to the Building. The Point of detonation(1.8 FP) was detected about km for West. The ammunition fell in uncertain small farm eit did not blow up. In 122021SET04 do Been/[stand] in Basrah had beenthundered/[shoot] 2 RPGs against the Building. Both the ammunition hadfailed/[misfire] the fallen and blown up target having/[bear in mind] for North. It did nothave damages nor decreases. In 122105SET04 the Building do Been/[stand] in Basrah,was attacked/[mug] by 1 RPG. The sentry he answered/[reply]/[respond] to the fire. Theammunition failed/[misfire] the target. It did not have damages in decreases. In

130146SET04 do was thundered/[shoot] mortar grenade/[garnet] against the BuildingBeen/[stand] in Basrah. The impact zone was close do sentry rank nº 2. It did not havedamages nor decreases. In 130233SET04 the 2 had had some explosions in Basrahapproximately km stop/[halt]/[quit]/[stall] NW do Cherokee Field, causing/[give rise to]the destruction of 3 houses. The IPS was dislocated/[displace]/[offset]/[shift] until thelocal o for ascertainments. In 142347SET04, a company of CHESHIRE wasattacked/[mug] by 1 RPG and fire of weapons fast (SAF) in Basrah, while itexecuted/[implement]/[perform]/[reexecute] operation/[surgery] ERITREA, jointoperation/[surgery] with the TSU (Tactical Support unit). It did not have decreases.

In 142208SET04 Brigade CHESHIRE received the information that would

have activity das

MM in Basrah. Bad company for the place was sent/[forward]/[mail] and after one brief inquiry, it was understood/[comprehend]/[comprize] that it would have had an attemptof murder against a Colonel who it gives military duty/[service]/[job] in the IraqianMilitary duties/[service]/[job] of Emergency/[emergence]. The attack involved/[entail]/[wrap] 2 viaturas strangers and a number not calculated/[cipher] of armed people. The LP was puts in charge of to continue the inquiries. INTSUM nº 13PRIVATE 4 of 5

PRIVATE

In 150214SET04, the Building do Been/[stand] in Basrah was attacked/[mug] by 3RPGs. the 1 ammunition fell e it blew up in the Rank of Sentry 3, another one fell and

blew up in the camaratas and it finishes it failed/[misfire] target falling, without blowingup, to the main front da entered/[log on]. The fire had reply. The TSU was exacta putsin charge to investigate the location/[localization] da the inert ammunition. It did nothave decreases. 3. Conclusions The area das Bases of CEDAR II and TALLIL has livedcalm moments. However they have appeared some threats, defining the two Bases aswhite of future attacks. Other threats they had appeared in the past, but that they hadnever arrived to be materialize. All the threats will have to be taken/[give way] in sameconsideration that if record that does not have attacks since June. Fogos indirectoscontinue/[carry on] to be the biggest threat. The activação of protecção forces, as formof prevention, hindering the rank das Forces Anti-Iraqis (the AIF) in the terrain/[land],



for form the one that these cannot execute/[implement]/[perform]/[reexecute] its attacks,more seem to be the measures adjusted to adoptar at moment. Another preoccupyingsubject is the attacks to the convoys thatcarry/[bus]/[haul]/[raft]/[tram]/[transport]/[truck] provisions and material essential(replacement of stocks). These carriers/[transport] circulate essentially of night and

without any type of security what it propitiates theexecuted/[implement]/[perform]/[reexecute] attacks that perpendicularly not sã withgreat skill or red tape/[preparation] foresaw/[forecast]. Thus the intent monitoring dosthe main itineraries of access to the Bases, also constitutes share basic for the grocery dostatus of current security. The MM of and the OMS, currently argue the supply of armament for BAGHDAD. Destas members two organizations had beencongregated/[convene]/[flock]/[mass] in HAYY AL-RISAALA, later das conjunctsweekly, with the intention to argue the provision of armament of AL AMARAH for THAWRA. It was order especially the supply of Rockets KATYUSHA, mines antitank,rifles DRAGUNOV (to sniper), and fast weapons. The commander das MM of THAWRA still insisted, that if BAGHDAD situation if did not decide/[hammer

out]/[resolve]/[solve] in a next future, also would be requested/[order]/[requisition]combatants. A MIRI representative offered 3 million Dinars, to the Commander dasMM of THAWRA, as offers da Faith of God and promised/[pledge] to supply the askedfor bracket/[support]. This comes to confirm that the MM and the MIRI 2

they had waked up/[awake]/[wake] to cooperate/[to co-operate], in its

shares against the MNF.

MIRI well is known by receiving weapons through its pluggings/[linking]/[connection]with Irão. The Province of MAYSAN habitually is used/[overutilize]/[utilize] as Basefor the northward movement of weapons do Iraq, through its border with Irão and das

its innumerable itinerary centenarians of contraband. Although the apparent calm, thethreat still is sufficiently alive, now based in small attacks the forces da coalition. Theorganized crime has profit stature and will be inside soon the main threat, as well asforeign threat produced with bracket/[support] da Al-Qaeda and do Irão.

Nassíria, 15 of September of 2004 The Officer da GNR in the G2 Cell da MSU HugoTelmo Rebelo Marques/[asterisk]/[brand]/[dial]/[rib]/[score]/[tablet] de Faria Captain of Cavalry 2

MIRI Mujahideen of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq.


Katana0182 01:23, 19 June 2008 (GMT)

#6

PRIVATE MSU/G2 INTSUM Nº 5 27 28 AGO 04 1. Generalities 22º day da NAJAFcrisis initiated with confrontations between dos forces the USA and apoiantes of AL-SADR, close da its residence in NAJAF – confrontations that none das parts accepted tohave/[bear in mind] initiate. Doctors affirm/[assert] that they had had died sets of ten of

and hundreds of wounded. The forces do Army the USA and do IIG had comeclose/[approximate]/[near] do Sanctuary but they had not





launched/[chuck]/[flip]/[gun]/[pitch]/[sling]/[toss] an attack direct, for this being dos themost sacred places da Shiita culture. At certain moment the IIG itannounced/[advertize]/[toll] that do controlled/[automonitor]/[manage]/[rein] thecomplex Sanctuary what later was tasted/[sample]/[taste]/[prove] not to be truth. In thefollowing day it was arrived a peace accord with the radix/[radical] leader Moqtada Al-

SADR, in the city of NAJAF. The leader more influential Shiita, Ayatollah AliSISTANI, suggested the agreement, that was well acceptance for the IIG andconsidered/[regard] by these as a great victory. The members do army of SADR willhave to abandon/[relinquish] the Sanctuary of Imam Ali until 10H00 of friday and todeliver/[give over]/[hand] weapons. The pact appears hours after the attacks the

NAJAF, to have reached ratio inigualáveis, being considered/[regard] as the day bloodiest, das three weeks of confrontations. Al-SADR and its apoiantes kept thechallenge to the Temporary Government do Iraq (IIG) and to MNF, but hours later doAyatollah SISTANI to enter/[log on] in the NAJAF city, a spokesman do Ayatollahannounced/[advertize]/[toll] the agreement. In one it discusses/[confer] of the press wasexplained/[account] that Al-SADR accepted all the main points taxes for, Al-Sisitani. In

agreement, Al-SADR accepted in delivering/[give over]/[hand] to the responsibility doSanctuary to Ayatollah SISTANI and its men will deliver/[give over]/[hand] theweapons. The foreign forces they will leave NAJAF. This agreement was given whenAl-SADR, if dislocated/[displace]/[offset]/[shift] until Al-SISTANI, in local is da oldcity, however is not known if the two if had arrived to find/[meet upwith]/[encounter]/[lie]. The inbound/[arrival] do Ayatollah SISTANI the NAJAF, wasfolloied/[accompany] by thousand of apoiantes. A spokesman do IIG affirmed/[assert]that they accepted the agreement. Qassen DAOUD affirmed/[assert]: “Brothers we

finish to enter/[log on] the Porthole/[door]/[gate] da Peace. “. He also accepted the IIG

that the apoiantes of Al-SISTANI they were authorized to enter/[log on] in theSanctuary of Imam Ali, exactly still there being/[stand] the apoiantes of Al-Sadr. Theywill have to leave/[let] the Sanctuary friday for 10H00, jointly with apoiantes of Al-Sadr, already unrigged. Mr. DAOUD affirmed/[assert] that the apoiantes of Al-SADR,they would be then acceptances to join to the process politician. It affirmed/[assert]despite Al-SADR it would continue/[carry on] in freedom. The BBC affirmed/[assert]that this agreement was a form of all the intervening ones tosave/[rescue]/[salvage]/[volley] the face. After this period, where the events if hadconcentrated in the provinces of MAYSAN and BASRAH, it did not have incidents inDHI QAR and MUTHANNA and had decrease of attacks to the MNF. INTSUM Nº 5 1of 8 SECRETOSECRETO 2. Commentary One now enters/[log on] in a period of expectation and optimismo, but also of precaution therefore parameters do joined

agreement will not be thus so clear. The first point to have/[bear in mind] in account isthat everything leads/[give way] to believe that the agreement if only applies the NAJAF e KUFA. They will be able to have other areas that if include in the agreement.This is certainly feeling intended for Grande Ayatollah `Ali AL-SISTANI, although notto have guarantees for such. As the point is the care to have/[bear in mind] in relationAl- SADR, therefore its intentions had never been very clear, nor if it obtains/[achieve]to understand/[comprehend]/[comprize] which its Status from now. It is truth thatSanctuary was given/[impart]/[lavish]/[spoon] safe conduct to it to leave do and equalform was acceptance that if together if to the process politician. We will not be able toforget the fact that it still is on to assassínio of AL-KHOEI. Whichever the future statusof Al-Sadr, will have always one raised/[rear]/[tower] impact in MND (SE). However a

conclusion that already if can take off, is that exists the potential conflict, intra-Shiita, of a raised/[rear]/[tower] magnitude, decreased substantially. This because it is do common



knowledge that the smashing majority dos the Shiitas intends a pacific endstops/[halt]/[quit]/[stall] the situation. We could be/[stand] before thedesired/[hunger]/[wish] conciliation da Shiita population or even though das its elites.Another conclusion that if it takes off is that, in contrast to some perceptions, theauthority do IIG in generality and of ALLAWI in particular, was not afectada. The fact

is that the IIG did not have absolutely authority none in I begin, not obtaining/[achieve]to decide/[hammer out]/[resolve]/[solve] it the problems do program of reform dasecurity and failing/[misfire] in monopolizing the violence at the hands of the state.However it obtained/[achieve] for Al-Sadr between the sword and the wall andcorroded/[erode] its military capacity. If to events if had given/[impart]/[lavish]/[spoon]in another one any place that not it Sanctuary Imam Ali, Al Sadr and the JAM theywould not have survived to count/[reckon] history. The IIG can have/[bear in mind]

profit the respect da population to to demonstrate deference stops/[halt]/[quit]/[stall]with Al-SISTANI. The shares do IIG had been understood as being filed a suit. Al Sadr was not moved away/[fend] with the situation. It is truth that finished for saving/[rescue]/[salvage]/[volley] the face, as well as all the other intervening ones, are

just to understand/[comprehend]/[comprize] that it militarily was defeated and that onlytrue force that it withheld, the control dos the sacred places, to it was removed/[drawoff]/[exit]/[undock]/[withdraw]. If the IIG quickly it denied/[negate] the Al-Sadr, would

be the strong possibility of if repeating the situation. The MM they can stillmagnify/[augment]/[bulk] its power. Al-Sadr always had a control very ténue on OMS.Thus the frank possibility exists of that the MM if separate and that they

become/[dish]/[hollow]/[roughen]/[weight] its combats in deadly campaigns of destruction, some you gave/[impart]/[lavish]/[spoon] attacks can already have/[bear inmind] initiate in AL-AMARAH. The threat for the MNF now appears in the opponentsda inside current of Al-Sadr that they will continue/[carry on] to reject/[discard] theagreement between AL-Sadr, AL-Sistani and the IIG. It is difficult to see/[view] as itwill react Al-Sadr to the situation/[picture] that if presents to it. If it breaks/[shatter] the

pact, loses/[forfeit] credibility and affection, possibly until dos its apoiantes. The mando moment is without doubts Grande Ayatollah Ali SISTANI, that demonstrated againits moral force and its authority, understanding/[comprehend]/[comprize] the desire do

people for the peace. AL-SISTANI also demonstrated to an immense physical couragewhen returning the NAJAF. The impact in the AOR is early for evaluating/[assess]/[rate]/[value] which, but it is to wait/[await]/[expect]/[hope] moreearly that they appear, or later not conforming voices that will use/[overutilize]/[utilize]violent ways. The violence not yet finished/[complete]/[end]/[terminate]. Reports existthat affirm/[assert] that the current/[chain]/[stream] of Sadr starts/[start

at]/[begin]/[commence]/[get] to create a proper impetus with the danger of if becoming/[dish]/[hollow]/[roughen]/[weight] independent. The leader das MM inBASRAH, AL BASRI, during the conjuncts, he nailed that the MM would have tocontinue/[carry on] to resist the input/[entrance] das MNF in the cities, therefore battlenot yet finished/[complete]/[end]/[terminate]. One perceives here that thecurrent/[chain]/[stream] of AL-Sadr always was greater that OMS or the JAM,inhabiting in this the great threat for the MNF. It is time to wait/[await]/[expect]/[hope]to see/[view] current final metamorphosis da of Al-Sadr. Now one enters/[log on] in a

period of expectation and optimismo, but also of precaution therefore parameters do joined agreement will not be thus so clear. The first point to have/[bear in mind] inaccount is that everything leads/[give way] to believe that the agreement if only applies

the NAJAF e KUFA. They will be able to have other areas that if include in theagreement. This is certainly PRIVATE 2 of 8SECRETO feeling intended for Grande



Ayatollah `Ali AL-SISTANI, although not to have guarantees for such. As the point isthe care to have/[bear in mind] in relation Al- SADR, therefore its intentions had never

been very clear, nor if it obtains/[achieve] to understand/[comprehend]/[comprize]which its Status from now. It is truth that Sanctuary was given/[impart]/[lavish]/[spoon]safe conduct to it to leave do and equal form was acceptance that if together if to the

process politician. We will not be able to forget the fact that it still is on to assassínio of AL-KHOEI. Whichever the future status of Al-Sadr, will have always oneraised/[rear]/[tower] impact in MND (SE). However a conclusion that already if cantake off, is that exists the potential conflict, intra-Shiita, of a raised/[rear]/[tower]magnitude, decreased substantially. This because it is do common knowledge that thesmashing majority dos the Shiitas intends a pacific end stops/[halt]/[quit]/[stall] thesituation. We could be/[stand] before the desired/[hunger]/[wish] conciliation da Shiita

population or even though das its elites. Another conclusion that if it takes off is that, incontrast to some perceptions, the authority do IIG in generality and of ALLAWI in

particular, was not afectada. The fact is that the IIG did not have absolutely authoritynone in I begin, not obtaining/[achieve] to decide/[hammer out]/[resolve]/[solve] it the

problems do program of reform da security and failing/[misfire] in monopolizing theviolence at the hands of the state. However it obtained/[achieve] for Al-Sadr betweenthe sword and the wall and corroded/[erode] its military capacity. If to events if hadgiven/[impart]/[lavish]/[spoon] in another one any place that not it Sanctuary Imam Ali,Al Sadr and the JAM they would not have survived to count/[reckon] history. The IIGcan have/[bear in mind] profit the respect da population to to demonstrate deferencestops/[halt]/[quit]/[stall] with Al-SISTANI. The shares do IIG had been understood as

being filed a suit. Al Sadr was not moved away/[fend] with the situation. It is truth thatfinished for saving/[rescue]/[salvage]/[volley] the face, as well as all the other intervening ones, are just to understand/[comprehend]/[comprize] that it militarily wasdefeated and that only true force that it withheld, the control dos the sacred places, to itwas removed/[draw off]/[exit]/[undock]/[withdraw]. If the IIG quickly itdenied/[negate] the Al-Sadr, would be the strong possibility of if repeating the situation.The MM they can still magnify/[augment]/[bulk] its power. Al-Sadr always had acontrol very ténue on OMS. Thus the frank possibility exists of that the MM if separateand that they become/[dish]/[hollow]/[roughen]/[weight] its combats in deadlycampaigns of destruction, some you gave/[impart]/[lavish]/[spoon] attacks can alreadyhave/[bear in mind] initiate in AL-AMARAH. The threat for the MNF now appears inthe opponents da inside current of Al-Sadr that they will continue/[carry on] toreject/[discard] the agreement between AL-Sadr, AL-Sistani and the IIG. It is difficultto see/[view] as it will react Al-Sadr to the situation/[picture] that if presents to it. If it

breaks/[shatter] the pact, loses/[forfeit] credibility and affection, possibly until dos itsapoiantes. The man do moment is without doubts Grande Ayatollah Ali SISTANI, thatdemonstrated again its moral force and its authority,understanding/[comprehend]/[comprize] the desire do people for the peace. AL-SISTANI also demonstrated to an immense physical courage when returning the

NAJAF. The impact in the AOR is early for evaluating/[assess]/[rate]/[value] which, butit is to wait/[await]/[expect]/[hope] more early that they appear, or later not conformingvoices that will use/[overutilize]/[utilize] violent ways. The violence not yetfinished/[complete]/[end]/[terminate]. Reports exist that affirm/[assert] that thecurrent/[chain]/[stream] of Sadr starts/[start at]/[begin]/[commence]/[get] to create a

proper impetus with the danger of if becoming/[dish]/[hollow]/[roughen]/[weight]

independent. The leader das MM in BASRAH, AL BASRI, during the conjuncts, henailed that the MM would have to continue/[carry on] to resist the input/[entrance] das



MNF in the cities, therefore battle not yet finished/[complete]/[end]/[terminate]. One perceives here that the current/[chain]/[stream] of AL-Sadr always was greater thatOMS or the JAM, inhabiting in this the great threat for the MNF. It is time towait/[await]/[expect]/[hope] to see/[view] current final metamorphosis da of Al-Sadr.PRIVATE 3 of 8SECRETO 3. Conclusions It will obtain/[achieve] the peace accord, of

NAJAF, to take/[give way] the IIG, the Shiitas Iraqian and the uncertain one process of Iraqian peace, to the stability and democracy? For Iraqian Prime minister, IyadALLAWI, it has one I still alliviate/[alleviate]/[relieve] well-known and a celebrationthat small, in the agreement found/[meet up with]/[encounter]/[lie] in Najaf. Theagreement, although everything, happens after unexpected intervention do moreimportant religious leader in the Country, Ayatollah Ali SISTANI. In reality thisagreement displayed the limitations do ALLAWI government. As much the Americansas Mr. ALLAWI, had wanted to prevent/[keep off]/[avoid]/[dodge] a unsatisfactorycommitment, that he finished/[complete]/[end]/[terminate] with an increase do to beable dos the apoiantes of Moqtada SADR. Thus, in crisis ALLAWI and its moreimportant ministers, had played/[throw] hard, threatening/[menace] with an assault,

stop/[halt]/[quit]/[stall] to remove/[purge] the AL-SADR forces apoiantes do Sanctuaryof NAJAF. But this exactly assault it never arrived and its credibility disappeared.Consequentemente the prestige of Moqtada AL-SADR magnified/[augment]/[bulk]/[increase]. One more time it follows in freedom, being ableto put into motion itself/[jog] for where to apetecer to it. One more time it opposed todissolve it its military service. The SADR movement, the Shiitas can only have/[bear inmind] the dos bracket/[support] of a minority Iraqian, but the crisis demonstrated that itis a force to have/[bear in mind] in consideration. Soon the NAJAF agreementrepresents plus a truce that a solution for the problem. It gives/[impart]/[lavish]/[spoon]to the IIG little more than a brief moment to breathe. In security substance Mr.ALLAWI and the MNF still face one mix of challenges. Sunnita violencecontinues/[carry on] to be/[stand] centered in FALLUJA and other cities, in the callSunnita triangle the north and west of BAGHDAD. The men bomb (attacks suicidal),mortar attacks and rockets, and the detonations of vehicles in movement, temporarilythey had disappeared the third week do after NAJAF drama. The dos feeling of revoltdifferent Iraqian groups, are shiitas or sunnitas, the military USA inhabit in the presencedos in Iraq and also in the fact of all to have the sensation that the IIG does not pass of one marioneta at the hands of the Americans. The majority da violence seems tohave/[bear in mind] internal origins, but not Iraqian the Islamic combatants still seem to

be/[stand] sufficiently active. responsibility for the attempts, unfruitful, of murder of two members do IIG, was claimed/[complained] for militant do Islamic group of Abu

Musab al-ZARQAWI. ZARQAWI was born in Jordan and is a shady graphicrepresentation/[figure] considered/[regard] ally da Al-Qaeda (AQ). Much Sunnitas eKurdos Iraqian partilham the Shiita indignation, on the dos shares the USA in NAJAF.

Night after night the Arabic/[Arab] television shows to the deaths and destruction in thecity NAJAF saint. It enters/[log on] those that are not Shiitas, the intervention doAyatollah SISTANI can despoletar some controversial feelings. Exactly that they

partilhem do I alliviate/[alleviate]/[relieve] to generality with terminus da crisis of NAJAF – at least for now - Sunnitas and Kurdos can not accept the new position, busynow, for the most illustrious Shiita clergyman. For some, its intervention suggests thatthe new Iraq will be much less secular that the old one. Thisremembers/[recall]/[recollect] to them that the time where the Shiitas they were a

subordinated people and the country was governed/[rule] for the Sunnita elitefinished/[complete]/[end]/[terminate]. While the authorities prepare/[prep] the elections



for next January, the plans to lead/[give way] corporal/[handle]/[cable]/[cabo] the newcensus walks the wide pacings/[step]. The Shiitas is confident that the census it willdemonstrate that they represent 60% da population. Grande Ayatollah SISTANI insiststhat the clergymen must guide but not govern/[rule]. Nor all are tranquilos. 4. Currentthreat: JUPITER 2 (the threat level is substantial). PRIVATE 4 of 8SECRETO 5.

Verified/[ascertain]/[check] attacks Province of AL MUTHANNA In 272242AGOG04,when one patrols if Dutch base in Air prepared/[prep] to leave da Rumaythah, had anattack with 3 mortar detonations, whose grenades/[garnet] had fallen and blown up150m for West da entered/[log on] da base. Not it hears low damages nor. Province of DHI QAR NTR Province of MAYSAN In 262105AGO04, da Cimic with 1 gust of SAFwas attacked/[mug] a sentry in the Headquarters. It did not have decreases. In262124AGO04, a patrol das Forces of Reserva/[hold]/[reserve troops] (WR) wasattacked/[mug] by 4 elements do Iraqian army anti (the AIF) from a vehicle inmovement in Al Amarah. It had reply to the fire, what do forced/[ram]/[stress] theabandonment vehicle. An unknown number of elements do the AIF was wounded, to

judge/[adjudge]/[deem] for the left/[let] track of blood. Da Coligação did not have

decreases in the Forces (CF). Province of BASRAH In 262345AGO04, 1 RPG wasthundered/[shoot] against the building do been/[stand] in Basrah. The detonation point(FP) it was placed/[site] 500m for North. Grenade/[garnet] fell and blew up 50m for swda base. It did not have decreases. In 262359AGO04, a sentry do building do

been/[stand] was attacked/[mug] by a SAF gust. THE FP it was placed/[site] next to asquadron of polices. It did not have decreases. In 270020AGO04, the state building wasattacked/[mug] by 3 mortar detonations. The FP placed/[site] it 700m for North. 3grenades/[garnet] had fallen and blown up 200m for North do field. It did not havedecreases. In 270025AGO04, an engineering convoy was attacked/[mug] by animprovised explosive device/[sugar plantation] (IED) in the immediacy of 2 mosques inBasrah. It did not have decreases. In 270033AGO04, the state building wasattacked/[mug] by 5 mortar detonations. The FP placed/[site] it about 800m for NNE. 3das garnet had fallen and blown up the 300 m for This do field. Not it had decreases. In270100AGO04, the state building was attacked/[mug] by 2 mortar detonations. The FP

placed/[site] it about 500m for NNE. 1 grenade/[garnet] fell and blew up do inside perimeter and to another one 100m stops/[halt]/[quit]/[stall] This. It did not havedecreases. In 270143AGO04, the defense strings/[line] had been attacked/[mug] by amortar detonation. Grenade/[garnet] ciu e blew up the North do field. It did not havedecreases. In 270216AGO04, the building do been/[stand] was attacked/[mug] by 1RPG. The FP placed/[site] it about 100m for West. The RPG ammunition fell and blewup do outside field. It did not have decreases. In 270253AGO04, a squad WR, to effect

an escort to a logistic convoy for the building do state was attacked/[mug] by multipledetonations of RPG (2 you equip/[man]/[outfit]/[rig]) and SAF. Also they had been withPRIVATE 5 of 8SECRETO sensation that had been attacked/[mug] by fire of heavyweapons (HMG). The FPs was placed/[site] in the buildings in the neighborhood (IVO)dos the Shiitas apartments. One third squad WR wasdislocated/[displace]/[offset]/[shift] to support/[brace], attacking/[mug] both the dos

positions the elements do the AIF. The elements IN, das you equip/[man]/[outfit]/[rig]of RPG, had been died. Da did not have decreases in the forces coalition. In280020AGO04, a patrol, was attacked/[mug], for HMG, RPGs and SAF IVO south DaPonte do river SAA. 2 aggressors had been withheld. He did not have decreases in theMNF. In 272137AGO04, the logistic base of Shaibah (SLB) was attacked/[mug] by 2

rockets. 1 dos rockets fell e blew up da inside base next to the control tower, the other rocket fell but it did not blow up, together to the lodgings do commando/[command].



The 6 FP placed/[site] it about km for sw. It did not have decreases, but it is probablethat it has damages in viaturas. PRIVATE 6 of 8SECRETO 6. Threats NTR 7. Cabinetdo Comando/[command] Geral (GOC) (you finish 24 hrs) In last the 24 hours(27AGO04) they had observed/[notice]/[remark] it continuation dos the attacks do theAIF in Al Amarah e Basrah. Both the provinces of Al Muthanna and Dhi Qar had

remained calm without worthy incidents of register. In Al Amarah the headquarters daCimic suffered 10 indirectos attacks (29 mortar grenades/[garnet]). Inserted in shares 3attacks of SAF and one of RPG had also appeared. The CF had suffered three decreases(wounded) the MM had suffered 4 decreases (deceased). In Al Amarah it did not haveincidents later das 21H30. In Basrah, between 15H12 and 16H47, had had someindirectos attacks. The Hotel Shatt Al Arab (SAAH) it was attacked/[mug] by 1 Rocketand 2 mortar detonations. This resulted/[accrue] in the destruction of 2 containers and 1set on fire camião. Close do Cherokee Field had had 2 mortar attacks that they hadfallen and they blown up do inside perimeter, not causing/[give rise to] low. Sporadicalattacks to building do been/[stand] and to the defensive strings/[line] had continuedduring the night without causing/[give rise to] decreases. Last the 24 hours (28AGO04)

had been of an abnormal calm, in TO da MND (SE), counting itself/[reckon] only 6attacks to the MNF, without causing/[give rise to] decreases. They had had of morningtwo attacks, distinct, the convoys in the itinerary Cover in the province of Dhi Qar. Theattacks the convoys, in itinerary, are common and everything leads/[give way] to

believe that they are workmanship of criminals das local tribes. The Headquarters daCimic in Al Amarah, were attacked/[mug] the noon, for SAF and in Basrah a patrol wasattacked/[mug] for HMG, RPGs and SAF to the midnight. Yesterday the beginning of the night the Logistic Base of Shaibah, the South of Basrah, was attacked/[mug] by onerocket and the Dutch Air Base Rumaythah was attacked/[mug] by mortar detonations,when one patrol if prepared/[prep] to leave da base. The activity level das the AIF in TOda MND (SE) in them you finish 24 hours, is very similar to the level of before dosactivity das the AIF the conflicts in An Najaf. PRIVATE 7 of 8SECRETO 8.Operations/[surgery] Italian brigade Op. ARCHIMEDE - patrolling throughout thehigh-voltage string/[line] (400 KW) close to Nasiriyah; Op. BIG BROTHER –

patrolling do itinerary Cover in bracket/[support] to themaneuvers/[displacement]/[shift]/[luxation] das troops The USA; Op. STRONGSURVEILLANCE - to magnify/[augment]/[bulk] the security and patrolling thestroll/[return]/[rollback] das bases das CF (attacks are waited/[await]/[expect]/[hope]das the AIF). OP HOT DOG – to control/[automonitor]/[manage]/[rein] the freedom of movements the South of Nasiriyah. To keep/[keep abreast of]/[maintain] the security inthe itinerary Da Ponte Tampa on Rio Eufrates. Nassíria, 28 of August of 2004 The

Officer da GNR in the G2 Cell da MSU Hugo Telmo RebeloMarques/[asterisk]/[brand]/[dial]/[rib]/[score]/[tablet] de Faria Captain of CavalryPRIVATE 8 of 8 Katana0182 01:24, 19 June 2008 (GMT)

Document is true

I'am portuguese and have read this document, it's true, these are portuguese GNR summaries in iraq, they have all sort of confidential information that was not released to

public.





document 1 secret portugal iraq wikileaks

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