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Dismantling the Doomsday ClockPaul MeyerPublished online: 25 Mar 2010.

To cite this article: Paul Meyer (2010) Dismantling the Doomsday Clock, Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, 52:2,209-216, DOI: 10.1080/00396331003764710

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Eliminating Nuclear Threats: A Practical Agenda for Global

Policymakers. A Report of the International Commission

on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament.

Gareth Evans and Yoriko Kawaguchi, co-chairs. Canberra/Tokyo:

International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation, 2009.

328 pp. Available at http://www.icnnd.org.

On �� December ���� the prime ministers of Australia and Japan launched

the report of the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation

and Disarmament. Whether it was the timing of its release, or the venue

of the launch (Tokyo), the report seems to have gone largely unnoticed by

the mainstream global media. Even its principal official sponsor, Australian

Prime Minister Kevin Rudd, seemed oddly lukewarm in his brief public

remarks at the launch. Rudd referred to the report as representing ‘an

important framework for discussions and debate on non-proliferation and

nuclear disarmament in what will be a critical year in ����’.�

Perhaps the prime ministerial speechwriters were having an off day, but

all they could muster by way of a characterisation of the report was to repeat

twice more that it was ‘an important framework’ for discussion. The co-

chairs, former foreign ministers Gareth Evans and Yoriko Kawaguchi, and

their �" eminent fellow commissioners were politely thanked for ‘produc-

Review Essay

Dismantling the Doomsday Clock

Paul Meyer

Paul Meyer is a career Foreign Service Officer. He served as Canada’s Ambassador and Permanent

Representative to the UN and the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, 2003–07. In that capacity he led

Canadian delegations to the 2005 NPT Review Conference and NPT Preparatory Committee meetings in 2004

and 2007. He is currently based in Ottawa. The views expressed in this article are his own and do not necessarily

reflect those of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Canada.

Survival | vol. 52 no. 2 | April–May 2010 | pp. 209–216 DOI 10.1080/00396331003764710

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��� | Paul Meyer

ing such a report of quality’, hardly a ringing endorsement and certainly

not a call for action in keeping with the report’s #$ recommendations and an

‘action agenda’ divided into short-, mid- and long-term sections. The appar-

ent reticence of the official sponsors may be a%ributed to a certain modesty

of paternity and a desire to have others arrive at their own conclusions. For

the report to succeed its recommendations must be championed by states

with the power to implement them. But the inability of the two sponsoring

governments to endorse the commissions’ findings and commit to carrying

its recommendations forward does not augur well for the report’s broader

official reception.

It will be disturbing if the report does not receive the a%ention it merits. It

is a cogent and balanced description of the challenges faced by the Nuclear

Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The recommendations are well grounded

in fact and feasibility and, as the subtitle suggests, they provide a practical

agenda of means for policymakers, in the context of a clear vision of ends

that seeks to delegitimise nuclear weapons en route to their elimination. ‘If

we want to minimize and ultimately eliminate nuclear weapons, the critical

need is to change perceptions of their role and utility: in effect to achieve

their progressive delegitimation’ (p. ��).

This clarity as to the ultimate goal is a significant feature of the report,

which stresses the importance of initially moving towards a ‘minimization

point’ and sets a target date of ���� for its achievement. Avoiding the pitfalls

of traditional ‘time bound’ projects for nuclear-weapons abolition, the report

sagely concludes that ‘se%ing a specific target date for elimination is not likely

to be credible or helpful’ (p. #�). There is, however, an acute recognition that

completing that final leg of the journey requires prior engagement on pre-

paratory measures and conceptual reorientation. Only through a process of

devaluing the political and military significance of nuclear weapons will the

conditions for their ultimate elimination be created.

The commission correctly observes that the demand side of the nuclear

proliferation equation needs to be addressed as much as the supply side.

In a world where the five permanent member states of the United Nations

Security Council are in fact the five recognised nuclear weapon states under

the non-proliferation treaty, it is not surprising that nuclear weapons are still

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Review Essay | ���

considered in some quarters ‘as perceived sources of status and prestige’ (p.

#"). The report argues that this correlation between international political

status and nuclear-weapons possession is anachronistic. It sets out the prin-

cipal reasons for forgoing nuclear arms and is correct in its recognition that

nuclear-weapons possession is as much a political as a strategic phenom-

enon. Given the intangible nature of the political perceptions that might

motivate states to acquire nuclear weapons, it is understandable that the

commission finds it more difficult to articulate suitable strategies to counter

such perceptions. Such a strategy is implicit in the call

for the ‘progressive delegitimation’ of nuclear weapons

which would stigmatise any state still in possession

of such contraband. The report observes that nuclear

weapons cannot be un-invented, but like chemical and

biological weapons they can be outlawed (p. $').

Recognising that ‘ge%ing to zero’ will be an extended

process, the report usefully sets out a phased approach

via specific ‘action agendas’. The mid-term action agenda

for achieving the ‘minimization point’ by the year ���� is

bracketed by a short-term agenda to ���� and a long-term

agenda beyond ����. The short-term agenda appropri-

ately stresses the importance of achieving a positive outcome from the May

���� NPT Review Conference. This outcome should embrace measures to

strengthen the treaty regime, including improved safeguards, verification,

compliance and enforcement; a new ‘International Consensus for Action on

Nuclear Disarmament’ statement and measures to advance the implementa-

tion of the Middle East and other existing and proposed Nuclear Weapons

Free Zones (pp. �$�–�). While these are laudable aims, the difficulty will be

convincing states to accept concrete measures to strengthen non-proliferation

in return for mere statements on disarmament. The report wisely advocates

that such review conference diplomacy be supplemented by concrete action

on the disarmament front such as START follow-on reductions, adjustments

in nuclear doctrine and negotiated de-alerting steps.

Over the next �� years, the minimisation phase would focus on achieving

major changes concerning nuclear weapons in three areas: numbers, doc-

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��� | Paul Meyer

trine and force posture. The intention would be to reduce the global arsenal

of nuclear arms by ��% to �,��� warheads over the current level of approxi-

mately �",���. This would be accompanied by changes to nuclear doctrine

that would have every nuclear-armed state commit to what would amount to

a no-first-use policy. The commission calls upon the nuclear-armed states to

commit to the principle that the sole purpose of possessing nuclear weapons

‘is to deter others from using such weapons against that state or its allies’

(p. #�). The credibility of such declaratory policies would be reinforced by

force postures and an alert status reflecting this doctrinal commitment in

practical terms. While the report does not enter into the specifics of these

desired changes, it suggests that their results should be nuclear deterrent

capabilities which, while ‘demonstrably survivable’, would not be ‘instantly

useable’.

The action agenda beyond ���� is necessarily less specific and pre-

scriptive, but nonetheless sets out crucial political, military and legal

considerations that will determine the path and timing of achieving the goal

of zero nuclear weapons. The agenda for this ultimate stage consists of six

broad conditions that will need to be ‘created’; for example, ‘political con-

ditions, regionally and globally, sufficiently cooperative and stable for the

prospect of major war or aggression to be so remote that nuclear weapons

are seen as having no remaining deterrent utility’ (p. ��"). The commission

does not view this stage as some sort of ‘creation myth’ to placate nuclear

abolitionists, but as a necessary vision of an environment conducive to the

elimination of nuclear weapons. The creation of the conditions required

for this stage will be facilitated by implementing the short- and medium-

term agendas. The verification conditions required for the final stage, for

example, can be developed by devoting greater a%ention now to research

on verification of nuclear disarmament. The United Kingdom and Norway

have made an impressive start to this essential work thorough their collabo-

ration on nuclear disarmament-related verification issues. It is high time for

others to emulate this practical R&D activity.

It is a major strength of this report that it acknowledges the ‘inextricable

connections’ between disarmament and non-proliferation objectives. It will

be futile to expect to receive ‘international traction for supply side meas-

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Review Essay | ��"

ures’ (that is, strengthening the non-proliferation provisions of the NPT) if

the disarmament dimension is neglected (p. '�). The report rightly seeks to

minimise the discriminatory elements of the treaty if international coopera-

tion in support of its fundamental purposes is to be sustained. It is crucial to

‘eliminate the dichotomy between nuclear “haves” and “have nots” which

has done so much to impede the necessary strengthening and enforcement

of non-proliferation rules’ (p. #0). The measures advocated for enhancing

the treaty goals of nuclear non-proliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear

energy, are outlined in chapters ��–�� of the report. The vital role played

by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in supporting many of

these activities is highlighted and the commission calls for increasing the

budget and authority of the agency.

Unfortunately, in its discussion of institutional support for the treaty,

the report misses an opportunity to redress a chronic inequality in these

arrangements. Part of the disconnect between the non-proliferation and

disarmament poles of the NPT is the fact that while the former has an

entire organisation (the IAEA) dedicated to it, the la%er has no institutional

support whatsoever. While acknowledging that the treaty lacks the type of

executive machinery that normally underpins major international security

accords, the report does not venture beyond the status quo and simply calls

upon the IAEA to do more. In the crucial realm of compliance the report

remarks that ‘the NPT itself has no mechanism for determining compli-

ance: that falls by default to the IAEA Board of Governors’ (p. �#$). The fact

remains that some NPT states may well object to a body which includes

non-members pronouncing on questions of treaty compliance. The agency

lacks a mandate for monitoring compliance with any aspect of the treaty

beyond Article III and the safeguard agreements concluded pursuant to it.

If the treaty is to be strengthened and its inherent inequities mitigated, there

is a need to provide some institutional support that serves all core purposes

of the treaty. Until compliance with Articles I and VI get the same sort of

scrutiny and international monitoring as compliance with Articles II and III,

there will be limits to how effective implementation can be. In recent years

within the NPT process, Canada and other states have put forward specific

proposals for overcoming the treaty’s institutional deficit through initiating

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��0 | Paul Meyer

annual empowered meetings, establishing a standing bureau and providing

a modest secretariat. It would have been appropriate for the commission

to have taken these and other reform ideas into account in formulating its

recommendations.�

Similarly, while in several places the commission encourages more

reporting by states on their non-proliferation obligations, it does not

advocate the submission of consolidated reports on state compliance

with their commitments as a whole. Although there is already a reporting

obligation within the NPT context (pursuant to step �� of the so-called �"

practical steps contained in the Final Document of the ���� NPT Review

Conference) the commission seems to favour reporting by an external

body rather than by states themselves. It recommends that a ‘report card’

on state performance against the action agendas identified should be pub-

lished regularly by an international panel of independent experts. While

there may well be merit in having such a panel monitor state performance,

it would have been in keeping with the aim of strengthening the NPT to

have insisted more on the obligation of individual states to report on their

own compliance.

It is refreshing that the commission acknowledges that it intended ‘to

build upon and take further’ the work of earlier international commissions

devoted to this subject, such as the ���$ Canberra Commission, the ����

Tokyo Forum, and the ���$ WMD Commission headed by Hans Blix. Those

familiar with these previous commissions will find much of their analysis

and many of their recommendations echoed in the present report. Given

that the malaise of the global nuclear governance system has been diag-

nosed for some time and the prescriptive measures to correct it have been

largely identified by previous commissions, the value added by the present

commission might be questioned. The international community might have

been be%er served if Australia had dusted off the Canberra Commission’s

recommendations and championed a diplomatic strategy for implementing

them. There has been no want of practical recommendations to improve the

multilateral nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime. What have

been lacking are states prepared to invest political and diplomatic capital in

bringing such proposals to fruition.

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Review Essay | ���

The commission could have devoted more space to a discussion of why

the remedial measures it proposes have not been implemented in the past

and how to facilitate their adoption in future. Fortunately, in the final chapter,

there is a discussion of the need for focused political will to realise the grand

design. This complements the earlier enumeration of beneficial proposals by

discussing the factors critical for their success. It notes realistically that the

goal of a nuclear weapon free world will not be obtained ‘simply by making

lists of manifestly desirable outcomes’ and recognises that such an achieve-

ment ‘will be a ma%er of mobilising, and sustaining over many years, the

necessary political will on the part of all relevant decision-makers’ (p. ��").

This crucial political will is defined as a combination of four elements:

leadership, knowledge, strategy and process. The leadership should be

manifested at three levels: top-down by influential powers and personali-

ties; by like-minded peer countries; and bo%om-up by advocates within

civil society. The knowledge factor entails ensuring that accurate informa-

tion is available and key constituencies educated as to the imperatives for

action. The commission stresses the challenges posed by a ‘greying’ cohort

of nuclear experts inside and outside of government. Regarding strategy, it

essentially concludes that a step-by-step approach remains the most feasible

way to make progress, but this approach must be guided from the outset by

a ‘very clear and sharp ultimate goal’.

In considering process, it would have been useful to have examined

more closely the relative strengths and weaknesses of the existing multi-

lateral machinery from the Conference on Disarmament to the NPT and

the UN General Assembly, and its potential for realising the measures rec-

ommended. For example, the capability to initiate negotiations by means

of majority vote in the General Assembly versus the paralysis induced by

the consensus procedures of the Conference on Disarmament should have

figured as part of this analysis. The commission seems to favour bypassing

the machinery of traditional arms control in favour of campaign treaties

such as the O%awa Convention on Antipersonnel Landmines or the Oslo

process that culminated in the Cluster Munitions Agreement. These agree-

ments drew upon traditions of international humanitarian law and the

popular concern with the toll on civilians. Whether the same dynamic can

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��$ | Paul Meyer

be expected from focusing on the existential but more remote threat of

nuclear weapons is open to debate. The report commends the draft Nuclear

Weapons Convention, initially put forward in ���#, as a possible candidate

for a disarmament treaty worthy of general support, but in the end con-

cludes that it cannot serve as a rallying point for action. The chief difficulty

‘is that the issues it addresses are simply too complicated and too contro-

versial ... to be able to command the immediate broad-based support from

governments that has been characteristic of the other vehicles mentioned

and made them so practically useful’ (p. ���).

In lieu of the Nuclear Weapons Convention, the commission favours a

framework convention that expresses the commitment to the elimination

of nuclear weapons. The framework would allow for subsequent protocols

which would provide details and benchmarks for measuring progress in ful-

filling the convention’s goals. Although the report commends this approach

to the NPT Review Conference, such a legal framework for nuclear disarma-

ment already exists: it is called the NPT. In so far as benchmarks for nuclear

disarmament are concerned, a very serviceable set was agreed to at the ����

NPT Review Conference and could still provide a measuring tool for disar-

mament performance. Would the overlay of another legal instrument really

correct the failures of compliance on the part of existing NPT states?

These few reservations aside, the commission and its staff can take pride

in an excellent report that is both visionary and practical. But failure to follow

through with a sustained marketing phase has sounded the death knell for

the recommendations of many an international commission. Ideally, the

commission’s advocacy programme will reverse the early absence of media

and expert a%ention to the report, but only governments will be able to trans-

late the recommendations into a diplomatic strategy for their realisation.

Notes

1 See remarks of Prime Minister Rudd

at the �� December ���� launch of

the report in Tokyo at h%p://www.

pm.gov.au.

2 For a fuller discussion of NPT insti-

tutional reform, see Paul Meyer,

‘Saving the NPT: Time to Renew

Treaty Commitments’, Nonproliferation

Review, vol. �$, no ", November ����.

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