It is submitted that government employees may face dismissal if they test positive for illegal drug use. The Civil Service Commission declared in Resolution 07-1625, dated August 31, 2007:

It is settled that the use of illegal or prohibited drugs is a serious and grievous offense. This is because of the perils it poses not only on the users themselves but also on the general public. It is common knowledge that drug addicts become useless if not dangerous members of society and, in some instances turn out to be among the living dead. The dangers would all the more be multiplied or compounded if the person involved is one connected with the government, who happens to be performing some vital frontline services such as traffic enforcement as in the present case. It is for this reason that a government official or employee found to be using illegal drugs is considered to be guilty of grave misconduct, punishable with the supreme penalty of dismissal from the service with all its attendant accessory penalties. Substance abuse or drug addiction is directly anathema to the abiding tenet that a public office is a public trust.

Regrettably, the appellant cannot make use of his length of service and this case being his first offense to get off lightly. It has been ruled, in not few cases, that rather than mitigate liability, length of service should serve to aggravate culpability. For, one in the service long enough should know better than to engage in nefarious activities. Upon the other hand, the grave nature of the offense committed by the appellant negates appreciating in his favor the fact that this happens to be his first commission.

The Supreme Court held in Re: ADMINISTRATIVECHARGE OF MISCONDUCT RELATIVE TO THE ALLEGED USE OF PROHIBITED DRUG ("Shabu") OF REYNARD B. CASTOR, A.M. No. 2013-08-SC that testing positive for use of illegal drugs is considered as grave misconduct, punishable by dismissal for the first offense.

Substantial evidence obtained through a random drug test established that Castor was indeed positive for use of shabu. This is a flagrant violation of the law which is considered as grave misconduct. Under Section 46(A)(3), Rule 10 of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (RRACCS), grave misconduct is a grave offense punishable by dismissal even for the first offense.

Further, it is provided that under Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 13, series of 2010,4 any official or employee found positive for use of dangerous drugs shall be subjected to disciplinary/administrative proceedings with a penalty of dismissal from the service at first offense pursuant to Section 46(19) of Book V of Executive Order 292 and Section22(c) of its Omnibus Rules.

CSC Resolution No. 99-1410 dated July 1, 1999 further enunciates this point:

Government employees who are found positive for drugs and who can offer no satisfactory explanation may be subject to dismissal from the service. The offense is classified as Grave Misconduct  and punishable by dismissal in the service under Section 22, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292. Grave Misconduct is defined as an act which manifests a clear intent to violate the law or there is flagrant disregard of an established rule. It is also any act which society abhors and condemns.

However, this does not mean that testing positive for the use of illegal drugs means that the requisite procedure of Preliminary Investigation, Formal Charge, Formal Investigation, and Hearing may be dispensed with.

While it is true that a formal trial-type is not essential to due process, it is necessary that “the parties are given a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their sides of the controversy and to present supporting evidence on which a fair decision can be based.”1 Also, before an employer may dismiss an employee, the latter must be afforded due process which means, among others, the opportunity to confront the witnesses against him and to adduce evidence in his defense.The CSC Rules does not specifically provide that a formal charge without the requisite preliminary investigation is null and void. However, upon receipt of a complaint which is sufficient in form and substance, the disciplining authority shall require the person complained of to submit a Counter-Affidavit/Comment under oath within three days from receipt. The use of the word “shall” quite obviously indicates that it is mandatory for the disciplining authority to conduct a preliminary investigation or at least respondent should be given the opportunity to comment and explain his side. As can be gleaned from the procedure set forth above, this is done prior to the issuance of the formal charge and the comment required therein is different from the answer that may later be filed by respondents. Contrary to petitioner’s claim, no exception is provided for in the CSC Rules.2

Although administrative procedural rules are less stringent and often applied more liberally, administrative proceedings are not exempt from basic and fundamental procedural principles, such as the right to due process in investigations and hearings.3 In particular, due process in administrative proceedings has been recognized to include the following: (1) the right to actual or constructive notice to the institution of proceedings which may affect a respondent's legal rights; (2) a real opportunity to be heard personally or with the assistance of counsel, to present witnesses and evidence in one's favor, and to defend one's rights; (3) a tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so

1 Autobus Workers Union [AWU] vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 291 SCRA 219

2 Garcia vs. Molina, G.R. No. 157383,  August 10, 2010

3 Civil Service Commission v. Lucas, 361 Phil 486, 491 (1999).

constituted as to afford a person charged administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality; and (4) a finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial evidence submitted for consideration during the hearing or contained in the records or made known to the parties affected.4

4 Montoya v. Varilla, supra ar 841-842; Fabella v. CA, 346 Phil 940, 952-953 (1997)