do improved property rights decrease violence against...
TRANSCRIPT
Introduction Background Reported violence IPV Conclusion and Discussion
Do improved property rights decrease violence
against women in India?
So�a Amaral
University of Birmingham, UK
5th Summer School in Development Economics, Alba di Canazei
July, 2013
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Introduction Background Reported violence IPV Conclusion and Discussion
Motivation
Women's rights and conditions in India[Du�o, 2011; Doepke et al, 2011]
Many arguments in favour of gender-speci�c targeting programs andtheir impact on empowerment but, does targeting transfers towomen improve their welfare?[Bobonis et al, (2012); Eswaran and Malhotra, (2011); Block andRao, (2000); Ferrari and Iyengar, (2012)]
Objectives:
Identify the causal e�ect of a legislative change in inheritance rightson reported crime rates and intimate partner violence
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Introduction Background Reported violence IPV Conclusion and Discussion
Preview of results
Overall increase in household economic conditions decreases theequilibrium level of in�icted violence
Decrease in reported-crimes not robust to the inclusion ofstate-speci�c trends
Decrease in IPV for the younger cohorts who are wives of the HH
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Introduction Background Reported violence IPV Conclusion and Discussion
Channels of TransmissionE�ects of a change in the wife's wealth:
1 Intrahousehold welfare
If the threat point is divorce this could lead to a decrease in violence[Tauchen et al, (1991); Farmer at al, (1997)]
If the threat point is not divorce the husband may use violence toregain control of household distribution of resources: ambiguos[Block and Rao, (2000); Bobonis et al, (2012); Eswaran andMalhotra, (2012); Chin, (2012)]
2 Marriage Market: could improve the quality of the match thoughthis is not necessarily true
3 Reporting behaviour: Tolerance of violence, incidence and reportingIyengar, (2009)
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Introduction Background Reported violence IPV Conclusion and Discussion
Hindu Succession Act
HSA, (1956) is the major inheritance law in India.
Rules property law/inheritance laws for individuals of Hindu-type
religions
Applies to Hindus, Sikhs, Buddhists and Jains
Does not apply in Jammu and Kashmir (Arunachal Pradesh,Manipur, Nagaland, Mizoram and Meghalaya)
Joint Family Property: ancestral property
Separate Property: self- acquired property
Male coparcener: Hindu family male members
Daughters had rights to separate property but not ancestral property
HSA
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Introduction Background Reported violence IPV Conclusion and Discussion
Hindu Succession Act
Amendments in 5 states :
1 Kerala → 1976 (abolished the joint family property)2 Andhra Pradesh→ 19863 Tamil Nadu→19894 Maharashtra and Karnataka→1994
Central Amendments: 2005 (abolished marital status requirement)
Daughters (women) have now the same rights and liabilities as if theywere sons (men)
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Introduction Background Reported violence IPV Conclusion and Discussion
Problem and Strategy
Reverse Causality: Improved inheritance rights are a vehicle toimprove women's economic autonomy. But, violence can a�ectautonomy and autonomy may itself impinge on violence againstwomen: Basu, EJ (2006) and Eswaran et al, CJE (2011)
Use of the exogenous state and year variation caused by the legalamendments to identify the causal impact of female inheritancerights on violence committed against them
Identifying assumption for DiD: States that pass the amendmentswoud have had the same linear trend in crime rates as those who didnot in the absence of the amendments
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Introduction Background Reported violence IPV Conclusion and Discussion
Empirical Estimation
yst = β0 + λt + αs + δTst + β′X+ εst
δ is the di�erence-in-di�erence estimator given by:δ = E [yR
1− yR
0]− E [yNR
1− yNR
0]
yst measured as the (ln) rate per 1000 female population
yst = β0 + λt + αs + δTst + φTst
∑k
Post-law yearsk + β′X+ εst
Coe�cient of interest is φ which captures the dynamic e�ect of theamendments on yst
Grouped years where k = [1, 2]; [3, 4]; [5, > 5]
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Introduction Background Reported violence IPV Conclusion and Discussion
Data
Main dependent variables:Total, Family and Non-Family crimes
State- level analysis for the 16 major states of India spanning theyears 1975-2004
Crime, accidental deaths, suicides data collected from yearlypublications of the National Crime Records Bureau
Controls collected from the Census and Reserve Bank of India;political data collected from several reports from the ElectionCommission
Controls: literacy rate, rural population, growth rate of per capitaincome, female-male ratio, police force per capita, gender of theCM, % seats held by women in VS
Desc. stat.
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Introduction Background Reported violence IPV Conclusion and Discussion
Data: Total crimes against women 1975-2004
Disag. Map
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Introduction Background Reported violence IPV Conclusion and Discussion
Results
Results do not vary in direction and signi�cance when separating betweenNon-Family and Family crimes
Non-Family Family11/21
Introduction Background Reported violence IPV Conclusion and Discussion
Falsi�cation exercises
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Introduction Background Reported violence IPV Conclusion and Discussion
Falsi�cation exercises
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Introduction Background Reported violence IPV Conclusion and Discussion
Falsi�cation exercises
No e�ect found on non-female crimes: robbery and riots
Testing a comparative advantage: Is this e�ect driven by women inrice crop areas in comparison to wheat crop areas? → results seemfavourable
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Introduction Background Reported violence IPV Conclusion and Discussion
Empirical Estimation: Intimate partner violence
yisky = β0 + αs + ζk + λy + β′Xisky + δ1Tisk,(y≥r ′−17,m>r ′) + εisky
yisky dummy variable and it is a measure of the stock level ofviolence if the wife has ever been beaten by the husband
δ1 captures the e�ect of the HSAA for the younger cohorts, i.e. wereless than or 17 at the the reform year r ′ in reform states andunmarried: Tisk,(y≥r ′−17,m>r ′)
Inclusion of a control group term, the older cohort:Tisk,(y<r ′−24,m<r ′)
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Introduction Background Reported violence IPV Conclusion and Discussion
Data
NFHS waves 1998-99 and 2005-06: repeated- cross section acrossbirth cohorts
Surveys have a representative sample of all-India and at state-levelwith response rates above 90%
Household level questionnaires for eligible women i.e. ever-marriedwomen aged between 15-49
Sample is restricted to women who are the wife of the HH andwhere interviewed for the DV section without interruptions
Women in the sample were born between [1949-1991]
Sample restricted to 16 states of India
Control variables include age gap and son preference, number of HHmembers, hindu-type religion, ownership of television and educationand husband's employment status
Desc. stat.
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Introduction Background Reported violence IPV Conclusion and Discussion
Results
Results do not change when including the older women as control groupFalsi�cation
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Introduction Background Reported violence IPV Conclusion and Discussion
Conclusion and Discussion
I �nd that improved property rights increased welfare conditions ofwomen i.e. decreased violence committed against them:
Results of reported crimes suggest a decrease in reported violence
Results are marginally not robust to the inclusion of state-lineartrends
Decrease of domestic violence at the household level persist toseveral tests
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Introduction Background Reported violence IPV Conclusion and Discussion
Reconciliation with the literature
Roy, (2002,2013); Rosenblum, (2013); Anderson and Genicot,(2012); Brule, (2012);
Empowerment e�ect?
Are these the selected women thus, the empowerment e�ect has ane�ect?
No empowerment e�ect on women but on men?
Work- in-progress:
DDD
The e�ect on daughters-in-law?
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Introduction Background Reported violence IPV Conclusion and Discussion
Motherland or Fatherland
Is this result due to empowerment e�ect or a shared control?
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Introduction Background Reported violence IPV Conclusion and Discussion
Conclusion and Discussion
Thank you!Comments are welcome!
Contact: amaral.so�[email protected]
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Literature
E�ects of changes in surplus within the marriage and in outside options:
Theory: intrahousehold distribution of resources models → mixede�ects→ Tauchen et al, NBER (1991); Bloch and Rao, AER (2000)
Empirics: e�ect of improvements in economic conditions of womenand welfare� ambiguos results between developed and developingcountries→ Bobonis et al, AER( 2012)
Violence against women in India: Iyer et al, AER, (2012); Andersonand Genicot, (2012); Eswaran and Malhotra, CJE (2011); Jensen atal, QJE (2009); Panda and Agarwal, WD(2005)
Hindu Sucession Act: Roy, (2002,2013); Anderson and Genicot,(2012); Brule, (2012); Rosenblum, (2013);
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DataCruelty by Husband and Relatives 1990-2004 FamilyDowry 1988-2004 FamilyDowry Deaths 1990-2004 FamilyImmoral Tra�c 1975-2004 Non - FamilyImportation of Girls 1994-2004 Non - FamilyIndecent Repr. of Women 1994-2004 Non - FamilyMolestation 1990-2004 Non - FamilyKidnapping of Women 1988-2004 Non - FamilyRape 1975-2004 Non - FamilySexual Harassment 1990-2004 Non - Family
Suicides- Property disputes 1988-2004Suicides- Family 1975-2004Suicides- Love a�airs 1975-2004
Accidental Deaths- Other causes (F+M) 1975-2004Accidental Deaths-Natural (F+M) 1975-2004
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Further Falsi�cation exercises
1 Comparative advantage?:
1 Pardhan, (1974); Qian, (2005); Mbiti,(2008); Mahajan, (2012);Carranza, (2012): Women's productivity in some agricultural crops ishigher than men;
2 Test whether women in rice crop areas would be more likely tobene�t from the reform
3 Several issues with testing this hypothesis → results seem favourable.
2 Reporting vs. incidence e�ect?
Anderson and Genicot, (2012) show that there was an increase inmale and female suicides due to the HSAA → I con�rm this resultbut not for suicides due to property disputesThe e�ect points to a decrease without associated change inreporting behaviour → Disentangling a decrease in reporting from anon-decrease in incidence does not seem plausible
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