distraction and persuasion

7/29/2019 Distraction and Persuasion

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Psychological Bulletin1973, Vol. 80, No. 4, 310-323

THE RELATION BETWEEN DISTRACTION AND PERSUASIONROBERT STEVEN BARON 2 ANDPENNY H. BARON

University of IowaN O R M A N MILLER

University of Southern CaliforniaDistracting subjects while they ar e exposed to a persuasive message enhancespersuasive impact in certain situations. This article reviews th e research con-cerning this relation between distraction and persuasion. It evaluates the vari-ous competing explanations for the distraction effect and highlights some majorconceptual issues in need of empirical attention. The conclusions ar e that (a )the distraction effect does have empirical validity which generalizes across agood many experimental contexts; (6 ) despite this experimental generality,distraction is not likely to prove useful as a mass persuasion technique al -though it may prove powerful in specific settings; (c) results indicating thatdistraction ca n reduce persuasive impact do not necessarily invalidate theoreti-cal explanations of the distraction effect ; (d ) whether pleasant distractionswill be more or less effective at heigh tening persuasion than unpleasant distrac-tions appears to be a function of whether subjects can easily ignore the dis-traction during th e message; an d (e ) both disruption of the counterarguingprocess and the need to just ify effort expenditure are, at present, equallypromising com prehensive interpretations of the existing data. O ther explanationsare not as compelling.

In 1964, Festinger and Maccoby reportedthat a message produced more persuasionamong subjects who were simultaneously dis-tracted than among nondistracted subjects.This finding provoked a good deal of research.While some studies both replicate Festingerand Maccoby's original distraction effect an dsupport their interpretation, others find pre-cisely th e oppositedistraction reduces atti-tude change. This review presents th e relevantliterature and evaluates various explanationsfor the effects distraction has on persuasion.Hopefully this process will clarify importantissues an d indicate fruitful areas fo r research.

G E N E R A L I T Y OF THE D I S T R A C T I O N EFFECTAt present, significant increments in per-suasion have been produced with a variety ofdistracting tasks: film (Festinger & Maccoby,1964), light monitoring task (Keating &Brock, 1971; Osterhouse & Brock, 1970),copying task (Kiesler & Mathog, 1968),1This article was written while the first and second

authors held Old Gold summer fellowships from th eUniversity of Iowa.2 Requests fo r reprints should be sent to Rober tSteven Baron, Department of Psychology, Universitypf Iowa, Iowa City, Iowa 52242.

evaluating speakers' personality (Miller &Baron, 1968), slides (Rosenblatt, 1966;Sharmo & Meador, 1969; Zimbardo, Ebbe-sen, & Fraser, 1969b), sound effects (Rule &Rehill, 1970), radio static (Silverm an &Regula, 1968), and adding task (Zimbardo,Snyder, Thomas, Gold, & Gurw itz, 1970 ). In-deed several of these research papers (Oster-house & Brock, 1970; Zimbardo et al., 1969b;Zimbardo et al., 1970) reported m ore than onesuccessful demonstration of -the effect. In addi-tion, Dorris (1967) and Freedman and Sears(1965) reported marginally significant dis-traction effects. Moreover, this does not ex-haust th e list. In these studies, distractio n wasconceptualized either as the presentation ofabsorbing sensory stimulation (irrelevant toth e speech) or the requirement that subjectsperform irrelevant activity during a message.If we accept these conceptualizations as aworking definition of distraction, it also seemssensible to include the studies of Zimbardo(1965), Zimbardo and Ebbesen (1970), andJanis, Kaye, and Kirschner (1965) as in-stances of the distraction effect. The first twoinvolve the effects of reading under delayedauditory feedback and the latter concerns theeffects of eating while reading. In short, given

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DISTRACTION AND PERSUASION 31119 confirmations of the effect, early concernover its "empirical validity" (McGuire, 1966,1968) no longer seems appropriate.The distraction effect also has a fair amountof generality. First, it has been produced bya w ide variety of distractions (see above list-ing). Second, it generalizes across at least 2 0different message topics. Third, it has beenobserved in situations where the message ispresented by a communicator in person(Freedman & Sears, 1965), on tape (Rosen-blatt, 1966), or film (Festinger & Maccoby,1964); and by printed material to be readsilently (Rule & Rehill, 1970) or aloud by thesubject (Zimbardo, 1965). Finally, it is notspecific to any one procedure, experimentaldesign, or cover story. Distraction has height-ened message impact in designs measuring at-titudes both before and after th e message(e.g., Rule & Rehill, 1970), in "after-only"designs (e.g., Festinger & Maccoby, 1964),and in both single (e.g., Osterhouse & Brock,1970) and multiple treatments designs (e.g.,Kiesler & Mathog, 1968). Likewise, distrac-tion effects occur in studies where subjectsparticipate in groups (e.g., Freedman & Sears,1965) or alone (e.g., Osterhouse & Brock,1970). While most distraction studies haveemployed college students as subjects, distrac-tion effects have been reported by Mann 3and Freedman and Sears who both usedhigh school students, and by Miller andBaron (1968) who recruited,women in laun-dromats. Furthermore, distraction effects haveoccurred in conjunction with at least nine dif -ferent cover stories.

The only major limit on the external valid-ity of the distraction effect is that every studyexcept one (the second study reported byZimbardo & E bbesen, 1970) relied on ques-t ionnaire data. Thus, in almost every case,data were collected among subjects who wereaware that they were under scrutiny. Con-sequently, it remains possible that demandcharacteristics and/or subjects' concernsabout self-presentation mediate th e effect (seesection on Reactivity below).

FAILURES TO REPLICATEAt present, at least seven studies havefailed to replicate the distraction effect (Mil-ler & Baron, 1968, Study 2 ; Miller & Levy,

1967; Vohs & G arrett, 1968; and those citedbelow). However, in four (and possibly five)4of these (Breitrose, 1966; Gardner, 1966;Haaland & Venkatesan, 1968; Zimbardo,Ebbesen, & Fraser, 1969a), the distractioninterfered with recall of message content.Since Festinger and Maccoby (1964, p. 360)recognized that distraction could only enhancepersuasion if it did not interfere with com-prehension of the persuasive message, thesedisconfirmations may not be particularlytroublesome.A separate question, of course, is why dis-traction has interfered with recall in somestudies and not others. Several factors seemrelevant to this issue. A distraction would bemore likely to totally divert attention fromthe content of a dull or noninvolving messagethan from an inherently interesting one. Ac-cordingly, wh ere distraction increases the per-suasive imp act of a message, subjects' involve-ment and interest in the topic has generallybeen high, and the distraction has been mod-erate. In contrast, in at least three of thestudies that fail to replicate th e effect, interestvalue of the messages was at best question-able, especially in relation to the inte nsity ofthe distractions employed (Breitrose, 1966;Gardner, 1966; Vohs & Garrett, 1968). Forexample, while Breitrose used Festinger andMaccoby's (1964) distraction, his messagesconcerned New Zealand politics and the nega-tive effect of eyeglasses.A second explanation fo r the inconsistenteffect of distraction on recall concerns wh ethersubjects focus attention on the message orthe distraction. Zimbardo et al. (1970) foundthat distraction increased the impact of apersuasive message only when audience at-tention was directed at the message. C ontrari-wise, when the audience was set to attend tothe distraction, distraction reduced, both re-call and persuasive impact relative to anondistracted control.

3L. Ma n n . The use of distraction as a techniquefor th e modification of attitudes. Paper presented atthe meeting of the Australian Psychological Society,1966.4 Recall was not measured by Vohs and Garrett(1968), but similar distractions interfered with recallin prior work (Vohs, 1964).


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312 R. S. BARON, P. H. BARON, AND N. MILLERIn sum, a variety of factors explain whydistraction will interfere with message com-prehension and attitude change in some situa-tions and not in others. Unfortunately, th e

fact that a given distraction can have vari-able effects on persuasion (e.g., Breitrose,1 9 6 6 ; Festinger & Maccoby, 1964) makesworking with such treatm ents a frustrating ex-perience unless there is opportunity for ade-quate pretesting. Consequently, it is likelythat distraction will have limited utility as apractical persuasive tool even though in manyrespects the distraction effect has a high de-gree of generality. However, the theoreticalsignificance of the effect is very important an dis discussed at length below. .

B A C K G R O U N DThe research on distraction stems from Al-lyn and Festinger's (1961) finding that fore-warned subjects tended to be less persuadedthan nonforewarned subjects (who simplywere told to- attend to the speaker's personal-ity), While these data support th e hypothe-sis that forewarning reduces persuasive im-pact, Festinger and Maccoby (1964) pointedout that a difference between the two condi-tions other than forewarning might producethese results. They assumed that people sub-vocally argue against counterattitudinal mes-sages and suggested that instructing nonfore-warned subjects to evaluate th e personalityof the speaker might distract them fromeffectively counterarguing, thereby leavingthem more vulnerable to persuasion.If this hypothesis is valid, then th e impact

of any message that tends to elicit counter-arguing might be enhanced by any form ofdistraction provided that it does not seriouslyimpair comprehension of the message. Totest this hypothesis, Festinger and Maccobyused an irrelevant, silent, and amusing film todistract fraternity members while they list-ened to a message that advocated th e aboli-tion of fraternities. The nondistracted sub-jects (also fraternity men) heard th e samemessage but the film they sa w showed th ecommunicator delivering th e message. Dis-tracted subjects changed their opinions morethan nondistracted subjects. Moreover, non-fraternity members exposed to the two treat-ments were not affected by the distraction.

These subjects presumably were not motivatedto counterargue, in that they did not opposeth e position advocated. Consequently, thislack of effect supported Festinger an d Mac-coby's contention that distraction facilitatespersuasion by interfering with the counter-argument process.5 The results of subsequentdistraction research generally support this in -terpretation. Other explanations are possible,however, and accordingly th e sections belowexamine the variou s com peting views.

P E R S O N A L I T Y E V A L U A T I O N A N D T H ES A L I E N C E O F CREDIBILITY

After the initial studies by Festinger andhis colleagues, Freedman and Sears (1965)independently manipulated forewarning andthe presence or absence of instructions toevaluate th e speaker's personality (henceforthreferred to as "evaluation instructions"). Theresults, while only marginally significant,nevertheless replicated th e distraction effectreported by Festinger and Maccoby (1964)and Allyn and Festinger (1961). Miller andLevy (1967) , however, did not obtain thisresult. Subjects instructed to attend to thespeaker's personality (distracted condition)agreed less with a persuasive message than didthose instructed to simply attend to the mes-sage. This led Miller and Levy to speculatethat evaluation instructions do not distractsubjects from counterarguing, but instead,focus attention on the characteristics of thesource and thereby enhance the salience of hiscredibility. Since both Allyn and Festingerand Freedman and Sears used a highly cred-ible com mu nicator, whereas M iller and Lev yused a source w ith relatively am biguous cred-ibility, this interpretation could reconcile th einconsistent outcom es.Miller and Baron (1968) investigated thisquestion in two related experiments. In Study1, credibility was manipulated by varying (ontape) th e speaker's accent and vocabulary. Inthis study, distracted subjects changed theirat t i tude more than nondistracted subjectswhen the source was highly credible (p


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DISTRACTION AND PERSUASION 313distraction had no effect on attitude change.8While these latter data were not predicted,subjects' comments in the low-credibility con-dition indicated that th e speaker's (negative)characteristics we re par ticu larly salient. If lowcredibility was quite noticeable to begin with,any effect of instructions that increase thesalience of credibility would have been seri-ously attenuateda basement effect.The outcome of Study 2 supports this con-jec ture . Credibility was varied by presentingsubjects with written descriptions of thespeaker prior to the message. The credibilitycues provided by this manipulation were pre-sumably less salient than in Study 1, and in-deed, distraction did have an effect in bothhigh- and low-credibility conditions. Dis-tracted subjects were less persuaded in bothcredibility conditions.7 Apparently th e credi-bility manipulations only established tw olevels of low credibility. The manipulationcheck and postexperimental interviews indi-cated that subjects did not think th e "highlycredible source" was highly credible. Thus,th e heightened resistance of distracted sub-jects in Study 2 is understandable if evalua-tion instructions (the distraction) do indeedenhan ce the salience of the source's credibility.At very least, the results of this pair ofstudies and of Miller and Levy (1967) are notconsistent with th e contention that evaluationinstructions simply distract subjects fromcounterarguing and thus uniformly increasepersuasive impact. Rather, these results indi-cate that evaluation instructions enhance per-suasion for subjects exposed to a highlycredible source and reduce it among those ex-posed to a source who lacks credibility. Never-theless, it is possible that other forms of dis-traction do indeed enhance persuasion by dis-rupting the counterargum ent process.a Kiesler and Mathog (1968) argued that just suchan outcom e supports Festinger and Maccoby's (1964)hypothesis. They maintained that on e exposed to abarely credible source may not need to cbunterarguesince he can rely upon source derogation to resist in-fluence. If so, and if evaluation instructions inhibitcounterarguing, one would expect evaluation instruc-tions to heighten persuasion only when the source ishighly credible.7 There were no recall differences that even ap-proached significance (lowest p > .50).

THE AFFECT HYPOTHESISAnother alternative to the counterargu-ment disruption hypothesis is that persuasivedistractions are effective because they are

pleasant and put the audience in a "betterhumor" (McGuire , 1966, p. 482), or createpositive affect (Zimbardo & E bbesen, 1969, p.38 ) . This "affect" explanation suggests that,compared to a no-distraction condition,pleasant distractions should increase persua-sion; affectively neutral distractions shouldnot increase persuasion; and unpleasant dis-tractions should actually reduce persuasion.In accord with this explanation, a number ofinvestigators found that messages accom-panied by pleasant stimuli are more persua-sive than those presented in the presence ofnoxious stimuli. Political slogans presentedduring a free meal received greater approvalthan when accompanied by a noxious odor(Razran , 1940). Similarly, subjects who hadaccess to peanuts and Pepsi-Cola while read-ing a message were more persuaded tha n thoseexposed to noxious odors (Janis et al., 1965).Finally, Zimbardo et al. (1969b) found thatdistracting male subjects with sexually arous-ing slides generally increased the persuasiveimpact of a message more than an affectivelyneutral distraction. While these findings areconsistent with the affect hypothesis, other ex-planations are possible. For example, in theJanis et al. study, th e differential effectivenessof the positive and negative irrelevant stimu-lation might be due to the fact that passivelysmelling unpleasant odors does not disruptcounterarguing very much. Thus, this effectper se does not uniquely support the affectexplanation.Moreover, unpleasant distractions have notconsistently inhibited persuasion (in com-parison to a nondistracted control cell) aspredicted by this position.8 Janis et al. (196S)found that exposing subjects to a foul odorduring a message did not decrease persuasion

8 Such an outcome could be reconciled with th ecounterargument disruption hypothesis if one heldthat aversive distractions facilitated counterarguingby leading su bjects to focus on the message in an at-tempt to ignore the negative stimulation. Unfor-tunately, such an argument has a strong post hocflavor. The affect hypothesis, however, clearly pre-dicts that aversive stimulation will detract frommessage impact.


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314 R. S. BARON, P. H. BARON, AND N. MILLERrelative to a nondistracted control. Indeed,contrary to the affect hypothesis, three offour message topics showed a nonsignificanttendency in the opposite direction. On theother hand, Zimbardo et al. (1969a) reporteddata that are more consistent with this keyprediction of the affect hypothesis. In twosubexperiments the experimenter exposed fe -male subjects to either gory medical slides(negative affect condition) or scenery slides(neutral affect condition) while they heard acounterattitudinal message. All subjects alsoheard anothe r m essage while they read it froma slide in order to establish a nondistractedcontrol condition. Both studies showed lesspersuasion in the negative affect conditionsthan in nondistracted control conditions. Fur-ther, neu tral distractions generally caused mo repersuasion than the negative distractions, butthis effect was significant only in the secondsubexperiment.9 Clearly th e data from th eZimbardo et al. studies (1969a, 1969b) coin-cide nicely with th e predictions made by theaffect hypothesis; not only do pleasant dis-tractions heighten persuasion more than doless pleasant distractions, but more impor-tant , an unpleasant distraction actually re-duces th e persuasive impact of a message.These data would constitute strong supportfor th e affect hypothesis were it not for thefact that Rosenblatt (1966) reported a verycomparable study that failed to replicate keyresults of Zimbardo et al. (1969a). In onecondition, Rosenblatt used, as a negative dis-traction, dental slides that were quite similarto the unpleasant medical slides used by Zim-bardo et al. Contrary to Zimbardo et al., th eunpleasant dental slide distraction marginallyfacilitated rather than hindered the impact ofth e message relative to a nondistracted controlgroup. That is , Rosenblatt's results replicatedth e nonsignificant tren d of Janis et al. Thus,these data and the results of Zimbardo et al.'sStudy 2 present a quandry, especially giventhe numerous differences between the two(within versus between designs, different mes-sage topics and content, different subjectpools, different distractions). However, threeother sets of distraction findings clearly dem-

9 Neutral distractions had inconsistent effects, en-hancing persuasion (relative to nondistraction) in thesecond subexperiment and reducing it in the first.

onstrate that th e affect hypothesis does notprovide a comprehensive explanation for theeffect that distraction has on persuasion.First, several investigators (e.g., Kiesler &Mathog, 1968; Osterhouse & Brock, 1970;Rosenblatt, 1966; Zimbardo et al., 1970)found that affectively neutral distractionsheighten the impact of persuasive appeals.If distraction only affects persuasion as afunction of the affect it creates,-such distrac-tions should not enhance persuasion at all.Second, if the affect notion is correct, the re-lationship between distraction and persuasionshould be unaffected by whether the messageis a counterattitudinal one or not. However,Festinger and Maccoby (1964) indicated thata pleasant distraction increases persuasiononly if the message is counterattitudinal.Third, the effect of distraction has been foundto interact with variables such as credibility(Kiesler & Mathog, 1968), self-esteem (Rule& Rehill, 1970), and whether subjects attendto the message or the distraction (Zimbardoet al., 1970). The affect hypothesis is gen-erally unable to explain such outcom es evenpost hoc.In sum, it is clear that while the affect hy-pothesis may have some validity it is inade-quate as a single explanation for the relation-ship between distraction and persuasion. Onth e other hand, it is becoming apparent thatin certain settings a pleasant distractor willmore effectively heighten persuasion (Janisetal., 1965; Razran, 1940; Rosenblatt, 1966;Zimbardo et al., 1969b). Consequently, anyexplanation for the distraction effect thatmerits serious consideration must provide aplausible interpretation of this effect.

HYPOTHESIS I N V O L V I N G D E M A N DC H A R A C T E R I S T I C S

Both Rosenblatt (1966) and Silverman andRegula (1968) offered hypotheses about howsubjects' definitions of the experimental situa-tion might account for the "distraction ef -fect." Rosenblatt suggested that distractionfacilitates persuasion by disguising the ex-periment as one on comprehension andthereby m inim izing suspicion of persuasive in -tent. This, in turn, might enhance persuasion(a ) by improving source credibility or (b)by creating a situation in which subjects do


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DISTRACTION A N D PERSUASION 315not concern themselves with counterarguing.Although this view is similar to Festinger andM accoby's (1964) hypothesis, there is an im-portant difference. Festinger and Maccoby's(p. 36 0) "disruption" hypothesis suggeststhat distraction interfere s with one's ability tocounterargue, whereas Rosenblatt's (p. 85)hypothesis suggests that distracted subjectsare not motivated to counterargue due to re-active aspects of the experim ental setting. Thedifference is important, for if Rosenblatt iscorrect, the "distraction effect" will be limitedto reactive situations. That is , only when in -dividuals feel they are being studied andevaluated are they likely to impute signifi-cance to the presence of distraction and de-cide that a test of comprehension is in prog-ress. If limited to such reactive settings, thendistraction would have no utility whatsoeveras a practical persuasive tool.In accord with his hypothesis, Rosenblatt(1966, p. 86) found that in each of three dis-traction conditions subjects indicated less per-suasive intent than did subjects in a nondis-tracted condition. As Rosenblatt pointedout, however, since suspicion was assessedaf ter th e message ended, causal direction re -mains ambiguous; th e suspicion items m ayhave been the first stimulus to suspicion; al-ternatively, the ability to m uster cou ntera rgu-ments may arouse suspicion of persuasive in -tent.Another line of reasoning also bears onRosenblatt's hypothesis. If distraction lowerssuspicion of persuasive intent and if this low-ered suspicion improves source credibility,more favorable source evaluations should oc-cu r in distraction conditions. Several studies(Allyn & Festinger, 1961; Festinger & Mac-coby, 1964; Haaland & Venkatesan, 1968)have reported such an effect. A basic problemwith Rosenblatt's hypothesis, however, is thatit is not at all clear that suspicion of persua-sive intent does indeed reduce the impact ofa persuasive m essage (M cG uire, 1968, p. 185;Papageorgis, 1968, p. 2 7 4 ) . It apparently onlydoes so when the advocated position is ac-ceptable to the audience (Brock & Becker,1965; Walster & Festinger, 1962) . Thus, evenif distraction does lower such suspicion, it isnot necessarily clear that this provides anadequate explanation for the distraction effect.

The demand explanation offered by Silver-man and Regula (1968) does not involvesuspicion of persuasive intent. They suggestedthat distracted subjects' perception of theexperiment as a test of comprehension ledthem to attend more closely to the messageand comprehend it better. This, in turn, in -creased persuasion. They reasoned that if sub-jects thought the distraction (radio static)was unintentional, they would not ascribe sig-nificance to it (i.e., view the situation as a testof comprehension). At most, high uninten-tional distraction might annoy subjects and,therefore, inhibit attitude change. As ex-pected, when th e distraction w as intentional,a higher degree of distraction did producemore attitude change. Contrary to expecta-tion, however, the same effect tended to occurwhen the distraction was unintentional (p< .08). Since support for Silverman andRegula's position depends on finding no at-titude differences between the two levels ofunintentional distraction (or a difference inth e opposite direction), the marginal effect ob-served seriously weakens their argument.While postexperimental assessments of per-ceived purpose of the experiment did con-form to their predictions, th e causal inter-pretation of data such as these is ambiguous(Rosenblatt, 1966).Moreover, there are several sets of findingsthat are inconsistent with Silverman andRegula's (1968) hypothesis. First, Zimbardoet al. (1969b) obtained distraction effects ina study which used an extremely plausiblecover story (involving physiological reac-t ions). It seems unlikely that these subjectsviewed the experiment as a test of comprehen-sion. Second, Silverman an d Regula's height-ened attention hypothesis implies that, when-ever distraction heightens persuasive impact,it should yield superior comprehension of mes-sage content relative to nondistraction condi-tions ; yet existing data show virtually no sup-port for this notion.10 In addition, if attentionmediates th e distraction effect, why should-itobtain only among those who oppose the ad-vocated position of the message (Festinger &10 In fact, th e only significant recall differences re -por ted have been in the opposite direction (Oster-house & Brock, 1970; Sharmo & Me ador, 1969; Zim-bardo et al., 1969b).


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316 R. S. BARON, P. H. BARON, AND N. MILLERMaccoby, 1964)? Finally, neither of thesedemand interpretations explain why pleasantdistractions are more effective than unpleasantones (see section on Affect) or why the effectof distraction interacts with credibility or self-esteem.11 In short, there is l i t t le support forth e contention that distracted subjects aremore vulnerable to persuasion because theydefine th e experiment as a test of memo ry .Thus, if the distraction effect is indeed usuallya function of certain reactive arrangements,those arrangements seem to facil i tate persua-sion through their effect on some addi t ionalmediating process.

THE C O U N T E R A R G U M E N T DISRUPTIONHYPOTHESISThe prominence of Festinger and Mac-coby's (1964) counterargument disruption hy-pothesis stems in part from it s primacy, butit also reflects the importance of the counter-argument concept in explaining numerous at-t i tude change phenomena.12 This hypothesisaccommodates not only much existing datamanifestly concerned with distraction, but agood number of studies investigating the ef-

fects of role playing (e.g., Janis & King,1954), eating while reading (Janis et al.,1965), and effort expendi ture (Zimbardo,1 9 6 5 ) upon persuasion. It explains the previ-ously noted differential effectiveness of pleas-ant distractions by arguing that pleasant dis-tractions hold one's at tention more, and there-fore, are more disruptive. Failures to replicateth e distraction effect are not compelling evi-dence against this hypothesis since these in-stances either were specific to one particulardistraction (Miller & Baron, 1968; Miller &Levy, 1967) or generally involved settingswhere the distraction in terfere d with messagecomprehension. Finally, in several studieswhere distraction has had inconsistent (i.e.,11All three of these latter criticisms apply equallywell to the notion that th e distraction effect obtainsbecause th e novelty of the distraction captures sub-ject attention and thereby prod uce s greater learningan d comprehension of the message. Thus, this noveltyexplanation will not be discussed in the text.12 The process of counterargument has been usedas an explanatory concept in research on distraction,forewarning (e.g., Freedman & Sears, 196S), one-versus two-sided messages (Hovland, Lumsdaine, &Sheffield, 1949), persuasive intent (Brock, 1967), andinoculation (McG uire, 1964),

interactive) effects as a function of anothervariable, learning or attention factors mayunderlie the inconsistency (Rule & Rehill,1 9 7 0 ; Zimbardo et al., 1970). However, th emost compelling support for the disruptionhypothesis derives from studies in which dis-traction has had differential effects only inthose conditions where counterarguing waslikely. For example, Festinger and Maccobydemonstrated that distraction failed to havedifferential effects among subjects who agreedwith the advocated position of the message.The intuit ive assumption about such subjectsis that they are not motivated to counter-argue, and indeed Brock (1967) reported thatsubjects engage in more coun terargum entationthe greater the discrepancy between the ad-vocated position and their own. In accord withthis, all studies obtaining distraction effectshave used counteratt i tudinal messages andmost of these have been highly involving aswell.Unfor tuna te ly , we know so little about th eantecedents of counterarguing that it is dif-f icult to predict w hen co unte rarg um ent is or isnot likely to occur.13 Consequently, a morefruitful means of verifying th e disruption hy-pothesis might be to develop a m easure ofcounterargumentat ion and directly measureth e effect of distraction u pon it (Osterhouse &Brock, 1970). There are a number of diffi-culties, however, in devising such a measure(see Miller & Baron , in press). A primaryproblem is that demonstrating that subjectsproduce counterarguments, when asked by theexperimenter to do so, in no way establishesthat they spontaneously engage in such ac-13O ne means of circumventing this problem is touse messages which attack sacred beliefs. Presumablysubjects rarely have counterarguments fo r such at-tacks unless given a specific inoculation treatment(McGuire, 1964). Thus, it would seem that if thedisruption hypothesis is valid, distraction should onlyenhance such attacks if subjects previously have beeninoculated. Interestingly, McGuire and Papageorgis(1962) f ound that distraction instructions had noeffect on inoculated subjects although th e instructionsdid improve message impact fo r subjects who re-

ceived a supportive treatment. However, ambiguityabou t whether distraction is supposed to prevent theconstruction of new counterarguments or block theuse of readily available counterarguments makes itdifficult to interpret whether this outcome supportsor contradicts Festinger and Maccoby's hypothesis.


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DISTRAC TION AND PERSUASION 317tivity when not asked.14 Differential counter-arguing observed after such a request may bea consequence rather than a cause of attitudechange ( seebelow) .Osterhouse and Brock's (1970) recent at-tempt to implement this strategy can be criti-cized on these grounds. Using an ingeniousquantitative m anipulation of distraction, theirgeneral finding in two subexperiments wasthat communication acceptance was greaterand the number of counterarguments waslower the more rigorous the distraction. Asthey themselves noted, however, "the causaldirection between counterargument produc-tion and agreement [with th e message] hasnot been established in this investigation [p .353]." Given that people generally are con-cerned with appearing rational and intelligentwhen they are scrutinized in an experiment, itis quite possible that they view a request tolist thoughts about the message as a demand(o r an opportunity) to just i fy their reactionto the message. Therefore, if they resist in -fluence their responses are bound to be codedas counterarguments even if such responses re -sult from rather than cause resistance to per-suasion. Consequently, while Osterhouse andBrock's data are consistent with th e disrup-tion hypothesis, they do not constitute suf-ficient evidence to support th e conclusion thatdistraction heightens persuasion by inhibitingcounterarguing. 15An additional problem with the disruptionexplanation stems from th e assumption thatcounterarguing is a common means of resistinginfluence. While much data support this view(see Footnote 12 ) , in almost every case thesedata are also consistent with alternative ex-planations that do not involve th e counterar-guing process (C hu, 1967; Rosenblatt16;

14 Even with severe time restrictions subjects m ayrespond with obvious counterarguments that theydid not think of until that point (and would not un-less asked to).15Osterhouse and Brock strongly favor the dis-ruption interpretation of their data going so far asto title their paper "Distraction increases yielding topropaganda by inhibiting counterarguing." As indi-cated above, this conclusion, while plausible, seemspremature.16 P. C . Rosenblatt. Alternative explanations ofwarning effects. Paper presented at the meeting ofthe Western Psychological Association, San Diego,Cal i fornia , March 28-30, 1968.

Tannenbaum, 1967). Sears and Abeles (1969)suggested that when exposed to a discrepantmessage subjects may reject the message w ith-out any elaborate rationale more often thanthey engage in counterargumentation. If in-deed counterarguing is shown to be an un-usual an d rarely used mode of resisting in -fluence, the plausibility of Festinger and Mac-coby's (1964) explanation would be seriouslyweakened.

THE EFFORT HYPOTHESISThe most compelling alternative to Fest-inger and Maccoby's disruption hypothesisironically stems from Festinger's (1957) the-ory of cognitive dissonance. The effort re-

quired to engage in (attitude) discrepant be-havior is a major determinant of dissonance;the greater the effort, the greater the dis-sonance (Zimbardo, 1965). Since choosing tohear a counterattitudinal message can beviewed as attitude-discrepant behavior, th eeffort required to comprehend a counterat-titudinal message will directly determine theamount of dissonance created by the choice.Att i tude change is a likely way to reduce theensuing dissonance. Subjects can jus t i fy theirdecision to expose themselves to the persua-sive materials by either overvaluing th e mes-sage or distorting their initial attitude so as tominimize any discrepancy with the message.In short, distraction may facilitate persuasionby forcing th e subject to exert high effort inorder to hear and understand th e persuasivemessage (Dorris, 1967; Kiesler & Mathog,1968; M iller & Levy, 1967; Zimbardo et al.,1970).This explanation is quite robust in termsof it s ability to account fo r distraction ef-fects. First, it accommodates th e fact thatheretofore distraction effects have been gen-erally limited to counterattitudinal messages.W e would argue, however, that under certaincircumstances th e effort hypothesis predictsdistraction effects even on proattitudinal mes-sages. If one incurs costs to hear a proatti-tudinal message, one can often reduce dis-sonance merely by focusing on how the mes-

sage supports one's beliefs. However, if theeffort involved is particularly high, if th esupported attitude is not of central import-ance, and if there are few other justifications


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318 R. S. BARON, P. H. BARON, AND N. MILLERfor expending th e effort, enough dissonancecould remain to alter atti tudinal position,making one more extreme in one's favorableview. This prediction clearly warra nts experi-mental attention. Only Festinger and Mac-coby (1964) have varied whether the messagewas pro- or counteratti tudinal, and in thatstudy, subjects who held differing initial posi-tions (pr o versus con subje cts) wer e com-pared. Given the possible con tamina ting fac-tors involved in relying on an independentvariable that is based on preexisting subjectdifferences (i.e., that does not entail randomassignment) additional research which variesthe advocated position of the message isnecessary.

A second important distraction finding ex-plained by the effort hypothesis is that pleas-ant distractions are often more effective thanunpleasant distractions. A key assumptionhere is that th e effort created by the (sensory)distractions used in research varying affectdoes not involve reception of the stimuli butrather ignoring th e stimuli. Quite simply,choosing to ignore or forego pleasant, amus-ing, sexy, or tasty stimuli is undo ubtedly moreeffortful than choosing to ignore nasty, gory,unpleasant stimuli. Implicit in this argumentis the notion that effort can be conceptualizedin terms of the psychological cost of one'schoices. Thus, effort can be conceptualized notonly in terms of w ha t one invests, expends, orendures, but also in terms of what one givesup (Adams, 1965). Moreover, one can iden-tify tw o types of distractions correspondingto those tw o conceptualizations of effort. Thefirst represents events th e subject must attendto or participate in if he is not to alienate theexperimenter. The key characteristic of suchdistractions is that subjects have little al-ternative but to experience th e distracting ac-tivity if they participate in the experiment.These distractions include those where the ex-perimenter explicitly requests activity (e.g.,Zimbardo et al., 1970), especially those whoserate or difficulty is controlled by the experi-menter (e.g., Osterhouse & Brock , 1970; Z im-bardo, 1965). For this type of "low-choice"distraction the effort involved seems best con-ceptualized in terms of what one must do orendure to hear the message, and any dis-sonance stems from one's choice to participate

in th e study. Given that with such distractionssubjects are forced to engage in distractingactivity, the task of hearing the message ismade more difficult or costly the more in -volving, demanding, an d disruptive the dis-traction is . Consequently, with such distrac-tions, dissonance and consequent distractioneffects should generally be greater, th e moreunpleasant and taxing the distracting activi-ties are. In accord with this thinking, studiesemploying precisely such distraction tech-niques (Osterhouse & Brock, 1970 ; Zimb ardo,1965; Zimbardo & Ebbesen, 1970) findgreater persuasion the more taxing the dis-t ractor.The second type of distractor, however,creates situations in which the subject has agood deal of perceived choice about what heattends to during the message (e.g., visualpresentations). Clearly th e experimenter hasmuch less control over subject attention onthese "high-choice" distractions as opposedto those involving controlled activity.17 Withthese distractions, it seems most appropriateto conceptualize effort in terms of what onemust give up to hear the message. If oneassumes that whenever subjects attend tothe message they are giving up input fromsuch distractions (or rewards they would get

17 The status of auditory an d olfactory distractionin this categorization admittedly is somewhat am -biguous. Subjects should find it harder to screen outsuch stimuli as opposed to visual stimuli, but it stillmight be possible to ignore th e presence of soundsand smells sufficiently so "th at subjects still retain agood deal of the freedom of attention they have withvisual distractors. Similarly, those activity orienteddistractions in which the experimenter does notclosely control th e rate, intensity, or quality of sub-ject activity (e.g., Zimbardo et al, 1970) presentsome prob lems. These . distractions tend to requ iresome activity of subjects. Thus, one might expectthat th e more unpleasant and taxing th e distraction,th e greater th e dissonance (since subjects must con-tend with it). Y et, on the other hand, th e subjectdoes have a good deal of freedom concerning his rateof activity, etc., so one cannot be certain of thiscategorization. However, given evaluation apprehen-sion and the demand fo r constant activity thatusually accompanies such distractions, it seems mostsensible to class them as "low-choice" distractors. Inaccord with this, a fairly high rate of activity acrossal l conditions is generally found with such distractors(e.g., [R. S. Baron & D. Mortimer. Distraction, ef -fort , and attitude change. Unpublished manuscript,University of Iowa, 1972] ; Zimbardo et al., 1970).


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DISTRACTION AND PERSUASION 319for more fully engaging in distraction activ-i ty) , th e situation corresponds to the classicfree-choice dissonance paradigm. The morepositive th e distraction (or the potential re -wards for distracting activity), th e morecostly (i.e., dissonant) th e choice to ignore(reject) it in favor of the message. Of course,one way to reduce the dissonance caused bythis choice is to overvalue the message (thechosen alternative) . Consequently, with thistype of distraction, one would expect morepersuasion the more pleasant the distraction(assuming the subject attended to the mes-sage). Just such "high-choice" distractionswere employed in those studies w here pleasantdistractions were more effective than lesspleasant distractions. Moreover, in accordwith this reasoning, Zimbardo et al. (1970,p. 671) suggested that the persuasive effectsof a distraction may obtain only when sub-ject attention is focused either by interest orinstruction on the message. Clearly, if atten-tion to the message is not a salient choicealternative, subjects would not expend effortto attend to the message.18Since the effort hypothesis, like the counter-argument disruption hypothesis, is fairly ro-bust in its ability to accommodate a broadrange of distraction findings, any unique sup-port fo r this position is of interest. Zimbardo(1965) manipulated effort by varying the in-terval between speaking and hearing one's ownvoice (as one read a message) through use ofa delayed auditory feedback apparatus. Morepersuasion occurred in the high-effort condi-tions, a finding confirmed by Mann (see Foot-note 3). While dissonance theory accounts forthese results, Zimbardo (1965, p. 116) him-self recognized th e alternative possibility thatthey could have been due to the distractingeffect of delayed auditory feedback. In a fol-low-up study, Zimbardo and Ebbesen (1970)had each subject read three messages, onewhile exposed to white noise, one under de-layed auditory feedback, and one under nor-mal conditions. They found that effort ex-

18 Of course, if a very strong demand were madeto attend to the message, this might attenuate th eeffect of "high-choice" distractions by decreasing per-ception of choice. However, this is not a problemwith "low-choice" distraction s since her e dissonancestems from th e choice to participate as opposed toth e choice to attend to the message.

pended to hear th e message was generallylowest under normal conditions and highestunder delayed auditory feedback, and accord-ingly, attitude change was lowest in the formerand greatest in the latter. Moreover, at leaston certain measures of persuasion (e.g., netproportion of changers), the difference be-tween the white noise and delayed auditoryfeedback conditions was marginally signifi-cant. Zimbardo and Ebbesen argued that th ecounterargument hypothesis does not predictsuch a difference. They maintained that bothwhite noise and delayed auditory feedbackshould be equally distracting and, therefore,should produce equal persuasion if distrac-tion (i.e., counterargument disruption) is thecritical variable underlying th e delayed audi-tory feedback effect. Unfortunately they offerno substantiation. Indeed it seems much moreplausible to assume that distractions will beprogressively more effective at disruptingcounterarguing (i.e., more distracting) th egreater the effort one must expend to over-come or ignore them to hear the message.Consequently, while Zimbardo and Ebbesen'sdata are certainly consistent with th e efforthypothesis, it seems equally consistent withth e counterargument disruption hypothesis.

This ambiguity illustrates a major difficultyin differentiating th e counterargument disrup-tion hypothesis from the effort hypothesis.That is, it seems impossible to manipulatedistraction independently of effort. Consider,for instance, Osterhouse and Brock's (1970,p. 354) argument that their manipulation ofdistraction (light guessing) does not vary ef-fort. This argument is based on the fact thatthe recall of distracted subjects was not su-perior to that of nondistracted subjects. Ap-parently, Osterhouse and Brock assumed thatgreater effort expended on the message shouldproduce greater recall. However, th e high ef-fort created by distraction settings is notdirected at memorizing th e message, but in-stead is directed at overcoming or ignoring th edistraction in order to obtain or be exposedto th e message. Thus, there is little reason toexpect that such high effort will be reflectedin greater recall of the message. Indeed, datafrom a recent study conducted by Baron andMortimer (see Footnote 17) indicate thatwhen subjects are directly questioned about


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320 R. S. BARON, P. H. BARON, AND N. MILLERthe effort involved in Osterhouse and Brock'sdistraction, th e results clearly show that th edistraction is perceived as being quite ef-fortful relative to nondistraction. In short,it seems futile to try to distinguish be-tween th e effort and disruption hypothe-ses by attempting to find tasks that areeither effortless but disrupting or effortfulbut nondisrupting since these qualities in -variably are confounded. The principal meanso f circumventing this sort of methodologicalproblem is to devise an experiment for whichthe contending explanations make competingpredictions.Kiesler and Mathog (1968) attempted tofollow this strategy. They reasoned that ex-pending effort to hear a barely credible sourceshould create more dissonance (i.e., is harderto just i fy) than expending effort to hear ahighly credible source. Thus, they argued thatth e effort hypothesis predicts a greater distrac-tion effect among subjects hearing th e low-credibility speaker. Instead, distraction in -creased persuasion under high credibility anddecreased it under lo w credibility. WhileKiesler and Mathog recognized that the re-verse distraction effect in the low credibilitycells did not seem particularly consistent withFestinger and Maccoby's (1964) disruptionhypothesis, they nevertheless concluded thattheir data generally supported that interpreta-tion. This conclusion, however, is open toquestion.Kiesler and Mathog (1968), in derivingtheir "effort predictions," reasoned that, sinceboth the low credibility of the speaker an dth e counterattitudinal nature of the messageare cognitive elements that, separately, aredissonant with th e choice to listen, th e jointpresence of both elements must heighten dis-sonance in some additive fashion. For ex-ample, they argued that dissonance will beparticularly high when "The person is ...putt ing effort into listening, not only to adiscrepant com mun ication, but to a speaker oflittle worth [p . 1124]." While we agree thatexpending great effort to hear a moron mightin many instances produce dissonance, ex-pending effort to hear a moron disagree withyou is not nearly so dissonant.18 Several con-

19 This statement assumes that when one choosesto hear a low-credibility source attack his beliefs, he

sistency theories maintain that it is quiteconsonant to find that a disreputable sourcedisagrees with one's beliefs (Heider, 1958;Osgood & Tannenbaum, 1955) . Further, anumber of dissonance analyses (e.g., Aronson,Turner, & Carlsmith, 1963) recognize thatone can reduce th e dissonance created bycounterattitudinal messages by derogating thecredibility of the message source. Thus, ac -cording to these formulations, it is generallyconsonant (with your attitud e) to have low-credibility sources disagree with you and dis-sonant to have high-credibility sources at-tack your beliefs.If this analysis is correct, the effort hypoth-esis can accommodate Kiesler and Mathog's(1968) results. The key assumption is thatchoosing to hear th e low-credibility attack isconsonant with subjects' preexisting beliefs.Given this assumption, expending effort tohear th e low-credibility attack heightens be-havioral commitment to one's preexisting be-liefs (since one has expended effort to sup-port those beliefs) . As Kiesler (1968) sug-gested, heightened commitment to one's be-liefs should intensify the resistance of suchbeliefs to persuasion. This analysis then ac-counts for the low persuasion among dis-tracted subjects hearing th e low-credibility at-tack. A similar analysis applies to Miller andBaron's (1968) data. Thus, it appears thatth e effort hypothesis, rather than being in-consistent with these data, represents th e mostcomprehensive interpretation of the effects ob-served under both high and low credibility.Another interesting test of the effort hy-pothesis concerns the effects of self-esteem onth e distraction effect. Aronson (1968) arguedthat dissonance effects are more likely whensubjects have high self-esteem. According toAronson, dissonance is generally created byany cognition that is inconsistent with apositive view of self. Thus, if the distractioneffect is mediated by dissonance reduction, onewould expect stronger distraction effectsdoes so expecting an inept or absurd presentation thatsupports the validity of his preexisting attitude.Kiesler and Mathog did employ somewhat absurd at-tacks (e.g., all students should wear unif orm s; bedchecks should be conducted in college) that make itall th e more plausible that subjects in the low-credibility conditions co uld use the message to sup-port the sensibility of their own positions.


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DISTRACTION AND PERSUASION 321among subjects having high self-esteem. Con-sistent with this prediction, Rule and Rehill(1970) reported that distracting sound effectsenhance th e impact of a counteratti tudinalmessage read just after a success experience(high self-esteem t rea tment ) . I f instead sub-jects read the message just after a failure ex-perience (low self-esteem treatment), distrac-tion has no effect. Rule an d Rehill, however,also found that low self-esteem subjects hadbetter recall of the communicat ion an d poorerrecall of the distraction sound effects. Thus,they concluded that the failure experience re-duced sensory input thereby ren dering th e dis-traction less of a disruption among low self-esteem subjects. A proponent of the efforthypothesis could, of course, accommodatethese recall data by arguing that if low self-esteem subjects were less "aware" of the dis-traction (Rule & Rehill, 1970, p. 360), theywould not have to expend much effort to hearthe message, thus the null effect in those cells.Nevertheless, given th e plausibility of Ruleand Rehill 's argument, these data do notuniquely support th e effort hypothesis.The effort hypothesis, while robust, is stillawaiting definitive corrobo ration. Close scru-tiny of cognitive dissonance theor y suggests atleast on e means of generating such corrobora-tion. Specifically, engaging in e f f o r t f u l atti-tude-discrepant behavior should result in dis-sonance only if subjects have a good deal ofchoice in making their decision and little justi-fication for engaging in the chosen behav ior.On the other hand, the degree of choice andjustification involved in exposing oneself to adiscrepant message would seem to be unre-lated to the extent to which a person counter-argues (providing that th e justification didnot affect demand characterist ics). Thus, ifdistraction enhances persuasion because it in-terferes with counterarguing, it should fa -cilitate persuasion regardless of choice orjustification. On the other hand, if the abovedissonance interpretation is correct, distrac-tion should facilitate persuasion only whenfreedom of choice is perceived to be greatand/or justification for exposure is low. Simi-larly, if distraction effects ar e mediated byeffort justification, one should be able to pro-duce distraction effects without even exposingsubjects to a message if one can get them to

commit themselves to hearing the messageunder effortful conditions. Wicklund, Cooper,and Linder (1967) presented data that aresuggestive of such effects by using running inplace as a manipulation of effort. If these ef-fects are replicated using standard distractionmanipulations, they would represent strongsupport for the effort hypothesis.Of course, even if such data were obtained,the plausibility of the effort hypothesis re -quires the assumption that subjects have feltthat they have a good deal of volition when-ever distraction effects occur. Since distrac-tion studies rarely comment on this aspect ofth e procedure, it is difficult to assess whetheror not this condition has been met in priorresearch. However, to the extent that investi-gators have obtained infor me d consent in thisresearch, subjects must have been allowedchoice concerning their participation. Since agrowing number of investigators now obtaininformed consent as a matter of course, itseems likely that this assumption has been metfairly regularly, at least in the more recentresearch. Moreover, as Zimbardo and Ebbesen(1970) argued, "most m en perceive they h avechoice and free will unless such an illusion isexplicitly denied them. . . . objective absenceof choice is not 'n o choice' in the minds ofsubjects [p . 212 ] . "

S U M M A R Y A N D C O M M E N TIt is clear that distraction reliably enhancesthe persuasive im pact of messages in a varietyof settings. Moreover, some failures to pro-duce th e distraction effect may be due to theparticular form of distraction used (Miller &

Baron, 1968; Miller & Levy, 1967 ) while theremainder quite possibly are due to factorsthat cause distraction to reduce m essage com-prehension (Breitrose, 1966; Gardner, 1966;Haaland & Venkatesan, 1968; Vohs & Garrett,1968). On the other hand, the empirical ex-ceptions indicate the complexity of the rela-tion between distraction and persuasion. Ifcomprehension is significantly reduced, theeffect will be reversed. Some evidence sug-gests that distraction effects will not obtainwhen the speaker has low credibility, or whenthe audience has low self-esteem. The distrac-tion effect may also be restricted to situationsin which subjects have a great deal of choice


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322 R. S. BARON, P. H. BARON, AND N. MILLERand little justification with respect to theirdecision to expose themselves to the persua-sive message. The effect may also be limitedto situations in which subjects rely on coun-terargument to resist persuasion. Finally, itseems likely that distraction effects will occuronly when subjects focus their attention onthe message as opposed to the distraction.

These limiting conditions suggest that dis-traction may not be very useful as a practicalmass persuasion technique. For example, onemust do more than just flash a distractionalong with one's message in order to enhancemessage acceptance. One must also accomplishthe more difficult task of insuring that theaudience tries to focus attention on the mes-sage. Furthermore, the distraction effect, whilereliable, does not usually cause dramaticchanges in attitude. Note, however, that Zim-bardo and Ebbesen (1970) presented datasuggesting that th e effects of distraction mightbe substantially more powerful on overt be-havior than on questionnaire responding.Thus, it is possible that distraction may proveto be a powerful persuasion technique, albeitone that is effective only in certain limitedsettings.Among current explanations for the distrac-tion effect, those involving affect (Zimbardo &Ebbesen, 1969), novelty (Dorris, 1967, seeFootnote 11), persuasive intent (Rosenblatt,1966), and learning (Silverman & Regula,1968) are inadequate as single explanationsof the existing data. The counterargumentdisruption hypothesis of Festinger and Mac-coby (1964) fares better but lacks compellingdirect conf i rmat ion. The effort hypothesis,derived from a consideration of Festinger's(1957) dissonance theory, is at least as com-prehensive an explanation of the distractiondata as is the disruption hypothesis, althoughthis has not been recognized in existing discus-sions of the distraction literature (e.g., Oster-house & Brock, 1970; Zimbardo & Ebbesen,1969). This review suggests further that at-tempts to discriminate between these twopositions will be a fruitful area for research.

R E F E R E N C E SADAMS, J. S. Inequity in social exchange. Advances inExperimental Social Psychology, 1965, 2 , 267-300.AIXYN, J., & FESTINGER, L. The effectiveness of un-

anticipated persuasive communications. Journal ofAbnormal an d Social Psychology, 1961, 62 , 35-40.A R O N S O N , E. Dissonance theory:. Progress and prob-lems. In R. P. Abelson, E. Aronson, W. J. Mc-Guire, T. H. Newcomb, M. J. Rosenberg, & P. H.Tannenbaum (Eds ) , Theories of cognitive con-sistency: A sourcebook. Chicago: Rand McNally,1968.A R O N S O N , E., TURNER, J. A., & CARLSMITH, J. M.Communicator credibili ty and communicator dis-crepancy as determinants of opinion change. Jour-na l o f Abnormal an d Social Psychology, 1963, 67,31-37.B R E I T R O S E , H'. S. The effect of distraction in at-tenuating cou nterargu me nts. Unpublished doctoraldissertation, Stanford University, 1966. Cited byP. G. Zimbardo, M. Snyder, J. Thomas, A. Gold,

& S. Gurwitz, Modifying the impact of persuasivecommunications with external distraction. Journalo f Personality and Social Psychology, 1970, 16,669-680.B R O C K , T. C . Communicat ion discrepancy and intentto persuade as determinants of counterargumentproduct ion. Journal of Experimental Social Psy-chology, 1967, 3, 296-309.

B R O C K , T. C ., & BECKER, L. A. Ineffectiveness of"overheard" counterpropaganda. Journal of Per-sonality and Social Psychology, 1965, 2, 654-660.CHTJ, G. C. Prior familiarity, perceived bias and one-sided versus two-sided communications. Journal ofExperimental Social Psychology, 1967, 3, 243 -254.DORRIS, J. W. Persuasion as a function of distractionand counterarguing. Unpublished manuscript, Uni-versity of California, Los Angeles, 1967. Cited byP. G. Zimbardo, M. Snyder, J. Thomas, A. Gold,& S. Gurwitz, Modifying the impact of persuasivecommunications with external distraction. Journalo f Personality and Social Psychology, 1970, 16,669-680.

F E S T E S T G E R , L. A theory of cognitive dissonance.Evanston, 111.: Row, Peterson, 1957.FESTINGER, L., & MACCOBY, N. On resistance to per-suasive communications. Journal of Abnormal an dSocial Psychology, 1964, 68 , 359-366.F R E E D M A N , J. L., & SEARS, D. O. Warning, distrac-tion, an d resistance to influence. Journal of Per-sonality and Social Psychology, 1965, 1, 262-266.

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- persuasive communications: An examination of thedistraction hypothesis. Journal of Personality an dSocial Psychology, 1968, 9, 167-170.HEIDER, F. Th e psychology of interpersonal relations.New Y ork: Wiley, 1958.H O V L A N D , C ., LTIMSDAINE, A. A., & SHEFFIELD, F. D.Experiments on mass communication. Princeton:Princeton University Press, 1949.JANIS, I. L., KAYE, D., & KIRSCHNER, P. Facilitatingeffects of "eating-while-reading" on responsiveness


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DISTRACTION A ND PERSUASION 323to persuasive communications. Journal of Per-sonality an d Social Psychology, 1965, 1, 181-186.JANIS, I. L., & KING, B. T. The influence of roleplaying on opinion change. Journal of Abnormalan d Social Psychology, 1954, 49 , 211-218.KEATING, J. P., & BROCK, T. C. A myth about dis-traction. American Scientist, 1971, 59, 416-419.KIESLER, C. A. Commitment. In R. P. Abelson, E .Aronson, W. J. McGuire, T. H. Newcomb, M. J.Rosenberg, & P H . Tannenbaum (Eds . ) , Theorieso f cognitive consistency: A sourcebook. Chicago:Rand McNally, 1968.KIESLER, S. B., & M A T H O G , R. B. Distraction hypoth-esis in attitude change:. Effects of effectiveness.Psychological Reports, 1968, 23, 1123-1133.MoGuiRE, W. J. Inducing resistance to persuasion. InL. Berkowitz ( E d . ) , Advances in experimental so-cial psychology. New Y ork: Academic Press, 1964.McGuiRE, W. J. Attitudes and opinions. Annual Re-view of Psychology,,1966, 17, 475-514.McGuiRE, W. J. The nature of atti tudes and at-titude change. In G. Lindzey & E. Aronson (Eds.),Handbook of social psychology. (Rev. ed.) R ead-ing, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1968.McGuiRE, W. J., & PAPAGEORGIS, D. E ffectiveness offorewarning in developing resistance to persuasion.Public Opinion Quarterly, 1962, 26, 24-34.MILLER, N., & B A R O N , R. S. Distraction, communi-cator credibility and attitude change. Unpublishedmanuscript, University of Minnesota, 1968. De-scribed in P. G. Zimbardo & E . B . Ebbesen, In -fluencing attitudes and changing behavior. Reading,Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1969.MILLER, N., & BARON, R. S. On measuring counter-arguing. Journal for the Theory of Social Behavior,in press.MILLER, N., & LEVY, B. H. Defaming and agreeingwith the communicator as a function of emotionalarousal, communication extremity, an d evaluationset. Sociometry, 1967, 30, 158-175.

O S G O O D , C . E., & TANNENBAUM, J. H. The principleof congruity in the prediction of attitude change.Psychological Review, 1955, 62, 42-55.OSTERHOUSE, R. A., & BROCK, T. C. Distraction in-creases yielding to propaganda by inhibiting coun-terarguing. Journal of Personality an d Social Psy-chology, 1970, IS, 344-358.P A P A G E O R G I S , D. Warning an d persuasion. Psycho-logical Bulletin, 1968, 70 , 271-281.R A Z R A N , G. H. S. Conditioned response changes inrating and appraising sociopolitical slogans. Psy-chological Bulletin, 1940, 37, 481. (Summary)R O S E N B L A T T , P. C. Persuasion as a funct ion of vary-ing amounts of distraction. Psychonomic Science,1966, 5, 85-86.RULE, B. G., & REHILL, D. Distraction an d self-esteem effects on atti tude change. Journal of Per-sonality and Social Psychology, 1970, 15, 359-365.S E A R S , D. O., & ABELES, R. P. Attitudes an d opinions.

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SHARMO, G. W., & MEADOR, L. M. The effect ofvisual distraction upon recall an d attitude change.Journal of Communication, 1969, 19, 157-162.SLWERMAN, I., & R E G T J L A , C . Evaluation apprehen-sion, demand characteristics, and the effects of dis-traction on persuasibility. Journal of Social Psy-

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"overheard" persuasive communications. Journal 'o f Abnormal an d Social Psychology, 1962, 65 ,395^-02.WICKLUND, R. A., COOPER, J., & LINDER, D. E . E f-fects of expected effort on attitude change priorto exposure. Journal of Experimental Social Psy-chology, 1967, 3, 416-^-28.Z I M B A R D O , P. G. The effect of effort an d improvisa-tion on self-persuasion produced by role-playing.Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1965,1, 103-120.Z I M B A R D O , P. G., & EBBESEN, E. B. Influencing at-titudes an d changing behavior. Reading, Mass.:Addison-Wesley, 1969.ZIMBARDO, P. G., & EBBESEN, E. B. Experimentalmodification of the relationship between effort,attitude, an d behavior. Journal of Personality an dSocial Psychology, 1970, 16, 207-213.Z I M B A R D O , P. G., EBBESEN, E . B., & E R A S E R , S. C.Negative emotional distraction and attitude change:Horror, disgust and inhibition. Unpublished manu-script, S tan for d University, 1969. (a ) Described inP. G. Zimbardo & E . B. Ebbesen, Influencing at -titudes an d changing behavior. Reading, Mass.:Addison-Wesley, 1969.Z I M B A R D O , P. G., EBBESEN, E . B., & F R A S E R , S. C.Positive emotional distraction and attitude change:Sexual excitement and facilitation. Unpublishedmanuscript, Stanford University, 1969. (b) De-scribed in P. G. Zimbardo & E. B. Ebbesen, In-fluencing attitudes and changing behavior. Reading,Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1969.Z I M B A R D O , P. G., SNYDER, M., THOMAS, J., GOLD, A.,

& GURWITZ, S. Modifying the impact of persuasivecommunications with external distraction. Journalo f Personality and Social Psychology, 1970, 16,669-680.(Received December 5 , 1972)

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