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volume 0 INTRoDuCTIoN AND GeNeRAl ReQuIRemeNTS SeCTIoN 2 GeNeRAl GuIDANCe

PART 3

GD 04/12

STANDARD foR SAfeTy RISk ASSeSSmeNT oN The STRATeGIC RoAD NeTwoRk

SummARy

This Standard sets out the approach which must be applied in all administrative and technical aspects when designing, operating and constructing for the strategic road network, where safety should be a consideration. It updates, and clarifies, requirements and guidance for addressing safety risks. This includes planning, preparing, designing and constructing highway works, maintenance, demolition and improvements, projects and schemes, and when revising Agency technical standards, specifications and requirements. This Standard sets out the HA requirements for managing safety and as such it does not provide legal advice or guidance. This document only applies to England’s Strategic Road Network.

INSTRuCTIoNS foR uSe

This Standard is to be incorporated in the Manual.

1. Insert new Content pages into Volume 0.

2. Insert GD 04/12 into Volume 0, Section 2, Part 3.

3. Please archive this sheet as appropriate.

Note: A quarterly index with a full set of Volume Contents Pages is available separately from The Stationery Office Ltd.

DeSIGN mANuAl foR RoADS AND BRIDGeS

November 2012

DeSIGN mANuAl foR RoADS AND BRIDGeS GD 04/12 volume 0, Section 2, Part 3

Standard for Safety Risk Assessment on the

Strategic Road Network

Summary: ThisStandardsetsouttheapproachwhichmustbeappliedinalladministrative andtechnicalaspectswhendesigning,operatingandconstructingforthe strategicroadnetwork,wheresafetyshouldbeaconsideration.Itupdates, andclarifies,requirementsandguidanceforaddressingsafetyrisks.This includesplanning,preparing,designingandconstructinghighwayworks, maintenance,demolitionandimprovements,projectsandschemes,and whenrevisingAgencytechnicalstandards,specificationsandrequirements. ThisStandardsetsouttheHArequirementsformanagingsafetyandassuch itdoesnotprovidelegaladviceorguidance.Thisdocumentonlyappliesto England’sStrategicRoadNetwork.

The hIGhwAyS AGeNCy

November 2012

volume 0 Section 2 Part 3 GD 04/12

ReGISTRATIoN of AmeNDmeNTS

Amend No

Page No Signature & Date of incorporation of

amendments

Amend No

Page No Signature & Date of incorporation of

amendments

Registration of Amendments

volume 0 INTRoDuCTIoN AND GeNeRAl ReQuIRemeNTS SeCTIoN 2 GeNeRAl GuIDANCe

PART 3

GD 04/12

STANDARD foR SAfeTy RISk ASSeSSmeNT oN The STRATeGIC RoAD NeTwoRk

Contents

Chapter

Part 1

1. Introduction and Use of this Document

2. Defining the People at Risk

3. Duties and Responsibilities

4. General Principles

Part 2

5. Principles of Safety Risk Assessment and Control

6. Technical Requirements

7. Roles, Responsibilities and Competence

8. Glossary

9. References

10. Abbreviations and Acronyms

Annexes

Annex A Generic Safety Risk Analysis Methods

Annex B Average Road User Safety Risk on GB Roads

Annex C Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment Tool

Annex D Cost Benefit Tool

DeSIGN mANuAl foR RoADS AND BRIDGeS

November 2012

November 2012


PART 1

1. INTRoDuCTIoN AND uSe of ThIS DoCumeNT

1.1 This standard is presented in two parts.

Part 1 provides an overview of the Highways Agency’s (Agency) safety risk management framework and sets the context within which safety risk management decisions are taken in accordance with this standard.

Part 2 takes this information and translates it into a specific safety risk decision making framework for safety risk assessment and control across all of the populations affected by the Strategic Road Network (SRN).

Background

1.2 On 28 February 2001 a vehicle came off the M62 motorway at Great Heck, near Selby, ran down the embankment and onto the East Coast Main Line, where it was struck by a passenger train. The train was derailed and then struck by a freight train travelling in the opposite direction. Six passengers and four staff on the trains were killed. The driver of the vehicle was found guilty of causing the deaths of 10 people by dangerous driving.

1.3 The Health and Safety Executive (HSE) investigated the circumstances that led to the incident and their report made it clear that the accident had resulted from a highly unlikely and unpredictable chain of events. However, the Government was concerned about the general issues this crash raised and asked for a wider investigation into the accidental incursion of road vehicles onto the railway. This investigation identified specific actions related to road/rail incursions as well as more general and fundamental issues to do with the methods used by the Agency to assess and record safety risks, and the documentation of the decision processes linked to the management and or treatment of these.

1.4 Since this time the Agency has developed a more transparent approach to safety risk management and has been working towards the embedment of this approach across all of the various areas of the business.

objectives

1.5 Agency projects have traditionally used a prescriptive approach to demonstrating safety, relying on adherence to detailed standards. These standards

are based on research, pilot activities and many years of experience, capturing the necessary safety risk mitigation properties. However, this approach is becoming less appropriate for the more complex and innovative systems now being installed on the SRN. The Agency has been successful in improving safety, but this means that future improvements in safety will be much more difficult to realise and thus a more refined approach to safety decision making is required on highway projects going forward.

1.6 This standard updates and clarifies requirements and guidance for addressing safety risks. It introduces the concept of ‘trade off’ and describes how safety risk tolerance can be used to optimally balance safety risk between affected populations. This approach is not new and the principle of ‘trade off’ is accepted by the HSE. The ‘trade off’ principle has been applied:

• in road over rail situations;

• in the development of Existing Motorway Minimum Requirements;

• in Managed Motorway requirements;

• in the Department for Transport (DfT) ‘Managing the accidental obstruction of the railway by road vehicles’ report; and

• in Aiming for Zero projects to improve/benefit worker safety.

1.7 A key requirement of this standard is that appropriate safety risk assessment, evaluation and management is undertaken to inform all activities, projects and decisions. This includes ensuring that the safety risk impacts for different populations (see Chapter 2 ‘Defining the People at Safety Risk’) that the Agency has a responsibility for, along with their safety risk exposure and safety risk tolerance, are taken into account. It also requires that documentation is kept which evidences the decision making process.

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Chapter 1 Introduction and use of this Document

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Chapter 1 Introduction and use of this Document

Scope

1.8 This Standard has been developed in consultation and with the agreement of devolved administrations. It deals with all safety risk management activities in relation to the design of the SRN in England only. It is for other highway authorities and devolved administrations to choose whether to adopt all or part of this standard.

1.9 This Standard does not provide guidance on operational safety risk decision making such as Traffic Officer dynamic risk assessment processes. Operational decisions will need to have regard to the safety risk control measures specified by designers who use this Standard.

1.10 This Standard is not a legal interpretation of the legislation it refers to; as such it does not provide legal advice or guidance. In the event of queries on the applicable law, independent legal advice should be sought.

mandatory Sections

1.11 Sections of this document containing mandatory requirements are identified by highlighted boxes. These requirements are mandatory and no departures from this standard will be accepted. Appropriate safety risk assessment, evaluation and management must be undertaken so that a decision can be made on the basis of what is reasonably required. In circumstances where reliable data is limited or not available the principles of the standard must still be applied; in these instances the professional judgment of a competent person will be required (please see Chapter 6 for more details). The text outside boxes contains advice and explanation, which is commended to ‘users’ for consideration.

Implementation

1.12 This Standard gives the approach which must be applied forthwith by all Agency staff and supply chain, in all administrative and technical aspects when designing operating and constructing the SRN, where safety should be a consideration. This includes planning, preparing, designing and constructing highway works. This includes maintenance, demolition and improvements, projects and schemes, and when revising Agency technical standards, specifications and requirements.

1.13 Application of this standard will ensure that safety risk and investment decisions affecting the SRN are made:

• Consistently – so that similar decisions, made by different people at different times, in different locations result in comparable outputs.

• Aligned – so that full account is taken of Agency targets, objectives, duties, responsibilities and policies.

• Robustly – so that decisions are demonstrated by evidence or expert advice and are auditable.

• Value – so that decisions made represent value for money (VfM).

• Transparently – so it is clear why, and how, a particular decision was taken.

1.14 The processes referenced in this standard should be applied pragmatically and avoid the creation of a burdensome and bureaucratic process. Instead the process should be viewed as an opportunity to simply and effectively record the best judgements of the professionals involved.

1.15 The guidance contained in this standard sets out existing process and best practice that the Agency and its representatives should already be following.

1.16 It should be read in conjunction with the Design Manual for Roads and Bridges (DMRB) and the Agency’s Health and Safety Management System contained within the Management Arrangements for Health and Safety (MAHS), where advice and guidance including policy statements for traffic officers, workers, construction workers and other parties can be found. For advice/support and access to MAHS please contact the HA team responsible for Health and Safety.

equality Impact Assessment

1.17 The guidance in this standard has been developed to ensure that all persons affected by the SRN and thereby exposed to safety risk are considered. The safety risk assessment process will itself identify any disadvantaged or vulnerable people and appropriate control measures are mandated.

Definitions and Abbreviations

1.18 Terms and references relevant to this standard are dealt with in Chapters 9, 10 and 11 of this document.

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2. DefINING The PeoPle AT SAfeTy RISk

2.1 Highway authorities have specific legal duties and responsibilities that are prescribed by various acts and regulations; thus a balanced safety risk assessment methodology that takes account of these must be put in place.

2.2 To illustrate transparent compliance with its legal duties and responsibilities relating to safety risk the Agency has developed the safety risk decision-making process described in this Standard. This process must be applied in a manner that enables the Agency to do what is reasonably required to manage, operate and maintain the SRN within the legal duties of the Secretary of State for Transport.

2.3 There are four populations that must be taken into account when considering what is reasonably required to manage their safety risk exposure. These populations are defined on the left hand side of Table 1 below and then these populations have been brigaded for the purposes of this standard into three groups as illustrated on the right hand side of the table. These definitions shall be applied throughout this document and in its interpretation.

Population 1 – People directly employed by the Agency and who work on the SRN, e.g. Traffic Officers.

Population 2 – People in a contractural relationship with the Agency, including Agency National Vehicle Recovery Contract operatives, all workers engaged in traffic management activities and incident support services, and any other activities where live traffic is present, (such as persons carrying out survey and inspection work).

‘workers’

Population 3 – Other parties, including road users, the police and emergency services and non-motorised ‘Users’ such as equestrians, cyclists and pedestrians, as well as those others not in a contractural relationship with the Agency, such as privately contracted vehicle recovery and vehicle repair providers.

‘users’

Population 4 – Third parties includes any person or persons who could be affected by the SRN, but who are neither using it, nor working on it, i.e. living or working adjacent to the SRN, using other (non-Agency) transport networks that intersect with the SRN (e.g. local roads, railways) and those who are living or working in properties owned by the Agency.

‘other Parties’

Table 1 – Defining and Brigading Populations

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Chapter 2 Defining the People at Safety Risk

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3. DuTIeS AND ReSPoNSIBIlITIeS

3.1 The safety of ‘Workers’ (see Table 1), is governed by employer responsibilities under Health and Safety legislation. When considering safety risks to these populations (both planned and incident management), the duties of an employer are discharged through compliance with the Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1999. (Regulation 3 deals with risk assessments). Where the Agency acts as a designer (either directly or through its supply chain), the requirements to address safety risk assessment for all populations exposed (during construction and maintenance works) is covered by the Construction (Design and Management) Regulations 2007 (particularly Regulation 11).

3.2 The Construction (Design and Management) Regulations 2007 (SI 2007/320), (the CDM Regulations) define ‘structure’ as including a road. The CDM Regulations define ‘workplace’ as a workplace within the meaning of regulation 2(1) of the Workplace (Health, Safety and Welfare) Regulations 1992 (SI 1992/3004 as amended) (the 1992 Regulations), other than a construction site. In regulation 2(1) of the 1992 Regulations ‘workplace’ is defined as ‘any premises or part of premises which are not domestic premises…made available…as a place of work…other than a public road’. Thus a designer must consider the use of a public road in the context of its use by ‘Users’ (Population 3 from Table 1) for normal operation only.

3.3 The safety of ‘Users’ and ‘Other Parties’ (Populations 3 and 4 from Table 1) is generally regulated under statute. There is only one exception to this principle and that is when the use of the road is temporarily constrained by the Agency implementing roadworks. In this instance only, the road is not in a state of normal operation and the Agency’s responsibility under health and safety legislation changes because it is ‘undertaking’ something. In practice this means that during construction and maintenance works the Agency has interfered with the normal operation of the road and this attracts a greater liability, which means that during the period of road work activity the Agency must manage the safety risk exposure of ‘Users’ differently.

3.4 The principal difference between the populations defined and then brigaded in Table 1 is the level of control that the Agency has over each, e.g. ‘Users’ have a responsibility for their own safety and are responsible for their actions that may affect the safety of others. Whereas ‘Workers’ are acting on behalf of and representing the Agency and thus their safety risk exposure is controlled by the Agency’s management and operational control processes.

3.5 The activities of ‘Users’ and/or ‘Other Parties’ cannot be controlled in the same way as for ‘Workers’. Instead it is expected that ‘Users’ will comply with the law and the Highway Code and that they will take account of all the prevailing conditions (including but not limited to) the weather, road character and condition, traffic level and composition, and any warning signs. The scope of this control is shown in the diagram at Figure 1.

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Chapter 3 Duties and Responsibilities

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Chapter 3 Duties and Responsibilities

figure 1 – Scope of control

3.6 ‘Users’ on the SRN can be reasonably expected to:

• balance the safety risks of using the road network against the social and economic benefits of travelling;

• have a general awareness of the safety risks that they are exposed to (through training, driving instruction and driving tests, road safety campaigns, media reporting of collisions, warning signs on the roads of specific hazards etc.);

• have control over the safety risks to which they are exposed, of which they are reasonably aware, e.g. heavy rain, congested route; and

• have a knowledge of their legal obligations whilst using the road and are aware that there is an expectancy that they comply with them.

Other Parties

Users

Workers

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4. GeNeRAl PRINCIPleS

4.1 The approach set out in this Standard allows safety risk tolerance, balancing judgments, and benefits versus costs to be examined, while taking account of available budgets and other duties when considering safety measures. This is consistent with HSE guidance for ‘sensible safety risk management’, which seeks to ensure that ‘Workers’ and the public are properly protected, and understand their responsibilities, while providing an overall balance of benefit and safety risk.

4.2 Balancing benefits and safety risks, when considering safety risk control measures, is applicable for all aspects of highway design maintenance and operation to and on a highway. The starting point for development of a design should be to consider the applicability of standards (compliance with standards is one of the simplest practicability tests), any additional controls must be tested using the reasonably required approach. However, where a substandard road feature exists that does not contribute to the safety problem that is the subject of the issue being investigated or addressed; this feature should not automatically be upgraded. When standards can not be fully complied with or where safety risk exposure is a concern, controls will need to be tested for practicability.

4.3 All suitable potential measures to reduce safety hazards encountered by ‘Users’ must be assessed and those measures that are reasonably required must be implemented. This means that where the cost of a measure identified in the assessment is, in the reasonable opinion of those carrying out the assessment, disproportionate to the benefit derived, then reasonable discretion may be exercised not to implement that measure, but this decision and the evidence used to inform it must be documented. The following rules apply:

• if the benefit cost ratio (BCR) of the measure being considered is > 2 then it should be considered;

• if the BCR is < 1 then the presumption is that this is disproportionate and should not be promoted on safety grounds;

• any other measures with BCR’s between 1 and 2 should be considered alongside all the other options and where a greater benefit could reasonably be achieved by allocation of the cost of that measure elsewhere within the scheme or a wider programme of works this should be considered. Benefits will generally be measured against a risk of death, i.e. Value of Preventing a fatality (VPF); depending on the data available other measures such as Fatalities and Weighted Injuries (FWIs), Personal Injury Accidents (PIAs) or incidents could also be used.

4.4 Certain defined people in the ‘Users’ group (Population 3, Table 1) will undertake a function of their work on the SRN. However, this function is governed by the statutory requirements on their employer’s management and operational control processes.1 Designers must undertake appropriate liaison with stakeholders.

4.5 There is no single methodology for assessing what is disproportionate in terms of safety risk tolerance levels; decisions about safety risk and the controls that achieve compliance have to be carefully considered and specialist technical knowledge and informed judgement is required.

4.6 The Agency can exercise discretion in deciding to provide or omit certain safety control measures. The factor that would be relevant during any form of legal challenge is that A) a decision must be taken and B) the decision must be recorded. This means that a determination to do nothing is a valid decision, if to do nothing is the proper conclusion of the assessment process outlined in this Standard and is documented. However, it is unacceptable for safety risk decisions to be made by default or for a decision not to be recorded.

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Chapter 4 General Principles

1 The definition of Road ‘Workers’ used in the Aiming for Zero vision and strategy document does not apply.

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Chapter 4 General Principles

4.7 Other terminology such as Globally at Least Equivalent (GALE) describes a concept that is sometimes used for highway projects. The Agency will instruct when this principle applies and this will generally be where schemes are not primarily safety related. This situation may arise where the overall scheme is being promoted on the basis of reducing congestion. In this type of scenario the safety risk for ‘Users’ from some composite hazards may be allowed to increase as long as the overall scheme delivers an improved or as an absolute minimum the same global level of safety risk for ‘Users’.

4.8 A tool to help decision makers has been provided at Annex C, the tool is not a recipe for assessment and is no replacement for sound judgment and technical expertise.

November 2012


PART 2

5. PRINCIPleS of SAfeTy RISk ASSeSSmeNT AND CoNTRol5.1 The safety risk management flowchart process (Figure 2), applies to all situations described at paragraph 1.7. However, its use depends on the context. Examples of applying this process to different decision types are provided in Chapter 6.

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Chapter 5 Principles of Safety Risk Assessment and Control

figure 2 – Safety Risk management Process

Stage 1 – Determine the scope

Stage 2 – Identify the hazards

Stage 3 – Identify relevant criteria for populations

Stage 4 – Consider existing risk exposure for each population

Stage 5 – Risk analysis, assessment and evaluation

Stage 6 – Risk control decisions

Stage 7– Document safety risk decision in a safety risk report

Stage 8 – handover of safety risk report to operators

Stage 9 – update and refresh the safety risk report when change proposed

Stage 10 – monitor and review safety risk report assumptions

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5.2 All of the actions described in this chapter and in the technical requirement Chapter 6 must be executed by competent persons. The competence and approval process is described in Chapter 7.

Stage 1 – Determine the Scope

5.3 Describe what is included and what if anything is to be excluded from the assessment and record this. The scope may be a geographical area in the case of a road scheme or the boundaries of a decision, e.g. change of process for temporary traffic management at roadworks. In either case the breadth of the assessment or the subject of the decision must be clearly articulated and documented.

Stage 2 – Identify the hazards

5.4 Hazard identification must identify all reasonably foreseeable hazards to all populations collectively and individually, and for all modes of operation, using methods appropriate to the level of complexity of the issues. The aim is for a comprehensive understanding of Who, What, Where, When, Why and How populations are affected. A systematic approach, using previous experience where it exists, should be used as a starting point. This may not always be possible, such as when dealing with a new or novel activity or situation, or when there is insufficient relevant and reliable data available. In these instances techniques, such as brainstorming may be required. Other methods, e.g. hazard and operability studies and Failure Mode and Effects Analysis, may also be necessary in specific and technically complex circumstances.

Stage 3 – Identify Relevant Criteria for the Populations

5.5 Here the aim is to set out the relevant criteria for the populations affected by the hazards identified in Stage 2. This criterion is then used to examine the need for additional safety risk controls. The criteria to be considered must, as a minimum, include:

• the safety risk on the population; and

• the Agency’s safety risk tolerance for this population (see Chapter 6).

Stage 4 – Consider existing Risk exposure for each Population

5.6 In 2001, the HSE published the report, ‘Reducing Risk, Protecting People’, known as R2P2 (to explain their approach to their enforcement role in considering risk tolerability). It explains the concept of ‘trade off’, whereby an increase in the safety risk from one hazard can be balanced by a commensurate decrease in the safety risk of another hazard.

5.7 To illustrate the safety risk assessment approach applied by the Agency the updated R2P2 version of the HSE tolerability of risk (ToR) ‘triangle diagram’ (see Figure 4) has been adapted to fit the requirements and statutory duties relating to highways. The ToR diagram was developed by the HSE on the assumption that people will tolerate safety risks to them if they receive some commensurate benefit in return for being exposed to the risk and that the people responsible for exposing them to the safety risks will take appropriate measures to minimise their exposure. Thus consideration must be given to those persons exposed to, or potentially affected by, a safety risk, see Figure 3.

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5.8 For all populations (‘Workers’, ‘Users’ and ‘Other Parties’) there are three regions of safety risk that each population could find itself in:

• Broadly acceptable – do nothing, (no additional risk controls or analysis required).

• Unacceptable – do something or stop the activity.

• Tolerable – test for any reasonably required safety risk controls that are not already implemented.

5.9 These are expressed in Figure 4.

5.10 Moving from the bottom to the top of the triangle in Figure 4 represents increasing ‘safety risk’ for a particular hazardous activity (measured by the individual safety risk and societal concerns it engenders). The dark zone at the top represents an unacceptable region. There are three regions in the TOR framework that inform the Agency’s rules for decision making.

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figure 3 – Individual and Collective Safety Risk Definitions

figure 4 – The hSe’s ToR model or ‘Safety Risk Triangle’

IndividualThe safety risk to a single

person is used to represent the risk of all those running the risk,

and a specified outcome.

The risk measure is the probability of a typical individual member of

one of the constituent populations, e.g. Worker, User or Other Party

being killed or injured during a year whilst undertaking

a particular activity.

CollectiveThis is the safety risk, to a group

of people or a population, associated with a particular

scenario, control measure or hazardous event.

Quantified as the average number of fatalities, or fatalities and weighted

injuries, per year that would be expected to occur.

RISK

Unacceptable Region

Tolerable Region

Broadly Acceptable Region

Reasonably practicable control measures must be introduced for risk in this region to drive residual risk towards the broadly acceptable region

Negligible Risk

Level of residual risk regarded as insignificant – further effort to reduce risk is not likely to be required

Risk cannot be justified save in extraordinary circumstances

Incr

easi

ng in

divi

dual

risk

s an

d so

ciet

al c

once

rn

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5.11 The Agency applies the HSE tolerability recommendations to ‘Worker’ and ‘User’ populations to help us understand the safety risk exposure and tolerance levels for each of them as shown in Figure 5. The safety risk exposure to the ‘Other Parties’ population is not defined in this Standard and must be dealt with on a case by case basis.

5.12 The HSE advises that an individual safety risk of death of 1:1,000 per annum for ‘Workers’ who are at work and 1:10,000 per annum for members of the public (Populations 3 and 4) who have a safety risk imposed on them ‘in the wider interest of society’, should be used as a guideline for the boundary between the ‘tolerable and the unacceptable regions. This means that for a worker a tolerable safety risk level could be 1:2,500 and for ‘Users’ this could be 1:15,000. Safety risk located in the tolerable region is judged to be tolerable so long as the determining organisation (the Agency)

can demonstrate that there are no further safety risk control and mitigation measures that are reasonably required. Similarly for ‘Users’ the individual safety risk of death of 1:1,000,000 per annum corresponds to a very low level of safety risk and is used as a guideline for the boundary between the broadly acceptable and tolerable regions.

5.13 An activity/project/scheme that exposes ‘Workers’ to a risk of greater than 1:1,000 per annum, (e.g. 1:850) is ‘unacceptable’. Similarly an activity/project/scheme that exposes users to a risk of 1:9,500 is ‘unacceptable’. In these circumstances, either the activities being considered must cease, or additional control and mitigation measures must be implemented to reduce the safety risk to below the boundary between tolerable and unacceptable, and to drive the risk level down as far as is reasonably required.

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figure 5 – Agency Applying exposure and Tolerance levels

Increasing risk

“Workers” “Users”

Unacceptable

Tolerable

Broadly Acceptable

Greater than 1 in 1,000

Greater than 1 in 1,000,000

Less than 1 in 1,000

Less than 1 in 10,000

Greater than 1 in 1,000,000

Greater than 1 in 10,000

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5.14 The annual risk to road users by road type diagram at Figure 6 has been developed using the same boundaries as those used by the HSE for fatality risk to members of the public. The figures used to calculate this risk exposure and the process is attached at Annex B. It can be seen that in all cases the ‘User’ annual risk of fatality is firmly in the ‘tolerable’ region and whilst the annual risk of road user fatality is tolerable on all road types considered here, motorways are the safest roads and are some six times safer than rural ‘A’ roads.

5.15 The level of safety risk deemed tolerable for a project must take into account a number of criteria:

• The maximum level of safety risk that is deemed tolerable for the section of road by the decision maker (see Chapter 6 for details). This might consist of a percentage of the overall network or regional safety risk profile or an absolute criterion in terms of ‘Users’ Killed and Seriously Injured (KSI) and expert advice may be required. Levels of performance for safety risk

mitigation systems that are deemed to be a minimum for the duty of care to be met, i.e. the acceptable safety risk exposure for the population.

• Good practice that is available for mitigating the safety risk (existing standards and/or operational procedures.

• The cost benefit of different options for safety risk mitigation, as long as they deliver a safety risk level lower than the maximum tolerable safety risk for the populations concerned (as shown in Figure 5) and meet the minimum performance requirements.

• The overall effects of the actions taken.

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figure 6 – Annual Risk of Death to Individual ‘users’ by GB Road Type

Increasing risk

Unacceptable

Tolerable

Broadly Acceptable

*Rural A roads 1 in 50,000

*Urban A roads 1 in 100,000

*Motorways 1 in 320,000

HSE risk to “Users”

1 in 10,000

1 in 1,000,000

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Stage 5 – Safety Risk Analysis, Assessment and evaluation

5.16 For safety risk analysis the detail must be proportionate to the safety risks being considered. The appropriate safety risk analysis methods may be either qualitative, semi-quantitative or quantitative. A range of safety risk measures are also available for communicating the outputs of any safety risk analysis, including measures of individual and collective safety risk. For details of generic safety risk analysis methods please see Annex A. Outputs from safety risk analyses are compared with tolerability criteria and associated regions of safety risk (see paragraphs 5.8 – 5.14) All potential delivery options for a project must be considered and one recommended that is most likely to result in successful delivery whilst also providing an acceptable level of benefit (and value for money etc.).

5.17 Populations with safety risks that fall into a broadly acceptable area must be regarded as acceptable and no further risk controls introduced. This means that if a population’s collective risk exposure is located in the broadly acceptable region then further risk assessment is not necessary.

5.18 A Safety Risk Assessment Tool (see Annex C) has been provided to assist decision makers in assessing the broad justification in terms of safety risk alone. This tool does not address the other impacts and benefits of the proposal. Where the Risk Assessment Tool is used, a copy of the risk matrix assessment, including the potential hazards identified and the reasoning behind the selection of severity, likelihood and Overall Risk Level should be included within the Safety Risk Report, see Stage 7 of this chapter.

Stage 6 – Risk Control Decisions

5.19 Risk control is the process of implementing measures that take into account the implications for either A) a single risk or B) a range of different risks and then what is needed to control them across the different populations. Final risk controls must maximise the collective benefit and demonstrate that controls go far enough to manage

the safety risks for all populations. Risk control normally involves expenditure and effort, and it is likely that a variety of different risk control options that require different levels of investment and effort will be identified. It is common practice to review the BCR of the different options and select those with the highest BCR. ‘Trade off’ enables examination of the adverse consequences of options and the comparison of their relative effect; facilitating a balanced decision through a ‘trade off’ between reducing the target risk (the risk that you are seeking to address) and the increase in other safety risks.

5.20 The process used must take account of safety risk implications for all affected populations. And the method to assess individual safety risk controls shall be:

• Define the control option;

• Work out the safety risk implications (benefits and disbenefits) for all affected populations, including consideration of how the control may affect human behaviour, (ie is there evidence to suggest that a population may behave differently because they feel safer or less safe);

• Consider if the option goes far enough to manage safety risk and if any disbenefits are tolerable (see below); and

• Revise the option as necessary and repeat until the optimum solution for all populations is found.

5.21 A hierarchy of control measures exists and this is known by the acronym ERIC, which stands for Eliminate, Reduce, Isolate and Control. When considering control measures; the aim should be to work down through the hierarchy; this means that the ideal option will be to eliminate the safety risk you are seeking to control, but this may be unachievable or the costs disproportionate so the decision maker will progress down through the hierarchy applying benefit cost considerations at each level and to each safety risk being addressed. A flowchart for this element of the process is shown at Figure 72.

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2 ‘Other Parties’ are out of scope of this decision-making flowchart.

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5.22 Tests for whether control measures go far enough or whether any disbenefits are tolerable depend on the population and the associated responsibilities of the Agency to manage the safety risk exposure to those populations (Chapter 2, Table 1), and the tolerability criteria described previously (at 5.11 – 5.14). When calculating costs and benefits, technical evidence and judgments must be used to define the expected life/duration of the technical product, project or scheme. The COBA (Cost Benefit Analysis) manual provides guidance on calculating BCR’s and the safety risk rules for BCR’s are provided at 4.3. The tool at Annex D may also be helpful.

5.23 The expected life/duration of the technical product, project or scheme will vary according to the situation, e.g. for a technology product the life may be 10 years, or for a three week maintenance scheme it would be the duration of the scheme. For simple, low value control measures, this may be qualitative and based on the reasoned judgment of a competent professional. However, as the level of complexity, safety risk or uncertainty increases so must the level of quantification of costs and benefits.

figure 7 – Controls Decision-making flowchart

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Understand current problem(Risk Assessment)

Identify potential control options(Hierarchy of controls)

Understand implications of potential control options

for ‘Workers’

Do control options go far enough for this population/are any increases in risk

tolerable


for ‘Users’


for ‘Other Parties’

Do control options go far enough for this population/are any increases in risk

tolerable

Do control options go far enough for this population/

are any increases in risk tolerable

Eliminate options, revise as necessary

and repeat

Determinepreferred option

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5.24 For ‘Users’, the definition of reasonableness takes account of the following:

• Costs, time or resources to introduce controls in one area should not impact on the ability to implement other safety measures that deliver more collective benefit or that have a higher BCR.

• Controls should not have an unreasonable impact on the performance of the network, as measured against criteria other than safety, e.g. journey times or air quality.

5.25 In addition, the costs associated with preventing a fatality should not generally exceed the established value of preventing a fatality figure described in ‘WebTAG unit 3.4.1’ (Accidents Sub Objective- Table 3: Average value of prevention of road accidents by severity and element of cost).

5.26 For ‘Workers’ (Populations 1 and 2) evidence must be presented to demonstrate that the sacrifice (in terms of time, money or effort) of doing more would be disproportionate to the benefits gained from doing it.

5.27 For ‘Workers’ and ‘Users’ it can be reasonable for the safety risks associated with individual hazards to increase. However, the residual safety risk level must remain tolerable and the populations subject to the increase in safety risk is gaining some proportionate level of overall benefit from the project or decision as a whole.

5.28 Where individual safety risk controls result in a safety benefit to one population, the outcome for other populations must be that they are not disproportionately adversely affected in safety terms and the residual safety risk to a negatively affected population must always at least remain within tolerable parameters.

5.29 Safety risk controls are not fixed. It is appropriate to remove safety risk controls that are no longer reasonable/reasonably practicable in circumstances where safety risk profiles, legislation, or approved codes of practice have changed.

5.30 There is no simple methodology for computing what is reasonably required and identifying a proportionate solution. Where there is a need to balance safety risk across different populations, the preferred safety risk control will A maximise safety risk reduction to the population with the highest current level of individual or collective safety risk exposure and B offer the least detriment to the trade off population and C will represent the best overall balance of net present value and benefit cost ratio.

5.31 An extreme trade off example might be to spend £1m to prevent five staff suffering bruised knees is likely to be grossly disproportionate; but to spend £1m to prevent a bridge collapse capable of killing five people is likely to be proportionate.

5.32 At this stage it is appropriate to think about the sensible review period for the safety risk assessment and control measures under consideration.

5.33 The decision about whether or not a control measure is justified will often be based on economic grounds. Thus if a control measure is being disregarded then the impact to the population of any potential increased safety risk stemming from this decision can be estimated in cost terms. This then can be compared with the cost of doing more and thus allow a more informed decision to be reached. A Cost Benefit tool has been provided at Annex D to help decision makers assess whether control measures go far enough. The tool uses an order-of-magnitude technique which provides a simplified methodology to allow designers to consider, on comparable terms, the control measure cost savings against a judgement of the maximum likely change in safety risks. This tool should only be used as a filter and not a single deciding factor since non-accident related impacts (e.g. delays) are not taken into account.

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Stage 7 – Document Safety Risk Decision in a Safety Risk Report

5.34 Details of the safety risk assessment must be recorded in a safety risk report, the detail of which will be commensurate with the matter under consideration and will include:

• the hazards identified and evidence considered;

• details of the safety risk analysis and safety risk assessment;

• details of safety risk controls considered and the rationale for why the final choice of safety risk control was considered sufficient;

• any time limits on the validity of the safety risk assessment/any known or anticipated changes that would require the safety risk assessment to be reviewed;

• who did the safety risk assessment (and evidence that they were competent, see Chapter 7 for competence requirements).

5.35 The scale of the safety risk report will be guided by the complexity of the situation, it may be a standalone report for a Type C decision and equally for a Type A decision could be a composite part or section of another project report.

Stage 8 – handover of Safety Risk Report to operators

5.36 The safety risk report is a living document that must be handed on to the next responsible authority, be that a different part of the same organisation or a separate organisation, where this is appropriate, e.g. a built road scheme passing from those responsible for construction to those responsible for operation and management. Thus it must be retained in a suitable format to make sure that it is retrievable for the life of the safety risk controls to which it relates.

Stage 9 – update and Refresh the Safety Risk Report when Change Proposed

5.37 Safety risk assessments contained within a safety risk report are live documents which must be reviewed and updated throughout the life of the project and its subsequent migration to maintenance and operation as part of the SRN:

• whenever the activity they relate to changes; or

• when new information or findings from any investigations or problems reported by Workers/Others means that the outcome may change;

• to reflect any changes in legislation.

5.38 When risk assessments are updated consideration should be given to industry best practice, budgets and other duties, change in situation and ensuring that controls remain reasonably required.

Stage 10 – monitor and Review Safety Risk Report Assumptions

5.39 The assumptions that were used to:

• inform the risk analysis and assessment;

• inform the risk controls;

• inform the decisions about whether risks are tolerable;

must be updated periodically to ensure that uncertainties are validated and performance reviewed. The monitoring regime shall be contained within the safety risk report.

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6. TeChNICAl ReQuIRemeNTS

6.1 The previous chapters have articulated the general requirements in terms of safety risk analysis, assessment and evaluation, the content of this chapter explains:

• Who should be the decision maker.

• What decision makers should take into account, as part of their decision making.

• An approach that can be used to guide decision making.

• How much information decision makers should document for an audit trail.

6.2 The minimum requirement is that the outcome of safety risk analysis must be recorded to demonstrate that decisions:

• Meet Agency requirements.

• Meet legal requirements.

• Take account of all relevant factors.

• Maximise the overall return from available resources.

• Take account of any implications for others affected by the decision, in both the short and long term.

• Lead to reasonable, proportionate and defensible set of actions.

• Produce an appropriate audit trail.

6.3 There are three main inputs into decision making as shown in Figure 8.

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Chapter 6 Technical Requirements

figure 8 – Decision-making Inputs

Understand issues

Understand risks and

uncertainties

Appraisal of cost and benefits

Decision Making

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6.4 There are four principal steps to making a decision and these are:

• defining the decision to be made;

• establishing decision objectives and determining decision boundary;

• evaluating disproportion and tolerability; and

• documenting the decision.

6.5 The Agency uses a three-tiered approach (as illustrated in Figure 9) to reflect the safety risks and uncertainties associated with different decision levels related to the complexity of issues. As the level of complexity increases (e.g. the greater the number of scheme elements and/or control measures are involved), the greater the number of ‘trade off’/balancing decisions that are required, so the higher the decision-making referral goes.

6.6 Decisions need to be made by the most appropriate person and thus a method to identify the decision boundaries must be applied; To do this the decision must be characterised (i.e. wholly Type A, B or C, or as containing a mix of Type A, B or C characteristics). Table 2: provides an approach that can be used to determine ‘features’ and thus characterise the decision; the feature descriptions can be amended to suit the decision under consideration.

figure 9 – Decision-making Pyramid

Type C DecisionsProfessional Roles

Type C – These are decisions which are complex infrequent and/or have major implications for the SRN and, as such, require a detailed and rigorous approach.

Type B – These are decisions that could have some significant operational implications.

Type A – These are relatively routine decisions, are familiar, and without operational implications. The main issue for these types of decision is to ensure they are made consistently with minimum effort and maximum efficiency.

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features Type A Specialist Technical/Coordinator Roles

Type B Professional Safety Advisors

Type C Professional Roles

What is the size of the decision impact? (geographically and in impact terms; extent of the network, number of ‘Users’/‘Workers’)

Local, low density Local, high density or national, low density

National, high density

What are the cost implications of the decision for the Agency?

Low Medium High

What is the lifetime of the decision? (how long will the Agency be affected by the decision)

Rest of the day Months to a few years Decades

What is the level of safety risk or uncertainty associated with the decision?

Low Medium High

What is the policy or stakeholder interest level? (how sensitive is it?)

Low Medium High

Note: Stakeholder could be many bodies, e.g. user, worker, another road authority MP etc.

Table 2 – Characterising Decision features

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6.7 The decision maker should refer to any outputs from previous safety risk analysis, assessment and evaluation work in relation to the matter under consideration, e.g. if a decision or a feature within it has previously been characterised as a Type C this should inform the current decision level ascribed. All evidence considered (both retrospective and new) should be referenced in the safety risk report.

6.8 Having characterised the individual features of the decision (using Table 2) the next step is to determine a resultant overall type for each aspect of the decision-making process. The ‘characterisation rules’ in Table 3 should then be used to identify the appropriate decision maker; this will usually be decided by the project in consultation with the specialist technical advisor.

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Project feature Classifications

Decision Type Comments

All Type A Type A Where all decision features are classified as Type A then the entire decision will be of Type A.

All Type B Type B Where all decision features are classified as Type B then the entire decision will be of Type B.

All Type C Type C Where all decision features are classified as Type C then the entire decision will be of Type C.

Three or more Type B, remainder Type A

Type B Where three or more decision features are classified as Type B and the remainder are Type A, then the entire decision shall be of Type B.

Three or more Type C

Type C Where three or more decision features are classified as Type C then the entire decision shall be of Type C.

Equal distribution of classifications across features

Type B/C Where there is an equal distribution of classification features then the decision shall be governed by the relative importance of the classifications, i.e. a decision may still be a Type B with two Type C features. In this instance then the overall decision type would be Type B but the two features that were identified as Type C would require a greater rigour of analysis assessment and evaluation.

Table 3 – Characterisation Rules

6.9 When the general approach has been decided between either Type A, B or C, the decision maker must then identify how individual options can be compared to each other. This process is known as establishing decision criteria. The basic process for undertaking this task is summarised in Figure 10.

6.10 Within the Figure 10 flowchart, value does not necessarily mean monetary, i.e. the results of cost benefits analysis although this will often be the case. Non-monetary types of decision criteria are:

• Direct data – i.e. collision statistics, number of vehicles.

• Safety risk exposure of workers.

• Safety risk exposure of users.

• Reliability/effect upon congestion.

• Financial.

6.11 Whatever criteria, employed, the same combination must be used for all options under consideration so that like for like comparison can be made.

6.12 The preferred option for assessment is Quantitative – either financially (i.e. value in terms of £) or non-financially (e.g. score out of 100, or absolute value in units other than £). Where it is reasonable to do so, effort should be made to assess decision criteria financially, as this is the easiest way of making direct comparison between the options. The last resort is qualitative assessment, (e.g. high/medium/low or good/average/poor) which should only be used where the required effort to collect additional robust information is disproportionate to the scale of the decision or it is not practical to quantify the decision criteria (e.g. some dynamic decision making).

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6.13 Type A decision criteria – These are decisions which are relatively routine and familiar so there should be plenty of existing professional experience and direct data to inform Type A decisions thus; additional analysis should not be needed to inform these decisions.

6.14 Type B decision criteria – These are more complicated decisions where the Agency is likely to have some knowledge and experience, but it is unlikely that there will be sufficient directly relevant professional experience or data to form an evidence base. Consequently more formal analysis will be required.

6.15 Type C decision criteria – these decisions are more complex and less common there is likely to be very little if any directly relevant professional experience or data. Therefore Type C decisions will need to make significant use of analysis.

6.16 The main purpose of establishing decision criteria and valuing individual options against them is to inform an overall assessment (or valuation) of the individual decision options. This will then form the basis for a comparison of options in order to identify the optimum solution. This is where the decision maker must consider trade-off, balancing decisions and wider implications.

6.17 Further guidance on calculating the Net Present Value (NPV) and BCR, including what costs and benefits to include and appropriate discount rates, is provided in the HM Treasury Appraisal and Evaluation in Central Government, the ‘Green Book’.

figure 10 – Basic Process for establishing the Decision Criteria and Assessing options (see para 6.10 for explanation)

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Establish individual decision criteria

Determine the approach to assessing criteria

Acceptable

For each option: Check criteria ‘values’

Assess individual options

Revise Option

Unacceptable

For each option assess a ‘value’ for each of the criteria

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6.18 When the decision value boundary has been established and the need to escalate or delegate (see Figure 9 Decision-making Pyramid) has been considered the next step is to take all of the information gathered in the earlier stages of this chapter and make a decision. Depending on the complexity of the situation this may mean that ‘trade off’ between exposures needs to be considered, safety risk balanced, or disproportion considered. The decision maker’s workflow for ‘trade off’ decisions is as shown in Figure 11.

6.19 It is only appropriate to consider trade off for a road population with an intolerable risk exposure if the trade off is to improve that risk exposure.

6.20 To assess tolerability reference should be made to the most recent version of the ‘Information for Managing Safety on the Highways Agency Network’ report. This report is updated annually and provides an update at a national level of user safety risk; please contact the team responsible for safety risk and governance for advice, support and access.

6.21 Where there is more than one option then the decision maker needs to make a ‘Balancing Judgment’. The process of doing this is often known as Multi Criteria Analysis (MCA). In this situation the decision maker will follow the workflow at Figure 11 and compile a list of acceptable proposals and plot these onto a performance matrix (e.g. Table 4). This presents the decision criteria and associated values for each option, as determined from the steps set out previously in this chapter.

figure 11 – ‘Trade off’ workflow

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Review Safety Risk Report

Review current safety risk exposure of populate

Review current safety risk exposure of populate

New risk exposure is tolerable. All reasonably required controls

have been implemented

New risk exposure is intolerable

Accept proposal and document decision

Reject option and refer for additional analysis

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Decision options user Safety worker Safety Risk exposure

Cost

Option 1 2.5 PIAs saved/yr 1/1,500 £500k

Option 2 6 PIAs saved/yr 1/2,100 £1.5m

Option 3 4 PIAs saved/yr 1/1,050 £750k

Table 4 – example of an mCA performance matrix

6.22 If the performance matrix does not clearly indicate the best decision option it will be necessary to either test for disproportion or convert the criteria values (see para 6.10) to a consistent set of scores, and then give relative weights to the criteria.

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7. RoleS, ReSPoNSIBIlITIeS AND ComPeTeNCe

7.1 In order to assign appropriate competencies for each function/role involved in developing an option and taking it forward for a decision through the approval process, it is necessary first to consider what is involved in each role. This consideration is provided by developing a Responsible, Accountable, Consulted and Informed (RACI) matrix for the process. Table 6 (overleaf) provides an example of a RACI with suggested assignments.

7.2 The RACI matrix process requires that all of the steps in a process are mapped out and that each role that undertakes an element of the process is identified. Then appropriate RACI assignments are allocated to fields in the matrix by combining these two factors. The interpretation of each RACI assignment is given in Table 5.

7.3 The RACI matrix illustrates the interaction between different roles and responsibilities for the various tasks that make up the safety risk management process and details differences in decision making/approval responsibilities. Competence levels of achievement are shown in Table 7.

7.4 Accountability must not be delegated for any activity. However, responsibility can be. In practice this distinction means that an individual who is accountable for completing a step in the decision making/approval process can delegate the detailed checking to another person, but in such a case they must be sure that they are delegating the task to a person with sufficient competence.

7.5 Those who use this standard who are participants in the safety risk management process will need to refer to both the RACI and competency definition charts to be clear about their responsibilities, decision-making levels and competency requirements. Assessing competence is covered later on in this chapter.

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Assignment Interpretation

Responsible This person is responsible for action/implementation and typically the individual(s) who actually complete the task. However, in some circumstances this person may delegate parts of the work to others, including other organisations. Under these circumstances they retain responsibility for ensuring that the task is completed. Responsibility can be shared, with the degree of responsibility on each person determined by the ‘Accountable’ person.

Accountable The individual or group who is ultimately answerable for the function/activity. Includes ‘yes’ or ‘no’ authority and veto power. Only one ‘A’ can be assigned to a function and this accountability cannot be delegated to another role.

Consulted The individual(s) to be consulted prior to a final decision/action. Communication should be two way, there being a requirement on whoever is consulted to respond to the information provided.

Informed The individual(s) who needs to be informed after a decision/action is taken. The communication is one way. There is no requirement for an informed person to respond.

Table 5 – RACI Assignments Interpretations

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esponsibilities and Com

petenceResponsibility and Decision-making levels for Tasks

Project Consultant/Designer

hA Project Sponsor

hA Technical Specialist

hA Regional manager

Professional Safety Advisor

Professional Roles

Project lifecycle Stage

Safety Risk management Process

Task Decision Type/RACI assignment

Options or feasibility stage

Determine the scope of the safety risk assessment

Define Project Scope

All types – R All types – A All types – C All types – C

Define safety baseline objectives

All types – R All types – A All types – C Type B and C – C

Type B and C – C

Type C – C

Characterise Project Features


Type B and C – C

Type C – C

Agree Preferred Option

Identify the hazards

Hazard identification


Type B and C – C

Type C – C

Identify and consider organisational safety risk tolerance

Confirm project justification


Type B and C – C

Type C – C

Identify the Agency’s safety risk tolerance for each population


Type B and C – C

Type C – C

High level safety risk analysis and safety risk assessment

Understand safety risks associated with option


Type B and C – C

Type C – C

Table 6 – example of a Safety Risk management RACI matrix

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hA Project Sponsor


hA Regional manager


Professional Roles




Establish current level of safety risk for each population


Type B and C – C

Type C – C

Identify the overall safety risk benefit/disbenefit between options considered


Type B and C – C

Type C – C

Development Stage

Detailed safety risk analysis and detailed safety risk assessment

Understand safety risks associated with option for all populations during all phases of implementation

All types – R All types – A All types – C Type B – C Type C – C

Type B – C Type C – C

Type C – C

Establish current level of safety risk for each population


Type B and C – C

Type C – C

Identify the Agency’s safety risk tolerance for each population


Type B and C – C

Type C – C

Table 6 – example of a Safety Risk management RACI matrix (continued

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hA Project Sponsor


hA Regional manager


Professional Roles




Determine if project justified on basis of current level of safety risk

Type A and B – R

Type A – A Type B – C/A

Type A – C Type B – C

Type B – C Type B – C/A

Type C – C/A

Safety risk Control

Identify potential safety risk control options

All types – R Type A – A All types – C Type B and C – A

Type B and C – C

Type C – C

Understand implications for each individual population

All types – R Type A – A All types – C Type B and C – A

Type B and C – C

Type C – C

Decide whether safety risk control options for each individual population go far enough are any increases in safety risk tolerable

All types – I Type A – A Type B – C/A Type C – C

All types – I Type A – I Type B – A/C Type C – C

Type B – I Type C – A/C

Consider trade-off/balancing of safety risk

All types – I Type A – A Type B – C/A Type C – C

All types – I Type A – I Type B – A/C Type C – C

Type B – I Type C – A/C

Develop project safety plan

All types – R All types – A All types – I All types – I Type B and C – I Type C – I

Table 6 – example of a Safety Risk management RACI matrix (continued)

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hA Project Sponsor


hA Regional manager


Professional Roles




Construction or implementation stage

Document safety risk decision in a safety risk report

Ensure delivery is as per the plan and all safety risk controls implemented

All types – R All types – R Type C – C All types – A Type C – C Type C – C

Document changes in project safety plan and develop further as necessary


Operation Handover of safety risk report to operators

Validate assumptions and clarify any uncertainties


Update and fefresh the safety risk report when change proposed.

Review performance


Keep safety documentation up to date

All types – R All types – R Type C – C All types – R Type C – C Type C – C

Table 6 – example of a Safety Risk management RACI matrix (continued)

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7.6 The essence of competence is relevance to the workplace. What matters is that there is a proper focus on both the safety risks that occur most often and those with serious consequences. Competence is demonstrated by the ability of the individual to undertake the functions described in Chapters 5 and 6 of this Standard.

7.7 To be competent, an individual must be able to demonstrate:

• sufficient knowledge of the specific tasks to be undertaken and the safety risks associated with these;

• sufficient experience and ability; and

• they can recognise their limitations and how these should be overcome (skills development plans).

7.8 The development of competence is an ongoing process. Individuals should develop their competence through experience in the job and through training.

7.9 To evaluate the competence of individuals an assessment will be required, assessments should focus on the individual and their role in particular functions to deliver projects. The assessment should be proportionate to the safety risks, size and complexity of the work. It is therefore recommended that the levels of competence achievement as described in Table 7 is used. These levels are relevant to all staff regardless of grade and can be used to identify strengths and weaknesses in current performance and define learning and development goals and progression paths.

7.10 The functions that individuals are engaged in should then be measured against Table 7 levels of competence, an assessment checklist is provided at Table 8.

level Description

Can lead/direct 1 Direct and plan the work of others and teams

Can guide and show 2 Lead peer review, check and verify the work of others

Can do independently 3 Undertake the function independently (though may receive contributions from others)

Can contribute 4 Contributes to the work of others but doesn’t undertake the function independently

Table 7 – Competence levels of Achievement

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1 2 3 4

Can lead/direct

Can guide and show

Can do independently

Can contribute

Safety risk terminology Hazard, safety risk, hazard identification, safety risk analysis, safety risk assessment (or evaluation), safety risk control, safety risk management, safety risk versus uncertainty

Legal context HSWA, MHSW Regs, CDM, Road Traffic Act, Highways Act, Duty of care, corporate manslaughter, role of the HSE, reasonably required

Safety risk management principles

ALARP, GALE, precautionary principle, safety decision making, importance of evidence/audit trails, safety management systems (HSG65)

Determine the scope of projects

Consideration, definition and documentation of the project scope. The project/decision boundaries, impact on all populations, local objectives, and local problems

Identify hazards arising from scope of project and identify safety risks to populations associated with hazards

Checklists, brainstorming, qualitative, semi-quantitative, quantitative, risk matrices

Define appropriate criteria and tolerance for populations

Tolerability of safety risk, safety risk trade off (including individual and collective)

Gather analyse, assess and evaluate relevant data

HA methodologies, event trees, fault trees, bow-tie, cause-consequence, risk modelling, measures of safety risk, data for safety risk analysis (and what to do if no data)

Analyse safety risk control options and decide preferred options

Hierarchy of safety risk control, approaches to determining ‘reasonableness’ and procedures for actively managing safety risks

Decision-making HSMS; safety policy; organisation; operational procedures; safety risk assessment methodologies; tolerability criteria; assurance; procedures for review of current approach; potential issues with the current approach

Table 8 – Assessment Checklist

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8. GloSSARy

Term explanation

Agency The Highways Agency.

Assumptions Assumptions are required in order to assess the degree of severity and likelihood of the hazard.

Construction and maintenance worker

Person whose job it is to perform construction and maintenance tasks on projects, from within a safe working area.

CDm Regulations The Construction (Design and Management) Regulations.

Decision maker The individual or group of individuals appointed with a mandate to consider and determine safety risks at a defined level in accordance with this standard, and identified on the project specific RACI charts. Decision Makers may be in the Overseeing Organisation supply chain or the Overseeing Organisation depending on the safety risks being considered and the requirements of the project specific RACI chart. Decision Makers in the Overseeing Organisation supply chain will also ensure that all the information pertinent to resolution of the safety issue to be considered by the Overseeing Organisation is available for that decision to be made.

Designer A person, group of persons or organisation performing the duties of a designer as defined by the CDM Regulations 2007.

Design Standards The standards and specifications containing Mandatory Requirements and used by the highway authority and stipulated as such in a standards management system, other policy documents, contracts (e.g. ‘Employers Requirements’) or a design brief or design statement.

Departure or Departure from Standard(s)

A non-compliance with a Mandatory Requirement of a Declared Standard.

Design manual for Roads and Bridges (DmRB)

The Stationery Office publication containing current standards, advice notes and other guidance documents relating to the design, maintenance, operation and improvement of motorways and trunk roads.

GAle Globally At Least Equivalent – a method of safety risk management appropriate where safety improvements to ‘Users’ are not sought.

hazard A source of potential harm which poses a threat to ‘Users’, ‘Workers’, or third parties.

highway Authority An organisation that is responsible for the maintenance of public roads.

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Term explanation

measures of impact Needs to reflect the purpose of the safety risk assessment. Typical measures of impact used by the Agency include:

• Number of collisions.

• Number of casualties.

• Number of fatalities.

• Numbers of killed or seriously injured (KSIs).

• Fatalities and weighted injuries (FWI).

mitigation measure The aim of mitigation is to reduce or alleviate the hazard safety risk through the use of qualitative or quantitative actions. After the initial hazard analysis the drafter of the technical requirements should be able to identify possible mitigations.

National vehicle Recovery Service operatives

Persons employed as part of the HA National Vehicle Recovery Service.

Professional Safety Advisor Group

A group comprising Safety Risk and Health and Safety specialists that provide advice to Chief Highway Engineer.

Project Anything that involves work or an activity on or affecting the SRN, including surveys and inspections and construction, maintenance, upgrading, improvement and renewal projects.

Project feature A high level property of the project that can be expected to affect safety management requirements.

Project manager Person representing the Agency’s interests on the project and to whom the Project Consultant reports.

Project Sponsor Any person working for the Agency, representing the Agency’s interests on the project.

Project Safety Risk management

The process of managing safety risks associated with project(s).

Safety Risk The combination of the likelihood and the consequence of a specified hazard being realised. It is a measure of harm or loss associated with an activity.

Safety Risk Analysis A procedure to identify threats and vulnerabilities, analyse them to ascertain the exposures, and highlight how the impact can be eliminated or reduced.

Safety Risk Assessment The overall process of safety risk identification, safety risk analysis and safety risk evaluation.

Safety Risk evaluation A process that takes the output of safety risk analysis and compares each safety risk level against the safety risk tolerance and prioritises safety risk controls.

Safety Risk management The overall process of safety risk assessment, plus processes for assigning ownership of safety risks, taking actions to control them and then monitoring and reviewing progress.

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Term explanation

Safety Risk measures The outputs from safety risk analysis should be expressed in terms of appropriate safety risk measures. These may include measures of:

• individual safety risk;

• collective safety risk.

The decision to present results in terms of individual or collective safety risk will be based on the intended use of the information.

Safety objective A statement describing what if any contribution a project will deliver from a safety perspective, generally associated with managed motorway projects where the project is promoted on congestion reduction grounds.

Safety Risk Tolerance The threshold levels of safety risk exposure that, with appropriate approvals, can be exceeded, but which when exceeded will trigger some form of response (e.g. reporting the situation to senior management for action).

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9. NoRmATIve AND INfoRmATIve RefeReNCeS

Normative – separate documents referenced within the standard (unless otherwise stated, the most recent versions of the separate documents should be referenced.

Title location of Document

Health and Safety At Work Act 1974 HSE Books

Design Manual for Roads and Bridges The Stationary Office

Management Arrangements for Health and Safety The Highways Agency

Agency Work Instructions and/or Guidance

Information for Managing Safety on the Highways Agency Network

WebTAG unit 3.4.1 (Accidents Sub Objective-Table 3: Average value of prevention of road accidents by severity and element of cost

Department for Transport

Transport Statistics Great Britain

Informative – provides only additional background information.

Title location of Document

Reducing Risks Protecting People HSE Books

Construction Design and Management Regulations 2007

Road Traffic Act 1988 The Stationary Office

Highways Act 1980

Green Book

Health and Safety At Work Act 1974 HSE Books

Managing the accidental obstruction of the railway by road vehicles Department for Transport

COBA (Cost Benefit Analysis) manual

Aiming for Zero The Highways Agency

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10. ABBRevIATIoNS AND ACRoNymS

AfZ Aiming For Zero

AlARP As Low As Reasonably Practicable

BCR Benefit Cost Ratio

Bvm Billion Vehicle Miles

CoBA Cost Benefit Analysis

DfT Department for Transport

DmRB Design Manual for Roads and Bridges

eRIC Eliminate Reduce Isolate Control

fwI Fatality and Weighted Injury

GAle Globally at Least Equivalent

hSe Health & Safety Executive

kmS Kilometres

kSI Killed or Seriously Injured

mCA Multi criteria analysis

mAhS Management Arrangements for Health and Safety

mm Managed Motorway

NPv Net Present Value

NSCRG National Safety Control Review Group

PIA Personal Injury Accident

PSCRG Project Safety Control Review Group

PSA Professional Safety Advisor

PSRm Project Safety Risk Management

RACI Responsible Accountable Consulted Informed

R2P2 Reducing Risk Protecting People

SfAIRP So Far As Is Reasonably Practicable

SmS Safety Management System

SRN Strategic Road Network

ToR Tolerability of Risk

TSGB Transport Statistics Great Britain

vPf Value of Preventing a Fatality

wI Work Instructions

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Chapter 10 Abbreviations and Acronyms

November 2012

Volume 0 Section 2 Part 3 GD 04/12

11. eNquirieS

All technical enquiries or comments on this Standard should be sent in writing as appropriate to:

Chief Highway Engineer The Highways Agency 123 Buckingham Palace Road London G CLARKE SW1W 9HA Chief Highway Engineer

This document was notified in draft to the European Commission in accordance with Directive 98/34/EC, as amended by Directive 98/48/EC.

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Chapter 11 enquiries

November 2012


ANNex A GeNeRIC SAfeTy RISk ANAlySIS meThoDS

Qualitative

A1.1 Qualitative safety risk analysis methods generally assess the likelihood and impact components of safety risk using non-numerical, descriptive terms, e.g. high, medium, and low. Results are often presented in a likelihood-impact matrix.

A1.2 This type of safety risk analysis is generally used where there is a need for a quick prioritisation of a large number of disparate safety risks. It is not generally appropriate where:

• there is a requirement for a detailed analysis of whether or not targets have been met;

• there is a need to take numerical data into account;

• there is a need to determine an overall (total) level of safety risk from a particular activity or project option;

• there is a need to demonstrate the adequacy of any safety risk controls or residual safety risk levels using cost-benefit analysis.

Semi-quantitative

A1.3 Semi-quantitative safety risk analysis methods tend to place likelihood and impact measures into bands or numerical ranges, e.g. likelihood of ‘once every 5–10 years’; impact of ‘1–5 casualties’. As with qualitative analysis, results are usually presented in a likelihood-impact matrix.

A1.4 This type of safety risk analysis is generally used where there is a need for absolute prioritisation of a large number of disparate safety risks, using expert judgments (or even data) expressed in numerical terms. It can also be used to get an indication of overall (total) safety risk from an activity or hazard. It is not generally appropriate for detailed analysis of small numbers of hazards, each of which has a range of possible consequences.

Quantitative

A1.5 Quantitative safety risk analysis produces a single point (absolute) value of safety risk, e.g. safety risk of 2.3KSIs/yr. This is good for:

• detailed analysis of smaller numbers of hazards, each of which has a range of possible consequences;

• taking data into account;

• situations where there is a need to obtain a reasonable estimate of the overall (total) safety risk for an activity or hazard.

A1.6 This type of analysis is not generally appropriate for analysis of large numbers of disparate safety risks.

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Annex A Generic Safety Risk Analysis methods

November 2012


ANNex B AveRAGe RoAD uSeR SAfeTy RISk oN GB RoADS

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Annex B Average Road user Safety Risk on GB Roads

B1.1 The calculations presented here can be used to inform the section on risk tolerance criteria for road users in this standard.

Basis of the Analysis

B1.2 Data used in this analysis was taken from Transport Statistics Great Britain (TSGB), each year new data is added and the calendar year relevant to these calculations was 2011 (TSGB 2011) with the exception of the numbers of fatalities by road type which have been taken as the three-year average 2007-09 from the 2010 TSGB statistics because TSGB 2011 does not appear to report fatality numbers by road type.

B1.3 A critical assumption in the following calculations is that the results apply to road user safety risk on GB roads. Whilst it may be possible to derive the equivalent statistics for roads in England only, this has not been undertaken at this stage.

Basic Data used in the Analysis

B1.4 The tables show extracts from the TSGB data that we have used for the analysis. Those numbers with a letter after them (e.g. ‘(a)’) are referred to in the equations that describe the calculations.

year major roads (billion vehicle kilometres)

motorway A’ roads All major roads

Rural urban All ‘A’ roads

2010 98.2 (a) 139.8 79.7 219.5 317.7

Table B1 – motor vehicle Traffic by Road Class (TSGB 2011, Table TRA0202b)

Billion vehicle kilometres

year Cars and taxis motorcycles Buses and coaches

light vans Goods vehicles

All motor vehicles

2010 392.4 4.7 5.2 67.2 26.4 495.9

% total vehicle kms

79% (b) 1% 1% 14% 5% 100%

Table B2 – Road Traffic by vehicle Type (TSGB 2011, Table TRA0201)

November 2012


Number of Registered vehicles (TSGB 2011, Table RDe0103)

B1.5 42.9 million (c)

Number of full Car Driving licence holders (TSGB 2011, Table NTS0201)

B1.6 35.3 million (d)

2007 2008 2009 3 yr average

Motorways 154 136 114 135 (e)

Urban A roads 469 420 374 421

Rural A roads 1,018 858 790 889

All A roads 1,487 1,278 1,164 1,310

Table B3 – Numbers of fatalities by Road Class (TSGB 2010, Table 8.3)

Calculating Average Road user Safety Risk on GB motorways and ‘A’ Roads

B1.7 There are two sets of calculations to support this:

1. Based on average vehicle kilometres per registered vehicle on motorways and ‘A’ roads.

2. Based on average kilometres per car driving licence on motorways and ‘A’ roads.

motorways Rural ‘A’ urban ‘A’ All ‘A’

Average kilometres per registered vehicle 2,291 (u) 3,261 1,859 5,120

Average fatalities per registered vehicle 3.1E-06 (v) 2.1E-05 9.8E-06 3.1E-05

Average risk of fatality of one in …….. 318,324 (w) 48,238 101,823 32,732

Table B4 – Analysis Per Registered vehicle

motorways Rural ‘A’ urban ‘A’ All ‘A’

Average kilometres per car driving licence 2,202 (x) 3,135 1,787 4,922

Average fatalities per car driving licence 3.0E-06 (y) 2.0E-05 9.4E-06 2.9E-05

Average risk of fatality of one in …….. 331,183 (z) 50,187 105,937 34,054

Table B5 – Analysis Per Car Driving licence

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November 2012


Deriving the Numbers

B1.8 The following equations show how the numbers were derived for motorways. The numbers for ‘A’ roads are derived in a similar manner. Note that the intermediate numbers presented here have been subject to rounding for presentation purposes so may not generate the same final results.

u = a / c = 98.2 × 109/42.9 × 106 = 2,291v = e / c = 135/42.9 × 106 = 3.1×10 6w = 1 / v = 1/3.1 × 10-6 = 318,324

x = (a × b) / d = (98.2 × 109 × 0.79) / 35.3 × 106 = 2,202y = (e × b) / d = (135 × 0.79) / 35.3 × 106 = 3.0×10-6

z = 1 / y = 1/3.0 × 10-6 = 331,183

B1.9 It can be seen that there is very little difference in the results when the analysis is based on either total numbers of registered vehicles or total numbers of car driving licences.

B1.10 For the purposes of establishing relatively simple numbers that are consistent with the analysis above we would propose the following average annual risk of fatality to road users of:

Motorways 1 in 320,000 Urban ‘A’ roads 1 in 100,000 Rural ‘A’ roads 1 in 50,000

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Tolerance Criteria

B1.11 The following schematic shows a possible tolerance criteria framework for road users. There is no statutory basis for road user safety risk upon which we have drawn the criteria that determine the boundaries between the three regions in the framework: unacceptable; tolerable and broadly acceptable. However, the numbers shown are the same as those used in the Tolerability of Risk framework used by the HSE for fatality risk to members of the public.

B1.12 Based on the simple analysis shown above and using the proposed numbers we can map the average annual road user risk of fatality onto it and it can be seen that in all cases the road user annual risk of fatality is firmly in the ‘tolerable’ region defined by the criteria suggested. In this form it should be clear that whilst the annual risk of road user fatality is tolerable on all road types considered here, motorways are the safest roads and are some six times safer than rural ‘A’ roads.

November 2012


B/4


figure B1 – Annual Risk Death to Individual Road users

Discussion

1. The numbers used to generate this analysis are based on the TSGB and so do not represent the SRN exactly.

2. The analysis is based on all road motor vehicles with a refinement for car vehicles only.

3. The analysis is conservative in that it assumes that the population of road users is determined by the number of registered vehicles or car vehicle licences. This is the same as assuming an average vehicle occupancy of 1.0 whereas we know that it varies between 1.2 and 1.5. If occupancy were taken into account this would result in a decrease in the average vehicle kms per road user with an associated reduction in the annual individual risk of fatality.

Broadly acceptable

Unacceptable

Tolerable

Ann

ual r

isk

of d

eath

to in

divi

dual

road

use

r

1 in 10,000

1 in 1,000,000

Rural ‘A’ roads, 1 in 50,000

Urban ‘A’ roads, 1 in 100,000

Motorways, 1 in 320,000

November 2012


ANNex C hAZARD IDeNTIfICATIoN AND RISk ASSeSSmeNT Tool

oveRvIew

C1.1 Risk is the likelihood of potential harm from a hazard being realised. The extent of risk will depend on:

• The likelihood/probability of that harm occurring.

• The potential severity of that harm, i.e. of any resultant injury or adverse health effect.

• The population which might be affected by the hazard, i.e. the number of people who might be exposed.

C1.2 There are various matrix methods of assessing and recording risk. An example is given overleaf.

Step 1: Identification of hazards

C1.3 The first step of methodology involves the identification of potential hazards.

Step 2: Assess the potential severity of harm

C1.4 For each hazard, make an assessment of the potential severity in terms of accident type. The reasoning behind the selection of severity category should be recorded. The severity is normally related to the most typical outcome rather than the worst case outcome. Reported Road Casualties Great Britain gives information at a national scale of severity outcomes, but local data should also be referred to.

Step 3: Assess the likelihood/probability

C1.5 For each hazard make an assessment of the relative probability of an accident occurring, bearing in mind that any accident is rare, random and multi-factored. Probability is a function of exposure in combination with other factors. Exposure can be derived from vehicle flows and compositions. Other factors that can affect likelihood include route type, route function, route location. Using experience and

engineering judgement, consider all the factors that affect probability in each individual case and select a category. The reasoning behind the selection of category should be recorded. The selection should be based on additional accidents possible as a result of the decision, not an expectation of ‘inherent’ underlying accidents for the route or junction type.

Step 4: Assess the Risk Classification for each hazard

C1.6 Use the risk matrix below to assess the risk associated with each hazard. Each hazard may result in significant variations in risk between populations.

Step 5: Assess the overall Risk Classification for the Decision

C1.7 Where different populations are considered separately, the element with the greatest Risk Classification will generally define the overall Risk Classification for the hazard.

C1.8 Where there is more than one hazard, the hazard with the greatest Risk Classification will generally define the overall Risk Classification. However, the person making the assessment needs to exercise engineering judgement and a greater or lesser overall Risk Classification may be selected provided that the reasoning behind this decision is recorded.

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Annex C hazard Identification and Risk Assessment Tool

Novem

ber 2012

volume 0 Section 2

Part 3 GD

04/12example method of hazard Identificationand Risk Assessment

Project/Decision DateDecision Maker/Assessor Contact Details

Ref Hazard Description P S R Response/Control Measure P S R Details123

Risk classification and required action

Probability (P) Severity (S) Risk Classification (R)1 2 3 4 5

minor moderate Serious major Catastrophic Low (1–9) Ensure assumed control measures are maintained and reviewed as necessary

1 Extremely unlikely 1 2 3 4 52 Unlikely 2 4 6 8 10 Medium (10–19) – Additional control measures

needed to reduce risk rating to a level which is equivalent to a test of ‘reasonably required’ for the population concerned.

3 Likely 3 6 9 12 15

4 Extremely Likely 4 8 12 16 20 High (20–25) – Activity not permitted. Hazard to be avoided or risk to be reduced to tolerable5 Almost Certain 5 10 15 20 25

Probability that harm will occur most common potential severity of harm e.g.1 Extremely unlikely Highly improbable, never known

to occur1 Minor harm Minor damage or loss no injury

2 Unlikely Less than 1 per 10 years 2 Moderate harm Slight injury or illness, moderate damage or loss

3 Likely Once every 5–10 years 3 Serious harm Serious injury or illness, substantial damage or loss

4 Extremely likely Once every 1–4 years 4 Major harm Fatal injury, major damage or loss5 Almost certain Once a year 5 Catastrophic harm Multiple fatalities, catastrophic loss

or damage

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Annex C

h

azard Identification and Risk A

ssessment Tool

November 2012


ANNex D CoST BeNefIT Tool

Introduction

D1.1 This tool is an order-of-magnitude technique which provides a simplified methodology to allow decision makers to consider, on comparable terms, the whole life cost savings of non-inclusion of a control measure against the decision maker’s judgement of the maximum likely change in annual traffic accidents arising from the non-inclusion.

method

D1.2 The methodology suggested here only applies to localised changes to the infrastructure that are likely to have no more than a minimal impact on other parts of the network. This method of appraisal focuses on comparing potential increases in the number of accidents (the impacts) against whole life cost savings from the infrastructure (the benefits). The analysis concentrates on safety effects, without considering vehicle, operating and time costs.

D1.3 The methodology for the appraisal has the following steps:

Step 1

D1.4 Obtain the savings in whole life costs (ΔC). These are derived using the following expression:

ΔC = C2 – C1

where C2 represents the whole life cost of the control measure(s), while C1 represents the whole life cost with the control measure(s) incorporated.

Step 2

D1.5 Obtain the typical cost of an average accident (A) for the relevant road type using the information published in the latest version of ‘Reported Road Casualties Great Britain’ which is published annually. It can be found on the Department for Transport’s website. This document gives the average cost of the prevention of accidents for each injury category and different road types. Select the appropriate figure for the particular decision site.

Step 3

D1.6 Obtain the total number of accidents equivalent to the savings in whole life cost (N1)

N1 = ΔC/A

D1.7 To obtain an equivalent annual accident figure (N2), it is suggested that N1 is divided by the time limits of the decision/scheme/project/life.

Step 4

D1.8 Compare the annual number of accidents equivalent to the savings in whole life cost (N2) against the designer’s judgement of the maximum increase in annual accident numbers likely to be caused by the Decision from the design parameters required by the Standard. Note: This can only be an order-of-magnitude assessment not a detailed calculation.

Site evaluation

D1.9 It is stressed that this technique does not provide an ‘answer’; it is simply an aid to designers in balancing cost savings against possible increases in potential accident risk. The technique will be particularly helpful where the ‘accident equivalent’ of the whole life cost saving is substantially larger (perhaps by several orders of magnitude) than any possible risk that could reasonably be expected to result from the decision, or vice versa. But, even where this is the case, the designer should ultimately judge whether the decision is likely to be justified or not.

Scheme evaluation

D1.10 Where the application of the above technique shows that the decision may be associated with accident disbenefit costs and these costs outweigh the potential whole life cost savings, the decision maker should:

• Consider the other non-safety benefits and their relative importance.

• Consider the scale of overall (macro level) predicted scheme safety benefits for all design elements and how these compare with the (micro level) accident disbenefit costs at the geographic location of the site and determine if the overall safety benefits are justified, i.e. macro level benefits minus the sum of individual micro level-related disbenefits.

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Annex D Cost Benefit Tool

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