divine unity & divided self_barnes

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Modem Theology 18:4 October 2002ISSN 0266-7177

DIVINE UNITY AND THEDIVIDED SELF: GREGORY OFNYSSA'S TRINITARIANTHEOLOGY IN ITS

PSYCHOLOGICAL CONTEXT

MICHEL REN BARNES

Introduction

In the last hundred years Gregory of Nyssa's Trinitarian theology has receiveda substantial amount of attention. While those reading Gregory have comefrom a variety of denominational perspectives, in almost all cases Gregory'sTrinitarian theology has been treated as a paradigm for a certain kind ofTrinitarian theology. Indeed, today the most common understanding of thecontent and significance of Gregory's theology is that it is such a paradigm.In the same period of time Gregory's psychology has been studied extensively,primarily from the perspective of determining his philosophical sources and

the degree or character oftheir influence upon his theology. Source questionshave usually revolved around the two options of Platonic or Stoic.1 Suchsource questions have had a mirrored presence in dogmatic histories. To alarge extent these investigations were driven by a desire either to removeGregory's credibility as a Christian theologian by impugning his theology assimply philosophical Hellenism (so from Liberal Christianity), or to defendGregory from such attacks by revealing the fundamentally evangelical characterof that theology (so from traditional Christianity).

The Trinitarian paradigm that Gregory represents has come more and

more to be understood as centered upon the Trinity as Three Persons. At thsame time, the notion of "person" has come more and more to be understood


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476 Michel Ren Barnes

of such moves is that Gregory's Trinitarian theology is re-stated either as TheTrinity as "personalrelationship" or as Locating consciousness(es) in the TrOften there is an assumption that when traditional thought is re-stated from

a modern or contemporary perspective such re-statement renders the thoughtmore complex and sophisticatedwhen, in fact, more often than not suchre-statements simplify the original. In Gregory's case, what has been lost isan awareness of what he is himself most concerned with, or the context inwhich he is developing his theology. Strangely, despite the fact that Gregory'sTrinitarian theology is appropriated because of its perceived psychologicalcontent, the scholarly studies of Gregory's psychology have not been soughtout as resources for elaborating that psychology.3 However (and this isimportant), while a knowledge of Gregory's psychology reveals its rolein his Trinitarian theology, it also makes clear that personal relationship orconsciousness are not the important, substantial psychological concepts forGregory. Gregory's psychology takes its fundamental shape from a concernfor the integrity of the will in its action, and, as a corollary, the character andredress of impediments to the action of the will.4

Most considerations of the psychological content of Gregory's Trinitariantheology begin with his Trinitarian theology and work to some kind of psychology. I will start from Gregory's psychology and work to his Trinitarian

theology. In a general way this movement repeats Gregory's own, for he firstwrites ids major treatises on psychology, and then next writes his majortreatises on the Trinity. The major treatises on psychology from this time areOn the Soul and Resurrection and On the Making ofMankind(one might alinclude Life ofMacrina, which is also written at this time); his major treatiseson the Trinity from this time are the books against Eunomius; also includedis the Catechetical Oration, which dates between 383 and 386. Two of the"short" Trinitarian treatises, On the Trinity and On "Not Three Gods" (the

most elaborate), as well as On the Holy Spirit, are also written in the yearsfrom 380 to 383.5 In short, I intend to look at what traditional psychologicalconcerns are for Gregory, and to see how these concerns go along with hisuse of psychological language in a Trinitarian context.6

The Classical Phenomenology ofthe Will

Gregory's earliest writings are typically described as being "ascetic" ingenre, but it would be just as accurate (and more helpful) to say that Gregory

wrote moral psychologyor even, just "psychology." To speak of thesewritings as ones of"psychology" cues us instantly to the continuities between


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Divine Unity and the Divided Self 47

psychology in Gregory's day: interest in the character or nature of the soulwas consistently governed by moral concerns, and the analysis driven bythese concerns was couched in competing accounts of the nature ofthe soul.

Whether the focus is on the nature of the soul itself, or on the relationship ofthe soul to the body (e.g., the localization of functions or parts of the soulin parts of the body), the interest is still fundamentally moral.10 Insofar as"consciousness" was a topic in classicalancient and Hellenisticpsychology,it was predominantly as a moral phenomenon.11

As a moral phenomenon what was most striking and problematic about"consciousness" was itsfracturedcharacter, the experience of a consciousness divided against itself.12 Moral psychology began with the phenomenon

ofan internal conflict, not simply of"not doing the good that one willed" butofeeling what one did not want to feel. The most famous illustration of theproblem of this internal conflict is the case of Leontius, which Plato repeatsin Republic TV (440a) to deploy his own account of the soul. Briefly, whilewalking the walls of Athens, Leontius found himself attracted to the sight ofthe exposed bodies of those executed for instigating civil war. Leontiusknows that such an attractionindeed, such a pleasureis wrong, but thedesire is strong. The crisis is resolved by another "part" of Leontius arisingwithin himself, virtually to "shout down" or at least to shame his immoraldesire. This story is offered by Plato to support his positing of the conflictedmoral state of humans; countless other examples, similarly motivated, couldbe provided as well from a wide variety of ancient and Hellenistic authors.13

The nature or identity of conflicting motivations could be expressed in avariety of ways, and the competition between these ways meant that anypsychology was inevitably polemical in its form, since an author chose oneapproach rather than another.14 For some, the rational constituted a separatesoul from the irrational. At the other end of the spectrum (with a variety of

opinions in between) was the opinion that such conflicting motivations werenot in themselves outside the realm of reason, but that the overwhelmingmajority of people lacked the knowledge and discipline which could bringthe feelings into proper order. Similarly, there was a variety in the understandings of what kind of existence the sources of these feelings had. Somerelated the different motivations or drives to different essences in the soul,each situated in a different part of the body, such that it was meaningfulto speak of the different "parts" of the soul. Others spoke of a single soul oressence but with different faculties which corresponded to the differentkinds of motivations. Finally, some thought that there was only one faculty,and that all motivations occurred in this one site Even within a specific school


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and a triple soul; but others think that he is from a body and a soul havingthree powers; and again, some say that it is a question ofa body, ofa partialmind, of a soul and of the spirit whichfirmsup thisflabbybody. Still others

compose man ... of a twofold soul and a twofold mind."16

Gregory's Psychology: On the Soul and the Resurrection andOn the Making of Mankind

The first of Gregory's own works on psychology is entitled On the Soul andthe Resurrection (late 379 or 380?). Ever since Aristotle, treatises "on the soul"were standard for treating human psychology, especially for giving accounts

of the structure or organization of the soul. Gregory's On the Souland theResurrection takes the form of a dialogue between himself and his eldersister, Macrina; the conversation is ostensibly the one that occurred betweenthem the night before she died, events that Gregory describes in his Life of

Macrina.17The dominant question of the majority of ie dialogue is the statusof emotions, their "structural" and their moral status. If emotions are judgedto be morally problematic, then the structural question is whether emotionsare an intrinsic or essential feature of our psychic makeup. Macrina's reflec

tion on the issue is shaped by reflection on Gen. 1:25, which leads her to thinkof human nature in terms of being "the image and likeness of God", to askwhether emotions are part of human nature as originally created, and ingeneral to frame her questions in causal and temporal categories (e.g., whatis the cause of emotions, how does this cause relate to other psychic causesin us, and when did this cause become a part ofour soul?). Macrina representsa psychology that externalized emotions, and the "drama" of the dialogueis furnished by Gregory finding such a psychology unsatisfactory.

The main aspects of the psychology ofOn the Soul and the Resurrection canbe illustrated from a close reading of one passage.

Upon this I [Gregory] returned to the definition which she had previouslygiven of the soul, and I said that to my thinking it had not indicateddistinctly enough all the powers of the soul, which are a matter ofobservation. Her definition declares the soul to be an intellectual essence[], which imparts to the organic body the power [] oflife by which the senses operate []. Now the soul is not thusoperative only in our scientific and speculative intellect; it does notproduce results in that world only, or employthe organs of sense onlyfor this their natural work. On the contrary, we observe in our nature


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Divine Unityandthe DividedSelf 479

not of the body is plainly intellectual. Now our definition exhibits thesoul as something intellectual; so that one of two alternatives, bothabsurd, must emerge when we follow out this view to this end; either

anger and desire are both second souls in us, and a plurality of soulsmust take the place of the single soul, or the thinking faculty in us cannot

be regarded as a soul either (if they are not), the intellectual elementadhering equally to all of them and stamping them all as souls, or elseexcluding every one of them equally from the specific qualities of soul.

You are quite justified, she [Macrina] replied, in raising this question,and it has before this been discussed by many elsewhere; namely, what

we are to think of the principle of desire and the principle of anger

within us. Are theycoessential with the soul, inherent in the soul's veryselffrom herfirstorganization, or are they something different, accruingto us afterwards.18

We learn much from this passage. First, we are given a definition of soul, inwhich it is described as intellectual, meaning rational and immaterial, andyet the only functions of the soul specified are those relating to the material

world (in this case, the body and the senses). Any problem of "How doesan immaterial entity affect a material one?" is presumed away, removingpotential difficulties not simply from the realm of psychology but also fromtheology(e.g., the rational, immaterial God acts upon the material world).Next, in this definition the soul is described as a cause: Gregorysays that thesoul imparts to the body the power of life, and we can imagine that any sortofTrinitarian theology which follows psychological modeling would havea precedent for thinking of the divine life in causal categories. Third, thecausality of the soul is described in the technical language of, and . The psychological application of this aetiological analysis has

its beginning in Aristotle's On the Souland thereafter becomes a commonplace: see, e.g., works On the Soulby Tertullian and by Iamblichus (or thediscussion of these by Festugire).19 Fourth, Gregory here uses Platonic tripartite terminology to name the problematic psychological causes or parts,i.e., "desire" and "anger", and (the third is ).Fifth, desire and anger are each described specifically as a "cause" thatproduces multiple effects. Sixth, the existence ofthese causal sites poses theproblem ofwhether there are "multiple souls" because: (a)Howcan anythingof the sort of desire and anger be described as "rational" and thus belongingto a rational soul; and (b) How can anything which is one (e.g., the soul)produce effects which are different in kind? Seventh, the technical or scholastic


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the experience ofa divided will, and that the goal of any such psychology isto give an account of the soul which overcomes that experience of division(in Platonism, chiefly by identifying that psychic unit which is not dividedagainst itself). This last point is different in kind from the previous eight,as it raises something like a hermeneutical question, namely, what are theinherent limitations in applying to a simple God terminology designed toidentify and overcome a structure of psychic division?

For the moment we can summarize the psychological analysis in theselection from On the Soul and the Resurrection as follows: the will is ineffective in its attachment to the good; this lack of effectiveness is due to what isexperienced as a conflict in the will; and this conflict suggests divisions in

the will, i.e., the will is not meaningfullyas a moral agentone with itself.For the future we expect that each of these three points in the analysis willfigure in any psychological description of the Trinity.

The second treatise by Gregory on human psychology and anthropologyis On the Making ofMankind, probably written shortly after On the Soul anthe Resurrection, just as Gregory was beginning the first book of his AgainstEunomius {Contra Eunomium) in 380.20 It is regularly remarked by scholarthat the work is a kind ofHexameron piece, in that it is styled as an exegesisof "six days" material in Genesis; in this case the focus is on Gen. 1:25 (a textalready important in On the Souland the Resurrection). Included in On the

Making ofMankindis a substantial treatment ofthe physiological constitutionof humans, and in general the work is more concerned with the interactionof mind and body than is On the Soul and the Resurrection.21 The two workcan usefully be regarded as complementary accounts of human nature, which,in their two areas of focus reflect the classical ways offramingan account ofwhat is specific to human nature.22

While On the Soul and the Resurrection shows no awareness ofthe Trinitaria

controversies raging around its author, On the Making ofMankindbeginswith an argument against the anti-Nicene Trinitarian theology of Eunomiusand his followers. Gregory's argument for the unity of God is significant forour purposes.

And let no one suppose me to say that the Deity is in touch with existingthings in a manner resembling human operation, by means of different

powers. For it is impossible to conceive in the simplicity of the Godhead

the varied and diverse nature of the apprehensive operation-, not evenin our own case are the faculties which apprehend things numerous,although we are in touch with those things which affect our life in many


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ofall, and uses each appropriately for the object before it, is one and thesame, not changing its nature by the differences ofoperations, how couldany one suspect multiplicity of essence in God on the ground of His

varied powers?23

in short, Ifthe mind does many differentthings, butstillremainsone, then wreason thatGod'sunityisnotfractured byhisdiverse operations. The terminofor the different elements of this analysis is key: there is mind, , whichis described as a power or faculty, ; this faculty produces and monitors many different operations, . Neither the case of a multiplicityof powers nor that ofa multiplicity of operations is evidence of fundamentaldivisionsi.e., different essencesin the existent that acts, whether mindor God.

Two different polemics come together in this passage. The first is thetraditional debate in classical psychology over whether different psychological faculties must be understood as existing in different essences or souls(or parts of the body). Platonists tend to sayyes; Gregorycomes down moreon the side of the Aristotelians, who sayno. The second polemical context isthe engagement with the anti-Nicene theology of Eunomius. One peculiarityof Eunomius' Trinitarian theology is his argument that since each different

operation comes from a separate cause (which Eunomius calls , not),24 the different operations of producing the Son and producingthe Spirit are the effects of different essences: the Father and the Son are thusdifferent in essence.25 Such fine distinctions in aetiologies are of centralimportance to the Trinitarian theologies of the Eunomian controversy andespecially of Gregory ofNyssa.26 In Gregory's writings of substance againstEunomius he will argue that since the Father, Son, and HolySpirit can beshown to possess the same power, they must then have the same nature.This argument turns upon the philosophically developed understanding thatcertain capabilities () are exclusive to specific natures, as burning istofire.27In On the MakingofMankind, however, Gregory is offering a psychological analogyto the Trinity, the first ofa number of analogiespsychologicaland otherwisehe will utilize in his writings.28

Given that the subject of this essayis how traditional psychological concerns go along with Gregory's use of psychological language in a Trinitariancontext, there is one other significant argument in MakingofMankindwhichneeds to be noted, one which again draws upon the resemblance between

the human mind and God. Again working from Gen. 1:25, Gregorysays thatthe origin of our free will lies in our resemblance to the divine.


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Thus there is in us the principle of all excellence, all virtue and wisdom, and every higher thing that we conceive: but pre-eminent amongall is the fact that we are free from necessity, and not in bondage to anynatural power, but have decision in our own power as we please; forvirtue is a voluntary thing, subject to no dominion: that which is theresult of compulsion and force cannot be virtue.29

This needs to be noted. In Gregory's psychology, the attribution ofa capacityto will is not derived from existence as individual(s), or from the existenceof individuals in "relation": the cause of its existence is wholly unrelated tothe reality of individual existence. The existence of a will in an existent isdetermined by its nature; the kindof will an existent possesses is determinedby its specific nature. Animals, for example, have different kinds of willsthan we humans do.30 God has a free will because a free will is oneof the perfections of the divine nature. Free will follows from the kind ofnature, namely, the perfect nature of divinity: the Perfect Life wills perfectly,i.e., it willsfreely.31In short, simply to attribute a will to each of the Threeestablishes nothing about their common nature, for it presumes the answerto the very question at issue, What is the nature of each of the Three! We musknow what kind ofnature the Son and Holy Spirit each have so we can know

what kind of will they have (and vice versa).32

The Significance of

Some time ago J. H. Srawley remarkedapropos of Gregory's CatecheticalOration (or the Great Catechism)that the term "denotes 'a par-ticular center ofbeing'" and has a different meaning than "person."33 Similar

judgments have been offered since then with some regularity, and yet the

habit of translating and treating as "person" has continuedunabated.34 Sometimes even those scholars who demonstrate for us thatGregory does not use as a psychological term, but rather as,e.g., a term ofpredication, themselves continue to treat as thoughGregory meant something in the realm of psychological discourse. We must

be veryclear: Gregory uses to mean an existent with real andseparate existence, and he does not use the term to refer to or to name a sub

ject of cognition or volition.

especially has the sense of "individual" when it is set inrelation to the categories or language of either or . The formulaof distinction "one / three " specifies the lan


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primarily historical, not logical.36 By historical, not logical I mean thatbishops in the fourth century did not come to formulate the linked definitionof the specific terms and because was theuniquely clear and distinct term to use, but because the term was already inplay in the Christian tradition.37

What we can say about Gregory's understanding of is that it isintimately tied to the broader shape ofhis Trinitarian theology and, it should

be noted, to what is new in that theology. In particular, unlike the theologyofNicaea, 325, and that of Athanasius, Cappadocian theology does not use"generation" to ground a doctrine of "common nature" or "one essence" inthe Trinity. Where Athanasius and his contemporaries use the doctrine of

divine generation to prove that the Father and Son have the same nature oressence, Gregoryuses generation as the basis for distinguishing the Persons.This is a major development, and it is only within the context of this new movethat can one understand how and why Gregory uses as he does.

In the late 350s those who supported the council and creed of Nicaea,325, argued that the language of Father and Son referred to a relationshipin which the offspring has the same nature as the source. A parent's child isalways the same nature as the parent. In the case of the Trinity, if the Father

was indeed a father and the Son was indeed a son, then the kind of generation by the Father which produced the Son was that kind in which anature was communicated from source to offspring. Being from the Father'sessence, the Son was of the same essence. In the 350s, then, the theological"work" of Father-Son language was to ground the continuity of essence

between the Two.38 This in itself marks a development from the originaltheology ofNicaea, 325, in which the burden of the argument for continuityof nature is carried directly by essence language, and a reader of thecreed could be left wondering (as some were) if "Father" and "Son" referred

simply to the Incarnation. Such a limitation on what the two titles referredto was not intendedas it would be todayto negate doctrinal assertionsabout pre-Incarnation; rather, in the "logic" of the theology of Nicaea,325, statements about the divinityof the Son were being made through theconcepts and language of, and not through "Father-Son" language.39

What "Father-Son" language was notdoing was grounding any doctrine ofthe separate existences of the Two.40

It is not too much of a clich to say that in the second half of the fourth

century there are thus two arguments to be made among those favoringNicaea: how to argue for the single or common nature in the Trinity, andhow to argue for the separate reality of each of the Three (even if polemically


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Two. The Father-Son relationship is not the basis for his arguing for a common nature or essence between the Two.42 At times Gregory seems to parethat relationship down to its simplest termsnamely, Cause and Causedand he has taken some criticism from moderns for this move. I think thatsuch criticism comes out of the expectation that psychological entities("persons") really are fundamental to Gregory's exposition of the Trinity,when they are not, and in this way modern problems with Gregory's causallanguage are related to the equally modern idea that means"person". One of the most direct statements by Gregory of his argument forthe real existence and identities of the Three occurs at the end of On "NotThree Gods", and this passage can usefully be quoted here.

while we confess the invariablecharacter of the nature,43 we do not denythe difference in respect of cause, and that which is caused, by whichalone we apprehendthatone [person]4* is distinguishedfrom another; by o

belief, that is, that one is the Cause, and another is of the Cause.... sincethe idea ofcause differentiates the Persons of the HolyTrinity, declaringthat one exists without a Cause, and another is of the Cause....45

Bythis succinct argument Gregory articulates his doctrine of the reality ofthe individuality of the Three. The argument is particularly interestingbecause it both receives and transforms previous Nicene theology: on theone hand, the traditional concerns for the uncaused character of the Fatherare clearly represented, but, on the other hand, the unqualified use of"uncaused" no longer functions as the criterion of divinity.46 The relationship of the Son to the Father is still of central importance, but for a differentreason than it was before. Where before in Nicene theology the reality of thetitles "Father" and "Son" guaranteed that there was a natural relationship

(a continuity of nature or unity of essence) between these Two, now thatreality guarantees that there is some difference in existence between the Twoso entitled.47 The character of that difference is expressed in terms of causality, the reality of that difference is expressed by the term .

Given the context for Gregory's concern over unity and individualityinthe Trinity, it is hard to see how asserting the psychological character of theThree or the social reality of the One would advance any argument againsthis opponents. How does arguing that the Three are each psychological

entities make the reality of their individualitymore certain? How, exactly,would a Nicene Trinitarian theology be advanced by the assertion that therei G d lti l ill ? S h ti i f l l t th d g th t


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theologies that denied the individual reality of either of these Two. First,there was Marcellus of Ancyra, who was known for denying the real separate existence of the Word; his more radical protg, Photinus, developedhis theology further to a doctrine of the Word and Spirit as projections of theFather.48 However, the more serious threat faced by Gregory was the anti-Nicene Trinitarian theology of Eunomius of Cyzicus. While no one couldaccuse Eunomius of impugning the reality of the Son,49 the same was not trueof his theology of the Spirit, whom he described as the "activity" of the Son.(The Son, by contrast, was an "essence" in his own right.) The Holy Spiritwas the Son in action; the Spirit's "reality" was the Son. If the confrontationwith Eunomian theology over the nature of the Son required Gregory to

develop his argument for the Father and the Son having the "same nature",then equally Gregory's confrontation with Eunomian theology over the realityof the Holy Spirit required him to develop his argument for the Spirit'sindividual existence. The same is true for Gregory of Nazianzus, who saysin 380:

Now ifHe [the Holy Spirit] were an accident, He would be an activity ofGod, for what else, or of whom else, could He be, for surely this is what

most avoids composition? And if He is an activity, He will be effected,but will not effect and will cease to exist as soon as He has been effected,for this is the nature of an activity. How is it then that He acts and sayssuch and such things, and defines, and is grieved, and is angered, andhas all the qualities which belong clearly to one that moves, and not tomovement?50

This passage from Nazianzus is important for its description of Eunomian"minimalist" pneumatology, and, as well, for the way it clearly illustratesthat what is at stake is not simply the "separate reality" of the Holy Spirit,but the Spirit's status as what we would call a "person": the Holy Spirit"acts and says such and such things, and defines, and is grieved, and isangered...." One other point should not be lost from reading the passage:Nazianzus stumbles in his ability to say what the Holy Spirit is, to say whatkind of existence the Spirit has (i.e., "personal").51 Gregory of Nyssa's writingson the Holy Spirit come after this Oration by Gregory of Nazianzus, and thereis reason to believe that he understood the need for stronger and clearer

language on both the distinct and the personal reality of the Holy Spiritlanguage which made clear that the Spirit like the Son was a psychologica


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Gregory's Psychology ofthe Trinity: The Catechetical Oration

Gregory several times offers descriptions ofthe real existence ofthe Son and

Spirit; the language is largely technical, and the terminology largely overlapsfrom statement to restatement in the work. Gregory's description ofthe Sonand Spirit in the Catechetical Oration brings together assertions grounding thereality ofan individual existent with assertions grounding the psychologicalnature ofthat existent. I give both occasions ofGregory's definitionthe onehe gives ofthe Son and the one he gives ofthe Spiritbut I will focus on thesecond expression.

[The Word is] ... a self-subsisting existent [ ], with a

faculty of moral choice [] ever-working, all-powerful.52

[W]e conceive of the Spirit as an existent Power [ ], withits own existence [| ] ... an individual [], with a faculty of moral choice [], self-moved,active, always choosing what is good, and for its every purpose havinga power [] sufficient to its will [].53

First it will be useful to remember that earlier when Gregory argues in Against

Eunomius, bookI, that Eunomius is actually proposing a fourth member ofthe Trinity, namely, the energy (called "Father") that produces the Son, hesays that Eunomius is making the energy "an existent Power, self-existing,

bringing about expression by a voluntary motion".54 Leaving aside the lastqualification, Gregory here offers a basic definition of what he understandseach of the Three tobe. In the Catechetical Oration,55 Gregory continues to usethe same language, but the "psychological" description of the Individuals isfurther developed. What seems to be consistent throughout all of Gregory'sdefinitions of the kind of existence each of the Three possesses is that

Gregory first lays out the reality of the individual existence,56 and next laysout the psychological content (if any) of that existence.57 The two descriptionsare connected, but they are not identical, and, most importantly, there is nooverarching concept or term which names them both or together: there isthus no concept of "person" as we tend to mean it.

A few words glossing the definition might be helpful. The phrase "existentPower" is Gregory's term for fullyexistent or real ("transcendentally real").The ancient basis for Gregory's language here is Plato's Sophist247D, where

"the markof the real" is that it possesses the power to affect,58

and Gregorycertainly understands "real" to include the power to affect. While hypostaticf G ' f f


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by Epictetus, for whom (and thereafter) it has virtually the sense of "moralpersonality".60 By contrast, Gregory's language of "self-moved, active" isabout as generic a description of something that is alive as is possible: theoriginal and more typical provenance of the two terms is as descriptions ofsoul. Finally, we come to Gregory's description of the moral perfection ofsuch an Individual: the will does not fail to decide for the good, and havingdecided, the will has the integrity and strength to will the good it hasdecided for. In its own way, positing the existence of such an effective, integral will is every bit a statement of divine otherness, God's transcendence,as the attribution of "existent Power" or full and perfect existence.

The Efficacy ofGod's Will

In this final section I will show that while Gregory may indeed be said tohave a psychology of the Individuals of the Trinity, in the end that psychology maps out a radical difference between our self-experience andthe "self-experience" of those Individuals. At the end of my treatment ofOn the Soul and the Resurrection I remarked that the ineffective moralcharacter ofthe will wouldfigurein any psychological description by Gregory

of the Trinity.

61

It goes almost without saying that this ineffective characterof the will is not something that Gregory would attribute to God, but rathersomething which is overcome in God. And indeed Gregory is emphatic, inhis description of the wills of the Son and the Spirit, that they perfectly willthe good and accomplish the good that they will. We must know, Gregorysays, that the Word's will is completely effective, and

that such a will has also capacity to act must be the conclusion of adevout mind. For if you admit not this potency, you prove the reverse to

exist. But no; impotence is quite removed from our conception of Deity.Nothing of incongruity is to be observed in connection with the Divinenature, but it is absolutely necessary to admit that the power of thatword is as great as the purpose, lest mixture, or concurrence, of contradictions be found in an existence that is incomposite, as would be thecase if, in the same purpose, we were to detect both impotence andpower, if, that is, there were power to do one thing, but no power to dosomething else.62

This part of Gregory's description of the psychological integrity of the Wordhas to do with His creative capacity: this is a question of cosmology and


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becomes, for Origen, the basis for describing the Son as being generated bythat very will. God did not intend to generate the Son, and then did generate,using other means (even if those means were never external to Him); theintention itself brings the Son into existence.63

The old context of providence (and what is by now a full doctrine ofcreation ex nihilo) still remains in Gregory's thought, for the act of creationcontinues to be a key subject of theological reflection andfiguressignificantlyin doctrines of the Trinity.64 But the doctrine of divine sufficiency in creatingis not the point here: the point is that the divine will is equal to the good, ormore specifically, being equal to the good is one sign ofa will being divine.65

Thus the passage from Catechetical Oration that I began quoting just above

continues in this way:

Also we must suppose that this will in its power to do all things willhave no tendency to anything that is evil (for impulse towards evil isforeign to the Divine nature), but that whatever is good, this it alsowishes, and, wishing, is able to perform, and, being able, will not fail toperform; but that it will bring all its proposals for good to effectualaccomplishment.

This emphasis on the ability of the Word and the Spirit to successfully willand do the good becomes, in the rest of the CatecheticalOration, the singlemeasure of the potency and efficacy of their divine wills; creative potencyis no longer referred to.66 The integrity of the wills of the Son and Spirit areconspicuous and significant evidence that the Two are divine. If we wonderif, as with us, the Son's will is ineffective in its attachment to the good, we refrom Gregory that "the Word ... works out effectually whatever He wills".If we wonder ifthe Son experiences a conflict in the will, we read that the Wo"works out effectually whatever He wills by having a power concurrentwith His will". If we wonder if the Son's will is not one with itself, we readthat He is "very Power with an impulse to all good".67 The reality ofthe Son'sand Spirit's morally effective willand the significance of that realityisbrought home all the more when we note that Gregory's most extensivestatements to this effect68 occurs not in the section of the Catechetical Orationdevoted to the doctrine of the Trinity, but in the section which deals withthe relative moral (im)perfection of human wills, where evil is described

as originating from the failure of our wills. This brings us to somethingfundamental.i i ff i f i f S S i i i


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mitigates the otherness of a will that is one with itself by his judgment thatsome humans have attained an undivided, unconflicted will. Moses is sucha one, according to Gregory in On the SoulandResurrection,69 and Macrinaportrayed as such a person in the Life ofMacrina.70 As some come more andmore to resemble God, , their wills become more unified, and their co-

willing with the Trinity more extended. In any case, while there may be ahandful of people in the history of the human race who have attained to anundivided, unconflicted will, for the vast majority of us such a psychologicalstate is unknown and unexperienced:71 it is not our experience of our own

will.72 Moreover, even if it is the case that Gregory's ascetic doctrine of the

Christian sage allows the possibility that a human will can be one with itself

and that a few at least can indeed experience the reflected state of psychological integrity that we were originally created with, the psychology of theTrinity contains one other level of psychological unity to which humanscannot attain: the Individuals of the Trinity have wills which are not onlyone with themselves but perfectly one with the will of the other Two.73

Perfect unity among wills, like unity within a will ("freedom"), is true onlyofwills with a divine natureif this were otherwise then Gregory's argument that unity ofoperationsproves unity ofnature would have no standing

This Trinitarian argument depends upon the fundamentals articulated in Onthe MakingofHumanity, namely, that the existence and kind ofwill anyonehas is determined by the kind of nature that that one has.74

For the communityofnature [ ] gives us warrant that thewill of the Father, of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit is one, and thus, ifthe Holy Spirit wills that which seems good to the Son, the communityof will [ ] clearly points to unity ofessence[ ].75

Each of the Three may be said to possess an integrated will, and the facultywhich enacts that will, but we must be careful not to impose the implicationsofa later concept of "person" (e.g., Boethian or Cartesian) upon Gregory andmake an erroneous presupposition. There is nothing in Gregory's writingswhich requires that the wls ofeach ofthe Three be conceived ofas separatewills.76 In a conceptual idiom where the existence of a faculty ofcognitivevolition collapses into the existence of real individualityor vice versa

we can expect that each will exists uniquely and exclusively in a given individual. But this is not Gregory's conceptual idiom. Gregory may link cognitiveli i l i i i i b h ki d f i h diff


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Nazianzus is perhaps even clearer on this point when he comments on theScripture passage, "The Son came down from Heaven, not to do His ownWill, but the Will of Him That sent Him."

But since, as this [Scripture passage] is the language of Him Whoassumed our Nature (for He it was Who came down), and not of theNature which He assumed, we must meet the objection in this way, thatthe passage does not mean that the Son has a special will of His own,besides that of the Father, but that He has not; so that the meaningwould be, "not to do Mine own Will, for there is none of Mine apartfrom, but that which is common to, Me and Thee; for as We have one

Godhead, so We have one Will".

78

Conclusion

Most modern readings of personhood and the Trinity in Gregory serve tocircumscribe the sorts of discussions in which Gregory is taken to engage.Gregory is taken to say something that can be easily assimilated into therange of options available in modern discussions ofthe role of psychologicallanguage in Trinitarian theology. In postmodern terms one might say that

the otherness ofhis language is domesticated by being read as easily assimilatedto the contours of modern psychological and Trinitarian discourse. Myargument here has shown that in order to become good readers of Gregorynot only do we need to notice that he frequently does not advocate thepositions modern have taken him to advocate, but, equally importantly, weneed to understand that the contours of the discussions within which he ishistorically situated are very different from those of modern Trinitariantheologians. His true contribution to the discussion of psychology andTrinitarian theology may thus be to offer a reorientation of what should bediscussed. Reading Gregory does not so much offer us opinions corresponding to an existing range of modern options, as it suggests that the very shapeof what it means to use psychological terms in Trinitarian theology isdifferent from modern expectations.79

NOTES

1 The foundational works on Gregory's sources were (chronologically): Karl Gronau, Poseid-onios und die Jdisch-Christliche Genesisexegese (Berlin: Ruck und Verlag von . G. Teub1914); Harold Cherniss, The Platonism ofGregoryofNyssa (1930; rpt., Berkeley: . Franklin1970); Jean Danilou, Platonisme et thologie mystique; essai sur la doctrine spirituelle deGrgoire de Nysse (Paris: Aubier ditions Montaigne 1944); John Cavarnos "The Psychology


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Divine Unity and the DividedSelf 491

3 Recent significant works on Gregory's psychology include (chronologically): Gerhart B.Ladner, "The Philosophical Anthropology of Saint Gregory of Nyssa", Dumbarton OaksPapers, (1958), pp. 61-94; Ton H. C. Van Eijk, "Marriage and Virginity, Death and

Immortality", in Epektasis, Jacques Fontaine and Charles Kannengiesser, eds (Paris:Beauchesne, 1974), pp. 209-235; Catharine P. Roth, "Platonic and Pauline Elements in theAscent of the Soul in Gregory of Nyssa's Dialogue on the Souland Resurrection", VigChristianae 46 (1992), pp. 20-30; Rowan Williams, "Macrina's Deathbed: Gregory ofNyssaon Mind and Passion", in Lionel Wickham and Caroline Bammel, eds Christian Faith anGreekPhilosophy in Late Antiquity(Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1993), pp. 227-246; and Michel RBarnes, "The Polemical Context and Content ofGregory ofNyssa's Psychology", Journal of

Medieval Philosophy and Theology 4 (1994), pp. 1-24.4 By "psychology" or "psychological" I mean having to do with cognitive volition.5 Two early "short" treatises on the TrinityAdGraeca and Ep. 38are written at the sam

time (379-380) as Gregory is writing On the Soul and Resunection and On the MakingMankind. Strangely, the two Trinitarian treatises, filled as they are with the language of and (respectively), show no signs of the unequivocally psychologicalconcerns Gregory is working through in the other writings. On the SoulandResurrectioshows no sensitivity to trinitarian concerns, while On the MakingofMankindengages witsuch concerns explicitly, and one can observe in On the Making ofMankind Gregory'sexplicit turn to trinitarian polemics while he is engaged primarilywith writing a workonhuman psychology or anthropology. See myarticle, "The Polemical Context and Contentof Gregory ofNyssa's Psychology", pp. 4 and 11.

6 Life ofMosesand the Commentaryon the Song ofSongs are usuallyjudged tobe late wordating from the late 380s or early390s, shortly before Gregory died in 394 (5?).

7 A substantial introduction to Hellenisticpsychology maybe found in Julia Annas, HellenisticPhilosophyofMind(Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1992). The standard studof Hellenistic psychology is Brad Inwood, Ethics and Human Action in Early Stoicis(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985). A useful collection of articles treating different classicalpsychologies is Psychology, Stephen Everson, ed, Companions to Ancient Thought, vol. 2(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). Two other works, different in subjectand scope, are helpful to know: HenryJ. Blumenthal, Plotinus'Psychology: HisDoctrinesthe Embodied Soul (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971); and P. A. Vander Waerdt, "ThPeripatetic Interpretation ofPlato's Tripartite Psychology", GreekRoman Byzantine StudiXXVI (1985), pp. 283-302.

8 "... while it [virginity] is the channel which draws down the Deity to share man's estate[i.e., in the virginalIncarnation], it keeps wings for man's desires toriseto heavenly things,and is a bond of union between the Divine and human, by its mediation bringing intoharmony these existences so widely divided." On Virginity , Nicene and Post NiceneFathers, Second Series, V:345. Hereafter this series is abbreviated as NPNF.

9 See my "'The Burden ofMarriage' and Other Notes on Gregory ofNyssa's On Virginity",Studia Patristica vol. 37, M. F. Wiles and E. J. Yarnold, eds (Leuven: Peters, 2001), pp. 12

10 The physiological way of talking about the soullocating certain parts or functions inspecific organsis supported bynone other than Plato: one of the great ironies is that whilehe may have intended to replace a physical or material account of the soul with an immaterial description, his psychology was instead understood as overlaying an immaterialdescription upon a material.

11 It is important to remember that in classical psychology generally, "consciousness" wasunderstood primarilyas "willing" or "the will in action". To be conscious was to will, one

experienced the fact of selfhood in the act ofwilling (not, aswould later be the case, in anawareness of the fact that Iam willing), and to have a divided consciousness was to have adi id d ill (or to ha e conflicting ills) (The best ill stration of this classical d


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13 I am not here interested in the names or numbers of conflicting drives Plato identifies, butsimply the fact that, for Plato, the basic story of the internal moral life of humans is one ofconflict needing to be resolved.

14 The best (and most influential) illustration of the "polemical" character of Hellenisticpsychology is provided by Galen, especially in his On the Doctrines ofHippocrates andPlatthree tomes, Phillip de Lacy, ed, trans., and comm., Corpus Medicorum Graecorum, vols 4.1,(Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1978,1980,1984).

15 It is important to be clear that not even for Plato was this "fracturedness" simply a matterofa mind-body opposition.

16 The catalogue is from Marius Victorinus, Against Arius 1A, in Theological Treatises on thTrinity, Mary Clark, trans, intro., and comm., Fathers of the Church vol. 69 (Washington,DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1981), p. 190. The very Neoplatonic Victoriusclaims the last psychology for his own understanding; a two-soul (rational, irrational)psychology is also articulated by (the seemingly unschooled) Macrina in On the Soul and the

Resurrection.

17 Scholars have noted the resemblance in genre between Gregory's On the Soul and theResurrection and Plato's dialogue, the Phaedo, which also gives an account of the soul, ledby Socrates who is about to die. In this case, the dialogue form gives emphasis to the moralperspective on the matter at hand. Treatises "on the resurrection" are more specificallyChristian in origin, and by Gregory's time are traditional works of apologetic. Christiansbegan to write treatises on the resurrection as soon as they turned to the task of apology,in order to justify a doctrine which was especially perceived as bizarre and irrational by thesurrounding Pagan culture.

18 The translation is from NPNF V:439, with some modification; for example, the NPNF translate with "consubstantial", which is, I think, misleading: I give "coessential".The Greekis from PG XLVI48C-49B; there is, as yet, no critical edition ofthis work.

19 A. J. Festugire, La rvlation d'Herms Trismgiste, 4 vols (Paris: Socit d'ditions des BeLettres, 1949-1954).

20 See the very useful article by Eugenio Corsini, "La polemica contro Eunomio e la formazione della dottrina sulla creazione in Gregorio di Nisa", Arche Telos: L'anthropologia dOrigene e di Gregorio di Nissa, U. Bianci and H. Crouzel, eds (Milano: Universit Cattolicadel Sacro Curore, 1981), pp. 197-216.

21 Gregory's On the Making ofMankindshould be compared to Philo's work of the same name,as well as to the work by the Cappadocian protg, Nemesius of Emesa, On the Nature of

Mankind.22 It is interesting to note that while modern constructions might expect Gregory to discover

the most fundamental dualism in a "mind-body" tension, in fact the separation is experienced, according to Gregory, in the will.

23 On the Making ofMankindVI.1-2, NPNF V:391-392, emphasis added. In all cases, includingplurals, "essence" is ""; "power" is ""; and "operation" is "".

24 Some scholarship has steadfastly maintained that an "essence-energy" distinction is introduced into late fourth century Greektheology by Basil of Caesarea. This understandingis wrong, since the distinction is used by Eunomius well in advance of Basil. See my"Background and Use ofEunomius' Causal Hierarchy", in Arianism AfterArius: Essaysonthe Developmentofthe Fourth CenturyTrinitarian Conflicts, M. Barnes and D. Williams,(Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1993), pp. 217-236.

25 Eunomius' opinion that each different operation comes from a separate cause really ispeculiar in the era. The much more typical judgment can be found in Origen's observation

that, "By the one heat wax is melted and mud is dried". On FirstPrinciples..11. Notefrom my opening descriptions of On the Soul and the Resurrection and On the MakingofMankind that both works invoke the psychological version of "single cause multiple


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from uspossessing substance [] 'in the beginning', that is in wisdom." Origen,Commentaryon Gospel Accordingto John 1.292, Ronald J. Heine, trans, and comm., Fatherthe Church vol. 80 (Washington, OC, Catholic University of America Press, 1989), p. 94.

36 For a clear description of the traditional understandings of in the first half ofthe fourth century, see Joseph Lienhard, "The 'Arian' Controversy: Some CategoriesReconsidered", TheologicalStudies, XLVm (1987), pp. 415-436.

37 I am, however, willing to say that the terms probablyentered the tradition originally (withOrigen and Tertullian) because of their available connotations. It is important to be clearthat initial (early third century) motivation is not necessarily identical with the later(second-half fourth century) motivation: for the fourth century the drive is tradition andexisting preference(s) ofexpression.

38 This is the case as well among those whowithout supporting Nicaeaopposed thetheology which had developed in opposition to that council (e.g., Basil of Ancyra).

39 The theological priority ofessence language in Nicene theology was the basis ofHarnack'sjudgment of the "fall" from Nicaea, 325, to Constantinople, 381.

40 A hard-edged Nicene like Marcellus of Ancyra could object to any use of "two" whenspeaking of the divinity: all important assertions about God were to be made using onlythe singular.

41 For more on this, see my "The Fourth Centuryas Trinitarian Canon", Theology, Rhetoric anCommunity, Studies in Christian Origins, vol. I, L. Ayres and G. Jones, eds (London & New

York: Routledge, 1997), pp. 47-67.42 I have referred to this argument previously, namely that since the Father, Son, and Holy

Spirit can be shown to possess the same power (), then they must have the samenature. What Gregorydoes is to argue that if we can identify certain attributes as belongingexclusively to the divine, and we can show that the Son and Spirit possess this attribute,then we can conclude that the Son and Spirit must then be divine also.

43 The "invariable character of the nature" is a technicalphrase, used often byBasil ofCaesarea (and, at one point in his career, Athanasius), to saywhat later is said by. Thus Gregory is beginning by saying, "While we confessunity...."

44 Most English translations of this passage (such as that in the NPNF) have the word"person" here, but "person"


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58 The term "power" is not sufficient m itself, for it leaves open a use like Philo's, m which thepowers have only a derivative existence

59 If the Spirit, like the Son, is an "Individual with a faculty of a moral choice", it would bepossible, m logic, to describe something as an "individual with no faculty of a moralchoice"

60 The older Stoic sense of, by contrast, had the term relegated to bemg a landof preparatory choice, a "choice before a choice", For a contextual definition of

which makes clear its importance and technical character, see Brad Inwood, Ethics andHuman Action in EarlyStoicism (Oxford Clarendon Press, 1985), pp 240-242 It is Inwoo

who suggests the translation of as "moral personality" See also Albrecht Dihle,The TheoryofWill in ClassicalAntiquity, pp 60-61, especially his fulsome footnote 49,p 193 Winling, Discours Catechetique, also recognizes the technical sense of Gregory's usof

61 I summarized the psychological phenomenology described m On the SoulandResurrectioas the will is ineffective m its attachment to the good, this lack of effectiveness is due to

what is experienced as a conflict m the will, and this conflict suggests divisions m the will, e, the wl is not meaningfully one with itself

62 Catechetical Oration I, NPNF V 476, Winling, Discours Catechetique, 148 48-6063 See On First Principles 664 See myThe PowerofGod, Chapter Six, "The Pro-Nicene Doctrine of Divine Productivity "65 This emphasis m doctrine undoubtedly comes from more than just fourth-century

Trinitarian theology Maruchaeism, which Gregorycriticizes regularly, may be said to havehad a doctrine of the insufficiency of the will of the Good In any direct confrontationbetween good and evil, evil wins, the good can only run awayto fight (or run away agam)another day

66 As, for example, m CatOr V, "Now m what has been previously said, the Word of God

has been shown not to be this actual utterance ofspeech, or the possession ofsome scienceor art, but to be a power essentially and substantially existing, willingallgood, andbein

possessedofstrength to execute allitswill, and, ofa world that is good, this power appetitand creative of good is the cause " NPNF V478, emphasis added

67 "It was shown that the Word of God is a substantial and individuallyexistent bemg,Himself both God and the Word, Who has embraced m Himself all creative power, orrather Who is verypower with an impulse to allgood, Who worksouteffectually whateverbyhavinga powerconcurrentwith Hiswill, Whose will and workis the life of all things thexist " CatOr Vm,NPNF V484

68 This passage is given m the previous footnote69 In her translation ofOn the Soulandthe Resurrection Catharine Roth inserts a footnote

express her shock at Gregory's description ofMoses' moral perfection See her On the Soulandthe Resurrection (Crestwood, NY St Vladimir's SeminaryPress, 1993), p 52 870 This feature of Gregory's moral psychology is very much m keepmg with the Stoic notion

of the sage, which Gregory otherwise seems to employ (or be influenced by) In the LifeofMacrina Gregory's sister is repeatedly praised as the "true philosopher", and severalscholars have noted the resemblance between Gregory's portrait of Macrina and Stoic

biographies ofsages71 Gregory's doctrine of "universal salvation" should not be taken to mean that m this lifetime

everyone will become pure ofheart and see, m interior vision, God reflected m us Gregorysays clearlythat the degree of our purification m this lifetime affects our knowledge ofGodm the next it determines where we "start from" m our spiritual movement towards God

See On the Premature Death of Infants72 There was m Stoicism a toposon the inability of any two individuals to "do" the same actan act bemg denned from intention to performance so the question is a philosophical issue


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"other". While it is true that Gregory's discursive (or linguistic) sense of God's otherness isgreater, Augustine has a greater existential sense of God's otherness.

73 A passage from Gregory of Nazianzus' Oration XXX.12 well illustrates the reality of thisTrinitarian "common will": "For what, says He, is the Will of My Father? That every

one that believeth on the Son should be saved, and obtain the final Resurrection. Now isthis the Will of the Father, but not of the Son? Or does He preach the Gospel, and receivemen's faith against His will? Who could believe that? ... For I cannot see how that which iscommon to two can be said to belong to one alone, however much I consider it, and I donot think any one else can." NPNF VII:314.

74 One very specialized question thus emerges: in what way does the unity of humanity, bywhich is meant humanity as the "first creation", provide the basis for a unified willingamong what is, after all, "one human"? (I am here invoking Gregory's doctrine of the "two-stage creation" of humanity as given, e.g., in On the Nature of Humanity and CatecheticaOration.)

75 Against Eunomius' Creedof383, NPNF V:132, GNO .403.4-7. Other than in the phrase

"communityofwill", each occurrence of"will" is . Note the parallel use of""for nature and will. (The NPNF gives this workas book ofGregory's Against Eunomius,

but it has been established for some time that this bookis a separate work.)76 Or, alternatelyconceived, we can saythat the individualityof the wills does no "work" in

Gregory's trinitarian theology, except (perhaps) in discussions of the Father's productionof the Son and Spirit. But even there, the conceptual linkbetween divine will and divinenature leaves the individuality ambiguous. See, for example, these two passages from

AgainstEunomius.6 (which the NPNF calls "Book Vm"): "For the goodandthe eternalwiscontemplatedasoperating, indwelling, andco-existingin the eternalNature, not arisinfrom any separate principle, nor capable of being conceived apart from the object of

will..." and "... in the case ofthat Nature which is unspeakable and above all thought, our

apprehension of all comes together simultaneously-of the eternal existence of the Father,and of an act ofwillconcerning the Son, and of the Son Himself...." NPNF V:202-03,emphasis added.

77 On "NotThree Gods", NPNF V:335.78 OrafzonXXX.12,NPNFVH:314.79 I want to acknowledge the contribution ofwhat might be described asconceptual "reverse

lend-lease" from Lewis Ayres, and, similarly, to thankSusan Needham for her editorialworks ofsupererogation.


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