dissertations on the history of metaphysical and ethical and of 1000211843dissertations on the...

DISSERTATIONS.ti

ON THE HISTORY

OF

METAPHYSICAL AND ETHICAL,

AND OF

MATHEMATICAL AND PHYSICAL SCIENCE;

BY

DUGALD STEWART, F. R. SS. LOND. " EDIN.

THE RIGHT HON. SIR JAMES MACKINTOSH, LL. D. F. R. S. ;

JOHN PLAYFAIR, F. R. SS. LOND. " EDIN.

AND

SIR JOHN LESLIE,

CORRESPONDING MEMBER OF THE ROYAL INSTITUTE OF FRANCE.

WITH A GENERAL INDEX.

ADAM AND CHARLES BLACK, EDINBURGH;

SIMPKIN, MARSHALL, " CO., WHITTAKER " CO., AND HAMILTON, ADAMS, " CO.,

LONDON ; AND JOHN CUMMING, DUBLIN.

M.DCCC.XXXV.

y.

Printedby THOMAS ALLAN

"

Company,

265 High Street, Edinburgh.

ADVERTISEMENT.

THE first of the followingDissertations, in its first Part, exhibits

a view of the progress of Metaphysicaland Ethical Philosophyfrom

the revival of Letters till the close of the seventeenth century ;

and its second Part is devoted to the MetaphysicalPhilosophy

of the eighteenth. The historyof the Ethical Philosophy of that

period is continued in the Second Dissertation. The Third, in

two Parts, brings down the history of Mathematical and Phy-sical

Science till the era marked by the discoveries of Newton

and Leibnitz ; and the last continues the inquirythroughout the

eighteenth century. The continuations just mentioned were ren-dered

necessary by the death of the two eminent men who laid

the foundations and raised the principalpart of the superstructure

of these celebrated Discourses.

The First and Third were written for, and prefixedto, the Sup-plement

to the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Editions of the ENCY-CLOPAEDIA

BRITANNICA ; and the Second and Fourth were written

for the Seventh Edition, now in course of publication; the whole,

printedin their natural order, constitutingthe first or introductory

volume of that work. As these Dissertations exhibit a copious and

accurate view of the progress of Knowledge and Discoveryin those

434013

IV ADVERTISEMENT.

grand divisions of Science of which they treat, and as they are

the productions of writers of high and acknowledged reputation,

the Publishers feel assured that they will meet the wishes of many

by detaching them from the extensive work to which they are pre-fixed,

and presenting them to the literary world in a separate form.

In doing so, they have used the double column and type of that

work, because, to have thrown the matter of this publication into

anyother form, would have so extended its bulk and price as

materially to interfere with its circulation and utility.

The Publishers have only to add, that in order to facilitate re-ference,

they have annexed a general and copious Index of the

contents of the several Dissertations above specified.

EDINBURGH, November 1835.

CONTENTS.

DISSERTATION FIRST.

Progress of Metaphysical and Ethical Philosophy.

Page.

PREFACE, containing some Critical Remarks on the Discourse prefixed to the

French Encyclopedic,.

PART FIRST." INTRODUCTION,.....

13

CHAPTER I. From the Revival of Letters to the publication of Bacon's Philo-sophical

Works,. .

. "

.14

CHAPTER II. From the publication of Bacon's Philosophical Works till that

of the Essay on Human Understanding.

Section 1. Progress of philosophy in England during this period." Bacon, 32

Hobbes, 40

Antagonists of Hobbes,. .

. .

"

42

Section 2. Progress of Philosophy in France during the seventeenth century.

Montaigne " Charron"

La Rochefoucauld,

Descartes"

Gassendi"

Malebranche,...

56

Section 3. Progress of Philosophy during the seventeenth century in some

parts of Europe not included in the preceding Review, 84

PART SECOND." INTRODUCTION,.....

99

Progress of Metaphysics during the eighteenth century.

Section 1. Historical and Critical Review of the Philosophical Works of

Locke and Leibnitz"

Locke,. . .

.100

Section 2. Continuation of the Review of Locke and Leibnitz"

Leibnitz, 123

Section 3. Of the Metaphysical Speculations of Newton and Clarke. " Di-gression

with respect to the system of Spinoza, Collins, and

Jonathan Edwards."

" Anxiety of both to reconcile the scheme

of Necessity with Man's Moral Agency. " Departure of some

later Necessitarians from their views,. . .

139

vi CONTENTS.

Page.

Section 4. Of some Authors who have contributed, by their Critical or His-torical

Writings,to diffuse a taste for MetaphysicalStudies." Bayle." Fontenelle. " Addison. " MetaphysicalWorks of

Berkeley,. . .

. .

.151

Section 5. Hartleian School,.

. . . .

169

Section 6. Condillac,and other French metaphysiciansof a later date, 172Section 7. Kant, and other metaphysiciansof the New German School, 187Section 8. MetaphysicalPhilosophyof Scotland, . . . 204

NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS,......

232

DISSERTATION SECOND.

Ethical Philosophy" EighteenthCentury.

INTRODUCTION, ....... 293

Section, 1. PreliminaryObservations,.

. .

296

Section 2. Retrospectof Ancient Ethics, .... 299

Section 3. Retrospectof Scholastic Ethics, .... 307

Section 4. Modern Ethics,.

. ..

.

.315

Hobbes,.

. ...

316

Section 5. Controversies concerningthe Moral Faculties and the Social Af-fections.

Cumberland."

Cudworth."

Clarke. " Shaftesbury."Bossuet. "

Fenelon.

"Leibnitz." Malebranche." Edwards." Buffier, 323

Section 6. Foundations of a more justtheoryof Ethics.Butler. " Hutcheson. " Berkeley." Hume. " Smith." Price. "

Hartley." Tucker. " Paley." Bentham. " Stewart. " Brown, 342

Section 7. General Remarks,.....

400

NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS,......

417

DISSERTATION THIRD.

ProgressofMathematical and PhysicalScience.

PART FIRST,....

...

433

Section 1. Mathematics. 1. Geometry,....

434

2. Algebra,......

440

Section 2. Experimental Investigation.1. Ancient Physics,.

449

2. Novum Organum,.....

453

CONTENTS. Vll

Page.

SectimS. Mechanics. ]. Theory of Motion, 474

2. Hydrostatics, .... 480

Section 4. Astronomy. 1. Ancient Astronomy, . . .481

2. Copernicus and Tycho,.

.

"

484

3. Kepler and Galileo,.....

488

4. Descartes, Huygens, "c. .... 493

5. Establishment of Academies, "c.. . .

499

6. Figure and Magnitude of the Earth,. .

.501

Section 5. Optics. 1. OpticalKnowledge of the Ancients, . , 503

2. From Alhazen to Kepler,....

506

3. From Kepler to the commencement^of Newton's Optical

Discoveries,......

509

PART SECOND."

From the commencement of Newton's Discoveries to the

year 1818, ...... 517

PERIOD FIRST. Section 1. The New Geometry,. .

.

ibid.

Section 2. Mechanics, General Physics, "c. ..." 535

Section 3. Optics,.......

545

Section 4. Astronomy,......

554

DISSERTATION FOURTH.

Mathematical and Physical Science " Eighteenth Century.

INTRODUCTION,........

575

Section 1. SpeculativeMathematics. 1. Geometry,". . .

580

2. Arithmetic,......

586

3. Algebra,. .

..

.

.591

4. The Higher Calculus}.....

598

Section 2. Applicate Science. 1. Dynamics,....

602

2. Hydrostatics and Pneumatics,....

607

3. Electricity,.

. . ..

.', 617

4. Magnetism,.

. .

.

.

, " .

624

5. Optics,.

...

630

6. Doctrine of Heat,.....

639

7. Astronomy,.....

655

DISSERTATION FIRST:

EXHIBITING A GENERAL VIEW

SINCE THE REVIVAL OF LETTERS IN EUROPE.

BY DUGALD STEWART, ESQ. F.R.SS. LOND.AND

EDIN.

LATE PROFESSOR OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY IN THE UNIVERSITY

OF EDINBURGH.

PREFACE,

CONTAINING SOME CRITICAL REMARKS ON THE DISCOURSE PREFIXED TO THE

FRENCH ENCYCLOPEDIA

WHEN I ventured to undertake the task ofcontributing a Preliminary Dissertation

to the Encyclopedia Britannica, my original in-tention

was,after the example of D'Alembert,

to have begun with a general survey of the va-rious

departments of human knowledge. The

outline of such a survey, sketched by the com-prehensive

genius of Bacon, together with the

corrections and improvements suggested by his

illustrious disciple,would, I thought, have ren-deredit comparatively easy to adapt their intel-lectual

map to the present advanced state of the

sciences ; while the unrivalled authority which

their united work has long maintained in the

republic of letters, would, I flattered myself,have softened those criticisms which might be

expected to be incurred by any similar attemptof a more modern hand. On a closer examina-tion,

however, of their labours, I found myselfunder the necessity of abandoning this design.Doubts immediately occurred to me with respectto the justness of their logicalviews, and soonterminated in a conviction that these views are

radically and essentially ^rroneous. Instead,

therefore, of endeavouring to give additional

currency to speculations which I conceived tobe fundamentally unsound, I resolved to avail

myself of the present opportunity to point outtheir most important defects ;" defects which, I

am nevertheless very ready to acknowledge, it

is much more easy to remark than to supply.The critical strictures which, in the course of

this discussion, I shall have occasion to offer on

my predecessors,will, at the same time, accountfor

my forbearing to substitute a new map of

my own, instead of that to which the names of

Bacon and D'Alembert have lent so great and

sowell-merited a celebrity; and may perhaps

suggest a doubt, whether the period be yet ar-rivedfor hazarding again, with any reasonable

prospect of success, a repetition of their bold

experiment. For the length to which thesestrictures are likely to extend, the only apologyI have to offer is the peculiar importance of the

questions to which they relate, and the high au-thorityof the writers whose opinions I presume

to controvert.

Before entering on his main subject,D'Alem-bertis at pains to explain a distinction " which he

represents as of considerable importance " be-tweenthe Genealogy of the sciences, and the

Encyclopedical arrangement of the objects ofhuman knowledge. 1 " In examining the for-mer,"

he observes, " our aim is,by remounting

1 " II ne faut pas confondre Tordre Encyclop"Uque des connoissances humaines avec la G"iealogie des Sciences.'Avertissement, p. 7-

DISS. I. PART I. A

PRELIMINARY DISSERTATIONS.

.

to tlje.originand genesisof our ideas, to trace

' thiscauses to;which thfissciences owe their birth ;and to mark the characteristics by which theyare distinguishedfrom each other. In order toascertain the latter,it is necessary to compre-hend,

in one generalscheme.,all the various de-partmentsof study; to arrange them into pro-per

classes ; and to pointout their mutual rela-tionsand dependencies."Such a scheme is some-timeslikened by D'Alembert to a map or chart

of the intellectual world; sometimes to a Ge-nealogical1

or EncyclopedicalTree, indicatingthe manifold and complicatedaffinities of thosestudies,which, however apparentlyremote andunconnected, are all the common offspringofthe human understanding.For executingsuc-cessfully

this chart or tree, a philosophicaldeli-neationof the natural progress of the mind may

(accordingto him) furnish very useful lights;althoughhe acknowledgesthat the results of thetwo undertakingscannot fail to differ widelyinmany instances," the laws which regulatethegenerationof our ideas often interferingwiththat systematicalorder in the relative arrange-ment

of scientific pursuits,which it is the pur-poseof the EncyclopedicalTree to exhibit.2

In treatingof the firstof these su ejects,it can-notbe denied that D'Alembert has displayed

much ingenuityand invention; but the depthand solidityof his generaltrain of thoughtmaybe questioned.On various occasions,he hasevidentlysuffered himself to be misled by a spi-rit

of false refinement; and on others, whereprobablyhe was fullyaware of his inabilitytorender the theoretical chain complete,he seemsto have aimed at concealingfrom his readers thefaultylinks,by availinghimself of those epi-grammatic

points,and other artifices of style,with which the geniusof the French language

enables a skilful writer to smooth and varnish

over his most illogicaltransitions.The most essential imperfections,however, of

this historical sketch,may be fairlyascribed toa certain vagueness and indecision in the au-thor's

idea, with regardto the scope of his in-quiries.What he has in generalpointedat is

to trace, from the theoryof the Mind, and fromthe order followed by nature in the develope-ment of its powers, the successive stepsby whichthe curiositymay be conceived to have beengraduallyconducted from one intellectual pur-suit

to another; but, in the execution of this

design(which in itself is highlyphilosophicaland interesting),he does not appear to havepaid due attention to the essential differencebetween the historyof the human species,andthat of the civilised and inquisitiveindividual.The former was undoubtedlythat which prin-cipally

figuredin his conceptions,and to which,I apprehend,he ought to have confined himself

exclusively;whereas, in fact, he has so com-pletelyblended the two subjectstogether,that

it is often impossibleto say which of them wasuppermost in his thoughts. The consequenceis,that,instead of throwing upon either those

strong and steadylights,which might have beenexpectedfrom his powers, he has involved bothin additional obscurity.This indistinctness ismore peculiarlyremarkable in the beginningofhis Discourse,where he represents men in theearliestinfancyof science,before theyhad timeto take any precautionsfor securingthe meansof their subsistence,or of their safety," as phi-losophising

on their sensations, on the exist-enceof their own bodies, and on that of the

material world. His Discourse, accordingly,sets out with a series of Meditations,preciselyanalogousto those which form the introduction

1 It is to be regretted,that the epithetGenealogicalshould have been employed on this occasion,where the author's wishwas to contradistinguishthe idea denoted by it,from that historical view of the sciences to which the word Genealogyhadbeen previouslyapplied. t

2 The true reason of this might perhapshave been assignedin simplerterms by remarking,that the order of inventionis, in most cases, the reverse ofthat fitted for didactic communication. This observation appliesnot only to the analyticaland syntheticalprocesses of the individual,but to the progressiveimprovements of the species,when compared wit'hthefl 1*1*0 tirroTYi ar\ 4-e r\i*Aas"**!V.A*1 U,, 1 ".,_:""! **.! 3 " _!..

__ _

l _li /" "_i. .

"* * """____!" i

,-i A|

taught

before they studied speculativegeometry ; and governments were established before politicswere studied as a science. Aremark somewhat similar is made by Celsus, concerning the historyof medicine : " Non medicinam rationi esse posterio-rem, sed post medicinam inventam,rationem esse qusesitam."

PREFACE TO THE FIRST DISSERTATION.

to the philosophyof Descartes; meditationswhich, in the order of time, have been uniform-ly

posteriorto the study of external nature ;and which, even in such an age as the present,are confined to a comparativelysmall numberof recluse metaphysicians.

Of this sort of conjecturedor theoretical his-tory,the most unexceptionablespecimenswhich

have yet appeared,are indisputablythe frag-mentsin Mr Smith's posthumous work on the

Historyof Astronomy, and on that of the An-cient

Systems of Physics and Metaphysics.That, in the latter of these, he may have occa-sionally

accommodated his details to his own

peculiaropinionsconcerningthe objectof Phi-losophy,may perhaps,with some truth, be al-leged

; but he must at least be allowed the me-rit

of completelyavoidingthe error by whichD'Alembert was misled ; and, even in those in-stances

where he himself seems to wander a

littlefrom the rightpath,of furnishinghis suc-cessorswith a thread, leadingby easy and al-most

insensible steps, from the first gross per-ceptionsof sense, to the most abstract refine-ments

of the Grecian schools. Nor is this the

onlypraiseto which these fragmentsare en-titled.By seizingon the different pointsof

view from which the same objectwas contem-platedby different sects, they often bestow a

certain degreeof unityand of interest on whatbefore seemed calculated merely to bewilderand to confound ; and render the apparent aber-rations

and capricesof the understanding,sub-servientto the studyof its operationsand laws.

To the foregoingstrictures on D'Alembert' sview of the originof the sciences,it may beadded, that this introductorypart of his Dis-course

does not seem to have any immediate

connection with the sequel. We are led,in-deed,to expect,that it is to prepare the way

for the studyof the EncyclopedicalTree after-wardsto be exhibited ; but in this expectation

we are completelydisappointed," no referenceto it whatever beingmade by the author in thefarther prosecutionof his subject. It forms,accordingly,a portionof his Discourse altoge-ther

foreignto the generaldesign; while,fromthe metaphysicalobscuritywhich pervadesit,the generalityof readers are likelyto receive an

impression,either unfavoui'able to the perspi-cuityof the writer,or to their own powers of

comprehensionand of reasoning. It were to bewished, therefore,that,instead of occupyingthefirstpages of the EncycZ"pedie,it had been re-served

for a separate article in the body of thatwork. There it might have been read by thelogicalstudent, with no small interest and ad-vantage

; for,with all its imperfections,it bearsnumerous and preciousmarks of its author'shand.

In delineatinghis EncyclopedicalTree, D'A-lemberthas, in my opinion,been stillmore un-successful

than in the speculationswhich havebeen hitherto under our review. His venera-tion

for Bacon seems, on this occasion, to have

preventedhim from givingdue scope to his ownpowerful and fertile genius,and has engagedhim in the fruitless task of attempting,by meansof arbitrarydefinitions,to draw a veil over in-curable

defects and blemishes. In this part of

Bacon's logic,it must, at the same time, beowned, that there is somethingpeculiarlycapti-vating

to the fancy; and, accordingly,it hasunited in its favour the suffragesof almost allthe succeedingauthors who have treated of thesame subject.It will be necessary for me,therefore,to explainfullythe groundsof that

censure, which, in oppositionto so many illus-triousnames, I have presumed to bestow on it.

Of the leadingideas to which I more particu-larlyobject,the followingstatement is givenby

D'Alembert. I quote it in preferenceto the

corresponding-passage in Bacon, as it containsvarious explanatoryclauses and glosses,forwhich we are indebted to the ingenuityof thecommentator.

" The objectsabout which our minds are oc-cupied,are either spiritualor material,and the

media employed for this purpose are our ideas,either directlyreceived,or derived from reflec-tion.

The system of our direct knowledge con-sistsentirelyin the passiveand mechanical ac-cumulation

of the particularsit comprehends;an accumulation which belongsexclusivelytothe provinceof Memory. Reflection is of twokinds,accordingas it is employedin reasoningon the objectsof our direct ideas,or in study-ing

them as models for imitation.

PRELIMINARY DISSERTATIONS.

" Thus, Memory, Reason, strictlyso called,and Imagination,are the three modes in whichthe mind operateson the subjectsof itsthoughts.By Imagination,however, is here to be under-stood,

not the facultyof conceivingor repre-sentingto ourselves what we have formerlyper-ceived,a facultywhich differs in nothing from

the memory of these perceptions,and which, if itwere not relieved by the invention of signs,would be in a state of continual exercise. The

power which we denote by this name has anobler provinceallotted to it, that of render-ing

imitation subservient to the creations of

genius." These three faculties suggesta correspond-ing

division of human knowledge into three

branches, 1. History,which derives its materialsfrom Memory ; 2. Philosophy,which is the pro-duct

of Reason ; and 3. Poetry(comprehendingunder this title all the Fine Arts),which is the

offspringof Imagination.1 If we placeReasonbefore Imagination,it is because this order ap-pears

to us conformable to the natural progressof our intellectual operations.2The Imagina-tion

is a creative faculty; and the mind, beforeit attempts to create, beginsby reasoninguponwhat it sees and knows. Nor is this all. In

the facultyof Imagination,both Reason and

Memory are, to a certain extent, combined,"the mind never imagining or creatingobjectsbut such as are analogousto those whereof ithas had previousexperience.Where this ana-logy

is wanting,the combinations are extrava-gantand displeasing; and consequently,in that

agreeableimitation of nature, at which the finearts aim in common, invention is necessarilysubjectedto the control of rules which it is thebusiness of the philosopherto investigate.

" In farther justificationof this arrangement,it

may be remarked, that reason, in the course

of its successive operationson the subjectsofthought,by creatingabstract and generalideas,remote from the perceptionsof sense, leads tothe exercise of Imaginationas the last step ofthe process. Thus metaphysicsand geometryare, of all the sciences belongingto Reason,those in which Imaginationhas the greatestshare. I ask pardon for this observation fromthose men of taste, who, littleaware of the near

affinityof geometry to their own pursuits,andstillless suspectingthat the onlyintermediate

step between them is formed by metaphysics,are disposedto employ their wit in depreciatingits value. The truth is, that, to the geometerwho invents, Imaginationis not less essentialthan to the poet who creates. They operate,indeed, differentlyon their object,the formerabstractingand analyzing,where the latter com-bines

and adorns; " two processes of the mind,it must at the same time be confessed, which

seern from experienceto be so littlecongenial,that it may be doubted if the talents of a great

geometer and of a great poetwill ever be united

in the same person. But whether these talents

be or be not mutuallyexclusive, certain it is,that theywho possess the one, have no righttodespisethose who cultivate the other. Of allthe great men of antiquity,Archimedes is per-haps

he who is the best entitled to be placedbythe side of Homer."

D'Alembert afterwards proceedsto observe,that of these three generalbranches of the En-cyclopedical

Tree, a natural and convenient sub-division

is afforded by the metaphysicaldistri-butionof thingsinto Material and Spiritual.

" With these two classes of existences,"he ob-serves

farther, " historyand philosophyareequallyconversant; but as far Imagination,her imitations are entirelyconfinedto the mate-rial

world ; " a circumstance,"he adds, " which

1 The latitude givenby D'Alembert to the meaning of the word Poetry is a real and very importantimprovement onBacon, who restricts it to Fictitious History or Fables. (De Aug. Scient. Lib. ii.cap. i.) D'Alembert, on the other hand,employs it in its natural signification,as synonymous with invention or creation. " La Peinture, la Sculpture,1'Architec-ture,

la Poe'sie,la Musique, et leurs differentes divisions,composent la troisieme distribution ge'ne'ralequi nait de 1'Imagi-nation,et dont les partiessont comprisessous le nom de Beaux-Arts. On peut les rapportertous a la Poe'sie,en prenantce mot dans sa significationnaturelle,qui n'est autre chose qu'inventionou creation."

2 In placingReason before Imagination,D'Alembert departsfrom the order in which these faculties are arrangedbyBacon. " Si nous n'avons pas place',comme lui,la Raison apres PImagination,c'est que nous avons suivi dans le systemeEncyclopedique,1'ordre metaphysiquedes operationsde 1'esprit,plutotque Tordre historiquede ses progres depuisla re-naissance

des lettres"

(Disc. Prelim.) How far the motive here assignedfor the change is valid,the reader will be enabledto judge from the sequelof the above quotation.

PREFACE TO THE FIRST DISSERTATION. 5

conspireswith the other arguments above stated,in justifyingBacon for assigningto her the lastplacein his enumeration of our intellectual fa-culties."

l Upon this subdivision he enlargesat

some length,and with considerable ingenuity;but on the present occasion it would be quitesuperfluousto follow him any farther, as morethan enough has been alreadyquoted to enable

my readers to judge, whether the objectionswhich I am now to state to the foregoingex-tracts

be as sound and decisive as I apprehendthem to be.

Of these objectionsa very obvious one is sug-gestedby a consideration,of which D'Alembert

himself has taken notice," that the three facul-ties

to which he refers the whole operationsofthe understandingare perpetuallyblended to-gether

in their actual exercise, insomuch that

there is scarcelya branch of human knowledgewhich does not, in a greater or less degree,furnish employment to them all. It may be

said,indeed, that some pursuitsexercise and in-vigorate

particularfaculties more than others ;that the study of History, for example, al-though

it may occasionallyrequirethe aid bothof Reason and of Imagination,yet chieflyfur-nishes

occupationto the Memory ; and that thisis sufficient to justifythe logicaldivision of ourmental powers as the ground-work of a corre-sponding

Encyclopedicalclassification.2 This,however, will be found more speciousthan solid.In what respects is the facultyof Memory moreessentiallynecessary to the student of historythan to the philosopheror to the poet ; and, onthe other hand, of what value, in the circle of the

sciences,would be a collection of historical de-tails,

accumulated without discrimination,with-out

a scrupulous examination of evidence, or

without any attempt to compare and to genera-lize? For the cultivation of that speciesof his-tory,in particular,which alone deserves a place

in the EncyclopedicalTree, it may be justlyaf-firmed,that the rarest and most comprehensive

combination of all our mental giftsis indispen-sablyrequisite.

Another, and a still more formidable objec-tionto Bacon's classification,may be derived

from the very imperfectand partialanalysisofthe mind which it assumes as its basis. Whywere the powers of Abstraction and Generaliza-tion

passedover in silence ?" powers which, ac-cordingas theyare cultivated or neglected,con-stitute

the most essential of all distinctions be-tween

the intellectual characters of individuals.

A correspondingdistinction,too, not less im-portant,

may be remarked among the objectsofhuman study,accordingas our aim is to treasure

up particularfacts, or to establish generalcon-clusions.Does not this distinction mark out,

with greater precision,the limits which separatephilosophyfrom mere historical narrative, thanthat which turns upon the different provincesofReason and of Memory ?

I shall only add one other criticism on thiscelebrated enumeration, and that is,its want of

distinctness,in confoundingtogetherthe Sciencesand the Arts under the same general titles.Hence a varietyof those capriciousarrange-ments,

which must immediatelystrike everyreader who follows Bacon throughhis details ;"the reference, for instance, of the mechanical

arts to the departmentof History; and conse-quently,accordingto his own analysisof the

Mind, the ultimate reference of these arts to the

facultyof Memory ; while at the same time, inhis tripartitedivision of the whole field of hu-

1 In this exclusive limitation of the provinceof Imaginationto thingsMaterial and Sensible,D'Alembert has followedthe definition given by Descartes in his second Meditation : " Imaginari nihil aliud est quam rei corporece figuram sen imagi-nem contemplari;"" a power of the mind, which (asI have elsewhere observed) appears to me to be most preciselyex-pressed

in our languageby the word Conception. The provinceassignedto Imaginationby D'Alembert is more extensivethan this,for he ascribes to her also a creative and combining power ; but stillhis definition agrees with that of Descartes,inasmuch as it excludes entirelyfrom her dominion both the intellectual and the moral worlds.

2 I allude here to the followingapology for Bacon, suggestedby a very learned and judiciouswriter: " " On a faitcependant a Bacon quelques reprochesassez fonde's. On a observe que sa classification des sciences repose sur unedistinction qui n'est pas rigoureuse,puisque la me'moire, la raison, et [Imaginationconcourent necessairement danschaque art, comme dans chaque science. Mais on peut re'pondre,que 1'un ou 1'autre de ces trois faculte's,quoiqueseconde'e

par les deux autres, peut cependantjouer le role principal.En prenant la distinction de Bacon dans ce sens, sa classifica-tionreste exacte, et devient tres utile."" (DEGERANDO, Hut. Comp. Tome I. p. 298.)

6 PRELIMINARY DISSERTATIONS.

man knowledge, the art of Poetryhas one en-tire

provinceallotted to itself.These objectionsapplyin common to Bacon

and to D'Alembert. That which follows has a

particularreference to a passage alreadycitedfrom the latter,where, by some false refinements

concerningthe nature and functions of Imagina-tion,he has rendered the classification of his pre-decessor

incomparablymore indistinct and illo-gicalthan it seemed to be before.

That all the creations or new combinations of

Imagination,implythe previousprocess of de-compositionor analysis,is abundantlymanifest ;

and, therefore,without departingfrom the com-monand popularuse of language,it may un-doubtedly

be said,that the facultyof abstractionis not less essential to the Poet, than to the Geo-meter

and the Metaphysician.1 But this is notthe doctrine of D'Alembert. On the contrary,he affirms,that Metaphysicsand Geometry are,of all the sciences connected with reason, those

in which Imaginationhas the greatest share ;"an assertion which, it will not be disputed,has atfirstsightsomewhat of the air of a paradox; andwhich, on closer examination, will,I apprehend,be found altogetherinconsistent with fact. Ifindeed D'Alembert had, in this instance,used,as some writers have done, the word Imagina-tion

as synonymous Avith Invention, I should nothave thoughtit worth while (atleast so far as thegeometer is concerned) to disputehis proposi-tion.

But that this was not the meaning annex-edto itby the author, appears from a subsequent

clause,where he tells us, that the most refined

operationsof reason, consistingin the creationof generalswhich do not fall under the cogniz-ance

of our senses, naturallyled to the exercise of

Imagination.His doctrine,therefore,goes to theidentification of Imaginationwith Abstraction ;two faculties so very different in the direction

which theygiveto our thoughts,that,accordingto his own acknowledgment, the man who is

habituallyoccupiedin exertingthe one, seldomfails to impair both his capacityand his relishfor the exercise of the other.

This identification of two faculties,so strong-lycontrasted in their characteristical features,

was least of all to be expectedfrom a logician,who had previouslylimited the provinceof Ima-gination

to the imitation of material objects; alimitation,it may be remarked in passing,whichis neither sanctioned by common use, nor byjustviews of the philosophyof the mind. Uponwhat ground can it be alleged,that Milton's

portraitof Satan's intellectual and moral cha-racterwas not the offspringof the same creative

facultywhich gave birth to his Garden of Eden ?After such a definition,however, it is difficultto conceive,how

,

so very acute a writer should

have referred to Imaginationthe abstractionsof the geometer and of the metaphysician; andstill more, that he should have attempted tojustifythis reference, by observing,that theseabstractions do not fall under the cognisanceofthe senses. My own opinionis, that, in the

compositionof the whole passage, he had a"view to the unexpectedparallelbetween Homerand Archimedes, with which he meant, at the

close,to surprisehis readers.If the foregoingstrictures be well-founded,

it seems to follow, not only that the attempt ofBacon and of D'Alembert to classifythe sciencesand arts accordingto a logicaldivision of ourfaculties,is altogetherunsatisfactory; but that

every future attempt of the same kind may be

expectedto be liable to similar objections.Instudying,indeed, the Theory of the Mind, it is

necessary to push our analysisas far as thenature of the subjectadmits of; and, whereverthe thingis possible,to examine its constituentprinciplesseparatelyand apart from each other :but this consideration itself,when combined

with what was before stated on the endless

varietyof forms in which theymay be blended

1 This assertion must, however, be understood with some qualifications; for,althoughthe Poet, as well as the Geometerand the Metaphysician,be perpetuallycalled upon to decompose,by means of abstraction,the complicatedobjectsof per-ception,

it must not be concluded that the abstractions of all the three are exactly of the same kind. Those of the Poetamount to nothingmore than to a separationinto parts of the realities presentedto his senses ; which separationis only apreliminarystep to a subsequent recompositioninto new and ideal forms of the thingsabstracted ; whereas the abstractionsof the Metaphysicianand of the Geometer form the very objectsof their respectivesciences.


aided by all the lightsof the eighteenthcentury,have been able to add but little to what Bacon

performed.After the foregoingobservations, it will not

be expectedthat an attempt is to be made, inthe followingEssay, to solve a problem whichhas so recentlybaffled the powers of theseeminent writers, and which will probablylongcontinue to exercise the ingenuityof our suc-cessors.

How much remains to be previouslydone for the improvement of that part of Logic,whose provinceit is to fix the limits by which

contiguousdepartments of study are definedand separated! And how many unsuspectedaffinities may be reasonablypresumed to exist

among sciences,which, to our circumscribed

views, appear at present the most alien from

each other ! The abstract geometry of Apol-lonius and Archimedes was found, after an in-terval

of two thousand years, to furnish a torch

to the physicalinquiriesof Newton ; while, inthe further progress of knowledge, the Etymo-logy

of Languages has been happilyemployedto fillup the chasms of Ancient History; andthe conclusions of ComparativeAnatomy, to il-lustrate

the Theory of the Earth. For my ownpart, even if the task were executed with the

most completesuccess, I should be stronglyin-clinedto think, that its appropriateplacein an

Encyclopaediawould be as a branch of the articleon Logic;" certainlynot as an exordium to thePreliminaryDiscourse; the enlarged and re-fined

views which it necessarilypresupposes be-ingpeculiarlyunsuitable to that part of the work

which may be expected,in the first instance,toattract the curiosityof every reader.

Before concludingthis preface,I shall sub-joina few slightstrictures on a very concise and

comprehensivedivision of the objectsof HumanKnowledge,proposedby Mr Locke, as the ba-sis

of a new classification of the sciences. Al-though

I do not know that any attempt has everbeen made to follow out in detail the generalidea, yet the repeatedapprobationwhich hasbeen latelybestowed on a division essentially

the same, by several writers of the highestrank,renders it in some measure necessary, on the

present occasion, to consider how far it is found-ed

on just principles; more especiallyas it iscompletelyat variance not only with the lan-guage

and arrangement adoptedin these preli-minaryessays, but with the whole of that plan on

which the originalprojectors,as well as the con-tinuators, of the Encyclopedia Britannica,ap-pear

to have proceeded.These strictures will,at the same time, afford an additional proof ofthe difficulty,or rather of the impossibility,inthe actual state of logicalscience, of solvingthis great problem, in a manner calculated tounite the generalsuffragesof philosophers.

" All that can fall,"says Mr Locke, " with-inthe compass of Human Understandingbeing

either,first,The nature of thingsas they are inthemselves,their relations,and their manner of

operation; or, secondly,That which man him-selfought to do as a rational and voluntary

agent, for the attainment of any end, especiallyhappiness;or, thirdly,The ways and meanswhereby the knowledge of both the one and theother of these is attained and communicated; Ithink science may be divided properlyinto thesethree sorts :

"1. *otf/x"j,or Natural Philosophy.The endof this is bare speculativetruth ; and whatsoevercan afford the mind of man any such, falls under

this branch, whether it be God himself, angels,spirits,bodies, or any of their affections,as num-ber

and figure,"c." 2. Ilgaxr/xj],The skill of rightapplyingour

own powers and actions for the attainment of

thingsgood and useful. The most considerableunder this head is Ethics, which is the seekingout those rules and measures of human actions

which lead to happiness,and the means to prac-tisethem. The end of this is not bare specula-tion,but right,and a conduct suitable to it.*

" 3. 2?j/is/wr;x"),or the doctrine of signs,themost usual whereof being words, it is aptlyenough termed also Aoytxri,Logic. The businessof this is to consider the nature of signsthe

From this definition it appears, that as Locke included under the title of Physics,not only Natural Philosophy,pro-perlyso called,but Natural Theology,and the Philosophyof the Human Mind, so he meant to refer to the head of Practict,

not onlyEthics,but allthe various Arts of life,both mechanical and liberal.


mind makes use of for the understandingof

things,or conveyingits knowledge to others." This seems to me," continues Mr Locke,

" the firstand most general,as well as natural,di-visionof the objectsof our understanding; for a

man can employ his thoughtsabout nothingbuteither the contemplationof thingsthemselves,for the discoveryof truth ; or about the thingsin his own power, which are his own actions,for the attainment of his own ends ; or the

signsthe mind makes use of, both in one and

the other, and the rightorderingof them forits clearer information.

,

All which three, viz.

things as they are in themselves knowable;actions as theydepend on us, in order to hap-piness;

and the rightuse of signs, in order to

knowledge; beingtoto ccelodifferent,theyseem-edto me to be the three great provincesof the

intellectualworld, whollyseparateand distinctone from another."1

,

,.

From the manner in which Mr Locke ex-presses

himself in the above quotation,he ap-pearsevidentlyto have considered the division

proposedin it as an originalidea of his own ;and yet the truth is, that it coincides exactlywith what was generallyadoptedby the philo-sophers

of ancient Greece. " The ancient

Greek Philosophy,"says Mr Smith, "was divid-edinto three greatbranches, Physics,or Natural

Philosophy; Ethics, or Moral Philosophy; andLogic. This generaldivision,"he adds, " seemsperfectlyagreeableto the nature of things" Mi-Smith afterwards observes, in strict conformityto Locke's definitions (ofwhich, however, heseems to have had no recollection when he

wrote this passage),"That, as the humanmind and the Deity,in whatever their essencemay be supposed to consist,are parts of the

great system of the universe,and parts, too,productiveof the most importanteffects,what-

everwas taughtin the ancient schools of Greece,

concerningtheir nature, made a partof the sys-temof physics."2

Dr Campbell,in his Philosophyof Rhetoric,has borrowed from the Grecian schools the

same very extensive use of the words physicsand physiology,which he employsas synonymousterms ; comprehending under this title " notmerelyNatural History,Astronomy,Geography,Mechanics, Optics,Hydrostatics,Meteorology,Medicine,Chemistry,but also Natural Theologyand Psychology,which," he observes, " havebeen, in his opinion,most unnaturallydisjoinedfrom Physiologyby philosophers."" Spirit,"headds, " which here comprisesonlythe SupremeBeing and the human soul,is surelyas much in-cluded

under the notion of natural objectas bodyis ; and is knowable to the philosopherpurelyinthe same way, by observation and experience."*

A similar train of thinkingled the late cele-bratedM. Turgot to comprehejidunder the

name of Physics,not onlyNatural Philosophy(asthat phraseisunderstood by the Newtonians),but Metaphysics,Logic,and even History.4

Notwithstandingall this weightof authority,it is difficultto reconcile one's self to an arrange-ment

which, while it classes with Astronomy,with Mechanics, with Optics,and with Hy-drostatics,

the strikinglycontrasted studies ofNatural Theologyand of the Philosophyof theHuman Mind, disunites from the two last thefar more congenialsciences of Ethics and ofLogic. The human mind, it is true, as well asthe material world which surrounds it, forms

a part of the greatsystem of the Universe ; but

is it possibleto conceive two parts of the samewhole more completelydissimilar, or rathermore diametricallyopposite,in all their charac-teristical attributes ? Is not the one the appro-priate

fieldand provinceof observation," a power

1 See the concludingchapterof the Essay on Human Understanding,entitled," Of the Division of the Sciences."J Wealth ofNations, Book v. chap. i.3 PhilosophyofRhetoric,Book i.chap. v. Part iii-" 1.4 " Sous le nom de sciences physiquesje comprendsla logique,qui est la connoissance des operationsde notre espritet

de lagenerationdenos ide'es; la metaphvsique,quis'occupede la nature et de 1'originedes etres ; et enfin la physique,pro-prement dite,quiobserve 1'action rautuelle des corps les uns sur les autres, et les causes et 1'enchainement des phenomenessensibles. On pourroit y ajouterVhistoire."" (CEuvres de TURGOT, Tome II. pp. 284, 285.)

In the year 1793, a quarto volume was publishedat Bath, entitled Intellectual Physics.It consists entirelyof speculationsconcerningthe human mind, and is by no means destitute of merit. The publicationwas anonymous ; but I have reasonto believe that the author was the late well-known Governor Pownall. "

DISS. I. PART I. B


habituallyawake to all the perceptionsand im-pressionsof the bodilyorgans ? And does not

the other fall exclusivelyunder the cognisanceof reflection; " an operationwhich inverts all the

ordinaryhabits of the understanding,abstract-ingthe thoughtsfrom every sensible object,

and even strivingto abstract them from everysensible image? What abuse of language canbe greater, than to applya common name to

departmentsof knowledge which invite the

curiosityin directions preciselycontrary, andwhich tend to form intellectualtalents,which,if not altogetherincompatible,are certainlynotoften found united in the same individual ?

The word Physics,in particular,which, in ourlanguage,longand constant use has restricted

to the phenomena of Matter,cannot failto strike

every ear as anomalously,and therefore illogical-ly,applied,when extended to those of Thoughtand of Consciousness.

Nor let it be.imaginedthat these observationsassume any particulartheoryabout the natureor essence of Mind. Whether we adopt,on this

point,the languageof the Materialists,or thatof their opponents, it is a propositionequallycertain and equallyindisputable,that the phe-nomena

of Mind and those of Matter, as far as

they come under the cognisanceof our faculties,

appear to be more completelyheterogeneousthan any other classes of facts within the circle

of our knowledge; and that the sources of ourinformation concerningthem are in every re-spect

so radicallydifferent,that nothingis morecarefullyto be avoided, in the studyof either,than an attempt to assimilate them, by meansof analogicalor metaphoricalterms, appliedtoboth in common. In those inquiries,above all,where we have occasion to consider Matter and

Mind as conspiringto produce the same jointeffects(in the constitution,for example,of ourown compounded frame),it becomes more pe-culiarly

necessary to keepconstantlyin viewthe distinctprovinceof each,and to remember,that the business of philosophyis not to resolvethe phenomena of the one into those of theother,but merelyto ascertain the generallawswhich regulatetheir mutual connection. Mat-ter

and Mind, therefore,it should seem, are thetwo most generalheads which ought to form

the ground-workof an Encyclopedicalclassifi-cationof the sciences and arts. No branch of

human knowledge,no work of human skill,canbe mentioned, which does not obviouslyfall un-der

the former head or the latter.

Agreeablyto this twofold classificationof thesciences and arts, it is proposed,in the follow-ing

introductoryEssays, to exhibit a rapidsketch of the progress made since the revival of

letters : First, in those branches of knowledgewhich relate to Mind ; and, secondly,in thosewhich relate to Matter. D'Alembert, in his

PreliminaryDiscourse, has boldlyattemptedtoembrace both subjectsin one magnificentde-sign

; and never, certainly,was there a singlemind more equalto such an undertaking. Thehistorical outline which he has there traced

forms by far the most valuable portionof that

performance,and will for ever remain a proudmonument to the depth,to the comprehensive-ness,

and to the singularversatilityof his genius.In the presentstate of science,however, it hasbeen apprehended,that,by dividingso great awork among different hands, somethingmightperhapsbe gained,if not in pointof reputationto the authors, at least in point of instructionto their readers. This division of labour was,

indeed, in some measure, rendered necessary(independentlyof all other considerations),bythe important accessions which mathematicsand physicshave received since D'Alembert'stime ;" by the innumerable improvementswhichthe spiritof mercantile speculation,and therivalshipof commercial nations,have introducedinto the mechanical arts ;" and, above all,bythe rapidsuccession of chemical discoveries,which commences with the researches of Black

and of Lavoisier. The part of this task which

has fallen to my share is certainly,upon thewhole, the least splendidin the results which ithas to record ; but I am not without hopes,thatthis disadvantagemay be partlycompensatedby its closer connection with (what ought tobe the ultimate end of all our pursuits)the in-tellectual

and moral improvement of the spe-cies.

I am, at the same time,well aware that,in

proportionas this last consideration increasesthe importance,it adds to the difficultyof my


undertaking. It is chieflyin judging of ques-tions" coming home to their business and bo-soms,"

that casual associations lead mankind

astray; and of such associations ho\v incalcu-lable

is the number arisingfrom false systems of

religion,oppressiveforms of government, andabsurd plans of education ! The consequenceis,that while the physicaland mathematical dis-coveries

of former ages present themselves to

the hand of the historian,like masses of pureand native gold,the truths which we are herein quest of may be comparedto iron,which, al-though

at once the most necessary and the most

widelydiffused of all the metals,commonly re-quiresa discriminatingeye to detect its exist-ence,

and a tedious,as well as nice process, to

extract it from the ore.

To the same circumstance it is owing, that

improvementsin Moral and in Political Sciencedo not strike the imaginationwith nearlysogreat force as the discoveries of the Mathemati-cian

or of the Chemist. When an inveterate

prejudiceis destroyedby extirpatingthe casualassociations on which it was grafted,how power-ful

is the new impulsegiven to the intellectualfaculties of man ! Yet how slow and silent the

process by which the effect is accomplished!Were itnot, indeed, for a certain class of learned

authors, who, from time to time, heave the loginto the deep,we should hardlybelieve that thereason of the speciesis progressive.In this re-spect,

the religiousand academical establish-mentsin some parts of Europe are not without

their use to the Historian of the Human Mind.

Immoveably moored to the same station by the

strengthof their cables,and the weightof theiranchors,theyenable him to measure the rapi-dity

of the current by which the rest of theworld are borne along.

This, too, is remarkable in the historyof ourprejudices; that,as soon as the film falls fromthe intellectual eye, we are apt to lose all recol-lection

of our former blindness. Like the fan-tastic

and giantshapeswhich, in a thick fog,theimaginationlends to a block of stone, or to the

stump of a tree, theyproduce,while the illusionlasts,the same effect with truths and realities ;but the moment the eye has caught the exactform and dimensions of its obiect, the spell is

broken for ever ; nor can any effort of thoughtagain conjureup the spectreswhich have va-nished.

As to the subdivisions of which the sciences

of Matter and of Mind are susceptible,I havealreadysaid,that this is not the proper placeforenteringinto any discussion concerningthem.The passages above quoted from D'Alembert,from Locke, and from Smith, are sufficient toshow how littleprobabilitythere is,in the actualstate of LogicalScience,of unitingthe opinionsof the learned in favour of any one scheme of

partition.To prefix,therefore,such a schemeto a work which is professedlyto be carried onby a set of unconnected writers,would be equal-ly

presumptuous and useless ; and, on the mostfavourable supposition,could tend onlyto fetter,by means of dubious definitions,the subsequentfreedom of thoughtand of expression.The ex-ample

of the French Encyclopediecannot here be

justlyallegedas a precedent. The preliminarypages by which it is introduced were written bythe two persons who projectedthe whole plan,and who considered themselves as responsible,not onlyfor their own admirable articles,butfor the generalconduct of the execution ; where-as,

on the present occasion, a porch was to be

adaptedto an irregularedifice,reared,at differ-ent

periods,by different architects. It seemed,accordingly,most advisable to avoid, as muchas possible,in these IntroductoryEssays,all in-novations

in language,and, in describingthedifferent arts and sciences,to follow scrupulous-ly

the prevailingand most intelligiblephrase-ology.The task of definingthem, with a greater

degreeof precision,properlydevolves upon thoseto whose provinceit belongs,in the progress ofthe work, to unfold in detail their elementaryprinciples.

The sciences to which I mean to confine myobservations are Metaphysics,Ethics, and Poli-tical

Philosophy;understanding,by Metaphy-sics,not the Ontologyand Pneumatology of the

schools, but the inductive Philosophyof theHuman Mind ; and limitingthe phrasePoliticalPhilosophyalmost exclusivelyto the modernscience of Political Economy ; or (to expressmyself in terms at once more comprehensiveand more precise)to that branch of the theory


of legislation which, according to Bacon's defi- departments of knowledge, and theeasy transi-

nition, aims to ascertain those " Leges legum, tions by which the curiosity is invited from the

ex quibus informatio peti potest quid in singulis study of any one of them to that of the other

legibus bene aut perperam positum aut constitu- two, will sufficiently appear from the following

turn sit." The close affinity between these three Historical Review.

DISSERTATION FIRST.

PART FIRST.

IN the following Historical and Critical

Sketches, it has been judged proper by the dif-ferent

writers, to confine their views entirely to

the period which has elapsed since the revival of

letters. To have extended their retrospects to

the ancient world would have crowded too great

a multiplicity of objects into the limited canvason

which they had to work. For my own part,

I might, perhaps with still greater propriety,

have confined myself exclusively to the two last

centuries; as

the Sciences of which Iam to

treat, present but little matter for useful remark,

prior to the time of Lord Bacon. I shall make

no apology, however, for devoting, in the first

place, a few pages to some observations of a more

general nature, and to some scanty gleanings of

literary detail, bearing more or less directly on

my principal design.

On this occasion, as well as in the sequel of

my Discourse, I shall avoid, as far as is consist-ent

with distinctness and perspicuity, the mi-nuteness

of themere bibliographer ; and, instead

of attempting to amuse my readers with a series

of critical epigrams, or to dazzle them with a

rapid succession of evanescent portraits, shall

study to fix their attention on those great lights

of the world by whom the torch of science has

been successively seized and transmitted.1 It

is, in fact, such leading characters alone which

furnish matter for philosophical history. To enu-merate

thenames or

the labours of obscure or

even secondary authors, whatever amusement it

might afford to men of curious erudition, would

contribute but little to illustrate the origin and

filiation of consecutive systems, or the gradual

developement and progress of the human mind.

1 I have ventured here to combine a scriptural expression with an allusion of Plato's to a Grecian game ;"

anallusion which,

in his writings, is finely and pathetically applied to the rapid succession of generations, through which the continuity ofhuman life is maintained from

age to age ; and which are perpetually transferring from hand to hand the concerns and du-tiesof this fleeting scene. TivvStn; TI KKI ixr^tQovrH T"rSa;

,

jtaS/ivriX^aftvraSa ro" f"'mi fa^dSiSotrts aXXoy l| a'XXoiv."

(PLATO, Leg.lib. vi.)

Et quasi cursores vita'i lampada tradunt" LUCRET.


CHAPTER I.

FROM THE REVIVAL OF LETTERS TO THE PUBLICATION OF BACON'S PHILOSOPHICAL

WORKS.

THE long interval,commonly known by the

name of the middle ages, which immediatelypre-cededthe revival of letters in the western part

of Europe,forms the most melancholyblankwhich occurs, from the first dawn of recorded

civilisation,in the intellectual and moral his-tory

of the human race. In one pointof viewalone, the recollection of it is not altogetherun-pleasing,inasmuch as, by the proofit exhibitsof the inseparableconnection between ignoranceand prejudiceon the one hand, and vice,mi-sery,

and slaveryon the other, it affords,in

conjunctionwith other causes, which will after-wardsfall under our review, some security

againstany future recurrence of a similar cala-mity.

It would furnish a very interestingand in-structivesubjectof speculation,to record and

to illustrate(withthe spirit,however, rather ofa philosopherthan of an antiquary),the variousabortive efforts,which, during this protractedand seeminglyhopelessperiodof a thousand

years, were made by enlightenedindividuals,toimpartto their contemporariesthe fruitsof theirown acquirements.For in no one age from itscommencement to its close,does the continuityofknowledge(ifI may borrow an expressionof MrHarris),seem to have been entirelyinterrupted:" There was alwaysa faint twilight,like that

auspiciousgleamwhich, in a summer's night,fills

up the interval between the settingand therisingsun."1 On the present occasion, I shallcontent myselfwith remarking the importanteffects producedby the numerous monastic esta-blishments

all over the Christian world, in pre-serving,amidst the generalwreck, the inesti-

mableremains of Greek and Roman refinement

,

and in keepingalive,duringso many centuries,those scattered sparksof truth and of science,which were afterwards to kindle into so brighta flame. I mention this particularly,because,inour zeal againstthe vices and corruptionsof theRomish church, we are too apt to forget,how

deeplywe are indebted to its superstitiousandapparentlyuseless foundations, for the most pre-cious

advantagesthat we now enjoy.The studyof the Roman Law, which, from a

varietyof causes, natural as well as accidental,became, in the course of the twelfth century,anobjectof generalpursuit,shot a strongand aus-picious

ray of intellectual lightacross the sur-roundingdarkness. No studycould then have

been presentedto the curiosityof men, morehappilyadaptedto improvetheir taste,to enlargetheir views, or to invigoratetheir reasoningpowers; and although,in the first instance,prosecutedmerelyas the objectof a weak andundistinguishingidolatry,it nevertheless con-ducted

the student to the very confines of ethical

as well as of politicalspeculation; and served,inthe meantime, as a substitute of no inconsider-able

value for both these sciences. According-lywe find that,while in its immediate effects it

powerfullycontributed,wherever it struck itsroots, by amelioratingand systematizingthe ad-ministration

of justice,to accelerate the progressof order and of civilization,it afterwards furnish-ed,

in the further career of human advancement,the parent stock on which were graftedthe firstrudiments of pure ethics and of liberal politicstaughtin modern times. I need scarcelyadd,that I allude to the systems of natural jurispru-

PhilologicalInquiries,Part III. chap.L


point of view, onlyan effect,it is not, on the

present occasion,less entitled to notice than the

causes by which it was produced.The renunciation, in a great part of Europe,

of theologicalopinionsso long consecrated bytime, and the adoptionof a creed more pure inits principlesand more liberalin its spirit,couldnot fail to encourage, on all other subjects,acongenialfreedom of inquiry. These circum-stances

operatedstill more directlyand power-fully,by their influence,in underminingthe au-thority

of Aristotle ;" an authoritywhich for

many years was scarcelyinferior in the schoolsto that of the Scriptures; and which, in someUniversities,was supportedby statutes, requir-ing

the teachers to promiseupon oath,that intheir publiclectures,theywould follow no otherguide.

Luther,l who was perfectlyaware of the cor-ruptionswhich the Romish church had contriv-ed

to connect with their veneration for the Sta-

girite,2 not onlythrew off the yokehimself,but,in various partsof his writings,speaksof Aris-totle

with the most unbecoming asperityandcontempt.3 In one very remarkable passage,he asserts,that the studyof Aristotle was whollyuseless, not onlyin Theology,but in NaturalPhilosophy. " What does it contribute," heasks," to the knowledge of things,to trifleandcavil in language conceived and prescribedby

Aristotle,concerningmatter, form, motion, andtime?"* The same freedom of thoughton to-pics

not strictlytheological,formed a prominentfeature in the character of Calvin. A curious

instance of it occurs in one of his letters,wherehe discusses an ethical .questionof no small mo-ment

in the science of politicaleconomy; "" How far it is consistent with moralityto ac-cept

of interest for a pecuniaryloan ?" On thisquestion,which, even in Protestant countries,continued,tilla very recent period,to divide theopinionsboth of divines and lawyers,Calvintreats the authorityof Aristotle and that of thechurch with equaldisregard.To the former he

opposes a close and logicalargument, not un-worthyof Mr Bentham. To the latter he replies,

by showing,that the Mosaic law on this pointwas not a moral but a municipalprohibition;a prohibitionnot to be judged of from any par-ticular

text of Scripture,but upon the principlesof natural equity.s The exampleof these twoFathers of the Reformation would probablyhavebeen followed by consequences stillgreater and-more immediate, if Melanchthon had not unfor-tunately

given the sanction of his name to thedoctrines of the Peripateticschool : 8 but still,among the Reformers in general,the credit ofthese doctrines graduallydeclined,and a spiritof research and of improvement prevailed.

The invention of printing,which took place

1 Born 1483, died 1546.2 In one of his letters he writes thus : " Ego simplicitercredo, quod impossibilesit ecclesiam reformari,nisi funditus

canones, decretales,scholastica theologia,philosophia,logica,ut nunc habentur,eradicentur,et alia instituantur." " BRUCK-ERI Hitt. Crit. Phil. Tom. IV. p. 95.

3 For a specimenof Luther's scurrilityagainstAristotle,see BAYLE, Art. Luther, Note HH.In Luther's ColloquiaMensalia we are told,that " he abhorred the Schoolmen, and called them sophisticallocusts,cater-pillars,

frogs,and lice." From the same work we learn,that " he hated Aristotle,but highlyesteemed Cicero,as a wiseand a good man." " See JORTIN'S Lifeof Erasmus, p. 121.

4 " Nihil adjumenti ex ipsohaberi posse non solum ad theologiamseu sacras literas,verum etiam ad ipsam naturalemphilosophiam.Quid enim juvetad rerum cognitionem,si de materia,forma, motu, tempore, nugariet cavillari queas ver-bis ab Aristotele conceptiset przEscriptis?" " BRUCK. Hist. Phil. Tom. IV. p. 101.

The followingpassage to the same purpose is quotedby Bayle : " Non mihi persuadebitis,philosophiamesse garrulita-tem illam de materia,motu, infinite,loco,vacuo, tempore, quae fere in Aristotele sola discimus,talia quae nee intellectum,nee affectum,nee communes hominum mores quidquam juvent; tantum contentionibus serendis,seminandisqueidonea." "BAYLE, Art. Luther, Note HH.

I borrow from Bayle another short extract from Luther : " Nihil ita ardet animus, quam histrionem ilium (Aristotelem),qui tarn vere Grseca larva ecclesiam lusit,multis revelare,ignominiamqueejuscunctis ostendere,si otium esset. Habeoin manus commentariolos in 1. Physicorum,quibusfabulam Aristsei denuo agere statui in meum istum Protea (Aristotelem).Pars crucis meae vel maxima est, quod videre cogor fratrum optimaingenia,bonis studiis nata, in istis coenis vitam agere,et operam perdere."" Ibid.

That Luther was deeplyskilled in the scholastic philosophywe learn from very highauthority,that of Melanchthon ;who tells us farther,that he was a strenuous partizanof the sect of Nominalists,or, as they were then generallycalled,Tcrminists

"

BRUCK. Tom. IV. pp. 93, 94, et sea.s See Note B.

" Et Melanchthoni quiclempraecipuedebetur conservatio philosophiseAristotelicae in academiis protestantium.Scripsitis compendia plerarumquedisciplinarumphilosophiseAristotelicse,quae in Academiis diu regnarunt."" HEINECCTI, Elem.Hist. Phil. " ciii. See also BAYLE'S Dictionary,Art. Melanchthon.

DISSERTATION FIRST. 17

very nearlyat the same time with the fall ofthe Eastern Empire, besides addinggreatlytothe efficacyof the causes above-mentioned, musthave been attended with very importanteffectsof its own, on the progress of the human mind.

For us who have been accustomed, from our in-fancy,

to the use of books, it is not easy to form

an adequateidea of the disadvantageswhichthose laboured under, who had to acquirethewhole of their knowledge throughthe mediumof universities and schools ;" blindlydevoted asthe generalityof students must then have beento the peculiaropinionsof the teacher who firstunfolded to their curiositythe treasures of lite-rature

and the wonders of science. Thus error

was perpetuated; and, instead of yieldingtotime, acquiredadditional influence in each suc-cessive

generation.*In modern times, this in-fluenceof names is,comparativelyspeaking,at

an end. The objectof a publicteacher is nolongerto inculcate a particularsystem of dog-mas,

but to prepare his pupilsfor exercisingtheir own judgments; to exhibit to them anoutline of the different sciences,and to suggest

subjectsfor their future examination. The fewattempts to establish schools and to found sects,have all, after perhaps a temporary success,provedabortive. Their effect,too, duringtheirshort continuance, has been perfectlythe reverseof that of the schools of antiquity; for where-as

these were instrumental,on many occasions,in establishingand diffusingerror in the world,the founders of our modern sects,by mixingupimportanttruths with their own peculiartenets,and by disguisingthem under the garbof a tech-nical

phraseology,have fostered such prejudicesagainstthemselves,as have blinded the publicmind to all the lightstheywere able to commu-nicate.

Of this remark a melancholyillustra-tion

occurs, as M. Turgot long ago predicted,

in the case of the French Economists; and

many examplesof a similar importmightbe pro-ducedfrom the historyof science in our coun-try;

more particularlyfrom the historyof the va-riousmedical and metaphysicalschools which

successivelyrose and fellduringthe last century.With the circumstances alreadysuggested,as

conspiringto accelerate the progress of know-ledge,another has co-operatedvery extensively

and powerfully; the rise of the lower orders inthe different countries of Europe," in conse-quence

partlyof the enlargementof commerce,and partlyof the efforts of the Sovereignsto re-duce

the overgrown power of the feudal aristo-cracy.

Without this emancipationof the lower or-ders,and the gradual diffusion of wealth by

which it was accompanied,the advantagesde-rivedfrom the invention of printingwould have

been extremelylimited. A certain degree ofease and independenceis essentiallyrequisitetoinspiremen with the desire of knowledge,andto afford the leisure necessary for acquiringit ;and it is onlyby the encouragement which sucha state of societypresentsto industryand ambi-tion,

that the selfishpassionsof the multitudecan be interested in the intellectualimprove-ment

of their children. It is only,too, in sucha state of society,that education and books arelikelyto increase the sum of human happiness;for while these advantagesare confined to oneprivilegeddescriptionof individuals,they butfurnish them with an additional enginefor de-basing

and misleadingthe minds of their infe-riors.To all which it may be added, that it is

chieflyby the shock and collisionof different andoppositeprejudices,that truths are graduallycleared from that admixture of error which theyhave so strong a tendencyto acquire,whereverthe course of publicopinionis forciblycon-

1 It was in consequence of this mode of conductingeducation by means of oral instruction alone,that the different sectsof philosophyarose in ancient Greece ; and it seems to have been with a view of counteractingthe obvious inconveniencesresultingfrom them, that Socrates introduced his peculiarmethod of questioning,with an air of scepticaldiffidence,thosewhom he was anxious to instruct ; so as to allow them, in formingtheir conclusions,the completeand unbiassed exerciseof their own reason. Such, at least,is the apologyoffered for the apparent indecision of the Academic school,by one ofits wisest as well as most eloquentadherents. " As for other sects," says Cicero," who are bound in fetters,before theyare able to form any judgment of what is rightor true, and who have been led to yieldthemselves up, in their tenderyears, to the guidanceof some friend,or to the captivatingeloquenceof the teacher whom they have first heard,they as-sume

to themselves the rightof pronouncingupon questionsof which they are completelyignorant; adheringto whatevercreed the wind of doctrine may have driven them, as if it were the onlyrock on which their safetydepended."" Cic.Lucullns,3.

DISS. I. PART I. C


strained and guided within certain artificialchannels,marked out by the narrow views ofhuman policy. The diffusion of knowledge,therefore,occasioned by the rise of the lowerorders, would necessarilycontribute to the im-provement

of useful science,not merelyin pro-portionto the arithmetical number of cultivated

minds now combined in the pursuitof truth,but in a proportiontendingto accelerate thatimportanteffect with a far greater rapidity.

Nor ought we here to overlook the influenceof the foregoingcauses, in encouragingamongauthors the practiceof addressingthe multitudein their own vernacular tongues. The zeal of

the Reformers first gave birth to this invaluable

innovation, and imposed on their adversariesthe necessityof employing,in their own de-fence,

the same weapons.1 From that momentthe prejudicebegan to vanish which had solongconfounded knowledgewith erudition ; anda revolution commenced in the republicof let-ters,

analogousto what the invention of gun-powderproducedin the art of war. " All the

splendiddistinctions of mankind," as the Cham-pionand Flower of Chivalryindignantlyex-claimed,

"

were therebythrown down ; andthe naked shepherdlevelled with the knightclad in steel."

To all these considerations may be added the

gradualeffects of time and experiencein cor-rectingthe errors and prejudiceswhich had

misled philosophersduringso longa successionof ages. To this cause, chiefly,must be ascrib-ed

the ardour with which we find various inge-niousmen, soon after the periodin question,

employedin prosecutingexperimentalinquiries;a speciesof studyto which nothinganalogousoccurs in the historyof ancient science.* Theboldest and most successful of this new school

was the celebrated Paracelsus,born in 1493,and consequentlyonlyten years younger thanLuther. " It is impossibleto doubt," says Le

Clerc, in his Historyof Physic, " that he pos-sessedan extensive knowledge of what is called

the Materia Medica, and that he had employedmuch time in working on the animal, the vege-table,

and the mineral substances of which it is

composed. He seems, besides,to have tried animmense number of experimentsin chemistry;but he has this great defect,that he studiouslyconceals or disguisesthe results of his long ex-perience."

The same author quotes from Pa-racelsus

a remarkable expression,in which hecalls the philosophyof Aristotle a wooden foun-dation.

" He ought to have attempted,"con-tinuesLe Clerc, " to have laid a better ; but if

he has not done it,he has at least,by discover-ingits weakness, invited his successors to look

out for a firmer basis." 5

Lord Bacon himself,while he censures themoral frailtiesof Paracelsus,and the blind em-piricism

of his followers,indirectlyacknowledgesthe extent of his experimentalinformation :" The ancient sophistsmay be said to have hid,but Paracelsus extinguishedthe lightof nature.The sophistswere onlydeserters of experience,but Paracelsus has betrayedit. At the sametime, he is so far from understandingthe rightmethod of conductingexperiments,or of record-ing

their results,that he has added to the troubleand tediousness of experimenting.By wander-ing

throughthe wilds of experience,his disciplessometimes stumble upon useful discoveries,notby reason, but by accident ;" whence rashlyproceedingto form theories,they carry thesmoke and tarnish of their art alongwith them ;and, like childish operators at the furnace,at-tempt

to raise a structure of philosophywith afew experimentsof distillation."

Two other circumstances,of a nature widelydifferent from those hitherto enumerated, al-though,

probably,in no small degreeto be ac-countedfor on the same principles,seconded,

with an incalculable accession of power, the sud-

1 " The sacred books were, in almost all the kingdoms and states of Europe,translated into the languageof each respec-tivepeople,particularlyin Germany, Italy,France, and Britain."" (MOSHEIM'S Eccles. Hist. Vol. III. p.'2G5.)The effect

of this singlecircumstance in multiplyingthe number of readers and of thinkers,and in givinga certain stabilityto themutable forms of oral speech,may be easilyimagined. The common translation of the Bible into'Englishis pronouncedbyDr Lowth to be stillthe best standard of our language.

' Hsec nostra (utssepe diximus)felicitatiscujusdamsunt potiusquam facultatis,et potiustemporispartut quam ingenii.""Nov. Org. Lib. i. c. xxiii.

* Histoire de la M^decine (ala Haye, 1729),p. 819.


den impulsewhich the human mind had justre-ceived.The same century which the invention

of printingand the revival of letters have madefor ever memorable, was also illustrated by the dis-covery

of the New World, and of the passage toIndia by the Cape of Good Hope ;" events which

may be justlyregardedas fixinga new era inthe politicaland moral historyof mankind, andwhich stillcontinue to exert a growing influenceover the generalcondition of our species. " Itis an era," as Raynal observes, " which gaverise to a revolution, not onlyin the commerceof nations, but in the manners, industry,andgovernment of the world. At this periodnewconnections were formed by the inhabitants ofthe most distant regions,for the supplyof wantswhich theyhad never before experienced.Theproductionsof climates situated under the equa-tor,

were consumed in countries borderingonthe pole; the industryof the north was trans-planted

to the south ; and the inhabitants of the

west were clothed with the manufactures of the

east ; a generalintercourse of opinions,laws andcustoms, diseases and remedies, virtues and vices,was established among men."

" Every thing,"continues the same writer," has changed,and must yet change more. Butit is a question,whether the revolutions that arepast, or those which must hereafter take place,have been, or can be, of any utilityto the hu-man

race. Will theyadd to the tranquillity,to

the enjoyments,and to the happinessof man-kind? Can theyimprove our present state, or

do theyonlychange it ?"I have introduced this quotation,not with the

designof attemptingat present any replyto the

very interestingquestionwith which it con-cludes,but merelyto convey some slightnotion

of the politicaland moral importanceof theevents in question. I cannot, however, forbearto remark, in addition to Raynal'seloquentandimpressivesummary, the inestimable treasure ofnew facts which these events have furnished for

illustratingthe versatile nature of man, and thehistoryof civil society.In this respect (asBa-con

has well observed)theyhave fullyverifiedthe Scriptureprophecy,multi pertransibuntet au-gebiturscientia ; or, in the stillmore emphaticalwords of our Englishversion," Many shall goto and fro,and knowledge shall be increased."1The same predictionmay be appliedto the gra-dual

renewal, (inproportionas modern govern-mentsbecame effectual in securingorder and

tranquillity)of that intercourse between the dif-ferentstates of Europe,which had,'in a great

measure, ceased duringthe anarchyand turbu-lenceof the middle ages.

In consequence of these combined causes, aid-ed

by some others of secondaryimportance,2 theGenius of the human race seems, all at once,to have awakened with renovated and giantstrength,from his long sleep.In less than a

' Neque omittenda est prophetiaDanielis de ultimis mundi temporibus; multi pertransibimtet augeliturscientia : Ma-nifeste innuens et significans,ease in fatis,id est, in providentia,ut pertransitusmundi (quiper tot longinquasnavigationesimpleturplane,aut jam in opere esse videtur)et augmenta scientiarum in eandem cetatem incidant." " Nov. Org. Lib. xciii.

2 Such as the accidental inventions of the telescopeand of the microscope.The powerfulinfluence of these inventions maybe easilyconceived, not only in advancingthe sciences of Astronomy and of Natural History,but in banishingmany ofthe scholastic prejudicesthen universallyprevalent. The effects of the telescope,in this respect,have been"often re-marked

; but less attention has been given to those of the microscope,which, however, it is probable,contributed not alittle to prepare the \yayfor the modern revival of the Atomic or CorpuscularPhilosophy,by Bacon, Gassendi, and New-ton. That, on the mind of Bacon, the wonders disclosed by the microscopeproduceda strongimpression in favour of theEpicurean physics,may be inferred from his own words. " Perspicillum(microscopicum)si vidisset Demociitus, exsilu-isset forte ; et modum videndi Atomum, quern ille invisibilem omnino affirmavit,inventum fuisse putasset."" Nov. Org.Lib. ii." 39.

We are told in the Life of Galileo,that when the telescopewas invented, some individuals carried to so great a lengththeir devotion to Aristotle,that theypositivelyrefused to look through that instrument : so averse were they to opentheir eyes to any truths inconsistent with their favourite creed " (Vitadi Galileo,Venezia, 1744). It is amusing to findsome other followers of the Stagirite,a very few years afterwards,when they found it impossibleany longerto call inquestionthe evidence of sense, assertingthat it was from a passage in Aristotle,where he attempts to explainwhy starsbecome visible in the day-timewhen viewed from the bottom of a deep well,that the invention of the telescopewas bor-rowed.

The two facts,when combined, exhibit a trulycharacteristical portraitof one of the most fatal weaknessesincident to humanity ; and form a moral apologue,dailyexemplifiedon subjectsof still nearer and higherinterest thanthe phenomena of the heavens.

In ascribingto accident the inventions of the telescopeand of the microscope, I have expressedmyself in conformitytocommon language;but it ought not to be overlooked,that an invention may be accidental with respectt,o the particularauthor,and yet may be the natural result of the circumstances of societyat the periodwhen it took place. As to the in-struments

in question,the combination of lenses employed in their structure is so simple,that it could scarcelyescape thenotice of all the experimentersand mechanicians of that busy and inquisitiveage. A similar remark has been made by


century from the invention of printing,and thefall of the Eastern empire,Copernicusdiscoveredthe true theoryof the planetarymotions, and a

very few years afterwards, was succeeded by thethree greatprecursors of Newton, " TychoBrahe,Kepler,and Galileo.

The step made by Copernicusmay be justlyregardedas one of the proudesttriumphsof hu-man

reason ;" whether we consider the sagacitywhich enabled the author to obviate,to his ownsatisfaction,the many plausibleobjectionswhichmust have presentedthemselves againsthis con-clusions,

at a periodwhen the theoryof motionwas so imperfectlyunderstood ; or the bold spi-rit

of inquirywhich encouragedhim to exercisehis privatejudgment,in oppositionto the autho-rity

of Aristotle," to the decrees of the churchof Rome, " and to the universal belief of the

learned,duringa longsuccession of ages. He

appears, indeed, to have well merited the enco-miumbestowed on him by Kepler,who calls

him " a man of vast genius,and, what is of stillgreater moment in these researches,a man of afree mind."

The establishment of the Copernicansystem,beside the new field of studywhich it opened toAstronomers, must have had great effects on

philosophyin all itsbranches,by inspiringthosesanguineprospectsof future improvement,whichstimulate curiosity,and invigoratethe inventivepowers. It afforded to the common sense, evenof the illiterate,a palpableand incontrovertibleproof,that the ancients had not exhausted thestock of possiblediscoveries ; and that, in mat-ters

of science,the creed of the Romish churchwas not infallible. In the conclusion of one of

Kepler'sworks, we perceivethe influence ofthese prospectson his mind. " Hsec et cetera

hujusmodilatent in pandectissevi sequentis,nonantea discenda, quam librum hunc Deus arbitersseculorum recluserit mortalibus." 1

I have hitherto taken no notice of the effects

of the revival of letters on Metaphysical,Moral,or Political science. The truth is,that littlede-serving

of our attention occurs in any of these

departmentspriorto the seventeenth century ;and nothingwhich bears the most remote ana-logy

to the rapid strides made, duringthe six-teenth,in mathematics, astronomy, and physics.

The influence, indeed, of the Reformation onthe practicaldoctrines of ethics appears to havebeen great and immediate. We may judge ofthis from a passage in Melanchthon, where he

combats the perniciousand impious tenets ofthose theologianswho maintained, that moraldistinctions are created entirelyby the arbitraryand revealed will of God. In oppositionto thisheresy,he expresses himself in these memorablewords : " " Wherefore our decision is this; thatthose preceptswhich learned men have commit-ted

to writing,transcribingthem from the com-monreason and common feelingsof human na-ture,are to be accounted as not less divine,than

those containedin the tables given to Moses;and that it could not be the intention of our

Maker to supersede,by a law graven upon stone,that which is written with his own fingeron thetable of the heart."2 " This languagewas, un-doubtedly,

a most importantstep towards a justsystem of Moral Philosophy; but still,like theother stepsof the Reformers, it was onlya returnto common sense, and to the genuinespiritofChristianity,from the dogmas imposed on thecredulityof mankind by an ambitious priest-hood.5

Many years were yet to elapse,before

Condorcet concerningthe invention of printing." L'invention de rimprimerie a sans doute avance1 le progres de 1'especehumaine ; mais cette invention "toit elle-meme une suite de 1'usagede la lecture repandu dans un grandnombre de pays.""Vie de Turgot.

1 Epit.Astron. Copernic.2 Proinde sic statuinius,nihilo minus divina prseceptaesse ea, quse a sensu communi et naturae jadiciomutuati docti ho-

authorityof a learned German Professor,Christ. Meiners"

See his Historia Doctrina: de Vero Deo. Lemgoviae,1780, p. 12.3 It is observed by Dr Cudworth, that the doctrine which refers the originof moral distinctions to the arbitraryap-pointment

of the Deity,was stronglyreprobatedby the ancient fathers of the Christian church, and that " it crept upafterward in the scholasticages ; Occam beingamong the first that maintained that there is no act evil,but as it is prohi-bited

by God, and which cannot be made good,if it be commanded by him. In this doctrine he was quicklyfollowed byPetrus Alliacus,Andreas de Novo Castro,and others."

"

See Treatise ofImmutable Morality.It is pleasingto remark, how very generallythe heresyhere ascribed to Occam is now reprobatedby good men of all


any attempts were to be made to trace, with wards adopted in the casuistryof the Jesuits,analyticalaccuracy, the moral phenomena of and so inimitablyexposedby Pascal in the Pro-human life to their first principlesin the consti- vincial Letters. The arguments againstthemtution and condition of man, or even to disen- employedby the Reformers, cannot, in strict pro-tanglethe plainand practicallessons of ethics priety,be considered as positiveaccession to thefrom the speculativeand controverted articles of stock of hujnan knowledge; but what scientifictheologicalsystems.* discoveries can be compared to them in value !2

A similar observation may be appliedto the From this periodmay be dated the decline3

powerfulappeals,in the earlyProtestant wri- of that worst of all heresies of the Romish

ters, to the moral judgment and moral feelingschurch, which, by opposingRevelation to Rea-of the human race, from those casuistical subtle- son, endeavoured to extinguishthe lightof both :ties,with which the schoolmen and monks of and the absurdity,so happily described bythe middle ages had studied to obscure the light Locke, became every day more manifest, of at-of nature, and to stifle the voice of conscience, tempting " to persuade men to put out theirThese subtleties were preciselyanalogous in eyes, that theymight the better receive the re-their spiritto the pia et religiosacalliditas,after- mote lightof an invisible star by a telescope."

persuasions.The Catholics have even begun to recriminate on the Reformers as the first broachers of it ; and it is to beregretted,that in some of the writingsof the latter,too near approachesto it are to be found. The truth is, as Burnetlongago observed, that the effects of the Reformation have not been confined to the reformed churches ;" to which it maybe added, that both Catholics and Protestants have, since that era, profitedvery largelyby the general progress of thesciences and of human reason.

I quote the followingsentence from a highlyrespectableCatholic writer on the law of nature and nations :" " Qui ra-tionem exsulare jubent a moralibus praeceptisquae in sacris literis traduntur, et in absurdam enormemque LUTHE-IU sen-tentiam imprudentesincidunt (quam egregieet elegantissimerefutavit Melchior Canus Loc. Theolog.Lib. ix. et x.),et eadecent, quae si sectatores inveniant moralia omnia susque deque miscere, ac revelationem ipsam inutilem omnino et ineffi-cacemredderepossent." " (LAMPREDI FLOREKTINI Juris Naturae et Gentium Theorcmata, Tom. II. p. 195. Pisis,1782). Forthe continuation of the passage, which would do credit to the most liberal Protestant,I must refer to the originalwork. Thezeal of Luther for the doctrine of the Nominalists had probably prepossessedhim, in his earlyyears, in favour of some ofthe theologicaltenets of Occam, and afterwards prevented him from testifyinghis disapprobationof them so explicitlyanddecidedlyas Melanchthon and other reformers have done.

1 " The theologicalsystem (saysthe learned and judiciousMosheim) that now prevailsin the Lutheran academies,is notof the same tenor or spiritwith that which was adopted in the infancyof the Reformation. The gloriousdefenders of re-ligious

liberty,to whom we owe the various blessingsof the Reformation, could not, at once, behold the truth in all itslustre,and in all its extent ; but, as usually happens to persons that have been longaccustomed to the darkness of igno-rance,

their app

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