dissonance effects as conformity to consistency norms: the effect of anonymity and identity salience

Copyright © The British Psychological SocietyReproduction in any form (including the internet) is prohibited without prior permission from the Society

Dissonance effects as conformity to consistencynorms: The effect of anonymity and identitysalience

Toby Robertson*Brunel University, UK

This paper presents an induced compliance experiment (N ¼ 55) that tests the idea,developed from social identity theory (SIT), that attitude shift towards advocacyreflects conformity to a consistency norm. Following computer-mediated groupdiscussion of the primed consistency norm in either anonymous or identifiedconditions, participants were given either high or low choice to advocate counter-attitudinally. As predicted by the social identity model of de-individuation effects (SIDE),anonymity increased identity salience and adherence to the in-group’s consistencynorm. As predicted by the social identity approach to dissonance, high choice/anony-mous participants shifted attitude significantly more than high choice/identifiedparticipants, an effect that was mediated by salience. Contrary to predictions, the highchoice/identified condition did not shift attitude significantly more than the low choicecondition, though the predicted effect was found when salience was controlled for.These data strongly support both SIDE’s view of anonymity and the SIT approach todissonance, especially as alternative approaches predict the reverse of these effects.Implications for research and theory are discussed in relation to dissonance, anonymityand social identity.

In the words of Harmon-Jones and Mills (1999), cognitive dissonance is a pivotal theory

in social psychology. In the original version, Festinger (1957) argues that we need

consistency among our cognitions, such that perceived inconsistencies will provoke a

noxious drive state, dissonance, which motivates behavioural or attitudinal change to

increase consistency. If people perceive they have willingly acted inconsistently withtheir attitudes, it is often attitudes that will shift to become more consistent with the

action. For instance, in the induced compliance paradigm, participants are induced to

advocate counter-attitudinally in either high or low choice conditions. The advocacy

typically takes the form of writing a persuasive essay or argument, and the choice

manipulation is typically achieved through varying the instructions, either politely

requesting or demanding participants to perform the advocacy. Attitude shift is only

* Correspondence should be addressed to Toby Robertson, School of Social Sciences and Law, Brunel University, Uxbridge, UB83PH (e-mail: [email protected]).

TheBritishPsychologicalSociety

683

British Journal of Social Psychology (2006), 45, 683–699

q 2006 The British Psychological Society

www.bpsjournals.co.uk

DOI:10.1348/014466605X82855


expected in high choice conditions. Those who feel more coerced into the inconsistent

action have a ready explanation for their actions and tend not to shift attitudes. Thus,

decision freedom is a necessary precondition for dissonance effects and induced

compliance experiments typically manipulate decision freedom in the expectation that

attitude shifts will be greater in high choice conditions.

Dissonance theory is pivotal for several reasons. Firstly, it has endured half a century

of research and has recently enjoyed a resurgence of interest (e.g. Aronson, 1999;

McKimmie et al. 2003; Monin, Norton, Cooper, & Hogg, 2004; Norton, Monin, Cooper,

& Hogg, 2003; Robertson, 2002; Robertson & Reicher, 1997; Stone & Cooper, 2001,

2003). Secondly, researchers regularly find support for its counter-intuitive prediction of

an attitude change following attitude-inconsistent behaviour. Thirdly, dissonance effects

have intrigued researchers for appearing at odds with related phenomena, such as the

influence of attitude on behaviour (e.g. Ajzen, 1985), persuasion as a result of a message

from an external source (e.g. Petty & Cacioppo, 1996) and conformity to group norms

(e.g. Turner, 1991). By contrast, dissonance effects typically demonstrate the influence

of behaviour on attitude, apparent persuasion from a self-generated message and

reduced adherence to attitudinal norms.

From the perspective of social identity theory (SIT; Tajfel, 1982), attitude change

leading to less adherence to an attitudinal norm is particularly odd, since conformity

should always lead to increased adherence. Given that the particular focus of this paper

is on the relationship of dissonance to conformity, it is worthwhile looking at an

example of a dissonance procedure that has reduced adherence to attitudinal norms.

Participants in Helmreich and Collins’ study (1968) advocated (counter-attitudinally) a

reduction of dental hygiene whilst the magnitude of incentive and the public

identifiability of the participants were manipulated. Participants subsequently agreed

more with their own advocacy the less they were paid and the more identifiable they

were, or as the authors put it, the more committed they were to their advocacies. If one

accepts that a strong regime of dental care was socially prescribed at the time and place

of the study, it is clear that the outcome for low pay and high commitment participants

was less adherence to the social norm. This effect appears to indicate that dissonance

effects have little to do with conformity and group processes.Nevertheless, a handful of recent studies inspired by SIT, and self-categorization

theory (SCT; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, &Wetherell, 1987; Turner, Oakes, Haslam, &

McGarty, 1994) have detected the influence of group membership and group norms on

dissonance effects (McKimmie, et al., 2003; Monin et al., 2004; Norton et al., 2003;

Robertson, 2002; Robertson & Reicher, 1997). SIT and SCT assume that cognition is

always shaped by social context and, in particular, by the relative salience or importance

of different group memberships in the context. Thus, dissonance research appears to

present an inconsistency of its own, in that dissonance processes are both sensitive to

normative influence and potentially reduce normative adherence.

Robertson and Reicher (1997) suggest a way of reconciling the inconsistency. They

argue that shifting attitude towards the advocacy could be seen as conformity to a norm

for attitude–behaviour consistency, even if the shift simultaneously flouts particular

attitudinal norms. Therefore, those experimental situations that simultaneously

downplay the importance of particular attitudinal norms and emphasize those for

attitude–behaviour consistency are likely to be those that successfully elicit attitude

change towards the advocated position. Conversely, if participants advocate the

opposite of a central, or group defining attitude, it is possible that attitude will shift away

684 Toby Robertson


from the advocacy, as has been found in a number of studies (e.g. Cooper & Mackie,

1983; Robertson & Reicher, 1997, Experiment 1).

The influence of a consistency norm has been supported experimentally. Robertson

and Reicher (1997, Experiment 2) told their law student participants that their in-group

(the Law Group) was either characterized by a norm for attitude–behaviour consistency,

or that such consistency was irrelevant to their in-group. All participants were thengiven high choice to advocate counter-attitudinally on a topic relevant to the group

(capital punishment) but on which there is no particular normative attitude. As

expected, post-advocacy attitudes were significantly closer to the advocated position

when there was a consistency norm than post-advocacy attitudes without a consistency

norm and pre-advocacy attitudes from a control group. Relatedly, Robertson, and

Reicher (1998) revealed how the different consistency norms that apply to different

identities could form the focus of political debate. Here, an academic mounted a

withering and tightly argued criticism of inconsistency in US and UK foreign policy. The

politician responded by embracing policy inconsistencies as the sine qua non ofeffective pragmatism in a complex world, recasting the academic’s intellectual rigour as

extreme and unsophisticated. The point is that the implications of inconsistency

depend on which consistency norms pertain to the identity in question. Broadly

speaking then, Robertson and Reicher reject Festinger’s assertion that inconsistency is

problematic, and assert instead that it is counter-normativity that is problematic.

Perceived non-conformity raises questions about the member’s legitimate position

within the group and is thus a potential threat to identity.

However, Robertson and Reicher’s (1997) manipulation of the content of group

norms could be criticized, since it leaves the data open to counter-explanations bothfrom dissonance theory and in terms of demand characteristics (Orne, 1962).

Dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957) argues that the magnitude of dissonance aroused by

an attitude–behaviour inconsistency depends on the importance of the attitude

involved. The greater the dissonance aroused, the greater the attitude shift needed to

restore consonance. If an emphasis on attitude–behaviour consistency can increase the

importance of the attitude in question, then the participant who is told his or her in-

group value consistency may shift attitude more because more dissonance is aroused in

this condition. Alternatively, the demand characteristic argument suggests that a

participant who is told by the experimenter that his or her in-group value consistencymay infer that the experimenter expects counter-attitudinal advocacy to be problematic

and comply with the expectation by shifting attitudes to reduce the inconsistency. Thus,

in the consistency norm condition, greater attitude shift can be explained by conformity

to a consistency norm, as Robertson and Reicher argue, by greater dissonance being

aroused, as Festinger might argue, and by compliance to demand characteristics.

A more convincing demonstration, and one far less open to alternative explanations,

would be to hold normative content constant across conditions, but manipulate the

salience, or relative importance of group membership in the context. SCT predicts that

increased salience increases normative adherence. Provided the salient identity has aconsistency norm, increasing salience should lead to greater attitude shift towards the

advocacy following induced compliance. This paper reports such an experiment.

The particular strength of this manipulation is that identity salience is a central

concept of SIT and SCT, but plays no part in any of the main explanations of dissonance

effects (e.g. Festinger’s cognitive dissonance theory (1957), Aronson’s self-consistency

theory (1968, 1992, 1999), Bem’s self-perception theory (1967; Bem & McConnell,

1970), Tedeschi, Schlenker and Bonoma’s self-presentation theory (1971); Steele and

Conformity in dissonance effects 685


Liu’s self-affirmation theory (1983); Cooper and Fazio’s ‘new look’ dissonance theory

(1984); Beauvois and Joule’s radical dissonance theory (1996, 1999) and Stone and

Cooper’s self standards model (2001, 2003). Not only is the present study the first to use

a salience manipulation to investigate dissonance effects, but also the specific method of

manipulating salience deployed here, namely, an anonymity manipulation, is

particularly well suited to the task of evaluating the relative viability of alternativeaccounts of dissonance phenomena. De-individuation theory (Diener, 1980; Prentice-

Dunn & Rogers, 1982; Zimbardo, 1969) would predict less normative adherence and

many dissonance theories (e.g. Brehm & Cohen, 1962; Festinger, 1964; Tedeschi et al.,

1971) would predict less attitude shift in anonymous conditions. Thus, if anonymity

leads to increased normative adherence together with increased attitude change

towards advocacy in the present study, then this would present serious problems for the

viability of dissonance and de-individuation theories.

De-individuation theory claims that anonymity induces a state of lowered self-

observation (Zimbardo, 1969) or self-awareness (Diener, 1980). De-individuated peopleare said to have limited ability to monitor their own behaviour in relation to personal,

moral and social norms, and are susceptible to atavistic and antisocial behaviour. For

example, Zimbardo reports that anonymized female participants gave stronger electric

shocks to a learner (confederate) than identified participants did. In another classic

research paradigm, a mirror is placed in front of a participant to increase self-awareness

and hence adherence to social norms. The presence of a mirror has been found to

reduce cheating in an exam (Diener & Wallbom, 1976) and to reduce the delivery of

shocks to an experimental confederate in the context of a learning experiment (Scheier,

Fenigstein, & Buss, 1974).Dissonance research reveals that anonymity can reduce attitude shift in induced

compliance (e.g. Carlsmith, Collins, & Helmreich, 1966; Harvey, 1965; Helmreich &

Collins, 1968). Carlsmith et al. compared the effect of face-to-face advocacy with

anonymous essay writing and found less attitude change when advocacy was

anonymous. The effect of anonymity is described as reducing commitment to the

advocacy (Brehm & Cohen, 1962; Festinger, 1964) or reducing public accountability

(Tedeschi et al., 1971). De-individuation and dissonance theories have little to do with

each other outside their predictions for anonymity, apart from both of them being

criticized for their individualistic notions of self (Reicher, Spears, & Postmes, 1995;Robertson & Reicher, 1997). In both cases, the criticisms suggest that de-individuation

and dissonance effects are related to social context and group norms, something the

individualistic theories are inapt to account for.

Accordingly, the social identity model of de-individuation effects (SIDE; Reicher et al.,

1995) predicts the opposite effects for anonymity and challenges individualistic notions of

de-individuation by arguing that they rest upon the faulty assumption that people are

merely individuals. The central tenet of SIT/SCT is that each individual hasmultiplepossible

selves associated with different group memberships such as Arsenal football club fan,

Catholic, female, psychologist, Briton and so on. The effect of anonymity cannot thereforebe to occlude the singular self, leaving no self, but rather to alter the relative salience of

different identities. In short, de-individuation is not a loss of self, but a shift of self.

More specifically, SCT states that the salience of a given identity is determined by

the meta-contrast ratio (Turner et al., 1987), the ratio of perceived differences within

and between groups. The greater the ratio, the more salient the identity becomes and

the more members conform to the group’s norms. SIDE extends SCT by arguing that

anonymity reduces visible differences within groups (i.e. between individual group

686 Toby Robertson


members). If visible differences between groups remain high (i.e. a group identity is

already salient), then the meta-contrast ratio of within and between-group differences

will increase, as will salience. In turn, this increases adherence to context specific

group norms (Lea, Spears, Watt, & Rogers, 2000). In the absence of visible between-

group differences (i.e. in low group salience conditions), the meta-contrast ratio is

little affected by reducing visible interpersonal differences via anonymity. However,anonymity in this situation will hinder interpersonal relationships, making people feel

more isolated and less likely to adhere to social norms.

Theevidence supportingSIDE is compelling (Postmes&Spears, 1998;Postmes, Spears,&

Lea, 1998, 2000; Postmes, Spears, Lea, & Reicher, 2000; Postmes, Spears, Sakhel, & deGroot,

2001; Reicher&Levine, 1994a, 1994b; Reicher, Levine,&Gordijn, 1998; Reicheret al., 1995;

Sassenberg&Postmes, 2002). For instance, Postmes and Spears’ (1998)meta-analytic review

of de-individuation research finds little evidence to support the central de-individuation

position that anonymity leads to anti-normative behaviour, but does find that anonymity has areliable effect of increasing adherence to context-specific norms. In an experiment, Postmes

et al. (2001) had participants discuss solutions to a problem over a computer text-messaging

system, whilst either identified (digitized photograph of all discussants displayed on each

participant’s computer screen) or anonymous (no photograph). They found that

conversation and subsequent individual solutions adhered to earlier normative primes

more in anonymous than identified conditions. In other words, the effects of anonymity on

conformity are explicable in terms of identity salience.

In sum, the current study pits individualistic approaches to dissonance and de-individuation on one side against a combination of SIT/SCT-based approaches on the

other. De-individuation theory predicts that anonymity weakens normative adherence,

and dissonance theory predicts that it reduces attitude shift following induced

compliance. The SIT/SCT approaches to dissonance and de-individuation predict that

anonymity (in group-salient conditions) will increase normative adherence and increase

attitude shift following induced compliance (provided participants freely choose to

advocate counter-attitudinally and salient identity is characterized by a norm for

attitude–behaviour consistency).Methodologically, the present study adapts the general procedure used by Postmes

et al. (2001) outlined above, where participants engage in a computer-mediated group

discussion on the importance of a primed group norm. In the present study, the norm is

for attitude–behaviour consistency. Participants are either identified using digitized

facial photographs presented on the computer screen during the discussion or remain

anonymous (no picture) throughout the procedure. Greater identity salience

(Hypothesis 1) and hence greater norm adherence (Hypothesis 2) are predicted in

the anonymous condition. Subsequently, participants are given either high or lowchoice to advocate counter-attitudinally. Both high choice conditions are predicted to

yield more attitude change than the low choice condition (Hypothesis 3) and the high

choice/anonymous condition is predicted to yield greater attitude shift than the high

choice/identified condition (Hypothesis 4).

Method

OverviewThe procedure consisted of seven phases that were presented to participants as a series

of separate studies. The first three were identical for all participants, and were designed

to prime the norm for attitude–behaviour consistency, increase group cohesion



and measure group identification. The fourth ‘study’ manipulated anonymity during a

computer-mediated group discussion on the importance of the primed norm for

attitude–behaviour consistency. SIDE predicts that anonymous participants should

adhere to the in-group norm more strongly. The next ‘study’ manipulated decision

freedom to advocate counter-attitudinally. The prediction was for greater attitude shift

towards the advocacy in high choice conditions, but especially so for highchoice/anonymous participants. The remaining ‘studies’ assessed key dependent

measures including attitude.

Participants and designParticipants were 64 first-year undergraduate psychology students (54 women and 10

men) aged between 18 and 24, who took part in exchange for £5 each. Participants were

invited to take part if they were attitudinally opposed to the war in Iraq, established at apre-testing session. All research was conducted during the last quarter of 2004, a year

and a half after the invasion of Iraq. Participants were run in 22 groups; 8 groups of two,

8 groups of three and 6 groups of four. Group size varied due to some participants not

keeping their appointments. Groups of participants were randomly allocated to one of

three conditions, high choice/anonymous and high choice/identified plus a control

condition of low choice/anonymous. Nine participants were omitted from the analysis

for refusing to advocate the war in Iraq, one in the low choice/anonymous condition,

two in the high choice/identified condition, and six in the high choice/anonymouscondition, leaving 55 participants in 22 groups. A higher refusal rate is expected in high

choice conditions as one of the consequences of greater decision freedom. The greater

drop out in high choice/anonymous conditions might indicate greater internalization of

the primed norm for consistency, and this will be explored in the results section. If so,

their removal may have lowered the average normative adherence in that condition,

arguably lessening the difference with high choice /identified condition, and lessening

the chances of finding a significant difference between the two high choice conditions

(Hypothesis 4). Given the low number of qualifying and volunteering students, the fullfactorial design could not be conducted. Nevertheless, the remaining three conditions

permitted the four hypotheses to be tested.

ProcedureOn arrival in the laboratories, participants were immediately seated in separate rooms

each equipped with a computer where they stayed for the whole experiment. No twoparticipants in the anonymous conditions arrived at the same time, so none had any idea

who else was taking part in the experiment. Participants were told that the experiment

focused on attitudinal differences between the psychology group and the law group,

and involved a series of short, separate studies, partly on paper, partly on the computer.

It was explained that they were taking part with other psychology group members

who would be doing the ‘study’ at the same time, that a similar number of law group

members would be doing the ‘study’ simultaneously in another part of the building and

that the studies involved some intergroup comparative and competitive elements.However, neither group would be able to view what the other group was saying or

doing. The intergroup context was introduced to increase the salience of participants’

group membership (Spears, Lea, & Lee, 1990; Turner et al., 1987).

At this point, the Internet Relay Chat (IRC) set up was introduced. It allowed one-to-

one communication between the participant and the experimenter and group-wide

688 Toby Robertson


communication. A digital photograph was then taken of participants’ faces in the

identified condition. Participants then read about (bogus) research reporting no

differences between the groups either in mean attitude to the war in Iraq, or variance

(which was said to be large). However, the psychology group was said to believe much

more strongly in the importance of attitude–behaviour consistency than the law group.

The bogus feedback was intended to maximize the perception of a psychology in-groupnorm for attitude–behaviour consistency, whilst minimizing the perception of a

particular normative attitude on the war in Iraq.

The first ‘study’ was designed to prime the norm for attitude–behaviour consistency. It

consisted of a 10-minute sentence-descrambling task (Srull & Wyer, 1979). When

unscrambled, 23 sentences expressed aspects of attitude–behaviour consistency. For

instance, the stimulus sentence ‘the line politician in rightly his with voted principles’ had

to be unscrambled into ‘the politician rightly voted in line with his principles’. Similarly,

‘exactly she says reliably what she thinks always’ could be reordered into ‘she reliablyalways says exactly what she thinks’. The other eight sentences were neutral, for example,

‘he givesmoney to charity’ and ‘they could not delay any longer’. To increase the relevance

of the primes to the participants, the sentences were alleged to come from psychology

group members whilst discussing their group’s values and attitudes. On average,

participants tried to unscramble 14 sentences, 12 of which were unscrambled correctly.

The second ‘study’ was based on the group cohesion task used by Doosje, Spears,

and Koomen (1995) in which participants estimated the number of black squares in a

grid of white and black squares (presented on paper). Estimates were sent via IRC tothe experimenter, who then sent bogus feedback on the responses of the other

group members, consisting of estimates close to the correct answer. Participants then

gave their final estimates. There were three grids of increasing complexity.

Participants were told that the psychology and law groups were doing this task

simultaneously and were competing for group points awarded for accuracy, adding

that the experimenters expected the psychology group to win because perceptual

accuracy was correlated with greater attitude–behaviour consistency. After the final

grid, participants were congratulated on being more accurate than the law group.This final aspect departs from Doosje et al.’s method, but was intended to further

establish the reality of the psychology group norm for attitude–behaviour consistency.

Study 3 consisted of the Brown, Condor, Matthews, Wade, and Williams (1986)

measure of strength of identity.

Study 4 manipulated anonymity during a computer mediated group discussion

concerning a dilemma that revolved around the importance of attitude–behaviour

consistency. Participants’ computer screens in the identified condition displayed the

digitized photographs of themselves and the other psychology group members takingpart in that session, together with their usernames, ‘psymem1’, ‘psymem2’ and so on.

In anonymous conditions, the computers displayed no photographs or usernames. All

participants read the following text:

A lawyer has strong personal beliefs in, and political commitments to, gender equality and

equal opportunities. He has been asked to defend an industrial employer accused of sex

discrimination. Several female employees claim that they have been repeatedly overlooked

for promotion while male colleagues with similar or less experience have been promoted.

The available evidence confirms this is the case : : : . If he agrees to defend the employer, the

lawyer knows he will have to argue the opposite of his personal beliefs. But, the employer is

entitled to a defence. Should the lawyer accept the case? What would you do if you were the

lawyer? Why?



Participants communicated via an Internet Relay Chat (MIRC) software package,

with sent messages appearing on all participants’ screens in the order they were sent.

Each message was identified with its sender’s user name (e.g. ‘psymem1’). After 10

minutes, the experimenter stopped the discussion, and participants completed

measures on their adherence to the primed norm, on their perceived level of anonymity

and on the salience of their group identity.

The next ‘study’ was presented as a last minute addition to the experiment, there to

help the researchers prepare a future experiment on persuasion. Decision freedom was

manipulated by altering written instructions. High choice participants were asked

politely to complete the unforeseen task, and read a statement of their freedom of

choice whether to comply. Low choice participants were instructed to complete the

task and did not see the freedom of choice statement. Participants were told that one

member of their group would be randomly selected to argue for the war in Iraq, whilst

the remainder of the groupwould be asked to argue against it. All participants were then

asked to advocate the war in Iraq, and were given 5 minutes to write as many persuasive

arguments as they could. The next two studies contained the key dependent measures,

including and in the following order, the same measure of attitude to the war in Iraq as

they had completed at the pre-test session, perceived persuasiveness of the advocacy,

perceived self-inconsistency and perceived freedom of choice to complete the

advocacy. When the tasks were completed, participants were questioned on their

perceptions of the purpose and aims of the ‘studies’, debriefed, thanked and paid.

MeasuresAll items were responded to on a 5-point Likert scale (1 ¼ strongly disagree, 5 ¼

strongly agree) unless otherwise stated. Strength of identification was measured using

Brown et al.’s (1986) 10-item measure with responses on a 5-point scale of frequencyranging from never to very often (a ¼ :70). Two questions assessed adherence to the

consistency norm, ‘psychology group members should only argue for what they believe

in’ and ‘if I were the lawyer, I would take the case and defend the employer’ (recoded;

a ¼ :74). Two questions assessed perceived identifiability, ‘the people I interacted with

were personally identifiable to me’, and ‘I felt identifiable to the people I interacted

with’ (a ¼ :81). One question measured the current salience of group membership,

‘right now, being a member of the psychology group is important to me’(adapted from

Haslam, Oakes, Reynolds, & Turner, 1999). Attitude to the war in Iraq was assessed withthe same nine questions pre- and post-advocacy. The items were ‘I am opposed to the

War in Iraq’, ‘the War in Iraq is necessary to make the world a safer place’ (recoded), ‘the

War in Iraq will lead to more terrorism’, ‘the removal of Saddam Hussein justifies theWar

in Iraq’ (recoded), ‘the War in Iraq is unjustified’, ‘I support the War in Iraq’ (recoded),

‘the War in Iraq is mostly about economics rather than fighting terrorism’, ‘on balance,

the War in Iraq is good for world peace’ (recoded) and ‘the War in Iraq has made the

world a more dangerous place’ (pre-advocacy a ¼ :85; post-advocacy a ¼ :85). Threequestions tapped participants’ perceptions of their own arguments, ‘I think myarguments were persuasive’, ‘I think my arguments went against my opinions’ and ‘the

argument writing task made me feel I contradicted myself’. These questions were

intended to help assess possible alternative explanations of attitude shift. Lastly, there

was a choice manipulation check, ‘I felt I had complete freedom of choice whether to

do the argument writing task or not’.

690 Toby Robertson


Results

Since participants interacted in groups, it was possible that their data were not

independent, which would have made group-level analysis necessary. This was checkedby calculating two intra-class correlations, on the salience variable and on the attitude

change measure. The correlation coefficients were low (salience r ¼ :1; attitude changer ¼ 2:1) indicating that the vast majority of the total variance was found within

interacting groups. The data were therefore sufficiently independent to be analysed at

the level of individual participants.

Participants excluded from the analysisAs outlined in the method section, a number of participants declined to perform the

advocacy. One-way ANOVAs were carried out on pre-advocacy attitude to the war in

Iraq, the number of scrambled sentences attempted and the number correctly

reordered, strength of identification, perceived anonymity and normative adherence,

with the independent variable being whether participants agreed or refused to perform

the advocacy. No differences were revealed, all Fsð1; 63Þ , 2:26; ns.

Manipulation checks and strength of identificationThe anonymity manipulation appeared to work well. After the group discussion task,

participants in anonymous conditions felt less identifiable (low choice/anonymous,

M ¼ 2:38, SD ¼ 0:70; high choice/anonymous, M ¼ 2:65, SD ¼ 0:76) than participantsin the identified condition (M ¼ 3:24, SD ¼ 0:82). A one-way ANOVA revealed a

significant difference among the three conditions, Fð2; 52Þ ¼ 5:91; p ¼ :005; h2p ¼ :19.

Planned contrasts revealed that the two anonymous conditions did not differ

significantly from each other, tð52Þ ¼ 1:07, ns, but both the high and low choice

anonymous conditions felt less identifiable than the high choice/identified condition,

tð52Þ ¼ 22:39, p ¼ :020; tð52Þ ¼ 3:32, p ¼ :002, respectively. The choice manipulation

was also successful. Low choice/anonymous participants reported feeling less freedom

of choice (M ¼ 2:69, SD ¼ 1:25), compared with the high choice/identified condition(M ¼ 4:11, SD ¼ 1:15) and the high choice/anonymous condition (M ¼ 3:85,SD ¼ 1:23). A one-way ANOVA revealed a highly significant difference among

conditions. Fð2; 52Þ ¼ 6:66; p ¼ :003; h2p ¼ :20. Planned contrasts confirmed that the

two high choice conditions did not differ significantly from each other, tð52Þ ¼ 20:66,ns, while both the high choice/anonymous and the high choice/identified felt greater

decision freedom than the low choice/anonymous condition, tð52Þ ¼ 2:87, p ¼ :006;tð52Þ ¼ 3:46, p ¼ 0:001, respectively. Strength of identification scores were similar

across conditions (low choice/anonymous M ¼ 2:57, SD ¼ 0:33; high choice/anon-ymous M ¼ 2:47, SD ¼ 0:42; high choice/identified M ¼ 2:60, SD ¼ 0:35). A one-way

ANOVA revealed no significant difference, Fð2; 52Þ ¼ 0:72; ns.

Group salience and normative adherenceFollowing SIDE, increased anonymity during the group discussion was predicted tocreate greater identity salience (Hypothesis 1) and hence adherence to the in-group

norm for attitude–behaviour consistency (Hypothesis 2). Means and standard deviations

for these variables are presented in Table 1. As predicted, a one-way ANOVA on the

salience data revealed a significant difference among conditions, Fð2; 52Þ ¼ 4:51;



p ¼ :016; h2p ¼ :15. Planned contrasts revealed that whilst there was no significant

difference between the two anonymous conditions, tð52Þ ¼ 21:00, ns, both the high

choice/anonymous and low choice/anonymous conditions had higher levels of salience

than the high choice/identified condition, tð52Þ ¼ 2:85, p ¼ :006; tð52Þ ¼ 23:68,p ¼ :001, respectively. The consistency norm was primed through a sentence-

descrambling task. There were no differences between conditions in the number of

scrambled sentences attempted, Fð2; 52Þ ¼ :95; ns, nor in the number correctly

unscrambled, Fð2; 52Þ ¼ :54; ns. Following group discussion, it was predicted thatnormative adherence would be greater in anonymous conditions. A one-way ANOVA

revealed a significant difference among conditions, Fð2; 52Þ ¼ 10:21; p , :001;h2p ¼ :28. Again, as predicted, planned comparisons revealed that whilst the two

anonymous conditions did not differ from each other, tð52Þ ¼ 0:28, ns, both high and

low choice anonymity conditions exhibited greater adherence to the consistency norm

than the high choice/identified condition, tð52Þ ¼ 3:86, p , :001; tð52Þ ¼ 23:92,p , :001, respectively. Including strength of identity and group size as a covariate did

not substantially alter salience or normative adherence effects and in all cases, thecovariates were not significant, all Fsð1; 51Þ , 1:8; ns.

Attitude changeAttitude change scores were calculated by subtracting post-advocacy attitude scores

from pre-advocacy scores, such that positive numbers indicated attitude shift towardsthe advocated position. Table 2 gives the mean pre-advocacy, post-advocacy and change

scores in the three conditions. One-way ANOVAs reveal no significant differences in

attitude pre-advocacy, Fð2; 52Þ ¼ 1:95; ns, and a slight trend post-advocacy,

Fð2; 52Þ ¼ 2:45; p ¼ :096. However, a one-way ANOVA conducted on the change

data did find a significant difference, Fð2; 52Þ ¼ 6:82; p ¼ :002; h2p ¼ :21. We expected

the two high choice conditions to produce more attitude change than the low choice

condition (Hypothesis 3). Planned contrast analyses revealed that, contrary to

expectations, the high choice/identified condition was not significantly different fromthe low choice/anonymous condition, tð52Þ ¼ 1:31; p ¼ :2, but consistent with the

prediction, the high choice/anonymous condition was, tð52Þ ¼ 3:61; p ¼ :001. Alsoconsistent with this prediction, the two high choice conditions, when combined, were

significantly different from the one low choice condition compared in a single contrast,

Table 1. Means of salience and normative adherence across condition

Condition

Low choice/anonymous(N ¼ 16)

High choiceanonymous(N ¼ 20)

High choiceidentified(N ¼ 19)

Dependent variable M SD M SD M SD

Salience 3.94a 0.44 3.70a 0.80 3.05b 0.78Normative adherence 4.00a 0.85 3.90a 0.64 3.00b 0.71

Note. Higher numbers indicate higher levels of identity salience and greater conformity to the primednorm. Means that do not share a superscript are significantly different.

692 Toby Robertson


tð52Þ ¼ 2:78; p ¼ :008. The fourth hypothesis predicted a significant difference

between the two high choice conditions with greater attitude shift expected in the

anonymous condition. A planned contrast analysis confirmed greater shift for

anonymous participants, tð52Þ ¼ 2:39; p ¼ :020. Including strength of identificationand group size as covariates did not substantially alter the attitude change effects, and

neither covariate was significant, both Fsð1; 51Þ , 1:04; ns.Consistent with these results being mediated by salience, the salience measure was a

significant covariate, Fð1; 51Þ ¼ 7:66; p ¼ :008; h2p ¼ :13. Moreover, the significant

difference between the two high choice conditions disappeared when salience was

controlled for, tð51Þ ¼ 1:35; p ¼ :185. The analysis of covariance also suggested a

reason for the unexpected lack of difference between the low choice/anonymous

condition and the high choice/identified condition. When salience was controlled for,

the difference became significant, tð51Þ ¼ 2:50; p ¼ :016, suggesting that the markedly

lower levels of both salience and normative adherence in the Identified condition

(see Table 1) limited attitude shift.

Perceptions of advocacyThree items tapped participants’ perceptions of their own advocacies. No specificpredictions were made concerning these data, but their inclusion was designed to help

test any alternative explanations of the attitude change data. Participants were asked

how persuasive they thought their arguments were. There were no significant

differences between conditions on this item (low choice/anonymous M ¼ 2:94,SD ¼ 1:18; high choice/anonymous M ¼ 2:65, SD ¼ 1:04; high choice/identified

M ¼ 2:35, SD ¼ 1:00; Fð2 52Þ ¼ 1:23; ns). Rated persuasiveness correlated with rated

anonymity (r ¼ 2:26, p ¼ :039) indicating that the less identifiable participants felt, themore persuasive they felt their advocacies were. However, persuasiveness did notcorrelate with attitude change (r ¼ :08, ns) or perceived freedom of choice (r ¼ :14,ns). These data run counter to a possible alternative explanation based on the

persuasiveness of the essays themselves. Participants were asked how much their

arguments had gone against their own opinions. There was little difference between

conditions (low choice/anonymous M ¼ 3:31, SD ¼ 1:58; high choice/anonymous

Table 2. Mean attitude pre- and post-advocacy, and attitude change across conditions

Condition

Low choiceanonymous(N ¼ 16)

High choiceannonymous(N ¼ 20)

High choiceidentified(N ¼ 19)

Attitude variable M SD M SD M SD

Pre-advocacy 3.92 0.61 4.13 0.53 4.29 0.53Post-advocacy 3.89 0.61 3.74 0.55 4.13 0.51Change 0.03a 0.27 0.39b 0.29 0.17a 0.32

Note. Higher scores on the attitude variables indicate greater opposition to the war in Iraq. Greaternumbers on the change variable indicate attitude shift in the direction of the advocacy. Means that donot share a superscript are significantly different.



M ¼ 3:68, SD ¼ 1:16; high choice/identified M ¼ 4:00, SD ¼ 1:37) and a one-way

ANOVA confirmed the differences were not significant, Fð2; 52Þ ¼ 1:10; ns. These datarun counter to a potential alternative explanation based on the advocacy seeming more

attitude-discrepant to participants who shifted attitudes more. Finally, participants were

asked to say how much they felt they had contradicted themselves. There was a marked

difference across conditions, (low choice/anonymous M ¼ 2:81, SD ¼ 0:91; highchoice/anonymousM ¼ 3:75, SD ¼ 0:97; high choice/identified M ¼ 3:95, SD ¼ 1:27),which was found to be significant, Fð2; 52Þ ¼ 5:50; p ¼ :007; h2

p ¼ :18. Planned

comparisons were carried out to find the conditions that differed significantly from each

other. The two high choice conditions did not differ significantly from each other,

tð52Þ ¼ 20:58; ns, but both the anonymous and identified high choice conditions

differed significantly from the low choice/anonymous condition, tð52Þ ¼ 3:14,p ¼ :003; tð52Þ ¼ 2:62, p ¼ :011, respectively. This suggests that the participants’

understanding of the term contradict implies a degree of responsibility or accountabilityfor the advocacy, not implied by the term against in the previous item. This finding

seemed to confirm the success of the choice manipulation. Interestingly, perceived self-

contradiction did not correlate with attitude change (r ¼ :01, ns), suggesting other

variables are implicated in the typical dissonance-style attitude effect.

Discussion

Consistent with predictions, anonymity in group-salient conditions increases salience

and adherence to the primed norm for attitude–behaviour consistency. Also as

predicted, anonymity increases attitude change towards the advocated position in high

choice conditions, with the effect clearly mediated through salience. This study

represents strong confirmation of the notion that adherence to a consistency norm can

account for attitude shift towards the advocacy following induced compliance. The

conclusions can be drawn with such confidence partly because the concept of salienceis central to SIT/SCT approaches, and partly because other dissonance theories predict

the diametric opposite of our results. Dissonance theory sometimes predicts greater

attitude shift if participants argue the opposite of more important attitudes, and

sometimes less shift with more important attitudes. The data presented here avoid such

alternative explanations because normative content was constant across conditions. It is

hard to see how dissonance theories could accommodate these data without adopting a

social, flexible and context-sensitive notion of self and the principle of meta-contrast

when dealing with the consequences of anonymity.The one prediction that is not clearly supported is that the two high choice

conditions would yield more attitude change than the low choice condition

(Hypothesis 3). Although the low choice condition differs significantly from the high

choice/anonymous condition, and from the two high choice conditions combined, it

does not differ significantly from the high choice/identified condition on its own.

However, reanalyzing the data with salience as a covariate did reveal the predicted

difference, suggesting that the unexpected lack of attitude change was due to the much

lower levels of salience in the Identified condition. To put it another way, high choice isnot sufficient to produce significant amounts of attitude shift towards the advocacy; it

has to be combined with a consistency norm. In the high choice/identified condition, it

appears that the low levels of salience reduced adherence to the primed norm, reducing

attitude shift.

694 Toby Robertson


Another point of interest is the obtained difference between salience scores and

strength of identification, in that anonymity leads to increases in one but not the other

despite the items concerned looking somewhat similar. Indeed, Haslam (2001)

describes the item we use as a measure of salience as being suitable for measuring both

salience and strength of identification. Nonetheless, the two are conceptually distinct.

Strength of identification refers to more enduring feelings of commitment to a group,the relevance of the group to one’s life as a whole and the attractiveness of the group in

the context. Salience, on the other hand, refers to transitory relevance and importance

of one identity among many in the current context. Moreover, Haslam describes the

measure of strength of identification we use as unsuitable as a measure of salience. In

sum, whilst the measure of salience may also measure identification, the reverse is

unlikely to be so. Coupled with the lack of differences in identification and the marked

differences in salience one can be confident that the salience item measures what it is

meant to.

A final issue concerning the results is that participants rate their self-contra-dictoriness in line with decision freedom, and yet self-contradictoriness does not

correlate with attitude change. Although no predictions are made about these measures,

the pattern of data is consistent with our approach. High self-contradictoriness only

leads to greater attitude shift when adherence to the consistency norm is also high. This

chimes with the present argument that attitude shift is not driven by a need for

consistency, but for normativity.

Even if one accepts that this study demonstrates the influence of a consistency norm,

the radical question is whether this justifies the reinterpretation of dissonance effects in

general as manifestations of conformity. It is, of course, impossible to say with certainty,but there are at least two reasons for preferring the more radical option. Firstly, the data

presented here are extremely difficult for dissonance theories to reinterpret. Secondly,

there is a prima facie case for viewing the typical dissonance experimental procedure as

ideal for emphasizing consistency norms, intentionally or otherwise. The participant is

usually a psychology undergraduate student and the researcher is usually a prestigious

member of staff. The researcher is likely to have the power to elicit compliance when

requesting the counter-attitudinal advocacy, and psychology students in the psychology

experiment are likely to feel they are being assessed on dimensions such as rationality,

honesty and intelligence, all of which can imply attitude–behaviour consistency. Thetime may be right to investigate the role of consistency norms in producing dissonance

effects across the full range of dissonance research paradigms.

More broadly still, this study justifies a focus on the social relationships and the

contexts pertaining in research settings. Instead of trying to explain public acts

including attitude expressions by reference purely to the mechanical and structural

properties of cognition, psychologists should focus on the meaning of behaviour, judged

in relation to the norms of salient identity. As mentioned earlier, non-conformity raises

questions over the legitimate position of the actor within the group, and can therefore

threaten identity. Ignoring the social psychological meaning of a given action in a givensocial context, as dissonance theory does, leads to a distorted and de-socialized view of

the human subject, where social behaviour is divorced from the social context that

creates it.

A case in point would be the self-awareness tradition, which suggests very clearly

that anonymity reduces people’s ability to monitor their own behaviour in terms of

social norms, and that heightened self-awareness through mirror placement, increases

that capacity. De-individuation studies such as Zimbardo’s (1969), described in



the Introduction, observe participants’ increased aggression and relate it only to the

internal workings of self-related cognition. The error of this explanation is well

documented by SIDE researchers (Reicher et al., 1995) among others who point out that

it is the contextual meaning of a given action vis-a-vis salient identity that determines its

expression or otherwise. This point is nicely amplified in the present data, where

anonymity produces markedly greater adherence to the primed norm, and adds to thebody of SIDE research. Within dissonance theory, anonymity is thought to reduce

dissonance arousal, either because of reduced commitment to the counter-attitudinal

act (Brehm & Cohen, 1962; Festinger, 1964) or reduced accountability to powerful

others (Tedeschi, et al., 1971). The opposite effect is observed in our study. A dissonance

theorist might contest this point arguing that reduced attitude change is a product of

anonymous production of the counter-attitudinal essay, rather than anonymous group

discussion. We concede this point, but it only supports our main argument that

whereas dissonance theorists consider anonymity as having a uniform effect due to

the internal workings of self-related cognition, we see the effect of anonymity ascomplex and flexible, depending on its cognitive and strategic implications for

salient identity.

Finally, the notion of identity threat is vital in SIT and much research explores in-

group favouritism and out-group derogation as responses to threat from an out-group

(e.g. Branscombe, Ellemers, Spears, and Doosje, 1999). In a similar vein, it is argued

here that non-conformity can threaten identity since it raises questions over

legitimate position within the group. The questions can be raised in the mind of the

actor on his or her own, and can be amplified by public accountability. This

represents a threat from the in-group as opposed to the more often studied threatfrom the out-group. Following this reasoning, it suggests that the attitude change

effects found in induced compliance studies are attitudinal adjustments to deny

deviance or to adopt a more prototypical position within the group. This also

represents a less studied response dimension since, typically, favouritism and

derogation are the focus of research. In short, induced compliance research may be a

fruitful way to explore group dynamics relating to less commonly studied situations

and responses. However, it must be pointed out that by demonstrating the role of

group processes in dissonance effects, this study probably raises more questions than

it answers. For instance, group processes are known to depend on the nature of thegroup, for example, real versus laboratory, task focused or person focused, and

identity threat is known to depend on intergroup relations. Yet this study is not able

to comment on what role these factors may have on the results we report here.

Nevertheless, in demonstrating that at least in one set of group circumstances,

dissonance effects reflect conformity to a consistency norm, we are able to challenge

individualistic approaches, and further push open the door to more detailed research

on moderating group variables.

A little more speculatively, induced compliance raises questions about how

different group memberships interact. When a member of Group A is asked toadvocate the opposite of one of Group A’s normative attitudes, why do they comply,

when doing so threatens that identity? The likely answer is that compliance is

normative for the participant’s relationship with the experimenter. In other words,

conformity to one identity’s norms can undermine conformity with another identity’s

norms. If this reasoning is sound, it follows that attitude change in induced

compliance is due to opposing normative demands from different, and simultaneously

salient, identities. SIT and SCT typically suggests that only one identity is salient at a

696 Toby Robertson


time, and researchers have studied conformity to only one group’s norms at a time.

Induced compliance and dissonance research in general offers a way of exploring the

interplay between different identities and normative influences. For instance, Emler

and Reicher (1996) discuss how adolescent female delinquents face a normative

dilemma where conformity to feminine norms undermines their delinquent identities

and vice versa. The dilemma is brought about both by the ‘dissonance’ between therespective sets of norms, but also by the social relationship between the identities in

that they were both lived out with the same audience. This suggests that incompatible

norms are made acutely problematic by particular social contexts. Further research

into this and related phenomena could extend SIT and SCT by exploring the interplay

between different identities, and how identity is expressed or lived out in front of

different audiences.

To conclude, although this study offers encouragement for those who would

reinterpret a wide range of dissonance effects in terms of an SIT/SCT notion ofconformity, it must be acknowledged that this work has only just begun. The dissonance

literature is vast. Nonetheless, given the rich insights that can be gained from this

research, it is a task well worth attempting.

Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank Tracey Alexander, Magda Vidovic and Andrea Day for help with

data collection.

References

Ajzen, I. (1985). From intentions to actions: A theory of planned behavior. In J. Kuhl & J. Beckman

(Eds.), Action-control: From cognition to behavior ( pp. 11–39). Heidelberg: Springer.

Aronson, E. (1968). Dissonance theory: Progress and problems. In R. P. Abelson, E. Aronson,

W. J. McGuire, T. M. Newcomb, M. J. Rosenberg & P. H. Tannenbaum (Eds.), Theories of

cognitive consistency: A sourcebook ( pp. 5–27). Chicago, IL: Rand McNally.

Aronson, E. (1992). The return of the repressed: Dissonance theory makes a comeback.

Psychological Inquiry, 3, 303–311.

Aronson, E. (1999). Dissonance, hypocrisy, and the self-concept. In E. Harmon-Jones & J. Mills

(Eds.), Cognitive dissonance: Progress on a pivotal theory in social psychology

( pp. 103–126). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.

Beauvois, J.-L., & Joule, R.-V. (1996). A radical dissonance theory. London: Taylor and Francis.

Beauvois, J.-L., & Joule, R.-V. (1999). A radical view on dissonance theory. In E. Harmon-Jones &

J. Mills (Eds.), Cognitive dissonance: Progress on a pivotal theory in social psychology

( pp. 43–70). London: American Psychological Association.

Bem, D. J. (1967). Self-perception: An alternative interpretation of cognitive dissonance

phenomena. Psychological Review, 74, 183–200.

Bem, D. J., & McConnell, H. K. (1970). Testing the self-perception explanation of dissonance

phenomena: On the salience of premanipulation attitudes. Journal of Personality and Social

Psychology, 14, 23–41.

Branscombe, N. R., Ellemers, N., Spears, R., & Doosje, B. (1999). The context and content of social

identity threat. In N. Ellemers, R. Spears & B. Doosje (Eds.), Social identity: Context,

commitment, content ( pp. 35–58). Oxford: Blackwell.

Brehm, J., & Cohen, A. R. (1962). Explorations in cognitive dissonance. New York: Wiley.

Brown, R., Condor, S., Matthews, A., Wade, G., & Williams, J. (1986). Explaining intergroup

differentiation in an industrial organization. Journal of Occupational Psychology, 59,

273–286.



Carlsmith, J. M., Collins, B. E., & Helmreich, R. L. (1966). Studies in forced compliance.I. The effect

of pressure for compliance on attitude change produced by face-to-face role playing and

anonymous essay writing. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 4, 1–13.

Cooper, J., & Fazio, R. H. (1984). A new look at dissonance theory. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances

in experimental social psychology, (Vol. 17, pp. 229–266). New York: Academic Press.

Cooper, J. S., & Mackie, D. (1983). Cognitive dissonance in an intergroup context. Journal of

Personality and Social Psychology, 44, 536–544.

Diener, E. (1980). Deindividuation: The absence of self-awareness and self-regulation in group

members. In P. Paulus (Ed.), The psychology of group influence. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

Diener, E., & Wallbom, M. (1976). Effects of self-awareness on antinormative behavior. Journal of

Research in Personality, 10, 107–111.

Doosje, B., Spears, R., & Koomen, W. (1995). When bad isn’t all bad: Strategic use of sample

information in generalization and stereotyping. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology,

69, 642–655.

Emler, N., & Reicher, S. (1996). The social psychology of adolescent delinquency. Oxford:

Blackwell.

Festinger, L. (1957). A theory of cognitive dissonance. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Festinger, L. (1964). Conflict, decision and dissonance. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Harmon-Jones, E., & Mills, J. (1999). Cognitive dissonance: Progress on a pivotal theory in social

psychology. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.

Harvey, O. J. (1965). Some situational and cognitive determinants of dissonance resolution.

Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1, 349–355.

Haslam, S. A., Oakes, P. J., Reynolds, K. J., & Turner, J. C. (1999). Social identity salience and the

emergence of stereotype consensus. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 25, 809–818.

Haslam, S. A. (2001). Psychology in organizations: The social identity approach. London: Sage.

Helmreich, R., & Collins, B. E. (1968). Studies in forced compliance: Commitment and magnitude

of inducement to comply as determinants of opinion change. Journal of Personality and

Social Psychology, 10, 75–81.

Lea, M., Spears, R., Watt, S., & Rogers, P. (2000). The IN-SIDE story: Social psychological

processes affecting on-line groups. In T. Postmes, R. Spears, M. Lea & S. Reicher (Eds.),

SIDE issues centre stage: Recent developments in studies of de-individuation in groups

( pp. 47–62). Amsterdam: KNAW.

McKimmie, B. M., Terry, D. J., Hogg, M. A., Manstead, A. S. R., Spears, R., & Doosje, B. (2003). I’m a

hypocrite, but so is everyone else: Group support and the reduction of cognitive dissonance.

Group Dynamics, 7, 214–224.

Monin, B., Norton, M. I., Cooper, J., & Hogg, M. A. (2004). Reacting to an assumed situation vs.

conforming to an assumed reaction: The role of perceived speaker attitude in vicarious

dissonance. Group Processes and Intergroup Relations, 7, 207–220.

Norton, M. I., Monin, B., Cooper, J., & Hogg, M. A. (2003). Vicarious dissonance: Attitude change

from the inconsistency of others. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 85, 47–62.

Orne, M. T. (1962). On the social psychology of the psychological experiment: With particular

reference to demand characteristics and their implications. American Psychologist, 17,

776–783.

Petty, R. E., & Cacioppo, J. T. (1996). Attitudes and persuasion: Classic and contemporary

approaches. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Postmes, T., & Spears, R. (1998). Deindividuation and antinormative behavior: A meta-analysis.

Psychological Bulletin, 123, 238–259.

Postmes, T., Spears, R., & Lea, M. (1998). Breaching or building social boundaries? SIDE-effects of

computer-mediated communication. Communication Research, 25, 689–715.

Postmes, T., Spears, R., & Lea, M. (2000). The formation of group norms in computer-mediated

communication. Human Communication Research, 26, 341–371.

Postmes, T., Spears, R., Lea, M., & Reicher, S. (2000). SIDE issues centre stage: Recent

developments in studies of de-individuation in groups. Amsterdam: KNAW.

698 Toby Robertson


Postmes, T., Spears, R., Sakhel, K., & de Groot, D. (2001). Social influence in computer-mediated

communication: The effects of anonymity on group behavior. Personality and Social

Psychology Bulletin, 27, 1243–1254.

Prentice-Dunn, S., & Rogers, R. W. (1982). Effects of public and private self-awareness on

deindividuation and aggression. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 43, 503–513.

Reicher, S. D., & Levine, M. (1994a). On the consequences of deindividuation manipulation for the

strategic communication of self: Identifiability and the presentation of social identity.

European Journal of Social Psychology, 24, 511–524.

Reicher, S. D., & Levine, M. (1994b). Deindividuation, power relations between groups and the

expression of social identity: The effects of visibility to the outgroup. British Journal of Social


Reicher, S. D., Levine, M., & Gordijn, E. (1998). More on deindividuation, power relations between

groups and the expression of social identity: Three studies on the effects of visibility to the

ingroup. British Journal of Social Psychology, 27, 15–40.

Reicher, S. D., Spears, R., & Postmes, T. (1995). A social identity model of deindividuation

phenomena. European Review of Social Psychology, 6, 161–198.

Robertson, T. (2002). Cognitive Dissonance as Social Influence. Paper presented at the general

meeting of the European Association of Experimental Social Psychology, San Sebastian, Spain.

Robertson, T., & Reicher, S. (1997). Threats to self and the multiple inconsistencies of forced

compliance. Social Psychological Review, 1, 1–15.

Robertson, T., & Reicher, S. (1998). An analysis of the construction and contestation of

contradictions in a debate between Noam Chomsky and Lord Jenkins on the Gulf War. British

Journal of Social Psychology, 37, 287–302.

Sassenberg, K., & Postmes, T. (2002). Cognitive and strategic processes in small groups: Effects of

anonymity of the self and anonymity of the group on social influence. British Journal of Social


Scheier, M. F., Fenigstein, A., & Buss, A. H. (1974). Self awareness and physical aggression. Journal

of Experimental Social Psychology, 10, 264–273.

Spears, R., Lea, M., & Lee, S. (1990). De-individuation and group polarization in computer-

mediated communication. British Journal of Social Psychology, 29, 121–134.

Srull, T. K., & Wyer, R. S., Jr. (1979). The role of category accessibility in the interpretation of

information about persons: Some determinants and implications. Journal of Personality and

Social Psychology, 37, 1660–1672.

Steele, C. M., & Liu, T. J. (1983). Dissonance processes as self-affirmation. Journal of Personality

and Social Psychology, 45, 5–19.

Stone, J., & Cooper, J. (2001). A self-standards model of cognitive dissonance. Journal of

Experimental Social Psychology, 37, 228–243.

Stone, J., & Cooper, J. (2003). The effect of self-attribute relevance on how self-esteem moderates

attitude change in dissonance processes. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 39,

508–515.

Tajfel, H. (1982). Social psychology of intergroup relations. Annual Review of Psychology, 33,

1–39.

Tedeschi, J. T., Schlenker, B. R., & Bonoma, T. V. (1971). Cognitive dissonance: Private racionation

or public spectacle? American Psychologist, 26, 685–695.

Turner, J. C. (1991). Social influence. Milton Keynes: Open University Press.

Turner, J. C., Hogg, M. A., Oakes, P. J., Reicher, S. D., & Wetherell, M. S. (1987). Rediscovering the

social group: A self-categorisation theory. Oxford: Blackwell.

Turner, J. C., Oakes, P. J., Haslam, S. A., & McGarty, C. A. (1994). Self and collective: Cognition and

self context. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 20, 454–463.

Zimbardo, P. (1969). The human choice: Individuation, reason, and order versus deindividuation,

impulse and chaos. Nebraska Symposium on Motivation, 17, 237–307.

Received 14 December 2004; revised version received 18 October 2005


dissonance effects as conformity to consistency norms: the effect of anonymity and identity salience

Documents