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Safety and security Dis tric t baseline repor t

Burao

Community Security Approach to Peace-building

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Safety and Security District Baseline Report: Burao

Authors

• Yann-Cédric Quero, Criminologist, Senior analyst (Ph.D. candidate, University of Montreal)

• Mireille Widmer, Community safety specialist (UNDP Somalia)

• Marie de Lutz, Analyst (Saferworld)

• Shamsia W. Ramadhan, Researcher (Saferworld)

• Lindsey Peterson, Analyst (UNDP Somalia and OCVP)

Copyright

Published and Copyright ©2011 by the Observatory of Conflict and Violence Prevention

No part of this book may be reproduced or utilised in any form or by any means electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording or by any information storage and retrieved system without permission in writing.

First Edition (August 2011)

First Printing (February 2012)

ISBN: 978-9966-1614-0-6

Inquiries should be addressed to:

Observatory of Conflict and Violence Prevention (OCVP)

Hargeisa, Somaliland

[email protected]

http://www.ocvp.org

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AcknowledgementsThe Somali Observatory of Conflict and Violence Prevention wishes to thank the following organizations (in alphabetical order):

Right from the beginning of this project, the Danish Demining Group participated in consultations on the development of the survey tools, particularly the Crime and Victimization Survey (CVS). In addition, it provided logistical and substantive support for facilitating several rounds of focus group discussions, including training of local non-governmental organization (NGO) partners, and facilitating and recording the proceedings, including the District Safety Plans. It also helped gather additional data for the district mapping in Burao, Las Anod, Bossaso and Galkayo.

The NGOs Haqsoor (Burao), Hornpeace (Las Anod), SORSO (Bossaso) and KAALO (Galkayo) provided local support for the facilitation of the district mapping and sampling, the CVS, and focus group discussions. SOYDEN and the Centre for Peace and Democracy also provided mapping information from four Mogadishu districts and supported the implementation of the CVS.

The International Centre for the Prevention of Crime (Montreal, Canada) provided expert feedback on the development of the CVS.

The Japan Centre for Conflict Prevention took a leading role in the development of the survey tools and methodological guidance, primarily the CVS and the focus group questionnaires. It oversaw the sampling of districts necessary to conduct the CVS, participated in the training of enumerators, set up the database, and oversaw data entry and cleaning.

The Observatory of Conflict and Violence Prevention (OCVP) contributed to the collection of additional information from Burao, Las Anod, Bossaso and Galkayo for the finalization of the Community Safety and Security Analysis.

SAACID contributed useful insights for the development of the CVS.

Saferworld was involved from the beginning in consultations on the development of the various survey tools, particularly the CVS. It took a leading role in collecting and analyzing information from the focus group discussions, including additional desk-based reviews, for the production of the initial Community Safety and Security Analyses for Burao, Las Anod, Bossaso and Galkayo. For Galkayo and Burao, Saferworld also performed a first statistical analysis of the data from the CVS, including additional key informant interviews.

SOCDA took a leading role in the implementation of the CVS. From the beginning of the project, it participated in the development of the CVS, recruited and oversaw the local teams of enumerators, participated in their training and supervision, as well as contributed to data entry and cleaning.

SOYDEN took the initiative of conducting focus group discussions in four Mogadishu districts, providing precious additional qualitative information on patterns of crime and violence in Mogadishu.

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in Somalia, in particular, the Armed Violence Reduction project within the Rule of Law and Security Programme, provided overall substantive, technical and financial support.


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Table of Contents

Executive summary 8

1. Introduction 11

2. Methodology 12

2.1 District mapping 12

2.2 Crime and Victimization Survey 12

2.3. Focus groups discussions 13

2.4. Key informant interviews 13

2.5 Validation process 13

3. Mapping of Burao District 14

3.1. Historical background 14

3.2. Geography and demographics 14

3.3. Resources and the economy 15

3.4. Access to basic services 16

3.5. Governance 16

4. Perceptions of insecurity 18

5. Forms of insecurity and violence 20

5.1. Homicide 20

5.2. Assault or physical attack 20

5.2.1. Victims 21

5.2.2. Perpetrators 21

5.3. Violence against women 22

5.4. Violence against children 23

5.5. Property crime 23

5.6. Conflict dynamics 24

5.7. Attacks by violent Islamic groups 25

6. Drivers and risk factors 26

6.1. Social factors 26

6.2. Economic factors 26

6.3. Political/governance factors 27

6.4. Firearms and security-related factors 27

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7. Perceived performance of justice and security actors 29

7.1. Comparative perspectives 29

7.1.1. General perception 29

7.1.2. Reporting 29

7.2. Police 30

7.2.1. Mapping information 30


7.2.3. Response 32

7.3. Statutory courts 33

7.3.1. Mapping information 33


7.3.3. Response 34

7.4. Elders and religious leaders 34

7.5. Women 35

7.6. Other non-state security providers 35

8. Recommendations 37

8.1. Prevention of muggings/robbery/theft 37

8.2. Prevention of terrorism 38

8.3. Prevention of violence against women 38

8.4. Prevention of land disputes 39

8.5. Prevention of revenge killings 39

8.6. Prevention of clan-based violence 39

8.7. Prevention of property theft 40

8.8. Improvement of institutional arrangements to promote security 40


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Figures

Figure 1: Number of surveys collected, by subdivision (Freq.) 12

Figure 2: Clan of the head of household (Freq.) 15

Figure 3: Residential status (Freq.%) 15

Figure 4: Occupation of the head of household (Freq. %) 15

Figure 5: Level and type of education of the head of household (Freq. %) 16

Figure 6: Assistance sought in case of sexual violence (Freq. %) 16

Figure 7: Change in perceived safety over the last 12 months (Weighted %) 18

Figure 8: Level of perceived safety walking after dark (Weighted %) 18

Figure 9: Activities avoided due to perceived insecurity (Weighted %) 18

Figure 10: Number of witnesses and number of crimes witnessed (Freq.) 19

Figure 11: Number of acts of physical violence witnessed (Freq. %) 19

Figure 12: Location and time of assault or physical attack (Freq. %) 20

Figure 13: Severity of injury from assault (Freq.) 21

Figure 14: Type of weapons used for assault (Freq. %) 21

Figure 15: Victims of assault, by gender and age (Freq.) 21

Figure 16: Victims of assault, by clan (Weighted %) 21

Figure 17: Victims of assault, by residential status (Weighted %) 21

Figure 18: Perpetrators of assault (Freq. %) 22

Figure 19: Type of weapons used for assault, by perpetrator profile (Freq. %) 22

Figure 20: Victims of sexual violence, by age (Freq.) 22

Figure 21: Sexual violence, by time and place (Freq.) 22

Figure 22: Perpetrators of sexual violence (Freq. %) 23

Figure 23: Assault against children (Freq.) 23

Figure 24: Type of property crime (Freq. %) 24

Figure 25: Property crime, by month (Freq. %) 24

Figure 26: Perpetrators of property crime (Freq. %) 24

Figure 27: Frequency of clan disputes (Freq. %) 24

Figure 28: Most common reason for clan disputes (Freq. %) 25

Figure 29: Change in availability of firearms over the last 12 months (Freq. %) 27

Figure 30: Type of firearms owned (Freq. %) 27

Figure 31: Main reason for owning a firearm (Freq. %) 28

Figure 32: Threat from remote controlled or time bombs (Freq. %) 28

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Figure 33: Perceived presence of mines or UXOs (Freq. %) 28

Figure 34: Levels of trust in public authorities who serve as security providers (Weighted %) 29

Figure 35: Reporting rates, assault (Freq. %) 29

Figure 36: Public authority to whom assaults were first reported (Freq.) 29

Figure 37: Reasons for not reporting assault (Weighted %) 30

Figure 38: Reporting rate, sexual violence (Freq. %) 30

Figure 39: Public authority to whom sexual assaults were first reported (Freq.) 30

Figure 40: Reporting rate, property crime (Freq. %) 30

Figure 41: Public authority to whom property crimes were first reported (Freq. %) 30

Figure 42: Level of trust in the police (Weighted %) 31

Figure 43: Level of trust in the police, by residential status (Weighted %) 31

Figure 44: Accessibility of the police (Weighted %) 31

Figure 45: Accessibility of the police, by subdivision (Weighted %) 31

Figure 46: Speed of response of the police (Weighted %) 32

Figure 47: Satisfaction with police response, by type of crime (Freq.) 32

Figure 48: Satisfaction with police response, assault (Weighted %) 32

Figure 49: Reasons of dissatisfaction with police response to assault (Freq.) 32

Figure 50: Satisfaction with police response, property crime (Freq.) 32

Figure 51: Satisfaction with police response, sexual violence (Freq.) 32

Figure 52: Reasons for dissatisfaction with police response to sexual violence (Freq.) 33

Figure 53: Level of trust in the courts (Weighted %) 33

Figure 54: Accessibility of courts (Weighted %) 33

Figure 55: Accessibility of courts, by subdivision (Weighted %) 33

Figure 56: Speed of court response (Weighted %) 34

Figure 57: Reasons for not turning to the courts (Freq. %) 34

Figure 58: Reasons for not turning to the courts, by gender (Weighted %) 34

Figure 59: Trust toward clan/community elders, by gender (Weighted %) 34

Figure 60: Trust toward religious leaders, by gender (Weighted %) 34

Figure 61: Reasons for female non-participation in community and town hall meetings (Freq. %) 35


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Executive summary

Burao District suffered a turbulent history in the 1990s. From 1991 to 1997, violent confrontations erupted first between clan militias fighting for control over the spoils of war – particularly the heavy weaponry left behind by the Somali army after the defeat of Siad Barre – and later between rebellious war veterans and the nascent Somaliland administration, which was struggling to assert its control over the clans. Eventually, inter-clan negotiations from 1997 to 1998 established a stable local governance structure. Remarkably, the administration also succeeded in disarming local militia groups without any external intervention or support.

Today, the district is overwhelmingly perceived as being safe, possibly in reaction and comparison to its violent past. This is in stark contrast to the 82 percent of CVS respondents who declared having witnessed one crime or more in the twelve months preceding the survey.

Violence against women is one of the most prominent types of violence highlighted by focus groups. The CVS recorded 13 instances of sexual violence in the 12 months preceding the survey, all directed against women. Alarmingly, 31 percent of victims were subjected to multiple abuses. Perpetrators were primarily identified as individual criminals. In addition, focus groups also emphasised a serious problem of domestic violence, often linked to qat addiction.

The CVS recorded no instance of homicide, even though focus groups highlighted the problem of revenge killings. Burao is one of the few places where revenge killings were actually considered a problem, rather than a legitimate way of achieving justice.

Nine percent of respondents said they had been assaulted, a fairly high rate considering the overwhelming perception of safety in the district. Assaults happened particularly at night in the street, markets and bush, although some assaults also occurred in the streets and markets in the afternoon. Firearms were almost never used. Assaults were mostly carried out with blunt instruments or bladed weapons, or with no weapons at all. Men were more often victims than women. Surprisingly, permanent residents experienced a higher rate of assault than IDP populations. Perpetrators were generally identified as individual criminals, and to a lesser extent as friends and neighbours. Organized armed groups were almost never responsible.

Children were also victims of assault or sexual violence. Child abuse and neglect – sometimes related to domestic violence, as a child’s fate is often closely related to that of their mother – was noted as a concern in focus group discussions. Allegations of child abductions were also made, but could not be verified by the CVS.

Property crime, in the form of street theft (43%) and home burglaries (40%), happened to 7 percent of respondents (6% of the sample). Again, perpetrators were mainly identified as individual criminals (72%); 15 percent of property crimes were committed by neighbours or acquaintances. Focus group participants highlighted livestock theft in rural areas, normally occurring after periods of droughts. In urban Burao, muggings and burglaries are fairly common.

Community disputes and clan conflicts are, however, rare in Burao District: 79 percent of CVS respondents stated that they never or almost never occur. When they do erupt, respondents find that they are triggered by crime (in 35% of cases), revealing that even conflict dynamics are rooted in criminal behaviour. Other causes of community disputes are family disputes, and disputes over resources. Urban areas are increasingly suffering land disputes because of urbanization and migration.

Focus group discussions also mentioned the threat of violent Islamic groups, which might send recruitment agents and operatives to the district. So far however a watchful population has averted the threat.

Drivers and risk factors were further explored during focus groups. Social factors that were mentioned include the political use and manipulation of clans; tensions between host and IDP communities; and qat abuse. However, focus groups also emphasized the strong social capacities for peace present in Burao, including healthy social norms and a widely-shared will to keep Burao safe. Economic factors contributing to the risk of violence include poverty, unemployment, rural-urban migration, competition for scarce resources (particularly in times of stress-induced vulnerability) and the shortcomings of traditional compensation mechanisms. Few political or governance causes were

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identified save for the unpredictability of the three competing legal systems – statutory, traditional and religious. Finally, security-related causes include the weakness of formal justice and security institutions, and the widespread ownership of firearms.

The latter is worth exploring further. Although firearms are almost never used during criminal acts, 73 percent of CVS respondents believe that firearms are more available than in the past, including 43 percent who say they are far more available. This trend is concerning. The majority of firearms (69%) that are owned appear to be Kalashnikov-type assault rifles. Owners said the rifles are mainly for protection (38% of respondents), or following tradition (34%).

The CVS also asked about the perceived performance of a range of justice and security actors. Overall, most trust is vested in elders, followed by the police and religious leaders with rather neutral ratings, and finally the courts, which are not trusted. Reporting rates are highest for sexual violence (62% of cases disclosed to the public, 23% reported to the police). Encouragingly, 31 percent of cases of sexual violence reported to the CVS resulted in a criminal conviction. Assaults were disclosed to the public in 45 percent of cases, including a mere 6 percent reported to the police. It should be noted, however, that women appear to turn to the police more often than men in the case of assault. Finally, property crime was only disclosed to the public in 30 percent of cases, with 4 percent of cases formally reported to the police.

As noted, women trust the police more than men. Contrary to focus group findings, the CVS reveals that permanent residents trust the police more than IDP populations do. The police are generally considered very accessible, although variations were naturally registered depending on the ward. Police response time is considered average. Respondents who reported cases of assault differed in their level of satisfaction, often saying that the police took no action. For property crime, they said police response was very good. For sexual assault, overall satisfaction is only fair.

Women also show marginally more trust than men in statutory courts, which are considered very accessible but also very slow. The main problems highlighted with the courts are a perception of corruption, as well as their high fees.

Elders, as noted, enjoy very high trust as security providers. Religious leaders enjoy less trust. Nevertheless, focus groups were overwhelmingly positive about these two groups. Women are generally allowed to participate in town hall meetings, although a large share of CVS respondents believed they should focus on family issues.

Finally, other security providers mentioned include civilian security committees and neighbourhood watches, a community-based policing forum, and private guards.

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1. Introduction

Evidence-based programming and policy development in the fields of community security, armed violence reduction and peace-building require a comprehensive and accurate prior analysis of insecurity. Measuring the outcome and impact of interventions to deal with insecurity is equally important, both to advance collective understanding of what works and what does not, and to hold all those involved accountable. The Somali Community Safety Framework (SCSF) is a loose consortium of organizations and local and international, non-governmental and United Nations agencies, which collectively aims at building Somali capacity to mitigate violence and insecurity in a sustainable manner1. Committed to evidence-based programming, participants in the SCSF identified the collection and analysis of solid data on safety as a priority.

The value added of these data would be greatly increased if they contributed to the adoption of common indicators and methodologies feeding into a common information pool. A broad consultation process was therefore undertaken in 2009–2010 under the umbrella of the SCSF to develop a Crime and Victimization Survey (CVS) that would be recognized by SCSF participants.

Somali ownership of the data and survey methodologies must be ensured. Until recently, the little data and knowledge available on causes and manifestations of insecurity – whether related to crime or conflict – generally remained within the organization that collected it, and were often lost when projects ended or key staff moved on. To contribute to local ownership, the Somali Observatory of Conflict and Violence Prevention (OCVP) is undertaking this task on behalf of participants in the SCSF, to ensure that a non-partisan academic institution will be the custodian of data and information on crime and conflict in the Somali regions. By collecting, storing and sharing the knowledge acquired, the OCVP can help ensure that interventions are guided by reliable evidence, and that their impact is measured and evaluated. It will also centralize data collection tools and methodologies, and encourage their widespread use to improve the comparability of the data collected.

UNDP Somalia is a founding member of the Somali OCVP. Through its Rule of Law and Security Programme, it supported the development and implementation of the CVS in selected Somali districts between 2009 and 2010. Specifically, this household survey was rolled out in the districts of Burao, Bossaso, Galkayo and Las Anod, as well as six Mogadishu districts (Waberi, Shangani, Hamar Weyne, Hamar Jabjab, Dharkenley and Wadajir). Locations were selected in order to cover some of the

major population centres so that more people might benefit from the lessons drawn from the survey while at the same time illustrating a variety of security challenges. In particular, the locations surveyed vary between conflict, post-conflict or crime-related. The entire raw data, as well as the data collection tools and methodologies, form the initial endowment of the OCVP and are publicly available for further research.

Based on these data, UNDP Somalia then supported the drafting, on behalf of the OCVP, of five Safety and Security District Baseline Reports, which will also be translated into Somali. These analytical reports are compiled using a selection of data from the CVS, focus group results, mapping information, key informant interviews and a number of secondary sources. Results are validated by the community and authorities prior to publication. The reports will be supplemented every year by brief updates of trends based on focus group discussions and possibly new qualitative and quantitative data.

The picture of safety and security that emerged from these baseline reports then guided the elaboration of appropriate responses by communities, local and state governments. These recommendations were elaborated by the District Safety Committees (DSCs), which were established under the authority of the District Council in each location, composed of representatives of youth, women, the elders and religious leaders, local government and police/justice officials. The suggested interventions are described in District Safety Plans, which will be integrated into the District Development Framework and as part of annual planning and budgeting cycles. Local and international agencies will benefit from these tools to select, design and measure the impact of ensuing interventions on the basis of this combination of data and needs assessment.

This Safety and Security District Baseline Report is divided into eight sections. Following this introduction, the research methodology is described in section 2. Section 3 provides a general profile (mapping) of Burao District, including important historical background notes. Section 4 looks at perceptions of insecurity, and section 5 presents the main security concerns noted in Burao. The drivers and risk factors underlying these problems are then explored in section 6. Section 7 takes a look at the perceived performance of justice and security actors, including the police, courts, elders, religious leaders, women, and other non-state security providers. Finally, section 8 provides recommendations extracted from the District Safety Plan developed in response to the analysis.

1 See www.somalipeacebuilding.org for more information.


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2. Methodology

This Safety and Security District Baseline Report for Burao was prepared by compiling data and information gathered through four research tools and methodologies: a district mapping, a crime and victimization survey, focus group discussions, and key informant interviews. It was complemented by further desk reviews. More information on the development, content and use of the various tools is available in the Monitoring and Assessment Toolkit2.

2.1 District mapping

The first tool used to produce this District Baseline Report is a mapping of existing formal and informal resources in the community to cope with insecurity. The mapping template3 seeks to capture initial indications on the composition of the target community, its demographic profile and degree of social cohesion (e.g. proportion of IDPs, clan profile). Historical background information is included to reveal traumatic events that may underpin the vulnerability of the community, and past peace initiatives, which may provide important lessons learned and influence perceptions regarding any new peace initiative. Existing institutions of justice, security and healthcare have been surveyed to map out the state’s capacity to enforce peace, justice and security, and provide assistance to victims of violence. Finally, capacities for peace such as civil society organizations, initiatives or mechanisms – for example, conflict management mechanisms or neighbourhood watch schemes–have been mapped out because, under certain conditions, they could be incorporated into programmes. Knowing how information is accessed/circulated in the community can also be useful for future awareness-raising activities.

In Burao, a first mapping was carried out in October 2009 by a UNDP team, followed by additional information collected in December 2009 by local NGO partner Haqsoor. In February 2011, the mapping information was updated with the support of the Danish Demining Group and the District Safety Committee.

2.2 Crime and Victimization Survey

The second tool used was a CVS questionnaire that was developed in 20094. This survey sought to provide the quantitative information necessary to establish an accurate picture of crime and victimization in target districts, and to measure the impact of interventions. Enumerators in Burao were hired by NGO partner SOCDA and trained in mid-December 2009 with the support of the Japan Centre for Conflict Prevention (JCCP).

The information gathered during the mapping exercise was used to determine possible district subdivisions where the CVS could be conducted. Subdivisions were chosen after meeting with the local administration, partner NGOs or community elders to obtain a profile for drawing maps, creating borders and estimating the number of households. This information was used to create the subdivisions of the districts. Researchers then identified starting points, which were followed by randomly sampling 20 households from each localised area.

Subdivisions covered by the CVS in Burao town included: Mohamed Ali 3 and 5; Sheikh Bashir; Farah Omar 11; and Lixle 4, 6 and 7. Rural villages included Jameecaadka, Gubataxil, Bisiqa, Waraabeye, Adow Yurara, Isku Dhoon, Balihiile, Labi-Guun, Dakhanyaro, Beer, Unuunley and Godorka. In each urban subdivision, 80 surveys were collected. 20 surveys were collected in each rural village. A total of 560 (70.0% of the sample) surveys were collected in Burao town, and 240 (30.0% of the sample) in rural villages (Figure 1).

Figure 1: Number of surveys collected, by subdivision

(Freq.)

Ref. BC3, n=8005

Data collection began on 12 December 2009. Two questions were modified to correct errors in skipping patterns on the first day of data collection. The remaining surveys were carried out from 17 December 2009 to 11 January 2010. The household survey collected information from 800 households in Burao District (randomized sampling). The total number of households in the entire district of Burao was estimated by SOCDA in preparation for data collection at 110,000 in Burao town and 70,000 in surrounding areas of the district, resulting in a sample size of 0.51 percent of Burao town and 0.34 percent in surrounding villages and rural areas. Based on the CVS, each household is composed of an average of 7.8 people (4.1 male and 3.7 female). The average number of youth below 15 per household is 3.4 (1.8 male, 1.5 female). It is, therefore, possible that an estimated 5,700 people have been covered by the CVS.

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2.3 Focus groups discussions

The third tool used was focus group discussions. These helped capture perceptions around the nature of insecurity in the district, its causes and risk factors, victims and perpetrators, and capacities for peace.7 Six focus groups were convened in the first week of June 2010, separately with women, youth, internally displaced persons (IDPs), elders and religious leaders, local authorities (district authorities, police and justice officials), and residents from rural areas. Local NGO partner Haqsoor facilitated the focus groups, with technical support from UNDP, Saferworld and the Danish Demining Group. The focus groups began with participants being asked to define safety, security and violence and then to speak about the levels and changes in security over the preceding twelve months. Participants were asked to compile a thorough list of all major types of violence experienced affecting the area and to identify their main concerns. They were then led through a process of describing the causes, locations, times or seasons, victims, perpetrators, means or weapons and levels of organization for each priority type of violence. Finally, they were asked to identify the individuals or institutions that they trusted to either prevent or respond to violence. Between 15 and 20 people attended each focus group. They were selected by the local NGO partner, and efforts were made to ensure that both men and women, young and adult and residents from different areas were represented.2.4 Key informant interviews

During the analysis process, Saferworld interviewed community-based organizations, local and international NGOs operating in Burao, public institutions and local authorities to better understand Burao and contextualize results. Interviews were carried out between 21 and 27 September 2010 in Burao. Each lasted between 45 minutes and two hours. 34 individuals were interviewed in 13 separate interviews. At the request of interviewees, names of individuals and organizations have generally been omitted.

2.4. Key informant interviews

During the analysis process, Saferworld interviewed community-based organizations, local and international NGOs operating in Burao, public institutions and local authorities to better understand Burao and contextualize results. Interviews were carried out between 21 and 27 September 2010 in Burao. Each lasted between 45 minutes and two hours. 34 individuals were interviewed in 13 separate interviews. At the request of interviewees, names of individuals and organizations have generally been omitted.

2.5 Validation process

Results from the focus group discussions were compiled and validated by the community in a workshop that was held in July 2010 with around 70 individuals, mainly from the focus groups. After further desk-based reviews, a draft Community Safety and Security Analysis was compiled by Saferworld in September 2010. After further editing, this was presented to the Burao District Safety Committee by UNDP and staff from the Observatory for Conflict and Violence Prevention (OCVP) in November 2010. During this time some additional qualitative information was received. Quantitative data from the CVS for Burao was collated and presented to the community by the OCVP on 20 April 2011. 70 members of the Burao community attended the presentation, including the regional Governor, the Mayor, other government representatives, and civil society (women, youth, elders, religious leaders, business traders and IDPs). The draft District Baseline Report for Burao was then finalized and presented to the Somaliland Ministry of Interior for final comments and endorsement in June 2011.

2 The Monitoring and Assessment Toolkit is available at http://www.somalipeacebuilding.org/pb-resources/maa.html

3 See Annex A of the Monitoring and Assessment Toolkit.

4 See Annex B of the Monitoring and Assessment Toolkit

5 Note: each caption is followed by the reference of the question in the Crime and Victimization Survey, and the number of respondents to the question (n). Where this number is below 30, trends cannot be inferred reliably, and the data is only presented for illustration purposes.

6 AR-13 and WV-1


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3. Mapping of Burao District

3.1. Historical background

Most people living in Somaliland, whether the region’s original inhabitants or internally displaced persons fleeing violence, are all too familiar with insecurity. As the perceived opponents of Siad Barre’s favoured clan group, Somaliland’s Isaq clan members were severely repressed by his regime.8 This sparked a resistance movement known as the Somali National Movement (SNM), which fought the central government from 1982 onwards. During a bitter struggle that killed roughly 60,000 people and displaced 400,000 more, much of the northwest’s infrastructure and residential areas were destroyed, including most of Burao.

Since 1991, Burao District has suffered many outbreaks of violence.9 In February 1992, militias from the two major clan groups in Burao (the Habar Jeclo and Habar Yonis) fought a violent power struggle that lasted one week, colloquially known as the Habar-Habar war. The struggle was over control of the heavy weapons left behind by the defeated military regime in February 1991. It was also sparked by clan jockeying to succeed the first Somaliland president, whose mandate was due to expire in May 1992. In May, in the difficult context of the succession for the presidency, another conflict erupted in Berbera over control of the seaport. Fighting broke out in the Sahil region, but spread to the neighbouring Togdheer region and its capital, Burao. A peace conference was eventually convened in October 1992 in Berbera. This was followed by another conference in Sheikh. State building efforts continued with the Borama conference, in early 1993, marking the transfer of power from the SNM to a civilian administration under Mohamed Ibrahim Egal.

Instability continued in Burao, however, as rebellious war veterans confronted the new administration. In July 1993, a clan conference in Burao announced that the Habar Yonis would no longer cooperate with the administration of President Egal. Tensions mounted until violence broke out in Burao in March 1995. From 1995 to 1997, the Habar Yonis and Government of Somaliland fought what is known as the Mashruuc war. Though this infighting never seriously threatened the Somaliland administration, it displaced an entire population internally and to neighbouring Ethiopia. It was not until July 1996 that a peace deal known as the Beer reconciliation was brokered and accepted. The conflict was fully settled at a conference in Hargeisa in early 1997.

Inter-clan negotiations between 1997 and 1998 demonstrated the conflicting clans’ ability to reach a consensus that facilitated the return of the displaced persons to Burao. A five-month National Peace Conference held in Hargeisa between October 1996 and February 1997 finally resolved the conflict, allowing the Somaliland administration to establish a stable governance structure in Burao. Active militia were assimilated into the national army or demobilized.

Remarkably, this disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process was achieved through the community and clan structure, without any external intervention or support.

3.2. Geography and demographics

Burao is today Somaliland’s second largest city. It gives its name to the district and also serves as the capital of Somaliland’s central Togdheer region. The city of Burao is well located. Close to Djibouti, Ethiopia and the northern port of Berbera, it also benefits from a reliable groundwater supply. The semi-arid climate is warm and dry all year round with limited rainfall between December and May.

Map 1: Map of Somalia

Source: United Nations Administrative Map, 2011

In the last decade, the area experienced rapid rural-urban migration as recurrent drought forced pastoralists to abandon livestock rearing. Population estimates for the district vary widely, but it could hold up to 400,000 people.10

Somaliland is dominated by the Isaq clan, but is also home to the Gadabursi Dir, Issa, Gaooye and Harti Darod (particularly the Warsangeli and Dhulbahante). The two major sub-clans in Burao District are the Habar Jeclo and Habar Yonis (Isaq). Minority clans in Togdheer region

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include the Warsangeli and Dhulbahante, Issa Muse, Arab and Gaboye (Madhiban).

In the CVS sample, the vast majority of households surveyed identified themselves as members of the Isaq clan (91.6%). Percentages for other clans were: Darod (3.3%), Digil-Mirifle (1.6%) and Hawiye (0.7%). The remaining clans (2.3%) were largely identified as Gabooye and its sub-clans.

The lack of representation of the other clans could possibly be explained by the location of the subdivisons surveyed (Figure 2).

Figure 2: Clan of the head of household (Freq.)

Ref. RP9, n=736

The district is also inhabited by internally displaced persons and refugees fleeing violent conflict in neighbouring regions. 95.3 percent of the CVS sample identified as permanent residents; the other categories which do not allow significant statistical analysis were IDPs (3.8%), and refugees (0.5%) (Figure 3)

Figure 3: Residential status (Freq.%)

Ref. RP10, n=730

The three IDP camps in Burao (the Koosar, Aadan Saleban and Ali Husein camps) house around 26,000 people.11 Migration has increased the population, land pressure and unemployment in Burao. This trend is likely to continue as pastoralists abandon traditional economic activity to search for better livelihoods. Rapid urbanization coupled by weak administration explains why land disputes have increased in urban areas where private ownership is a relatively new phenomenon. These disputes are likely to continue, souring relations between groups unless legal and land management systems are strengthened.

3.3. Resources and the economy

The private sector accounts for the bulk of economic activity in Burao. The district relies heavily on the livestock industry. Pastoralists consume a small portion of what they produce and trade the rest in the Burao-Yiroowe market. Camels, sheep and goats are exported from there to the Middle East, particularly to Dubai in the United Arab Emirates. The local livestock market, popularly known as Seylad is the convergence point for rural producers, urban consumers and commercial exporters. On any given day at Burao-Yiroowe, some 4,000 heads of sheep and goats may be sold for export, but sales can rise as high as 30,000.12 In addition to livestock exports, other economic activities in the district include light industries (e.g. detergent factories), construction companies, hotels, water bottling and telecommunication enterprises. At the informal level, a large segment of the population runs shops selling qat among other products.

The World Bank estimated per capita income for the Togdheer region of US$ 301-350 in 2007. 13 Along with Hargeisa and Awdal, this places Togdheer at the top of the income table for Somaliland. Burao’s central location has likely contributed to its economic revival following its destruction during the Somali civil war. Goods travelling to the south, central and eastern parts of Somalia all leave from the city’s outskirts. Rural merchants also daily sell their produce, which attracts business.

But many of Burao’s residents must also contend with new socio-economic challenges, including changing patterns of land use and ownership (communal to individual as a result of urbanization), and the search for livelihoods other than livestock. The most obvious alternatives, entrepreneurship or full-time employment, are not possible for those without the requisite skills, connections or start-up capital. Unemployment is, consequently, high in Burao.

In the survey, 36.1 percent of the heads of respondent households are unemployed. 24.0 percent work as labourers, 15.9 percent pastoralists and 12.5 percent as entrepreneurs or traders (Figure 4).

Figure 4: Occupation of the head of household (Freq. %)

Ref. RP11, n=724


16

3.4. Access to basic services

In comparative terms, Somaliland scores poorly on most development indicators. For example, under-five and maternal mortality are at 116 and 104 per 1,000 births respectively; access to education is very limited (a gross enrolment rate of 48 percent for boys and 32 percent for girls).14 These figures reflect poor state service delivery in most sectors, especially health and education. There is less than one teacher on average for every 100 schoolchildren and only 32 doctors for the entire population. Fortunately a vibrant civil society has emerged alongside the private sector to provide many social services.

Public administration is decentralized in Somaliland. Under this arrangement, Burao as one of 42 districts across six larger administrative regions15, has responsibility for service delivery. Unfortunately, decentralization has yet to improve service delivery across Somaliland as local administrations grapple with a low skill-base and limited ability to collect revenue.16

According to the Ministry of Education, as of February 2011 Burao counted 15,800 pupils enrolled in primary schools, 4,000 enrolled in secondary schools, and 3570 in private schools.17

The CVS sheds some further light on access to education. As shown in Figure 5, almost half of respondents (46.1%) declared that the head of household was neither formally nor informally educated. Out of the 22.1 percent of respondents informally educated, 74.8 percent had taken either life-skills training or adult literacy classes. The remaining quarter (25.2%) had attended a religious school. Of the 31.8 percent of respondents formally educated, 21.6 percent completed university or college, almost half completed either secondary or high school education, 28.6 percent completed intermediate, and 4.9 percent completed primary education.

Figure 5: Level and type of education of the head of

household (Freq. %)

Ref. RP16, n= 245

Burao’s medical facilities include 11 clinics and two hospitals – the General hospital and the Manhal hospital, which together provide 150 beds. The only information the CVS provided concerning access to medical care

relates to cases of sexual violence. Of the 12 cases of sexual violence reported in the CVS, seven (53.5%) of the victims said they received medical assistance from a hospital, local clinic, or doctor. None of the victims received psychological help (Figure 6).

Figure 6: Assistance sought in case of sexual violence

(Freq. %)

Ref. SV8 (n=12), SV9 (n=12)

3.5. Governance

Somaliland runs a hybrid governance system that combines elements of western-style liberal democracies with traditional Somali institutions. This arrangement grew out of a series of peace conferences convened between the area’s clan groups in the critical period following the Somalia civil war (1991-1993). Key elements include an executive branch of government in which a president is elected by popular vote and presides over a council of ministers; an independent judiciary; and a bicameral legislature in which the upper chamber (Guurti)18 is occupied proportionally by traditional elders from different clan groups. The Guurti, an institution that predates the Republic of Somaliland (declared in 1991), acts both as a check on the lower chamber and a clan-inclusive (if seriously gender imbalanced) conflict resolution mechanism. Government positions at all levels are subject to regular (if at times delayed) elections contested by a limited number of parties in line with restrictions imposed by the Constitution.

The central government representatives at the local level are the Regional Governor and his deputy. At the district level, District Councils are elected every five years, and headed by a Mayor. Burao District is typical in having a largely male local authority that is under-represented by women. However, the local authority works with different actors, such as members of civil society, police forces, armed forces, clan elders, religious leaders, international agencies, businesses and civil society organizations. For example, a development planning consortium is comprised of district councillors, municipality personnel, representatives of local non-governmental organizations, community based organizations and the private sector.19

17

According to the District Safety Committee, Burao town is further divided into four wards – Mohamed Cali, Farah Omar, Lixliye and Sh. Basheer – which each count a “village” committee of seven members. These committees work on security, sanitation, health and education.20

7 See Annex C of the Monitoring and Assessment Toolkit

8 The conflict between the inhabitants of northwest Somalia and the Siad Barre regime had clan dimensions. Barre, who had come to rely on a narrow power base centred on the Dhulbahante clan group, organized a coalition of Dhulbahante, Warsangeli and Ogadeni refugee militias to counter the Isaq-led SNM. See for example, Becoming Somaliland, Progressio, Bradbury, M., 2008, p. 63.

9 Much of the information that follows is extracted from ALI, Mohamoud Omer et al. (2011), Peace in Somaliland: An Indigenous Approach to State-Building, Academy for Peace and Development, Hargeisa, 2009

10 The local government reports a number of 36,226 households in the district. Burao District Mapping, February 2011

11 Burao District Mapping, Haqsoor, 2010

12 Somaliland Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture, 2009 Annual Report. This number excludes sales for local consumption known as daabaaxaad (for slaughter).

13 Ibid. p. 9.

14 Somali Reconstruction and Development Programme, Deepening Peace and Reducing Poverty, Volume IV: Somaliland, UN/World Bank, 2007, UN/World Bank, p. 6-7.

15 These are: Hargeisa, Togdheer, Sanaag, Awdal, Sool and Sahil.

16 UN/World Bank, op. cit., p. 10.

17 Burao District Mapping, February 2011

18 The Guurti predates the establishment of the Republic of Somaliland and is a traditional institution.

19 Burao District Mapping, Haqsoor, 2010. See section 7 for more information about the police and courts.

20 Interview with the Burao District Safety Committee, February 2011


18

4. Perceptions of insecurity

Feelings or perceptions of insecurity generally determine how people regulate their behaviour. They are, therefore, the main link between security and development. Burao focus group participants defined safety as the ability to prevent or address problems before they have a negative impact or harm an individual or community. Security was defined as the absence of internal or external threats of attack, the absence of fear and freedom of movement. Participants generally understood violence as the occurrence of negative/violent acts and, as part of this, the failure to prevent them. Examples of violence given by participants included physical confrontations such as attacks and fighting between individuals.

Focus group participants were overwhelmingly positive about recent trends towards safety in the area. The indicators they selected to underscore the point included: the construction of a new university; public-police cooperation; the absence of political violence during election campaigning; the hiring of private security guards; and the creation of village security committees. This is confirmed by CVS data (Figure 7). It could be, however, that the district’s violent history likely influenced the respondents’ answer to this question. Indeed, in the focus group discussions held to explore contemporary patterns of violence and insecurity, the history of insecurity was clearly a factor. The three outbreaks of violence identified above were used as a reference point, including when discussing definitions for terms such as safety, security and violence.

Figure 7: Change in perceived safety over the last 12

months (Weighted %)

Ref. PV1xRP1, n=676

There was also a nearly unanimous declaration of 97.0 percent of respondents who declared the streets are very safe and an additional 2.5 percent who declare the streets rather safe after dark (Figure 8).

Figure 8: Level of perceived safety walking after dark

(Weighted %)

Ref. PV2xRP1, n=733

The vast majority of respondent households said feelings of insecurity were not strong enough to make them avoid most daily activities. The only activity respondents were more ambivalent about due to insecurity was leaving livestock and property outside. Nearly half of respondents agreed they would avoid doing this. (Figure 9)

Figure 9: Activities avoided due to perceived insecurity

(Weighted %)

Ref. PV3 (n=436), PV4 (n=435), PV5 (n=433), PV6 (n=435) and PV7

(n=432)

Notably, 81.6 percent of CVS respondents said they had witnessed a crime within the past 12 months (Figure 10). This would appear to contradict the general perception of safety recorded in Burao.

19

Figure 10: Number of witnesses and number of crimes

witnessed (Freq.)

Ref. WV1 (n=711), WV2 (n=71), WV3 (n=93)

Among witnesses of assault or physical violence, 30.4 percent witnessed one incident; 26.1 percent witnessed two; 30.4 percent witnessed three; and 13.1 percent witnessed four or more. Also notable, there were two respondents who witnessed ten cases of physical violence over the twelve months preceding the survey (Figure 11).

Figure 11: Number of acts of physical violence witnessed

(Freq. %)

Ref. WV3 (n= 92)


20

5. Forms of insecurity and violence

A criminological typology of violence includes standard crimes such as homicide, assault, sexual violence, or property crime. However, in the Somali context, some individual crimes are not viewed as distinct events, but rather as components of broader conflict dynamics and inter-group violence. The table below shows the priority given by each focus group to different forms of violence:

Table 1: Prioritisation of different types of violence by focus groups

Women Youth Elders Religious groups IDPs Rural areas Local

authorities

1 Domestic violence

Clan based violence

Domestic violence

Land disputes Land disputes Revenge killings

Domestic violence

2 Rape Muggings/ theft

Mugging/ robbery

Violence against women

Rape Livestock theft Rape

3 Muggings/ robbery

Violence against women

Land disputes Alcohol and qat consumption

Muggings/ robbery

4 Land disputes Child neglect Female rape Female rape Land disputes

5 Revenge Killings

Unemployed young criminals

Revenge Killings

5.1. Homicide

Homicide was investigated as a component or result of assault (see section 5.2). The CVS did not record any homicide in Burao in the twelve months under study in the households surveyed.

According to focus group participants, revenge killings often occur within and across clans because of biased support for particular individuals from clan members, which quickly escalate disputes.21 The main trigger for killings is apparently disputes over compensation payments in which a wronged party does not receive timely or adequate payment. Under xeer law, perpetrators of different crimes (e.g. killings, maiming, etc.) are directed to compensate a victim’s family with an agreed number of livestock. According to focus group participants, most of these cases relate to land or property disputes. Whatever the issue, however, the cost of such reparations is borne communally by the perpetrator’s kin, and the community agrees on how much each member should raise.

Where delays or defaults on compensation agreements occur, the clan will readily take up the case and mobilize against the other parties.

5.2. Assault or physical attack

According to the CVS, 65 households (9.2% of respondent households) reported that a household member was the victim of an assault or attack over the year prior to the survey. Out of these, 40 said they were victimised once;

15 twice; and 4 three times. No single household said it had suffered more than three physical assaults.

The largest proportion of physical assaults happen at night in the street (19.7%). The second most high risk area was the market place at night (16.4%). Fields, bush or forest experienced 8.2 percent of assaults at night. Overall homes appear more secure, nevertheless with 6.6 percent of assault at night and 6.6 percent of assault in the afternoon (Figure 12).

Figure 12: Location and time of assault or physical attack

(Freq. %)

Ref. AA5xAA4 (n=61)

The 65 total declared incidents of assault or attacks injured 67 victims. Over half of those who suffered assault required medical assistance: 49.3 percent suffered medium injuries; an additional 11.0 percent incurred a heavy injury and required hospitalization (Figure 13).

21

Figure 13: Severity of injury from assault (Freq.)

Ref. AA13_R (n= 73)

The use of firearms in violent episodes was rare. According to victims who declared an assault or attack by force with a weapon to the CVS, the most common weapons used (45.2%) were a heavy blade (knife, sword, panga, axe) or club. The second most common weapons (32.3%) were more primitive items (stone, bottle, glass, rope, stick or fire). Attacks with no weapon comprised 19.4 percent of incidents. Attacks and assaults were much less likely to be carried out using a firearm (3.2%) (Figure 14).

Figure 14: Type of weapons used for assault (Freq. %)

Ref. AA6 (n=62)

5.2.1. Victims

Men were generally more at risk than women and remain susceptible for a longer period to becoming victim of assault. According to the CVS, assaults victims were reported from ages 10 to 64 for men and from ages 10 to 54 for women. Young men aged 15 to 36 years were at relatively high risk of being victim to assault. The group most at risk was men aged 25 to 29 years. Twelve assaults (18.5% of the total) happened to men in that group during the timeframe (Figure 15).22

Figure 15: Victims of assault, by gender and age (Freq.)

Ref. AA12_R1xAA11_R (n= 65)

A look at the clan affiliation of victims of assault or physical attack reveals that some clans appear to be more at risk than others. The Dir are the most targeted (33.3% of the Dir sample have been assaulted), followed by the Digil-Mirifle (25.0%). Attacks were less prominent within the Hawiye (9.1%), Isaq (9.1%), and Darod clans (4.2%). An additional 11.8 percent of other clans not listed in the CVS were also assaulted (Figure 16). As noted in section 3.2, Burao is mainly host to a population of Isaq, and so minority clans appear more vulnerable to attack.

Figure 16: Victims of assault, by clan (Weighted %)

Ref. AA1xRP9 (n= 65)

Nevertheless, the CVS data implies that 9.6 percent of the permanent resident population are more likely to become victim to physical assault or attack, compared to only 3.6 percent of the IDP population. There were no reported attacks against refugees. By gender, no IDP women had been subjected to assault (Figure 17).

Figure 17: Victims of assault, by residential status

(Weighted %)

Ref. AA1xRP10 (n=65)

5.2.2. Perpetrators

Within the CVS, the perpetrators of assault were mainly identified as individual criminals (39.3%). The next largest proportion of perpetrators were thought to be friends or neighbours (29.5%), followed by relatives or family members (13.1%). 11.5 percent of assault were declared to be instigated by a clan group and only 3.3 percent were identified as part of an organized armed group. An additional 3.3 percent were identified as others not distinguished by the CVS (Figure 18).


22

Figure 18: Perpetrators of assault (Freq. %)

Ref. AA7 (n=61)

Some variations exist among categories of perpetrators regarding the type of weapons used to commit assault and attacks (Figure 19). Individual criminals mainly use blunt weapons, while friends, neighbours, family and relatives predominantly use bladed weapons. Interestingly, no individual criminal was reported to use firearms (pistols and revolvers), with only friends and neighbours reportedly resorting occasionally to such weapons.

Figure 19: Type of weapons used for assault, by perpetrator

profile (Freq. %)

Ref. AA6xAA7 (n=61)

In four of the 56 reported incidents of assault or attack (7.1%), the perpetrator was thought to be under the influence of alcohol, qat, or other drugs.

During the focus groups discussions, participants identified perpetrators of violence mainly as young, unemployed adult males. Young men aged 15 to 20 were said to be perpetrators of both violent crime and clan-sponsored violence. Focus group participants associated this social group primarily with muggings and rape. Due to the lack of employment opportunities and/or the domination of such opportunities by older men, this group is mostly jobless, idle and on low incomes. Some are consumers of qat and alcohol and turn to crime to sustain their habit. Others have entered the criminal justice system but are repeat-offenders because, according to key informants, their wealthy families bail them from police custody before they are prosecuted. In times of clan or political violence, these young men can apparently be easily mobilized because their gathering areas are well known.

Adult men aged 20 – 40 were said to be less implicated in petty urban crime, but more likely to engage in livestock theft and violence associated with land disputes (see also section 5.5 on Property crime). According to focus group participants, it is common for individuals involved in a dispute to mobilise fellow clan members for support, regardless of the facts of a case. This is not difficult, as members are required to mobilize in the face of attacks against the clan.

5.3. Violence against women

As seen in Figure 15, women appear to be at relatively lower risk of assault than men and for a shorter period of time. The peak period for assault on women occurs when they are between 20 to 24 years old. The survey shows eight female assault victims (12.3%) from that age group.

Women are, however, at a higher risk of sexual violence. There were 13 declared instances of sexual violence reported through the CVS, accounting for 1.8 percent of respondents. Two of these victims were the respondents themselves, while the other 11 cases were females within the households, ranging from ages 15 to 44 years. There were no male victims. Data is only available on the age of seven victims. Four of these women were between the ages of 15 and 19 years. (Figure 20)

Figure 20: Victims of sexual violence, by age (Freq.)

Ref. SV5_R (n= 7)

30.8 percent of the victims have been subject to multiple abuses. Sexual violence occurred more frequently in more isolated environment—a field, bush, or forest either in the afternoon or at night (five incidents, or 38.5% of total assaults). The market and commercial areas at night were also identified as higher risk areas, the scene of three incidents (23.1%). Two incidents were reported to have

occurred in the street in the afternoon (15.4%) (Figure 21)

Figure 21: Sexual violence, by time and place (Freq.)

Ref. SV6xSV7 (n=13)

23

The majority of perpetrators of sexual violence were identified as individual criminals unknown to the family (69.2%). A less significant proportion was identified as a friend or neighbour (15.4%), and even less as a family member or other relative (7.7%). An additional 7.7 percent were identified as others not identified by the questionnaire (Figure 22).

Figure 22: Perpetrators of sexual violence (Freq. %)

Ref. SV10 (n=13)

Violence against women ranks high on the list of concerns of all focus groups, making it a priority. Most focus groups distinguish between sexual violence (referred to as rape), and domestic violence.23

Domestic violence is thought to be common by focus groups, mainly inflicted on wives by husbands and contributing to divorce and family breakdown. In cases where the marriage is cross-clan, violence against the woman can easily trigger a reaction from her clan group. According to focus group participants, some unemployed men consider providing for their families a challenge yet they consume qat and alcohol. Cases of wife-beating are very common when men are under the influence of intoxicants in the evening, particularly when wives question their qat chewing habit and ask for money for food.

Rapes can similarly escalate and draw in the clan. Rapes were generally reported happening at night or during the early evening in poorly lit areas such as river banks and dark alleys. They may occur when women are carrying out errands or girls are travelling to school. Unfortunately, when perpetrators are identified, many cases are settled out of court through the intervention of clan elders. The unfairness of such settlements was noted on several occasions in focus group discussions.

5.4. Violence against children

Many children (ages 0 to 18) have been victims of multiple forms of violence, including assault and physical attack, sexual violence, kidnapping and domestic child abuse and neglect.

According to the CVS, there were five accounts of assault against children from the ages 10 to 17, accounting for 9.4 percent of total assaults (Figure 23).

Figure 23: Assault against children (Freq.)

Ref. AA12 (n=7)

In addition, four cases of sexual violence against children between the ages of 15 and 19 were recorded (Figure 20).

Child abuse and neglect was highlighted as a concern during focus group discussions. Participants stressed that public acknowledgement of the problems is not common because child abuse and violence against women are not seen as features of the ideal Somali culture. They noted that society is not accustomed to having troubled children, but that economic stress is increasing the frequency of street children, child labour and child delinquency. The economic challenges of rural-urban migration were blamed for many of these cases, forcing children onto the streets and pushing them towards crime to survive. The victimization of children is manifested in the number of youth victims of assault, sexual violence and other crimes. Children are the most vulnerable group to the fallout of other forms of inequality, violence, and insecurity. For example, during the focus group discussions, it was mentioned that when women suffer domestic violence, their children also suffer and many are forced onto the street following family breakdown and neglect.

Some focus groups discussed child abduction. Allegations that were not backed up and that cannot be confirmed by the CVS were made against the IDP community. The CVS found only one incident of kidnapping over the past twelve months within Burao District, but no details surrounding this incident, such as the circumstances of the incident or age of the victim, were provided.

5.5. Property crime

Forty-seven crimes against property within Burao District were declared, representing 6.6 percent of the respondents and 5.7 percent of the sample. 35 households declared to have been victimised once and 12 were victimised twice.

Most crimes against property were characterised as street theft (42.6%), followed by home burglaries (40.4%), theft of crops or livestock (10.6%), water or land (4.3%), and other possessions not specified through an option in the CVS (2.1%) (Figure 24)


24

Figure 24: Type of property crime (Freq. %)

Ref. PC3 (n=47)

Furthermore, there were 18 cases (38.3% of assaults) in which a victim was injured and received medical attention.

There was no discernable pattern of crimes against property over the year, even though events were more frequent in the first half of the year. More property crimes occurred in June than in any other month (17.4%). The next largest proportion of property crime occurred in March (15.2%). February, April, and May all accounted for 10.9 percent each. Crime dropped steeply beginning in July (6.5%) with a slight increase in October (6.5%), November (8.7%), and December (6.5%) (Figure 25)

Figure 25: Property crime, by month (Freq. %)

Ref. PC4 (n=46)

Victims identified the perpetrators of property crime as mostly individual criminals unknown to the family (71.7%); another 15.2 percent were neighbours or friends. Less prominent perpetrators were identified as family members or relatives (6.5%), organized armed groups (4.3%), and others not specified in the CVS (2.2%) (Figure 26)

Figure 26: Perpetrators of property crime (Freq. %)

Ref. PC6 (n=46)

According to focus group discussions, livestock theft mainly occurs in the rural areas, where livestock is the main source of livelihood. Livestock theft normally occurs after droughts when those who lost their animals attempt to re-stock by raiding others. According to focus groups, livestock theft is generally organized and carried out by groups of younger men, but in many cases they are driven by economic necessity rather than greed or revenge. In Somali society, livestock represents wealth and status. It also enables a young man to marry, as livestock is used for dowry payment. The purpose of livestock theft, then, is essentially to restock for social status, livelihood and social engagements and transactions. This is especially important in the rural areas where hard cash is scarce and inadequate. It should be noted that in some parts of Somaliland, land is now being enclosed as part of the commercialisation of the livestock industry24. This contravenes customary xeer law and tends to increase competition among pastoralists for the remaining pasture and grazing land.

Muggings and burglaries are reportedly common in urban Burao and were another major concern. They often occur when unsuspecting pedestrians (often female) are suddenly attacked in the streets for mobile phones and money. Attackers sometimes intimidate the victim with a weapon (e.g. knives, sticks or clubs) though these are more commonly used for house break-ins. Mainly perpetrated by young men, these attacks are most common in poorly-lit areas. Focus group participants identified the hotspots, some of them also known criminal hideouts, as: October area, Kenya area, German Institute area, Kandahar area,

Hodan area and the river banks.

5.6. Conflict dynamics

As mentioned above, inter-group violence will often result in homicides and assaults, and is therefore difficult to distinguish from a CVS as a separate category. Nevertheless, 78.7 percent of CVS respondents declared that disputes between clans never or almost never happen. (Figure 27)

Figure 27: Frequency of clan disputes (Freq. %)

Ref. CD1 (n= 668)

A variety of triggers can cause clan conflict or community

25

disputes. According to the CVS, the most common (34.5%) are a result of general crimes (theft, robbery, rape, murder, etc.), indicating that even when conflicts occur, they tend to be rooted in criminal violence. The second largest instigator is family disputes (27.3%). Conflicts over resources and revenge each account for 16.5 percent of declared disputes, while power or cultural struggles account for 4.3 percent of declared disputes (Figure 28).

Figure 28: Most common reason for clan disputes (Freq. %)

Ref. CD3 (n= 139)

Men and women have generally different roles in conflict or clan disputes. According to focus group participants, although women can be victims of crime and insecurity, they may perpetuate or escalate violence when they actively seek to draw in the clan in a dispute. An example of this is when women are directly involved in cases of domestic violence and divorce, and encourage or incite male clan representatives toward retributive violence.

Many focus groups cited land disputes as a major cause of violent conflict among families and clans. In their focus group, Burao’s elders stressed the clan dimensions of this problem, explaining that different clan groups are continually watchful of territorial incursion by others. Purely a rural phenomenon in the past, land disputes are becoming more frequent in the city because of increasing urbanization. Unscrupulous dealing between wealthy individuals and local authority officials is said to be a major problem. In some cases, communally owned land may even be sold to several owners breeding multiple conflicts.25

Even though this cannot be confirmed by the CVS, as in other parts of Somalia and Somaliland, land disputes are said to follow a seasonal pattern. For example, the dry season brings disputes over water, land and livestock, as drought pushes groups to seek traditional grazing blocks that have fodder, often heightening competition with others for the same resource.

Rural-urban migration has also increased population,

land pressures and unemployment in Burao, according to focus group participants. This seems set to continue as pastoralists forgo traditional economic activity in search of better livelihoods. Rapid urbanisation in a context of weak administration explains the increase of land disputes in urban areas, where private ownership is a relatively new phenomenon. These disputes are likely to continue and sour relations between groups unless legal and land management systems are strengthened.

When damage is caused, the cost of reparations is borne communally by the perpetrator’s kin, and the community agrees on how much each member should raise. As already noted, however, the cycle of conflict may not end there. Where delays or defaults on compensation agreements occur, the clan will readily pick up the case and mobilize against the other party.

5.7. Attacks by violent Islamic groups

One form of insecurity mentioned briefly in focus groups was the threat to Somaliland from violent Islamic groups such as Al Shabaab, who are seen to have destabilized the territory as an extension of their campaign in southern Somalia. Although Al Shabaab fighters successfully bombed key institutions in October 2008, their operations have largely failed since then. Focus group participants believe that intense scrutiny by a proud and nationalistic populace, coupled with heightened security measures, have proved an effective deterrent.

21 See section 5.6 on Conflict dynamics for further information

22 See the discussion of violence against women, Section 5.3, for more information

23 As illustrated in Table 1, youth only referred to “violence against women”, IDPs only referred to “rape”, and people from rural areas did not prioritise any form of violence against women. All other groups mentioned domestic violence and rape/sexual violence as two separate issues.

24 UN/World Bank, op. cit., p. 7.

25 See also, Local Capacities for Peace; Addressing Land Based Conflict in Somaliland and Afghanistan, Academy for Peace and Development, Somaliland (undated).


26

6. Drivers and risk factors

Focus group discussions shed further light on the causes and risk factors of insecurity, whether conflict- or crime-related. Where possible, data from the CVS serves to illustrate particular elements mentioned during these discussions.

6.1. Social factors

Everywhere in the Somali regions, clan identity largely determines social and political relations. Contests between clans and sub-clans for political power or control over government, territory and economic resources such as land have shaped the area’s history. Burao is no exception. Although clan affiliation has positive as well as negative aspects, in times of conflict or stress it has been used in Burao and elsewhere to mobilize support for arbitrary causes, both personal or for those across the region irrespective of the rights and wrongs. This form of bias was referred to in focus groups as ‘clannism’ – that is, the political use and manipulation of clan. Importantly, instances of interpersonal crime can themselves trigger further clan-based violence through clan identities. Focus group respondents stressed that many forms of crime, abuse or bad conduct (including rape, revenge killings, and even domestic violence when it upsets larger social relations) can mobilize opposing clan groups for violence.

Hostility between the host community and IDPs was also said to be a problem. Typically disputes arise over sanitation and waste disposal as host communities tend to suffer any ‘overspill’ from IDP areas. The perception also exists that IDPs undercut locals in the job market, particularly in relation to manufacturing jobs, and that they are a source of crime or subversion. This too feeds distrust.

Consumption of qat was identified as a driver of crime and violence in the community by focus group participants. Although consumption is claimed to be recreational and is culturally associated with decision-making among men of status,26 it is now a daily habit for men of all ages. A large number of men apparently consume qat and sometimes alcohol at the expense of basic family needs. The trend is said to be particularly prevalent among the unemployed. Divorce, child neglect and domestic violence all tend to follow in the wake of misuse and addiction.

However, despite the social cleavages and economic stress that push conflict and violence in Burao, focus group participants agreed that they are tired of conflict and are committed to strive collectively for peace. They

were very aware that peace and security are prerequisites for development and are willing to collaborate with different institutions or social groups to improve safety in the community. At the same time they were clear that Burao and Somaliland can only maintain peace through its internal efforts and that external parties can only support or undermine their own efforts. It seems, then, that Burao, like much of Somaliland, exhibits healthy social norms associated with growing social coherence and progressive nationalism.

6.2. Economic factors

Poverty and unemployment in Burao are both a cause and a consequence of general insecurity. Focus groups said young men turned to violence largely to meet their needs because of unemployment and lack of opportunity. Young jobless men of marriageable age are said to be a particular risk category. If unable to afford the dowry, some young men were said to resort to rape in order to force a marriage, since in most of these cases a female rape survivor is made to marry the perpetrator by elders to settle the matter. Alternatively these idle young men can easily be recruited through clan networks to raid other clans or support vengeful acts. Economic stress also weakens community cohesion, reducing capacities to constructively deal with conflict when it arises.

As discussed above, due to the harsh climatic conditions, the inhabitants of Burao District have sought alternatives to traditional rural livelihoods leading to extensive rural-urban migration. The population is now concentrated in the urban centres where they seek out (but often fail to find) income-generating activities, abandoning livestock rearing. This inward migration, combined with too few economic opportunities in urban settings, also pressures the unemployed to turn to violence in whatever form (generally for survival).

For those who remain in rural areas there is still competition for scarce resources, such as land and livestock, which inevitably leads to occasional disputes and, under harsh conditions, to raiding. Disputes are more likely to arise at times of stress-induced vulnerability (e.g. during droughts and dry seasons) or in cases where new practices such as land enclosure have enhanced competition. Also discussed above are failures of traditional compensation mechanisms in the event of such actions. Poverty seems to be a contributing factor here too.

27

6.3. Political/governance factors

Politics are not a major source of conflict in Burao. Possible examples operate more at the level of the entire Republic of Somaliland, including tensions between rival political groups around elections and the intense opposition to the Somaliland project from Al Shabaab. In neither case is the conflict specific to Burao, however.

A governance issue that warrants mention is the reported lack of clarity and consistency in the legal systems when it comes to land and property. This is again a Somaliland-wide problem arising from the hybrid governance arrangements in which Islamic, customary and state law all run concurrently and intermingle. Taken together, however, these three frameworks are inconsistent in their treatment of land and property, creating opportunities for manipulation. Coupled with the absence of legal coercion against transgressors, this means, at the minimum, that there is no deterrent to would-be aggressors.27

6.4. Firearms and security-related factors

According to focus group respondents, weaknesses in the State security and justice system mean that those perpetrating crimes can easily evade punishment. Under such circumstances, victims may instead seek vengeance, including through revenge killings, beginning a spiral of feuding that can draw in clans.

Widespread ownership of firearms by civilians can facilitate such violence.28 Focus groups estimated the rate of possession of firearms in the area at three or four out of ten households. While widespread firearm possession was perceived as a problem in the past, participants now viewed it as a means of protection and security only, and argued that most firearms are registered.

However, while the CVS confirms that in Burao town routine crimes are generally committed with sticks, clubs and knives rather than firearms, it also points at a potential worrisome trend regarding the availability of firearms.

As noted above (Figure 14), firearms are only used in 3.2 percent of assaults in Burao. However, according to the CVS, there appears to be an increase in the availability of arms, with an overwhelming 72.9 percent of survey respondents saying arms have become more available, compared to 16.5 percent who declared no change in quantities of weapons in circulation, and 10.6 percent who declared a decrease in availability (Figure 29).

Figure 29: Change in availability of firearms over the last 12

months (Freq. %)

Ref. WE1 (n= 620)

According to survey respondents, the types of weapons owned are mostly AK-47/automatic rifles (68.8%), followed by handguns – pistols or revolvers (27.0%), and, lastly, hunting rifles and shot guns (4.3%) (Figure 30)

Figure 30: Type of firearms owned (Freq. %)

Ref. WE3_R (n=141)

The most common reasons among CVS respondents to own a firearm was protection (38.1%), followed by tradition (34.0%), work (23.8%), and lastly hunting (1.4%). An additional 1.4 percent of respondents declared that firearms were owned for other reasons not specified by the CVS (Figure 31).


28

Figure 31: Main reason for owning a firearm (Freq. %)

Ref. WE4 (n=147)

Apart from firearms, explosives were also sometimes seen as a threat. Roughly one third of respondents declared that there is an apparent threat from remote-controlled or time bombs, 22.1 percent of respondents fearing a high level of threat, and 11.8 percent a low level (Figure 32).

Figure 32: Threat from remote controlled or time bombs

(Freq. %)

Ref. WE7 (n=692)

Furthermore, 21.4 percent of respondents declared that there are mines and other unexploded ordnances present within their own communities (Figure 33).

Figure 33: Perceived presence of mines or UXOs (Freq. %)

Ref. WE8 (n=626)

26 HANSEN, P. (2010). The ambiguity of khat in Somaliland. Journal of Ethnopharmacology (132), pp. 590-599.

27 Inconsistencies arise because while customary law regulates pasture, grazing land, forests and water, its provisions are not complex and reflect a communal ownership perspective. Islamic law allows for commercial transactions over investments but not over land itself. Secular law (dating from the Barre era) allows leasing of land to individuals but maintains complete state ownership. Unfortunately all three systems slight women’s rights. UN/World Bank, op. cit., p. 9.

28 For a study on levels of firearm possession see, Community Safety and Small Arms in Somaliland, Danish Demining Group, 2007

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7. Perceived performance of justice and security actors

Both the CVS and the focus groups discussed the performance of the various public authorities mandated to respond to insecurity (namely the police, courts, religious leaders, and the clan or community elders). The following sections will first present a comparative perspective of the perceived performance of these different actors, including by type of crime. Each actor is then considered separately in further detail, including a discussion of the role of women and other non-state security providers.

7.1. Comparative perspectives

7.1.1. General perception

The CVS inquired into the level of general trust bestowed on clan/community elders, religious leaders, police and courts, inviting respondents to state for each of these whether their trust is very high, fairly high, fairly low or very low. In Burao, most trust is vested in the clan or community leaders. Trust levels for religious leaders and police are tied. The least trusted among all figures are the courts. Furthermore, in all four cases, women respondents tend to trust authorities less than men (Figure 34).

Figure 34: Levels of trust in public authorities who serve as

security providers (Weighted %)

Ref. AR1_R (n=699), AR4_R (n=676), AR7_R (n=702), AR10_R

(n=628)

7.1.2. Reporting

Out of 100 assaults, 44.6 percent were disclosed to the public (community elders, religious leaders, police, etc.). 6.2 percent were reported specifically to the police; and a criminal court reached a verdict in 3.1 percent of the cases. Interestingly, the reporting rates to police are higher for female than for male victims (Figure 35).

Figure 35: Reporting rates, assault (Freq. %)

Ref. AA1 (n=710), AA34 (n=61), AA39 (n=20), AA42 (n=2)

Of the 29 cases of assaults reported, nearly half were reported first to community elders, following by the government police and community-based policing units (such as neighbourhood watch schemes). Women tended to turn to the government police more often than men (Figure 36).

Figure 36: Public authority to whom assaults were first

reported (Freq.)

Ref. AA36 (n= 29)

The most prominent reason given for not disclosing assault to the public was that there are other means to resolve the incident (66.7%). Others declared that there was no one available to report to (16.7%), 8.7 percent of victims declared they were persuaded by others not to report, and an additional 8.7 percent declared fear of revenge as a reason for making no claim (Figure 37).


30

Figure 37: Reasons for not reporting assault (Weighted %)

Ref. AA35 (n=12)

Reporting rates appear higher when considering sexual violence. Out of 13 incidents of sexual violence recorded by the CVS, 61.5 percent were reported to the public, of which 23.1 percent to the police. 30.8 percent of the cases of sexual violence ended in a court decision (Figure 38).

Figure 38: Reporting rate, sexual violence (Freq. %)

Ref. SV1 (n=13), SV11 (n=8), SV16 (n=3), SV19 (n=4)

Out of the eight incidents of sexual violence disclosed to the public, six were reported directly to the police, and two cases were reported first to community elders (Figure 39).

Figure 39: Public authority to whom sexual assaults were

first reported (Freq.)

Ref. SV13 (n=8)

The lowest rates of reporting are related to property crime, with only 29.8 percent of cases disclosed to the public. 4.3 percent were reported to the police, and 4.3 percent reached a verdict (Figure 40).

Figure 40: Reporting rate, property crime (Freq. %)

Ref. PC1 (n=47), PC8 (n=14), PC13 (n=2), PC16 (n=2)

In the case of property crime, people appear to turn mainly towards their elders. Out of the 14 cases of property crimes which were disclosed to the public, nine cases (60.0%) were reported first to the community elders, five cases (33.3%) were first reported to the police, and one victim household (6.7%) first reported to non-state police such as neighbourhood watch schemes (Figure 41).

Figure 41: Public authority to whom property crimes were

first reported (Freq. %)

Ref. PC10 (n=14)

7.2. Police

7.2.1. Mapping information

According to the district mapping, there are a total of 211 policemen and six policewomen deployed in five police stations in Burao. 138 of them can read and write, according to the Police Commissioner and station commanders.29 Besides the Central police station, other police stations are located in rented houses, with insufficient transportation and telecommunication means.


As previously mentioned, in comparison to the public authority figures, CVS respondents declared the police were less trusted than the community elders, yet were tied with the religious leaders, and far more trusted than the courts (Figure 34). When isolated, the levels of trust in police recorded for CVS respondent households showed somewhat balanced results. Roughly half (51.2%) declared relatively to very high trust in police, and the other half (48.7%) declared relatively to very low trust (Figure 42).

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Figure 42: Level of trust in the police (Weighted %)

Ref. AR7xRP1 (n= 702)

Focus group participants identified the police as an institution with the power to deal with violence and maintain law and order in Burao. The institution was particularly well regarded by IDPs, who indicated that they have little else to rely on. However, this opinion was contradicted by the results from the CVS, which shows that permanent residents have more trust in the police than do IDPs (Figure 43).

Figure 43: Level of trust in the police, by residential status

(Weighted %)

Ref. AR7_RxRP10 (n=694)

A lack of resources is said to compromise the effectiveness of the police. Focus group participants spoke of police asking for payment to attend a crime scene and perform a service.

An average of 85.3 percent of respondents agreed that the police are relatively to very accessible (Figure 44). The respondents’ satisfaction rate about accessibility depends of the ward (Figure 45).

Figure 44: Accessibility of the police (Weighted %)

Ref. AR8xRP1 (n=713)

Figure 45: Accessibility of the police, by subdivision

(Weighted %)

Ref. AR8_RxBC3 (n=713)

Focus groups noted that police response times were sometimes slow, especially outside of town, because of transport problems. Officers must often rely on the public to bring them to crime scenes. Low pay and remuneration was seen as feeding corruption within the police. However, focus group respondents also cited examples of police-community collaboration and the existence of liaison groups through which the public supports the police.

Perceptions of police response time were also assessed. An average of 49.3 percent of all respondents declared that the police respond relatively to very rapidly and an average of 50.7 percent relatively to very slowly (Figure 46).


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Figure 46: Speed of response of the police (Weighted %)


7.2.3. Response

Satisfaction with police response to incidents of crime and violence varies according to types of incidents. Most dissatisfaction was registered in cases of property crime (Figure 47).

Figure 47: Satisfaction with police response, by type of

crime (Freq.)

Ref. PC14 (n=5), AA40 (n=13), SV17 (n=6)

Although the declared satisfaction levels in police response to assault cases are somewhat balanced, they do lean towards rather to very satisfied (53.9%) over unsatisfied (46.2%). Men appeared marginally more satisfied with police response than women (Figure 48).

Figure 48: Satisfaction with police response, assault

(Weighted %)

Ref. AA40x AA11_R (n= 12)

Lack of action taken by the police was the reason given by three dissatisfied plaintiffs out of six. Other reasons were the delayed response and unfair treatment. One respondent declared reasons not specified in the questionnaire (Figure 49).

Figure 49: Reasons of dissatisfaction with police response

to assault (Freq.)

Ref. AA41xA11_R (n=6)

Two property crime cases out of the 11 reported to the CVS (18.2%) were reported to the government police. Five victim households expressed grievances over police performance, with two saying it took too long. Another two cases declared a complete lack of action, and one case complained of other inadequacies (Figure 50).

Figure 50: Satisfaction with police response, property

crime (Freq.)

Ref. PC15 (n= 5)

Satisfaction with the police response to cases of sexual violence was evenly mixed, with three victim households reportedly satisfied and three victims dissatisfied with the police response (Figure 51).

Figure 51: Satisfaction with police response, sexual

violence (Freq.)

Ref. SV17 (n= 6)

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Two of those unsatisfied victims declared that the treatment was not fair, and one victim declared dissatisfaction for other reasons (Figure 52).

Figure 52: Reasons for dissatisfaction with police response

to sexual violence (Freq.)

Ref. SV18 (n=3)

7.3. Statutory courts

7.3.1. Mapping information

The Ministry of Justice administers justice largely through shari’ah courts, locally known as Madum, which deal particularly with civil matters related to family law, inheritance, compensation and retribution. There are five shari’ah courts in the district. Burao also has one Appeals court with three serving judges, one Regional court with four serving judges and one District court with three serving judges. All judges are literate. Their formal training includes paralegal training, training from Islamic institutions, as well as university educations. According to the Chairman of the Appeals court, as of February 2011 Burao also counts six practising lawyers.30


As stated above (see 7.1 Comparative perspectives), the courts were awarded the lowest amount of trust among public authority figures and institutions (Figure 34). Overall, most respondents (81.1%) declared a very low to relatively low level of trust in the courts, with women displaying marginally more trust in the institution than men (Figure 53).

Figure 53: Level of trust in the courts (Weighted %)


Though respondents declared low levels of trust in the court system, most households (58.4%) perceive the courts to be relatively to very accessible in terms of physical distance and ease to locate (Figure 54). Unsurprisingly, this perception varies across wards (Figure 55).

Figure 54: Accessibility of courts (Weighted %)

Ref. AR11 (n= 663)

Figure 55: Accessibility of courts, by subdivision (Weighted

%)

Ref. AR11_RxB3C (n=663)

Regarding court response time to criminal cases, the majority of respondent households (68.5%) said the courts to respond relatively to very slow (Figure 56).


34

Figure 56: Speed of court response (Weighted %)

AR12xRP1 (n=570)

Still, most respondents (75.2%) declared that they would turn to the statutory courts for justice in the event they become victim to a crime or violence.

Reasons provided by respondents for not turning to the courts included: the fees are too expensive (25.9%); the courts are perceived as corrupt or taking bribes (23.6%); court processes are too time consuming (17.2%); judgments are unfair (13.2%); court processes yield no final results (4%); and courts are difficult to access (2.9%) (Figure 57).

Figure 57: Reasons for not turning to the courts (Freq. %)

Ref. AR14

It should be noted, however, that men and women differed in their responses (Figure 58).

Figure 58: Reasons for not turning to the courts, by gender

(Weighted %)


7.3.3. Response

Two of the 28 assault claims made it to court (7.1%). One plaintiff household stated to be very unsatisfied with the verdict, and the other rather satisfied. The unsatisfied victim alleged corruption and bribery.

Of 11 total property crimes, only two (18.2%) reached a court verdict. There is no CVS data regarding the level of victim satisfaction.

Finally, there were four sexual violence case verdicts out of 13 reported cases. Unfortunately, the CVS provides no indication regarding the satisfaction of the victims.

7.4. Elders and religious leaders

Of the four main security providers, CVS respondents gave the highest trust score to traditional elders (Figure 34). Ratings are slightly higher among men than women (Figure 59).

Figure 59: Trust toward clan/community elders, by gender

(Weighted %)


Interestingly, the ratings of religious leaders in responding to violence and crime are more evenly distributed, with women affording them marginally more trust than men (Figure 60).

Figure 60: Trust toward religious leaders, by gender

(Weighted %)


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All focus group participants recognized and approved of the important role that traditional elders and religious leaders play in society. Elders are selected from clans while religious leaders are selected based on knowledge of the Qur’an and application of shari’ah (although the clan factor subtly also plays a role). In either case they have the moral authority in the eyes of the community to intervene in times of conflict. They play a critical role where the formal justice system fails or has little reach. Traditional elders play a role in decision-making, but also in enforcement, sometimes working together with the state. Their positive contribution is unanimously recognized, including in the youth focus group.

Traditional elders and religious leaders are central to Burao’s search for social harmony. According to focus group participants, they are well respected because they meet the community’s need for justice and conflict management where the state often cannot provide, or willingly cedes authority to the informal actors. As interpreters of socio-cultural rules, they also carry a moral authority derived from customary practice and religious law. People turn to elders and religious leaders in search of expedient justice and dispute resolution, even in places where courts are available. They are by and large more credible than the state system and less prone to corruption and manipulation. Communal land disputes, cases of domestic violence and other civic and social disputes are typically handled by elders while the police are used, at least in the first instance, for most criminal matters. At its best, these institutions obviate the need for outside mediators.31 But given that the state also recognizes these non-state actors as partners in service delivery, a convenient link is established between state and non-state justice systems, people and government.

7.5. Women

Women also have an important role to play in safety and security. According to the CVS, the vast majority of respondent households in Burao (84.0%) declared that there are no restrictions on females attending village and town meetings. Nevertheless, 16.0 percent disagreed. A large proportion of respondents declared that the reasons for this were because the family thinks women should focus on family issues (51.4%). Other reasons cited included: women feeling uncomfortable with participating (17.1%); male members of the household disliking women participating in public decision-making (15.2%); religion (7.6%); jealousy on the part of the husband who could then challenge the loyalty of the woman (3.8%) (Figure 61)

Figure 61: Reasons for female non-participation in

community and town hall meetings (Freq. %)

Ref. RP19 (n=122)

Women’s agency in security matters is complex. During the focus group discussions, it was emphasised that though women are often seen as victims of crime and insecurity, they also sometimes play a role in fuelling clan-based conflict, especially where domestic violence and divorce threaten inter-communal stability. Participants claimed that women encouraged or incited males to engage in conflict.

Also, focus group participants noted that wealthy parents indirectly contribute to violence by exonerating their children from prosecution when they are arrested. When their children are arrested they bribe the law enforcement agents to withdraw the case and prevent prosecution. They engage in corruption and weaken the justice system by paying for their sons’ release. If this does not succeed, they try to bribe or manipulate judges and court officials, according to focus group participants.

7.6. Other non-state security providers

Focus group participants stated that ‘civilian security committees’ are increasingly being formed in crime hotspots32 and many villages. Under each of the four village committees33, a neighbourhood watch of three armed men operates.34 A community-based policing forum and private security guards were also mentioned.35 By all accounts these are intended to deter crime either through area patrols by community volunteers or by paid security guards, both under the regulation of the Ministry of Interior under the Private Security Company regulation law. Monthly fees of around US$ 5 per household are apparently typical. It seems that if criminals are caught in the act by these patrols, they are arrested and brought to the area’s police station. In case of an armed situation, the police are also called.

Focus group participants were very positive about such arrangements. Most feel that crimes such as rape and muggings have declined in areas where these arrangements are in place. Private guards or watchmen are particularly important for the business community as their primary purpose is to prevent theft and protect property. Focus


36

groups mentioned no problems such as extortion, even though some District Safety Committee members later implied that watchmen may actually collaborate with thieves in some instances. Strict regulation and control are therefore important. Also, some participants noted that poorer communities often lack the organising power or finance for such arrangements, leaving them more vulnerable to crime.

It should be noted that civilian security committees are different from the regional security committees, which abused their power and have now been removed by the Somaliland administration.

As discussed earlier, a vibrant and active private sector and civil society are also important service providers in key sectors and are, therefore, a source of resilience to Burao. Civil society organizations and religious leaders have, for example, joined forces to raise awareness on the issue of violence against women: a series of workshops was organized mainly to discuss the problem of rape. Members of the Burao District Safety Committee argue

that the number of rape cases subsequently decreased. However, civil society also has weaknesses, such as a lack of coordination of activities, a lack of follow up by the government, and unequal distribution of activities in different areas of the community. Also, while the most important businessmen are conscious of their role as agents of change and actively contribute to peace in the community, smaller businesses sometimes seek to avoid contributions requested of them.



31 Endogenous Conflict Handling Mechanisms: Eliciting a Valuable Resource for Sustainable Peace Building, Jacobs, M., p. 30-32.

32 The focus group participants mentioned notorious areas such as October, Kenya, Sha’ab area, German Institute, Hodan and Kandahar.

33 See above, Section 3.5

34 Interview with the District Safety Committee, February 2011


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8. Recommendations

The following recommendations are taken from the Burao District Safety Plan. This was developed in several steps. A workshop was held from 26 July to 1 August 2010 with 70 individuals who had participated in the June 2010 focus group discussions in Burao. The workshop was facilitated by Saferworld, the Danish Demining Group, UNDP and Haqsoor. Participants validated the draft Community Safety and Security Analysis, prioritised security concerns, and brainstormed solutions to the issues identified. It should be noted that quantitative data from the CVS was not yet available at the time. The District Safety Committee then adopted the District Safety Plan that was produced. This is meant to be revised on an annual basis, to form part of the District Council’s annual work plan. External support is required for its full implementation.

8.1. Prevention of muggings/robbery/theft

Vision Intervention and activities for implementing the intervention

Local council and community contribution

External support needed

A district with adequately lit streets

1.1 Lighting up Burao’s streets, particularly in October, Kenya, German institute, Kandahar, and Hodan:• Conduct a Needs Assessment and feasibility Study• Develop a concept paper to promote the Burao Street Lighting Project• Popularize the Burao Street Lighting Project - Meetings with the District Safety Committee - Meetings with local authorities - Meetings with local organizations - Meetings with electricity companies• Form fundraising and resource mobilization committee - Develop fundraising plan - Effect a fundraising plan - Light up Burao’s streets

Publish legal notice to create awareness of the projectCash and/or in-kind contributions e.g. voluntary manual labour

Fund raising and resource mobilisation training

A district with wide, well-maintained and landscaped roads and pathways

1.2 Designing wide, well maintained and landscaped roads and pathways in Burao: • Design a representation of the desired Burao road system and

environment - Commission and complete a mural of the desired roads - Unveil the Mural and popularize the Burao landscape Project • Meeting with local authorities and the community leaders to lay out the

landscape project - Mapping out the areas and roads to be included on the project - Community consultations on the procedures and schedules of the project - Agree on the launch of the project • Establishing committee to oversee the planning and clearing of

problem areas - Clearing or pruning of the trees in the streets in dark alleys and isolated footpaths

Transport (fuel, drivers and trucks) Tools for clearing the bushesLabour to clear the bushes and trim trees Meals for the voluntary labourers

Allowances for the labourers for food.

A police force capable of effectively dealing with crime

1.3 Improve the police ability for policing:Re-training the policeEnhance police response time Increasing police patrols in the hotspot areasEquipping police with better telecommunication facilitiesEquipping police with vehicles (cars, motorcycles and bicycles)Providing conducive physical infrastructure for police work

1.4 Establish and /or strengthening existing policy frameworks for improved policing:Linking the community and the government institution responsible for public safety through joint forumsEstablishing and maintaining Community Policing Mechanisms

Land, water for constructionConstruction material – sandPolice forceCivilian-police cooperation with police force

Capacity building on community policing targeting security committees and policeFinancial resources to allow purchasing of equipment Documentation of case studies to highlight the plight of victims Facilitate exchange visits to success model regions

A population aware of crime and behaving to avert risks

1.5 Awareness forum in hotspotsPrioritise the most critical hotspots in townConduct local safety audits, including on women’s safetyAwareness raising forums to discuss modifications to the physical environment, or behaviours and systems that could help deter and prevent crime


38

8.2. Prevention of terrorism

Vision Intervention and activities for implementing the interventionLocal council and community contribution


A district secure and safe from terrorism

2.1 Enhancing the capacity of the community to effectively avert and to appropriately respond to Terrorism-induced violence:• Establishing and encouraging forum for disciplined discussions on

global actions with local consequences• Creating awareness on responsible citizenship• Educating the people – especially the youth on the distinction

between criminal and political actions• Inducting all able members of the community into community-based

safety and security programmes• Maintaining a firm and fair response to criminal offenses and activities• Training local police on terrorism specific violence• Establish and maintain village-level centres for the monitoring and /or

vetting of ‘aliens’• Transmitting any suspicious happenings to the relevant authorities• Police to establish checkpoints on the roads to control the movement

of incoming and outgoing vehicles.

Community mobilization Police checkpoints

Capacity buildingProvision of relevant informationProtection from undue harassment, local CSOs

8.3. Prevention of violence against women



A society free of domestic violence in which all members live happily and safely in their households

3.1 Presenting domestic violence to the community as a criminal offense and punishing it as such: • Establishing marriage counselling centres • Establish mechanisms and procedures of counselling for couples

seeking marriage • Promoting and popularizing procedures and mechanisms

available in Islam for resolving conflict within households • Establishing and maintaining mechanisms for the promotion

of the otherwise dominant members of the household currently experiencing circumstances that undermine their self-esteem

• Restricting availability and consumption of behaviour- influencing substances such as qat

Social structures for sensitization and awareness creation e.g. mosquesPublicise offences constituting domestic violenceCase studies – victims encouraged to publicly highlight plight Facilitate protection for members of households facing threats of violenceCourts promptly prosecute domestic violence

Capacity building targeting local civil society on lobbying and advocacy, case studies, on basic counselling and publicity material productionFinances for publishing/printing sensitization materials

Incidences of rape in Burao are reduced

3.2 Profiling rape as a violation of human dignity, religious teachings and a criminal offense: • Intensifying religious sermons on the evil of rape • Periodically publishing trends and statistics on rape • Training the police force on how to deal with rape victims • Equipping the police to effectively and efficiently deal with rape

related crime with equipment • Establish gender desk within police force • Advocate for sexual violence cases to be settled through court • Advocate for the establishment of juvenile courts to apprehend

and prosecute young offenders • Introducing mechanisms to name and shame repeat offenders • Intensifying public advocacy campaigns for responsible

parenthood • Intensified religious campaigns and mechanisms that regulate

moral conduct • Objectively addressing practices and attitudes that undermine

the capacity of the youth to marry • Establishing youth recreation centres • Advocate for separation of adult and juvenile courts and prison

Land for constructing the youth centresVoluntary services by religious and traditional leaders Community commitment and cooperation

Capacity building of religious leaders and traditional leaders and District Safety Committee on gender based violence, lobbying and advocacyAccess to mass mediaFinancial support to equip the police

3.3 Establish and/or support mechanisms for victim assistance: • Map and strengthen or make operational existing institutions

to comprehensively assist the victims of rape and domestic violence

Local authority contribute the land Community Mobilization

39

8.4. Prevention of land disputes



Equitable access to land by all persons well managed and well regulated

4.1 Securing ownership and access to land by instituting land reforms: • Documenting all land • Instituting/improving policies on land access and ownership • Regulating, monitoring and auditing all allocations of land • Regulating and documenting all land transactions • Establishing Land Dispute Resolution Committees in all settlements • Creating awareness of land laws • Conducting public campaigns and advocacy against illegal land

acquisition • Upholding the rule of law and enforcing the law in all matters

relating to land disputes • Computerizing land registration • Establishing a central Land Transactions Registry

Community mobilization

Capacity building of local authorities on efficient and effective land management system and conflict management, enforcement of the rule of lawFunding for equipment (e.g. computers)Training local authorities on alternative dispute resolution

8.5. Prevention of revenge killings

8.6. Prevention of clan-based violence



A community that protects all life and deters the illegal taking of any life

5.1 Limiting opportunities for crime and deterring revenge killings: • Arbitrating and managing conflicts urgently • Timely resolution of any conflicts by the relatives and by the

government • Establishing mechanisms for cooperation between citizens and

the government to apprehend any persons suspected of having killed another

• Campaigning against revenge killings • Prosecuting persons accused of revenge killings • Enforcing the decisions of the law courts

Individual cooperation and propagation of information – community participation

Funding for capacity building on conflict management and rule of law

5.2 Promote court settlements in cases of interpersonal crime, particularly sexual violence

5.3 Peace education, dissemination of conflict resolution skills



Clans living in harmony

6.1 Promoting peaceful co-existence: • Promoting inter-clan initiatives such as sports • Promoting inter-clan social relationships such as marriage • Promoting inter-clan programmes and structures such as schools • Establishing governance structures such as local committees made up

of members of different clans • Campaigning against stereotyping of different communities/clans to

reduce hostility

Space for sporting activities Participation and commitment to allow an enabling environment to facilitate dialogue and interaction among citizens to carry out the activities.Community mobilization and permission to group members to participate in activities

Positive propagandaPositive sermons


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8.7. Prevention of property theft



Property theft between communities reduced

7.1 Securing property ownership: • Registering property such as livestock etc. • Creating alternative livelihood opportunities in the rural area;

opportunities for employment and income generation • Prosecuting offenders • Rehabilitating imprisoned offenders

Local authority personnel and improved policy regime, police and court system 20 percent of the cost of constructing rehabilitation centres

Finances for capacity building to train rehabilitators, equipment to facilitate registration

8.8. Improvement of institutional arrangements to promote security



A secure, safe and participative community

8.1 Enhance the security of the community: • Establish consultative structures and forums at community level • Co-ordinate community safety strategies, provgrams and

initiatives - Highlight incidences targeting vulnerable groups • Carry out advocacy campaigns in the community

Office premises or gathering placeLicense for gatheringsSecurity to ensure the process is nonviolent

Financial support for training activistsCapacity building on lobbying and advocacy Training on documentation of victims/case studies for lobbying and advocacy

8.2 Strengthen the capacity of the District Safety Committee, including for conflict resolution skills

8.3 Establish and/or support mechanisms for the rehabilitation of offenders: • Establish a rehabilitation centre for perpetrators and (repeat

offenders)

Local authority contribute the land Community mobilisation

8.4 Develop tools to measure the effectiveness of neighbourhood and village security committees: • Establish consultative structure on the role of village

security committees • Liaise with neighbourhood watch committees (xaafado) and

assess their operational capability • Provide them with training • Formalise the link and operating procedures between the xaafad

committees and the police • Map the town and sub-divide it into operational units • Open training session to private security guards

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About the Somali Observatory of Conflict and Violence Prevention (OCVP)

The Somali OCVP – referred to as Homboro in Somali – gathers data and information on patterns of criminal social and political violence in the region, supporting analysis that can be useful to all Somalis. Homboro is the Somali name for the bottlenose dolphin, an animal celebrated in traditional songs for its intervention in protecting and rescuing human beings. The OCVP pursues a similar human security objective.

The OCVP is currently accumulating quantitative and qualitative data on insecurity and violence in the Somali regions, which are available for further use. The OCVP data and analytical reports can help practitioners ensure that interventions are guided by up-to-date information and evidence. The OCVP is also setting up a safety and security monitoring system to form the cornerstone of a Somali Early Warning and Response Network (EWARN). Beyond data collection and analysis, the OCVP will draw on the fields of conflict management — traditional and contemporary — to support practitioners and policy makers with guidance notes, an interactive discussion forum and training. By collecting, storing and sharing the knowledge acquired in the field of crime and violence reduction, it aims at becoming a centre of excellence for conflict and violence prevention.

For further information:

The Director

Observatory of Conflict and Violence Prevention (OCVP)

Hargeisa, Somaliland

[email protected]

http://www.ocvp.org


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district baseline reportocvp.org/docs/2015/safetyandsecurity/burao safety and... · 2015-03-01 ·...

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