Accounting, Auditing & Accountability JournalDisclosure of information on intellectual capital in Danish IPO prospectusesPer Nikolaj Bukh Christian Nielsen Peter Gormsen Jan Mouritsen

Article information:To cite this document:Per Nikolaj Bukh Christian Nielsen Peter Gormsen Jan Mouritsen, (2005),"Disclosure of information onintellectual capital in Danish IPO prospectuses", Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, Vol. 18 Iss 6pp. 713 - 732Permanent link to this document:http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/09513570510627685

Downloaded on: 12 November 2015, At: 18:46 (PT)References: this document contains references to 74 other documents.To copy this document: permissions@emeraldinsight.comThe fulltext of this document has been downloaded 3236 times since 2006*

Users who downloaded this article also downloaded:S. Mitchell Williams, (2001),"Is intellectual capital performance and disclosure practices related?", Journalof Intellectual Capital, Vol. 2 Iss 3 pp. 192-203 http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/14691930110399932Saverio Bozzolan, Francesco Favotto, Federica Ricceri, (2003),"Italian annual intellectual capitaldisclosure: An empirical analysis", Journal of Intellectual Capital, Vol. 4 Iss 4 pp. 543-558 http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/14691930310504554Mohammad J. Abdolmohammadi, (2005),"Intellectual capital disclosure and market capitalization", Journalof Intellectual Capital, Vol. 6 Iss 3 pp. 397-416 http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/14691930510611139

Access to this document was granted through an Emerald subscription provided by emerald-srm:507905 []

For AuthorsIf you would like to write for this, or any other Emerald publication, then please use our Emerald forAuthors service information about how to choose which publication to write for and submission guidelinesare available for all. Please visit www.emeraldinsight.com/authors for more information.

About Emerald www.emeraldinsight.comEmerald is a global publisher linking research and practice to the benefit of society. The companymanages a portfolio of more than 290 journals and over 2,350 books and book series volumes, as well asproviding an extensive range of online products and additional customer resources and services.

Emerald is both COUNTER 4 and TRANSFER compliant. The organization is a partner of the Committeeon Publication Ethics (COPE) and also works with Portico and the LOCKSS initiative for digital archivepreservation.

*Related content and download information correct at time of download.

Dow

nloa

ded

by S

UR

AB

AY

A U

NIV

ER

SIT

Y A

t 18:

46 1

2 N

ovem

ber

2015

(PT

)

Disclosure of information onintellectual capital in Danish IPO

prospectusesPer Nikolaj Bukh

Aarhus School of Business, Aarhus, Denmark

Christian NielsenCopenhagen Business School, Frederiksberg, Denmark

Peter GormsenNovozymes Ltd, Bagsvaerd, Denmark, and

Jan MouritsenCopenhagen Business School, Frederiksberg, Denmark

Abstract

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to examine whether information on intellectual capital(non-financial information on knowledge based resources) is disclosed in Danish IPO prospectuses.Further, to analyse whether this voluntary disclosure has changed in the period from 1999 to 2001 andto analyse what factors can explain the amount of disclosure in the prospectuses.

Design/methodology/approach – The paper uses content analysis to compile a measure ofdisclosure on each prospectus and statistical analysis to test whether there is an association betweendisclosure and company type, the existence of managerial ownership before the IPO, the size of thecompany or the age of the firm.

Findings – Based on statistical analysis, it is concluded that the extent of managerial ownershipprior to the IPO and industry type affects the amount of voluntary intellectual capital disclosure, whilecompany size and age do not affect disclosure. The results are interpreted in the light of the increasingimportance of disclosing information on value drivers, strategy and intellectual capital to the capitalmarket and constitute a contribution to the ongoing debate on corporate reporting practices.

Practical implications – Since information on intellectual capital is already disclosed in IPOprospectuses this reporting form can be used as inspiration when an intellectual capital report isdeveloped. The results also indicate that companies and their advisers believe that this type ofinformation is important in the capital market’s assessment of the company’s value. Further, it issuggested that intellectual capital reports should be read in the context of the firm’s strategy in thesame manner as an prospectus is read.

Originality/value – Very few papers have analysed disclosure in prospectuses and it has been froma different perspective from this paper. Further, this paper analyses a time series of data anddemonstrates how the amount of disclosure has developed over the years. Finally, the papercontributes to the body of literature on what factors explain disclosure in general.

Keywords Disclosure, Intellectual capital, Prospectuses, Denmark

Paper type Case study

The Emerald Research Register for this journal is available at The current issue and full text archive of this journal is available at

www.emeraldinsight.com/researchregister www.emeraldinsight.com/0951-3574.htm

The authors have benefited from the many constructive comments made by Henning Madsen,Maria Anne Skaates, and Mette Rosenkrands Johansen. They are also grateful to Mikkel Gadmarand Lene Thorsgaard Jensen for their research assistance and to two anonymous referees fortheir comments that helped us both strengthen the arguments and improve the presentation.

Disclosure ofinformation

713

Received 29 January 2004Revised 19 August 2004

Accepted 26 October 2004

Accounting, Auditing &Accountability Journal

Vol. 18 No. 6, 2005pp. 713-732

q Emerald Group Publishing Limited0951-3574

DOI 10.1108/09513570510627685

Dow

nloa

ded

by S

UR

AB

AY

A U

NIV

ER

SIT

Y A

t 18:

46 1

2 N

ovem

ber

2015

(PT

)

IntroductionIn recent years, companies’ disclosure of information has gained increased attentiondue to globalisation and integration of capital markets, greater mobility of monetaryand actual goods, tougher competition, new dominating industries, and developmentsin IT and the internet. Reports (e.g. Eustace, 2001; FASB, 2001; Upton, 2001) andacademic contributions (e.g. Lev, 2000; Beattie and Pratt, 2002a, b) have argued thatdemand for external communication or information on knowledge-based resources isgrowing as companies increasingly base their competitive strength and thus the valueof their company on know-how, patents, skilled employees and other intangibles. Thisdemand for external communication applies to both traditional annual reporting andnewer types of reporting such as intellectual capital statements, supplementarybusiness reporting and prospectuses.

The Scandinavian countries are often noticed for their practices with respect todisclosure of intellectual capital (e.g. Holland, 2004, p. 11). Especially the DanishGovernment initiatives with publishing a guideline for intellectual capital statements(DATI, 2001; DMSTI, 2003) has been highlighted as an example of state-of-the-artdisclosure models and business reporting (e.g. DiPiazza and Eccles, 2002, pp. 72-73;Fincham and Roslender, 2003, p. 71).

In this paper, we analyse the disclosure of information in Danish initial publicoffering (IPO) prospectuses from the last 12 years, primarily with respect to voluntarydisclosure of non-accounting information on knowledge-based resources – also calledintellectual capital. The methodology used in the analysis is a disclosure indexconsisting of 78 items. Disclosure index research in accounting and business reportingpractices has been widely applied (Marston and Shrives, 1991; Guthrie et al., 2004),because such studies represent an aspect of disclosure quality that can be captured bysummary measures (Beattie et al., 2002a).

The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. First recent trends in businessreporting are discussed and it is argued that the IPO prospectuses should be studied inorder to gain insight into the need for disclosure. Further, the section presents thefactors that will be taken into consideration in explaining differences in disclosure. Inthe following, two sections the methodology and the available data is described. Then,the results are presented and analysed and the paper is concluded with suggestions forfurther research.

Business reporting and companies’ external communicationThe relative importance of physical assets such as plant, equipment and stocks,compared to, for example, patents, skilled employees and strategic relationships, aredeclining. These changes in value creation have led many companies to experimentwith new modes of external communication – modes that convey information notpresently incorporated in financial reports. The alternatives vary from mass mediacommunication, via business reporting models and internet reporting to a widespectrum of stakeholders, to disclosure through investor relations meetings andprivate meetings between company management and institutional investors andanalysts (Holland, 1997; Beattie, 1999; Beattie and Pratt, 2001).

Among others Blair and Wallman (2001, p. 59) have argue for the necessity of amodel for business reporting that reflects the dynamics of wealth creation and Gelb(2002) have indicated that supplementary disclosure is an important medium for firms

AAAJ18,6

714

Dow

nloa

ded

by S

UR

AB

AY

A U

NIV

ER

SIT

Y A

t 18:

46 1

2 N

ovem

ber

2015

(PT

)

with significant levels of intangible assets. In relation to this, Galbraith and Merrill(2001) suggest that information on company strategy is incorporated into investors’decisions, and that information on intellectual capital – especially managementexperience – does have an effect on the valuation of the company. One of theinstruments that have been suggested as a tool both for identifying, managing andreporting intellectual capital and intangibles is the intellectual capital statement (seeDMSTI, 2003; Zambon, 2003).

Even though the precise definition of a report on intellectual capital in the literatureis connected with some ambiguousness, the statements that have been disclosed inDenmark since 1998 where Coloplast as the first firm issued an intellectual capitalstatement have many similarities. Most often intellectual capital is defined asknowledge resources, in the form of employees, customers, processes or technology,which the company can mobilize in its value creation processes. In practice intellectualcapital statements contain various financial and non-financial information, i.e. staffturnovers and job satisfaction, in-service training, turnover split on customers,customer satisfaction, precision of supply etc. (see Bukh et al., 2001; Mouritsen et al.,2001), as well as a substantial narrative part positioning the indicators within astrategic framework.

There is no doubt that the general reporting practices with respect to voluntarydisclosures is especially well-developed in Denmark and it might be argued thatstudying the disclosure of intellectual capital in a Danish or Scandinavian contextwould be misleading if generalized to a wider institutional context. However, this doesnot necessarily indicate that the practices have influenced the decision-makers withrespect to disclosures in IPO prospectuses, namely the investment banks. Furthermore,it should be taking into account that the first Danish IC reports were published in 1998while our sample spans more years. Another interpretation of the results fromstudying a Danish context could be that is presently the Danish case may be the futurein other countries.

Various studies of investors’ and analysts’ information demands indicate asubstantial difference between the types of information found in companies’ annualreports and the types of information demanded by the market (Eccles et al., 2001;Eccles and Mavrinac, 1995). In cooperation with the Institute of Chartered Accountantsof Scotland (ICAS), Beattie (1999) studied the ability of financial reporting to satisfyusers’ demands. The results illustrated that although non-financial information stillhas lower priority than traditional financial information; users consider disclosureregarding risk factors and quality of management to be insufficient.

Theoretically, additional relevant non-financial information is expected to lower thecost of equity capital (see Verrecchia, 2001) because increased disclosure lowersinvestor uncertainty about the future prospects of the company and facilitates a moreprecise valuation of the company (Botosan, 1997). Related to this argument, thedisclosure of information on intellectual capital is expected to reduce informationasymmetry and to enhance stock market liquidity and increase demand for companies’securities (for example Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991). Both Botosan (1997) andRichardson and Welker (2001) confirm this in that they conclude that the quantity andquality of financial disclosure is negatively related to the cost of equity capital forcompanies.

Disclosure ofinformation

715

Dow

nloa

ded

by S

UR

AB

AY

A U

NIV

ER

SIT

Y A

t 18:

46 1

2 N

ovem

ber

2015

(PT

)

The IPO prospectusThe IPO prospectus has by Beattie (1999) as well as Cumby and Conrad (2001) beensuggested as a “role model” for future reporting because companies are typically moreopen and future-oriented in their IPO reporting. It has also been claimed by Daily et al.(2003) that IPO prospectuses are likely to be especially accurate because companies areliable for any misleading or inaccurate information. Although the same could be saidabout other reporting media including the annual report it can be observed that theprospectus usually contains more information about future expectations regardingmarket developments and earnings, strategic direction and intent, management andboard composition, etc., compared to the annual report from the same firm. This is atleast the case for a number of Scandinavian prospectuses that have been examined bythe authors of this paper. However, there are likely to be substantial differences innational legislation and traditions with respect to disclosure in prospectuses. In arecent study of disclosure in interim report of Greek firms by admission of securities toAthens Stock Exchanges, Mavridis (2002) noted for instance that annual reports asthey are used in other countries are not very common among Greek medium-sizedfirms.

At the time of admission for listing on the stock exchange, the company publishesits IPO prospectus in order to market the share to investors. An admission to listing onthe stock exchange offers a unique opportunity to study the amount and type ofvoluntary information considered for disclosure to the capital market. Thus, Matheret al. (2000) argue that management has an incentive to present the company in the bestpossible light in order to maximise the proceeds of the share issue (see also Aharonyet al., 1993). Although this could lead to earnings management, managers of companiesinvolved in taking a company public have incentives to present the underlyinginformation in the most favorable light possible (Mather et al., 2000). Thus, the IPOprospectus provides insight into which types of information are selected by a companyand its advisors for presenting the company in relation to investors and analysts.

Admission for listing on the stock exchange requires the company to report aboutits achievements, skills and growth potential in a reliable and sober manner, in order todemonstrate to investors that investing in the company will most likely generate acompetitive return. This effort to attract investors is centred on the IPO prospectus,which clarifies the company’s financial capability, performance, operation, skills, andthe resources through which it intends to prove continued growth and increasedshareholder wealth. With regard to this aspect, Ang and Brau (2002) show that greatercompany transparency before the initial issue decreases the flotation costs of the IPO,and Schrand and Verrecchia (2004) find that greater disclosure frequency in the periodprior to the IPO is associated with less underpricing.

The annual report has not only investors as its readers as it also conveysinformation to employees, potential employees, customers, the press and otherstakeholders. Compared to that the IPO prospectus have a more limited group ofreaders than annual reports, and some differences in extent of disclosure can beexpected. Compared to annual reports, prospectuses can be expected to provideadditional disclosure of the company’s long-term strategy, a specification of leadingnon-financial indicators relevant in assessing the effectiveness of the strategyimplementation, comprehensive disclosure on company risks, and a discussion of therelation between leading indicators and future profits (Cumby and Conrad, 2001).

AAAJ18,6

716

Dow

nloa

ded

by S

UR

AB

AY

A U

NIV

ER

SIT

Y A

t 18:

46 1

2 N

ovem

ber

2015

(PT

)

DisclosureA substantial body of research conducted from an information-economics perspectivehas concentrated on studying why companies disclose more information than isrequired by regulation. In relation to IPO prospectuses, Jenkinson and Ljungquist(2001) provides a comprehensive review of the literature. In general, proxies for ex anteuncertainty such as, underwriter reputation (Megginson and Weiss, 1991) as well asdisclosure of earnings forecasts in IPO prospectuses (Clarkson and Merkley, 1994) havebeen shown to reduce under-pricing. Most under-pricing models (see Jenkinson andLjungquist, 2001) predict that reducing ex ante uncertainty, for example by improveddisclosure, and reduces under-pricing. Thus, by increasing voluntary disclosure, the exante uncertainty surrounding an issue is reduced and thus the firm’s need forunder-pricing also lessens.

In this paper, we study the extent of voluntary disclosure in Danish IPOprospectuses and investigate whether this can be explained by four control variables –industry differences, managerial ownership before the IPO, company size andcompany age. The first factor, industry differences, has previously been used toexplain differences in disclosure in annual reports by Adrem (1999) and Cooke (1989)because there are differences in industry disclosure norms (see Gibbins et al., 1990). Asintellectual capital is regarded as being especially important in high-tech industries, itis anticipated that IT and biotechnology companies will disclose more informationthan traditional manufacturing and commercial companies. Further, since themarket-to-book values of IT and biotechnology companies are generally higher, thedisclosure of measures that lie outside the traditional accounting realm is likely to berelatively more important.

Turning to a corporate governance perspective, the second factor, managerialownership before the IPO, may influence companies’ disclosure practices and thus theextent of disclosure in the IPO prospectus. The existence of some degree of managerialownership in the company is a mechanism for ensuring management – shareholderalignment of interests (Demirag et al., 2000, p. 348). According to O’Sullivan (2000,p. 409), we can expect less disclosure from management if there is significantmanagerial ownership. In accordance with this line of argument, directors of the boardwho themselves do not own a substantial portion of the company can be expected toencourage more intensive auditing and disclosure because they are more likely toperceive them-selves as fulfilling a monitoring role. Similarly, Hossain et al. (1994), in astudy of listed Malaysian companies, conclude that the amount of voluntary disclosurevaries with ownership structure.

Other factors such as firm size and internationalization are also likely to influencedisclosure. Robb et al. (2001), for instance, find that larger firms and firms with a globalfocus provide higher levels of both forward-looking and historical non-financialdisclosures in their annual reports than other firms, while they in the same study onlyfind minimal industry and country effects.

This leads us to the third category of research, where company size has been relatedto the amount of voluntary disclosure. Empirical studies date back to the 1950s, where,for example, Anton (1954) concluded that one-third of large American and Canadiancompanies regularly present results to stockholders while the corresponding figuresfor small companies are one out of 20. Among the explanations are that largercompanies are more likely to have a wider ownership base, and that the costs of

Disclosure ofinformation

717

Dow

nloa

ded

by S

UR

AB

AY

A U

NIV

ER

SIT

Y A

t 18:

46 1

2 N

ovem

ber

2015

(PT

)

providing information are more prohibitive for small companies. The latter problemtends to grow with increased disclosure.

However, another factor to be considered is that larger companies, when comparedto smaller ones, seem less risky to investors and have better access to resources. Smallcompanies thus have greater incentives to reduce uncertainty by disclosure. Thisargument presumes that a small company – all other things being equal – shoulddisclose more information and more details on competitors than is the case for a largecompany. These implications have been supported in studies by, for example, Ahmedand Courtis (1999) and Adrem (1999). However, not all studies conclude that the size ofthe company is a significant factor in explaining voluntary publication of information.For instance, Wallace (1988) and Stanga (1976) who conclude that size is not asignificant factor in explaining differences in companies’ reporting between Nigeriaand the USA.

Finally, company age has often been seen as a proxy for risk in the sense that themore established companies are less risky. From this perspective, the extent of acompany’s disclosure is expected to be related to how many years it has been inbusiness. For example, Kim and Ritter (1999, p. 430) provide evidence thatnon-financial information is of greater importance in the valuation of youngercompanies because forecast earnings work better for assessing younger companiesthan historical earnings do (see Klein, 1996; Amir and Lev, 1996). Furthermore, Jaggi(1997, p. 314) demonstrates that the number of years the company has been in businessinfluences the accuracy of the forecasts disclosed in IPO prospectuses. These resultsindicate that there might be a negative relationship between the age of the companyand the extent of its disclosure.

From the prior empirical research outlined above, the four hypotheses below aredeveloped. As none of the literature reviewed above relates directly to disclosures inconnection with IPO’s, and because there are varying competing explanations thehypotheses are stated in the null form:

H1. Industry differences. There is no association with respect to disclosure ofinformation on intellectual capital between companies in high-tech industries(IT and biotechnology) and traditional manufacturing and commercialcompanies.

H2. Managerial ownership. There is no association between the amount ofdisclosure on intellectual capital and the existence of managerial ownershipbefore the IPO.

H3. Company size. There is no association between the amount of disclosure onintellectual capital and the size of the company.

H4. Company age. There is no association between the amount of disclosure onintellectual capital and the age of the firm.

These factors have been raised and studied in the disclosure literature and cancontribute with insights with respect to understanding the mechanisms of disclosure inconnection with an IPO. While H1 might be explained by industry norms andinstitutionalized disclosure practices and furthermore that there are significantdifferences in competitive aspects across industry groups, the three latter controlvariables (H2, H3, H4) primarily concern the minimization of risk from the investors

AAAJ18,6

718

Dow

nloa

ded

by S

UR

AB

AY

A U

NIV

ER

SIT

Y A

t 18:

46 1

2 N

ovem

ber

2015

(PT

)

perspective. Pre-IPO managerial ownership is an important factor, because it indicatesto potential investors whether the people who know the most about the futureprospects of the company, namely its present management team, considers thecompany a good investment. Age and size are proxies for the chance of the companygoing bankrupt, i.e. age concerns the history of the company and size relates towhether it has critical mass to survive a fierce competitive environment over time.

MethodologyIn the empirical part of this paper, a disclosure index is used to quantify the amount ofinformation regarding intellectual capital included in the prospectuses. This tool hasmost often been applied to quantify the extent of disclosure in annual reports (e.g.Hossain et al., 1994; Adrem, 1999). However, its application is not limited to annualreporting, although it has also in been applied to IPO prospectuses by Cumby andConrad (2001) as well as Guo et al. (2004), who studied product-related IPO disclosurein biotechnology companies.

The disclosure index methodology consists of the calculation of the number ofinformation-related items that a given report contains, based on a predefined list of thepossible index items. Items such as the distribution of turnover between geographicalsegments, number of patents, and influence of research on staff satisfaction areexamples of items, which could be included in the index. The number of items includedin the index varies between the specific studies. Barrett (1976), for example, includesonly 17 items in his index and in Cooke’s (1989) study as many as 224 items wereincluded.

Further, the disclosure index can include only voluntary information (Adrem, 1999;Hossain et al., 1994; Gray et al., 1995; Guthrie and Petty, 2000), mandatory information(Wallace et al., 1994), or both voluntary and mandatory information (Inchausti, 1997;Beattie et al., 2002b). See also Marston and Shrives (1991) for a more detaileddescription of the use and methodology of disclosure indices. The particular researchdesign was chosen for our study because the disclosure index approach represents aproxy for the quality of disclosure of intellectual capital in IPO prospectuses. Whenapplying such an approach, it is, however, important to consider the reliability of theresults and the objectivity of the study (Unerman, 2000). In the present study, thesecriteria are handled through a thorough literature review, clear instructions in thecoding process and verifying the coding through separate coding by multipleresearchers.

It can be argued that the amount of disclosure might not be an exact indicator ofdisclosure quality (Beattie et al., 2004, p. 210). However, as we are concerned withextent of disclosure, we find the disclosure index method to fulfill our requirementssatisfactorily. Beattie et al. (2004, p. 213) also express concerns in relation to the abilityof a “one-dimensional” approach to the study of a complex, multi-faceted concept.Thus, their reservations relate to losses of detail in the data that such methods lead to.Despite this, Guthrie et al. (2004) suggest this method as a fruitful avenue for futureresearch into voluntary disclosures in business reporting.

The disclosure indexThere are no widely accepted theoretical guidelines for selecting items; therefore, thesuccessful use of the disclosure index methodology depends on critical and cautious

Disclosure ofinformation

719

Dow

nloa

ded

by S

UR

AB

AY

A U

NIV

ER

SIT

Y A

t 18:

46 1

2 N

ovem

ber

2015

(PT

)

selection of items (Marston and Shrives, 1991). As the focus of this article is voluntaryinformation, the choice of items was based on a thorough inspection of the literature oncorporate disclosure (see Eccles and Mavrinac, 1995; AICPA, 1994; Blair and Wallman,2001; Beattie et al., 2002b; Beattie and Pratt, 2002a) and intellectual capital reporting(Guthrie and Petty, 2000; DATI, 2001; Sveiby, 1997). Regarding intellectual capitalstatements, the experiences and results of the major Danish project concerningintellectual capital statements (DATI, 2001; DMSTI, 2003) were a major source ofinsight. Since the analysis focuses on the voluntary extent of disclosure in IPOprospectuses, information required by the authorities was not included in the index.

In our study of the extent of voluntary disclosure of non-accounting information –,e.g. information on knowledge-based resources, strategy and processes – in Danish IPOprospectuses, a disclosure index consisting of 78 items was applied. Table I show thatthese items were divided into six different categories and provide information on thenumber of items in each category. All items in the disclosure index are listed in Table II.

The extent of disclosure was quantified as the percentage of recorded informationitems found in the prospectus. In other words, the IPO prospectus is given one point if agiven index item is found in the prospectus and no points if the given item is not foundin the prospectus. This can be seen in the following formula, which was used tocalculate the index score of each IPO prospectus:

Score ¼�Xm

i¼1

di=M�£ 100%;

where di expresses itemi with the value 1 if the itemi was found in the IPO prospectus inquestion and otherwise 0. M expresses the maximum amount of information containedin a prospectus, i.e. 78 items. However, if the index of items is sufficientlycomprehensive, every company is ranked equally whether the items are weighted ornot because an extensive list of items implies gradual equalization (see Firth, 1979). Forexample, Chow and Wong-Boren (1987) applied both weighted and non-weightedindices and reached the same results.

DataThe data consist of the IPO prospectuses from all stock exchange listings at theCopenhagen Stock Exchange from 1990 until 2001, excluding the listings that pertainto increases in share capital and the listings of unit trusts. Unit trusts are also notincluded as their objectives are significantly different from those of other companies.No firm were introduced on the Copenhagen Stock Exchange in 2002-2003.

Items

Employees 27Customers 14IT 5Processes 8Research and development 9Strategic statements 15

Table I.The disclosure index (78items)

AAAJ18,6

720

Dow

nloa

ded

by S

UR

AB

AY

A U

NIV

ER

SIT

Y A

t 18:

46 1

2 N

ovem

ber

2015

(PT

)

Per

cen

tag

eof

com

pan

ies

mak

ing

dis

clos

ure

Per

cen

tag

eof

com

pan

ies

mak

ing

dis

clos

ure

Employees(27item

s)17

.8IT

(five

item

s)16

.8S

taff

bre

akd

own

by

age

25.0

Des

crip

tion

and

reas

onfo

rin

ves

tmen

tsin

IT10

.3S

taff

bre

akd

own

by

sen

iori

ty19

.1IT

syst

ems

47.1

Sta

ffb

reak

dow

nb

yg

end

er2.

9S

oftw

are

asse

ts5.

9S

taff

bre

akd

own

by

nat

ion

alit

y5.

9D

escr

ipti

onof

ITfa

cili

ties

7.4

Sta

ffb

reak

dow

nb

yd

epar

tmen

t70

.6IT

exp

ense

s13

.2S

taff

bre

akd

own

by

job

fun

ctio

n17

.6S

taff

bre

akd

own

by

lev

elof

edu

cati

on25

.0Processes

(eightitem

s)15

.3R

ate

ofst

aff

turn

over

7.4

Info

rmat

ion

and

com

mu

nic

atio

nw

ith

inth

eco

mp

any

19.1

Com

men

tson

chan

ges

inn

um

ber

ofem

plo

yee

s19

.1E

ffor

tsre

late

dto

the

wor

kin

gen

vir

onm

ent

22.1

Sta

ffh

ealt

han

dsa

fety

7.4

Wor

kin

gfr

omh

ome

0.0

Ab

sen

ce1.

5In

tern

alsh

arin

gof

kn

owle

dg

ean

din

form

atio

n25

.0S

taff

inte

rvie

w4.

4E

xte

rnal

shar

ing

ofk

now

led

ge

and

info

rmat

ion

17.6

Sta

tem

ents

ofp

olic

yon

com

pet

ence

dev

elop

men

t30

.9M

easu

reof

inte

rnal

orex

tern

alfa

ilu

res

8.8

Des

crip

tion

ofco

mp

eten

ced

evel

opm

ent

pro

gra

man

dac

tiv

itie

s26

.5F

rin

ge

ben

efits

and

com

pan

yso

cial

pro

gra

ms

1.5

Ed

uca

tion

and

trai

nin

gex

pen

ses

4.4

En

vir

onm

enta

lap

pro

val

san

dst

atem

ents

/pol

icie

s27

.9E

du

cati

onan

dtr

ain

ing

exp

ense

s/n

um

ber

ofem

plo

yee

s1.

5E

mp

loy

eeex

pen

ses/

nu

mb

erof

emp

loy

ees

8.8

Researchanddevelopment(nineitem

s)22

.7R

ecru

itm

ent

pol

icie

s14

.7S

tate

men

tsof

pol

icy

,str

ateg

yan

d/o

rob

ject

ives

ofR

&D

acti

vit

ies

41.2

HR

Md

epar

tmen

t,d

ivis

ion

orfu

nct

ion

4.4

R&

Dex

pen

ses

39.7

Job

rota

tion

opp

ortu

nit

ies

8.8

R&

Dex

pen

ses/

sale

s20

.6C

aree

rop

por

tun

itie

s10

.3R

&D

inv

este

din

bas

icre

sear

ch4.

4R

emu

ner

atio

nan

din

cen

tiv

esy

stem

s67

.6R

&D

inv

este

din

pro

du

ctd

esig

n/d

evel

opm

ent

7.4

Pen

sion

s10

.3F

utu

rep

rosp

ects

reg

ard

ing

R&

D26

.5

(continued

)

Table II.The disclosure index

Disclosure ofinformation

721

Dow

nloa

ded

by S

UR

AB

AY

A U

NIV

ER

SIT

Y A

t 18:

46 1

2 N

ovem

ber

2015

(PT

)

Per

cen

tag

eof

com

pan

ies

mak

ing

dis

clos

ure

Per

cen

tag

eof

com

pan

ies

mak

ing

dis

clos

ure

Insu

ran

cep

olic

ies

25.0

Det

ails

ofco

mp

any

pat

ents

27.9

Sta

tem

ents

ofd

epen

den

ceon

key

per

son

nel

44.1

Nu

mb

erof

pat

ents

and

lice

nse

set

c.22

.1R

even

ues

/em

plo

yee

13.2

Pat

ents

pen

din

g14

.7V

alu

ead

ded

/em

plo

yee

2.9

Strategicstatements(15item

s)27

.9Custom

ers(14item

s)27

.5D

escr

ipti

onof

new

pro

du

ctio

nte

chn

olog

y35

.3N

um

ber

ofcu

stom

ers

47.1

Sta

tem

ents

ofco

rpor

ate

qu

alit

yp

erfo

rman

ce41

.2S

ales

bre

akd

own

by

cust

omer

7.4

Str

ateg

ical

lian

ces

69.1

An

nu

alsa

les

per

seg

men

tor

pro

du

ct80

.9O

bje

ctiv

esan

dre

ason

for

stra

teg

ical

lian

ces

35.3

Av

erag

ecu

stom

ersi

ze2.

9C

omm

ents

onth

eef

fect

sof

the

stra

teg

ical

lian

ces

30.9

Dep

end

ence

onk

eycu

stom

ers

41.2

Des

crip

tion

ofth

en

etw

ork

ofsu

pp

lier

san

dd

istr

ibu

tors

66.2

Des

crip

tion

ofcu

stom

erin

vol

vem

ent

25.0

Sta

tem

ents

ofim

age

and

bra

nd

38.2

Des

crip

tion

ofcu

stom

erre

lati

ons

47.1

Cor

por

ate

cult

ure

stat

emen

ts8.

8E

du

cati

on/t

rain

ing

ofcu

stom

ers

13.2

Bes

tp

ract

ice

2.9

Cu

stom

ers/

emp

loy

ees

1.5

Org

aniz

atio

nal

stru

ctu

re45

.6V

alu

ead

ded

per

cust

omer

orse

gm

ent

14.7

Uti

lisa

tion

ofen

erg

y,

raw

mat

eria

lsan

dot

her

inp

ut

goo

ds

4.4

Mar

ket

shar

e(%

)47

.1In

ves

tmen

tin

the

env

iron

men

t10

.3R

elat

ive

mar

ket

shar

e32

.4D

escr

ipti

onof

com

mu

nit

yin

vol

vem

ent

4.4

Mar

ket

shar

e,b

reak

dow

nb

yco

un

try

/seg

men

t/p

rod

uct

19.1

Info

rmat

ion

onco

rpor

ate

soci

alre

spon

sib

ilit

yan

dob

ject

ive

1.5

Rep

urc

has

e5.

9D

escr

ipti

onof

emp

loy

eeco

ntr

acts

/con

trac

tual

issu

es25

.0

Table II.

AAAJ18,6

722

Dow

nloa

ded

by S

UR

AB

AY

A U

NIV

ER

SIT

Y A

t 18:

46 1

2 N

ovem

ber

2015

(PT

)

The full list of IPOs was obtained from the Stock Exchange, and the actual 68 IPOprospectuses were obtained either from the companies themselves or from theunderwriting banks. For the purpose of our analysis, we only considered the disclosurein the IPO prospectuses. The average disclosure of all the indicators included in ourdisclosure index is 22 per cent, varying from Lundbeck’s (Danish pharmaceuticalcompany, IPO in 1999) prospectus, which discloses 51 per cent of the proposedvoluntary information items, to Sparekassen Svendborg’s (Danish bank, IPO in 1990),which does not disclose any of the items at all. Of the overall categories of thedisclosure index, “strategic statements” and “customers” are the information categorieswhere most information is disclosed, both averaging 28 per cent across the total sample(see Table II for all sub-totals and disclosure percentages).

Table III classifies the IPO prospectuses by industry. It shows the increasingimportance of IPO’s within the IT and pharmaceutical sectors in most recent years.However, when the time period is taken as a whole, it is still the production and tradingcompanies that dominate listings on the stock exchange, encompassing 44 IPO listingsout of 68.

Descriptive statistics for the three continuous variables “age”, “size”, and“managerial ownership before the IPO” are shown in Table IV. In most cases thedata for these variables were contained in the prospectus but otherwise the firms werecontacted or the data were obtained from the Danish register of firms with limitedliability.

ResultsIn Table V, the average disclosure per prospectus has been calculated as describedabove and divided into the six different categories depicted in Table I. In interpretingthe data, it should be kept in mind that although all Danish IPO prospectuses over a

Pharmaceuticaland researcha

IT andtechnologyb

Trade andservicec Production No. of IPOs

2001 3 1 42000 3 3 1 71999 1 4 51998 1 4 4 4 131997 1 1 1 1 41996 1 1 4 61995 2 4 4 101994 4 41993 1 1 21992 2 21991 3 2 51990 4 2 6No. of IPOs 7 17 24 20 68

Notes:a Pharmaceutical companies, biotechnological companies and other types of research companies;b software companies, hardware companies, internet companies and other kinds of IT andhigh-technological companies; c trade companies, wholesalers, banks and other kinds of servicecompanies

Table III.Number of prospectuses

classified by type ofbusiness

Disclosure ofinformation

723

Dow

nloa

ded

by S

UR

AB

AY

A U

NIV

ER

SIT

Y A

t 18:

46 1

2 N

ovem

ber

2015

(PT

)

12-year period have been included the small number of observations limits theconclusions that can be drawn.

Table V shows that the total amount of information has increased during the overallperiod within all categories. This development is especially predominant for thecategories employees, strategic statements and R&D.

There is, however, a break point in the trend. Across all categories, there is adecrease in disclosure from 1999 to 2001. Using standard regression analysis andapplying a trend dummy variable for the last two years, we found a significantdifference in the slope. The regression analysis yields the equation:

DisclosureðYtÞ ¼ 3:48þ 2:08*t 2 6:52*D*t þ 1t;

T-test values : ð7:00Þ ð22:47Þ

where : D ¼ 0ðt ¼ 1990-1999Þ and D ¼ 1ðt ¼ 2000-2001Þ

A possible explanation is that until 1999 disclosure of information on intellectualcapital was a simple way of signalling an attractive IPO in the same way that that themere naming of companies as “dot.com” attracted investors (see Lee, 2001). However,after the tech stock crash, behavioural patterns might have changed so radically thateven though there was not a great difference in the types of companies going publicbefore and after the break point, after the break point there was measurable reluctancein disclosing the types of information that the “dot-com’s” used to disclose.

Max. items Employees Customers IT Processes R&D Strategic statements Totala

Year (27) (14) (5) (8) (9) (15) (78)

2001 4.8 3.8 0.8 0.8 3.5 5.5 19.02000 7.3 3.0 0.3 1.9 4.0 5.0 21.41999 8.8 5.8 1.2 2.0 5.8 7.0 30.61998 6.6 4.8 0.8 1.6 1.8 5.4 21.11997 4.3 4.5 1.3 1.3 2.3 4.8 18.31996 4.2 3.5 1.2 1.5 2.2 4.3 16.81995 3.0 4.4 0.8 1.4 1.6 3.7 14.91994 5.0 3.5 1.3 0.3 0.5 2.5 13.01993 1.5 3.5 1.0 1.0 0.0 4.0 11.01992 2.0 4.0 0.5 0.5 1.5 3.0 11.51991 2.0 2.0 0.6 0.4 0.0 1.6 6.61990 2.3 2.2 0.8 0.3 0.3 1.8 7.8

Note: a There are some minor variances in the cross-totals because of rounding errors

Table V.Average number of itemsper prospectus for eachyear

Variables Mean Std. deviation Min Max Variance

Disclosure 16.94 8.65 0 40 74.74Size (no. of employees) 1,017,82 2,502,86 7 17,064 6,264.298Age (years) 27.54 27.77 1 149 771.31Managerial ownership prior to the IPO (%) 22.75 34.84 0 100 1,213,82

Table IV.Descriptive statistics

AAAJ18,6

724

Dow

nloa

ded

by S

UR

AB

AY

A U

NIV

ER

SIT

Y A

t 18:

46 1

2 N

ovem

ber

2015

(PT

)

As indicated in Table VI, there is a difference in the level of information between thedifferent industry categories. The number of observations is rather small, but thedifference with respect to disclosure between so-called traditional sectors, i.e.manufacturing, commercial and service companies, and high-tech sectors, i.e. IT,technology, pharmaceutical and biological engineering is statistically significant.These differences are consistent with the studies by Cooke (1989, 1991) and Meek et al.(1995) who also concluded that the ratio of voluntary disclosure varies acrossindustries. Since the number of Danish IPO prospectuses is limited it was decided toaggregate the initial four industries into two main sectors, the high-tech comprisingand low-tech sectors for the remainder of the analysis.

Analysis of company characteristics influencing disclosureAn analysis of variance (ANOVA), controlling for technological type of the company(high-tech/low-tech), was used to test if the extent of managerial ownership before theIPO, company age and company size influenced disclosure. In order to conduct theANOVA analysis, we divided the data on the independent variables into discretegroups in order to determine whether there is an effect on disclosure as the presumeddependent variable.

The extent of “managerial ownership before the IPO” was classified according theexistence of such managerial ownership in the company at the time of IPO or not. Thisvariable was thus measured as either “no pre-IPO managerial ownership” or “pre-IPOmanagerial ownership” in the cases where this was present. The variable ‘companyage’ was measured in years and operationalised by distinguishing between youngcompanies and old companies where enterprises aged less than 20 years wereconsidered as young companies. Lastly, “company size” was treated by dividing thedata into small companies – of less than 250 employees – and large companies – of250 employees or more.

H1. Industry differencesThe independent variable “technology type” has a significant influence on the extent ofdisclosure, high-tech companies disclosing almost twice as much information (31.7 percent) as low-tech companies (16.4 per cent). It is not surprising that this variable issignificant, as we were able to group our industrial categories according to thischaracteristic in the previous section. Moreover, this result may be compared to thoseof other studies indicating that investors and analysts engaged in knowledge-intensiveindustries – for example technological and pharmaceutical companies – find

Employees Customers IT Processes R&DStrategic

statements TotalDisclosure

(%)

IT and technology(n ¼ 17) 7.6 5.5 0.7 1.9 3.7 6.3 25.7 33.0Pharmaceutical andresearch (n ¼ 7) 5.3 2.0 0.7 1.3 6.8 5.3 21.5 27.6Production (n ¼ 20) 3.1 4.2 1.0 1.5 1.5 4.4 15.6 20.0Trade and service(n ¼ 24) 3.8 2.8 0.9 0.5 0.1 2.3 10.4 13.3

Table VI.Average amount of

disclosure by industryand category

Disclosure ofinformation

725

Dow

nloa

ded

by S

UR

AB

AY

A U

NIV

ER

SIT

Y A

t 18:

46 1

2 N

ovem

ber

2015

(PT

)

non-financial information especially relevant for estimating the value of these types ofcompanies (Mavrinac and Boyle, 1996; Mavrinac and Siesfeld, 1997).

The difference between sectors also supports that companies with more intellectualcapital need to disclose more voluntary non-financial information because increasedinformation can help to reduce investors’ uncertainty and, thereby, ensure that thecompany in question does not have to pay a high premium due to investors’ perceivedinformation risk. However, the difference could also be that industry norms fordisclosure (see Gibbins et al., 1990) affect the firm’s disclosure as is suggested byMather et al. (2000) who find industry differences in the use of graphs in AustralianIPO prospectuses.

H2. Managerial ownershipThe extent of management ownership before the IPO was also found to havesignificant influence on the amount of disclosure. Companies where management hadan ownership share in the company at the time of listing on the stock exchangedisclosed more information on intellectual capital. Note that this result is quitesurprising and contrary to the literature previously cited (Demirag et al., 2000;O’Sullivan, 2000). Our statistical analysis indicated that managerial ownership prior tothe IPO had a positive effect on the companies’ disclosure. A company wheremanagerial ownership was present prior to the IPO disclosed on average 26.4 per centas opposed to 17.1 per cent for the companies without managerial ownership before theIPO. The question of why this was the case cannot be answered within the context ofthis study. One possible explanation, however, might be that managers have a greaterincentive to market the company, as the resulting lower cost of capital will directlyaffect their profit from the offering.

H3. Company sizeThe analysis did not find significant correlation between “company size” expressed interms of number of employees and the extent of disclosure Since the number ofobservations is limited, the possible disconfirmation of Verrecchia’s (1983) proprietarycosts theory, furthermore confirmed by, e.g. Inchausti (1997), should be taken as atentative conclusion. However, the results should be viewed in the light of the specificsituation of the companies at the time of the publication of their IPO prospectuses. Thecompanies in our study are about to be listed on the stock exchange, hence althoughthey inevitably differ relative to company size, regardless of the size of the company,the flotation costs are very similar.

H4. Company ageAlso, our analysis did not find any significant difference with respect to theindependent variable “age”. In relation to the perceived risk of investing in a company,age is a part of documenting that the company has been, and therefore in the future willbe, able to sustain itself. Our results thus indicate that the history of the company doesnot matter to the capital market, although the track record of companies iscontinuously emphasized by capital market actors. This might indicate that it is thetrack record of present management team or the managing director, rather than the ageof the company that matters. No previous studies have elaborated further on thisaspect, wherefore it is an interesting avenue for further investigation.

AAAJ18,6

726

Dow

nloa

ded

by S

UR

AB

AY

A U

NIV

ER

SIT

Y A

t 18:

46 1

2 N

ovem

ber

2015

(PT

)

DiscussionThe results of our analyses lead us to three tentative conclusions. First, the resultsregarding industry differences supports the proposition that intangibles-intensivecompanies need to disclose more non-accounting information (H1). Possibly, in order tolower their risk premium. Second, there was an indication that management ownershipcreates incentives for greater disclosure (H2). This result was in opposition to previousfindings, but could, possibly, be explained by the fact that the time of IPO, which is ourspecific focal point, is a unique case. The reasoning behind this is that management hasa greater incentive to disclose information when they too will profit from the stockmarket listing. They are thus more interested in conveying the intrinsic value of thecompany to the stock market. Interestingly, this difference does not prevail for thehigh-tech companies – something that could have been expected – as the IPO profitsgenerally are assumed to be greater there. Thus, we can also conclude that thetechnology factor weighs more than the ownership factor when it comes to the extentof disclosure.

The result that “size” (H3) and “age” (H4) are not significant individuallycontradicts a number of earlier studies (Ahmed and Courtis, 1999; Adrem, 1999; Kimand Ritter, 1999; Jaggi, 1997). Although it is important to note that our conclusion isbased on a rather small dataset, it could indicate that there are other organizationalcharacteristics, which are more decisive. Our analysis indicates that industrycharacteristics play a greater role in the assessment of how much informationcompanies should disclose in order to facilitate the capital market’s valuation analyses.The results indicate here that it is the old/large low-tech companies, which distinguishthemselves from the other three possible categories. This result is in accordance withthe cost of disclosure theory, which states that the costs for this type of company willbe relatively lower.

Concluding remarksVoluntary disclosure of information on intellectual capital in Danish IPO prospectuseshas increased substantially in the last decade. This development can partly be relatedto the fact that relatively more IT and pharmaceutical companies have been listed onthe Copenhagen Stock Exchange in the later years covered by our study, but also thatthe prospectuses of these types of companies generally include more information onintellectual capital. These results correspond to the suggestion in the literature thatcompanies relying mainly on intangible assets for value creation – for examplehighly-educated staff, R&D, patents etc. – have to disclose more variednon-accounting information in order to reduce information asymmetry betweenmanagement and external stakeholders.

Our analysis showed that grouping the companies into high-tech and low-techsectors, revealed significant differences between high-tech and low-tech sectors withregard to the disclosure of voluntary non-accounting information. Likewise, the extentof management ownership before the IPO had a significant influence on the extent ofvoluntary non-accounting disclosure in the IPO prospectuses. On the other hand, ageand company size were found insignificant. The four control variables included in thestudy relate to hypothesis regarding industry norms (H1) and the minimization ofinvestor uncertainty (H2, H3, H4).

Disclosure ofinformation

727

Dow

nloa

ded

by S

UR

AB

AY

A U

NIV

ER

SIT

Y A

t 18:

46 1

2 N

ovem

ber

2015

(PT

)

In relation to the future development of business reporting practices, DiPiazza andEccles (2002) advocate for an approach that considers differences in relevance ofinformation across industries as is also reflected in the industry differences that wefind. Pre-IPO managerial ownership (H2) concerns the minimizing of uncertainty forpotential investors as it indicates whether management has money on the line too. Ourresults indicate that when management has money on the line, they tend to disclosemore information on intellectual capital.

An influence of size on the extent of disclosure could be evidence of the much-citedcost of disclosure theory (see Verrecchia, 1983). However, as our results wereindecisive, they might indicate that the cost of disclosure theory does not have asignificant importance in the present era of more advanced accounting systems andinstant reporting. Finally, the variable age was indecisive as well. This might beattributed to the fact that analysts and investors do not regard the too distant past ofthe company important. Furthermore, the suggestion was made that perhaps it was notthe age or track record of the company itself that mattered, but rather it was the trackrecord of the existing management team that was the focus of the capital market. Asthese possible explanations could not be tested using the approach adopted in thestudy they can be suggested as areas for future research.

It is often stated that the current level of mandatory disclosure of information is notsufficient to convey a true picture of the company’s present value and future prospectsand that supplementary information on, e.g. intellectual capital should be disclosed.However, at the same time, there are reservations as to whether supplementarybusiness reporting is a credible means of voluntary disclosure and whether indicatorsof such information are relevant. Therefore, this paper has focussed on the reporting ofsuch non-accounting information in IPO prospectuses as information disclosed herewas suggested to comprehend information that the capital market would findimportant. As firms issuing the IPO prospectus attempt to address the needs of thecapital market, we believe that the actual disclosure practises in IPO prospectuses giveinsights into the capital market’s need for information.

The disclosure of information on intellectual capital in IPO prospectuses, which hasbeen the focus of this paper, indicates that companies and their advisors believe thatthis type of information is important in the capital market’s assessment of thecompany’s value. However, in order to be more specific about the motives behind thedisclosure of intellectual capital, in IPO prospectuses and other supplementary reports,for example, intellectual capital statements, and about how this information will formthe basis of the market’s assessment of the company, it is necessary to look moredirectly at the work of the analysts and investors. This could be done using researchinterviews as was done, e.g. by Holland (2004) who provides evidence that bothanalysts and fund managers consider information on intellectual capital in theirfundamental mosaic of information, which is the cornerstone of their discussions withand about the company.

Finally, a more detailed understanding of companies’ motives for disclosure as wellas analysts’ and investors’ need for information should make the link to the companies’cost of equity capital. Schrand and Verrecchia (2004) have demonstrated that greaterdisclosure frequency in the period prior to the IPO is associated with lowerunder-pricing as well as some of the more traditional measures of a companies’ cost ofcapital such as bid-ask spread and analyst forecast dispersion also will be lower.

AAAJ18,6

728

Dow

nloa

ded

by S

UR

AB

AY

A U

NIV

ER

SIT

Y A

t 18:

46 1

2 N

ovem

ber

2015

(PT

)

Moreover, Guo et al. (2004) provide evidence that the disclosure of information relatedto product development, patent protection and venture capital backing in biotech IPOprospectuses subsequently lowers bid-ask spread and share return volatility.

References

Adrem, A. (1999), “Essays on disclosure practices in Sweden: causes and effects”, doctoraldissertation, Lund Studies in Economics and Management, Vol. 51, Institute of EconomicResearch, University of Lund, Lund.

Aharony, J., Lin, C.J. and Loeb, M.P. (1993), “Initial public offerings, accounting choices, andearnings management”, Contemporary Accounting Research, Vol. 10, pp. 61-81.

Ahmed, K. and Courtis, J.K. (1999), “Associations between corporate characteristics anddisclosure levels in annual reports: a meta analysis”, British Accounting Review, Vol. 31,pp. 35-61.

AICPA (1994), Improving Business Reporting – A Customer Focus: Meeting the InformationNeeds of Investors and Creditors; Comprehensive Report of the Special Committee onFinancial Reporting, American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, New York, NY(The Jenkins Report).

Amir, E. and Lev, B. (1996), “Value-relevance of nonfinancial information: the wirelesscommunication industry”, Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 22, pp. 3-30.

Ang, J.S. and Brau, J.C. (2002), “Firm transparency and the costs of going public”, Journal ofFinancial Research, Vol. 25 No. 1, pp. 1-17.

Anton, H.R. (1954), “Funds statements practices in the United States and Canada”,The Accounting Review, October, pp. 620-7.

Barrett, M.E. (1976), “Financial reporting practices: disclosure and comprehensiveness in aninternational setting”, The Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 14 No. 1, pp. 10-26.

Beattie, V. (1999), Business Reporting: The Inevitable Change, Institute of Chartered Accountantsof Scotland, Edinburgh.

Beattie, V. and Pratt, K. (2001), Business Reporting: Harnessing the Power of the Internet forUsers, Institute of Chartered Accountants of Scotland, Edinburgh.

Beattie, V. and Pratt, K. (2002a), Voluntary Annual Report Disclosures: What Users Want,Institute of Chartered Accountants of Scotland, Edinburgh.

Beattie, V. and Pratt, K. (2002b), “Disclosure items in a comprehensive model of businessreporting: an empirical evaluation”, working paper, University of Stirling, Stirling.

Beattie, V., McInnes, B. and Fearnley, S. (2002a), “Narrative reporting by listed UK companies: acomparative within-sector topic analysis”, Working paper, University of Stirling, Stirling.

Beattie, V., McInnes, B. and Fearnley, S. (2002b), Through the Eyes of Management: A Study ofNarrative Disclosures, Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales, MiltonKeynes.

Beattie, V., McInnes, B. and Fearnley, S. (2004), “A methodology for analysing and evaluatingnarratives in annual reports: a comprehensive descriptive profile and metrics fordisclosure quality attributes”, Accounting Forum, Vol. 28 No. 3, pp. 205-36.

Blair, M. and Wallman, S. (2001), Unseen Wealth, Brookings Institution, Washington DC.

Botosan, C.A. (1997), “Disclosure level and the cost of equity capital”, The Accounting Review,Vol. 72 No. 3, pp. 323-49.

Bukh, P.N., Larsen, H.T. and Mouritsen, J. (2001), “Constructing intellectual capital statements”,Scandinavian Journal of Management, Vol. 17 No. 1, pp. 87-108.

Disclosure ofinformation

729

Dow

nloa

ded

by S

UR

AB

AY

A U

NIV

ER

SIT

Y A

t 18:

46 1

2 N

ovem

ber

2015

(PT

)

Chow, C.W. and Wong-Boren, A. (1987), “Voluntary financial disclosure by Mexicancorporations”, The Accounting Review, Vol. 62 No. 3, pp. 533-41.

Clarkson, P.M. and Merkley, J. (1994), “Ex ante uncertainty and the underpricing of initial publicofferings: further Canadian evidence”, Canadian Journal of Administrative Sciences,Vol. 11, pp. 54-67.

Cooke, T.E. (1989), “Voluntary corporate disclosure by Swedish companies”, Journal ofInternational Financial Management and Accounting, Vol. 1, pp. 171-95.

Cooke, T.E. (1991), “An assessment of voluntary disclosure by Swedish companies”,International Journal of Accounting, Vol. 26 No. 3, pp. 174-89.

Cumby, J. and Conrad, J. (2001), “Non-financial performance measures in the Canadianbiotechnology industry”, Journal of Intellectual Capital, Vol. 2 No. 3, pp. 261-72.

Daily, C.M., Certo, S.T., Dalton, D.R. and Roengpitya, R. (2003), “IPO underpricing:a meta-analysis and research synthesis”, Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, Vol. 27No. 3, pp. 271-95.

DATI (2001), A Guideline for Intellectual Capital Statements – A Key to Knowledge Management,Danish Agency for Trade and Industry, Copenhagen.

Demirag, I., Sudarsanam, S. and Wright, M. (2000), “Corporate governance: overview andresearch agenda”, British Accounting Review, Vol. 32, pp. 341-54.

Diamond, D. and Verrecchia, R. (1991), “Disclosure, liquidity and the cost of equity capital”,Journal of Finance, September, pp. 1325-60.

DiPiazza, S.A. Jr and Eccles, R.G. (2002), Building Public Trust: The Future of CorporateReporting, Wiley, New York, NY.

DMSTI (2003), Intellectual Capital Statements – The New Guideline, Danish Ministry of Science,Technology and Innovation, Copenhagen.

Eccles, R. and Mavrinac, S. (1995), “Improving the corporate disclosure process”, SloanManagement Review, Summer, pp. 11-25.

Eccles, R.G., Herz, R.H., Keegan, E.M. and Phillips, D.M. (2001), The Value Reporting Revolution:Moving beyond the Earnings Game, John Wiley & Sons, New York, NY.

Eustace, C. (2001), “The intangible economy: impact and policy issues”, Report of the High LevelExpert Group on the Intangible Economy, EU Commission, Brussels.

FASB (2001), Norwalk, CT, “Improving business reporting: insights into enhancing voluntarydisclosures”, Steering Committee Business, Reporting Research Project, FinancialAccounting Standard Board.

Fincham, R. and Roslender, R. (2003), The Management of Intellectual Capital and its Implicationsfor Business Reporting, The Institute of Chartered Accountants of Scotland, Edinburgh.

Firth, M. (1979), “The impact of size, stock market listing, and auditors on voluntary disclosure incorporate annual reports”, Accounting and Business Research, Vol. 9, Autumn, pp. 273-80.

Galbraith, C.S. and Merrill, G.B. (2001), “IPO performance in business to business ‘B2B’e-commerce firms: effects of strategy and industry”, Managerial Finance, Vol. 27 No. 7,pp. 1-15.

Gelb, D.S. (2002), “Intangible assets and firms’ disclosures: an empirical investigation”, Journal ofBusiness Finance & Accounting, Vol. 29 Nos 3/4, pp. 457-76.

Gibbins, M., Richardson, A. and Waterhouse, J. (1990), “The management of corporate financialdisclosure: opportunism, ritualism, policies and processes”, Journal of AccountingResearch, Vol. 28, pp. 121-43.

AAAJ18,6

730

Dow

nloa

ded

by S

UR

AB

AY

A U

NIV

ER

SIT

Y A

t 18:

46 1

2 N

ovem

ber

2015

(PT

)

Gray, S.J., Meek, G.K. and Roberts, C.B. (1995), “International capital market pressure andvoluntary annual report disclosures by US and UK multinationals”, Journal ofInternational Financial Management and Accounting, Vol. 6 No. 1, pp. 43-68.

Guo, R., Lev, B. and Zhou, N. (2004), “Competitive costs of disclosure by biotech IPOs”, Journal ofAccounting Research, Vol. 42 No. 2, p. 319.

Guthrie, J. and Petty, R. (2000), “Intellectual capital: Australian annual reporting evidence”,Journal of Intellectual Capital, Vol. 1 No. 3, pp. 241-51.

Guthrie, J., Petty, R., Yongvanich, K. and Ricceri, F. (2004), “Using content analysis as a researchmethod to inquire into intellectual capital reporting”, Journal of Intellectual Capital, Vol. 5No. 2, pp. 282-93.

Holland, J. (1997), Corporate Communications with Institutional Shareholders: Private Disclosuresand Financial Reporting, Institute of Chartered Accountants of Scotland, Edinburgh.

Holland, J.B. (2004), Corporate Intangibles, Value Relevance and Disclosure Content, The Instituteof Chartered Accountants of Scotland, Edinburgh.

Hossain, M., Tan, M.L. and Adams, C. (1994), “Voluntary disclosure in an emerging capitalmarket: some empirical evidence from companies listed on the Kuala Lumpur stockexchange”, International Journal of Accounting, Vol. 29 No. 4, pp. 334-51.

Inchausti, B. (1997), “The influence of company characteristics and accounting regulation oninformation disclosed by Spanish firms”, The European Accounting Review, Vol. 6 No. 1,pp. 45-68.

Jaggi, B. (1997), “Accuracy of forecast information disclosed in the IPO prospectuses of HongKong companies”, The International Journal of Accounting, Vol. 32 No. 3, pp. 301-19.

Jenkinson, T. and Ljungquist, A. (2001), Going Public: The Theory and Evidence of HowCompanies Raise Equity Finance, 2nd ed., Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Kim, M. and Ritter, J.R. (1999), “Valuing IPOs”, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 53,pp. 409-37.

Klein, A. (1996), “Can investors use the prospectus to price initial public offerings?”, The Journalof Financial Statement Analysis, Fall, pp. 23-40.

Lee, P.M. (2001), “What’s in a name.com? The effect of ‘.com’ name changes on stock prices andtrading activity”, Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 22, pp. 209-43.

Lev, B. (2000), “Communicating knowledge capabilities”, working paper, Leonard N. SternSchool of Business, New York University, New York, NY.

Marston, C.L. and Shrives, P.J. (1991), “The use of disclosure indices in accounting research:a review article”, British Accounting Review, Vol. 23, pp. 195-210.

Mather, P., Ramsay, A. and Steen, A. (2000), “The use and representational faithfulness of graphsin Australian IPO prospectuses”, Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, Vol. 13No. 1, pp. 65-83.

Mavridis, D.G. (2002), “Disclosed information aspects in Greek interim reports”, ManagementResearch News, Vol. 25 No. 11, pp. 1-22.

Mavrinac, S. and Boyle, T. (1996), “Sell-side analysis, non-financial performance evaluation, andthe accuracy of short-term earnings forecasts”, working paper, The Ernst & Young Centrefor Business Innovation, Paris.

Mavrinac, S. and Siesfeld, T. (1997), “Measures that matter: an exploratory investigation ofinvestors’ information needs and value priorities”, working paper, Richard Ivey School ofBusiness, London.

Disclosure ofinformation

731

Dow

nloa

ded

by S

UR

AB

AY

A U

NIV

ER

SIT

Y A

t 18:

46 1

2 N

ovem

ber

2015

(PT

)

Meek, G.K., Roberts, C.B. and Gray, S.J. (1995), “Factors influencing voluntary annual reportdisclosures by US and UK and continental European multinational corporations”, Journalof International Business Studies, Vol. 26, pp. 555-72.

Megginson, W. and Weiss, K.A. (1991), “Venture capitalists’ certification in initial publicofferings”, Journal of Finance, Vol. 46, pp. 873-903.

Mouritsen, J., Larsen, H.T. and Bukh, P.N. (2001), “Intellectual capital and the ‘capable firm’:narrating, visualising and numbering for managing knowledge”, Accounting,Organizations and Society, Vol. 26 No. 7, pp. 735-62.

O’Sullivan, N. (2000), “The impact of board composition and ownership on audit quality:evidence from large UK companies”, British Accounting Review, Vol. 32, pp. 397-414.

Richardson, A.J. and Welker, M. (2001), “Social disclosure, financial disclosure and the cost ofequity capital”, Accounting, Organizations and Society, Vol. 26, pp. 597-616.

Robb, S.W.G., Single, L.E. and Zarzeski, M.T. (2001), “Nonfinancial disclosures acrossAnglo-American countries”, Journal of International Accounting, Auditing & Taxation,Vol. 10, pp. 71-83.

Schrand, C. and Verrecchia, R.E. (2004), “Disclosure choice and cost of capital: evidence fromunderpricing in initial public offerings”, working paper, The Wharton School, Universityof Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA.

Stanga, K. (1976), “Disclosure in published annual reports”, Financial Management, Vol. 5 No. 4,pp. 42-52.

Sveiby, K.E. (1997), The New Organizational Wealth: Managing and Measuring KnowledgeBased Assets, Berrett-Koehler, San Francisco, CA.

Unerman, J. (2000), “Methodological issues: reflections on quantification in corporate socialreporting content analysis”, Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, Vol. 13 No. 5,pp. 667-80.

Upton, W.S. (2001), Business and Financial Reporting: Challenges from the New Economy,Financial Accounting Standard Board, Norwalk, CT, Special Report.

Verrecchia, R.E. (1983), “Discretionary disclosures”, Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 5No. 3, pp. 179-94.

Verrecchia, R.E. (2001), “Essays on disclosure”, Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 32,pp. 97-180.

Wallace, R.S.O. (1988), “Corporate financial reporting in Nigeria”, Accounting and BusinessResearch, Vol. 18, pp. 352-62.

Wallace, R.S.O., Naser, K. and Mora, A. (1994), “The relationship between the comprehensivenessof corporate annual reports and firm characteristics in Spain”, Accounting and BusinessResearch, Vol. 25 No. 97, pp. 41-53.

Zambon, S. (Ed.) (2003), “Study on the measurement of intangible assets and associated reportingpractices”, Report prepared for the Commission of the European Communities EnterpriseDirectorate-General, Brussels.

Further reading

Shiller, R.J. (1990), “Speculative prices and popular models”, Journal of Economic Perspectives,Vol. 4, pp. 55-65.

AAAJ18,6

732

Dow

nloa

ded

by S

UR

AB

AY

A U

NIV

ER

SIT

Y A

t 18:

46 1

2 N

ovem

ber

2015

(PT

)

This article has been cited by:

1. Stuart Cooper, Richard Slack. 2015. Reporting practice, impression management and companyperformance: a longitudinal and comparative analysis of water leakage disclosure. Accounting and BusinessResearch 45, 801-840. [CrossRef]

2. Leire Alcaniz, Fernando Gomez-Bezares, Jose Vicente Ugarte. 2015. Firm characteristics and intellectualcapital disclosure in IPO prospectuses. Academia Revista Latinoamericana de Administración 28:4, 461-483.[Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]

3. Laura Bini, Francesco Dainelli, Francesco Giunta. 2015. Is a loosely specified regulatory interventioneffective in disciplining management commentary? The case of performance indicator disclosure. Journalof Management & Governance . [CrossRef]

4. Mary Low, Grant Samkin, Yuanyuan Li. 2015. Voluntary reporting of intellectual capital. Journal ofIntellectual Capital 16:4, 779-808. [Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]

5. Viktoria Goebel. 2015. Intellectual capital reporting in a mandatory management report: the case ofGermany. Journal of Intellectual Capital 16:4, 702-720. [Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]

6. Edila Eudemia Herrera Rodríguez, Clea Beatriz Macagnan. 2015. Revelación de informaciones sobrecapital estructural organizativo de los bancos en Brasil y España. Contaduría y Administración . [CrossRef]

7. Frank Schiemann, Kai Richter, Thomas Günther. 2015. The relationship between recognised intangibleassets and voluntary intellectual capital disclosure. Journal of Applied Accounting Research 16:2, 240-264.[Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]

8. Carlo Bagnoli, Giulia Redigolo. 2015. Business model in IPO prospectuses: insights from ItalianInnovation Companies. Journal of Management & Governance . [CrossRef]

9. Chaabane Oussama Houssem Eddine, Shamsul Nahar Abdullah, Fatima Abdul Hamid, Dewan MahboobHossain. 2015. The determinants of intellectual capital disclosure: a meta-analysis review. Journal of AsiaBusiness Studies 9:3, 232-250. [Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]

10. Shaw Warn Too, Wan Fadzilah Wan Yusoff. 2015. Exploring intellectual capital disclosure as a mediatorfor the relationship between IPO firm-specific characteristics and underpricing. Journal of IntellectualCapital 16:3, 639-660. [Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]

11. Viktoria Goebel. 2015. Is the literature on content analysis of intellectual capital reporting heading towardsa dead end?. Journal of Intellectual Capital 16:3, 681-699. [Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]

12. Aleksandra B. Zimmerman. 2015. The JOBS Act disclosure exemptions: Some early evidence. Researchin Accounting Regulation 27, 73-82. [CrossRef]

13. Christian Nielsen, Gunnar Rimmel, Tadanori Yosano. 2015. Outperforming markets: IC and the long-term performance of Japanese IPOs. Accounting Forum . [CrossRef]

14. Anthony R. Bowrin. 2015. Comprehensiveness of internet reporting by Caribbean companies. Journal ofAccounting in Emerging Economies 5:1, 2-34. [Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]

15. John Dumay, Linlin Cai. 2015. Using content analysis as a research methodology for investigatingintellectual capital disclosure. Journal of Intellectual Capital 16:1, 121-155. [Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]

16. Anna Maria Biscotti, Eugenio D’Amico. 2015. Theoretical foundation of IC disclosure strategies in high-tech industries. International Journal of Disclosure and Governance . [CrossRef]

17. Luis Rodríguez Domínguez, Ligia Carolina Noguera Gámez. 2014. Corporate reporting on risks: Evidencefrom Spanish companies. Revista de Contabilidad 17, 116-129. [CrossRef]

Dow

nloa

ded

by S

UR

AB

AY

A U

NIV

ER

SIT

Y A

t 18:

46 1

2 N

ovem

ber

2015

(PT

)

18. Bambang Bemby Soebyakto, Mira Agustina, Mukhtaruddin. 2014. Analysis of Intellectual CapitalDiclosure Practises: Empirical Study on Services Companies Listed on Indonesia Stock Exchange. GSTFJournal on Business Review (GBR) 4. . [CrossRef]

19. Susanne Arvidsson. 2014. Corporate social responsibility and stock market actors: a comprehensive study.Social Responsibility Journal 10:2, 210-225. [Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]

20. Christian Ott, Ulrike Schmidt, Thomas Guenther. 2014. Information dissemination on intellectual capitalin mergers and acquisitions: purchase price allocations, press releases and business press. Accounting andBusiness Research 44, 280-314. [CrossRef]

21. Akmalia M. Ariff, Steven F. Cahan, David M. Emanuel. 2014. Institutional Environment, Ownership,and Disclosure of Intangibles: Evidence from East Asia. Journal of International Accounting Research 13,33-59. [CrossRef]

22. John Dumay, Linlin Cai. 2014. A review and critique of content analysis as a methodology for inquiringinto IC disclosure. Journal of Intellectual Capital 15:2, 264-290. [Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]

23. Eric Tsui, W.M. Wang, Linlin Cai, C.F. Cheung, W.B. Lee. 2014. Knowledge-based extraction ofintellectual capital-related information from unstructured data. Expert Systems with Applications 41,1315-1325. [CrossRef]

24. Farooq Omar, Nielsen Christian. 2014. Improving the information environment for analysts. Journal ofIntellectual Capital 15:1, 142-156. [Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]

25. Nicoleta Maria Ienciu, Dumitru MatișIntellectual capital disclosure of romanian listed companies 143-162.[Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF] [PDF]

26. Matteo Mura, Mariolina Longo. 2013. Developing a tool for intellectual capital assessment: an individual-level perspective. Expert Systems 30:10.1111/exsy.v30.5, 436-450. [CrossRef]

27. Eirini Manolopoulou, Sotiris Kotsiantis, Dimitris Tzelepis. 2013. Application of association and decisionrules on intellectual capital. Knowledge Management Research & Practice . [CrossRef]

28. Tommaso Pucci, Christian Simoni, Lorenzo Zanni. 2013. Measuring the relationship between marketingassets, intellectual capital and firm performance. Journal of Management & Governance . [CrossRef]

29. Liliana Feleagă, Niculae Feleagă, Voicu D. Dragomir, Luciana M. Râbu. 2013. European evidenceon intellectual capital: Linking methodologies with firm disclosures. Acta Oeconomica 63, 139-156.[CrossRef]

30. Linlin Cai, E. Tsui, C.F. CheungA taxonomic approach to the identification of intellectual capital fromcompany reports 338-341. [CrossRef]

31. Mahesh Joshi, Daryll Cahill, Jasvinder Sidhu, Monika Kansal. 2013. Intellectual capital and financialperformance: an evaluation of the Australian financial sector. Journal of Intellectual Capital 14:2, 264-285.[Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]

32. Ramin Gamerschlag. 2013. Value relevance of human capital information. Journal of Intellectual Capital14:2, 325-345. [Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]

33. Alok R. Saboo, Rajdeep Grewal. 2013. Stock Market Reactions to Customer and Competitor Orientations:The Case of Initial Public Offerings. Marketing Science 32, 70-88. [CrossRef]

34. I-Shuo Chen, Jui-Kuei Chen. 2013. Present and future: a trend forecasting and ranking of universitytypes for innovative development from an intellectual capital perspective. Quality & Quantity 47, 335-352.[CrossRef]

Dow

nloa

ded

by S

UR

AB

AY

A U

NIV

ER

SIT

Y A

t 18:

46 1

2 N

ovem

ber

2015

(PT

)

35. Abdul Halim Hazianti, Jaafar Hartini. 2013. The Influence of Capital-Raising Activity on IntangiblesReporting: Evidence from Malaysia. International Journal of Trade, Economics and Finance 376-379.[CrossRef]

36. Vivien Beattie, Sarah Jane Smith. 2012. Evaluating disclosure theory using the views of UK financedirectors in the intellectual capital context. Accounting and Business Research 42, 471-494. [CrossRef]

37. Lino Cinquini, Emilio Passetti, Andrea Tenucci, Marco Frey. 2012. Analyzing intellectual capitalinformation in sustainability reports: some empirical evidence. Journal of Intellectual Capital 13:4,531-561. [Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]

38. Vathsala Wickramasinghe, Nayana Fonseka. 2012. Human resource measurement and reporting inmanufacturing and service sectors in Sri Lanka. Journal of Human Resource Costing & Accounting 16:3,235-252. [Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]

39. Hung-Yi Wu, Jui-Kuei Chen, I-Shuo Chen. 2012. Ways to promote valuable innovation: intellectualcapital assessment for higher education system. Quality & Quantity 46, 1377-1391. [CrossRef]

40. Abdulrahman Anam Ousama, Abdul‐Hamid Fatima, Abdul Rashid Hafiz‐Majdi. 2012. Determinants ofintellectual capital reporting. Journal of Accounting in Emerging Economies 2:2, 119-139. [Abstract] [FullText] [PDF]

41. Gunnar Rimmel, Johan Dergård, Kristina Jonäll. 2012. Human resources disclosure in Danish intellectualcapital statements. Journal of Human Resource Costing & Accounting 16:2, 112-141. [Abstract] [Full Text][PDF]

42. R. Atan, A. RahimCorporate reporting of intellectual capital: Evidence from Ace Market of Bursa Malaysia1021-1026. [CrossRef]

43. Michela Cordazzo, Philip G.M.C. Vergauwen. 2012. Intellectual capital disclosure in the UKbiotechnology IPO prospectuses. Journal of Human Resource Costing & Accounting 16:1, 4-19. [Abstract][Full Text] [PDF]

44. Walter Aerts, Peng Cheng. 2012. Self-serving causal disclosures and short-term IPO valuation – evidencefrom China. Accounting and Business Research 42, 49-75. [CrossRef]

45. Deborah Branswijck, Patricia Everaert. 2012. Intellectual capital disclosure commitment: myth or reality?.Journal of Intellectual Capital 13:1, 39-56. [Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]

46. Azwan Abdul Rashid, Muhd Kamil Ibrahim, Radiah Othman, Kok Fong See. 2012. IC disclosures inIPO prospectuses: evidence from Malaysia. Journal of Intellectual Capital 13:1, 57-80. [Abstract] [FullText] [PDF]

47. Ismail Adelopo. 2011. Voluntary disclosure practices amongst listed companies in Nigeria. Advances inAccounting 27, 338-345. [CrossRef]

48. Klaus Möller, Ramin Gamerschlag, Finn Guenther. 2011. Determinants and effects of human capitalreporting and controlling. Journal of Management Control 22, 311-333. [CrossRef]

49. Anne-Laure Mention. 2011. Exploring voluntary reporting of intellectual capital in the banking sector.Journal of Management Control 22, 279-309. [CrossRef]

50. Mohammad Nurunnabi, Monirul Hossain, Md. Hossain. 2011. Intellectual capital reporting in a SouthAsian country: evidence from Bangladesh. Journal of Human Resource Costing & Accounting 15:3, 196-233.[Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]

51. Wen-Hsin Hsu, Yao-Ling Chang. 2011. Intellectual capital and analyst forecast: evidence from the high-tech industry in Taiwan. Applied Financial Economics 21, 1135-1143. [CrossRef]

Dow

nloa

ded

by S

UR

AB

AY

A U

NIV

ER

SIT

Y A

t 18:

46 1

2 N

ovem

ber

2015

(PT

)

52. Rosalind H. Whiting, James Woodcock. 2011. Firm characteristics and intellectual capital disclosure byAustralian companies. Journal of Human Resource Costing & Accounting 15:2, 102-126. [Abstract] [FullText] [PDF]

53. Leire Alcaniz, Fernando Gomez-Bezares, Robin Roslender. 2011. Theoretical perspectives on intellectualcapital: A backward look and a proposal for going forward. Accounting Forum 35, 104-117. [CrossRef]

54. Susanne Arvidsson. 2011. Disclosure of non‐financial information in the annual report. Journal ofIntellectual Capital 12:2, 277-300. [Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]

55. Manuel Castelo Branco, Catarina Delgado, Cristina Sousa, Manuel Sá. 2011. Intellectual capital disclosuremedia in Portugal. Corporate Communications: An International Journal 16:1, 38-52. [Abstract] [FullText] [PDF]

56. Madan Lal Bhasin. 2011. Disclosure of Intellectual Capital in Annual Reports: An Empirical Study ofthe Indian IT Corporations. Modern Economy 02, 455-467. [CrossRef]

57. Kristina Jonäll, Gunnar Rimmel. 2010. CEO letters as legitimacy builders: coupling text to numbers.Journal of Human Resource Costing & Accounting 14:4, 307-328. [Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]

58. Gregory White, Alina Lee, Yuni Yuningsih, Christian Nielsen, Per Nikolaj Bukh. 2010. The nature andextent of voluntary intellectual capital disclosures by Australian and UK biotechnology companies. Journalof Intellectual Capital 11:4, 519-536. [Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]

59. Lídia Oliveira, Lúcia Lima Rodrigues, Russell Craig. 2010. Intellectual capital reporting in sustainabilityreports. Journal of Intellectual Capital 11:4, 575-594. [Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]

60. Susanne Arvidsson. 2010. Communication of Corporate Social Responsibility: A Study of the Views ofManagement Teams in Large Companies. Journal of Business Ethics 96, 339-354. [CrossRef]

61. Azwan Abdul Rashid, Muhd Kamil Ibrahim, Radiah OthmanAn analysis of intellectual capital disclosurein Malaysian IPO prospectuses 236-241. [CrossRef]

62. Manuel Castelo Branco, Catarina Delgado, Manuel Sá, Cristina Sousa. 2010. An analysis of intellectualcapital disclosure by Portuguese companies. EuroMed Journal of Business 5:3, 258-278. [Abstract] [FullText] [PDF]

63. Subhash Abhayawansa, James Guthrie. 2010. Intellectual capital and the capital market: a review andsynthesis. Journal of Human Resource Costing & Accounting 14:3, 196-226. [Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]

64. David Campbell, Mara Ridhuan Abdul Rahman. 2010. A longitudinal examination of intellectual capitalreporting in Marks & Spencer annual reports, 1978–2008. The British Accounting Review 42, 56-70.[CrossRef]

65. Hung-Yi Wu, Jui-Kuei Chen, I-Shuo Chen. 2010. Innovation capital indicator assessment of TaiwaneseUniversities: A hybrid fuzzy model application. Expert Systems with Applications 37, 1635-1642. [CrossRef]

66. Indra AbeysekeraChapter 3 Theoretical framework 25-37. [Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF] [PDF]67. References 91-100. [Citation] [Enhanced Abstract] [PDF] [PDF]68. Gunnar Rimmel, Christian Nielsen, Tadanori Yosano. 2009. Intellectual capital disclosures in Japanese

IPO prospectuses. Journal of Human Resource Costing & Accounting 13:4, 316-337. [Abstract] [Full Text][PDF]

69. Inderpal Singh, J‐L.W. Mitchell Van der Zahn. 2009. Intellectual capital prospectus disclosure and post‐issue stock performance. Journal of Intellectual Capital 10:3, 425-450. [Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]

70. Francisco Bravo Urquiza, Maria Cristina Abad Navarro, Marco Trombetta. 2009. Disclosure indicesdesign: does it make a difference?. Revista de Contabilidad 12, 253-277. [CrossRef]

Dow

nloa

ded

by S

UR

AB

AY

A U

NIV

ER

SIT

Y A

t 18:

46 1

2 N

ovem

ber

2015

(PT

)

71. Alexander Brüggen, Philip Vergauwen, Mai Dao. 2009. Determinants of intellectual capital disclosure:evidence from Australia. Management Decision 47:2, 233-245. [Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]

72. Christian Ax, Jan Marton. 2008. Human capital disclosures and management practices. Journal ofIntellectual Capital 9:3, 433-455. [Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]

73. Subhash Abhayawansa, Indra Abeysekera. 2008. An explanation of human capital disclosure from theresource‐based perspective. Journal of Human Resource Costing & Accounting 12:1, 51-64. [Abstract] [FullText] [PDF]

74. Salim Chahine, Igor Filatotchev. 2008. The Effects of Information Disclosure and Board Independenceon IPO Discount. Journal of Small Business Management 46, 219-241. [CrossRef]

75. Torsten J. Gerpott, Sandra E. Thomas, Alexander P. Hoffmann. 2008. Intangible asset disclosure in thetelecommunications industry. Journal of Intellectual Capital 9:1, 37-61. [Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]

76. Fabrizio Cerbioni, Antonio Parbonetti. 2007. Exploring the Effects of Corporate Governance onIntellectual Capital Disclosure: An Analysis of European Biotechnology Companies. European AccountingReview 16, 791-826. [CrossRef]

77. Suresh Cuganesan, Christina Boedker, James Guthrie. 2007. Enrolling discourse consumers to affectmaterial intellectual capital practice. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal 20:6, 883-911.[Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]

78. J‐L.W. Mitchell van der Zahn, Inderpal Singh, Joshua Heniro. 2007. Is there an association betweenintellectual capital disclosure, underpricing and long‐run performance?. Journal of Human Resource Costing& Accounting 11:3, 178-213. [Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]

79. Lori Holder-Webb, Jaffrey R. Cohen. 2007. The Association between Disclosure, Distress, and Failure.Journal of Business Ethics 75, 301-314. [CrossRef]

80. Gregory White, Alina Lee, Greg Tower. 2007. Drivers of voluntary intellectual capital disclosure in listedbiotechnology companies. Journal of Intellectual Capital 8:3, 517-537. [Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]

81. Inderpal Singh, J.‐L.W. Mitchell Van der Zahn. 2007. Does intellectual capital disclosure reduce an IPO'scost of capital?. Journal of Intellectual Capital 8:3, 494-516. [Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]

82. Alina Lee, John Neilson, Greg Tower, J‐L.W. Mitchell Van der Zahn. 2007. Is communicating intellectualcapital information via the internet viable?. Journal of Human Resource Costing & Accounting 11:1, 53-78.[Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]

83. Pauline Weetman. 2006. Discovering the ‘international’ in accounting and finance. The British AccountingReview 38, 351-370. [CrossRef]

84. Per Flöstrand, Niklas Ström. 2006. The valuation relevance of non‐financial information. ManagementResearch News 29:9, 580-597. [Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]

85. Christian Nielsen, Per Nikolaj Bukh, Jan Mouritsen, Mette Rosenkrands Johansen, Peter Gormsen. 2006.Intellectual capital statements on their way to the stock exchange. Journal of Intellectual Capital 7:2,221-240. [Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]

86. Giovanni Bronzetti, Romilda Mazzotta, Graziella Sicoli, Maria Assunta BaldiniIntellectual CapitalDisclosure in Sustainability Reports 195-214. [CrossRef]

Dow

nloa

ded

by S

UR

AB

AY

A U

NIV

ER

SIT

Y A

t 18:

46 1

2 N

ovem

ber

2015

(PT

)