dissemination of combat information 10 june 1952

8/3/2019 Dissemination of Combat Information 10 June 1952

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~ ~ .-- --- ---' - ~ i.;ttEtiljliizt UNCLASSIfIEDOFFICE, CHIEF OF ARMY FIELD FORCESFort Monroe, Virginia

A TTNG,-64 350. 05/50(DOCI)(C)(30 Jun 52) 30 June 1952

SUBJECT: Dissemination of Combat Information . \ ' ~ ' ~ ~ - - - i \ ~ ; - ~ \ . ~ \ . ; , : ' . ; ~ ~ _ : ; ~ \ ,:. " ') .' -, .: ' , ' ; 1 ' , I i I'I> " , " ,

TO: See distribution .k. 1 : 1S52 Ir,r'L:V I \_ t J ~ ~ i ll . .

1. In accor,dance\w'ith SR 525-85-5, Processing of CombatI ~ o r m a t i o n , the inclosed EXTRACTS are forwarded to Departmentof the Army, Army Field For'ce's and the service schools for evalu ~ t i o n and necessary action. ' It may be appropriate, in cer taincases, for these agencies to take actioJi upon a single extracted item;in others, may be desirable to develop a cross-sect ion of accumulated extracts on a particula:r subject before initiating actiop; andotten, th e extracted item serves ,t o reaffirm our doctrinefJ and tech

,' .; !niques.2. Copies are furnished to other military agencies to keep

them informed concerning theater problems from the front line,through th e logistical command.

3. These EXTRACTS are derived from reports which arec l a s s i f i e ~ SECRET. For the greater convenience of the user" ~ h i s Office downgrades each extracted item to th e lowest classificationcotnpatible with securitY. No effort is made to paraphrase or .deleteany p o r t i ~ n of the extracted remarks, so that none 9f.tJ:1e ~ r i g i M l 'int,ent is lost. ", ' ". "

4. 'Combat information EYTRACTS herein which are applicable to trainin,g at.:.the com,pany-battery level also,appear in Army.Field Forces TRAINING BULLETINS .

. ' . '

FOR THE, CHIEF OF ARMY FIELD FORCES:. "

/r) j(?!)fit:!".JW. H. MELHORNExtracts from sources Lt Col, AGe 376 thru 383 Asst Adjutant General

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ZDIstRIB UTION: .3 ACOFS. 0 .. 1a tiA 10 The Quartermaster General

3 ACOFS. G-Z, DA Z Executive for Reserve15 ACOFS, G-3. DA and ROTC AffairsZOZ ACOFS, G-4, DA. t, ' 'The Adjutant General

1010

Chief Signal OfficerThe Surgeon General

Z Chief of Chaplains 4 Chief of Transportation10 Chief Chemical Officer Comdt10

ZChief of Engineers", . )Chief of Finance z'2 The Armored SchoolTh e Arti l lery School

Z,"z Chi,ef of InformationT h ~ Inspector General 2.Z ,/ The Infantry SchoolArmy War Col:legeZ The' Judge Advocate General Z cascZ Chief of Military History Z Army G eneral SchoolZ 'Chief. National Guard Z Asst Comdt. The Arti l lery

Bureau School. A A & G ~ Branch10 Chief of Ordnance 1 ea Pres . AFF Boards

Z The Provost Marshal 1 CO. Arctic Test Branch'General

, l ' , , : . : 'Copies furnished:,70 TA G (10 ea CINC and CG . Major Oversea Command), CG's'z ea Continental Armies

4 Army AA Command,Z' Military Distr ict of W a s h b ~ g t o n 2.' Tactical Air Command '2.' Chief of Naval Operations. Dept of th e Navy , ,1 ' ,CO. Mountain &: Cold Weather Tng' Command ,,;t,.,Z Chief, Army Advisory Gp. Air Command and ~ t a f f ,

School. Air UniversityComdt of Cadets. US Military AcademyComdt

Z Armed Forces Staff CollegeZ MarinE; ,Corps SchoolZ USAF Air-Ground Operations SchoolZ Counter Intelligence Corps SchoolZ The Provost Marshal General 's School1 Officer in F ~ r g e , Atlal:l:ti,C: F l ~ t J ~ t ~ U i g e n c e Cent

Attn: Ground Forces Officer1 Chief. AFF Human R e s e a r c ~ tJnjt No 1

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OFFICE, CHIEF OF ARMY FIELD FORCESFort Monroe, Virginia

EXTRACTS OF COMBAT INFORMATION

SOURCE: Command Report - 15th In! Regt i ', ' .DATE: February 1


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b. That a flash hider be provided for the RifleCal .30 MI.

" . c; That this be made a study by the Army FieldForces Board arid thai 'a CGurs'e ot-instruction in hight firingbe included in the basic training of replacements pr ior to' .their arr ival in this theater . .,'.

SOURCE: Command Report - 5th Regi1l)ental Combat ,TeamDATE: Decen:tber 195.1., Source No 377

AZIMUTH READING DEVICE FOR SHELL REPORTING.'," :. ~ E S ' T , R I C T E D ) ,*lthough reports' of enemy artilleryf"for t ~ j . ~ , : ~ r i ~ w e r ~ light. shell reports continued to beturned in with er rors in azimuth readings. "f\ .special Com:pass B 0 8 ; t : ~ " ~ S b.een f o r w a r d ~ d to each front l ine unit.

The board is a,piece of soft pine 12" square by 1" indepth. Four long spikes are put at each corner to stake i tto the ground. A ppotographe'd'disc w ith highglaze contentiis.'p'laced on the board' with a 'directional north arrow at theside. A wooden arrow ,i s 'placed in the center of the boa:i-'d:and can be 'made to pivot 'b y hand. " ..\, " To operate the board, all that is nec'essary is to pointthe w,ooden arrow in the direction of the sound or flash. 'r ~ . ~ d the numbers 8..t, this point and report them to the CPo

~ t . is r e c o m m e n d ~ q t h a ~ least one b,oard be ma:de _available to each company on the front line and that no detailed "or technical explanation be made on the use of t h ~ \ board. A man should be taught three steps in the procedure:(1) Point the 'ci'rrowin direction of sound or flash. (2) Readthe numbers at ' the point and (3) Give the information to

personnel ***.*

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UNCLASSIFIEDUS;E OF KOR,EAN 'LABOR., "

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(CO:NFII)ENTIAL) A total of one thousand"three hundreds e y e n t y ~ f o u r (1374) indigenous personnel are employed inv a r i ~ u s .capa,cities ,witbintbe,regiment. one ,thousand seventyseven (1077) of those a re members of the Korean ServIceCorps. ' th e remaining two hundred ,ninety-seven (297) aremiseel1a.neou. ,personnelwho are p,roc'ured tlirough the CivilA f f a i ~ s O f f ~ e e r . These Korean' p e t - s o ~ l perform an invaluable s,erviee t,o the' Regiment',by ca,..rying ammuDition. rationsand other supplies to,.front Une p o s ~ t i o n s , .inaccessible' to 'vehicle t ~ , a n s p o r t . . 1hei r utilizatioil I'n 'other areas as KP's ,etc, .. has r e l i ~ v e d United States per.Orinel for otper and moreimportant, tasks.

I "LISTENING DEVICE.

(CONFIDENTIAL) The most outstanding development inthe c o m r n u n i ~ a t i o n field for the month was the expanded useof listening devices by all line units. The listening device iscomposed of a microphone and, r'eceiving set. The microphoneis placed in likely avenues of approach, at a,range-greaterthan that of th e Outpost Line of Res.istance. Mortar concentrations are placed on the same spot and fired when soundsof approaching en'emy are' identified.' The.regiment has ,' ,profitedfr 'om the use of the device and plans to' initiate train-, 'ing in i ts use in 'oreier tobet ier e x p i ~ ~ t . i ts warning eaPflbilitie's.

t,:* *.* ,. . ,TUBE EXPLOSIONS, 2/1 MORrAR):

;. < :1" f .. ~ O N F I D E N T I A L ) :n the, past t w o ~ o n t h s ,there havebeen' two instances "in which rounds have exploded in th e 4.2inch,mortar tubes,.' The Heavy Mortar Company developeda. system' of firing' the p1.ece which afforded maximum,protection for the crew in th e event ' of an explosion. ' T ~ e system"incorporates firing by lanyard and a revetment behbldwbich, .the crew remains until the round has safely left the tube.

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SOURCE: Command Report - 3d Inf DivDATE: JanuarY' 1 ~ 5 Z Source No 378

DIVISION AVIA TION COMPANY'..I

(RESTRICTED) The Division' Light Air Section is in r e ~ 1 i t Y a composite airseet ion with m ~ s s . supply, .operations andhousing operating from a common airstr ip. The sectionfunctions much the same' as: a s e p a ~ a t e company. but doesnot have a T lOirE authorizat ion.6verhead personnel requirements are accomplished by airplane mechanics. vehicledrivers or by special duty p e r s o n ~ e l . In this manner aseparate mess is .maintained to pr'ovide for messing of .aviation;personnel. Recommend that a cT IO&E b.e authorized -estab ..lis.bing a Division Aviation Company to include all ArmyA v ~ t i o n unctic>ns of the Division.'

SOURCE: Command Report - .9th Infantry ite.gt. ' DATE: January 1952, Sourc,e No 379

REPLACEMENT PROBLEMS.(CONFIDENTIAL) The greatest problem continues to

be replacements, both officer and enlisted. In the formercase officers are being received whose training and experience are at a di:rect variance with the needs of a combatregini.ent. . It w , ~ u l d a p p e a r t , ~ t - t h e ~ s s ~ m p t i O n is being madeth8.t, any offic.erwearing "c'rossed rifles" is a qualified 1!)4Z_~ ' m a n y cases. however, these officers have had a background with no c o m m a ~ experience but instead as personneloftjcers. intelligence specialists. TI8rE,etc.

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Enlisted m ~ h , are ' s t i ~ l ' arriving ,a s i m i l ~ r ,manner.Recently, r o r ' e l C a ~ p l e . arpan w i t ~ a dry cle.aning machine. ' . ' '. . . I , ~ p e r a t o r ,MOS and another with steam locomotive operatorMOS w e ~ e assigned. Many men with arti l lery and other , ~ , . ' branch specialities are similarly received. Every effort is

'b-eing made to ~ v e t h ~ s , e , men reassigned so that the bestends of the service are being served not only in utilizing

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trained manpower but by contributing to good morale byhaving men do ~ h e work they k n o w ~

The replacement p r o b l ~ m is: particularly pr,ess.ingsince Category IV c o m ~ i t m e n t s , a ~ d the rotation.programcause a high rate, o f , a t , ~ r , i t . i o n : on key personnel.

,In solving the p r ~ b l e m s , . , b a ~ t l e f i e l d commissions are

being made as c;')ften as suitable appointees are found. The9th Infantry IRTe gives a refreshf!r course which helps orientmen who are not familiar with Inf'methods.

SOURCE: C01'llroa,nd Report - Headquarters IX CorpsDATE: JanuarY,195Z Source No 380

AERIAL TRAMWAYS.: ' i ~ ' " . ., ' , (RESTRICTEDJ There are now in the Corps sector some15 01",20 of these valuable t ime-savers designed to meet the

supply tantl-,evacuation"'m!eds of infantry front-line units in: r ; n o u n t a i n t S U s t e r r a m ~ >The model of a.11 "later ones has beenth e 3d E n g i n e ~ t s " A e ' r i a l ' ' ' P r a m w a y 698.: Cons'truction 'on 'this was star ted as soon as:iJie ' H a g ~ of Hill 69'8, 'iri t'heformer Z4th Division sectDr-; wai;i t a . ' k e n ~ It,ts &s1.hgle::' stage.double-track' -system tramwaYo"po4Ne'ted by a 3/4- ton truckm4tor. w i t 1 i ; ~ ' w h e " e l rim attkehed:to tha d r f v e ~ ' - $ h a f t ' a s ' thedriving drum for -the haul c a b l e ' ~ " '1'he 1s'tra"ight-line distanceof the tramway is approximately lS'OO'feet. the 'static load 'cables are 18Z0 feet long, the difference in elevation betweenthe stations is 910 feet. In one period of 31 days Tramway698 had hauled 187 tons of ammunition, rations, and othersupplies to ,the top of th e hill. ' and evacuated Z4 casualties"During one ~ 4 - h o u r period it hauled 18 tons and evac'Uated "four casualties. Through its example the erection a ~ d m ~ i ~ ' " tenance of aeria l tramways' has become a primary m i s ~ i O ' r C of the enginee,rbattalions of divisions attached to th e Corps.

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COLD WEATHER OPERA TtON.' M4 AND M5 TRACTORS. : t I__ ' __ ~ ______________(CQNFIDENTIAL) I t i " ~ e c o m m e n d ~ d that an extende'd

t rack wedge {or t ractors. higb .peed, M4'and MS, be designed,and produced in order ta insure traction during operation on'frozen g ~ o u n d ~ n d ~ c e . : : It, i.s further recommended that suchextended.g:oack wedges be included in "Oft Vehicle Material"in the quantity of 48 per vehicle. ' . '. '

Combat experience had inpi.eated that M4 and M5 high-'~ p ~ e d t r .e tors do not lbave sufn-de'nt traction on' frozen groundand i c ~ to perform their mission as prime'm:overs for towed~ ~ # l J . ~ r y w e a p o n s . A ,field ,expedien t. bf welding steel cleatst ~ P . : ~ c n . s long. by one inch thick to stabdard t rack w e d g ~ s ~ s . , g i v e n good:,r.esults in the field. 'This expedient; however,n:takeslarge, demand..,'.on ,both mater ials and t ime. ' and ' itsSUCces s depends (1lmost. entirely dpon the skil l of the welder .t i n l e f ~ ~ h e w ~ l d s . a r e p e ~ e c t . the cleats ' break of f with usage.W : i ~ ~ ; t h e w . e l d e d , c l ~ a t 8 '.in-'goocl condition, however. it 'has'b e e n ' . f ~ u n d t ~ t , 2.4 c l e a t s ~ pel" t rack give good traction evenunder jcy C : : 9 ~ d i t i o n s . It is believed that this number wouldbe adequate for the ,:xtended wedges recommended.

SOURCE:'" , C o m m a ~ d Report .. 64th Tank Bn (Medium) DATE: January 1952 Source No 381 ',f(

TANK' TRACTION' ON FROZEN GROUND.", (CONFIDENTlAL) A ~ o r e suitable, type track, 5 ~ u l c : l

be de;;eloj;;ed for winter operations on, ground f r o ~ e n . solidlyto a' c i e p ~ h , m q r ~ . ~ b c l n two or t h r ~ ~ inches,. Exper.ence, ipKorea has shown 'that the present t rack, either steel or rubber,lacks traction and climb:ing ability, on s ~ e e p , g r a d e s on frozengr'ound, e';en i h o u g ~ t h e , ~ ~ na,'s s ~ f i d e ~ t power t9 ' J D p . . J t ~ t h ~ p u l l ~ A type 'M ' s ~ e i ' , ~ ' l e a t or g " r - O ~ s e r is n ~ ' e d e c l , t h A t w i l l break the surface sufficiEH1tly to give the ta'nk the nece'ssaryadditional traction anQ also.focus the weight of the tank onf e ~ e . ~ , ~ p o ~ ~ t ~ . , ~ x P e r ~ e r i t s . , ~ r ~ ' F ~ P ~ o n d u e t e ~ by thi,s ;unitwllerem every fourth t rack block IS a deep two-mch cJl.e.vronblock followed by three normal olle-'inc'h chevrori blocks (or

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normal rubber blocks). Although tests have not as yet beencomplicated by track failure, if is foreseen that the combination tracks being tested may over a period of t ime lead tot rack failure. The combination' of the one two-inch chevronblock followed by the three one'"':inch chevron blocks showedc c m s i ~ e ~ a b l y impJ'oved climbing ability; b u t . s ~ f i c i e n t tractionwa,;a ,still ~ I ) t ; o b t a . ~ e d to ,utilize the m.lrimum powet; : o u t p ~ t ofthe M46 or A I tank. , , ..

As opposed to. the above q ~ o m b i n a t i o n " the i n t ~ r s p e r s i , o n of normal rubber , b ~ o c k s with tH.e ' two-inch grouser ~ l o c k ' 'proved unworthy of further t e s i ~ Also, it was n.oted t ~ t . 'neither the solid two-inch grouser track, the solid one-inchgrouser track. nor the s'olid' i ' ~ D e r track were able to climbthE! solidly frozen slopes as wen 'a s the combination steeltrack. C o ~ s e q u e ~ ~ y . it i s r e . c ~ m m e n d e d that detailed studyand tests be conducted in the Continental United Statesr e f ~ r e n c e developmentofa tra.ck that will enhance the climbiJ,lgability of the future medi.um tank, without ~ u a i n g trackf ~ ~ u r e s , fQr winter , C ) p e ~ a t i o n s u n d e r , ~ e r r a i n conditions, s i . m ~ ; i . r those e n c ~ t e r e d in Korea. 'j ,. i.". ", r ** ****MAINl'ENA:r,-.rCE SHELTERS .. . - . .

(RESTRICTED) Action should be taken toward procure;me;nt of heatf.7d c a ~ Y 8 : s . shelters for tank maintenance operationsduring winter operations. Shelters should be of adequate sizeand height to, enable r e m o ~ l of. the power pack from the tank,using the wrecker boom, and to allow room for necessaryr e p a i r s ~ Although f j . ~ l d . expedients have been used, the re s.ulting shelters are , n o t m o y a b l ~ and are to some, extent asafety hazard in high winds. , I t ,is believed, t\).at . ~ ~ n t ~ I J . ~ ~ c e standards and deadline t imes during intense cold canbeilnprove!l by' proViding p r o p ~ r w o r } { i n g shelter, therebyeiiminating c l u m s i . D e s ~ a'nd the all-too-frequent, but necessary, trips to outside warming f i t e s ~

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SOURCE: Command Report - 19th In ! RegtDATE: December 1951 Source No 382

FIELD PROMOTION OF WARRANT OFFICERS.(RESTRICTED) Field promotion of wat'rant officers

should be made as simple and effective'as that for commissioning of second lieutenants

.. . " ,.' ,, ', ~ , ' , .'. .'. * .* . *

RANK AND '.JOB DISCREPANCIES. '(RESTRICTED) Though first lieutenants are filling

captain vacancies in combat', promotions have not been forthcoming because o f ~ a n overage of captains, Infantry. in thistheater . Promotions to captain of combat company commanders is neces$ ry to maintain proper morale and incentive for junior o f f i ~ e r s and is th e proper reward for deserving 'commanders. Authority to promote combat companycommanders to captainsregardiess of theater strength,;braqch'and grade. should be forthcom'ing.

, '.. * * .USE OF SOUND- LISTENING DEVICE-.

I ,(CONFIDENTIAL) The s o u n d ~ l i s t e n i n g device was f i rs t

used by us this month. It appears profitable, easy to insta1land maintain. Use is recommended for outpost;-positions andclose-in ambushes. Several times we detected enemy movement a t ranges up to 200 yards. A Chinese interpretergreatly increased the value of the i n s t r , w n ~ , n t ! b y .telling us ,jus t what was being' said 'by the enemy detected. ':,:, i, , , ' . ' ; : {.

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- ~ e ' . F l i E t J : r I J U 5


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. " UNCLASSIFIED SOURCE: C;.ornmand Report - :ist Cay Div . DATE: .October 1951 Source No 383

, " . I . iDisCUSSION ON DOCTRiNE AND TECHNIQUE.t ' t .( C O N F ~ P . . E N T I A . L ) It. not my ,purp.ose', within the limitations. irnpose4 , ~ y the.cu,rr,ent ~ e t i c a l s i t ~ t i o n and the scope of thisreport, . ~ . o , a t t ~ ~ a detaile4.dis.cussion, inv.olving:our bas'icqoctrine and ta,ct;ics .. . Inste-.d:1 prqpose to make some 'general.comments bas,ed on the experienceis of thi-s di:visicm while. . ,.engaged i ' i 1 . o . p ~ r a t i ~ n COMMANDqduring the period 8-Z8October 1951 . B e f o ~ e : d i 8 c u s s i o n ~ t h e soundness of doctrine.it is my. o p ~ i o n , that we sbc;.uld attempt to secure satisfactory' r ~ , s u l t s : fr,om its application. U n ~ i 1 we do this we are hardly

, in a .position to offer c o n s t r u c t i v ~ crit icism of any, value.. For. this reason,andqtl;ler:s too n1m1er,ous tomennon" I plan to discuss only the fundamentals and s t ress their importance. ,Operations in October ~ y .. aa always, revealed our weaknes,ses.; ,I hope to cSr,ndldly cover most .of these. ' How.v:er, , t h ~ " s u b j e c t ' s of this discussion, if complete. would be innumerable., Consequently,I have selected. only the .moreimportant and broader topics for review in this report .'1. Attacks. . ,:--..-----,

' ! ' . .., ' ..

. w,e ~ ~ t ~ . ~ e v e . r i s h l y night and dayfor ,a protracted periodp r e p a r i n g ~ i n r o i n ~ ~ detail, p l a n s ~ , attack and plans for' ' ., . 1 ~ g i s t i c a l supporto( r ~ ~ : ~ p e r a t i o n . : At the cqnc1usion of the. ~ l a n n i n g 'phase, it is . h 9 . p . ~ d that nolhing, has :been,overlooked..Onsideri.ng o u r . s ~ l v e s readvon "D" Day and "HJI Hour,. weJ u m p o f . ~ ; ~ b o X ' ~ l y . t h . r e . f , t ~ x we find. our ' . 'steam" g ' o n e ~ a n d 'stUI a long way from the objective. The plans are perfect, , support a v a i l ~ ~ l e . our supplies more than adequate. Wherein does the fault It-e? Often,., tar to o often. in myf ~ p i n i Q n : 'we f a , ~ l t o ' t a k ~ .advantage o f . o ~ r superiority of fire- p o w ~ r . ,f!specially: our organic. weapons.. depending instead'.on artiliery ~ . i . r t o " ~ : r . r y the load .. ,.oRGANIC WEAPONS,E V : E ~ Y ONE OF., 'J;'aEM,.MS'r BE EMPLOYED. :1"0 THE,MAfC1MV. ",; ~ ~ ' ) , l ~ , '

\ ' I ~ ' . . " . . d ; ~ , . ; ) I, . .,; '., ' . : ~ . '. ' , '. Too often we make th e mistake of not using all avail., able ,troops., I f a company is se'nt .ou t to take an ( ) b j e ' c f i v e ~ " . .

the entire company should be used. Every weapon should be .[9 OverUNCLASSIFIED 9 iI s tt l a:a
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EE6dili i i litl ca:a:,.. ,.,.....CONF 'DEN i 1* .U N C L A S ~ I F I E D " ,

fail to properly organize a position. The results are inevitable: our forces are immediately counterattacked andvaluable ground is lost. In my opinion, few subjects need' g r ' e ~ t e r ' s t r e ' S s in our training.' .. , :'\

, .'.. I f it is to be held, immediate preparation and'organizatfon of strong defensive positions is 'absolutely essential uponS'Edzing an objective. Consolidation'and' organization df aposition can ri-ever be ovel'-empbasized and because of our' failures to follow through,weare repeatedly shoved of f hillsby an enemY'who is aware of this weakness, who preparesfor this moment with'rapid counterattacks. I f th e supporting'weapons and art inery ' f i ies are properly used - - artilleryconcentration laid on avenues o(approach and a,ssembly areas ,organicwea'poris 'u&edto'keep t'hi enemy at a distattce ... -thEmthe assaulting units can usually hold untU reinforcementsarr ive.

'Another important item to be emphasized in training'is assault fire. ,If a unit has" as an objective a hil t OJ' piecelc,f terrain , then the best way ,to take'it is to get'-on'top;of i t - a.nd' fast! To this end we employ our rrubdmum supporting' f ires; however, in the 'fi 'nat'assault (thetaS't'r'ough'fc)rty or:'tifty:yai'ds when we mask our supportmg ' t i r ~ ' ) 1t is 'the attacking unitt!i own assault fire which must }(eep the' enemy downuntit we can close with 'him. Unle-ss 'our TROOPS MOVE

"FAST, AND FIRE WHEN THEY MOVE, rio objective will betaken'without great' c'ost in ~ l i v e - s ~ ' ..Our soldiers, one and all. have a tendency to 'stop'

moving when they fire a weapon. This failing must be overcome. ' Infantry soldiers must be taught the advantage ofassaulting' a position by firing while rapidly moving . Training in: loading and'firing: while moving', must be emphasized, and' practiced. '

, . . Attack of a 'Fortified 'Position. '. 1. ..

The' execution: of 'Operation COMMANDO found us facedwith the problem of reducing the heavie st fortified positions:yetencountered in th e Korean 'campaign. This should havepresented no :'great problem, but it did. We reacted as i f i twere a completely new and untouched-on phase of offensivewiloda.re., ay our, failure to use the, vast Clmount of experience

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g a ~ e d dl,lring the last war - - especially in the quite similarP ~ c i f i c campaigns. and even during the over one year of this war _. :we lost much valuable t ime and many lives .

Doctrines and suggested tactics on the ATTACK OF AFORTIFIED POSITION should no longer be treated as aspecialty field. It should receive consideration in each andevery offensive tactical training problem. Every answer.to even a hypothetical problem, should envision the reductionof mutually supporting bunkers. No longer should we thinkof certain weapons such as.the flame t h r o ~ e r . demolitionsof various types, etc; as being the exclusive property ofspecially .trained assaul t squads whose only mission is toreduce one bunker which delays the advance of the regularrifle elements. It is important that each objective be considered another Siegfried Line and the basically sounddoctrine applied in each c a s ~ " . : r p . J s . : r ~ q u i r e s t ime and training and rehearsals prior to an attack but. i t is time that we~ u s t take. Once we have stopped the:attaek long enough topermit th e enemy. to build bunker typer ; e m p l a c ~ m e n t s . sucha,s those we have re.cently e n c o u n t e r ~ d , then the techniquemU$t be rehearsed over and over to insures'Uces's in . ouroffense. TRAINING IN THE REDUCTION OF F.ORTIFIEDPOSITIONS SHOULD BE CONCURRENT IN ALL ~ A C T I C A L PROBLEMS.3. W.ithdrawal.

It has been proved by costly experience that night withdra,walsare disastrous.- yet our commanders still attemptthe.m. .Certainly an intelligent commander always considersthe pc;ssibility of a ~ i t h d r ~ w a l by planning the routes, desig- 'nating a covering force . etc. Due consideration should begiven to tbe sometimes illusory emergency which- requiressuch a move and. i f well thought out, the position is usuallynot untenable as fir&-t thought to be. By staying on positionwe can usually avert a catastrophe and at the ;same t ime boldhard won terrain. Naturally. this discussion, :is based onthe premise that the force is on position with adequate strengthto .4efend or delay untildayligh't. ::.;,'

. .-, : . :

UNCLASSIFIED eLCDRi i ; .,.'nPl8itJTIAtpt
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- - r.p aUI I ; IW6Aih: is::eeNfJl5EN i tALl J J ~ G . ~ ~ ~ ~ l t l j ~ ~

Our'troops must be instilled With'the spi,'tit.- confidence,and determinationto hold .." I f f'orced to;withdraw. to dQ soonly on order and under n 1 a ~ d m i 4 m control- in;planned phases.The final decision will normally: res t with the local commander. and' should only be made after carefully estimatingthe situation.

--" . 1

. . ,: . ~ ! ~ " ~ ' : . ', '.During.these operations we had excellent art i l lery sup

port but 'I-must admit that 'our commanders 'd o not knaw howto use. i t to. obtain maximum results . In my opinion we r.elyon artillery ' to bridge the gap between small arms fire', without properly using the organic infantry weapons to full advant;ilge. ' ~ . Thi-s, gap is too wide for such wasteful u s eo !art iUery .!Ven under ideal conditions where the infantry followswell plaeed: accurate' rolling fire. Minimum safety clearancein the ,Kor,ean hills prevents close- in support that is possibleon fiattel"' or rolling te r ra in . Since the movement of a Uhitup a steep slope' is slow; continuous fir-e must be laid on theobjective after the art i l lery has moved from the forward tothe reverse slope or higher up the slope. Once our infantryis within assaulting range, art i l lery sbould then 'b e shiftedto avenues of approach and reverse slopes. to prevent enemyr.emfo.rcements and counterattack. Instead, ' lOur men'willorder t h ~ fire lifted, . then s tar t the assaul t up a long' steepslope. When we do this, the enemy has suff icient t ime torecover and emerge from the well prepared posit ions onrever.se slopes. ready to enlage our troops. Thus'unortunately we'are caught a t th e worst moment when we are t iredfrom the long climb and assaul t and we have lost the shockeffect of art i l lery.

Our people mustbeforcibly shown the valae of well .employed a.rtillery f ire . I feel tbat this' can best be accomplished by training infantry behihd- t'ol1in.g fire a t the minimumsafety elearancewithinfantry weapons firing a t the objectivesimultaneously. In our practice problems there is always alifting"ef.,f{re before the infantry star ts either moving orf i r j n g ~ , This' gives an erroneous impression wbichunfortu .nately is : carried ,over: into eomba/tt .' .. , A t t ~ m e s th e ~ r t U l e r y forwar.9:. o ~ ~ ~ ~ r v ~ r . ~ ~ in nopos i tion to adjust fire, yet art i l lery is needed. What can be done

Ove:13 ilJPbRMAIIBI&P FUNCLASSIFIED eer4FIBEtJTIAL
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14

in such a case? For one solution, the battalion liaisonofficer Jrom an OP should'be able to assist . Any numberof method, 'canl be worked out'to keep continuous fire on anobjective.

Artil lery should 'seldom be fired by map coordinateunless nD other' means exist. ' This is an unsatisfactorymethod and is not accurate;t.itcannot ,be adjusted to giveeffective close support to the infantry in this type terrain.

The succes s' of Operation COMMANDO was greatlyaffected by use of direct f ire ISS-mm', 8-inch guns and tankweapons. We shoUld bever hesitate to move ' these weaponsup into th e bills within range for DIRECT FIRE againstbunker,s

. .i'. ,All high velocity direct fire weapons are effective' prov;ided they can be positioned. ' Future operations against'defensive positions should include. ' from the ve-ry start', theseweapons, which should move as close dftbe infantry as ispracticable. .

Massing 'of ar t i l lery f ires is sometimes overlooked.It :llVly.be.. the best plan to concentrate Z/3 or 3/4 of all available a r ~ l 1 e r y support ona battalion objective until 'i t iss e c ' \ 1 r e ~ We can do this, without 'materially affecting thes , u P l ? ~ t . o f other infantry units -that a re reorganizing'andmaking'preparations for the continuation of the attack.;

The importantpomt W',hich I wish to etnpbcisize here is:TEACH.THE INFANTRY THE IMPORTANCE OF PROPERLYUSED AR TILLERY, FIRE.' It is never to be substituted formore accurate 'mortar fire',"nor can it ever be used in place'of organic infantry weapons. It is the combination of allthese weapons, organic and supporting, which makes for asuccessful operation.5. ' Training.

, ,', , ' ~ : I, ' ": ;The subject ,of trat-ning beUig' s'Oclosely relate4 'to. the"

deficiencies herein bef:brre. 'discusseS and'since"most of ourills can, be c u ~ e d by realistietratning in the fundamentals.I W:0uld 1ike.. ! ~ m ~ n t i o : n . s . o . m ~ . p ~ ! ! . e . ~ .of ~ ~ d i v i d u a l t r a . i n b l g , ~ . ~ :

UNClASSIFfED Sf't';? r::- n;rr ?I '? 9'r I.eeNFI8EtJTIAI!
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17/24

-.

UNCLASSIFIED "",.., .....,t: . ," .. ' \ "'" '.. . ' tt ~ ~ a r e a p p i l r e n t l y not receiving suffiieient emphasis in our' . ' . . 1 ! '. :, ' ti". ,"0 r ~ p l a c e m ~ . ~ t trai,nmg centers.. ,

.. j '. . .. ' I,. ': t. . . " ! ' .',,' 'f .:..... .! 't ., .. : ' . ' .Our men must bave more UNIT: TMINING before reach-i ~ g ' a combat d l V i s . ' ~ o ~ It i ~ , a : p ' P a r e ~ f t ~ ' t ~ v e n t ' h ~ u g } l ' theyh a v ~ been ~ e ' ~ b . ~ r 8 , o f , s q u a : d s ' i ~ trabling centers , t.hey have

' c" ,.1. " ',' . _\ not,:-- or pos,s i p ~ , only once or twiCe,:,- - engaged in a, tacticalproblem ,under ,the leader,ship of an NCO who leads and directsthem under" silnuiated 'battlefield conaitions where they actually,apply the principles, of fire and movetnent as a fighting team.

, ' , 'c, , ' " c ' ,,,this m u c J : 1 ~ ~ e g l e c , t e d ' p ~ , s e , Q f ~ a s i c trainirtg left asthe ~ , ~ ? ~ n s i b i l i t y ,of a division' ~ J l g a ~ e d in corrtbat, while '?therless im'portant subjects are covered over and over in trainingcenters . Np subject can possibly be as important to the combat 'soldier. .

.' .... .. , , ',: . ' ," " ",; ' , c ;,, ' , ''1;rQPps need this ~ o n s t a n t trai.ning in basic tactics under. ' . . . . . . t . . I ',. . t ~ e ~ c t ~ l l e a d e r s h i p of an o f f i c e ~ or NCO :Who engages in the

p ~ , ' ~ l e r r i ' ~ s their :Ieadet and. not ~ e r ~ , l y as ' a supervisor' whoCi i t iques ~ ~ ~ , action o ia , ~ ; q u a d ~ e d b Y ~ : n acting ~ ~ ' i a d l e ~ d e r . In this division problems,of platoon and company size

a r ~ z:un ' ~ i t h i iveammunit ion at every available opportunity,but nevu ' have the time required to t ~ r t j out confident,well-trafued so ld ie rs . ' ' . " ' , '

Another, and perhaps more crit ical problem ~ ~ : ~ h e urgent need to afford our officers, of 'all grades', more' t imeand, practice in the actual command of troops. It is too oftenthe case, ~ ~ e n E ; v a l ~ t i n g the background of the line officerr e p l a c e m e n t ~ to'find that l 1 e ' ~ s bad l i t t le 'or no commandduty for many years. 'If fortunate, he bas ' ~ d s ~ ~ e recentbt:anch service s c ~ o o l training b ~ ~ in my view too muche m p h a s i ~ l s c u ~ r e n t l y p ~ ' c e ~ ' t J t i ~ type, of Pteparation forc ' o m m a n d ~ " S d i o o l s T ' ~ r e e x c e l l e n t ' a ' i d s 'but No SUBSTITUTEfor a d ~ a f d u t y with t r ~ ~ p ; s . : ' When ' i i ~ ~ s " a r e inv'olved theleader, mU,st KNOW from actual practical field experienceb ~ ~ k k D o w l e d ~ ~ ~ o o . often isn ' t re!l1embered until too late!..... ' ' . ..' ., .

.: .. t' , ; .' ., '.

: ' ....... t .. .. l ' ;"!fit ' 1 ~ ; C " ,.," F;. Toproperiy consider doctrines of defense In view ofexperi-ence and--conditions- which have and do influence our

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t O ~ J F I B E f Q ii'itL


18/24

16U N C L ~ S S \ F \ E O

actiobs in Korea I f ~ e l . before going im'o 'a 'generalized' '""description. we should cover these problems not for the,purpose of excusing our actions and justifying our adoption'of unorthodox methods,. but so that the ,l'ead,er will }:)e cognizant f:4 them. " " , ' , . , , ' <

B ~ a r in mind that n ~ r m a l ~ r g a n i z a t i o ~ ' of a ' division, . ' " 4 , , ' " '. sector is e ~ e m e l y , d ~ f i c u 1 t ' in our present t a c ~ ~ a ~ s ~ t u ~ t i o n . . Some of the fador.'sleading' to tl)is, are: , ' , '. . ' .:. . . . ,; .t . f.:! ., ." " F "a. Thew-iath of this cjivbion.sector _t p r e s ~ n t is over

Z6.000 yards: at t imes a companyfron[has e ~ c , e e d e . d Z.,.O,OO" _'... f ' . ..' - . . I" --4 ... ->,yards.. ",.' , . ~ ~ .

, , ' , ' . (,'. ',.' ,b. No regimental tank compa:nie!$ a:.:e, , r : C ? ~ ~ Q r havebeen assigned to this division. '.,c. Depth ..to the defensive position, because of wide

{'tontages and l imited troop strength. is obtained by , , ~ t l P p l e :i mentary b l o c k ~ n g ~ . o ~ i t i o n s .

In the final analysis there simply have not , ~ e e n enough" t r o ' o p ~ avai1a1:>le to cover the ground. I f you consider ,these fa'ctors, you possibly will ~ e r s t a n d why C)ur 'commanders

, adcSpted what they'- thought were' justified , l m p r o v i - . ~ t ~ t o , .. ; . t-' '" ';. . -'..... '. "meet the requirements. realizing that our doctrines are 'flexible and that the principles still apply under conditions' 1 i ~ r e in Korea.

I think i t best to briefly ~ e v i e w t ~ e evolution'of ' t h ~ , ' 4 ~ : " fense sulce the s ~ r t ot the K,Qreall ~ a r . , as i t p ~ u i c i p a l i y ", "concerns tlie company .. - 'the inference being that i f all com. I;l8.nies pt:0perly organize so the division defeJ'lse is , c , o ~ T e c t ..

" " , ' ',., . " ,'" r;',\ Early i n t h e ' ~ r . with our ~ r o o p s i n , ~ ~ l , ~ n u m b e r ~ , : " ; ,the e s t a b ~ i s h m e n t of. coordinated,! m ~ t u a l l ~ ,:sqPP9rting p : o s i t ~ o n s 'was impossible. ' ~ a s 5 ~ ~ D s s i p l ~ ! $ i ~ p l y : ~ : e , q ~ u s e , : t , b e , t r o o p s were not a V a i ~ b l e t , ~ c o y ~ r ~ l l t ~ e , ~ e r r a i n ~ . l ; ~ n : t a U fronts and sectors of responsibility p r ~ v ~ n t e 9 elther a t ie- in.physica1ly or by f ire. Units were' ' t h e h f o r c : ~ a ' l o ' adopt the "perimeter system, as the only means of defending the key; terram t e ~ h i r e s in their assigned sectors . This system, 4 ~ ' r


19/24

!kCWiI i JJ4P6AiilA:: s _@:@tlFfO'E'NTI,,,:f

-tiNCt ASSIEJEDYet we developed nothing new and, even then. never were allimportant f e a t u r ~ s in any given sector occupied.

.. ' .... ' 'I

As the number, of our units increased and conditions,generally improved in our favor we atill, to an extent. continlled to prepare our defensive positions as th e troops on theNaktong did. True. the sector decreased and i f we had continued to defend key .terrain features as they of the " P e r i m ~ t e r " did., ,no reason for complaint would available. But insteadof, occupying all of the key features. in a sector , o ~ r unitc:;ommanders started to a180 decrease the. area of occupation byforming close knit company perimeters on possibly one or tw ofeatur.e.s .. , :Even when defending -on line. instead of sendingp l a ~ o o n s ~ ! ) u t or smaller units, .... - as they did previ9u,sly - - t9occupy and. organize a piece of ground. the tendency.J?y thecompany c ~ o m m a n d e r was to pull the elem,ents of ,the companycloser together until all surrounded him on the p e r i p h ~ r y ofa circular position. Close-by features worthy of defendingwer.e. ignored. great gaps - - impossible to cover by fire - continued to exist between COMpanies. permittipg the e.nemyto m o v ~ a t will around our positions and attack from any point.

Sine:e the bad practices have . b e c o m , ~ e n g J ' a i ~ e d and solong accepted as theory of defense. we must go back to the,fundamentals of our basically sound defensive doctrines. rhedefense of key terrain in any unit sector must be stressedwhether H. is a squad. platoon. company or larger unit. Nolonger can the close companionship of t r o o p s , - - , J ~ des,ire tos.tay ~ o s e together in a tight perimeter - - influence o ~ r o ~ g a n i zatioD" of sectors;.of responsibility. We must J m . p ~ e . s s - g p o n them that i t is not n ~ c e s . a r y . to o;rgani:zr,e a co,rnpa,ny with. aphysical t ie-in between platoons or even squads, in some cases:;that gaps will exist .to permit us to prepare artillery andmorta,r .concentratiOlls. to cover the area by AWfire .from ,more than one,position. which eliminates the need for occupation and cr,eate. impact areas close-in. Our o f f i ~ ~ r s . m u , s , ~ ; p e taught that no armycan p h y s i ~ a , l l y . cover every ~ ~ C ; : h q( groundin its area of responsibility .

. We must i m p r ~ s s t e r r a i ~ analyzatiop. e v e ~ befQ..relay.ing out a hasty defens.ive p o s i t i ~ . A c o m ~ l l d ~ ~ mustwalk the terra:i. . Planning a company defense 'po;sition froma map is easy a n 4 ~ a V ' ~ s . phrsical energy. but is impracticable.

OVer17UNCLASS\F\D SiGPR
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20/24

U N C L ~ S S \ f \ E Q 18,Our officers m U 6 ~ study the terrain while walking o:v:er it .w i t h t h e , c a p a b U i t ~ e ~ , o f i t ~ i r unit in mind, before making adecision. BY,kn,owmg the s t . r ~ n g t h of h i ~ unit. t ~ e weaponsin possession ofbis men, the condition of his t roops .:.physical, mental, state of training - - the commander is ableto plan his defense as he walks. You canlt position a.utomatic. . ' .weapons from a map; you can' t locate the dea.d space in frontof positions. The se,lection' qf alternate and primary P o . s ~ t j , C ? n , s for automatic ~ e a p o n s must be made on the ground a n d ~ h e .type of emplacement. a:nd its exact 10,cation can only be. deter mined by looking c a r e f u l ~ y , ~ t the terJ'ai,n.

: >' Preparation of connecting. t l ' e n c h e ~ , a t l ~ a s t b e t w e ~ p prima,ry and alternate AW positions, .tpust b e c ~ ~ e . routiI;1eeven in h a s t y . d ~ e n ' s e s . If.time p e r m i ~ $ m o r e ~ l a b o r a t ~ J . l o s i t ions must be prepared with , . c o m m u n i ~ , a t i o n s treJ;lChe$ .andoverhead cover. .

, , "Upon occupying the position, the .companyan d p ~ a 1 ; . ~ o n supply routes must be .selected;. a J"econ m a d e ~ , if n e c ~ s S a ~ y . to determine the feasibility of using a certain r o u t e ~ Not;always will. the route over w h ~ e A . , ~ h e unit 11l;o.v;ed in t h ~ a t ~ C ~ i ' be the best for moving supplies ."'''::.,.a, s ~ o r ~ e , r route ,may.. ~ . x i . s t . one ~ v e r . less arduous cUmbing terrain, a more ~ c c : e s s i b ~ e route the position. .:, ','

; IAvenues of ,enemy a p p r o ~ c h must b.e., ~ t u d ~ e . d ; our d:e,...fenses planned to conform .with t h e : t e r ~ , a i n ..a . n d J h ~ , d e I l 1 ~ d s of gOM tactical principles. These -..v:enues . ~ a ; D . s . o ~ e t i m e s

'be interdicted by slJpportlng ;fires and . s e a . l e , d a s : : a ~ , entrp.nceto our position. '". ., ,. , < ,',Communicat,ion in every. fQrm must p l ~ n ~ e ~ : ~ l a r . e s , wire. radio, r u n n ~ r , . whi6tles. Prearrangeq s i g n a l s ; s . h ? , , ~ l d

be SOP i n , ~ v e r y 'cor;npa.DY,and taught to r e p l a . . C ; : e ~ e n t f 5 , ) ; A e minute they joina co,mpaJlY.: S i g ~ l s between, f ~ m p . a n i e s ; { l ~ d battalion headquarters ' P'lll$t, be pla.nned. We must n e v ~ r p ~ " ..without it. " ','i.', . '

" ; . ; .Routes of withdrawal convenient for aii e l e m ~ n t s ' to a .company assembly area and f r ~ ~ thispoint,to;.the new posi tion are a part of every d e f e n ~ i y e plan. .1, , :J

UNCLASSIFIED M ~ T r !if'1111!J 46


21/24

.s liil blii f

'P"freplans mustbeprepitred as !foon' after'o'Ccupation"a,S 'pOs'Sible t ' 'anddurin'g'daylight.' Every man in the company\, should know ~ ' P r e ~ a r ~ d 'concentrationsal 'ld be able to call 'lor them.' : . ,

Little need be said about the perimeter type of defensiveposition. Cenerally our: l roopshave been successful in setting, up -this d e : f ~ n s e ;arid have beett able' to withstaridheavy enemy 'a s s a ~ l t s ~ ' ' 1 ' h e ' Same principles tn ' p l ~ l i n i n g and 'preparmg'8. ', line defense are usually applicabie - - k ~ V ' terrain must be'occupied. Sometimes it is best to e10setight and oc'cuPY only, the dominating terrain features. This, "o'f course; dependson the size 01 th e unit. But, usually it l the' case' of a company, ,

"the deieD$e should lie' c 1 o s ~ and 'tight as ' terrain 'never allowsus the freedom of organization 'that we like. Our plans mustconfOrm With the terraizi.

,. ." '.7. Logistics.;when attacking. a unit faces many numerous and difficult

supply problems, but all have been studied and in most casesa reme'd'Ydeveloped. Stili we"a;re 'uWa'bleto keep the supplies'moving by the' 'conveyor belt s Y ' s t ~ T i i 1 : ( " th4:! f ( ) ~ r d units until' t r a " f f i ~ a b l e ; r o a d s can be built. ' At p l r e s ~ t i t ' d u r i n g the attack,supply'is usually accomplished by hand ' c ! : a r l ' y i n ' g ' p a r t i e ~ madeup o{indigenous labor who CarTy-CrOm a rear 'suPPly base .. 1')1is' is not completely' satisfactory. however." Even thoti"gh at. tiznes are able' to 'truck supplies to th e b i seof a position,' bnd 'carrying ' is still the only rrleans of getting 'it to th e top.By th e use of M3q r s . 'i f available for ' this purpose. many supplyproblems could very likely be leesened by decreasing the hand'carrying distance. In many instances M39' s can traverse steepslopes 'and even thbugh not'able to 'reach :the' top of i1 hill,' canreach a p6sition dose to the unit: Often: time S tanks too area b i ~ to reach the tops of some hilts to support the' infantry.Thfs' being possible, supplies 'f6r 'the infantrY'should be'1oaded' ~ n 'for th e ascent.,; ' .

Much can be done to improve our present flame thrower'if its use' ' t o ' b ~ p ~ a c t i e a : b l ~ : i n i n o u n i a i n f i g h t i n g . Resupply issucn'a problem that i t can never 'be used:' a:s: the efflcfent weaponthat ' i t 'i s and'to'meet our needs. Thedevetboprnent ot a simplerf,; ! [ ;, 1 . . ( , Over19

:zfSS!'F 'UNClJ\SS\F\D " . '" - " , ' ~ . '" ' . f l , ...eeUPIBE!rfl:JOI!


22/24

an't ari:ON F IEEtJT 1 ; 2 : 1 : e ~..

UNCLASSIFIED zorefueling system wheJreby fuel tanks can be refilled close tousing units' position!! ::should, receive top ,prioT.ity. 1\ l ighterweight.. I O D g ~ , r burning perio


23/24

UNCLASS'F1ED In regard to security, i t must never be forgotten that

th e enemy possesses many of our type radios and has attime jammed our channels. It is also entirely possible thatsome of our moves were blunted becaus. th e enemy possessedprior knowledge of the particular move. To take full advantage of our excellent signal equipment, thorough training ofoperators, expert maintenance, and uninterrupted resupplyof batteries and spare parts, are essential througbout allechelons right to the smallest units.9. Tactical Air Support .

Air strikes should seldom be used against an objectivewhen forward observer adjusted artillery and mortar fire isbeing placed and th e infantry is positioned ready to moveunder cover of this fire. By placing an a ir strike on sucha positlon, much time is lost in lifting artillery and againgetting fire . o ~ the objective after the strike . . At the sametime the momentum of the attack is lost and the accurate. . . .pinpoint 4. Z, 8 l ...mm fire is sacrificed for less accuratearea coverage. In addition adjacent units, , t tacking, losetheir supporting fire while aircraft is in the area.

This same aircraft can be 'used much more effectively. . by s t r i k ~ n g just beyond the objective, without iifting the

supporting fire, to interdict asseinbly and build'-Jlp ~ r e a s t6 prevent enemy reinforcement. . ' 100- to Z50-Pound bombs equipped with VT fuzes should be used.

Prior preparation of defensive positions should includea softening up by air power using 500- and 1000-pound bombs.However, against heavily fortified positions and bunkert,, . this should b e . d o n ~ before th e attacking'troops start theattack. Fo.r as previously stated, artillery fire should seldombe lifted once the infantry has started moving. To soften upthe ~ o r e hea.yi1y defended hills with lattger Personnel bunkersand weaPons the heavy (lOOO-pound) bombs must be used.

. . . ." . f . ~ : A '-"

. O f c ( ) u r f l ~ . t napalm and 'rockets areto 'an e ~ t e n t effectivebut thcdr effeC:tiveness is greater against troops in opentrenches . . Are8::,9apalm bombing is difficult and costly in ai r . craft aga#ist the J : ( ~ r e a f t . w L positions. ' It is probable that

." "1lUt s a r 6 . ' ~ l i u . m . " ' b ~ t : o f air .craftcould be'more effectively em'., " ~ I J " . ' ; \


24/24

~ ~ ' , r l i " ' ~ NCLASSIFIIDConclusion.

An attempt. in the foregoing ha:s' been -made to- cover theprobleaur..enceuntered,JIftd some 'of, the methods we have learnedfrom 'expe,iencehe"er, ~ . r . e ' -are . bowever. innumerableimportant' subjects ,' la . ;menticmed in the il'ltroduction. fa dis - .cus.ion of _ icb should be included but bave not been;for reasCIBof time a;nd s p a ~ . .

There are many tb;iilg. that we can do to improve theefficiel'lcy of our operation.. . For certain. we can improvethe leadership qualities of our company grade officers and Iknow of no better way than by proper training. Our communi:'cation sy'stem needs constant improvement; also I cal'l't overemphasize the importance of accurate. timely casualty re porting and the passing on of imormation to the next higberheadquarters.

Most of .the problems encountered are old ones; everyoneis aware' of the 8 i ~ p l e r f supposedly common errors that .s o l d i e r 8 a n ~ officers bave always made. We must emphasizethe fundamentals i l l a program wbich is filled with small unittactics. i Other les . important subjects can be covered con- 'currently. Our soldiers m ust be made to realize that the,mistakes made by ~ a i l i n g to apply fundamental doctrines costus lives and loss of valuable time .. I am convinced that ourdoetrines are sound 'and battle proven - - i t is in our applieationof th .s . doctrines or rather in our failure to apply them to thesituation that we have failed. -. .

_ ) . " t ', ') ..

.',i;

:: .i.".. i ' . t... .1) ,'.' ,'\'

. , .1 ,

" ... "UNCLASSlffED !!

dissemination of combat information 10 june 1952

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