Disintegration of the Soviet Union and the US Position on the Independence of Ukraine

Olexiy Haran

95-09 August 1995

Olexiy Haran is Chairman of the Department of Political Science at the University of Kiev Mohyla Academy. This paper was prepared while the author was a research fellow at the Center for Science and International Affairs (CSIA). His fellowship was supported by a grant from the International Research and Exchange Board (IREX). Additional research support was provided by the CSIA Cooperative Security Project, funded by the Carnegie Corporation of New York

DISINTEGRATION OF THE SOVIET UNION AND THE U.S. POSITION

ON THE INDEPENDENCE OF UKRAINE

INTRODUCTION

A) UKRAINE: TERRA INCOGNITA?

B) HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE U.S. APPROACH TOWARD UKRAINE

I. THE RISE OF NATIONAL MOVEMENTS IN THE SOVIET UNION: THE

AMERICAN REACTION Perestroika and nationalities problem: American perceptions. Rukh proposes new Union treaty, the West expects "Bulgarization" of Ukraine. Crisis in Sovietology. Ukrainian Studies in the West. II. DISINTEGRATION OF THE SOVIET UNION: CHALLENGE FOR THE UNITED STATES Popular movements shift to the idea of independence. Events in the Baltics and the Gulf War. American perceptions of the possibilities of disintegration of the Soviet Union. The Congress and Ukraine. The White House on Union Treaty. 'Chicken Kiev' speech. Baker and Cheney: difference of approaches. Ukrainian referendum. Creation of the CIS: American reaction. III. THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION AND INDEPENDENT UKRAINE The "Russia-first" and "Russia-second" approaches. Domestic situation in Ukraine. Russia's "Monroe doctrine": appeal to the West. Ukraine's mistakes. U.S. accent on nuclear problem. Ukraine is bargaining on nuclear issues. Changes in Ukrainian public opinion. Stalemate in American-Ukrainian relations. CONCLUSION: LESSONS AND PERSPECTIVES

INTRODUCTION

The disintegration of the Soviet Union and the emergence of

the new states have created a new geopolitical situation, not only

in Eastern Europe, but on the global level as well. The United

States lost its main enemy, the Cold War is over, and many

Americans believe that there are no grounds for U.S. involvement

in the affairs of the former Soviet Union. However, Russia remains

a great power with a huge nuclear arsenal, and the future of

economic and political reform is unclear, as is its foreign

policy, especially in the so-called "near abroad." The conflicts

in this region influence the domestic and foreign policies of

Russia and destabilize the situation in Eastern Europe, providing

new challenges for Western policy in this region.

Independent Ukraine, with a population of more than fifty

million, has emerged as one of the main players in Eastern Europe,

and Ukrainian-Russian relations are crucial for the future of the

Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The interest in Ukraine

is increasing in Western capitals.

This paper covers the period from 1989 to 1992. In order to

understand the evolution of U.S. policy towards Ukraine, it is

important to assess the position of the Bush administration, which

was challenged by the disintegration of the Soviet Union. I intend

to analyze the broad geopolitical background of American-Ukrainian

relations, America's perceptions of Ukraine, and the implications

for relations with Ukraine and Russia.

Before analyzing the policy of the Bush administration, it is

important to briefly cover two issues: (1) insufficient knowledge

about Ukrainian history in pre-perestroika times; (2) historical

background of American policy towards Ukraine.

(A) UKRAINE: TERRA INCOGNITA?

During the first years of perestroika (1985-87) the

overwhelming majority of politicians and scholars (including

Mikhail Gorbachev and many Ukrainian intellectuals) could not have

predicted the disintegration of the Soviet Union. This was true

for the West as well. Therefore, the question arises: why were

these changes unexpected?

Ukraine was to a great extent terra incognita, and not only

for the West. The history of Ukraine was distorted by Soviet

propaganda; many documents describing the most tragic aspects of

Ukrainian history were concealed from the public, as well as from

most of the scholars. Only with the advent of glasnost (which

reflected the desire of the Soviet leaders to overcome

"stagnation" and to "improve" the Soviet system) was it possible

to reveal the real course of Ukrainian history, the role of the

Ukrainian national movement, and its dynamics.

At the beginning of this century Ukrainians in the Russian

empire were prohibited from publishing any materials in their

language. During World War I, revolution, civil war, and the

foreign invasions of 1917-20, Ukrainians were on different sides

of

the barricades. Then came years of Poland's political and cultural

domination (Polonization) for Western Ukraine and Stalinism for

Eastern Ukraine; the famines of 1921, 1933, and 1947 (the 1933

famine, as we now know, was artificially created by Stalin and

cost Ukrainians from 3 to 5 million lives1 ) ; the Great Terror of

the 1930s; World War II, when Ukrainians, finding themselves

between Stalin and Hitler, created the Ukrainian Insurgent Army to

fight on both fronts (their resistance was suppressed by the Red

Army only at the beginning of the 1950s); the subtle and extremely

dangerous Russification of the 1960s-1980s; and finally, Chernobyl

in 1986.

One can find people who lived in Austria-Hungary, Ukrainian

People's Republic, and Poland, under Soviet, German and once again

Soviet rule. Many people (including many Ukrainians) believed that

the process of Russification was historically objective and

irreversible. But in every period of history we can also find

examples of resistance, and with the first signs of liberalization

during perestroika the latent energy was freed, involving in the

process of nation- and state-building many Russified Ukrainians,

as well as Russians and Jews living in Ukraine.

B) HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE U.S. APPROACH TOWARDS UKRAINE

During the turmoil of 1919-20, the Allies generally ignored

the pro-Western Ukrainian People's Republic. More than seventy

years later, House Majority Leader Richard Gephardt stated, in a

speech on April 22, 1993, that the West had provided no support to

Ukraine when it had fallen under the Bolshevik rule.2 Part of the

explanation for it can be found in Ukrainian politics: a split in

the Ukrainian national movement because of different political

orientations; a struggle among its leaders; internal instability

and rapid changes of different regimes; naiveté of socialist

leaders in their belief in lasting peace; delay in building a

Ukrainian army; the inexperience of Ukrainian diplomats; and the

Brest-Litovsk Treaty with Germany in February 1918, followed by

German occupation and establishment of a pro-German regime in

Ukraine for six months.

However, the main reason for the Allies' policy was the

option to support the White Russians, the main force against the

Bolsheviks, whose aim was to restore the Russian empire. Despite

the fact that President Woodrow Wilson included the idea of self-

determination of nations in American foreign policy, the united

States withheld recognition of the Baltic states until 1922. The

problem of self-determination of nations was not the reason for

America's initial refusal to recognize the Soviet Union. Before

and after recognition, criticism was directed at the undemocratic

Soviet system in general, not the subjugation of nations in

particular. The U.S. recognition of the Soviet Union in 1933, in

the year of the artificial famine imposed on Ukraine by Stalin,

was dictated by geopolitical factors. However, the United States

never accepted incorporation of the Baltic states into the Soviet

Union, which occurred after its diplomatic recognition of the

Soviet Union. This provided legal and moral grounds for support of

the

struggle of Baltic republics for independence during perestroika.

The situation gradually began changing with the end of World

War II and the beginning of the Cold War. The U.S. intelligence

services provided some assistance to guerilla movements in the

Baltic republics and Western Ukraine. Displaced persons who became

postwar immigrants were highly politicized and aware of their

Ukrainian identity. Having created several diaspora organizations

in the West, they became a factor in American domestic and foreign

policy; the CIA and Radio Liberty also used them in the

ideological struggle against the Soviet Union during the Cold

War.3 As a result, in 1959, at the end of his second term,

President Dwight Eisenhower added the Captive Nations resolution

to his policy of "rollback." Following the demands of ethnic

lobbies, he signed this resolution three weeks before his meeting

with Nikita Khrushchev. Congress passed the resolution

unanimously. It stated that the independence of submerged nations

was in the vital interest of the United States, and called for an

annual week of commemoration of "Captive Nations.”4

However, the drafts of the resolutions appealing for the

establishment of diplomatic relations with Soviet Ukraine proposed

several times after World War II by members of Congress were never

passed5: broadening of American contacts with Ukraine could be

complicating negotiations with Moscow on security issues; at the

same time it could be used in Soviet efforts to create the image

of a "successful Soviet nationalities policy" with which to woo

the

countries of the Third World.

Moreover, it is widely acknowledged that the main purpose of

the Captive Nations resolution was rhetorical. In a talk with

Soviet Ambassador to the United States Anatoliy Dobrynin on June

12, 1969, Henry Kissinger, President Nixon's adviser on national

security, asked him not to pay attention "to separate public

critical statements by the president on one East European country

or another, since this is only a tribute to some layers of the

U. S. population which play a role in American elections."6 But

some argued that though the Congress also considered it a "routine

response" to the electorate, it was "ignorant" of its content.7

The resolution not only became a factor in the ideological

struggle with the Soviet Union, but also created a certain

commitment by the United States to the affairs of "captive

nations," compared to Western Europe, which never placed such

emphasis on this question and human rights in East-West relations.

The American campaign in 1970s and 1980s for human rights in

the Soviet Union also drew attention not only to the situation of

Jews but to other nationalities as well: many Soviet political

prisoners were Ukrainians, and Ukrainian national churches (Greek

Catholic and Autocephalous Orthodox) were underground.

The Captive Nations Resolution and human rights issues were

actively used by President Ronald Reagan in his policy towards the

Soviet Union. He was the first president who transformed the

annually observance of Captive Nations week into a public event.

Reagan’s language about the "evil empire" played an important role

in

drawing attention to the rights of nations, though his "black

white," "good-evil" approach simplified the picture and the

problems of the multipolar world. In 1988 he declined Gorbachev's

invitation to visit Moscow for the celebration of the millennium

of the introduction of Christianity in Kiev Rus. One of the

reasons was his disinclination to legitimize the Soviet policy of

banning Ukrainian national churches. Reagan's influence on the

events in Ukraine should not be overestimated, as the atmosphere

of the Cold War impeded broadening of contacts with the West, but

surely it influenced the dissident movement in Ukraine to a

certain extent.

I. THE RISE OF NATIONAL MOVEMENTS IN THE SOVIET UNION: THE

AMERICAN REACTION

When perestroika started, perhaps nobody in the West expected

that it would lead to the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Even

among the scholars who were aware of the Soviet nationalities

problem, including scholars from the Ukrainian diaspora, the

cautious approach predominated. One of the arguments, for

instance, was that for the West "to offer a strong lead in

stimulation of self-consciousness" was "hazardous," as "the plight

of the Jews is quite well known." The possible expectation was

"hope to ... impel oppressive governments to lighten burdens, if

ever so slightly, in the USSR and elsewhere."8

Not surprisingly, the official U.S. approach was even more

cautious: Washington was preoccupied with relations with Moscow on

global security issues. Speaking about contradictions in the

Western approach towards the national question in the Soviet

Union, Michael Mandelbaum pointed out that it is "an issue, as

well, over which other countries have little leverage. Most

Western governments are likely to prefer to ignore it, and this

may well be the prudent diplomatic course;" however the "Western,

and especially American, publics may insist on making it a central

point in East-West relations, just as the Soviet government's

treatment of dissidents and would-be emigres was forced onto the

agenda in the 1970s."9 Gail Lapidus, arguing for a broadening of

knowledge and contacts with the republics of the Soviet Union,

stated that "while reaffirming the principle of national self-

determination, and cognizant of the special legal status of the

Baltic states," it was better to refrain "from aligning itself in

support of one or another national group."10

Probably one of the most eloquent examples of the Moscow-

entered approach was demonstrated by Jerry Hough. In a book

published in 1990 he wrote: Least of all should it have been assumed that the country was about to fly apart. Americans have had little experience with ethnic unrest based on linguistic demands and they have grossly overreacted to what they have been seen in the Soviet Union... Yet, it is striking how extraordinarily rare it is for ethnic groups within the borders of a country to become independent countries unless the central power has been defeated in war.

From a comparative perspective the Soviet Union looks like one of the most stable multinational countries. The non-Russian peoples are deeply divided among themselves. Historically, the ethnic and religious conflicts that are most explosive involve the blocking of the upward mobility of ambitious members of the minority... Soviet leaders have long been sensitive to the need for this mobility, and individual Lithuanians, for example, have less to gain personally from independence than does Lithuania as a collective nation.11

The conclusion about the stability of the Soviet Union was

not correct: at the end of 1989 the Communist Party of Lithuania

declared secession from the CPSU; in March 1990 the Lithuanian

popular movement, the "Sajudis," won the elections, and Lithuania

proclaimed independence.

One of the explanations for the Moscow-centered approach in

Washington was probably the fact that the initial platform of

popular movements in the Soviet Union included a demand for a new

Union treaty that would, in fact, provide for the creation of a

confederation; at that time this was resisted by Gorbachev. In

Ukraine not only the Rukh adhered to this position, but also the

more radical and anticommunist Ukrainian Helsinki Union. There was

socialist phraseology in the documents of popular movements,

references to a "true Leninist nationalities policy." That is why

the expectations of many specialists on Soviet nationalities were

not about the "dissolution of the Soviet Party-state," but about

some kind of "Bulgarization" of republics,12 i.e., greater

republican autonomy within the Soviet context. For the West it was

also necessary to test the seriousness of Gorbachev's intention to

reform the Soviet Union "from above." As Zbigniew Brzezinski

pointed out: the West's actual political response to secessionism should be more tempered if the Soviet Union does become engaged in a bona fide effort to redress fundamentally the existing national inequities... the West should do more than merely applaud. It should then tangibly help that experiment...a genuine confederation or commonwealth would be the best option for everyone concerned: the Russians, most of the non-Russians, and certainly the outside world.13

But the most important reason for the cautious official line

was the fact that the United States was determined not to

undermine its relations with Gorbachev on a wide range of security

issues. American policymakers had already made a new and

"revolutionary" approach: to move "beyond containment," as

proclaimed by George Bush on May 12, 1989, to test Soviet "new

thinking," and, if the new Soviet course should prove to be

reliable, to assist its main enemy in its desire to be transformed

and reformed. The United States was also afraid of the possible

expansion of the militant Islamic fundamentalism in Central Asia.

By the beginning of the 1990s, one more argument for stable

relations with Gorbachev was the Western concern for the payment

of the large Soviet debt.

Nevertheless, the general dynamics of national movements were

underestimated and the picture of events in the Soviet Union was

distorted. For more than forty years, relations with the Soviet

Union had defined American foreign policy to a great extent, and

the psychological factor played an important role "at the highest

levels" as well: Bush's sympathy... suggested an almost emotional preference for familiar processes and gradual, orderly change, even at the sacrifice of democratic ideals. It was wholly consonant with his increasing desire to form a tacit alliance with Mikhail Gorbachev against Boris Yeltsin and others who seemed to be extremists in the context of Soviet politics.14

Difficulties in adapting to the new situation can also be

explained by the crisis in Sovietology. Despite indisputable"

successes, there were a number of drawbacks. Sovietologist Peter

Rutland summarized rather common explanations of this crisis:

-political bias, either of the left or the right;

-lack of grounding in the languages and histories of Soviet

nationalities;

-difficulties in getting information;

-the seduction of leading academics into the role of media

pundits;

-"professional, personal, and political rivalry left émigré

scholars 'out in the cold,' and prevented Sovietology benefiting

from their insights."15

In comparison with other studies on Soviet nationalities,

Ukrainian studies were rather developed. Nevertheless, as

Alexander Motyl pointed out, they "were frequently considered

irrelevant to 'real' politics in the USSR, politically motivated

by émigré agendas, and emotionally charged by nationalist

perspectives. In a word, it was supposed to be 'unscholarly '.”16

It also led to the underestimation of the Ukrainian national

movement.

II. DISINTEGRATION OF THE SOVIET UNION: CHALLENGE FOR THE UNITED

STATES

The practical consequences of the previously mentioned

problems for American foreign policy began to arise in 1990; after

the republican elections in March, popular movements shifted to

the idea of independence. The independence of Ukraine was de facto

proclaimed as the aim of Rukh in June and finally adopted by the

Second Congress of Rukh in October 1990. But U.S. officials and

many leading Sovietologists still considered Ukraine and Belarus

to be the main supporters of the Kremlin's attempts to preserve

the Soviet Union. It created a serious gap of approaches between

the Ukrainian national movement and U.S. official policy. Before

1990 there was no contradiction between American rhetoric in

support of national self-determination and the programming

documents of the popular movements; from now on this divergence

became clear.

After Lithuania proclaimed its independence in March 1990 and

Gorbachev announced an economic blockade against this republic,

U.S. criticism of Gorbachev was rather subdued. The only real

response was a month-long delay before signing a treaty granting

the Soviet Union the status of most favored nation." However, now

American scholars and decision-makers began to think about the

possibility of the disintegration of the Soviet Union. In October

1990, the Council on Foreign Relations organized a symposium on

Soviet nationalities and American foreign policy. The general

prediction was that the rise of nations in the Soviet Union would

continue, and that the West might face a lot of problems: nuclear

proliferation, Russian fascism, Islamic fundamentalism,

Balkanization, mass emigration: therefore, the West could not step

aside. It had to adopt a new "activist" policy, not simply react

to the events. It was stressed that Washington would not adopt "a

policy of linkage that makes the Kremlin access to U.S. markets

(including credit markets) contingent on its agreement to

wholesale decolonization." At the same time, it was pointed out

that "Gorbachev has become part of the problem (in this case, the

nationality problem), not the solution."18 Therefore, it was

considered necessary to establish an official U.S. presence in all

the republics of the Soviet Union, and to provide more direct

assistance to republics, not through the center.19

The new challenge to American policy was created at the

beginning of January 1991: bloody provocations in the Baltics

coincided with the Gulf War. As the United States was interested

in Gorbachev's support in the Gulf, its reaction was even more

cautious than that of the EC, which suspended $1 billion in aid to

the Soviet Union. When a U.S.-Soviet summit scheduled for February

was cancelled, the United States denied that it had any relation

to the events in the Baltics. It is necessary to stress that the

U.S. approach to Yeltsin and his supporters at that time was

cautious too: Washington was still mainly preoccupied with

relations with Gorbachev, and "Bush did not wish to inflame

Gorbachev by seeming to court his adversaries."20

What were the approaches to these problems within academic

circles? Richard Pipes argued that, taking into account the future

disintegration of the Soviet Union which at best could be

preserved as "a loose economic community of fully sovereign states

on the model of the early EEC or European Free Trade Association,"

Washington should shift all economic aid to republics, and to

supply to the center "only food shipments and managerial know-how

which would be helpful in developing business in the Soviet

Union."21

The arguments of his opponents, Jerry Hough and Steven Cohen,

were that radicals in the Soviet Union, such as Yeltsin, did not

have influence, and their radicalism could undermine the reforms.

Hough made incorrect parallels with American history: We must not equate democracy with the avoidance of force to preserve the Union. Lincoln used force.... If the democrats stand for the dissolution of the union, they will be defeated... Gorbachev has acted as he has in recent months not because of army-KGB pressure, but because of the need to place himself in the electoral center of the Slavic Republics. He forecasted: There is no way republics are going to break away in the next decade or so...economic reform is going ahead very seriously and will accelerate.22

Lapidus took a more flexible approach based on the premise

that Gorbachev now acted together with reactionary forces, and

Yeltsin became the symbol for uniting democratic forces; however,

the question of whether the Soviet Union would exist was wrong.

The problem was what kind of federation would emerge.23

The official policy of the United States was to broaden

contacts with the republics. At the same time, answering the

question about possibilities of recognition of their independence,

Counsellor of the Department of State Robert Zoellick pointed out:

"We do not support the 'break-up' of the Soviet Union, and I

cannot, speculate on the criteria of circumstances under which the

U.S. might 'recognize' the independence of entities that might

emerge… there is a different situation, obviously with the

Baltics, whose aspirations for independence we back."24

The Congress was probably better prepared than the

administration to understand the aspirations of popular movements

in the republics. First, support of the ethnic lobby was of great

importance for many Congressmen. Second, many members of Congress

worked in 1970s and 1980s on human rights cases in Ukraine. They

knew the situation and, moreover, they knew much about former

political prisoners who now became the leaders of several national

democratic organizations. They had no pro-Moscow stereotypes

towards these people. The campaign for human rights provided a

kind of alliance between liberal Democrats and hard-line anti-

communist Republicans.25

As a result, several documents devoted to the situation in

Ukraine were passed by Congress, among them the November 15, 1989

Senate letter asking President Bush to urge Gorbachev to legalize

the banned Ukrainian churches, and the 1990 Joint Resolution

authorizing a week of commemoration for the victims of the 1932-33

forced famine in Ukraine.26 One hundred and sixty-five members of

Congress sent letters to Gorbachev demanding the release of Stepan

Khmara, one of the most radical deputies of the Ukrainian

Parliament, who was arrested in November 1990 by communist

authorities.

The visits of the Rukh's leaders to the United States were

of great importance as well. They helped to overcome the effects

of Soviet propaganda, which tried to describe the Rukh as a

dangerous nationalist movement. The most successful, perhaps, was

the visit made in September 1990 by Mykhailo Horyn, a former

political prisoner who was one of the founders of the Ukrainian

Helsinki

Union and the Ukrainian Republican Party, head of the Rukh's

Secretariat. While Gorbachev successfully persuaded Bush and Baker

to avoid meetings with him, Horyn managed (with the help of the

diaspora) to meet with four members of the cabinet, including

Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney.27

In late July 1991, Bush and Gorbachev signed START-I, which

was of extreme importance because it was the first document to

reduce, not just to limit, nuclear weapons. During the meeting

with Bush, Gorbachev inserted some remarks about Yugoslavia: he

wished to persuade Bush before his visit to Kiev that Ukrainian

secession might lead to a Yugoslav-type war. Bush was worried that

"Gorbachev's accomplishments [were] being lost in all this talk

about independence." Therefore, he himself inserted into the draft

of his Kiev speech several passages intended, as he said, to make

the speech "more sensitive to Gorbachev's problems."28

As Michael Beschloss and Strobe Talbott describe, the welcome

of the American president in Kiev was in sharp contrast to the

reception in Moscow, "where much of the populace regarded him as

just one more foreign dignitary coming to pay homage to the most

unpopular man in the Soviet Union." But it did not change Bush's

approach. Perhaps it even strengthened his intention to support

Gorbachev. In Kiev, Bush referred to his listeners as "Soviet

citizens" and compared federalism in the United States and in the

Soviet Union: "As a federation ourselves, we want good relations,

improved relations, with the republics." (Bush's approach was not

unique for the West. In 1990, Margaret Thatcher compared Ukraine

to

California, causing anger among Ukrainian MPs.) He stressed that

the United States "will not aid those who promote a suicidal

nationalism based on ethnic hatred." Obviously it was aimed at

Georgian President Zviad Gamsakhurdia, "but Bush also knew that

there were similar ethnic passions in Ukraine, and his warning

thus applied to his listeners in Kiev as well."29 If Bush was

really trying to send a message not only to the Caucasus but to

Ukraine as well, it was, as I argue below, a misunderstanding of

the policy of the Ukrainian national movement towards ethnic

minorities.

The next day the speech was condemned in the Senate by

Democrat Dennis DeConcini. In the New York Times William Safire

referred to Bush's statements as a "dismaying 'Chicken Kiev

speech'.” Paul Goble, former special assistant for the Soviet

Nationalities in the U. S. State Department's Bureau of

Intelligence and Research, even argued that Bush unintentionally

sent a message to hard-liners in the Kremlin and "gave the green

light to the coup plotters - who moved less than three weeks later

- by suggesting that the United States would support virtually any

steps to guarantee the territorial integrity and stability of the

Soviet Union.”30 Goble also mentions that in the first reaction to

the coup Bush said that he believed that Soviet Vice-President

Gennadiy Yanayev might be a reformist. But later these words were

deleted from television reports.31

Bush's position showed Ukrainians that the United States

underestimated their national aspirations. George Urban, former

director of Radio Free Europe, analyzed the bitterness of the

leaders of the Ukrainian national movement in these words: By Western standards these are naive people. Their naivety is their strength, the source of their appeal, but also their Achilles' heel. They have taken our admonitions about human rights, self-determination, and especially our commitments under the Helsinki documents very seriously.32

However, it is necessary to add that the leaders of the

Ukrainian national movement, among whom were both former political

prisoners and former members of the Communist Party who quit in

199033, were realistic enough to begin a peaceful transition to an

independent state without ethnic conflicts. Their tactics were to

split the communist camp in Ukraine and to attract some part of

the group to the idea of national independence. These tactics were

based on the understanding of political stalemate in Ukraine.

However, the price of a smooth transition to independence was the

inability of the ruling elite to start reforms.

Immediately after the failure of the coup in August 1991, the

American approach towards the new realities was tested on the

question of recognition of Baltic states. Germany urged other

Western countries to recognize their independence even before the

failure of the coup, and at the EC ministerial meeting on August

27, all twelve of the EC countries recognized the Baltics. But

Bush decided not to create additional trouble for Gorbachev, and

promised to wait until September 2 in order to recognize Baltics

after their recognition by the Soviet Union. Only after Gorbachev

failed to secure recognition through the Soviet parliament did

Bush recognize the Baltics on September 2, before the Soviet

recognition on September 6.

Germany was also in favor of increasing aid to the Soviet

Union. However, proposals made by Congressman Richard Gephardt,

House Armed Services Committee Chairman Les Aspin and Senate Armed

Services Committee Chairman Sam Nunn were supported neither by

Republicans nor Democrats because of the recession in the United

States: it would have been dangerous for Bush to support these

plans on the eve of the forthcoming elections. At a meeting in

London in late August, G-7 officials recommended additional

shipments of food and medicine but rejected financial aid. At the

end of 1991, the position of the Bush administration began to

change. However, over 70 percent of the aid given to the Soviet

Union came from the EC, and, as French President François

Mitterand argued, the idea of a U.S.-sponsored aid conference put

forward by the Bush administration was intended to secure

America's leading role among the Allies after the Cold War, while

the G-7 had already assumed the leadership role in coordinating

aid to the former Soviet Union (FSU).34

The first official U.S. commentary on the future of the

Soviet Union was made by Secretary of State James Baker on

September 5. He formulated five principles of U.S. policy towards

the republics, which included a peaceful solution of the future of

the Soviet Union by the peoples of each republic through

democratic elections, respect for human rights, especially "equal

treatment of minorities," and changes of the borders consistent

only with CSCE principles. He expressed his hope for the

continuation of some central authority with which the United

States and its allies could work.

As Michael Beschloss and Strobe Talbott point out, Bush and

his national security adviser Brent Scowcroft also hoped that "the

Soviet Union would survive in some coherent form - preferably a

federation of republics with strong economic and military ties to

the center." Afraid of the future of nuclear weapons in the

republics, Bush decided to propose a postscript to the START

treaty. However, Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney was "uneasy"

about further strategic arms reductions. He argued that the break-

up of the Soviet Union would also add to the pressure from

Congress for radical cuts in defense expenditures. Nevertheless,

Bush made his proposal on September 27. By proposing bilateral

concessions he intended to strengthen Gorbachev in his dealings

with the Soviet military; "he was also offering Gorbachev a fig

leaf behind which to conceal the withdrawal of nuclear weapons

from non-Russian republics."35

Gorbachev not only welcomed Bush's offer as a "major step"

but replied with a new proposal "that he hoped would return him to

the center of the world stage. But few listened. The Soviet Union

was breaking apart, and there was nothing that either Bush or

Gorbachev could do about it."36

By the end of November, however, it seemed that Cheney came

to realize the necessity of shifting from a "Moscow only" policy

to consideration of the republics as well, overcoming the

dominance of Baker's approach. The disagreement was about how to

get more influence in the new states: by quick recognition

(Cheney) or by

recognition as the reward for, fulfillment of certain conditions

(Baker). There was also pressure from Congress for quick

recognition. The resolution adopted by the Senate on November 20

called on the president to recognize Ukraine's independence should

the December 1, 1991 referendum. confirm the Ukrainian

Parliament's declaration of independence.

To a great extent, these steps can be explained not only by

the understanding of new geopolitical realities, but also by the

coming elections. In early November, during a special election to

fill the Senate seat from Pennsylvania after Republican Senator

John Heinz died in an airplane crash, the Bush-supported candidate

was defeated. According to polls,_ one of the reasons for this was

that voters of East European descent were disappointed by Bush's

cautious position on the recognition of the Baltic states.37 Bush

was not eager to repeat the same mistake with Ukraine.

At a meeting with Ukrainian-Americans at the White House on

November 28, Bush indicated that the United States would recognize

the independence of Ukraine after the referendum on December 1.

Gorbachev's recognition of Ukraine's independence was not

mentioned as a precondition of this step. This was an important

shift in American policy. However, when Gorbachev called Bush and

said he was "disappointed" that the United States acted

"prematurely, Baker conceded to his aides that Gorbachev's

complaint about the U.S. position on Ukrainian independence had

some merit; it was a bad

precedent for the United States so badly to 'jump the gun'...

Scowcroft agreed, admitting, 'I think we've signaled a more

forward-leaning policy than we had in mind.' He warned the

president that by shifting sides so blatantly, 'we may prejudice

relations between Kiev and Moscow.’”38

But this shift was balanced by taking into account Yeltsin's

new role: the United States promised to wait to officially

recognize Ukrainian independence until Russia had done so.

On December 8 and 9 of 1991, the Commonwealth of Independent

States was established. The leaders of the three Slavic republics

first informed Bush about their decision, and then informed

Gorbachev, causing him to become angry. From then on the Bush

administration was no longer eager to support Gorbachev.

The United States expressed its support of the creation of

the Commonwealth structure. In November 1991, a group of nuclear

security specialists argued that "the United States still has an

incentive to prefer as little disintegration as possible ... the

United States may have little leverage on the disintegration

question. But it can try to create incentives for union rather

than independence. "39

On December 12, Baker stressed that U.S. priorities which

were essential for American recognition of the new states were, in

the following order: (1) military and especially nuclear security;

(2) democracy; (3) market-oriented economies. Having received a

positive response from the Ukrainian government regarding these

principles and the international obligations of Ukraine as one of

the state-successors of the Soviet Union under the Conventional

Forces in Europe Treaty and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

(NPT), the United States recognized Ukraine as well as Russia,

Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan after the resignation

of Gorbachev on December 25.

III. THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION AND INDEPENDENT UKRAINE

The situation after the dissolution of the Soviet Union

demanded new theoretical reconsiderations. It is possible to

single out schematically two opposite approaches which continue to

exist: the "Russia-first" approach, also known as "moderate

globalism,” and the "Russia-second" approach, sometimes viewed as

the "Cold War II" scenario or "radical globalism.”40

The "Russia-first" approach stresses that the main threat: is

a weak Russia, because patriotic feelings of offended Russians may

lead to extreme nationalism; that is why it is dangerous to try to

isolate and weaken Russia. Moscow's central role in the FSU, where

Russia has "vital, special interests," is recognized by a positive

attitude towards "some form of a common market and collective

security framework." The "Russia-first" approach is also based on

the arguments that "Russia was the central force in the

destruction of the Soviet totalitarian state" and that without

democratic Russia there will be no other democratic states. The

policy of other new states is sometimes viewed as threatening

Russia's interests.41

The grounds for the "Russia-second" approach is that Russia

remains unreliable, and threatens U.S. interests. According to

Zbigniew Brzezinski, Soviet disintegration was "more than

overshadowed by the disintegration of the great Russian empire."

Therefore, it would be a mistake to concentrate only on the

socioeconomic recovery of Russia, and "any Russian efforts to

isolate and eventually again to subordinate Ukraine through the

maintenance of a Moscow-controlled outpost in Crimea, for example

... should be viewed as obstacles to effective financial and

economic assistance." While his opponents advised Western

politicians to "quietly discourage" the Lithuanian proposal for

the formation of a regional group of western republics of the ESU,

Brzezinski called for "intermediary forms of involvement with

Europe" and for support for "a Baltic Sea/Black Sea zone of

enhanced cooperation.”42

This approach stresses that Western cooperation with Yeltsin

to solve the problems of other republics led to the acceleration

of disintegration, and that is why it was counterproductive.

According to Paul Goble, one of the most eloquent proponents of

these views, it is necessary to pay attention to the diversity of

the republics, and it is impossible to make generalized judgments

based on specific cases: the emergence of Gamsakhurdia as a leader

in Georgia did not mean that the same anti-democratic scenario

would result in other states .43

The "Russia-second" approach also stresses that the future of

Russian reform is obscure because of the possibility of

disintegration and because of Russia’s huge size, which creates

difficulties for reform and limited possibilities of Western

assistance.44 At the same time, "a Western-oriented Ukraine, with

its large Russian population, could engage Russia in the west."45

Despite growing tension in the relations among former Soviet

republics, the main threat to stability in the East is their

domestic situation regarding the ability to begin successful

economic and political reforms. Ukraine faces a huge challenge:

building a nation-state, civil society, democracy, and market

simultaneously. But it cannot be achieved in one step.

The period after the referendum on the independence of

Ukraine was the best period in which to start economic reform. The

overwhelming majority of not only Ukrainians, but also Russians,

Jews, and other nationalities, supported independence. Even in

Crimea during the referendum of December 1991, a majority voted

for Ukrainian independence. To a great extent, this can be

explained by the expectations for a better economic situation in

independent Ukraine. Therefore, despite the fact that many people

were not in favor of market reform (which at first would lead to a

lower standard of living), it was the best time to begin the

reform, and, in this way, to reduce separatist and pro-Russian

sentiments. There are many possible reasons why action was not

taken: Kravchuk didn't really want reform because he was part of

the former nomenklatura; because of his cautious political style;

because of the pressure from his pro-communist entourage; because

of his fears that Russia would try to exploit anti-market moods in

order to stimulate separatist movements. Ian Brzezinski, a Kiev-

based security official with the Parliament's Council of Advisers,

points out:

"Kravchuk sees major security problems with economic reform. The

potential of Russian pressure combined with internal strains in

eastern Ukraine, which would bear the weight of economic reform,

is a real concern.”46 However, this does not absolve the Ukrainian

ruling elite of responsibility for its inability to start reforms.

Ukrainian leaders were disturbed by the deterioration of

relations with Russia and the inattention of the United States.

They interpreted these approaches as signs of the necessity to

rely on their own forces and to shift from an idealist to a

realist interpretation of world politics.

First, relations with democrats in Russia became tense.

Throughout the whole period of perestroika, Yeltsin's prestige

among Ukrainian democrats was very high. However, several days

after the coup, when Ukrainian independence was proclaimed, the

members of the close entourage of the Russian President stated

that territorial borders between Russia and Ukraine might be

revised if Ukraine decided to leave the union.

It was a real blow even to those who stood in favor of

preserving some kind of confederation with Russia. Then came the

problem of how to divide foreign assets as well as property of the

former Soviet Union, such as the Black Sea Fleet. Dimitri Simes

from Carnegie Endowment for International Peace recognized that

"in the aftermath of the putsch Yeltsin and his associates

aggravated the situation by taking over many central ministries

and unilaterally positioning Russia as heir to the Soviet Union.”47

It was not by chance. A Russian version of the "Monroe

doctrine" continues to exist and to dominate Russian politics.

These views were expressed not only by Zhirinovsky or Rutskoy, but

also by figures from Yeltsin's milieu such as Migranian and

Stankevitch.48

Very often the interpretations of East European history by

former Sovietologists remain to be Russocentric. Simes, for

example, wrote that "Kiev was the birthplace of the Russian

nation. It was there a thousand years ago that the Russians

adopted Christianity." However, even Soviet historiography did not

consider the population of Kiev Rus as Russian: it was called "Old

Russian ("Rusyn") , and was viewed as a "cradle" of three

"brother-nations."49

Sergo Mikoyan argues that under the Soviet rule Russians were

exploited more than other nationalities, and that a "Ukrainian

mafia" controlled the Politburo, and overestimates the role of

ultranationalist groups in Ukraine which are by now on the margins

of Ukrainian politics. If the United States considers the

Caribbean and Central America zones of vital interest, continues

Mikoyan, why does America use a "double standard" and not

recognize the "special rights" of Russia?50

Even such a prominent figure as Alexander Solzhenitsyn, in

his recent interviews, compares the secession of some republics of

the Soviet Union to possible secession of southern states from the

United States becausse of the influence of the Spanish-Speaking

population.51

Very soon these views were reflected in actions of the

Russian parliament. In January 1992, a Russian parliamentary

committee proposed to look into the legality of Khrushchev's

transfer of the Crimea to Ukraine in 1954. On March 12 Kravchuk

announced a temporary halt of the removal of tactical missiles to

Russia (in addition to pressure from Russia, Ukraine had not

received any compensation for nuclear materials) . While

disapproving of this step, Motyl gives the following explanation:

"Kravchuk's move was a transparent plea for attention and

understanding." However, he continues, the next day the New York

Times recommended that the U.S. use positive incentives to induce

Russia to disarm, but employ negative ones - that is, the threat

of "no Western assistance" - toward Ukraine. So, "the moral is

clear: Russia is trustworthy, while Ukraine is not. Plead with the

former, get tough with the latter."52

By May 6, tactical nuclear weapons were sent to Russia

without any compensation. In mid-May, the Crimean parliament

proclaimed independence from Ukraine (but then withheld it) . On

May 21-22, the Supreme Soviet of Russia declared that the 1954

transfer of the Crimea to Ukraine was "without the force of law"

and that this question should be solved with the participation of

the Crimea. While the West condemned the Serbs in the similar

situation, there was no Western reaction in 1992 regarding Russian

policy toward the Crimea.

On May 23, under these circumstances, Ukraine signed the

Lisbon Protocol, joining START-I, but also began to seek security

guarantees. However, inexperienced Ukrainian diplomats made

several mistakes. According to Motyl:

(1) decisive steps toward building their own armed forces

were taken after signing the commonwealth accords, which referred

to single joint commands. This damaged relations not only with

Russia, but also with the West, which was disturbed by the

"emergence" of half a million troops;

(2) the decision to claim all of the Black Sea Fleet caused

relations with Russia to deteriorate;

(3) in stopping withdrawal of tactical missiles, Kiev paid

too heavy a price for international recognition "by appearing

irresponsible and willing to jeopardize international peace."53

Could these steps taken by Ukraine, especially the last one,

justify a negative American reaction? The answer is yes. However,

it is necessary not to forget that the very existence of the

Ukrainian state was at stake because of the Russian position. And

in these circumstances, the United States nevertheless seemed to

be interested only in one thing: nuclear arms.

Summing up the position of the Bush administration on

Ukraine, the Chief U.S. Negotiator on Safe and Secure

Dismantlement of Nuclear Weapons, James Goodby, stressed that it

was debatable whether the United States overemphasized the role of

Russia. Moreover, there were no important reformers in Ukraine

compared with Russia. In general, Bush rightly perceived the new

threats, and his diplomacy was preventive. He achieved the removal

of tactical missiles from non-Russian republics and converted

START-I

into a multilateral agreement with the Lisbon Protocol. He had

support of the Democratic Party in Congress too. But Bush's

approach was hard-line, and in the new circumstances after the

1992 American presidential elections and the changes in Russia and

Ukraine, it had to be modified.54

From the point of view of many scholars in the United States,

the importance of the nuclear problem was overestimated by each

player; it was given symbolic value.55 Henry Kissinger pointed out

that "the United States has been remarkably slow in dealing with

the new republics... .The rare visits of U.S. officials deal

almost exclusively with the nuclear issue, an important but

limited dialogue."56 During Senate hearings in June 1993 Senator

Joseph Biden remarked to Special Adviser to the Secretary of State

Strobe Talbott: while we are, at the same time, debating and not resolving, whether we are going to continue nuclear testing; and while the Chinese continue a policy as the rogue nation, along with Korea, in the international community; and while the Russians are contemplating making it easier for India to become a more potent force militarily, it seems to me, at a minimum, that it complicates your job when you sit, down in Kiev to make the case that they should be responsible in fulfilling their international obligations.57

(Nevertheless, these arguments may also support the official

American view that the success of non-proliferation policies are

is being tested in Ukraine.)

When in November 1992 Ukrainian Prime Minister Leonid Kuchma

announced that Ukraine was unwilling to give strategic nuclear

weapons to Russia, the United States finally offered Ukraine $175

million for dismantlement if Ukraine ratified START-I and acceded

to the NPT. However, as Heather Wilson, Director for Defense

Policy and Arms Control on the National Security Council Staff in

1989-91, argues:

In reality, this linkage made little sense. The assistance the U.S. would provide, if used properly, would bring Ukraine into de facto compliance with the terms of the START treaty even if the Rada did not ratify it. Rather than work the practical problem, de-mate the warheads, and destroy the ICBMs and their silos, the U.S. held out for Ukrainian ratification of a document negotiated before Ukraine existed as an independent state.58

How was this policy viewed in Ukraine? In a journal published

with the participation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Eduard

Lysytzyn points out that "hasty" and energetic U.S. policy was in

the interests of the United States. But was it positive for

Ukraine? He argues that the United States "forgot" about Belarus

soon after its nuclear disarmament.59 It is also necessary to

mention that although Ukraine agreed to a non-nuclear future, Kiev

and other capitals lacked the understanding of the technical

difficulties to fulfill this aim.

All of these factors led to gradual changes, both in public

opinion and in the official line of the Ukrainian government:

those who saw nuclear weapons as a bargaining chip began to gain

momentum. This camp included a large spectrum of political forces,

from nationalists (UNA-UNSO and Stepan Khmara) through national

democrats (Ihor Yukhnovsky), and from centrists (Leonid Kuchma)

through socialists (Olexander Moroz).60

By the end of 1992, the situation of stalemate on the nuclear

issue emerged. For a breakthrough, it would be necessary to

broaden the agenda of American-Ukrainian relations.

CONCLUSION: LESSONS AND PERSPECTIVES

There are objective differences in the respective approaches

of Washington and Kiev to security problems. After the end of the

Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the United

States has viewed nuclear proliferation as the main danger for its

security. Traditionally, Washington was oriented toward dialogue

with Moscow to try to solve the problems of nuclear security. At

the same time, unlike Russian diplomacy towards the West,

Ukrainian foreign policy and the manner in which it was propagated

were less skillful and less successful. As a result, from the

point of view of the American public, Ukraine appeared in the same

category with Northern Korea, Iraq, and Libya. At the first half

of 1993, the Clinton administration essentially followed Bush's

policy towards Ukraine, namely Baker's hard-line approach.

For Ukraine the problem of nuclear weapons is subordinated to

the more profound security problem - internal and external

stability connected to a great extent with the relations with

Russia. Therefore, from the Ukrainian point of view it was

necessary to broaden the agenda of dialogue with the United

States. On one hand, Ukrainian inconsistency in handling the

nuclear problem did harm to Kiev's reputation and led to its

isolation, but on the other, it helped to draw the attention of

the West to the necessity of a deeper understanding of security

matters in this region.

The new phase in American-Ukrainian relations was signaled

during the visit of U.S. Ambassador-at-Large Strobe Talbott to

Kiev in May 1993. Talbott broadened the agenda beyond nuclear

issues, emphasized "partnership" between the two countries, and

proposed U.S. mediation between Ukraine and Russia on nuclear and

other issues.

The success of nationalist and communist forces during

parliamentary elections in Russia in December 1994 was shocking

for the United States. But even before these elections Yeltsin's

diplomacy became more tough vis-à-vis the West. These changes

increased Ukrainian importance in U.S. policy in the region.

The Ukrainian position was also changing. Deep economic

crisis and the threat of isolation in the international arena led

Ukraine to concessions. The Trilateral Statement signed in January

1994 by the presidents of the United States, Russia, and Ukraine

envisaged that the warheads of all Ukrainian SS-24s would be

removed within ten months, and other nuclear warheads would be

transferred to Russia "in the shortest possible time." In

exchange, Ukraine was promised enriched uranium from these

warheads as fuel for nuclear power stations, and financial help

from the United States for dismantlement of these warheads. It

became an important victory for Clinton in the sphere of foreign

policy.

At the end of January 1994, the Ukrainian parliament ratified

the START-I treaty without conditions. U.S. analysts rightly saw

the parliament's move as a reaction to the success of pro-Russian

forces during presidential elections in Crimea. However, Ukrainian

parliament postponed access to the NPT. The serious argument was

the fact that, according to the Trilateral Statement, only after

Ukraine accedes to the NPT, will the United States and Russia

"reaffirm their commitment to Ukraine, in accordance with the

principles of the CSCE Final Act, to respect the independence and

sovereignty and the existing borders of the CSCE member states and

recognize that border changes can be made only by peaceful and

consensual means."61 These obligations were too vague for Kiev.

Ukraine joined the program "Partnership for Peace" proposed

by the United States as the compromise to satisfy the desire of

Eastern European countries for security guarantees. It envisaged

consultations, exchanges between the military, and assistance from

NATO in developing different programs. It had a great symbolic

effect; however, it provided no real guarantees.

Thus, the main importance of the Trilateral Statement for

Ukraine was overcoming the threat of isolation and making a

breakthrough in American-Ukrainian relations. It led to changes

not only in American rhetoric, but also in attitudes,62 and,

moreover, in the general approach of the U.S. decision-makers. The

United States supported territorial integrity of Ukraine not only

in July 1993, after Russian Supreme Soviet passed a resolution

declaring Sevastopol to be a part of Russia, but also after

separatist decisions made by Crimean leaders in May 1994.

Parliamentary elections in Ukraine in March 1994 strengthened

the positions of Communist and pro-Russian forces. However, it is

important for the public in the West to understand that any

attempts to "reunite" Ukraine with Russia would lead to war.

Moreover, as Roman Szporluk points out, Ukrainian Communists "will

reinforce the anti-Yeltsin and anti-Western camp in Russian

domestic politics." 63 It seems that Moscow prefers another

scenario: to dictate its policy to a weak Ukraine. But this is

also not in the interests of the West. It could create the

perspective of "Yugoslavization" of Ukraine and once again

aggravate the problem of nuclear weapons on its soil.

After the crisis over Crimea in May 1994, Anders Aslund,

director of the Stockholm Institute of East European Economics,

wrote: "To induce Ukraine to focus on its economy and shed its

nervousness about Russian ambitions, the West could help by

offering some sort of security guarantees.”64 Speaking about

possible guarantees against Russian intervention, Rowland Evans

and Robert Novak proposed: A military response would surely be ruled out, but there are other options: warning Moscow of an automatic cutoff of all Western financial and economic assistance; announcing that Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic would join NATO within six months; ending all pretense of offering Russia even partial membership in the Group of Seven economic club.65

President Kuchma, elected in July 1994, stresses the

necessity of radical reform and, at the same time, the necessity

of closer ties with Russia. He has persuaded the Ukrainian

Parliament to accede to the NPT. In turn, Ukraine has received

security assurances (though not guarantees) from the United

States, Russia, Great Britain, and France. However, these

assurances don't preclude the possibility that Russia will exert

pressure on Ukraine, which once again will impede Ukrainian

reforms.

In this case the United States could help reforms in

Ukraine. Taking into account its own interest in a final solution

to the nuclear problem and a stable Ukraine, the United States

could continue to encourage the Ukrainian leadership to implement

the reforms which have been announced. These reforms would lead,

for a certain period, to a further decrease in the standard of

living. They have prompted sharp criticism from the left in the

Ukrainian Parliament, which has stronger support from the

Russified eastern and southern regions and eventually could be

used by Russia in order to exert pressure on Kiev. In this case,

U.S. support of the territorial integrity of Ukraine would be

extremely important for reform in Ukraine, and, moreover, for the

fate of the Ukrainian state.

However, for Kiev it is necessary to understand that Russia's

place in American policy will always be greater than that of

Ukraine. Therefore, in developing relations with Ukraine, "unlike

other cold wars - incipient or actual - the Ukrainian-Russian case

involves a third party (the United States) well placed to

influence the relations of the antagonists because it shares their

interests."66 If the last assumption is true, the role which the

United States could play in securing stability and transition to

democracy in the region should not be overlooked.

1. Stanislav Kulchytski, Tsina "velykoho perelomu" (Kyiv: Ukraina, 1991), pp. 355-356.

2. Cited in Olexandr Dubyna, "SSHA - Ukraina: vid tysku do 'novogo partnerstva'?" Polityka i chas, No. 9 (September 1993), p. 16. 3. For more details, see Alexander J. Motyl, Sovietology, Rationality, Nationality: Coming to Grips with Nationalism in the USSR (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), pp. 132-146. 4. Department of State, American Foreign Policy: Current Documents. 1959 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office [U.S.G_P.O.], 1963), pp. 878-879. 5. Victor Cherniavsky and Serhiy Cherniavsky, "Dovhyi shliakh do vyznannia," Polityka i chas, No. 2 (February 1992), pp. 38-43. 6. Serge Schmemann, "Soviet Archives: Paper Trail of a Rigid, Authoritarian System," New York Times, February 8, 1991, p. A8. 7. For detailed coverage of the influence of domestic politics on U.S. policy towards Ukraine, see Susan D. Fink, "From 'Chicken Kiev' to Ukrainian Independence: Domestic Politics in U.S. Foreign Policy toward Ukraine," in Robert A. De Lossa, ed., Nationalities Papers [(Special volume on Ukraine)] (forthcoming). I am grateful to the editors of the journal for the possibility to be acquainted with the manuscript of the article. 8. Donald W. Treadgold, "Nationalism and Its Implications," in Robert Conquest, ed., The Last Empire: Nationality and the Soviet Future (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1986), pp. 392, 394. 9. Michael Mandelbaum, "Ending the Cold War," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 68, No. 2 (Spring 1989), p. 34. 10. Gail Lapidus, "Gorbachev's Nationalities Problem," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 64, No. 4 (Fall 1989), p. 108. 11. Jerry F. Hough, Russia and the West: Gorbachev and the Politics of Reform (New York: Touchstone, 1990), p. 206 12. See, for example, Alexander J. Motyl, "The Sobering of Gorbachev: Nationality, Restructuring, and the West," in Seweryn Bialer, ed., Politics, Society,

and Nationality inside Gorbachev's Russia (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1989), p. 171. 13. Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Post-Communism Nationalism," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 68, No. 5 (Winter 1989/1990), p. 20. 14. Michael R. Beschloss and Strobe Talbott, At the Highest Levels: The Inside Story of the End of the Cold War (Boston: Little, Brown, 1993), p.87. 15. Peter Rutland, "Sovietology: Notes for a Post-Mortem," The National Interest, No. 31 (Spring 1993), p. 112. 16. Alexander J. Motyl, Dilemmas of Independence: Ukraine After Totalitarianism (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993), p.5. 17. For a more detailed account, see Allan L. Kagedan, "American and French Responses to the Lithuanian Unilateral Declaration of Independence," in Miron Rezun, ed., Nationalism and the Breakup of an Empire: Russia and Its Periphery (Westport, Conn. Praeger, 1992), pp. 157-167. 18. Michael Mandelbaum, ed., The Rise of Nations in the Soviet Union: American Foreign Policy and the Disintegration of the USSR (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1991), pp. 12-14, 55-62, 90-98. 19. Ibid., pp. 61, 98-99. 20. Michael R. Beschloss and Strobe Talbott, At the Highest Levels, p. 287. 21. Richard Pipes, "The Soviet Union Adrift", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 70, No. 1 (1991), pp. 85-86. 22. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. Subcommittee on European Affairs, Soviet Disunion: the American Response, 102nd Cong., 2nd sess., 1991 (Washington, D.C.: U.S.G.P.O., ), pp. 46, 56, 67-69, 72, 118-119. 23. House Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, Recent developments in the Baltics, 102nd Cong., 1st sess.,.1991 (Washington, D.C.: U.S.G.P.O.), pp. 5-7, 33-34, 36-37. 24. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. Subcommittee on European Affairs, Soviet Disunion: the

American Response, pp. 36, 125. 25. See Fink, "From 'Chicken Kiev' to Ukrainian Independence: Domestic Politics in U.S. Foreign Policy toward Ukraine." 26. Ibid. 27. Ibid. 28. Cited in Michael R. Beschloss and Strobe Talbott, At the Highest Levels, pp. 414, 417-418. 29. Ibid., pp. 417-418. 30. Paul Goble, "For Russia, Another Cruel August?" Christian Science Monitor, August 5, 1992. 31. Author's interview with Paul Goble on April 6, 1994. 32. George Urban, "The Awakening", The National Interest, No. 27 (Spring 1992), p. 45. 33. Levko Lukianenko, the leader of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union, was sentenced in 1961 to death but then spent 27 years in prison; in 1990 he was elected to the first Ukrainian Parliament. 34. William W. Newmann, "History Accelerates: the Diplomacy of Co-operation and Fragmentation," in James E. Goodby and Benoit Morel, ed., The Limited Partnership: Building a Russian-US Security Community (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 41-44, 53-54. 35. Michael R. Beschloss and Strobe Talbott, At the Highest Levels, pp. 443, 446. 36. Ibid., p. 446. 37. Ibid., p. 448. 38. Ibid., p. 449. 39. For their arguments and recommendations how to reach this aim, see Kurt M. Campbell, Ashton B. Carter, Steven E. Miller, and Charles A. Zraket, Soviet Nuclear Fission: Control of the Nuclear Arsenal in a Disintegrating Soviet Union, CSIA Studies in International Security, No. 1 (Cambridge, Mass.: Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University, 1991), p. 69-70.

40. See, for example, Jim Hoagland, "The Russia Debate: Nixon vs. Brzezinski," Washington Post, March 26, 1992, p. A21; William C. Bodie, "Ukraine and Russian-American Relations," in George Ginsburgs, Alvin Rubinstein, and Oles Smoliansky, eds., Russia and America: From Rivalry to Reconciliation (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1993), pp. 115-117; Olexandr Dubyna, "SSHA-Ukraina", pp. 16-20. 41. See, for example, Dimitri K. Simes, "America and the Post-Soviet Republics," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 71, No.3 (Summer 1992), pp. 73, 76; 78, 81, 87. 42. Zbigniew Brzezinski, "The Cold War and Its Aftermath," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 71, No. 4 (Fall 1992), pp. 47-49. 43. House Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, United States Policy Toward the Commonwealth of Independent States, 102nd Cong., 2nd sess., 1992, pp. 26-27; Paul Goble, "Forget the Soviet Union," Foreign Policy, No. 86 (Spring 1992), p. 58; Paul Goble, "Ten Issues in Search of a Policy: America's Failed Approach to the Post-Soviet States," Current History, Vol. 92, No. 576 (October 1993), pp. 305-308. 44. Paul Goble, "Ten Issues in Search of a Policy", p. 306-307; Alexander J. Motyl, Dilemmas of Independence, pp. 185-186. In academic circles there were even arguments in favor of nuclear status for Ukraine (e.g., by John Mearsheimer). But his article published in Foreign Affairs (Summer 1993), according to Strobe Talbott, who at that time was Ambassador at Large in the Clinton administration), was "balanced" in the same issue by an article by Steven E. Miller, which was based on the same arguments as Clinton's policy and reflected the dominant view (Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on European Affairs, U.S. Policy on Ukrainian Security, 103rd Cong., 1st sess., 1993, p. 25). 45. Adrian Karatnytsky, "The Ukrainian Factor", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 71, No. 3 (Summer 1992), p. 107. 46. Cited in Steven Erlanger, "Ukraine's Opportunity: Western Suspicions of Russia", New York Times, April 17, 1994, p.8. 47. Dimitri K. Simes, "America and the Post-Soviet Republics", p. 80.

48. For a detailed coverage of Russian policy of restoring its influence in the FSU, see Fiona Hill and Pamela Jewett, "Back in the USSR": Russia's Intervention in the Former Soviet Republics and the Implications for the United States Policy Toward Russia (Cambridge, Mass.: Strengthening Democratic Institutions Project, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 1994); Mark Smith, Pax Russica: Russia's Monroe Doctrine, Whitehall Paper Series 21 (London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies, 1993). 49. Dimitri K. Simes, "America and the Post-Soviet Republics," p. 82. 50. Sergo A. Mikoyan, "Understanding Ukraine," in George Ginsburgs, Alvin Rubinstein, and Oles Smoliansky, eds., Russia and America: From Rivalry to Reconciliation, pp. 151-153. 51. Cited in Boston Globe, May 5, 1994, p. 10. 52. Alexander J. Motyl, Dilemmas of Independence, p.180. 53. Ibid., p. 109-111. 54. This view was presented at a seminar at Massachusetts Institute of Technology on May 4, 1994. 55. See, for example, William H. Kincade and Natalie Melnyczuk,"Eurasia Letter: Unneighborly Neighbors," Foreign Policy, No. 96 (Spring 1994), pp.86 - 87; William W. Newmann, "History Accelerates", pp. 48 - 49. Legal aspects were not simple too. There were weighty arguments that Ukraine had legal and moral obligations to accede to the NPT as a non-nuclear power in the "shortest period of time". At the same time the official Ukrainian argument was that the Ukrainian case was to a great extent unique. It was also argued by a number of Western experts that the NPT was "silent on the issue of inherited nuclear weapons"(See, for example, William H. Kincade and Natalie Melnyczuk, "Eurasia Letter," p. 87). John Lepingwell pointed out that by the beginning of 1994 Kravchuk's letter to Bush in May 1992, regarding the signing of the Lisbon Protocol, was the only document where Ukraine specified terms to eliminate all nuclear weapons on its territory (7 years). He added: "the letter's status under international law would seem to be lower than that of a formal treaty. such as protocol itself, although such

accompanying statements are typically considered an integral part of the agreement." (John W. R. Lepingwell, "Negotiations over Nuclear Weapons: The Past as Prologue?" RFE/RL Research Report, Vol. 3, No. 4, 28 January 1994, p. 10). 56. Henry H. Kissinger, "The New Russian Question, Newsweek, February 10, 1992, p. 34. 57. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. Subcommittee on European Affairs, U.S. Policy on Ukrainian Security p. 30-31. 58. Heather Wilson, "Missed Opportunities," The National Interest, N 34 (Winter 1993/94), pp. 31-32. 59. Eduard Lysytzyn, "Pered vyborom: Pro deiaki aspekty jadernoi polityky Ukrainy," Polityka i chas, N 9 (September 1993), pp.29-34. 60. For details, see Bohdan Nahaylo, "The Shaping of Ukrainian Attitudes toward Nuclear Arms," RFE/RL Research Report, Vol. 2, No. 8, (February 19, 1993), pp. 21-45. 61. Cited from RFE/RL Research Report, Vol. 3, No. 4, January 28, 1994, p. 14. 62. See, for instance, "1994 May Be Ukraine's Year. U.S. Policy Shifts Away From Russia," Washington Post, February 14, 1994, p. 23. 63. Roman Szporluk, "Reflections on Ukraine after 1994: The Dilemmas of Nationhood," The Harriman Institute Forum, Vol. 7, No. 6, p. 2. 64. New York Times, June 10, 1994, p. A29. 65. Washington Post, June 9, 1994, p. A27. 66. William H. Kincade and Natalie Melnyczuk, "Eurasia Letter: Unneighborly Neighbors," p. 104. Two years earlier George Urban, stressing the necessity of an active American role in the region, tried to analyze it not only from strategic but also from cultural and philosophical perspectives: "Some of the problems with which Ukrainians and Russians confront us are obscure, metaphysical, and very Slavic. They take us into first and last things in human and extra-human existence. They do not sit well with our pragmatic and utilitarian turn of mind. But these are questions history has put on our agenda; we may not always like them, but we

cannot evade them. It may well be that our distant successors, chronicling the decline and-fall of the Soviet empire, will say of our age that the world's reorientation toward a safer and less warlike order had its roots in the great seed-bed of Slavic suffering" (George Urban, "The Awakening," p. 46).