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DISASTER &EMERGENCY
MANAGEMENT
anzd
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.auAustralian & New ZealandDisaster and EmergencyManagement Conference30 - 31 May 2016 I Jupiters Hotel, Gold Coast
bushfire&naturalCRCHAZARDS
CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS PEER REVIEWED
Australian and New Zealand
Disaster and Emergency
Management
Conference 2016
Jupiters Hotel, Gold Coast
Conference Proceedings
Peer Reviewed
Publisher Details Publisher Association for Sustainability in Business Inc. Contact Tara Smith Address PO Box 29, Nerang QLD 4211 Telephone +61 7 5502 2068 Fax +61 7 5527 3298 Email: [email protected]
Table of Contents
Mass-casualty triage algorithms: In search of best practice
Cameron Anderson MDis&EmergResp
Edith Cowan University
Correspondence to:
Cameron Anderson
9 Hurst St
Walkervale, QLD
Abstract
Background Mass-casualty triage algorithms are a ubiquitous tool aimed at helping responders to major incidents
identify and categorise patients most in need of care. This review seeks to present the current
literature regarding triage algorithms, including training methods, validation attempts, and their
usability during exercises and incidents.
Methods A search was undertaken of MEDLINE, EMBASE and CINAHL, producing 382 unique results. Following
review using pre-determined inclusion and exclusion criteria, 31 publications were selected for
inclusion. These covered four broad themes: accuracy, training, indications and validation.
Discussion Triage is an important component of incident management, but may not be necessary in all mass-
casualty incidents. Responders tend to over-triage more but under-triage less during incidents when
compared to exercises and retrospective studies. Algorithms must strike a balance between
sensitivity and specificity; the SALT algorithm appears to be the best from those studied. Optimal
training is critical to accuracy, and best results come from a combination of didactic and practical
training, although virtual reality training shows promise. Validation of algorithms remains
notoriously difficult and no standardised criteria exist to assess algorithms against.
Conclusions Incident managers must consider the scale of the incident and the resources available to determine
if patients will benefit from full implementation of a mass-casualty triage system. Responder training
needs to be effective to ensure accuracy and minimise under- and over-triage - including didactic
and practical sessions. The lack of validation for algorithms remains a significant issue, and much
work remains to ensure that mass-casualty patients receive the best of evidence-based care.
Introduction ‘Triage’ is a term with military origins, coming from the French trier, ‘to sift or sort’ (Aitken &
FitzGerald, 2012, p. 222; Field & Norton, 2012, p. 321). In the setting of a mass-casualty incident –
defined as an incident where the scale of the incident overwhelms the available resources –
responders must assess and prioritise patients for treatment (Deluhery, Lerner, Pirrallo, & Schwartz,
2011, p. 526). Triage also has the secondary function of allocating patients to appropriate receiving
facilities (Postma et al., p. 1061). A number of triage algorithms have been proposed to assist
responders with this task, including but not limited to START, the Manchester Triage Sieve and Sort
model, SALT, and the Careflight algorithm (Challen & Walter, 2013, p. 630). Each of these seeks to
stratify patients into four categories: Priority 1 for patients requiring immediate attention, Priority 2
for patients requiring urgent attention but can tolerate a delay, Priority 3 for patients where any
necessary intervention can be delayed (often referred to as “walking wounded”), and Priority 4, or
deceased; some models also introduce a fifth category, “expectant”, for patients who are not
expected to survive (Challen & Walter, 2013, p. 630).
Such algorithms are not devoid of complications, however. Mass-casualty triage suffers from an
almost complete lack of evidence, largely due to the difficulties involved in prospectively studying
mass-casualty incidents (Challen & Walter, 2013, p. 629). Questions remain as to when and how
triage algorithms are best used, and how the triage decision should be displayed or documented
(Aitken & FitzGerald, 2012, p. 222). Additionally, it is unclear what training methods are most
effective to ensure responders are well-versed in the application of such algorithms (Deluhery et al.,
2011, p. 526). This review aims to critically analyse the literature as it relates to mass-casualty triage
algorithms, specifically attempts to validate and analyse its performance during “real word” mass-
casualty incidents, training exercises, and theoretical studies.
Methodology In September 2015, MEDLINE, EMBASE and CINAHL were searched with the terms below. Results
were limited to those in English language. The title and abstract of each result was reviewed by the
author for relevance, with the full text of potentially relevant results being reviewed also. Each
search encompassed the full range of dates available, up until the search was conducted on
September 5, 2015 (MEDLINE) and September 13, 2015 (CINAHL and EMBASE). A further search of
each database was conducted on April 8, 2016 to check for recently-published relevant literature.
Studies relating to the subject of pre-hospital mass-casualty triage algorithms were included, with
the exception of anecdotal reports, articles and case studies not of a scientific nature. Studies not
related to this topic, including studies exploring in-hospital triage, in-hospital disaster procedures
and pre-hospital triage for individual patients (i.e. not associated with a mass-casualty incident) were
excluded. Studies that explored mass-casualty incident management from a command or
organisational perspective without a triage focus were also excluded.
Search terms:
(Prehospital OR pre-hospital OR out-of-hospital OR out of hospital OR paramedic$ OR ambulance$
OR emergency medical service$ OR emergency medical technician$ OR EMS OR EMT)
AND (disaster$ OR catastroph$ OR mass casualt$ OR mass-casualt$ OR major incident$)
AND ((triage) OR (sieve AND sort) OR (START AND SAVE) OR (SALT))
Results 382 unique results were returned (MEDLINE 240, CINAHL 14, EMBASE 128). Following review, 30
publications were identified as being relevant to this study and were selected for inclusion. One
further publication was identified in the later search for recent literature.
Three studies were identified which discussed the effect and necessity of mass-casualty triage, or
the lack thereof. All of these papers explored responses to previous mass-casualty incidents. One
described an incident where no triage whatsoever was undertaken, one explored an incident where
triage was undertaken but may have been unnecessary, and another study described an incident
where limited triage was undertaken except that which was necessary to ensure patients were
dispatched to appropriate hospitals.
24 studies explored accuracy in mass-casualty triage. 20 of these included statistics measuring one
or more algorithms, with nine assessing the START algorithm, eight assessing the SIEVE algorithm,
two each assessing the SALT and Careflight algorithms, three assessing the Paediatric Triage Tape
(PTT) method, and still others assessing novel and proposed algorithms. Only four of these drew
their data from major incidents; proxy patient data from hospital trauma records was used for seven
studies, and simulated patients and exercises were used in nine studies.
11 studies were identified as exploring education and training in mass-casualty triage. These studies
largely focused on the effectiveness of different methods of triage training, including internet-based
training, drills and exercises (including in virtual environments), and didactic sessions. Most of these
studies measured change in efficacy by means of an assessment delivered before and after the
training session in question, with some administering a follow-up assessment some time later to
assess retention of the material.
Seven studies were identified that explored the issue of validating mass-casualty triage algorithms.
These papers were a mixture of attempts to validate an algorithm against a pre-determined criteria,
attempts to create criteria to use in validating algorithms, and suggestions to improve existing
algorithms.
Discussion
Indications While the definition of a mass-casualty incident is well understood – that is, an incident of a scale
that overwhelms the capacity of responders – the exact circumstances where triage algorithms bring
benefit has yet to be determined. It is clear, however, that applying some method of triage brings
benefit other than simply stratifying patients by the severity of their condition. This was
demonstrated during a number of terrorist bombings in Karachi in 2009, where the only ambulance
services were three independent charity-run services, none of which were able to provide scene
command, triage, or advanced treatment (Zafar et al., 2011, p. 562). As a result, the responding
ambulances simply transported all patients to the nearest hospital. The first group of patients
transported were in fact already dead, which had the effect of “clogging” the emergency
department; shortly thereafter, nearly all patients were transported to a nearby private hospital
(Zafar et al., 2011, p. 562). While this is an extreme example, it does serve to underscore the
importance of command, control and coordination, triage, and the careful and considered
disposition of patients from the scene directly to the most appropriate receiving hospital, which is
not necessarily the closest hospital.
Even so, it appears that not all mass-casualty incidents require a full system of triage, particularly if
significant resources are available and an effective coordination structure has been instituted. The
2011 bombing of Oslo and shooting at Utøya Island in Norway resulted in the transport of 92 and 60
patients, respectively, to four different destinations, yet no formal triage algorithm or tagging
system was used (Sollid et al., 2012, p. 8). The abundance of ambulances responded to each incident
meant that patients were extricated to one of three casualty collection posts, assessed, and
depending on their condition transported to a casualty clinic or the most appropriate of three
hospitals immediately – of the 152 patients transported, only 10 were subsequently transferred
elsewhere, indicating that in the vast majority of cases, patient disposition was appropriate (Sollid et
al., 2012, p. 8). Similarly, it has been suggested that given the huge amount of resources available
following the London bombings of 2005, triage for the purposes of resource allocation was not
necessary and may have only served to delay patient care and transport (Challen & Walter, 2013, p.
632). Accordingly, if sufficient resources are available that all patients can be transported promptly,
it may be that patient will benefit from a brief assessment aimed at determining the most
appropriate destination hospital, followed by immediate transport.
Accuracy Where a triage algorithm is necessary, the accuracy of triage is critical in minimising under- and
over-triage rates. Under-triage occurs when a patient is allocated a triage category too low for the
acuity of their condition, introducing the potential for serious injuries to be missed; conversely, over-
triage occurs when a patient is allocated a triage category too high for their acuity, causing them to
consume resources they may not require at that time and potentially diverting resources away from
more seriously ill patients. Increases in critical mortality (the death of patients following the
incident) have been linked to high over-triage rates, with accurate triage proving to be a
determinant for survival (Frykberg & Tepas, 1988, p. 569). Studies assessing triage accuracy fell into
three broad categories: those examining “real life” mass-casualty incidents; those examining data
derived from paper-based or live scenarios and exercises; and those that applied a triage algorithm
to proxy patient data from hospital records.
The triage algorithms most frequently examined in the literature were Simple Triage and Rapid
Treatment (START), Sort / Assess / Lifesaving treatments / Treatment and transport (SALT), the Adult
Triage Sieve (Sieve), Sort, and the Paediatric Triage Tape. START and Sieve are very similar
algorithms, assessing ambulatory status, respirations, and perfusion markers (presence of a radial
pulse and capillary refill time in START, and pulse rate or capillary refill time in Sieve) to allocate a
triage category (Critical Illness and Trauma Foundation, 2001; Smith, 2012). START further assesses
the mental status of the patient before allocating a category. Sort is a more detailed algorithm,
advocated by Major Incident Medical Management and Support (MIMMS) as being a second-level
triage algorithm in conjunction with Sieve. Physiological markers used by Sort are conscious state
(Glasgow Coma Score), respiratory rate, and systolic blood pressure, which yield a score that
correlates to a triage category (Smith, 2012). SALT is effectively a two-level algorithm in one, in that
it instructs clinicians to assess unmoving patients or those with an obvious life threat first, then
those who can wave or make a purposeful movement, followed by those able to walk. The clinician
then undertakes an individual assessment of each patient, assessing the presence or absence of
breathing, whether the patient has minor injuries only, and whether the patient is likely to survive
given the available resources (American College of Surgeons - Committee on Trauma, 2008). The
Paediatric Triage Tape is a variation on the Sieve algorithm, where a paediatric patient is laid by the
tape to determine the patient’s height, and from there determine which set of physiological
determinants are to be applied (L. A. Wallis & Carley, 2006b).
Sensitivity and specificity in triage algorithms appear to be inversely proportional for all studied
triage algorithms. The data in the reviewed studies identified that the best-performing triage
method in terms of over-triage rates was the Paediatric Triage Tape (Cheung et al., 2013; Rehn,
Andersen, Vigerust, Kruger, & Lossius, 2010; L. A. Wallis & Carley, 2006a), with START emerging as
the best-performing adult triage algorithm (Ersoy & Akpinar, 2010; Garner, Lee, Harrison, & Schultz,
2001; Gebhart & Pence, 2007; Hu, He, Zhang, & Cao, 2014; Ingrassia et al., 2010; Lerner, Schwartz,
Coule, & Pirrallo, 2009; Sztajnkrycer, Baez, & Luke, 2006; Vassallo, Horne, Ball, & Whitley, 2014; L. A.
Wallis & Carley, 2006a). The data indicates that SALT emerges as the algorithm with the lowest
under-triage rate; SALT’s over-triage rate was only slightly higher than START, which may indicate
that of the current common primary algorithms, SALT is best at “striking the balance” between
sensitivity and specificity (Cone et al., 2009; Cone, Serra, & Kurland, 2011). A significant limitation is
that of the algorithms reviewed, SALT has the least evidence relating to it, with only two scientific
studies found, both by the same author. SALT also requires significant clinician judgement which
may impact its reliability, as it asks the clinician to make a judgement as to the severity of the
patient’s injuries and whether they are likely to survive given available resources (American College
of Surgeons - Committee on Trauma, 2008). As with all triage algorithms, high-quality prospective
validation is required.
One aspect that must be considered when evaluating under- and over-triage rates in the context of
exercises or incidents is: what level of inaccuracy is inherent in the tool, and what is introduced by
the responder? It is possible that the answer lies in the different environments from which data was
taken. Studies that drew data from proxy patient data from hospital records tended to show a high
under-triage rate, but a low over-triage rate (Cheung et al., 2013; Garner et al., 2001; Gebhart &
Pence, 2007; Horne, Vassallo, Read, & Ball, 2013; Sztajnkrycer et al., 2006; Vassallo et al., 2014; L. A.
Wallis & Carley, 2006a); studies that drew data from exercises or paper tests showed a significantly
lower under-triage rate but a slightly higher over-triage rate (Cone et al., 2009; Cone et al., 2011;
Ersoy & Akpinar, 2010; Field & Norton, 2012; Ingrassia et al., 2010; Lerner, Schwartz, Coule, &
Pirrallo, 2010; Pelaccia et al., 2009; Rehn et al., 2010; Wolf, Bigalke, Graf, Birkholz, & Dittmar, 2014);
and finally, studies that drew data from real incidents had a miniscule under-triage rate but a
significantly higher over-triage rate (Aylwin, König, Brennan, Shirley, & et al., 2007; Frykberg &
Tepas, 1988; Hu et al., 2014; Postma et al.). This data suggests that the inherent inaccuracy of triage
tools may be represented by the proxy patient data analysis, as this removes any responder error.
Responder error, on the other hand, appears to introduce less under-triage and more over-triage
during exercises and tests, exaggerated even more during incidents, nearly eliminating under-triage
at the cost of a significantly higher over-triage. The challenge, therefore, is to reduce over-triage
without a corresponding increase in under-triage.
Training Training and education in mass-casualty triage is pivotal to the performance of responders in
performing an effective triage, however it has long been recognised that mass-casualty training can
be difficult to organise and enormously expensive. Lack of appropriate training in mass-casualty
response can lead to mass-casualty incidents becoming chaotic catastrophes, underscoring the
importance of effective training programs (Dal Ponte, Dornelles, Arquilla, Bloem, & Roblin, 2015).
The optimal method of training to ensure effectiveness at a major incident remains unclear (Cohen
et al., 2013), however a combination of didactic and practical training appears to be key in improving
triage efficacy (Ersoy & Akpinar, 2010; Rehn et al., 2010). Short didactic training sessions are often
used to educate responders on the application of triage algorithms, however disagreement exists as
to whether such training, in isolation, is actually effective (Deluhery et al., 2011; Lampi, Vikstrom, &
Jonson, 2013). It is clear, however, that practical sessions are highly effective in improving triage
performance, with studies indicating that accuracy, speed and responder confidence increase
dramatically following a triage exercise or drill (Lerner et al., 2010; Rehn et al., 2010). Such exercises
need not be major events, however – single-responder training with multiple manikins has been
shown to be just as effective as larger scenarios, with responder efficacy peaking at the second
manikin (Vincent, Burgess, Berg, & Connolly, 2009).
The use of technology in triage education appears promising. While questions remain about the
efficacy of short didactic sessions in isolation, short (15 minute) training modules delivered via the
internet have been demonstrated to be effective in dramatically improving triage accuracy in
responders who have not been exposed to triage training previously, with improvements sustained
after one month (Báez, Sztajnkrycer, Smester, Giraldez, & Vargas, 2005). Likewise, studies employing
virtual reality to train in triage methodology appear promising, with two studies demonstrating skill
improvements that rival the results gleaned from ‘real life’ mass-casualty scenarios (Cohen et al.,
2013; Cone et al., 2011). While further work remains to be done in this area, early indications
suggest that didactic and practical training sessions may, at least in part, be able to be replaced by
online training modules and virtual reality exercises with no reduction in responder efficacy. This
finding could prove critical in delivering triage education to responders in isolated locations, or
reinforcing training in between formal sessions.
Validation The nature of mass-casualty incidents renders scientific validation of triage algorithms notoriously
difficult. While it is recognised that high-quality prospective studies are required in this area,
attempts at validation have been limited to the retrospective analysis of major incident data, and
the use of proxy patient data from hospital trauma databases (Challen & Walter, 2013, p. 629;
Gebhart & Pence, 2007, p. 68). Limitations of the analysis of major incident data is the frequent loss
of triage tags upon admission to hospital, and the fact that often, documentation is severely lacking
that would assist researchers in determining what information responders based triage decisions on
(Challen & Walter, 2013, p. 632). Limitations impacting the analysis of hospital trauma data is that
patients are not presenting from mass-casualty incidents, which may present with a different
pattern of injury and treatment, and that researchers must often make assumptions in order to
derive a triage category, due to the relevant information often not being recorded for single trauma
patients (Gebhart & Pence, 2007, p. 72).
Further confounding attempts to validate triage algorithms is a lack of a criteria against which to rate
the performance of the tools. Many of the studies included in this review use Injury Severity Scores
(ISS), with an ISS score above 15 or 16 forming the (arbitrary) criteria to classify a patient as a Priority
1 (Red) patient – however, ISS scores give a score based on injuries whereas physiological triage
algorithms measure acuity, meaning that ISS may not be the most appropriate method of validating
algorithms (L. Wallis, Carley, & Hodgetts, 2006, p. 291). Other criteria have been proposed to aid in
validating algorithms, including Baxt and Upenieks which classified patients based on the
interventions they required upon reaching definitive care, and the method proposed by L. Wallis et
al. (2006), which expanded on the Baxt and Upenieks criteria for paediatrics (L. Wallis et al., 2006, p.
293). A major limiting factor of both these methods is that they themselves are unvalidated and
derived from expert opinion. Clearly, a robust, validated and standardised method of assessing
triage algorithms is necessary before a high-quality prospective validation of triage algorithms will be
possible.
Perhaps due to the lack of validated algorithms, a lack of standardised triage algorithms has also
been found to cause issues for responders to major incidents. One Australian study found that at the
time, every jurisdiction had different triage taxonomies, leading to potential issues for responders
tasked across borders to the 3.31 million individuals residing within 100km of a state border (Nocera
& Garner, 1999, p. 37). Similarly, the lack of standardisation may result in improvements to triage
algorithms being slow to spread to other jurisdictions. One example of this is the work the New York
Fire Department did to modify their START algorithm in the aftermath of a major incident in 2007.
They identified that while algorithms are aimed at removing, as much as possible, the clinical
judgement from the responder in determining a triage category, such a lack of judgement
sometimes led to worse outcomes for patients who were suffering from severe conditions (such as a
heart or asthma attack), but because they were still able to mobilise or had normal vital signs, were
triaged to a low category and withheld treatment (Erich, 2013, pp. I-6). Standardisation and a robust,
evidence-based validation of triage algorithms will certainly allow victims of major incidents to be
offered the very best in evidence-based care.
Conclusion Although much work remains to be done to ensure that mass-casualty triage is based on high-quality
evidence, it is clear that triage is an important component of a broader major incident coordination
strategy. While triage is an important factor in ensuring that patients are transported to the most
appropriate receiving facility, the mere presence of a large number of casualties does not necessarily
mean that a full triage and tagging system must be implemented. The key factor remains that the
number of patients must overwhelm the available resources, resulting in prolonged treatment at a
casualty collection post, before the implementation of a full triage and treatment system is likely to
be beneficial.
The mere implementation of a triage algorithm is not sufficient, however – the accuracy with which
the algorithm is applied is critical. Under- and over-triage both have the potential to adversely affect
patient outcomes, and while the data shows that some algorithms do perform better than others in
this key area, all algorithms exhibit the tendency to increase over-triage as under-triage decreases,
and vice versa. The environment plays a part here, however – the data suggests that during real
incidents, over-triage rates are significantly higher and under-triage rates significantly lower than
during exercises or retrospective data analysis. The challenge is to reduce over-triage without
affecting under-triage, which requires effective training. The data indicates that in order for training
to be most effective, a combination of didactic and practical training is required, although
technological substitutes are beginning to show promise.
From an evidence-based practice perspective, however, the greatest issue plaguing mass-casualty
triage is the lack of validation for algorithms. While numerous attempts have been made to validate
different algorithms, the fact remains that it is extremely difficult to undertake high-quality
prospective studies in this area. Add to this the lack of a standardised criteria against which to assess
triage algorithms, and it becomes clear that a significant body of work remains to ensure that
patients involved in mass-casualty incidents benefit from the best evidence-based care possible.
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Australian Red Cross psychosocial recovery approach to the October 2013 Blue Mountains bushfires
Authors:
Diana Bernardi, Jessie Huard, Danielle O’Hara and Melissa Morgan.
Australian Red Cross
Level 4, 464 Kent Street
Sydney 2000 NSW
Paper Presented at the Australian and New Zealand Disaster and Emergency Management
Conference 30 – 31 May 2016 - Jupiters, Gold Coast
Australian Red Cross psychosocial recovery approach to the October 2013 Blue Mountains bushfires
ABSTRACT: Following the October 2013 bushfires Australian Red Cross ran a two-year
Recovery Program in the Blue Mountains. The program was unique as it emphasised the
long-term, ongoing nature of recovery and placed psychosocial needs as central to all
recovery. The approach emphasised respecting the independence, dignity and coping
mechanisms of individuals and the community.
The impacts of emergencies are long-lasting, diverse, and have profound effects upon
individuals, households and communities. These impacts are often described in terms of
psychosocial, economic, built environment, and natural environment impacts. Red Cross
recovery activities rest on the assumption that these four impacts are interrelated and that
people belong at the centre of all recovery processes.
The focus of the Red Cross’ Recovery Program was supporting local services through
advice, provision of resources and training to increase local capacity to organise, facilitate and
mange activities and support community recovery. Activities built upon existing capability
and resilience within the Blue Mountains community, and responded to the identified needs
of the community and local services. A Red Cross Recovery Project Officer was based in the
Blue Mountains and hosted by local government, offering a range of mutual benefits
including access to recovery expertise and the embedding of recovery lessons into key local
organisations.
A capacity-building approach ensured outcomes of the recovery program could be
maintained for both the longer-term recovery from the 2013 bushfires, and recovery from
future disaster events. It also contributed to building the resilience of individuals, families and
communities impacted by the fires and helped them to prepare for future events.
The program was externally evaluated and it was revealed the model was respected
and Red Cross presence in the Blue Mountains community was highly valued. This paper will
focus on examining the approach and identifying how effective elements can be replicated in
future events.
Keywords: Australian Red Cross; psychosocial recovery; Blue Mountains; resilience
Introduction
Individuals, households, organisations and communities have innate strengths and resilience
in the face of adversity. They are able to draw upon their own networks and community
resources during and after an emergency event. The impacts of some events, like the 2013
Blue Mountains bushfires, challenge this resilience and these resources. For some, the
prospect of losing everything they own, experiencing changes and disruption to their
neighbourhoods and community can be overwhelming.
Australian Red Cross has been responding to emergencies and providing humanitarian
assistance in Australia since 1914 and more recently with significant, well-regarded recovery
programs across Australia. The two-year Blue Mountains recovery program that Red Cross
ran up until December 2015 emphasised the long-term, ongoing nature of recovery and placed
psychosocial needs as central to all recovery. Using a community development approach, Red
Cross respected the independence, dignity and coping mechanisms already present in the
community.
The International Federation of Red Cross defines resilience as, ‘the ability of
individuals, communities, organisations or countries exposed to disasters, crises and
underlying vulnerabilities to anticipate, prepare for, reduce the impact of, cope with and
recover from the effects of shocks and stresses without compromising their long-term
prospects’ (IFRC, 2012). Effective psychosocial recovery sets the foundation for progressing
all other aspects of individual and community recovery (Australian Emergency Management
Institute, 2011).
This paper will emphasise that psychosocial recovery can help create a more resilient
and prepared community than before the initial event, as demonstrated through the positive
outcomes of the Red Cross recovery program in the Blue Mountains.
Blue Mountains Bushfires 2013
During October 2013, approximately 100 fires burnt across eastern NSW, including six major
fires. On October 16, an Australian Defence Force training exercise in Managaroo near the
Blue Mountains accidentally sparked a fire that became known as the ‘State Mine Fire’. It had
a perimeter of 190 kilometres and burnt over 46,000 hectares. At its most severe it travelled at
25 kilometres per hour, prompting thousands of people in the area to evacuate. As a
precaution staff and patients were evacuated from Springwood Hospital and a mass
evacuation centre was established in Penrith Panthers Club on October 23.
On October 17, two major fires started in the lower Blue Mountains, one near Mount
Victoria and the other in Springwood. Winmalee and Yellow Rock were the worst affected
communities with 193 homes destroyed and 100 damaged. A State of Emergency was
declared on October 20, the first such declaration in New South Wales since devastating
floods of 2012. With the assistance of cooler weather conditions the fire fighters managed to
bring the fires under control by October 25. The fires were declared extinguished on
November 13 having destroyed 118,000 hectares across the state and caused the death of a
pilot engaged in fire fighting.
Red Cross was activated to respond to the fires on October 17, and continued to field
volunteers until the Recovery Centre in Springwood closed. During this time over 116 trained
Red Cross volunteers provided psychosocial support in evacuation and recovery centres, and
over 5000 properties were door knocked. It is estimated that Red Cross volunteers provided
over 2900 hours of direct support to communities during this period.
The Impact of the Blue Mountains bushfires
Given Red Cross’ role under emergency arrangements in NSW is to provide psychosocial
support during an emergency, our recovery program followed naturally. Red Cross
established a recovery program in the weeks that followed the bushfires. Over the course of
the two years Red Cross was able to identify many of the impacts the bushfires had on the
Blue Mountains community and shape the recovery program accordingly.
Outreach is a key tool Red Cross uses to provide psychosocial support to individuals
in the aftermath of a disaster. Information gathered during outreach relating to the
community’s recovery that may be of relevance to local council, community services
providers or other government authorities is de-identified and shared with those groups. Red
Cross volunteers conducted five rounds of recovery outreach over the two year recovery
program.
The impacts identified through the outreach in the Blue Mountains across the two years
included:
Stress, anxiety and difficulty sleeping.
Concern over anxiety experienced by loved ones (children, partners, friends).
Anxiety regarding warm weather and fire seasons.
An increased sense of connectedness among the community and social support
groups.
Changing neighbourhoods and concern around changes as people left or rebuilt.
People feeling they lack control over or knowledge of what was happening on the
ground during the bushfire.
Desire for greater emergency preparedness across the community.
Concerns around rebuilding and the constant reminder that rebuilding and damage in
the community provided.
Australian Red Cross approach to recovery
Disasters cause significant social and psychological distress to people. While much less
visible than the physical injury and destruction that disasters can inflict, it can take much
longer for people to recover from the social and psychological impacts. The impacts of
emergencies are long-lasting, diverse and have profound effects upon individuals, households
and communities (Ohl and Tapsell, 2000 and Tapsell et al, 2002). These impacts are often
described in terms of psychosocial, economic, built environment, and natural environment
impacts (Australian Emergency Management Institute, 2011).
People’s roles, routines and assumptions are impacted as a result of disasters and
recovery. Disasters disrupt everyday activities as well as plans and goals for the future
(Gordon, 2006). This adds to people’s sense of powerlessness during recovery, as being able
to plan helps people gain a sense of control over their life (Gordon, 2006). These impacts
manifest in many different ways, including increased economic pressures, loss of
productivity, fragmenting of communities and increased incidences of physical, mental health
or wellbeing issues (Australian Red Cross, 2010). The purpose of psychosocial support is to
support and build resilience with the aim of increasing the ability of people and communities
to cope with and recover from emergencies (IFRC, 2012).
The Australian Red Cross recovery program is based upon the National Principles for
Disaster Recovery (CDSMAC, 2009), and draws upon the National Strategy for Disaster
Resilience (COAG 2011) as well as our own domestic and international experience. Red
Cross has been supporting the recovery of rural, regional, urban and indigenous Australian
communities after disasters since 2006 (Australian Red Cross, 2015c). Red Cross work is
informed by a unique national and international network of expertise, including other Red
Cross national societies, academia, business and community organisations (Australian Red
Cross, 2015c).
Red Cross takes a community development approach to recovery, meaning ‘we work
to empower and support communities to create their own solutions which improve overall
social cohesion and achieve sustainable long term change.’ (Australian Red Cross, 2015d).
Red Cross’ recovery programs are run for all hazards and work closely with local services, all
levels of governments and community groups. The result of this community led approach is
that all the recovery programs are reflective of the communities Red Cross works with.
The focus of the work in psychosocial recovery comes from an observed gap in
traditional recovery programs. The psychosocial approach has its roots in research and
practice undertaken by the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
Psychosocial Reference Centre, World Health Organisation, Phoenix Australia, Australia
Psychological Society, the National Center for PTSD (USA), Dr Rob Gordon and Anne Eyre.
This focus on psychosocial recovery is embedded within Red Cross strategy, including within
its strategic goals and outcomes.
Red Cross Blue Mountains recovery program
Australian Red Cross established a recovery program in the Blue Mountains to support the
local community for a period of two years. In doing so, Red Cross took on a lead role in
supporting not only local service providers but the local government; building their capacity
to support their local community now and into the future. The program focused on an area
that often receives a secondary or tertiary focus as communities recover from disasters;
psychosocial recovery.
Australian Red Cross in the Blue Mountains prioritised a place-based community
development approach, locating the project officer in the impacted community. This was
designed to facilitate a collaborative approach that built connections across different sectors
and the community. Co-working is a highly practical method of improving coordination,
cooperation and collaboration during the disaster recovery phase of an emergency in Australia
(Australian Red Cross, 2015a). This approach meant that Red Cross did not implement its
own programs, but worked in partnership in all projects with the local government and
community organisations. The impact of this approach is evident in the ongoing community-
led projects in the area.
In establishing a community recovery program in the Blue Mountains, Australian Red
Cross recognised that the local community and community service providers were well
established with strong connections to the communities in which they worked. The
organisations in the Blue Mountains included neighbourhood and community centres as well
as major non-government organisations including the Salvation Army, Gateway Family
Services and community service networks that facilitated collaboration among the local
services.
Throughout the two year recovery program in the Blue Mountains, Red Cross
coordinated more than 35 workshops and activities designed to:
increase the disaster preparedness of individuals, households and organisations
who care for those that can be particularly vulnerable during emergencies
assist with the improving emergency management plans for children’s services in
the area.
Red Cross staff delivered 38 training sessions on community recovery, how to
communicate with disaster impacted communities and Psychological First Aid. The program
also facilitated partner organisations and the community to access community recovery
experts.
Red Cross volunteers completed five rounds of community outreach, visiting
community members in their homes to check in with them, see how their recovery was
progressing and find out what needs they had. These needs were then de-identified and
summarised into reports that were shared with partners to assist their service delivery.
The value of having local Red Cross volunteers to assist in the delivery of our
recovery work can’t be underestimated. The local volunteers helped to establish Red Cross’
reputation during the recovery, and are continuing the work even after the 'formal' recovery
program has finished. It is local volunteers that have connections and will be present in the
community as they continue to experience the impact of the bushfire for years to come. Much
of Red Cross’ support, including providing psychological first aid at anniversary events,
outreach and ongoing attendance at Local Disaster Welfare Committees was only possible
because Red Cross had skilled and committed volunteers in the Blue Mountains.
Evaluation findings
Six months after the two-year program commenced, Red Cross engaged Social Policy and
Management Consultants the Miller Group to conduct a program evaluation of the Blue
Mountains Recovery Program in June 2014. The Miller Group consulted regularly with the
Red Cross recovery team and participated in Evaluation Reference Group meetings.
The Miller Group (2016) evaluation found strong evidence that the Recovery Program
increased recognition of the complexity of recovery among state and local government and
emergency services agencies. It also found that as a result of their engagement with this
recovery program both levels of government were subsequently better prepared to respond to
community needs in future events.
Methodology
The main evaluation framework was based on a Program Logic model, which includes
identification of all inputs, outputs and anticipated outcomes and was aligned to the IFRC
Framework for Evaluations (IFRC 2011).
Primary data sources included:
• Direct feedback from the Red Cross recovery team,
• Reflection notes from the Project Officer,
• 36 face to face and phone interviews with 26 representatives from partner agencies
• 18 face to face interviews with residents from affected suburbs
• One debriefing session with Red Cross outreach volunteers
Secondary sources included:
• Red Cross recovery team resource and activity reporting spreadsheets,
• Outreach reports,
• Outreach data spreadsheets,
• Demographic data from Blue Mountains City Council website,
• Reports from review of outcomes from children’s services workshop,
• Partnership feedback tracking sheet, and
• Partnership engagement spreadsheet.
The evaluation found the program played a valuable role in the recovery process and
was successful in meeting its program objectives, namely it:
• Supported individuals and communities impacted by the fires to drive their own
recovery;
• Ensured psychosocial recovery was recognised by target groups as critically important
for recovery; and
• Disseminated and provided appropriate recovery resources and recovery training for
individuals, communities and community organisations.
Partnership reflections
Through 36 interviews, the Miller Group determined that partner agencies valued the
combination of practical resources, training and expertise provided by the Red Cross.
Partners placed high value on the quality of Red Cross resources and expertise in
disaster recovery. Red Cross distributed 5,075 resources, coordinated five rounds of outreach
in affected areas and delivered or facilitated 38 training sessions to 1,125 attendees. Of
particular mention were programs developed by Red Cross such as Psychological First Aid,
Communicating in Recovery, the children’s services workshop – Beyond the Emergency
Assembly Point, and the Pillowcase Project – preparedness lessons for primary school aged
children.
Red Cross had its most significant impact in preparedness through the development of
specific projects in collaboration with partner agencies, including Rural Fire Service, State
Emergency Service, NSW Fire and Rescue, NSW Police, Blue Mountains City Council,
school counsellors and senior school staff, Mountains Community Resource Network,
neighbourhood centres and Mountains Occasional Care Service.
Partners valued being ‘listened to’ by Red Cross, rather than having an ‘agenda’
imposed upon them. In addition to providing information, expertise in recovery and resources,
Red Cross worked closely with partners to identify how areas of recovery or preparedness
need could be addressed.
The effectiveness of the program was further enhanced by the perceived
‘independence’ of Red Cross. Partners highly valued the role the Red Cross team played in
coordinating effort, creating links between partners, providing governance and facilitating
new projects and positive relationships.
Partners were asked to identify the key things they had learnt from working with Red
Cross and were provided with a list of options and then invited to add to this which they did
with quite varied responses that demonstrated very specific and individual learnings.
Examples of (other) things partners said they learnt from their work with Red Cross include:
• you have to retain a sense of humour
• you have to be honest with your community, that is, tell them if you can do things as
well as if you can’t
• that there is more than one way to do things
• what a really good communicator looks like and how important that is in forums such
as public meetings where people are distressed
• the value of a simpatico partner
• the value of an international evidence based approach
• the value of Red Cross’s volunteer base
• that the training and the skills of all Red Cross staff is very high.
Factors contributing to success
The Miller group concluded that no single factor could be identified as leading to the success
of the program, however the following factors contributed:
1. A two-year program enabled time for planning and engagement, projects to develop and
flourish and assisted with exit planning and sustainability. The second year of the program
saw partnerships increase and deepen, expand from the Blue Mountains Local
Government Area to Lithgow and Hawkesbury, and knowledge about psychosocial
recovery and preparedness to be transferred to other regions and internationally. The Red
Cross recovery team also supported partners to drive new projects and gain funding.
2. The co-location of the Recovery Project Officer with Blue Mountains City Council
(BMCC) enabled the Project Officer to establish credibility and build effective networks.
3. The early involvement of the team in recovery governance mechanisms including the
Recovery Steering Committee, Wellbeing Working Group, the Disaster Resilience and
Preparedness Working Group (Chair) gave the team a strategic overview and embedded
Red Cross within the governance process and community effort.
4. Employing a community development approach to recovery enabled the team to
effectively listen to and address the needs of the community. Community development
also promotes a strengths-based approach to recovery, allowing Red Cross to align with
the community service sector.
5. Facilitating relationships, building capacity in community service partners and supporting
partners to identify and drive their recovery led to longer-term sustainable outcomes.
6. Understanding partners and appreciating different organisational cultures and ‘ways of
doing things’ was important. Not imposing a ‘way of doing things’ or expecting outcomes
that were Red Cross driven was highlighted by partners as a particular strength of the
program.
7. The high-level skills and knowledge of the Project Officer were vital to the success of
Program. The skills identified by partners included facilitation, verbal and written
communication, organisational abilities and rapport building.
8. The Project Officer was well supported organisationally by excellent management,
administration and coordination provided by the Red Cross NSW/ACT Recovery Team.
9. Access to high quality, evidence based resources to meet community needs was was the
single most valued factor identified by partners. This includes access to experts such as Dr
Rob Gordon, trauma recovery psychologist and Jolie Wills, a disaster recovery expert
from New Zealand Red Cross.
10. The organisational evaluation framework and the openness of the team culture to
evaluation made it a very positive environment for reflection and program improvement.
Recommendations
The Miller Group (2016) made a number of recommendations, including ‘Supporting the
Supporters’ work should commence as early as possible in the recovery process to ensure
recovery workers are able to maintain their own wellbeing and reduce the potential for
‘burnout’ and ‘recovery fatigue’.
The first outreach event could be scheduled for earlier in the recovery process (i.e.
week two to week four) to support residents with their early recovery needs and where
possible the same volunteers should return to the same locations to build increased
connectedness.
Finally, it was suggested the value of printed resources and material should be more
consistently monitored. A methodology should be established to gather feedback on the
usefulness and value of Red Cross resources being used in particular contexts through
separate monitoring or evaluation processes.
Impact of the Australian Red Cross program on community recovery
Ongoing locally inspired and driven preparedness programs in the Blue Mountains suggest
that the approach adopted by Red Cross has successfully enabled program sustainability. With
this increased ability to adapt and cope with disasters, crises, shocks and stresses the Blue
Mountains community can build on these gains and be better prepared for the inevitable next
event in their community.
The Red Cross recovery program looked to strengthen resilience at multiple levels;
individual, community and local government. Local government is responsible for
infrastructure, development, maintenance and community services. It can therefore either
strengthen or weaken the recovery response at all levels. The Red Cross program recognises
the importance of local government and its profound impact on community resilience. By
engaging early with the Blue Mountains City Council and embedding the Recovery Project
Officer in Council, Red Cross ensured that council were taken along the recovery journey.
At a community level, Red Cross worked to strengthen resilience by engaging with
community service providers, who have a wide reach in the community and will be present in
the Blue Mountains in the future. They also engage regularly with community members who
may be particularly at-risk during emergencies, and are trusted sources of information.
Working with community service providers, the Red Cross program demonstrated a
commitment to program sustainability and longevity across both recovery and preparedness
initiatives.
Individually, Red Cross worked to strengthen resilience through a range of activities
from outreach (linking individuals with services they can access), to heightening physical and
psychosocial preparedness. The project officer engaged with local Red Cross volunteers and
members as agents of change within their community.
Conclusion
Psychosocial recovery is increasingly acknowledged as a critical part of recovery after a
disaster. The longer-term, community-led program managed by Red Cross in the Blue
Mountains from late 2013 to late 2015 was highly valued by community members, local
services and local government alike. The ability of the community to drive their own recovery
and prioritise psychosocial recovery contributed in no small way to the success of this
program. A community development approach ensured outcomes of the recovery program
could be applicable for both the longer-term recovery from the 2013 bushfires, and support
recovery for future disaster events.
In the Blue Mountains, the community-led psychosocial recovery program has led to
increased preparedness and connection in the community. The benefits of this will be
ongoing, heightening wellbeing and preparing the community for inevitable future events.
Recovery from an event such as the bushfires that affected the Blue Mountains in
October of 2013 is long, complex and multifaceted. In confronting these challenges, Red
Cross works to ensure the expert support offered to local government, service providers and
individuals is tailored to local need, has longevity and effectively supports existing strengths
in the community. The program that was recently completed in the Blue Mountains indicates
that prioritising psychosocial recovery can assist not only in the short and medium term, but
also build resilience in the community for the future.
Reference List Australian Emergency Management Institute (2011), Australian Emergency Management Handbook Series: Handbook 2 Community recovery. Australian Psychology Society and Australian Red Cross (2010). Psychological First Aid: An Australian Manual. Australian Red Cross, (2015a), Co-working in disaster recovery 2015 National Disaster Resilience Roundtable Report Australian Red Cross (2015b), Humanity in Action: Strategy 2020 URL: http://www.redcross.org.au/Strategy%202020%20-%20full%20comprehensive%20strategy.pdf [accessed 2 April 2016] Australian Red Cross (2015c), Australian Red Cross Disaster Recovery Program, brochure. Australian Red Cross (2015d) Ways of Working. URL: http://www.redcross.org.au/ways-of-working.aspx [accessed 22 April 2016] COAG (2011), National Strategy for Disaster Resilience, Council of Australian Governments, URL: https://www.coag.gov.au/node/81 [accessed 21 April 2016]. CDSMAC (2009) National Principles for Disaster Recovery, brochure. URL: https://www.ag.gov.au/EmergencyManagement/Respond-and-recover/Documents/national-principles-for-disaster-recovery.pdf [accessed 21 April 2016]. Gordon, R. (2006), ‘Acute responses to emergencies: Findings and observations of 20 years in the field’, The Australian Journal of Emergency Management International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (2012) Psychosocial Support: Towards Safe and Healthy Living URL: http://www.ifrc.org/PageFiles/53493/1226403-IFRC%20Health%20Corporate%20Folder%202012-EN-11-PS-LR.pdf [accessed 2 April 2016] International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (2011) IFRC Framework for Evaluation URL: http://www.ifrc.org/Global/Publications/monitoring/IFRC-Framework-for-Evaluation.pdf [accessed 10 April 2016] Ohl, C and Tapsell S (2000). Flooding and Human Health: The Dangers are not always obvious, British Medical Journal. Tapsell, S., Penning-Rowsell, E., Tunstall, S. and Wilson, T.(2002). Vulnerability to flooding: health and social dimensions, Proceedings of the Royal Society, 360 (1796), 1511-25. The Miller Group (2016) Red Cross Blue Mountains Recovery Program Evaluation: Final Report URL: http://www.mcrn.org.au/index.php/links-resources/emergency-recovery-preparedness/emergency-recovery-preparedness-resources-for-services-1# [accessed 13 April 2016]
Acknowledgements
The authors would like to acknowledge everyone at Red Cross who helped create this paper. From the volunteers who delivered our recovery work in the Blue Mountains to Shona Whitton and Rachel Flitman who reviewed this paper – thank you.
How do we increase the capacity of State Government and participating organisations
to face unexpected risks?
Dr Antonella Cavallo
Department for Communities and Social Inclusion (DCSI)
Government of South Australia
Adelaide, SA 5000
Paper Presented at the
2016 Australian & New Zealand Disaster and Emergency Management Conference
Gold Coast (QLD), 30 - 31 May 2016
How do we increase the capacity of State Government and participating organisations
to face unexpected risks?
Abstract: This paper makes a knowledge contribution to disaster risk
reduction (DRR) strategic thinking.
Increasing global uncertainty and hyper-connectivity have been linked to
higher exposure to unexpected risks. National and international DRR
strategies have been shown to be insufficient to move countries, states,
communities and individuals to prepare in a more responsible way.
This paper investigates the application of Complex Systems Thinking (CST) to
DRR strategies in order to build resilience in preparation for unexpected risks.
It summarises findings arising from a research project conducted between
2012-2015 in South Australia involving ten State Government agencies, the
Australian Red Cross and community members from a metro and a peri-urban
council.
CST offers a holistic understanding of a disaster in time and space, while
appreciating the uncertainty involved in risk management. However, its
implementation is encountering numerous difficulties because of the
reductionist model on which DRR strategies are formulated. This paper argues
that these efforts need to be complemented with systemic methods that may
overcome the hierarchical structures in which current DRR strategies are
conceived and implemented. This requires systems to develop the ability to be
ambidextrous, that is, to keep current DRR structures in place while extending
their range to include unexpected events for which no prescribed actions exist.
The question arises, how should this be done?
This paper addresses these thematic questions and advances the argument that
DRR strategies and policies should be designed with an ambidextrous
mindset; this will enable DRR practitioners to ‘think outside the box’ and to
take better account of the complex systemic conditions in which disasters
develop.
Keywords: Systemic, interagency, ambidexterity, unknown, emergency.
Introduction
It is difficult to accept that uncertainty is part of our decisions-making, planning, response to
disasters and even our daily routine. Yet, despite plans and preparation, emergencies involve
a number of unexpected factors for organisations and communities. Disasters such as
Hurricane Katrina in the United States in 2005 and Super Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines
in 2014 are extreme examples of how natural disasters can represent a challenge full of
unexpected factors. However, emergency events do not need to have the size of Hurricane
Katrina or Super Typhoon Haiyan to pose unexpected challenges for the communities
involved.
In Australia, the storm surge during the Queensland floods in 2011, the rapidity of the
fire during Pinery in November 2015 in South Australia and the recurrent pandemic threats
are examples of emergencies that have tested or are likely to test the ability of communities
and organisations to get ready for the unexpected. Reports highlight how despite the high
degree of preparation of survivors, they still felt unprepared and shocked when confronted
with the actual emergency situation (e.g. Feneley 2013).
In disaster risk reduction, uncertainty has been primarily explained as due to a lack of
comprehension or understanding of a problem. In other words, uncertainty has been
considered an epistemological question (Cavallo 2015B). This has led to the assumption that
a higher level of knowledge could lead to the elimination of uncertainty and unexpected
factors.
Imagine (unrealistically) that we were able to simulate our air transportation system and everything else relevant to how airplanes are used and maintained. Would that capability have helped prevent 9/11? My answer is “No.”
Abbott 2007, p. 44
If on one hand, this approach to uncertainty has been important to tackle a series of recurring
risks and situations, on the other it has not taken into consideration that there is an abundance
of risks and situations in an emergency that stay largely uncovered until they are experienced
during and in the aftermath of emergencies. While learning progresses – the so called
‘instructionist approach’ to managing uncertainty (Loch et al. 2006), it is important to
acknowledge that any large scale emergency poses a number of unexpected factors for
responding agencies as much as for the affected wider community.
Disaster preparedness strategies have allowed a higher degree of preparation and awareness
in the wider community. However, a number of risks and situations are difficult, if not
impossible, to anticipate by following a plan.
While preparedness plans and arrangements are fundamental to prepare well for emergencies,
the higher level of complexity posed by uncertainty needs to be complemented with new
approaches that allow for flexibility and quick adaptation by organisations and communities.
For this reason, a new way of thinking needs to be used in disaster risk reduction strategies to
ensure a higher degree of preparation for the unexpected. This problem has been addressed in
the literature (Morin 2007; Berkes & Ross 2012; Aven & Krohn 2014; Cavallo 2015B) and
will constitute the paper’s background.
Contextual background
Resilience can be seen as a dynamic system property with two sub-properties: specified
resilience, that is resilience to foreseen risks and general resilience, that is, resilience to any
other risk, including unforeseen risks (Table 1). For a community to be resilient, both sub-
properties need to be tackled. However, ‘the disaster management literature is definitely
about specified resilience – to an earthquake, fire, flood, or landslides’ (p.17, Berkes & Ross
2012).
By leaving the definition of resilience open, that is by not defining resilience as a
goal, the National Strategy for Disaster Resilience (COAG 2011) acknowledges the dynamic
nature of resilience and calls on one hand for a better understanding of risks and, on the other,
for more collaborative and rationalised approaches to disaster preparedness and prevention.
While knowledge transfer needs to happen, it is also important to remember that good
practices cannot be copy-pasted, but need to be transposed in a way that fits the community
context (Fuhrer 2015). Working on adaptable and flexible approaches to disaster risk
reduction then becomes essential to ensure appropriate response, relief and recovery
processes are implemented to build general resilience.
Table 1 illustrates the two ways of thinking needed in disaster risk reduction to maximise
communities’ and organisations’ preparedness levels to build holistic community resilience
(Cavallo 2016). To use a Chinese saying, the key point of Table 1 is that disaster risk
reduction needs to ‘walk on two legs’. In other words, it needs to be ambidextrous (from
Latin ambi ‘both sides’ and dexter ‘right-handed’ meaning ‘able to use both hands equally
well’). The two columns in Table 1 should be understood as intertwined rather than mutually
exclusive.
The difference between complicated and complex (Snowden & Boone 2007) resides in the
level of knowledge available. In both cases, at the outset it is not clear how a problem is
going to be resolved. However, if a problem is complicated, a solution path will emerge
before the consequences of the problem emerge. In other words, the relationship between
cause and effect can be clarified prior to the emergence of the effect. For example, in the case
of a flood, there is a straight-forward cause – the displacement of people due to flooding –
and a well understood effect – setting up a relief centre to link affected people to emergency
accommodation opportunities. The opposite is true in complex problems, where the
relationship between cause and effect can only be ascertained in hindsight. For example,
building community resilience is complex because there is no definitive ‘recipe’ to achieve it.
Complicated problems can be broken down into smaller components under the assumption
that the sum of those components will provide the solution to the problem. In other words,
complicated problems can be addressed with reductionist approaches.
In complex problems, the sum of the components would result in ‘something more and
something less’ (Morin 2006) than the solution to the problem. For example, it is common
that in emergencies agencies take on differing tasks from the ones originally planned to
ensure an adequate service provision to the community. For this reason, different functions
cannot be defined in a discrete way because the necessary overlaps and interactions would be
neglected.
Systemic approaches allow having a holistic approach without decomposing the system into
its subsystems. The way Government is organised can be compared to a System of
Subsystems (SoSS, Gorod et al. 2008), where subsystems are not autonomous because they
depend on hierarchical organisational relationships.
A System of Systems (SoS) is a network of ‘systems functioning together to achieve a
common purpose’ (Shenhar & Dvir 2007). In a SoS the different organisations are
autonomous, independent and geographically distributed while being interdependent, because
decisions taken in one organisation can influence the actions taken in other organisations
belonging to the same SoS (Cavallo 2014). For this reason, complicated reductionist
approaches are more adequate to tackle identified risks, whereas complex systemic
approaches are more suitable to address unforeseen or unanticipated risks for which a plan
cannot be predefined (Cavallo & Ireland 2014). Therefore, complicated risks can rely on
exploitation of available information, that is, the problem is assessed and a solution can be
found. However, complex problems rely on the exploration of new knowledge and the
experimentation of new approaches. The combination of exploitation and exploration is
fundamental to release innovation (Huang et al. 2014) within the System.
The focus of specified resilience is on mitigating risks, while general resilience aims to create
and maintain the conditions for a safe operating space without focusing on specific risks
(Walker & Salt 2012).
Table 1. Ambidexterity in disaster risk reduction (Cavallo 2014).
AMBIDEXTERITY
Specified resilience General resilience
Complicated Complex
Reductionist Systemic
System of subsystems (SoSS) System of Systems (SoS)
Identified risks Unforeseen, unanticipated risks or unprepared community
Predominantly linear thinking Complex Systems Thinking
Exploitation of available information: Sense and respond
Exploration of new approaches: Probe, sense and respond
Mitigate risk of negative events Maintain and foster a safe operating space
Complex Systems Thinking (CST) is used to visualise the network of relationships (‘System
of Systems’ Cavallo 2012) that characterises preparedness, relief and recovery. In CST,
Government takes a coordinating and enabling role in the network, rather than being the
authority at the top of the command-control chain that is rightly typical of response strategies,
which are not addressed in this paper. Available information is used to design plans, while
exploratory approaches are implemented to customise DRR programs to different
communities’ needs.
CST takes into consideration that emergencies develop systemically. Therefore, the way we
prepare for them needs to be at least in part systemic. However, this is no easy task. While
research (Cavallo 2015B) showed that there is significant potential to use CST in conjunction
with current frameworks and strategies, existing organisation structures and strategies are still
based predominantly on reductionist principles. For example, this is visible in the hierarchical
organisation charts, which characterise the vast majority of organisations involved in
emergency management. As mentioned above, this configuration reflects the need to have
clear command chains in emergency response. However, in the phases preceding and
following a large-scale emergency it is important to work in networks rather than in
hierarchies to allow better adaptation, flexibility and customisation of programs to the needs
of the affected communities.
These considerations are at the basis of the effort of the Emergency Relief Functional Service
in South Australia, which is implementing an inter-agency strategy to overcome gaps in relief
and recovery by influencing the distribution of capabilities across the relief and recovery
spectrum.
An interagency strategy for South Australia
The South Australian Emergency Relief Functional Service (ERFS) is responsible for
opening and operating relief and recovery centres following an emergency. Relief and
recovery centres are ‘hubs of services’, where community members can gather relevant
information and be connected with needed assistance available on site or on demand.
ERFS collaborates with a number of government and non-government organisations
to ensure adequate services are provided to the affected communities. The relief and recovery
System of Systems is illustrated in Figure 1.
Figure 1. Relief and recovery System of Systems from the ERFS perspective.
ERFS is currently reviewing its strategy to build general resilience and capacity to face
unexpected events by introducing an inter-agency strategy.
During an emergency, emergency management organisations collaborate in a systemic way
and are often asked to undertake more than what had originally been planned due to the
specific circumstances in which the emergency develops. However, the reductionist structure
at the basis of the collaboration often hinders the mutual collaboration, because organisations
refer to the roles that had been agreed on prior to the beginning of the emergency. This may
happen in particular when confronted with unexpected organisational and operational
challenges, which test the ability of the whole System of Systems to quickly adapt to the
changed conditions.
In the literature, this problem is identified in the inadequacy of hierarchical top-down models,
which do not allow for more organic, integrated and adaptable organisations (Weick 2005;
Cavallo 2015B). For example, memoranda of understanding (MoUs) are often used to set a
basis for collaboration between two organisations. However, this form of agreement has the
limitation to refer to the current status quo leaving little space to move capabilities and
resources throughout the vast palette of tasks to be undertaken during and after an
emergency.
Following the principle of ‘probe, sense and respond’, the process illustrated in Figure 2 will
be used progressively to design an interagency strategy jointly with all organisations that
participate to relief and recovery operations following a large-scale emergency.
The first step of the process has been completed, whereas the following steps will be
completed later this year.
First, staff members and volunteers from government and non-government organisations
were invited to participate in a series of interagency debriefs following the Pinery fire in
November 2015. These allowed the joint identification of strengths and areas of
improvement, with a particular focus on: community engagement, safety and wellbeing of
staff and volunteers, efficiency and effectiveness of operations, communication and data
sharing. Learnings collected in debriefs resulted in a thematic action plan to be implemented
within one year.
The second step involves an interagency workshop to identify current challenges, in
particular, those that can be addressed in a more collaborative way. In this step, the System of
Systems will start to take shape in a thematic network, where instead of organisations,
services are represented in clusters.
In step 3, these clusters are used to identify synergies between different organisations’
missions. What resources can agencies share? What are outstanding unmet needs? How can
the mutual collaboration between agencies help meet them and overcome organisational
obstacles? This information will be mind-mapped and translated into an operational inter-
agency strategy to be discussed with all organisations involved before being released in step
4.
Figure 2. Process to design a relief and recovery interagency strategy.
Building general resilience in practice
The interagency structure has a similar form to the System of Systems represented in Table 1.
It will allow for more flexibility and adaptation to the specific circumstances in which the
emergency develops, because it will allow a more organic resource distribution.
In this new context, Government systematically connects different agencies and
encourages them to use and exchange each other’s resources to achieve better results for the
community. For example, limited volunteering capacity can be overcome by inviting another
organisation in to undertake a similar role. To this end, the inter-agency strategy aims to
indirectly contribute to building volunteering capacity state-wide. In this way the efficiency
of relief and recovery operations, as well as their sustainability, are preserved.
Moreover, recent disasters have shown that ‘off-the-shelf’ services are often not appropriate
for the specific context and communities involved. For this reason, solution paths need to be
identified to support agencies to work together to develop plans that fit the South Australian
and regional context better and that are collectively complementary. The aim is also to create
enough overlap to ensure a robust collaborative structure that does not rely solely on one
agency for key services and to rationalise current capabilities by encouraging the distribution
of resources from areas that are over-serviced to areas that are under-serviced.
The inter-agency strategy will also help the communication with and among participating
agencies. Planning together will make it easier to work together during an emergency. It will
help to clarify roles and responsibilities ahead of time for both agencies and ERFS regional
staff, which is only activated at the time of an emergency.
Finally, training for functions requiring interagency collaboration will be designed and run in
collaboration and agreement with partnering organisations.
Conclusion
Emergencies are characterised by uncertainty. Plans can only address a part of the risks that
may emerge in an emergency. However, disasters increasingly pose complex unexpected
challenges that need to be addressed in new ways that complement current strategies and
frameworks, while introducing new strategic elements to emergency management planning.
Disaster consequences are complex and systemic. Therefore, the organisational
structure behind relief and recovery needs to be systemic to be able to tackle challenges more
effectively and promptly.
This paper reports how the Emergency Relief Functional Service at the Government of South
Australia is taking an ambidextrous approach to planning in preparation for disasters. In
particular, ERFS aims to build general resilience to face unexpected risks in emergencies by
building inter-agency capacity for adaptation and flexibility to the specific circumstances of
different emergencies while continuing to plan for identified risks.
The collaboration between ERFS and participating government and non-government
organisations in planning for future emergencies will allow for better communication, higher
efficiency and effectiveness of operations and more cohesive inter-agency teams.
Acknowledgements
The views represented in this article are solely those of the author and may not be construed
as in any way representative of the views or policies of the Government of South Australia.
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Partnerships for innovation: transitional shelter solutions in the Syrian refugee response
Emma Cliffe
Researcher
School for Global, Urban and Social Studies
RMIT University
Melbourne, Victoria, Australia 3000
Paper presented at the
Australia and New Zealand Disaster and Emergency Management Conference
Broadbeach, Gold Coast (QLD), 30-31 May 2016
Partnerships for innovation: transitional shelter solutions in the Syrian refugee response
ABSTRACT: Shelter has proved to be one of the most endemic challenges in large scale
humanitarian and disaster response. While there is certainly a place for tents within a suite of
shelter options; for refugees or displaced persons who face years or even decades without a
permanent home, a more dignified, durable and sustainable solution is required. The aim of
this article is to reflect on ‘partnerships for innovation’ between traditional humanitarian
responders and private sector organisations; models which can be considered innovative in
and of themselves, as well as a fundamental component of strategies to improve the
effectiveness, efficiency, quality and impact of humanitarian response. Such partnerships for
innovation will be illustrated using the case study of the Refugee Housing Unit, a transitional
shelter solution designed by United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR), IKEA Foundation and
social enterprise Better Shelter, currently implemented during the Syrian refugee response.
The research for this article was undertaken in collaboration with RedR Australia and RMIT
University, with the findings informed by field work in the Za’atri and Azraq refugee camps in
Jordan in 2015.
Keywords: innovation, partnerships, private sector, transitional shelter, Syrian refugee crisis
Introduction “Today’s humanitarian emergencies are beyond anything we have experienced in living
memory. Unless we urgently change the way we tackle them, the world will become an increasingly difficult place to live for millions of people who have already lost almost everything.” (António Guterres 2015, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 2015, p.1)
The global humanitarian landscape is changing rapidly. The scale, frequency and complexity
of natural and human-induced disasters has escalated in the last 30 years, becoming
characteristic of a world that is “more unpredictable, more uncertain, and increasingly
vulnerable” to disasters (Mitchell & Ramalingam 2014, p.1). This state of “global disruption”
(ACFID 2014) in humanitarian affairs is being driven by a number of social, economic,
political, environmental, and technological factors, otherwise known as “megatrends” (Bond
2015). The humanitarian system is almost at breaking point as the United Nations (UN) and
other humanitarian agencies struggle to respond to four ‘level three’ crises in Iraq, South
Sudan, Syria and Yemen (UNOCHA 2016); and the cost of humanitarian assistance has tripled
in the last ten years (Guerrini 2014). An estimated 60 million people, the highest number on
record, have been forced to flee conflict, violence and persecution; with an estimated 13.5
million of those from Syria alone (UNOCHA 2015) and the number is continuing to rise.
As such, there is an imperative for humanitarian organisations to embrace innovative
solutions, adopt different ways of working, trial new approaches, and explore new partnerships;
particularly with the private sector. Partnerships for innovation between humanitarian
organisations and the private sector can be considered as innovative in and of themselves, as
well as a fundamental component of strategies which seek to improve humanitarian response.
This article will reflect on the effectiveness, efficiency, quality and impact of the partnership
for innovation brokered between the United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR), IKEA
Foundation and social enterprise Better Shelter with respect to the Refugee Housing Unit
project; an innovative transitional shelter solution currently implemented during the Syrian
refugee response.
Understanding humanitarian innovation
The concept of innovation was originally derived from management theory and research and
development methods (R&D) in the private sector, referring to the point at which an invention
becomes commercialised. In the 1950s economist Joseph Schumpeter was particularly
influential within the discourse of innovation, pioneering his theory of “creative destruction”
which favoured bold and radical new ideas, and privileged the concept of novelty
(Ramalingam, Scriven & Foley 2009, p.3). Although traditionally the domain of the private
sphere; the humanitarian sector has co-opted the language of innovation, albeit quite recently.
The subject first gained traction at an Innovations Fair hosted by the Active Learning Network
for Accountability and Performance (ALNAP) on Humanitarian Action in November 2009
(Betts 2014), and since then the innovation debate has flourished. ‘Transformation through
Innovation: power of business in emergencies’ was one of four themes at the World
Humanitarian Summit in May 2016, and there are an increasing number of dedicated
innovation labs and challenge grants which continue to be established.
Private sector origins, along with the diversity of interpretation and use by humanitarian
agencies, has resulted in a number of different definitions pertaining to the term ‘innovation’
(Betts & Bloom 2014). This lack of conceptual clarity around innovation has led to frequent
misuse, over-use, and poor understanding of the term within the humanitarian sector (Betts &
Bloom 2014). This has led many critics of innovation to label it as just another “buzzword” or
“fad”, leaving the meaning and value of innovation contested (Betts & Bloom 2014). For the
purposes of this article, innovation can be understood as: “a novel solution to a social problem
that is more effective, efficient, sustainable, or just than existing solutions, and for which the
value created accrues primarily to society as a whole rather than private individuals” (Phills,
Deiglmeier and Miller 2008, p.38). As such, innovation in the humanitarian context can be
conceptualised as an output, a process, or a response to a social problem, ultimately designed
to achieve positive social impact.
Partnerships as the foundation of humanitarian innovation
Rapid changes in the global context highlight the urgent need for innovation and partnership
in humanitarian response. The humanitarian reform agenda called for by UNOCHA in 2006
was sparked by critiques of the current business models on offer, and the recognition that
humanitarian organisations no longer had the resources, capacity, scope or expertise to respond
alone. Without innovation, humanitarian organisations risk “employing inefficient and
outdated solutions, duplicating efforts, mismanaging limited resources, and ultimately,
overlooking the needs of some of the most vulnerable populations” (Binger, Lynch & Weaver
2015, p.4). As such, unique and creative solutions, new approaches, and partnerships with
‘unusual suspects’ such as the private sector are crucial if humanitarian organisations are to
better respond to the current and future challenges of humanitarian response.
Working in partnership is the foundation of humanitarian innovation. Partnerships are
fundamentally about complex relationships between two or more stakeholders, working
together on a compelling goal, “to achieve together what we could not achieve alone”
(Houghton 2011, p.1). Successful partnerships should embrace reciprocity whereby both
parties generate and receive “shared value”, a concept pioneered by Porter and Kramer (2011,
p.1) which aligns economic return with social impact. Partnerships can be described by the
functions and tasks they perform, and classified by the number of stakeholders engaged; as
well as the respective ideologies and motivations of each of the actors involved (Andonova &
Carbonnier 2014). Relationships between organisations can be understood along a spectrum,
with coexistence at one end, and partnership at the other; while collaboration can be understood
as one facilitative element of an overall partnership (Kent 2008). Effective partnerships are
about more than common objectives, responsibilities and joint work; partnerships are also
about underlying issues of power, attitudes and styles of working (Street 2011, p.1). Working
in partnership requires a set of principles that create trust, equity, and mutual accountability,
which are underpinned by responsibilities and ethical norms and behaviours on both sides.
Private sector engagement in humanitarian response
It is important to acknowledge that private sector engagement in humanitarian response is not
new. Businesses have a long history of being involved in humanitarian response (Zyk & Kent
2014); demonstrated most notably after the Indian Ocean Tsunami in 2004, during which the
private sector contributed USD $565 million towards the response (Cozzolino 2012). However,
it is clear that the nature of private sector partnerships and the scale of their involvement in
humanitarian response is adapting and growing at a rapid pace. Many organisations within the
humanitarian and private sectors exhibit diverse but often complementary and overlapping
motivations for engaging in partnership (Andonova & Carbonnier 2014). Humanitarian
organisations have traditionally been motivated to engage with the private sector to generate
funding through the provision of cash support, in-kind donations, and employee giving
schemes or sponsorship (Andonova & Carbonnier 2014).
However, the private sector also presents a relatively untapped resource of knowledge,
ideas, capabilities and resources, in technical areas such as information technology,
communications, logistics, transport or managerial expertise. Equally, the private sector is
learning there are a range of genuine benefits stemming from partnerships with humanitarian
agencies that go beyond the ‘bottom line’. Humanitarian partnerships offer the private sector
opportunities to work in new contexts, build new skills, open up new markets, and contribute
to staffing benefits such as increased staff retention and higher job satisfaction (Andonova &
Carbonnier 2014).
Recognition of the challenge and opportunity: the universal right to shelter
Nowhere is this demand for innovation in humanitarian response more apparent than in the
shelter sector, particularly when considering the needs of refugee populations. Shelter is a
fundamental human right as outlined in article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (Carver 2011); yet “providing adequate shelter is one of the most intractable problems
in international humanitarian response” (Sandersen & Burnell 2013, p.5) and examples of
demonstrated innovation within the shelter sector remain limited. This scarcity of innovation
can be explained by the demand-driven nature of the shelter sector, ad hoc engagement of
beneficiaries, limited coordination and partnership, and a deficiency of formal learning
initiatives across the sector (Gray & Bayley 2015). As such, it is “difficult to speak
convincingly of ‘new’ or innovative practices towards refugees, while there remains a
significant gap in historical knowledge and institutional memory” (Easton-Calabria 2014,
p.20). The provision of humanitarian shelter is often constrained by a multiplicity of political,
economic, social, and cultural considerations; just some of which include procurement
processes, land tenure, beneficiary and government engagement, and coordination within the
sector. Shelter solutions straddle the divide between temporary and permanent, and relief and
recovery; which has often resulted in shelter being the “least successful form of aid when
compared to other humanitarian intervention sectors” (ALNAP 2003, p.4).
Typically tents have been the dominant form of shelter response provided by
humanitarian agencies. At least 3.5 million refugees currently live in UN supplied tents (Baker
2013), with the average length of residence being 17 years (Betts 2013). Tents have a number
of advantages in that they are low cost, lightweight, easy to procure, transport and stockpile,
and are quick to erect. However, there are also a number of fundamental issues with tents as a
shelter solution. Tents lack durability, have a short lifespan, and there is little scope to repair
or upgrade them. Tents are short on space and comfort, and physical safety is a key concern,
particularly for women and children as there is no lock and little privacy. While there is
certainly a place for tents within a suite of humanitarian shelter options, for those in refugee
camps who face years or even decades without a permanent home, a more dignified, durable
and sustainable solution was required.
One of the most influential shelter innovations to date has been the transitional or ‘t-
shelter’ approach. Described by Abrahams (2014, p.526) as “more than a tent, less than a
house”, the transitional shelter approach was originally developed by USAID and Interaction,
and first implemented during the Indian Ocean Tsunami response in 2004 (Gray & Bayley
2015). This approach is driven by the theoretical framework of “shelter as process” (Davis
1978), which places shelter within a holistic context of recovery and long term development,
rather than just a physical solution to address the immediate needs of a community in the
aftermath of a disaster (Gray & Bayley 2015). Traditionally shelter solutions favoured by
humanitarian organisations have focused on the ‘product’ of shelter due to funding constraints,
the visibility of physical housing, and the highly complex political and legal context of
providing shelter to those who are refugees or internally displaced persons (IDPs) (Gray &
Bayley 2015). However, this focus on product can lead to ill-considered or unsustainable
solutions which are inappropriate for the local culture, climate and needs of the beneficiary
population.
An innovative transitional shelter solution
To address this lack of appropriate shelter options for refugees the Refugee Housing Unit
(RHU), an innovative transitional shelter solution, was co-created in partnership between
UNHCR, IKEA Foundation, and social enterprise Better Shelter; to provide a “home away
from home” for refugees fleeing violence and persecution (Better Shelter 2015). This is an
example of a transformative partnership between humanitarian responders and the private
sector, purposely intended to disrupt the current status quo of traditional shelter options.
Discussions began in 2009 when the CEO of the IKEA Foundation and the Head of
International Corporate Partnerships at UNHCR met each other at a dinner engagement
(KPMG International 2016). At that point in time IKEA had little experience in the
humanitarian sector, and the UNHCR was just starting to articulate their approach to private
sector engagement (KPMG International 2016). Later that year, the IKEA Foundation invited
UNHCR and Formens Hus Foundation, a small sustainable design agency, to a meeting at their
offices in Leiden, Sweden (Ramalingam & Bound 2016); and an idea for a sustainable
alternative to refugee housing was born.
IKEA and UNHCR proceeded to collaborate with three universities, and 15 companies
in the plastic, steel, automobile, lighting, and logistics industries from across five different
countries, in order to develop a prototype of the design (Delarue 2014). UNHCR and the IKEA
Foundation subsequently initiated a partnership in 2010; and formally acquired the RHU
project in 2013, renaming it Better Shelter (Better Shelter 2015). After significant investment
in the design, testing and piloting of the project, UNHCR and IKEA Foundation publicly
announced their partnership on World Refugee Day, 20 June 2013 (Better Shelter 2015).
Table 1: Technical specifications of the Refugee Housing Unit
Capacity Five people
Cost USD $1,250
Ceiling height 1,840mm (minimum)
Weight / volume 160 kg / 1.15m³ comes in 2 packages
Sphere compliant Yes
Windows 4 pieces (640cm² each)
Door 1 piece (740 x 1,690 mm)
Door can be placed in side wall or gable
Ventilation 2 pieces (620 cm² each)
Insulation Modular panels of polyolefin foam, rhulite panels with thermal
insulation, insulated technical metallic tile on roof
Flooring Plastic sheet flooring
Fire safety Meets international building standards EN ISO 11925-2:2010 and EN
13823:2010
UV protection 2,700h UVA – 100% functionality
Wind speed 18 m/s
Snow load 10 kg / m²
Snow and wind resistant
Privacy Metal partition lines
Security Padlock and internal lock
Power PV panel with LED light. 4h light per day and USB power to charge a
mobile phone
Procurement Imported materials
Materials Steel frame, special plastic screws
Construction UNHCR staff and refugees.
No additional tools required
Time required for
construction 4 hours
Lifespan 3 years, with basic maintenance. Steel frame can last for 10 years if
correctly assembled.
Re-useability Easily dismantled and transported
Image 1: The Refugee Housing Unit (Better Shelter, 2015)
Advantages of the partnership for innovation
Opportunity to leverage funding
Given the current funding environment, humanitarian organisations must be creative in seeking
out new opportunities and flexible funding mechanisms, particularly through the development
of new partnerships. While there has been no shortage of innovative or unique shelter designs
of late, few have made it beyond the prototyping stage, often due to a lack of crucial financial
backing to take these projects to market (UNHCR 2015). Transaction costs can be high, and a
lack of adequate time, staffing and financial resources can be a major impediment to
establishing and implementing a successful partnership. Over 90 percent of UNHCR’s USD
$1 billion annual budget is sourced through voluntary contributions from governments
(UNHCR 2015), highlighting a clear need for the organisation to diversify their funding
streams and consider alternative sources of finance. In 2013 the IKEA Foundation donated
USD $32,955,422 to UNHCR in cash and in kind support, making the IKEA Foundation
UNHCR’s largest supporter. Over the duration of the RHU project, IKEA invested USD $7
million of catalytic funding into the R&D of the shelter (UNHCR 2015), an amount clearly out
of reach for many, if not all, humanitarian organisations drawing on existing sources of
funding.
Competency-based approach
One of the most important elements of the partnership was that UNHCR, IKEA Foundation
and Better Shelter engaged through a competency-based approach which focused on strategies
for co-creation; capitalising on the strengths, core skills and diversity of the individual
organisations. This ensured that input was relevant and added genuine value and quality to the
overall project. UNHCR contributed substantial knowledge of humanitarian principles and
significant experience in responding to refugee issues. IKEA brought extensive experience in
management, logistics and supply chains, and design and manufacturing, including simple low
cost flat-pack packaging. IKEA’s contributions were critical in reducing the costs of the project
and increasing the efficiency of the manufacturing and procurement process. Better Shelter
also contributed a range of complementary skills including architectural expertise and
knowledge of democratic design principles. The organisation’s small and dynamic team meant
they were able to act quickly and turn ideas into potential solutions (Better Shelter 2015).
Utilising ‘democratic design’ principles
Another aspect of the RHU project where the private sector partners added significant value
was in their application of ‘democratic design’ principles, a holistic approach which places the
end user at the centre of the solution (Better Shelter 2015) and is responsive to their specific
needs and cultural context (Betts & Bloom 2014). This approach allows organisations to build
on the skills, talent, and resources at the local level (Betts & Bloom 2014), and support people
to provide their own solutions to complex challenges such as shelter, improving the quality of
response. Building on the concept of ‘human centred design’, IKEA has spearheaded the
concept of ‘democratic design’ which promotes five elements: form, function, quality,
sustainability, and low cost; to ensure products are accessible to many, not just a few (Elmansy
2014).
Better Shelter incorporated democratic design principles into the project by engaging
former refugees from the Dadaab Camp in Kenya in the design of the RHU (World Design
Impact 2014). Handmade prototypes of the RHU were then piloted by 52 families living in
refugee camps in Iraq and Ethiopia where further feedback was provided and improvements
were made over a six-month period (Better Shelter 2015). After the first three months of testing,
100 per cent of refugees in both Iraq and Ethiopia “confirmed that the RHUs worked” (UNHCR
Innovation 2015, p.1). The benefit of this multi-disciplinary approach was that the project also
generated local economic activity by engaging beneficiaries in the construction of the RHUs
through cash for work programmes; and this in turn encouraged greater ownership and support
for the project from the beneficiary communities and donors.
Scaling up and diffusion
A crucial indicator of success with respect to partnerships for innovation is the ability of
organisations to leverage opportunities and scale up operations for maximum impact. UNHCR
placed its first commercial order for 10,000 RHUs in March 2015, and due to the manufacturing
processes utilised, production has been easily scaled up to meet demand (Better Shelter 2015).
As of May 2016 the RHUs have been implemented in a range of other contexts including
internally displaced person (IDP) camps in Iraq, refugee camps in Greece and Dijibouti, and
child-safe spaces in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Médecins Sans Frontières
(MSF) also used RHUs to establish temporary health facilities in Gorka following the Nepal
Earthquake. While it is clear there is significant demand for transitional shelter solutions such
as the RHU, it is also important to recognise that tents are only used for a relatively small
number of refugees of concern to UNHCR, around 10 percent in 2012, and other strategies
such as host families or urban rental assistance programs can be used as a successful alternative
to camp facilities. As such, innovations such as the Refugee Housing Unit should be considered
just one of a “menu of options” (UNHCR 2015).
Challenges of the partnership for innovation
Procurement
One of the key challenges during the partnership for innovation was the procurement process
(Better Shelter 2015), as UNHCR abides by strict procurement processes and guidelines. While
this can help to ensure quality, performance and impact in UNHCR’s programming, this
rigidity leaves limited space for innovation. UN agencies also require that contracts can only
be issued to organisations that have been operating for at least three years. Johan Karlsson from
Better Shelter explained: “Many start-ups don’t have that history, and are automatically
excluded from supplying to the UN” (Halais 2015, p1). While there can be disadvantages in
siloing innovation in specific labs, departments or funding pools, in this case, one of the
advantages in working with UNHCR’s Innovation Lab was that they had a degree of autonomy
from their parent agency and deliberate processes to encourage flexibility in planning and
budgeting (Bloom & Faulkner 2016). Where other departments were often restricted by
strategic plans and institutional bureaucracy, the UNHCR had some freedom to operate and
this meant they could facilitate an efficient procurement process which wouldn’t have been
possible under the traditional UN regulations (Halais 2015).
Intellectual property
Common in social innovation is the concept of ‘open source’ which encourages the practice of
new products and ideas being accessible to others in the public domain. This can pave the way
for increased collaboration and reduced costs, however this approach is often at odds with
private sector motivations for R&D which focus on a return on investment. In the RHU project,
the partners neglected to discuss intellectual property rights, such as patents, copyright and
trademarks, early on in the relationship and this became a significant barrier at the point where
the RHU was ready to move into commercial production: “When we saw that this was going
to go commercial, that it was not just going to be an R&D project, that's when people started
to become very protective” (Halais 2015, p.1). The project was subsequently delayed for almost
six months until an agreement was reached (Halais 2015). The solution was found in a new
type of contracting approach in which UNHCR received ownership rights for the specifications
around the performance of the product, rather than the design or material composition
(Ramalingam & Bound 2016). Then, after three years or 30,000 units produced (whichever
comes first), UNHCR will receive the design specification, which will allow them to buy the
product in open competition (Ramalingam & Bound 2016). While a solution was ultimately
found, in many humanitarian contexts this extensive period of consultation and negotiation
would not be feasible or sustainable with regards to the time and resources required to settle
the issue.
Risk aversion and preparing to fail
The appetite for risk and failure is also a considerable challenge in partnerships for innovation,
where creative ideas, new approaches and working with different partners are crucial.
Humanitarian organisations are often adept at tolerating a high level of risk, particularly when
operating within conflict areas. However, organisational structures and processes as well as a
strong emphasis on accountability to donors, both public and institutional, make it difficult for
humanitarian organisations to claim space for innovation (Ramalingam, Scriven & Foley
2009). In this context, it is important to consider ‘whose risk are we talking about’? There is
also an inherent ethical tension between innovative solutions which require new solutions and
a process of piloting and adaptation, and the humanitarian imperative of ‘do no harm’. The
freedom to ‘fail quickly and fail fast’ is constrained, and this failure may be the difference
between ‘life and death’ for already vulnerable communities. Future prospects of partnerships
for innovation rely on the ability of organisations to balance the quest for new solutions with
humanitarian principles.
Evaluating partnerships for innovation: evidence and impact
Evaluating the impact of innovation is vital in order to demonstrate the value of new solutions,
approaches and ways of working (Ramalingam, Scriven & Foley 2009). The novelty of
innovation should not be viewed as good in and of itself; rather innovation should be judged
upon improvements achieved in efficiency, effectiveness, quality, social outcomes and impact
(Binger, Lynch & Weaver 2015). It is also important to consider from whose perspective you
are judging the results and impact of a particular innovation, and understand how this
influences the overall evaluation (Bloom & Betts 2014). A process for evaluating innovation
should be established at the outset of the partnership, by determining each organisation’s
definition of success, and the relevant metrics and measurement tools that will be employed. It
is also important to measure the success of the partnership independently to the success of the
project, using different tools and indicators. While it is too early to conclude with an overall
evaluation of the success of the RHU and its innovative partnership model, this section will
outline some initial observations, considerations and lessons learned.
Evaluating the RHU project
The RHU project has had initial success in a number of areas. At a cost of USD $1,250 and an
estimated lifespan of three years, the RHU is more cost effective than other transitional shelters
on the market; or tents which cost about a third of the price, but only last for around six months
(Better Shelter 2015). The innovative shelter design addresses key needs such as security,
privacy, lighting and solar power, an advantage given many refugee camps do not have
electricity. The shelters are also adaptable depending on the cultural context and climate.
Democratic design principles ensured that beneficiaries were engaged throughout the process
in the design, implementation and evaluation of the project. A lack of concrete foundations and
the ability to dismantle and relocate the shelter is also a crucial benefit, given the precarious
circumstances pertaining to refugees and land tenure. Syrian refugees living in the Kawergosk
Refugee Camp in Iraq explained: “there is a huge difference compared to living in a tent, […]
We consider this our house now”, and “The place...is my home. There is a door to open, no
need to bend, and you can open a window like in a real house” (Better Shelter 2014, p.7).
There are also some features of the RHU which may pose challenges, however limited
information is publically available and further independent evaluation is required. Overall,
there are still a large proportion of unmet shelter needs in Kawergosk Camp, with 65 percent
of refugees reporting that their shelter needs such as climate, privacy, and lighting had not been
met, and some residents are still living in tents (REACH 2015). However, it is not clear whether
this is specific to the RHUs being utilised in Kawergosk or whether other shelter solutions are
being used concurrently. Fire safety is another area which may require further improvement.
In December 2015, Switzerland discarded 62 RHUs it had purchased to house refugees
domestically, on the basis that testing showed the shelters were “easily combustible” (France-
Presse 2015, p.1). While there are currently no recognised standards for the development of
humanitarian shelters, Better Shelter has contested the findings of the report and confirmed that
the RHU complies with Euroclass classification EN13501-1, D-s2,d0 for construction products
in reaction to fire (Better Shelter 2015).
Furthermore, while the centralised production of RHUs can improve quality,
consistency, and avoids depletion of natural resources in countries which are experiencing
humanitarian crises; imported materials may not always be environmentally sustainable in the
local context. The purchase of local materials such as construction supplies can stimulate
market activity during a crisis, and support local communities by providing an income to
tradespeople and suppliers. While Better Shelter (UNHCR Innovation 2015, p.1) has said they
are “investigating options for using locally available materials for future designs”, further
research is required in order understand the impact that imported shelter solutions may have on
local economies.
Evaluating the partnership
Overall the initial partnership between UNHCR, IKEA Foundation and Better Shelter can be
considered a success. The partnership was able to create an effective alternative to traditional
shelter options, and the RHU has been implemented in a range of humanitarian contexts.
UNHCR assessed the partnership for innovation based on its ability to produce a truly
innovative product, and the establishment of best practice principles for innovation and
partnership in the humanitarian space, suggesting “there’s a real appetite throughout our
organization to form these kinds of partnerships” (Earney, in Halais 2015, p.1). Several
UNHCR departments are investigating options to replicate the partnership, and UNHCR is
already working with IKEA Foundation on another humanitarian project called ‘Brighter Lives
for Refugees’. IKEA Foundation and Better Shelter also consider the partnership a success,
and see the order of 10,000 RHUs for Iraq as the milestone in the beginning of a process that
will see them continually improve and adapt the shelter.
Lessons learned
The partnership between UNHCR, IKEA and Better Shelter has illustrated a number of
important lessons which can be applied more broadly to innovation across the humanitarian
sector. Firstly, innovation demands flexible funding arrangements. Organisations should
explore new business models and funding mechanisms which are conducive to testing, piloting
and adapting new approaches and solutions. Significant front-end investment is crucial in order
to commercialise innovation and take ideas to scale. Secondly, humanitarian organisations and
the private sector should seek to pursue more strategic and genuine partnerships with each other
which move beyond transactional or financial models of engagement, instead focusing on the
respective values, competencies and strengths of each organisation. To achieve this,
organisations require a common language for innovation, and access to platforms which
provide an entry point for these conversations to take place. Partnership brokering is also
proving to be an emerging capability required in both the humanitarian and private sector
spheres. Organisations need people who have skills in supporting and strengthening
partnerships, who can bridge traditional boundaries, and who can bring people to the
negotiating table to have honest and reflective conversations during the partnership brokering
process.
Thirdly, all humanitarian innovation projects should be underpinned by user-centred
and democratic design principles to ensure that the solutions developed are needs-driven,
sustainable, effective, and culturally and contextually appropriate. Fourth, partnerships for
innovation require creative solutions not only in the end product but throughout the innovation
journey, with respect to timeframes, procurement processes and intellectual property
considerations. Humanitarian responders also need to reflect on how their organisations are
structured to cope with risk and failure throughout the innovation journey. Finally, to assess
the effectiveness of these strategic partnerships, organisations require tools and frameworks to
evaluate the project and partnership independently of one another, in order to determine the
value proposition for future replication.
Conclusion
The partnership between UNHCR, IKEA Foundation and Better Shelter can be considered a
successful example of a transformative partnership for innovation which is innovative in and
of itself, while also providing a foundation for the development of humanitarian innovations
such as the RHU. Throughout the partnership the project stakeholders demonstrated
complementary priorities, goals and values; sought a strategic, long-term approach; and
undertook appropriate due diligence and risk management practices. As such, a number of
advantages resulted from the partnership including the ability to leverage catalytic funding,
adopting a collaborative, competency-based approach, utilising democratic design principles
which generated value for the refugee communities involved, and taking the solution to scale.
The project also identified some important barriers including challenges around procurement,
intellectual property and risk aversion.
The RHU has illustrated the new opportunities on offer and generated important
learning which can be applied to partnerships for innovation in the shelter sector, as well as the
humanitarian sector more broadly. The RHUs appear to fill a glaring gap in the market, and
offer a durable, sustainable and high quality transitional shelter alternative that is particularly
appropriate to refugee camp contexts, where the average stay can be years or even decades.
However, it is important that the RHUs are not perceived as a ‘silver bullet’ or a ‘one size fits
all’ solution. The provision of shelter solutions in refugee communities still requires careful
consideration of the needs of the local community, climate and context. As such, the RHU
should be seen as a valuable contribution to the range of shelter solutions on offer.
Acknowledgements
This research report has been prepared by Emma Cliffe from RMIT University, Melbourne,
Australia as part of the assessment requirements for the International Development Research
Project course in the Masters of International Development Program. The research was
undertaken in partnership with RedR Australia. The author acknowledges the support of Emma
Kettle, RedR Australia and Pr. Jose Roberto Guevera, Masters of International Development
Course Coordinator at RMIT University, Australia.
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Saving Nepal’s Cultural Heritage: Post Earthquake Emergency Response and Recovery in Kathmandu
Catherine Forbes
GML Heritage, Australia ICOMOS, ICOMOS-ICORP Abstract
The deep sense of loss felt by the people of Nepal following the Gorkha Earthquake
(25 April 2015), was not just for family and friends who had died, homes and
livelihoods destroyed, or familiar places that were now no longer recognizable. The
people also mourned the loss of their cultural heritage. The destroyed temples,
palaces, historic urban settlements, museums, artworks and other historical artifacts
were of immense importance to the Nepalese people, their identity and their daily
lives. These places represent the people’s cultural inheritance and are integral to
their sense of identity.
This paper outlines the emergency response undertaken by the Nepali authorities
and people, with assistance from UNESCO, in order to save their cultural heritage. It
describes the rapid assessment of damage undertaken through crowd mapping; the
emergency stabilization of monuments and the salvage of significant building
elements, religious artifacts and museum collections, including the assistance given
by the local police and army; the measures put in place to enable the people to
continue their daily rituals and customs; the preparations undertaken by Municipal
authorities and local stakeholders to facilitate the continuance of important cultural
festivals; and the ways in which meaningful access has been provided for tourists,
who contribute greatly to Nepal's economy. It also discusses issues for recovery
including addressing skills and materials shortages, facilitating economic activity and
livelihoods, and building resilience through disaster risk management for the future.
The paper concludes with lessons learned in relation to the protection of cultural
heritage and their application to the Australian context.
Saving Nepal’s Cultural Heritage: Post Earthquake Emergency Response and Recovery in Kathmandu 1. Introduction
The deep sense of loss felt by the people of Nepal following the Gorkha earthquake
(25 April 2015), was not just for family and friends who had died, homes and
livelihoods destroyed, or familiar places that were now no longer recognizable. The
people also mourned the loss of their cultural heritage.
This paper reviews the emergency response and recovery planning for Nepal’s
cultural heritage following the earthquake, and provides insight into some of the
lessons that can be learned and applied to the Australian context. It highlights the
importance of cultural heritage to cultural identity and the recovery of communities
following disaster, thereby demonstrating the importance of its inclusion in disaster
risk management planning, emergency response, and recovery planning.
1.1 Nepal’s Cultural Heritage
The World Heritage Property of the Kathmandu Valley consists of seven monument
zones. It includes three historic urban precincts, representing the three city states of
the Kathmandu Valley (Hanuman Dhoka, Patan and Bhaktapur) and comprising royal
palaces, temples, public open spaces and ancient urban settlements, including their
traditional vernacular architecture (housing, commercial facilities, community rest
houses, step wells, shrines and other monuments). The property also includes four
religious ensembles, two Hindu (Pahupati and Changu Narayan) and two Buddhist
(Swayambhu and Bauddanath). The sites are inscribed for their unique architectural
attributes: their tall, tiered, pagoda-like temples with their intricately carved elements
that demonstrate the exceptional quality of craftsmanship in brick, timber and
metalwork for which the Newari are recognized internationally: and large white
hemispherical stupas, topped by golden cubes featuring Buddha’s distinctive all-
seeing eyes and umbrella-like crowns. The sites are also inscribed for their living and
intangible cultural values. The beliefs, legends, daily rituals and practices associated
with these sacred places exemplify the unique amalgamation of Hinduism,
Buddhism, animism and Tantrism that exists within Nepal (WHC, 2012).
Hanuman Dhoka Durbar Square, 2014 Swayambhu, 2014
In addition to the World Heritage property, there are many cultural heritage sites of
both national and local significance scattered across the country that contribute to
the distinctive character of Nepal’s cities and landscapes, and the identity of its
people. This heritage includes not only buildings and monuments, but also important
collections of archival material, literature, artworks, textiles, and royal and religious
artifacts. In all its forms, the cultural heritage of Nepal is the inheritance of Nepal’s
people and needs to be passed on to future generations. It tells the stories of times
past, informs people of where they have come from and provides an understanding
of who they are. It is precious and irreplaceable (Australia ICOMOS, 2013).
1.2 Impact of the Gorkha Earthquake
The Gorkha earthquake of 25 April 2015 and its subsequent aftershocks had a
dramatic impact on the cultural heritage of Nepal, causing substantial damage to
many of the temples and other significant cultural monuments. Approximately 750
heritage sites were affected across the country, and 199 monuments within the
Kathmandu Valley World Heritage property suffered severe damage (37 totally
collapsed and 162 partially collapsed) (Shrestha, 2016). Much of the damage was
recorded through social media with images broadcast worldwide, including drone
footage taken over many of Kathmandu’s important and iconic heritage sites (Rana,
2015).
Several large temples collapsed in Hanuman Dhoka Durbar Square, located in the
centre of the city. This included Kasthamandap, one of Kathmandu’s oldest and most
important temples, after which the city was named. At the time of the earthquake the
Red Cross was collecting blood donations inside the temple and more than 70
people were killed when it fell (Weise (2), 2015). The Hanuman Dhoka Palace also
suffered with the collapse of its historic nine-storey palace and severe damage to the
wings that housed the royal collection of the Hanuman Dhoka Museum (site
evidence). In other parts of the city the Dharahara Tower, a popular tourist site for
both local and international visitors, collapsed and killed more than 150 people; and
the golden cube atop Bauddanath, the Nation’s largest stupa, also collapsed (site
evidence).
The damage to religious sites caused significant trauma, interrupting daily rituals and
offerings, and raising doubts within people’s belief systems. The collapse of many
traditional houses, including the monks’ sattals, had a significant impact on people’s
safety and security.
2. Emergency Response
2.1 Humanitarian Response
The initial emergency response to the earthquake was a humanitarian effort focused
on saving lives, and rightly so. There was a great sense of urgency as people lifted
and tossed aside debris in an effort to locate survivors. Unfortunately, this included
the fragile and intricately carved elements of the temples, which in the chaos, were
treated as scrap (Barry and Najar, 2015). Within a few days, as hope diminished,
heavy machinery was brought in to remove the debris and dig deeper to retrieve the
bodies of the lost (Eaton, 2015). This particularly affected the site of Kasthamandap,
where excavators pulled the remains of the temple aside and dug deep into its brick
base. The process caused even greater damage to the temple and its four central
posts, which had reputedly been cut from one tree up to eight hundred years ago
(Gautam et al, 2015).
2.2 Salvaging cultural treasures
Within the debris of the temples, many important religious artifacts and relics were
buried. These elements were of great significance to the Nepalese people because
of their association with the gods and goddesses to which the temples were
dedicated, as well as their links to important stories and legends (Theophile and
Gutschow, nd). Monks and local community members associated with the temple
sites worked hard to retrieve sculptures, bronze bells and other artefacts from the
rubble and to prevent their loss through looting (Ekin, 2015). As the police and armed
forces were involved in search and rescue, there was very little security for heritage
sites and the treasures they held.
Eventually, negotiations between UNESCO and the Nepali defence forces facilitated
the removal of heavy machinery from heritage sites and the provision of some
security personnel. The military and police also provided assistance by rescuing
National treasures from the Hanuman Dhoka Palace museum, which was too
dangerous for museum staff to enter (ICCROM, 2015).
2.3 Rapid assessment and crowd mapping
Earthquake is a regular occurrence in Nepal, with large destructive quakes occurring
approximately every 80 to 100 years in Kathmandu. Training in disaster risk
management for Nepal’s cultural heritage had therefore been provided in the years
leading up to the Gorkha earthquake by UNESCO’s cultural heritage specialists
ICOMOS–ICORP (UNESCO’s International Council on Monuments and Sites–
International Scientific Committee on Risk Preparedness), ICCROM (International
Centre for the Study of the Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property) and R–
DMUCH (Institute for Disaster Mitigation for Urban Cultural Heritage, Ritsumeikan
University, Kyoto) (ITC, 2009; Weise, 2015). Although disaster risk management
plans had not been completed or implemented, staff of the Department of
Archaeology (the state party responsible for protection and management Nepal’s
cultural heritage) and property managers acted as soon as they had dealt with their
own immediate family needs to identify and secure sites and undertake preliminary
damage assessments.
Within two days of the earthquake, and with the assistance of local and international
heritage networks (ICOMOS-ICORP and ICCROM) and social media, a crowd
mapping initiative was established to record the damage to heritage sites across the
country (ICCROM, 2015). Property managers, museum staff, community members
and friends were encouraged to record and photograph the damage to monuments,
museums, libraries and other sites, and locate them using a geographic information
mapping system (GIS). This formed the basis for a rapid assessment to determine
the extent of damage and potential needs.
2.4 Post disaster needs assessment (PDNA)
Data gathered through the crowd mapping exercise was used to inform the Post
Disaster Needs Assessment (PDNA) prepared by the Government of Nepal (National
Planning Commission, 2015). The assessment identified cultural heritage as one of
the key areas for recovery assistance within the social sector, recognizing its critical
role in cultural identity, international tourism, and economic development.
2.5 Coordination to rescue cultural heritage
Within two weeks of the Gorkha earthquake, and with the assistance of UNESCO
and ICOMOS Nepal, an Emergency Response Coordination Office (ERCO) was
established within the Department of Archaeology. ERCO’s role was to liaise with
government and provide coordination between the Department, site managers,
international responders and other stakeholders to secure and protect sites, salvage
artifacts and building materials, undertake more detailed damage assessments of
buildings and sites, shore partially collapsed structures, and prepare for the
monsoons.
2.6 First Aid for Nepal’s Cultural Heritage
In the early stages following the earthquake, an Italian search and rescue team
provided urgent stabilization of damaged monuments to make them safe and prevent
further damage (Weise, 2015). Additional assistance from the Department of
Archaeology, museum staff, local community members and professionals (architects
and engineers), artisans, and members of the armed forces and police, was provided
to assess damage to monuments and rescue artifacts. Hands-on training was
provided by experts from ICCROM, ICOMOS–ICORP, ICOM (International Council of
Museums), the Smithsonian Institution and the Prince Claus Fund (ICCROM, 2015)
on appropriate systems for salvaging, inventorying, cleaning and safely storing
artifacts and building elements, and emergency shoring.
2.7 Preparing for the Monsoons
It is well known that disasters rarely consist of a single event, and that secondary
hazards compound the effects. In Nepal, the monsoon rains were due two months
after the earthquake, and the already damaged sites had to be protected. The large
stupa of Swayambhu, which had occupied its hilltop position for a thousand years,
was cracked during the earthquake. As nobody knew its construction or what relics it
contained, temporary sealing of the cracks was considered essential to prevent water
entry and further damage until permanent repairs could be carried out after the
monsoon rains. Through discussion with materials conservation experts in the
ICORP network an appropriate method was found and implemented. Unfortunately,
failure to provide similar protection to the damaged dome of the Vishwarupa temple
at Pashupati resulted in its collapse at the end of the wet season (site evidence).
2.8 Enabling customary activities to continue
The earthquake had a substantial impact on people’s customary practices as many
of the temples and shrines where daily offerings were made had been destroyed. At
such a devastating time, the maintenance of these rituals was considered extremely
important and therefore, despite the damage, temple sites were reopened to the
public as soon as the debris was cleared (Parashar, 2015). Small shelters and
temporary hoardings were built around the linga that survived at the heart of each
temple site (site evidence). At Pashupati, on the Bagmati River, and at other funeral
sites, the ritual burning of the bodies of the thousands of people that had died
continued.
At Bauddanath, the local Buddhist community replaced the decayed central pole
(yasti) of the stupa, which represents the axis-mundi connecting heaven and earth,
following 20 days of ritual offerings. Although the higher levels of the stupa plinth are
still closed to the public, circumambulation around its base has been able continue
(site evidence).
Nepal hosts a large number of seasonal festivals associated with the sacred sites,
many of which involve parades through the streets. A huge effort was made by local
authorities to clear debris and prop damaged buildings to ensure that these festivals
could continue. The festivals were seen as an important way of uniting the
community and promoting healing.
3. Recovery planning
3.1 Coordination
Recovery planning for Nepal’s cultural heritage is an enormous task that will require
a high level of coordination between the Department of Archaeology, Government,
local authorities, property managers, site specific community and stakeholder groups
and international donors and experts. An understanding of the interrelationships
between urban infrastructure and specific site conditions, and between heritage,
development and tourism is needed.
Because heritage sites are located within urban contexts, which often contribute to
their important settings, recovery planning must take into account the following
considerations: the need to protect and maintain the heritage values of sites (both
tangible and intangible), the need to maintain the significant settings of the sites
whilst allowing new sympathetic development that accommodates modern living
standards, and the need to provide sustainable income sources for the community.
Capacity development in recovery planning and risk reduction was provided by
ICCROM, ICOMOS–ICORP, ICOMOS Nepal and R–DMUCH in early 2016 as a
follow up to previous workshops. A symposium was then held by the Department of
Archaeology and ICOMOS Nepal that engaged the Nepal Reconstruction Authority,
the Municipality of Kathmandu, site managers, local architects, engineers, artisans
and community stakeholders, with the aim of promoting coordination among the
various stakeholders and actors, and evolving a shared vision for risk reduction and
rehabilitation of cultural heritage sites and historical settlements (ICCROM, 2016).
3.2 Maintaining heritage values and building back better
A clear understanding of the attributes that express the cultural values of heritage
properties and their settings is essential to maintaining those values during recovery.
The focus on ‘building back better’, which generally assumes that new technologies
must replace the old, fails to recognize that traditional architecture has inbuilt
resilience and empirical knowledge, developed over generations through cyclical
testing in repeated earthquake events. It is not good enough to say that a structure
failed because of the earthquake. Traditional buildings have inbuilt anti-seismic
elements, which generally perform well during seismic events provided they are well-
maintained and not compromised by changes to them or their surroundings. It is
important to know exactly what failed and why.
Detailed assessment of the damage to determine causes of failure requires specific
knowledge of traditional construction technologies and materials and a good
understanding of local site conditions. With regards to the World Heritage property,
all work must be undertaken with a view to maintaining the Outstanding Universal
Value (OUV) for which the place was inscribed on the World Heritage list, and in
strict accordance with heritage conservation principles that focus on maintaining
integrity and authenticity (WHC, 2012). This involves retaining as much of the original
fabric of the buildings as possible and only supplementing and strengthening it where
necessary (Australia ICOMOS, 2013).
The Department of Archaeology and ICOMOS Nepal have prepared conservation
principles, guidelines and implementation procedures to guide repair and
reconstruction on Nepal’s heritage sites. However, capacity development also needs
to be provided for local professionals (architects and engineers) with little training or
experience in traditional construction and limited understanding of heritage
conservation principles, to enable their successful participation in the recovery
process. Without this training, recovery of heritage values (international, national and
local), integrity and authenticity is at risk.
3.3 Craftsmanship
Much of the aesthetic value of Nepal’s built heritage is in its fabric: the form and
structure of the buildings and the exquisite craftsmanship exemplified in their brick,
timber and metalwork (WHC, 2012). The repair and /or reconstruction of the
monuments will require skilled artisans and craftsmen with extensive experience
working with traditional materials and using traditional construction techniques.
Unfortunately, due to modernization, accelerated urbanization and the introduction of
imported materials and technologies, the traditional skill base in Nepal has been
severely eroded.
The Department of Archaeology and ICOMOS Nepal are engaging in efforts to locate
skilled artisans and craftsmen to be employed on the projects and train others. The
extent of damage to heritage properties and their ongoing repair and maintenance
needs over the following years will provide a long-term income source for these
workers. In recent years, the under recognition of these skills within the community,
and consequent low status and wages associated with this type of work, has been a
barrier to the intergenerational transfer of traditional building skills. The recovery
provides an opportunity to reverse this situation, revalue traditional construction
techniques and provide a sustainable skill base for the future of Nepal’s built cultural
heritage.
3.4 Materials shortages
The critical anti-seismic elements of the traditional buildings in Nepal are timber. The
brickwork and tiles provide the weatherproof cladding to the structures. Nepal has
been experiencing a severe shortage of quality construction timber for many years.
Shortages reported following the 1934 earthquake resulted in many structures not
being rebuilt or being rebuilt on a smaller scale. There is still a severe shortage of
Saal wood, the traditional rot and insect resistant hardwood used in the heritage
structures.
High quality fired bricks that match the bricks (size, shape, colour and finish) used in
the heritage structures are also difficult to obtain. Although hundreds of brickworks
are scattered across the Kathmandu Valley, most produce a much inferior quality
brick to that needed for the reconstruction of Nepal’s heritage buildings.
Although the Department of Archaeology has committed to ensuring supply of these
materials, without Government intervention and long term planning to ensure
sustainable supply into the future, it will be very difficult to maintain the quality,
authenticity and longevity of the monuments into the future.
3.5 Reengaging tourists
The earthquake has had a very significant impact on tourism in Nepal, with numbers
falling to a fraction of their former levels. Although the natural landscape of Nepal
probably provided the greatest attraction for tourists, the built heritage of Kathmandu
was also a major draw card. The collapse of the temples, palaces and housing in the
historic urban precincts of Hanuman Dhoka, Patan and Bhaktapur has had a very
large economic impact on local businesses. Tourist and pilgrim numbers also
decreased at the principal religious sites.
Most of the sites were reopened to the public as soon as the debris was cleared and
interpretive signage was erected showing images of the affected temples prior to the
disaster. As part of the recovery it is intended to allow visitors to view the
reconstruction works and watch craftsmen in action, reproducing the intricately
carved elements that will re-adorn the structures. Good management of tourists will
be essential to ensuring their safety and the safety of workers, artifacts and
monuments.
ICCROM and ICOM have held workshops with museum staff, focusing on the
development of safe and interactive storage spaces for museum collections to
enable visitors to see objects and understand their context through thoughtfully
prepared interpretive panels and photographs. The goal is to bring visitors back to
the museums and boost revenue (ICCROM, 2016).
4. Lessons for Australia There are many lessons that Australia can learn from the Nepal experience,
particularly about the protection and disaster and emergency management of cultural
heritage.
4.1 Recognising the importance of cultural heritage
Firstly, it must be recognised that cultural heritage has values that are important to
Australian communities, their sense of identity, their attachment to place, and their
emotional and psychological well-being. The UNISDR (United Nations Office of
Disaster Risk Reduction) has specifically included cultural heritage in the Sendai
Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction for 2015–2030 (UNISDR, 2015), thereby
recognising its importance to communities and the necessity of its inclusion in
disaster risk management planning. The importance of cultural heritage to
community identity is also recognized in a recent memorandum of understanding
between UNESCO and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), which
outlines its need for protection in conflict situations (UNESCO, 2016).
Cultural Heritage sites in Australia are protected under legislation at national, state
and local levels. Heritage assets, including urban precincts and conservation areas,
are documented and mapped on Local Environmental Plans (LEPs), and the heritage
values associated with such places are clearly stated.
4.2 Inclusion of cultural heritage in emergency plans
Cultural heritage places should be clearly identified for special attention in
emergency plans. The linking of heritage maps and inventories to hazard maps
would enable emergency response teams to identify whether a place is of heritage
significance and may therefore require a different approach to site management in
the aftermath of disaster. The use of GIS mapping may facilitate this.
4.3 Coordination
Coordination between the local, regional, state or national emergency control officer
and local and state authorities should also include liaison with the appropriate
heritage authorities. This may include the Heritage Branch of the State Government
and the peak heritage body in Australia, Australia ICOMOS. This would facilitate the
security and safety of heritage sites (World Heritage, national and state significant
properties), and ensure that appropriately trained experts are engaged in their
damage assessment and stabilization.
4.4 Rubble is not just rubbish
The debris associated with the destruction of heritage sites should not be assumed
to be rubbish. It may contain elements that are precious and irreplaceable. These
need be salvaged, sorted and stored by experts who know what to look for. Even the
rubble itself may be important to the repair or reconstruction of heritage places and
should not be discarded.
4.5 Expert damage assessment
Traditional nineteenth and early twentieth century building construction is a specialist
field of knowledge and its stability and recoverability requires evaluation by
engineers, architects and builders with substantial expertise and experience in the
area. Similarly, assessment of damage to a structure such as the Sydney Opera
House would require an expert with knowledge of its structural systems. Through
consultation with Australia ICOMOS, appropriately qualified professionals can be
found to undertake rapid assessments and organize emergency stabilization for such
structures.
4.6 Disaster risk management planning for heritage properties
All heritage properties should have disaster risk management plans that incorporate
mitigation, preparation, response and recovery strategies. This is a requirement of
World Heritage properties, but should be extended to national and state-listed
properties.
4.7 Training of property managers and staff
Recognising that often the first responder is the person on the ground at the time of
the incident, appropriate training should be given to heritage property managers and
staff to enable them to respond quickly to a hazard, evacuate people and collections,
and secure the property.
4.8 Building Upgrades
Although new buildings in Australia must be built in accordance with modern building
codes and standards, many heritage buildings would not meet these standards. Thus
the risk to heritage and to people in the vicinity of these buildings is much higher.
Upgrades to heritage buildings usually only occur when major refurbishment works
occur. Thus, there is a need for appropriate mitigation strategies to be put in place.
5.0 Conclusion
The protection of cultural heritage in times of disaster has received very little
attention to date in Australia. Yet its loss is greatly mourned as it impacts our identity,
and our connection to our community and place. For our heritage to survive so it can
be passed on to future generations, it needs to be considered in emergency
planning, response and recovery.
Abbreviations DoA Department of Archaeology ICOMOS International Council of Monuments and Sites ITC International Training Course R–DMUCH Institute of Disaster Risk Mitigation for Urban Cultural Heritage,
Ritsumeikan University, Kyoto WHC World Heritage Committee References
Australia ICOMOS (2013) The Burra Charter: The Australia ICOMOS Charter for Places of Cultural Significance.
Barry, Ellen and Najar, Nida (2015) As Human Crisis Takes Priority After Nepal
Quake, a Nation’s Treasures Become Its Scrap, New York Times, 28 April, 2015 Eaton, Jonathon (2015) Overview Report of the Nepal Cultural Emergency
Crowdmap Initiative, ICCROM and ICORP, 19 May 2015 Ekin, Annette (2015) Digging to save Nepal's cultural heritage after quake:
Smartphone app being developed to document salvaged artefacts as historians and architects work on assessing the damage, Humanitarian Crises, 01 May 2015
Gautam, D, Pradhananga, S, Kunwar, R.B and Sharma, M.K (2015) Preliminary
Report of Monuments Affected by Earthquake April 25, 2015, Nepal Government, Ministry of Culture, Tourism and Civil Aviation, Department of Archaeology: Kathmandu, Nepal
ICCROM (2015) First Aid to Nepal’s Cultural Heritage: from recovery to risk
reduction, ICCROM website, 15 June, 2015, http://www.iccrom.org/first-aid-to-nepals-cultural-heritage/
ICCROM (2016) ICCROM and Nepal: from response to resilience, ICCROM website,
25 April, 2016, http://www.iccrom.org/iccrom-and-nepal-from-response-to-resilience/
ITC (2009) Proceedings of UNESCO Chair Programme on Cultural Heritage Risk
Management, International Training Course (ITC) on Disaster Risk Management of Cultural Heritage, Ritsumeikan University, 2009, the 4th year in Kyoto and Kathmandu: Institute of Disaster Risk Mitigation for Urban Cultural Heritage, Ritsumeikan University, Kyoto
National Planning Commission (2015) Nepal Earthquake 2015, Post Disaster Needs
Assessment, Vol. A: Key Findings, Government of Nepal: Kathmandu Parashar, Utpal (2015) Nepal reopens quake-hit heritage sites despite UNESCO
concerns, Hindustan Times, Kathmandu, Jun 15, 2015 16:28 IST
Rana, Kishor (2015) Drone Flight over Kathmandu, posted on Facebook by Al Jazeera English, 28 April, 2015, https://www.facebook.com/aljazeera/videos/10153375507303690/
Shrestha, Dr.S.S. (2016) “Earthquake 2015 In Nepal: Response And Recovery
(Cultural Heritage)”, presentation at US ICOMOS conference, Implementation of the cultural heritage-related elements of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (SFDRR), 9–11 March 2016, Washington DC, USA
Theophile, Erich and Gutschow, Niels (nd) The Sulima Pagoda: East meets Wests in
the Restoration of a Nepalise Temple, Weatherhill: Trumbull, CT USA UNESCO (2016) Director-General in Geneva to strengthen UNESCO’s action for
Human rights, ODG 26 February 2016, UNESCO website, http://www.unesco.org/new/en/member-states/single-view/news/director_general_in_geneva_to_strengthen_unescos_action_for_human_rights/#.Vx7_y1IZDdk
UNISDR (2014) Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030, United
Nations Weise, Kai (2015) (1) Revisiting Kathmandu: Safeguarding Living Urban Heritage,
International Symposium, 25-29 September 2013, UNESCO: France Weise, Kai (2015) (2) President of ICOMOS Nepal, in personal communication 1
November 2015 World Heritage Committee (2012) Statement of Outstanding Universal Value for the
Kathmandu Valley World Heritage Property, Nepal, ID No.121 bis, extract from Adoption of retrospective Statements of Outstanding Universal Value, WHC-12/36.COM/8E, p.124
Stress and Growth Experiences Reported by Post-bushfire Field Research Interviewers
Adjunct Professor Jim McLennan
Dr Lynette Evans
School of Psychology and Public Health
La Trobe University
Bundoora, Victoria 3086
Lyndsey Wright
Contract Research and Education Manager
Bushfire and Natural Hazards Cooperative Research Centre
East Melbourne, Victoria 3002
Paper presented at the
Australian and New Zealand Disaster and Emergency Management Conference
Jupiters Gold Coast (QLD), 30 – 31 May 2016
Stress and Growth Experiences Reported by Post-bushfire Field Research Interviewers
ABSTRACT: There are numerous reports that those involved in disaster response and recovery are at-risk of developing post-traumatic stress disorder or experiencing secondary traumatic stress. There are few reports of research concerning the experiences of post-disaster field research interviewers. This presentation describes findings from follow-up surveys of those who conducted five post-bushfire research field interview studies of bushfire-affected residents 2009 - 2014. Aim: To investigate (a) the nature of the field research interviewers’ experiences; and (b) their perceptions of the adequacy of their preparation for the task. Method: Sixty-five post-bushfire research interviewers were invited to take part in a survey about their post-bushfire field experiences. Thirty-three researchers (51%) responded. Relevance: There is widespread agreement that climate change may lead to more frequent extreme weather events and associated natural disasters. Following such events agencies are likely to commission post-disaster field research studies in order to evaluate their preparation and response endeavours. Researchers need to be adequately prepared for such tasks. Results: Of the 33 research interviewers who responded 18 (55%) reported that at least one of their interviews had been notably emotionally stressful. Three (9%) reported experiencing moderate levels of stress up to one week after their field interviews, one (3%) reported experiencing a mild level of stress, 23 (70%) reported experiencing low levels of stress, six (18%) reported not experiencing any stress symptoms up to a week after their interviews. None of the researchers reported any stress symptoms at the time they were surveyed. Twenty one researchers (64%) reported that their experiences overall resulted in positive personal outcomes. Reports about their training and preparation were mostly favourable. Conclusions: Interviewing residents affected by future disaster events will be psychologically impactful for many who conduct post-disaster field research. For the majority, the experience will probably have some distressing elements, but will be viewed positively overall. A small percentage may experience moderate levels of secondary traumatic stress, especially if the event involved multiple fatalities, but this will be relatively transient. The approach to training and preparation prior to the post-bushfire field interviews was probably adequate, but will need more rigorous evaluation in future.
Keywords: secondary traumatic stress; vicarious traumatisation, field researchers; disasters;
adversarial growth
Introduction
There is widespread agreement that climate change may lead to more frequent extreme weather
events and associated natural disasters (United Nations Office For Disaster Risk Reduction,
2015). Agencies plan for these events and develop policies and programs to mitigate the risks
to communities, and are likely to continue to commission post-disaster interview-based field
research studies in order to evaluate their preparation and response endeavours (e.g., Every et
al. 2015). Researchers need to be adequately prepared for such tasks. There is an extensive
literature about psychological impacts of disasters on survivors (e.g., Neria et al. 2008) and
numerous reports describing damaging psychological effects on disaster responders, including
police, fire and other emergency rescue workers; and emergency medical personnel (e.g.,
Alexander & Klein, 2009). Several studies have investigated psychological distress reported
by researchers who interviewed individuals about distressing experiences such as violence,
sexual abuse, and torture (e.g., Coles et al. 2014). There is a long history of post-disaster field
research involving interviews with survivors (see, for example, Fritz & Marks, 1954).
However, as noted by Eriksen and Ditrich (2015), there are few published reports of research
investigating psychological effects on researchers who conduct post-disaster field interviews
with survivors. The distinctive role of post-disaster field researchers typically is to elicit
information from survivors about the nature of the event in order to mitigate future risk--rather
than to provide assistance or to explore empathically the distressing experiences of survivors.
The small number of reports we found were anecdotal accounts of researchers’ personal
experiences. Greenall and Marselle (2007) discussed their experiences interviewing survivors
of the September 2001 terrorist attacks on the New York World Trade Centre about evacuation
behavior:
When exposed to the traumatic experiences of our participants we sometimes found ourselves psychologically affected by what we were researching…we had tears in our eyes and almost had to halt some interviews for our own benefit, let alone the participant’s…this is known as vicarious traumatisation: the psychological process of becoming traumatised as a consequence of empathic engagement with survivors and their traumatic stories…we found ourselves re-experiencing 9/11 through recurrent recollections of survivor’s stories, and they even formed the basis of occasional nightmares…we experienced feelings of detachment and estrangement…we experienced feelings of dissociation from the normal world…one of our team withdrew from social interaction… (p. 545)
In other accounts, van Zijll de Jong et al. (2011) described researchers’ reactions while
conducting social impact assessments following the 2009 South Pacific tsunami; Dominey-
Howes (2015) offered a personal reflection on the emotional trauma of conducting post-disaster
research; and Eriksen and Ditrich (2015) discussed a researcher’s vicarious traumatisation
experiences associated with post-wildfire ethnographic research. What seemed to be lacking
were reports of systematic research investigating the experiences of post-disaster researchers
that (a) advanced conceptual understanding of the nature and determinants of secondary post-
traumatic stress; and (b) provided evidence-based guidance for preparing and supporting post-
disaster field researchers. The study described here is a contribution to remedying this lack.
We summarize findings from a retrospective study of researchers who conducted post-bushfire
field interviews following severe bushfire events in four Australian states 2009-2014. A
detailed account of the research procedure and an in-depth presentation of findings are
available in McLennan and Evans (2015). A brief report was published previously by
McLennan et al. (2016).
Residents of many areas of Australia are at high risk from bushfires (called ‘wildfires’
in North America and ‘forest fires’ in Europe). Over the period 1900 – 2011, 260 major
bushfires in Australia claimed 825 lives (Blanchi et al.). Following disastrous bushfires in
Victoria on 7 February 2009 in which 172 civilians died and more than 2,000 homes were
destroyed, Bushfire Cooperative Research Centre (BCRC) researchers conducted interviews
with survivors (McLennan et al. 2013). The researchers visited properties and interviewed
residents about pre-bushfire risk perceptions, plans and preparations in the event of bushfire
attack; and their decisions and actions during the fire. Subsequently, the BCRC undertook five
similar post-bushfire interview studies in the period 2011 to 2013, and the Bushfire and Natural
Hazards Cooperative Research Centre (BNHCRC) undertook a similar study in 2014. Each
was carried out by staff and students from universities, all of whom had prior experience in
conducting interviews about sensitive topics. All seven post-bushfire studies were approved by
university human research ethics committees. The findings from the seven studies and likely
implications for community bushfire safety are summarized in McLennan et al. (2015).
As part of their formal preparation for conducting their post-bushfire field interviews
with survivors the researchers were reminded that interviews could be stressful, were informed
about physical hazards they might encounter in the fire-affected area, and given instruction
about stress management and self-care during the deployment and afterwards—including the
importance of sharing their experiences with peers and maintaining regular contact with family
and friends.
Following the 2009 – 2014 program of post-bushfire research interviews we concluded
that there was a unique opportunity to undertake systematic research into (a) the experiences
of the interviewers, so as to advance conceptual understanding of the nature and potential
determinants of secondary post-traumatic stress among post-disaster field interview
researchers; and (b) the effectiveness of the preparation and training provided to the researchers
prior to their post-bushfire field interview deployment.
Method
Participants
Invitations to complete a self-report survey questionnaire or take part in an interview were sent
to 65 researchers who had participated in five of the seven post-bushfire field research
interview studies for the BCRC or the BNHCRC over the period 2009 to 2014 (contact details
were not available for the researchers who had taken part in two of the post-bushfire interview
studies). There were 33 respondents1, a 51% overall response rate; across the five studies
response rates ranged from 25% to 75%. Twenty (61%) of the respondents were females and
13 (39%) were males. Their mean age was 43.4 years (SD = 14.33 years). Nineteen (57%) had
a postgraduate degree, 13 (39%) had an undergraduate degree, one had a college diploma. The
majority (22, 66%) had backgrounds in behavioral or social science. Most (24, 73%) were
university employees, while nine (27%) were postgraduate students. All reported having
previous experience in conducting research interviews about sensitive topics.
Measure
A survey instrument was constructed in two versions: a self-administered questionnaire and a
structured interview guide. Although instructions differed, the questions in both had identical
content. Both asked about stressful interviews with bushfire-affected residents, their features
and how any researcher-distress was managed. Participants then completed a 20-item
secondary stress symptoms measure (SSSM) which comprised: (a) 17 items based on the
Secondary Traumatic Stress Scale (STSS; Bride et al. 2004); (b) two items from the depression
sub-scale of the Depression, Anxiety and Stress Scale (DASS; Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995);
and (c) a de-realization item from the Acute Stress Disorder Scale (ASDS; Bryant et al. 2000).
Some items were modified slightly to take into account that the original post-bushfire
interviews with affected residents did not have a therapeutic focus. All the items are in Table
1, all were answered on five-point response scales: 1 = no, I never experienced this; 2 = once
or twice; 3 = on several occasions; 4 = often; 5 = a lot—almost every day. The internal
consistency of the measure was adequate (α = .91) Total scores could range from 20 (no
symptoms) to 100. Researchers were also invited to (a) describe their overall assessments of
how their interviewing experiences affected them personally, and (b) comment on the adequacy
of the pre-deployment training and preparation provided. Responses to both questions were
inspected for content. Descriptions of the overall impacts of field interviews were categorized
as positive or negative. Comments about the adequacy of training and preparation were
categorized as positive or negative. Categorisations were by two judges. There were no
disagreements.
Procedure
The study reported here was approved by the La Trobe University Human Ethics Committee.
The BCRC and BNHCRC offices had field researcher contact details from five of the seven
post-bushfire deployments. The 65 researchers were invited to contact a La Trobe University
staff member to either complete and return a self-administered survey questionnaire, or take
part in a telephone or face-to-face interview if the field researcher preferred this. The 2013 and
2014 post-bushfire research interviewers were surveyed three months after their deployments.
The 2009 post-bushfire interviewers were surveyed in 2014. Of the 33 (51%) researchers who
responded: 27 completed the self-administered survey questionnaire, while 6 took part in an
interview with the staff member. Interviews were recorded and transcribed. No differences in
the patterns of responses to the questionnaires or the interviews were apparent.
Results
The average number of post-bushfire field interviews conducted by the 33 responding
researchers was 18, range: 5 to 54. Eighteen of the 33 researchers (55%) reported that at least
one interview had been experienced as notably emotionally stressful; each typically involved
several distressing elements. Seven of these 18 interviews (39%) involved deaths of family
members, or friends or neighbors; 12 (67%) involved the resident surviving serious threats to
life; 13 (72%) involved destruction of the family home2. The most frequently reported reactions
of the researchers during these interviews were: sadness (10, 30%) and holding back tears (8,
24%): …the lady I interviewed had lost her husband in the fire. She had evacuated with her horses and son and the husband had stayed to defend and get everything else ready before leaving. Unfortunately the husband had become overcome by smoke and was found deceased in the burnt-out family home. This is one of the hardest interviews I have ever done...Although I didn’t cry during the process…it was still extremely emotional. (2009 Victorian bushfires; researcher #008)
The most frequent methods by which researchers managed their feelings of distress during
these interviews were: concentrating on their role and focusing on the householder’s words
(14, 78%), and trying to communicate understanding of the householder’s experiences (10,
56%). The most frequent methods used by the researchers to manage their stress over the
deployment period were talking about their experiences: with their peers (15, 83%) and with
family members via phone (7, 39%). Six of the 18 researchers (33%) used physical exercise to
reduce stress. Three (17%) described withdrawing from their peers; three (17%) described
consuming more alcohol than usual.
Table 1 lists the frequency with which each of the 20 secondary stress symptom
measure (SSSM) items were reported. Three symptoms were reported by more than 25% of
the researchers up to one week after the interviews: I thought about some of the interviews
when I didn’t intend to (61%); Reminders of some of the interviews upset me (48%); I thought
that I did not want to do any more interviews like these (27%). Nine researchers reported
experiencing one to three symptoms one month after the post-bushfire interviews. No
researchers reported symptoms at the time of being surveyed.
SSSM total scores were calculated; scores could range from 20 (no symptoms reported)
to a maximum of 100: M = 26.4; SD = 8.00; range = 20 to 52. Six researchers (18%) reported
no symptoms. SSSM total scores were not related to any of the demographic characteristics of
the researchers, nor to the number of interviews conducted. However, SSSM total scores were
significantly higher overall for the nine researchers who conducted interviews following the
multi-fatality 2009 Victorian bushfires compared with researchers’ scores (n = 24) from the
other four fire events which did not result in fatalities. Because of the high positive skew of the
score distributions and the unequal numbers of researchers being compared, a Mann-Whitney
U-Test was employed: 2009 Victorian post-bushfire researchers’ mean rank = 23.0; other
researchers’ mean rank = 14.75; Mann-Whitney U = 54.5; Z = 2.196; p = .029.
In order to enable some comparison of secondary traumatic stress levels, the secondary
stress symptoms of the post-bushfire research interviewers were compared with those of a
sample of disaster workers exposed to secondary stressors. Using just the 17 items from the
STSS (see Table 1), researchers’ STSS total scores were calculated (possible range = 17 to 85;
Bride et al. 2004): M= 22.8; SD = 6.70; Range = 17 to 42. The mean STSS score of 782 Italian
rescue workers (ambulance, fire, police, rescue services) reported by Argentero and Setti
(2010) was M = 25.0 (SD = 17.33), a value only slightly greater than that of the post-bushfire
research interviewers (Cohen’s d = 0.16). Bride (2007) proposed the following STSS severity
level categories on the basis of data obtained from 282 US social workers: < 28 = little or no
stress; 28 – 37 = mild stress; 38 – 43 = moderate stress; 44 – 48 = high stress; > 49 = severe
stress. Using Bride’s secondary traumatic stress severity level values, three of the 33 research
interviewers (9%) reported experiencing moderate levels of stress up to one week after their
field interviews, one (3%) reported experiencing a mild level of stress, 23 (70%) reported
experiencing little stress, and six (18%) reported not experiencing any of the 17 STSS
symptoms up to a week after their interviews.
Table1: Frequency of reporting secondary stress symptoms during and up to one week after post-
bushfire interviews (N = 33)
__________________________________________________________________________________________
Secondary stress
symptoms
1 2 3 4 5 Item
mean
(SD)
>
month
I thought about some of the
interviews when I didn’t
intend to a,b [I]
13
(39%)
8
(24%)
7
(21%)
4
(12%)
1
(3%)
2.15
(1.18)
2
(6%)
Reminders of some of the
interviews upset me [I]
17
(52%)
11
(33%)
3
(9%)
2
(6%)
-- 1.70
(0.88)
3
(9%)
I thought that I did not want
to do any more interviews
like these [AV]
24
(73%)
4
(12%)
5
(15%)
-- 1.42
(0.750
2
(6%)
I avoided things that
reminded me of some of the
interviews [AV]
25
(76%)
3
(9%)
1
(3%)
4
(9%)
1
(3%)
1.55
(1.12)
3
(9%)
I had trouble concentrating
[AR]
25
(76%)
5
(15%)
2
(6%)
-- -- 1.39
(0.83)
--
I felt emotionally numb
[AV]
25
(76%)
4
(12%)
4
(12%)
-- -- 1.36
(0.70)
1
(3%)
It seemed as if I was re-
living the fire as
experienced by the
residents [I]
25
(76%)
7
(21%)
1
(3%)
-- -- 1.27
(0.52)
--
I felt downhearted and
‘blue’ c
26
(79%)
4
(12%)
1
(3%)
2
(6%)
-- 1.36
(0.82)
1
(3%)
I had trouble sleeping [AR] 26
(79%)
5
(15%)
1
(3%)
1
(3%)
-- 1.30
(0.68)
1
(3%)
I had little interest in being
around other people [AV]
26
(79%)
4
(12%)
3
(9%)
-- -- 1.30
(0.64)
2
(6%)
I found I couldn’t
remember some of the
interviews [AV]
27
(82%)
4
(12%)
2
(6%)
-- -- 1.30
(0.77)
--
I was easily annoyed [AR] 28
(85%)
2
(6%)
2
(6%)
1
(3%)
-- 1.27
(0.72)
1
(3%)
I felt discouraged about the
future [AV]
28
(85%)
3
(9%)
2
(6%)
-- -- 1.21
(0.55)
1
(3%)
I had disturbing dreams
which seemed related to
the interviews [AV]
29
(88%)
4
(12%)
-- -- -- 1.12
(0.33)
--
I felt jumpy [AR] 29
(88%)
4
(12%)
-- -- -- 1.12
(033)
1
(3%)
I was less active than usual
[AV]
30
(91%)
1
(3%)
2
(6%)
-- -- 1.15
(0.51)
--
Things around me did not
seem real d
30
(91%)
2
(6%)
1
(3%)
-- -- 1.12
(0.42)
--
I was unable to become
enthusiastic about anything c
30
(91%)
2
(6%)
1
(3%)
-- -- 1.12
(0.42)
1
(3%)
I expected something bad to
happen in my life [AR]
33
(100%)
-- -- -- -- -- --
__________________________________________________________________________________________
Note: 1 = no, I never experienced this; 2 = Once or twice; 3 = On several occasions; 4 = Often; 5 = A lot—almost every day. >month = frequency of reporting of this symptom a month or more after the interviews. These 19 symptom reports were from nine researchers, each of whom reported between one and three symptoms. a Items are arranged in descending order of frequency of symptom reports. b Items were based on those from the Secondary Traumatic Stress Scale (Bride et al., 2004) except where otherwise noted; [I] = item from the Intrusion sub-scale; [AV] = item from the Avoidance sub-scale; [AR] = item from the Arousal sub-scale. c Items from the Depression sub-scale of the Depression, Anxiety and Stress Scale (Lovibond & Lovibond., 1996). d Item from the Acute Stress Disorder Scale (Bryant et al., 2000).
Twenty one post-bushfire researchers (64%) described positive personal outcomes in
terms of understanding and personal growth. These accounts resembled what other researchers
have proposed to be adversarial growth following personally challenging experiences
(Tedeschi & Calhoun, 2004).
Lasting effects? Probably more philosophical than anything negative—things like the fragility and randomness of existence, the importance of realistic planning, the inability of human beings to imagine catastrophe, the resilience and goodness of so many people in adversity. The experience was inspiring as well as distressing. (2009 Victorian bushfires; researcher #14)
Ten referred to the importance of their task as field research interviewers in contributing to
improved understanding of community bushfire safety, for example:
I clearly heard many disturbing stories told by people who very narrowly escaped death…My own personal experience was positive – it made me reassess the value of life as well as providing me with great professional knowledge of bushfire; and positive self-worth in contributing to the solution of a national problem. (2013 Tasmanian bushfire; researcher #024)
None of the researchers reported psychological harm resulting from their post-bushfire
interviewing experiences.
Twenty one researchers commented on the adequacy of the training and preparation
provided: 11 of these (52%) were completely positive; three (14%) were mostly positive but
suggested some changes; one (5%) was negative. The remaining six (18%) said that they
wished there had been more opportunity for peer debriefing—all were from one deployment
where logistical arrangements made it difficult for interviewers to share experiences at the end
of each day and at the end of the deployment.
Discussion
The first aim of the study was to investigate secondary traumatic stress experiences reported
by post-bushfire field research interviewers. The negative experiences described were found to
be similar in many respects to those reported by other disaster workers and trauma research
interviewers. The more stressful aspects were associated with survivors’ accounts of fatalities,
threats to life, and loss of homes; feelings of sadness through empathic identification with
interviewees were common. The most frequent means by which researchers managed their
negative experiences during interviews was by concentrating on their role of obtaining the
required information. It seems likely that this role of obtaining information in order to mitigate
future bushfire risk to other communities served a protective function. Almost two-thirds of
the researchers reported that, while unpleasant and sometimes distressing, their experience as
field research interviewers was positive overall. An important aspect of this for many was a
belief that their work would contribute to future bushfire disaster risk reduction.
In relation to the second aim--investigating the effectiveness of the training and
preparation provided--it is tempting to conclude that the finding of no lasting symptoms of
secondary traumatic stress among the responding research interviewers indicates the overall
effectiveness of their training and preparation. However, the lack of a control or comparison
group means that the most that can be claimed is that there is little indication that the training
and preparation was inadequate. Most interviewers reported using the recommended self-care
practices of sharing their experiences with peers and being in regular communication with
family and friends. It seems that structuring arrangements to facilitate peer debriefing
opportunities is desirable. However, more rigorous evaluation of training and preparation of
post-disaster field researchers is needed.
Limitations of the research are acknowledged. This was a retrospective self-report study, and
the sample size was small. The response rate of 51% is comparable with previous surveys of
trauma workers (Bride, 2004). However, almost half the researchers did not respond and
caution should be exercised in generalising the findings. It was not possible to compare
responders and non-responders, except to note that the percentages of females and males
among both were very similar. Also, while the 24 researchers from the four non-fatality
bushfire events were surveyed within three months of their deployment, the 9 researchers from
the multi-fatality bushfire event were surveyed five years after that event. This difference
should kept in mind when comparing the responses of the two groups. It is noteworthy that the
response rate for these 2009 Victorian bushfires interviewers was the highest of the five studies
(75%).
The findings suggest that the following should be taken into account by those who
organise and manage post-disaster field research interview-based studies:
1. Interviewing residents affected by a disaster event will be psychologically impactful for
many who conduct post-disaster field research interviews, especially when the event resulted
in multiple fatalities. For the majority, the experience will probably have some distressing and
stressful elements but will be viewed positively overall. A small percentage will probably
experience moderate levels of distress, but the distress is likely to be relatively transient. The
risk of long-term psychological harm is likely to be quite low provided the researcher
interviewers are adequately trained and prepared by the research managers for what they may
encounter in the disaster area.
2. The levels of stress experienced overall by post-disaster research interviewers is likely to
rise with the number of fatalities and the magnitude of property and infrastructure destruction
associated with the disaster. This must be taken into consideration by research managers and
chief investigators in planning for training and supporting their field researchers.
3. Attention should be given to the apparent importance of integrating peer de-briefing
discussion opportunities into the daily schedules of researcher activities, especially in
circumstances where the research interviewers may not all be accommodated together after the
day’s interviewing.
4. Following a deployment, all aspects of the training and preparation provided to the
researcher interviewers need to be evaluated so as to ensure ongoing effectiveness.
5. Following a deployment, research interviewers should be followed-up after an appropriate
interval to monitor the levels of stress experienced by the researchers. The SSSM measure used
in the present study may be useful for this purpose since comparative data from the five 2009
– 2014 studies will be available (McLennan & Evans, 2015).
Notes 1 The 33 respondents provided 38 responses: four research interviewers took part in two or more post-bushfire studies. Only responses relating to first deployments have been included in the analyses reported here. 2 Several of the 18 respondents who described a notably stressful interview reported multiple features of each, so totals could exceed 18. Acknowledgements Sean Cowlishaw and Lindsay Pamment made major contributions to the research. The research was funded by the Bushfire Cooperative Research Centre and supported by the Bushfire & Natural Hazards Cooperative Research Centre. However, the views expressed here are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of those two organisations. The research was approved by the La Trobe University Human Ethics Committee, Reference FSTE HEC 13/R83; Chief Investigator: Lynette Evans; Co-investigators Jim McLennan and Lyndsay Pamment. We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting clarifications of a previous version of the paper.
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Resilience & medium-long term community recovery:
The Opportunity Waiting to Happen
Ms Louise Mitchell
Program Manager, Foundation for Rural and Regional Renewal
Bendigo, Victoria
Natalie Egleton
CEO, Foundation for Rural and Regional Renewal
Bendigo, Victoria
Paper presented at the
Australian and New Zealand Disaster and Emergency Management Conference
Broadbeach, Gold Coast (QLD), 30-31 May 2016
Introduction
Recovery programs are an essential facet of the comprehensive approach to emergency
management that includes mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery. It is widely
recognised that recovery has phases of its own including immediate, short, medium and
long-term. We argue the benefits of increased investment in medium to long-term recovery.
Allocating funds toward building capacity and connectedness in communities will contribute
directly to community resilience, defined by Norris (2008) as the ability of a community to
prepare for and recover from adverse circumstances that impact them into the future.
In a recent inquiry into the Australian Government funding of Natural Disaster Relief and
Recovery (Productivity Commission, 2014), the economic benefits of investing in mitigation
(both soft and hard) 1 over recovery was reported as an either/or proposition. It is not
however an either/or argument. Preparedness and resilience- building activity, including
hard and soft mitigation, can occur after the immediate/short-term recovery phase as well as
during the medium to long-term recovery, when the disaster is still in people’s memories
and communities have regained their capacity to work collectively. It is for this reason that it
has been recognised that this window of time is unique in terms of preparedness (PERI
2005, Alesch et al 2009, Nakagawa & Shaw 2004).
The medium to long-term recovery of communities is commonly a neglected component in
terms of supported activities/projects/programs that recognise that the impact of the disaster
may still be being dealt with (Rubin 2009). Community needs and expectations change
throughout the disaster response and recovery cycle, and it is in this context that “a long-
term commitment is required to continue to grow disaster resilience in our communities in
Australia” (Australian Business Roundtable, 2016).
Growing disaster resilience in our communities, particularly when they are in recovery,
requires appreciation of the communities as dynamic social systems and an understanding of
recovery in this context as outlined by Alesch et al (2009):
1 Soft mitigation includes mitigation actions which modify behaviour or embed risk in decision-making such as information provision, land use planning and building regulations (Productivity Commission 2014), Hard mitigation or infrastructure refers to physical structures or facilities that support the society and economy including roads, bridges, railways, ports, airports, school and hospitals as well as telecommunications, energy, water and sewage infrastructure.
‘Viewing the community as a system, rather than simply a collection of facilities, structures and people will enable an objective such as building resilience into the system so that it can absorb or reflect shocks and continue to function to be aspired to. Systems theorists tell us that systems survive only when they have an array of coping mechanisms at least equal to the array of challenges thrust upon them’.
This paper explores barriers to the uptake of resilience-building opportunities in the medium
to long-term recovery after a disaster, and offers examples of programs, projects and the
overarching mechanisms that are sensitive to and address these barriers. These programs
have been developed by a collaboration of partners committed to a strategic and community-
centred approach to the recovery of communities.2
Barriers to community resilience building in medium to long-term recovery
During the medium to long-term recovery after disaster the opportunity exists to enhance the
adaptive capacity and increase resilience in communities. Recovery is complex and will play
out differently for each community due to the fact that we are dealing with social, economic
and natural environment systems, the variable impact of different disasters and the
complexity for organisations leading and managing disaster recovery (Smith and Wegner,
2006). In the medium to long-term recovery, common barriers to building resilience include
1) resourcing, 2) volunteer and community fatigue, 3) fragmented social relations and 4)
organisational appetite for and ability to support an emergent approach over the long term.
Resourcing
This significant time period in a community’s recovery is often under-resourced and the
ongoing costs of re-establishing and providing for new initiatives may be way too high for
traditional funding mechanisms through local, state and federal governments. The economic
costs of disasters are increasing (Australian Business Roundtable, 2016) and this further
espouses the imperative for flexible funding that will support initiatives in medium to long-
2 A collaboration of NGO’s including the Foundation for Rural and Regional Renewal (FRRR), other Foundations, Trusts, Private and Public Ancillary Funds, corporations and individuals, as well as Government agencies have been working support communities affected by natural disasters. Working in partnership has assisted a strategic approach and helped to avoid duplication of effort and resources. FRRR has been assisting communities in their recovery from natural disaster events since Cyclone Larry in 2006, investing $11.5 million to date in recovery and resilience building initiatives.
term recovery that achieve resilience objectives, i.e. building the adaptive capacity and
adaptation of communities.
The national report, The Economic Costs of the Social Impact of Natural Disasters, (Deloitte
Access Economics, 2016) identifies and quantifies the social impacts of natural disasters,
including data on health and wellbeing, education, employment and community networks.
The report finds that the intangible3 costs of disasters are at least as high as the tangible
costs, resulting in the true cost of natural disasters being 50% greater than previously
estimated, as demonstrated in Table 1.
Disaster Intangible
Costs
Tangible
Costs
Black Saturday bushfires
(2009)
$3.9b $3.1b
Queensland floods (2010-
11)
$7.4b $6.7b
Newcastle earthquake
(1989)
$10.2b $8.5b
Table 1. Costs of Disasters
Government policy seeks greater community ownership of preparedness and medium to
long-term recovery is an ideal window for this. With the costs of disasters escalating and
predicted to be $33 billion per year by 2050 (Deloitte Access Economics, 2016), there is an
urgent imperative to provide resource support that will not only contribute to community
recovery but also directly or indirectly to disaster preparedness.
Volunteer and Community Fatigue
Alongside this dearth of resource support 12 months and ongoing after disaster, community
members are often experiencing fatigue due to the additional demands that recovery from
disaster has placed on them. After the 2009 bushfires over $305 million was allocated by
Victorian Bushfire Appeal Fund to restore infrastructure and services to bushfire affected
communities (FRRR, 2016a). Volunteers in these communities were accountable for
3 Intangible costs capture direct and indirect damages that cannot be easily priced such as death and injury, impacts on health and wellbeing, and community connectedness.
implementing these projects, with the weight of the responsibility falling on many
traumatised and unequipped individuals who had their community’s future in their hands.
Due to fatigue, many volunteers left their community organisations and some ceased to
volunteer altogether - an unintended outcome. To address this, a program called STEPS was
initiated through collaboration between the Victorian Bushfire Appeal Fund and the
Foundation for Rural and Regional Renewal , to support fire affected communities and
volunteers in their efforts to support and rebuild. An evaluation of this program found that at
the time the program was initiated:
54% of the participant volunteers rated their fatigue as high, and;
39% rated their fatigue as medium.
The reason for this included the following:
existing volunteers overloaded
personal recovery is still being attended to and taking its toll
high personal stress levels including internal disagreements, depression, family
breakdown
size of community means a low resource base and few replacement volunteers
age of committee members leading to retirement or capacity limitations
children/youth continuing to be impacted and therefore require greater supports
inadequately equipped for position/skills shortage
Community participants reported sentiments such as:
“Recently we lost the whole committee except the treasurer, the old committee was exhausted. We have lost two Presidents since the fires as they were involved in building their homes and concentrating on their business.”
“Volunteers are volunteered out. People want to but have just given so much. Volunteers have had to step back in their role to concentrate on their family and own emotional wellbeing.”
The peak of fatigue reported in this evaluation was mixed. Some participants reported it
occurred within the first 1-2 years after the fires whereas others reported it occurred around
4-5 years after the fires, when they had been working continuously on recovery and
rebuilding whilst playing roles in various committees without a break.
Fragmented Social Relations
In an action research approach to preparedness that adopted a participatory design, Akama et
al (2010) found that community uptake of their methods was inhibited by “deeply
entrenched obstacles – their sense of dependency on authority and fragmented social
relations among neighbours”. While data has not been collected to validate this, anecdotal
evidence attests to the difficulty communities have in taking next steps, when there is a
history of prior conflict, lack of trust or relationships are fragmented.
To varying degrees, fragmented social relations are found in most communities and can be
exacerbated after a disaster (Gordon, 2004). There is no easy answer to this for some
communities, however, with long-term support and inclusive engagement, or simply the
initiation of a community project, there is the possibility to transform these relationships.
Organisational appetite for and ability to support an emergent approach
For many organisations who work with communities, the appetite and ability to support
emergent approaches, in the community as a social system, is a factor that will impact
resilience building and preparedness.
Wheatley and Frieze (2015) offer ‘emergence’ as the fundamental scientific explanation for
a change theory that can be applied when working with community systems: “The world
doesn’t change one person at a time. It changes as networks of relationships form among
people who discover they share a common cause and vision of what’s possible …But
networks aren’t the whole story. As networks grow and transform into active, working
communities of practice, we discover how life truly changes, which is through emergence.
When separate, local efforts connect with each other as networks then strengthen as
communities of practice, suddenly and surprisingly a new system emerges at a greater level
of scale. This system of influence possesses qualities and capacities that were unknown in
the individuals.”
It is in the medium to long-term recovery when communities may be more able to be
engaged in both soft and hard mitigation, and now more able to organise collective
activities, that emergence can occur. This requires mechanisms that can support community
initiatives.
Mechanisms to support the building of resilience in communities during medium-long
term recovery
The mechanisms used to support medium to long term recovery and resilience building are
philanthropy; the gifting of time, resources, money or talent, and grants programs. The
philanthropic gifts are distributed to communities through grants and funded partnership
programs that targeted specific needs and opportunities in communities from 12 months to
seven years after disaster events.
Around 12 months after a disaster, when many individuals who were impacted have the
capacity to work more collectively in their communities, real opportunities exist for
communities to lead and build their own resilience. Figure 1 shows the evolution of response
and recovery provision to communities over time in response to community need. “As the
ability of community groups and organisations to function repairs, their level of input and
ownership over the recovery process increases to the point where the community becomes
fully functional”. (AGD, 2011).
Grant-making for self determination can step in here
Figure 1. Timing post disaster of grant-making aligning to Community driven needs assessment process (adapted from McKay in AGD 2011, p 160)
Through place-based grants programs and partnerships, communities are empowered in a
process of identifying priority needs and working together to deliver on the project.
Throughout the process relationships are developed, providing a sense of hope and improved
connectedness. The community group leading the project and any other groups involved
become the ‘self-organising' system referred to by Alesch et al (2009). The grants-making
organisation provides governance, keeps donors informed and enables flexibility so that
where initially identified needs change, processes can be implemented to cater for this.
The types of needs and opportunities 12 months after the impact of disaster that
communities have identified include (FRRR, 2016b):
support for volunteer fatigue in community groups
capacity building for community organisations
leadership capability development
strengthening of community networks, partnership and communications
practical human resource support
improving community connectedness and social wellbeing
community capacity building for future disasters
countering educational disengagement
support for early years development
support for mental health and trauma
strategies for mitigation and support after family breakdown
relieving financial barriers to participation in education
addressing educational disadvantage brought about by disaster impacts
Examples of programs and grants that support medium to long-term recovery
A place-based grants program entitled ‘Grants for Resilience & Wellness’ is providing
support to communities to address these ongoing and emerging recovery priorities. The
projects supported to date have taken diverse forms and approaches to responding to local
needs. They have each provided ways for people to come together, share skills and stories,
build relationships and community networks and strengthen their sense of belonging and
community identity beyond the disaster event. These types of activities are critical for
recovery and for building strong social capital (Chamlee-Wright and Storr, 2011).
Projects such as Kinglake Children’s Centre Parenting Support Program, Chum Creek
Primary School’s Mindfulness program, and the Berry Street Victoria Cartwheels program
were designed to support the needs of children by fostering creativity and providing
appropriate time and space for personal wellbeing. The Ellimatta Youth Action & Advisory
Group project, Marysville Upcycle, and Toolangi District Community House Community
Fitness project are providing community members with opportunities to connect and build
social capital in ways that are meaningful and relevant for them.
Table 2 shows outcomes of some of the projects supported through this particular program.
This aims to illustrate the diversity of projects and the level of benefit to communities. It is
important to note that whilst the number of people to benefit is important, not all projects
intend to have extensive reach, but rather a deeper level of support to fewer people, which
supports more at-risk people in their recovery.
Number of people benefitted
Project/ Organisation
Regions/ Towns
Feedback/Community outcomes
200 Saltbush community Initiatives: Pizza, Art & Stories
Bendigo “We thought conversations would be about past pain and trauma but instead these were about moving on, positive effects of being involved in the community post Black Saturday”.
10,000 Boolarra Folk Festival: Communications System
Boolarra “The new communications system made the annual event of the Boolarra Folk Festival much safer and more easily managed, and we anticipate that this 2 way radio system is an invaluable community asset. The now trained volunteers are able to be used in times of emergency, to assist the local emergency services to evacuate &/or manage traffic flow”.
“Having an effective radio system decreased the stress levels and increased the confidence of the event managing team”.
17 plus 12 on a waiting list
Marysville Men’s Shed: Mindfulness in Marysville
Marysville “40% of participants scored severe on the scale for depression, anxiety and stress before the course. After the course, 15% reported in the normal range while 25% rated in the mild or moderate range of severity”.
Number of people benefitted
Project/ Organisation
Regions/ Towns
Feedback/Community outcomes
“I am much less anxious”; “focus; a tool to continue to help me cope with panic attacks and physical stress. I was carrying so much physical stress; my body is more relaxed than it has been for 5 years”.
44 students plus mentors
Yea High School: Time & Space
Yea, including Kinglake Ranges
“The majority of the boys that participated felt that it had an impact on their relationship with their mother/mentor in a good way with some commenting that it has actually improved their relationship”.
138 Alpine Shire Council: Resilience Champions
Alpine “12 Resilience Champions completed training to host community events in the Alpine region, to improve disaster preparedness and resilience. Isolated people, women and families were priority groups to reach”.
“Of the community events held by Resilience Champions: neighbours met each other for the first time; fire plans were discussed that involved whole families; fire plans were written and shared; discussion about storing essential documents in safe place, having adequate insurance, surviving without power or water; plans for stock and pets; development of telephone and email lists; discussion of particular bushfire risks and neighbours showing each other the locations of their fire pumps and connections to water tanks”.
1,500 Bruarong Community Hall: Removal of dangerous tress
Alpine “The trees classified by the arborist as dangerous have been removed. This has enhanced community well-being as it has greatly lessened the risk of losing our loved community hall in any future bushfire events. A lot of community members have for years wanted to get rid of the old pines so are quite excited now it has finally happened. We have started planning the garden now the trees are removed and the neighbouring cattle can no longer wander in at will due to constantly broken fences caused by falling branches. Planning for future planting will provide further community engagement opportunities”.
Table 2: Examples of project outcomes
Figure 4: Whittlesea Men's Shed Members
Figure 3: Whittlesea Community Garden
Figure 6 & 7: Saltbush Community Initiatives: completed pizza oven & community involvement Figure 5: Marysville Upcycle Moomba Float
An independent evaluation of a community fitness program that was run over three years in
a community impacted by the 2009 bushfires found that in addition to individual benefits
including friendship and social interactions leading to more active and fulfilling lifestyles,
the community also benefitted through improved support for local groups activities and
services (Mackay, 2015). There was a marked increase in volunteering and involvement by
participants in community groups, which is a strong signal of increased connectedness and
therefore resilience. Mental health and health and wellbeing benefits were documented and
this along with a more connected community provides cost savings for public funding of
health and crisis services.
In the ‘Grants for Resilience and Wellness’ program, which has been running in Victoria
only, projects were broadly categorised according to project outcome. Figure 2 shows by
grant round, the numbers of grants funded 3 years after the fires, over a period of 3 years by
category (FRRR 2016c). These projects were initiated between 2012 (Round 1) and June
2015 (Round 7) each running for 12 months unless variations to the grant agreement were
applied for and approved. While capacity building for future disasters represents here only a
small proportion of the grants funded, there is strong anecdotal evidence that the impact of
the projects across all categories has been a strengthening of social capital. It is widely
accepted that increasing social capital builds community resilience.
0
1
2
3
4
5
Nu
mb
er
of
Pro
ject
s
Rd 1
Rd 2
Rd 3
Rd 4
Rd 5
Rd 6
Rd 7
Figure 2: Grants for Resilience and Wellness, Projects by Categories by Round, 2012 – June 2015, Rounds 1 - 7
Some of the community projects supported in the medium to long term after disaster that
have a direct link to emergency management policy objectives include:
Support to overcome immediate safety concerns including the purchase of UHF
radio networks to connect residents, and emergency power sources such as
generators (both of which have since been used during floods and severe fire
warnings)
Rochester and Elmore District Health Service (REDHS) researched the best legal
structure for the future Committee for Rochester (C4R), surveyed the community to
inform priorities and prepared an interim strategic plan in which they prioritised
recovery.
After 2011 floods, the Lockyer Valley Regional Council identified a broad range of
community needs but they had limited capacity to fund locally. They established a
Donation Account 4 and accumulated over $700,000 from business, trusts and
individuals, helping to fund a number of projects such as helipad construction, weed
eradication & control, and establishment of community hubs.
The resourcing of these grants and partnership programs enable community groups and
organisational partners to self-organise, create and innovate to begin to address the issues in
their context.
These mechanisms contribute to three of Australia’s National Strategy for Disaster
Resilience (COAG, 2011) suggested actions: partnering with those who affect change,
empowering individuals and communities to exercise choice and take responsibility, and
supporting capabilities for disaster resilience within communities.
Partnering with those who effect change
The NSDR notes the close connections between the formal system and the community
system and the importance of developing and strengthening “the partnership between
emergency management agencies and the community” (COAG, 2011 & AGD, 2014).
Building resilience is much broader than this when communities are conceptualised as self-
organising systems composed of networks of organisations and relationships.
4 FRRR has a special listing in the tax act that enables it to lend it’s Deductible Tax Recipient status to community groups fundraising for charitable purpose.
The grants and partnership programs actively encourage broad community support and
collaborative approaches to meet the presenting issues or capitalise on an opportunity to
improve community outcomes. The relationships developed between the grant-making
organisation and the community group leading a project are important. Regular
communications to maintain a trust relationship and awareness of unforseen changes to
projects enables the flexibility required to support the community.
The building of resilience through partnerships between organisations and community
groups is a process that takes time. A study by Curtin University (2013) on community
resilience in the town of Theodore, Queensland, found that “… community resilience cannot
be imposed on a community in the six weeks leading up to risk season. It depends on long
standing relationships within the community and aspects of social capital that need to be
built over years, even decades.”
Empowering individuals and communities to exercise choice and take responsibility
Weichselgartner et al (2014) expresses a concern in regard to the pursuit of the resilience
agenda “produced in a specific science-policy setting with particular institutional
arrangements, decontextualized top-down knowledge” that it offers a severely limited guide
to operational practice. A “co-designed bottom-up knowledge may have more purchase”.
The grants and partnerships programs are designed and reviewed with direct engagement
with local community groups and councils to ensure that the focus areas, grant amounts and
reach of the program continues to be responsive and adaptive to the long-term recovery
needs of communities.
In a number of programs there is a focus on community wellbeing, which links in with the
National Strategy for Disaster Resilience (2011) empowerment and shared responsibility
mantra as long as the broader community context is considered. A recent article by the
Beyond Bushfires team states that “Recognition of the wellbeing of a community, beyond its
disaster experience, affords the potential for empowerment and self-reflection through a
strengths-based lens.” (Gibbs et al., 2015). The focus on wellbeing and resilience in place-
based grants and partnership programs allows for the valuing of the diversity of
communities and therefore the diversity of projects that will be identified by those
communities to address their own issues and build their own community. In many projects
there is recognition that a focus other than on the disaster is key to engaging individuals and
community groups in projects.
As a result of this focus on wellbeing and a strength-based, community owned approach, a
diverse range of projects have been funded. These projects continue to facilitate community
connectedness and resilience, and as outlined above include community festivals,
community fitness, community safety, specific group conferences, arts projects and public
health programs for schools impacted by the disaster.
A challenge for agencies with emergency management responsibilities is the sense of
dependency on authority by communities. Akama (2015) realised that along with their
participatory design tools for preparedness, they “also had to build capacity in organisations
- local council, not-for-profit, emergency agencies who had resources, objectives and
dedicated staff – to shift their authority-centred practices towards one that supported
community-centred solutions”. McLennan (2016), studying the preparedness initiatives in
Warrandyte, Victoria, also reports on “the difficult balance participants in community-led
projects have to strike between working with the established disaster management system
while also seeking to challenge or influence at the same time”. Clearly, the way emergency
management agencies and communities work together towards the resilience agenda is still
emerging.
Supporting capabilities for disaster resilience within communities.
Key to the success of projects funded by these grants is the requirement for participatory and
capability building approaches. The sorts of capabilities for resilience supported and further
developed through these programs include the linking of adaptive capacities to adaptation as
articulated by Norris et al (2008):
“Community resilience is a process linking a network of adaptive capacities (resources with dynamic attributes) to adaptation after a disturbance or adversity. Community adaptation is manifest in population wellness, defined as high and non-disparate levels of mental and behavioral health, functioning, and quality of life. Community resilience emerges from four primary sets of adaptive capacities—Economic Development, Social Capital, Information and Communication, and Community Competence—that together provide a strategy for disaster readiness.”
The grass-roots initiatives enabled with these grants programs and partnerships also provide
for strengthening of the four characteristics of disaster resilient communities identified by
the National Strategy for Disaster Resilience (COAG, 2011): functioning well while under
stress; successful adaptation; self-reliance; and, social capacity.
However, as identified earlier in this paper, fragmented social relations in communities can
be a barrier to community resilience. Building the capacity of leaders in communities to
lead, create safe, inclusive spaces, mechanisms and processes for issues and situations,
which involve the potential for conflict is critical. In the new emergency management policy
environment of shared responsibility recommended by COAG (2011) building adaptive
governance capabilities and capacity in community organisations also assists for collective
processes in communities (Dodds et al, 2007). Capabilities and capacity is actively being
built through community leadership programs being supported by regional development
agencies and capacity building grants programs. Ensuring emergency management agencies
are linked in with these programs will build even greater capability at the community and
agency level.
Conclusion
The Regional Australia Institute (2013) identified “that a key challenge facing governments,
Non-Government Organisations (NGOs), local communities and other stakeholders in
disaster management is recognising the shift in timeframes from short-term recovery to
facilitating long-term community resilience”(p.2). They state that “more detailed,
comprehensive and locally contextualised planning is required to achieve this”. To enable
the capacities for this, engaging with communities in the broader context of their community
interests and functioning, in the medium to long term recovery period, is a critical
opportunity.
Barriers to building the resilience of communities in the medium to long term recovery time
period can be addressed with collective, pre-disaster partnerships and responsive programs.
Partnerships between government, non-government organisations (NGO), private/corporate
industries and communities can develop plans for resourcing for the medium to long term in
pre-planning for recovery. NGO’s working in disaster recovery and community resilience
building have mechanisms and flexibility to support an emergency approach, to support an
endeavour that is fundamentally based on trust and goodwill and the energy of community
(along with good governance and accountability). Governments alone are unable to deal with
the complexity of a community-centred approach to recovery from disasters. A stronger
investment and flexibility in funding arrangements to engage in partnerships is required.
Funding distribution mechanisms, such as grants programs and funded partnership
programs, designed to respond to community needs and build the connectedness and
capacity of communities, in the medium to long term recovery phase, are one of the many
tools that can be used to enhance resilience in local area communities. Evaluation of some of
these place-based programs, which have occurred as a result of partnerships between
government and NGO’s, have demonstrated a contribution to broader community resilience,
underpinning disaster resilience.
With a basis in asset-based community development, and consistent with the National
Community Engagement Framework principles5 (AGD, 2014), these place-based grants and
partnership programs (mechanisms) address many issues that contribute to community
wellbeing and resilience, in areas that include education, aged care, youth engagement, arts,
culture, men’s activities, women’s activities, local community infrastructure, and economic
development.
They also involve three of Australia’s National Strategy for Disaster Resilience (COAG,
2011) suggested actions: partnering with those who affect change, empowering individuals
and communities to exercise choice and take responsibility, and supporting capabilities for
disaster resilience within communities. While these programs may not always address
emergency management issues head on, through empowerment, relationship and capability
development in the post-disaster environment, resilience capacities are being built in these
communities.
Continuing partnerships across all sectors to fund community-led initiatives will give
communities the opportunity to build their adaptive capacity to withstand or respond to
future shocks to their community system, thereby building more disaster resilient
communities.
5 1. Understand the community: its capacity, strengths and priorities; 2. Recognise complexity; 3. Partner with the community to support existing networks and 4. Resources.
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Beyond the Emergency Assembly Point: building the capacity of children’s services to
prepare for and respond to emergencies
Melissa Morgan, Danielle O’Hara, Jessie Huard and Diana Bernardi
Australian Red Cross
Level 4, 464 Kent Street
Sydney 2000 NSW
Paper Presented at the Australian and New Zealand Disaster and Emergency Management
Conference 30 – 31 May 2016 Jupiters Gold Coast
Beyond the Emergency Assembly Point; building the capacity of children’s services to
prepare for and respond to emergencies
Abstract When bush fires impacted the Blue Mountains in October 2013, a number of
children’s services became acutely aware that their emergency management plans were not
sufficient in equipping staff with the knowledge to respond. Services discovered that many
assumptions about who could assist them were unfounded and untested. A significant gap in
knowledge and planning was identified.
Australian Red Cross designed and facilitated an interactive pilot workshop for children’s
services staff in the Blue Mountains to address these challenges. Results gathered following
the workshops indicated that staff immediately felt more informed, self-reliant, better
prepared, and confident to act during an emergency.
A follow up survey six months on found that as a result of the workshop, 100 percent of
participants felt more confident implementing their emergency plans and making decisions
during an emergency; 92 percent had undertaken preparedness activities with staff; 88
percent had undertaken preparedness activities with parents and 96 percent had undertaken
preparedness activities with children in their care.
Following the success of the pilot workshop, Red Cross facilitated an additional five
workshops across urban Sydney and its semi-urban and rural surrounds in 2015. Icek Ajzen’s
model of behaviour change was used to evaluate the impact that the workshop had on
attendee behaviour regarding their service’s preparedness for emergencies.
Keywords: Australian Red Cross; preparedness; disaster; children’s services; behaviour
change.
Introduction
Children’s services are vulnerable during emergencies for a plethora of reasons, including
having large numbers of children and babies entirely reliant on staff for survival. While
required by law to have emergency plans and practice them, their plans aren’t always robust
enough to cope with the complexities of a fast-moving disaster, as was the case in the 2013
Blue Mountains bushfires. By focusing on evacuation and a designated assembly point (often
on the premises), they neglect contingencies, reuniting carers and children, or early recovery
plans.
This paper focuses on Australian Red Cross’ approach to preparedness and the impact
of Beyond the Assembly Point workshops on the participating children’s services staff. The
results obtained from workshop evaluations suggest that the content and methodology are
effective in increasing the knowledge and resilience of children’s services staff and
enhancing their capacity and confidence to respond during emergencies.
Research undertaken for the National Climate Change Adaptation Research Facility
by the Australian Council of Social Service found community service organisations were
vulnerable and ill prepared for extreme weather events and climate change, with many at risk
of permanent closure as a result of major damage to their premises and disruptions to services
(Mallon et al. 2013). The survey found that one week after a disaster or extreme weather
event, 50 percent of organisations that sustain serious damage to their infrastructure would
still be out of operation; 25 percent might never provide services again (Mallon et al. 2013).
Thus, it is easy to understand why children’s services, which include Community and
Private Long Day Care, Occasional Care, Family Day Care, Out Of School Hours and Family
Support, have significant challenges responding to emergencies. Services may have large
numbers of dependant children in their care, without access to adequate transportation.
Children can be from newborn to school aged, and cared for with varying regularity. Some
services do not care for the same children each day, or even each week.
Red Cross’ approach to preparedness has been developed over a number of years and
is informed by our experience in local and international emergencies, academia and best
practice. There is extensive research indicating people who are prepared better cope with and
recover from disasters (Australian Red Cross, 2015b). Despite the traditional survival focus
in the broader emergency management sector in Australia, focusing on longer-term
psychosocial and recovery consequences, general resilience and social capital leads to better
outcomes following disasters (Chamlee-Wright and Storr, 2011). The focus on building
resilience, psychosocial recovery and sustainability is established within Red Cross strategy
and aligns with the Australian Government’s National Strategy for Disaster Resilience
(COAG, 2011), which promotes an all-hazards approach to resilience and increased shared
responsibility.
Through the Beyond the Emergency Assembly Point project, Red Cross delivered a
series of participant-focused, activity-based workshops for children’s services staff, directors
and owners. The workshop was designed for services to reflect on their unique circumstances
by posing questions rather than providing prescriptive information. This approach allowed
peer-to-peer learning and sharing of ideas, as well as identifying risks to their service and
emergency planning more broadly. The workshops were extremely well-received and led to
services taking action following the workshop. Thorough monitoring and evaluation allowed
the project team to track changing attitudes to preparedness through the lens of behaviour
change. This paper will examine this approach to emergency planning for children’s services
and demonstrate how it facilitated behaviour change.
Evaluation method
The Australian Red Cross Emergency Services Theory of Change (2015b) identifies that
social capital (Aldrich, 2010), knowledge and understanding, and self and community
efficacy are they key indicators of how well individuals, organisations and communities are
able to prepare for, respond to and recover from a disaster.
Red Cross aims to support and promote individual and community resilience by:
fostering and developing social networks
increasing access to relevant information and
delivering a range of services during times of greatest need.
Red Cross has approached behaviour change in disaster preparedness in a number of
ways; producing resources that guide the development of emergency plans, presentations to
community groups, and designing workshops for a range of audiences. Ways to influence
behaviour are as varied and nuanced as the individuals whose behaviour we seek to change.
In the past Red Cross has not used a consistent measure to assess and compare the
effectiveness of these interventions, though this is currently under development.
Behaviour change models have limitations, including the model selected. The project
team acknowledges that as practitioners they are not behaviour change experts, but see value
in charting changes in attitude and behaviour towards emergency preparedness.
In an attempt to understand the significant behaviour change intended through
feedback from the pilot workshop for children’s service, Red Cross applied Icek Ajzen’s
theory of planned behaviour (Ajzen, 1991). The theory posits that the best predictor of
behaviour change is intention; the stronger the intention, the more likely change will result.
Intention is shaped by a person’s attitude towards the behaviour and its outcome, subjective
norms and normative beliefs, and the perceived and actual control over completing the
behaviour (Ajzen, 1991). This model can help to determine why someone might not take
action, even when they indicate that the action would be beneficial. Through the evaluation,
Red Cross was able to corroborate that the high rate of intention resulted in a similar level of
actual action taken.
While intention is critical, perceived and actual control are necessary to achieve
action. Action may be inhibited by a lack of resources such as skills, money, training and
cooperation from others. Perceived control relates how easily the intended action can be
completed. Confidence, accessibility of required resources and the action being realistic are
contributing factors (Ajzen, 1991, 2011).
This theory is normally applied to individuals taking action in their own lives. Here it
has been applied where an individual is trying to take action within their workplace, and is
therefore confronted with organisational culture, position and influence. In this context,
action is based not only on the individual’s beliefs, but also on the organisation they work
within.
At each stage of the evaluation, children’s services were asked a series of questions
designed within Icek Ajzen’s theory of planned behaviour. Participants were followed up
three and six months following the workshop to measure longer term behaviour change.
Supporting at risk organisations: Beyond the Assembly Point
The Beyond the Emergency Assembly Point workshops have their origins in the 2013 Blue
Mountains bushfires. On 17th October 2013 two separate bush fires in Mount Victoria (Mount
York fire) and Winmalee (Linksview fire) caused large-scale property loss and damage and
major disruption to social and community services. At least five children’s services were
directly affected. Many other services were indirectly affected as the bushfires continued to
burn and threaten properties, resulting in many services deciding to close on 23rd October.
The event highlighted a number of vulnerabilities children’s services face in
emergency events and provided a frightening prompt to get better prepared. The quarterly
Blue Mountains Child and Family forum in March 2014 was consequently dedicated to
providing services an opportunity to share their bushfires experiences and identify ways they
could better prepare for future events. The group identified the need to explore the following
questions:
What is the role of emergency services during an event?
How can we prepare for events that happen quickly?
How can we better prepare our physical premises?
How are we responsible to staff, parents and children during an event?
How should we communicate our plan to staff, parents and children?
Are there issues specific to service type or location we should consider?
Services identified that they would like the opportunity to workshop these questions
and their plans with experts. As a result, Australian Red Cross was approached to lead the
development of a ‘Planning for Emergencies’ workshop, directed by input from emergency
service agencies, local government, children’s services and community service providers.
Red Cross has widely recognised experience in facilitating disaster resilience
workshops for community services providers. In 2014 it won both the state and national level
award for its ‘Building resilience for community services providers’ series of workshops run
in the Hunter and Central Coast regions of NSW. Red Cross built upon that workshop
structure for this new audience and context.
A total of 45 individuals representing 33 services attended the pilot workshop.
Financial support for backfill was provided by Blue Mountains City Council. Without this
support, a number of services would have been unable to attend. Australian Red Cross
facilitated the workshop with assistance from NSW Rural Fire Service, NSW State
Emergency Service, NSW Police Force, Fire and Rescue NSW, the Local Emergency
Management Officer and Regional Emergency Management Officer, Department of Family
and Community Services - also from Blue Mountains City Council, Mountains Community
Resource Network and Mountains Outreach Community Services.
Upon completion of the pilot workshop, attendees were asked to complete an
evaluation form. One hundred percent of participants agreed or strongly agreed that they felt
confident that there were changes their service could make to their emergency management
plans as a result of the workshop.
A Red Cross volunteer made a first round of follow up phone calls three months after
the workshop. The purpose of the calls was to evaluate the longer-term effectiveness of the
workshop, identify key changes taken and act as a ‘prompt’ for services to continue to take
action on their learning. A total of 96 percent of participants reported taking action on at least
one of their to-do items and 88 percent said they felt better prepared as a result of the
workshop. The strong feedback indicated the workshop model was an effective way to
engage children’s services in emergency preparedness.
Workshop development and structure
Following the success of the initial pilot, NSW Red Cross Emergency Services secured
funding through the Office of Emergency Management ‘Community Resilience Innovation
Program’ to run an additional five workshops and develop a corresponding guide, ‘Disaster
Ready: A Guide for Planning and Facilitating Workshops for the Community Service Sector’.
The objective of the workshops was to increase the knowledge and resilience of
children’s services to increase their capacity and confidence to respond during emergencies.
The workshops emphasised self-reliance, sharing ideas with other services, planning for a
range of scenarios and including staff, parents and children in emergency planning.
To assist in the development of the project, Red Cross convened an advisory group
comprised of representatives from local government, Department of Education, emergency
services, Red Cross staff and peak body representatives. The group provided invaluable
guidance and advice over the course of four meetings.
Invitations to the workshop were distributed in May 2015 one month prior to the first
workshop in the series. They were shared through local government partners, peak body
networks and the Department of Education. All workshops reached capacity following a
promotional email from the Department of Education.
A total of 101 representatives from community and private long day care, occasional
care, family day care, out of school hours and family support attended the five workshops in
Lithgow, Concord, Lakemba, Windsor and the CBD. These locations were chosen in
consultation with the advisory group and the Southern Sydney Region of Councils. In each
location, Red Cross identified emergencies likely to happen in that area; from bushfires and
floods in semi-urban and rural areas, to car accidents and storms in urban areas. This was
done to ensure the scenario activity component of each workshop was as realistic as possible.
The workshop structure was based on the 2014 Blue Mountains children’s services
workshop and refined in consultation with the advisory group. Representatives from combat
agencies created hazard-specific scenarios (bushfire, flood, storm, car accident or structural
fire) used in the workshop.
The workshop structure was developed in accordance with adult learning theory,
providing interactive activities that allowed participants to take in new information, link it to
their current and past experiences and adapt it to their own life or work situation. The
structure is provided in Table 1 below.
The workshop structure was designed to convey information, but most importantly to
encourage service providers to challenge their preconceptions about the risks they faced and
how to prepare for them. The peer-to-peer learning style of the workshop allowed
organisations to share their experiences and the measures they had taken to increase their
preparedness.
Workshops were attended by a local government representative and representatives
from emergency services (a mix of Police, Fire and Rescue, Rural Fire Service and State
Emergency Services, depending on their availability) and facilitated by a Red Cross
representative.
Table 1: Workshop structure
Activity Time Basic Outline
Introduction
15
minutes
Introduce facilitators and emergency service representatives. Outline aims
for the day.
Emergency
services
panel one
45
minutes
This activity provides participants with accurate information on the role of
emergency services. It also allows services to indicate their strengths and
challenges at the outset of the day.
Emergency services briefly cover the following:
What participants can expect them to be doing in an emergency
What they shouldn’t expect from them during an emergency
Any other key information about their service.
Community
Hazard
Mapping
1 hour This activity allows the participants to place their service in the geographic
environment and identify potential hazards and emergency assembly points
nearby. In small groups create a map identifying:
hazards in geographical area (include bushfire, flood, storm, gun man,
heatwaves, structural fire etc.)
where services are located
evacuation assembly points near service
evacuation assembly point away from service (plus contingencies).
Present back to larger group two key things learned. Emergencies services
comment on their observations.
Morning Tea
Warning
time
45
minutes
This activity allows participants to anticipate how they might be able to
assist their clients when there is threat of an imminent disaster. With
participants grouped in their tables, allocate each table an amount of
warning time that they have before a disaster affects the local area. The
warning periods are 1 day, 4 hours and 15 minutes. Participants will work
through a series of questions as a group:
Where would clients get information?
How would you communicate with your clients/staff?
Where would you evacuate to?
How would you get there?
Would you close your service?
Present back to larger group two key things learned. Emergencies services
comment on their observations.
Lunch
Speed
dating
45
minutes
This activity allows all participants to have a meaningful discussion with
fellow participants in a one-to-one setting. Questions could include:
How will we involve staff, clients, families and carers in planning for
emergencies?
How will we ensure our plan is regularly reviewed? Are our plans part of
staff induction and enrolment of new clients?
How will we encourage staff and clients to have their own household
plans and share them with us?
How would we manage staff, carers, clients and family conflicting
obligations during an emergency?
Large group debrief.
Emergency
services
panel two
30
minutes
Emergency services answer questions that were banked by participants
throughout the day.
Afternoon Tea
Scenario
1 hour This activity allows service providers to test their decision making in a
time pressured environment when new information is coming it. It also
allows service providers to consider some of the key questions they need to
consider when making decisions in this kind of an environment.
Lead facilitator reads through a scenario with two updates and in small
groups participants decide their actions.
Large group debrief.
To-do list 15
minutes
In this activity services write down the top three actions they will take at
their service after the workshop. These items are posted out to participants
one month later as a prompt.
Wrapping
up
15
minutes
Thank participants and emergency services for participation.
Go through aims of the workshop again.
Impact and results
Data collection was undertaken at four points throughout the project: at registration,
immediately following the workshop, three months and six months following the workshop.
This process captured responses to the six questions framed within the theory of planned
behaviour, feedback, and actions undertaken since the workshop.
It is acknowledged that there are limitations to the data collected. The sample size
over the course of the five workshops is limited to 101 participants. Reaching the participants
by phone three and six months after the workshop was challenging. The project team were
able to reach 70 of the participants (69 percent of attendees) for the three or six month follow
up, or both. The results are indicative only based on the sample size of the series of
workshops.
Interest and participation
From the commencement of the project there was significant interest from children’s services
in attending these workshops. Workshops quickly reached capacity once the NSW
Department of Education emailed out an invitation to services in NSW.
There was a waiting list of 299 services across the five workshops. Red Cross also
received 30 phone calls and 61 emails from interested services in the first six months of the
project. This indicates that children’s services have identified their vulnerability in the
context of emergency planning and see the value for this kind of training for staff and
management personnel.
Participant feedback
The level of enthusiasm and participation during the workshops indicated that the participants
were engaged with the content. This was confirmed in the workshop evaluation.
The most common responses to ‘what did you value most from today’s workshop?’ centred
on the following themes:
Participation of emergency services
Sharing ideas with other children’s services
Hearing from services who had experienced emergencies
Interaction and hands on activities
Spending the time to think about emergencies
Local information
Other general positive feedback included:
‘Fantastic workshop- every service should attend. Absolutely exceeded my
expectations! I would pay for you to conduct this session for all my staff and
families- please consider this- it is really fabulous!’
‘The best in service I have been on in a long time, I would pay to attend this as it
is so beneficial’
‘The workshop was the most informative and productive I have attended in 30
years’
When called three and six months after their workshops, participants continued to
emphasise how beneficial they had found the workshop. Comments captured at this stage
included:
‘The workshop was really informative and helpful. Loved it. Would like to send
other staff if another one is held next year.’
‘Found the workshop excellent … all centres should attend one.’
‘The workshop challenged our thinking. Would attend more workshops’
Anecdotal feedback further suggests that the workshops led to increased
conversations amongst children’s services, as well as greater interaction between children’s
services and emergency service agencies. The benefits of such connections are difficult to
capture and measure, but are undoubtedly a positive secondary effect of the workshops.
Participant action
At the workshops, participants were invited to create a to-do list for their organisation;
identifying three actions they committed to take to improve the preparedness of their
organisation. During the follow up phone calls three and six months after the workshop, Red
Cross asked the participants if they had completed their to-do list items. Six months after the
workshop, 93 percent of participants had actioned at least one of their to-do list items and 76
percent had actioned two or all three, indicating that the workshops communicated the
importance of not just talking about preparedness, but taking action. This contributed to
building resilience in these organisations.
Theory of Planned Behaviour Results
The theory of planned behaviour allowed the project team to track some changes in behaviour
and attitudes towards emergency preparedness as a result of the workshop. The results
highlighted that children’s services staff unsurprisingly felt responsible for looking after
children in their care during an emergency and that it was widely understood that being
prepared would help keep children in their care safe.
Table 2: Theory of Planned Behaviour Question One
I believe my service could act during an emergency without requiring assistance from emergency
services agencies (Fire Services, State Emergency Service etc.)
Strongly Disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly Agree
Pre-workshop 8% 21% 31% 31% 8%
Post-workshop 0% 1% 21% 57% 21%
3 month 0% 2% 13% 67% 18%
6 month 0% 7% 7% 71% 14%
Prior to the workshop nearly one-third of participants (29 percent) didn’t think that
their service could act during an emergency without requiring assistance from emergency
service agencies. This indicates a high level of dependence on an extremely limited resource
during a disaster, which supports what was discovered in the Blue Mountains bushfires.
Following the workshop this figure dropped, which could be attributed to the focus placed on
self-reliance and the discussions that increased awareness of the limitations of emergency
services. After six months only seven percent indicated they would require assistance and the
percentage of those that agreed or strongly agreed that they could act independently had
continued to increase to 86 percent.
Table 3: Theory of Planned Behaviour Question Two
I believe there are changes that could be made to better prepare my service for emergencies
Strongly Disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly Agree
Pre-workshop 0% 0% 13% 60% 27%
Post-workshop 0% 0% 2% 48% 49%
3 month 0% 7% 4% 50% 39%
6 month 0% 10% 5% 68% 18%
Participants were asked to indicate how strongly they agreed or disagreed that there
were changes that could be made to better prepare their service for emergencies. Services
indicated they were aware that improvements that could be made to increase preparedness.
It was evident that the knowledge gained in the workshop had an effect as the
percentage of people agreeing or strongly agreeing they needed to make changes jumped
from 87 percent at registration to 98 percent. Six months following the workshop, many
participants indicated they had already made changes, as highlighted earlier in the paper. This
could account for the percentage increase in people feeling neutral (five percent) or
disagreeing (ten percent) that they needed to make changes; they had already taken measures
to be better prepared at that time.
Table 3: Theory of Planned Behaviour Question Three
I believe that it will be easy to implement these changes
Strongly Disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly Agree
Pre-workshop 0% 1% 29% 60% 10%
Post-workshop 0% 0% 18% 62% 20%
3 month 0% 2% 16% 71% 12%
6 month 0% 7% 5% 83% 5%
Surveys also assessed whether participants thought it would be easy to implement
changes to increase preparedness at their service. Responses indicated a growing confidence
in their ability to foster change at their service, with 70 percent agreeing or strongly agreeing
at registration and 88 percent six months after the workshop. Many of the comments captured
throughout the six-month monitoring indicated the need for time to educate staff and bring
about change within organisations. The six month time frame for monitoring allowed for this
change process to be observed.
Feedback obtained via the monitoring process demonstrates behaviour change when
comparing responses at registration to the six-month follow up. The enthusiastic response to
the project, compounded by the data gathered, indicates the workshops were beneficial in
equipping participants with the knowledge, tools and motivation to be better prepared. The
theory of planned behaviour results allowed the project team to observe some changes in
attitudes and action as a result of the workshop.
Detailed results of the theory of planned behaviour questions are available in
Appendix A.
Conclusion
The Beyond the Emergency Assembly Point workshops were developed after identifying that
many children’s services emergency plans weren’t robust enough to handle the complexity of
a rapid onset disaster.
Albeit relying on a relatively small sample size, the results obtained are promising and
suggest that the workshops developed through this project were successful in catalysing
behaviour change among the target group. Significantly, 93 percent of participants completed
one or more of the actions they planned to take within six months of the workshop, indicating
the effectiveness of the workshop approach to motivate and inform behaviour change. The
success is also reflected in the results from the theory of planned behaviour questions, where
services were shown to be increasingly self-reliant and aware of the limited access to
emergency services as a result of attending the workshops.
This targeted, participant-focused approach to preparedness has been exceptionally
well-received by participants. The data suggests that this approach has increased participant’s
knowledge and resilience of children’s services, particularly their capacity and confidence to
respond during emergencies. Red Cross will continue to work with the community service
sector to increase their resilience and self-reliance by helping prepare their organisations and
clients for all types of emergencies.
References
Ajzen, I. (1991) The Theory of Planned Behavior. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision
Processes, 50.
Ajzen, I. (2011) The Theory of Planned Behavior: Reactions and Reflections, Psychology & Health,
26:9.
Aldrich D. (2010) ‘Fixing recovery: Social capital in post-crisis in resilience’. The Selected Works of
Daniel P Aldrich.
Australian Red Cross (2015a) Humanity in Action: Strategy 2020 URL:
http://www.redcross.org.au/Strategy%202020%20-%20full%20comprehensive%20strategy.pdf
[accessed 2 April 2016].
Australian Red Cross (2015b) Emergency Services 5 year plan.
Chamlee-Wright E. & Storr V.H. (2011) ‘Social capital as collective narratives and post-disaster
community recovery’, The Sociological Review, Volume 59, Issue 2, May 2011.
COAG (2011) National Strategy for Disaster Resilience, Council of Australian Governments, URL:
https://www.coag.gov.au/node/81 [accessed 21 April 2016].
Mallon, K., Hamilton, E., Black, M., Beem, B. & Abs, J. (2013) Adapting the community sector for
climate extremes: Extreme weather, climate change & the community sector – Risks and adaptations,
National Climate Change Adaptation Research Facility, Gold Coast.
Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank everyone at Red Cross who was involved in this project.
Particular thanks to both John Richardson and Rachel Flitman for their reviews of this paper.
[Page intentionally left blank]
Appendix A
Theory of Planned Behaviour Results.
SUMMARY
Question Strongly Disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly Agree
Pre 7 19 28 28 7
Post 0 1 21 56 21
3M 0 1 7 37 10
6M 0 3 3 30 6
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
Pre-workshop Post-Workshop 3 Months afterworkshop
6 Months afterworkshop
Timing of question
I believe my service could act during an emergency without requiring assistance from emergency services agencies (fire services, state emergency service etc.)
Strongly Disagree
Disagree
Neutral
Agree
Strongly Agree
SUMMARY
Question Strongly Disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly Agree
Pre 0 0 12 53 24
Post 0 0 2 48 49
3M 0 4 2 27 21
6M 0 4 2 27 7
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
Pre-workshop Post-Workshop 3 Months afterworkshop
6 Months afterworkshop
Time at which survey was conducted
I believe there are changes that could be made to better prepare my services for
emergencies
Strongly Disagree
Disagree
Neutral
Agree
Strongly Agree
SUMMARY
Question Strongly Disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly Agree
Pre 0 1 26 53 9
Post 0 0 18 61 20
3M 0 1 8 36 6
6M 0 3 2 34 2
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
Pre-workshop Post-Workshop 3 Months afterworkshop
6 Months afterworkshop
Time at which survey was conducted
I believe it will be easy to implement these changes
Strongly Disagree
Disagree
Neutral
Agree
Strongly Agree
SUMMARY
Question Strongly Disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly Agree
Pre 0 0 1 3 85
Post 0 0 1 21 77
3M 0 0 0 1 54
6M 0 0 0 8 33
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
120%
Pre-workshop Post-Workshop 3 Months afterworkshop
6 Months afterworkshop
Timing of question
I believe that by being prepared our service will be better able to keep the children in
our care safe during an emergency
Strongly Disagree
Disagree
Neutral
Agree
Strongly Agree
An Overview of Emergency Communication
Technologies in Australia
Dr Hung Nguyen1, Dr Sanjeev Naguleswaran2, Associate Professor Michael Webb1
1 Teletraffic Research Centre, The University of Adelaide, Australia
2 QSPectral Systems Pty Ltd, Australia
Paper presented at the Australian and New Zealand Disaster and Emergency Management
Conference, Gold Coast (QLD), 30 - 31 May 2016
An Overview of Emergency Communication Technologies in Australia
Abstract: This paper presents a brief overview of communication technologies and
infrastructure available for emergency operations in Australia. It also highlights significant
issues in current operational solutions and explores future technologies that can be used to
address these challenges.
Keywords: Emergency Communication, Software Defined Networking, Big data, Software
Defined Radio, 5G
In troduct io n
Australia is considered to be the most fire-prone country on earth. The threat of natural
disasters such as bushfires and floods affect many communities. Effective emergency
operations are critical to minimise the loss from natural disasters since first responders need
to exchange information (i.e., voice and data) in a timely manner to develop situational
awareness and coordinate relief efforts. However, natural disasters often result in widespread
degraded communications infrastructure while placing exceptional demands on that same
infrastructure (FCC/FEMA 2012). Furthermore, natural disasters or other emergency events
are usually unplanned by definition, causing panic conditions. In large-scale natural disasters,
different organisations may be involved with disparate technologies and communication
systems. Security requirements including communication and information protection can
exacerbate the interoperability issue. For example, interoperability issues were the main
factors causing the numerous breakdowns of communication systems during emergency
operations in Australia over the last few years (ABC Adelaide, 2015; Hyde, 2013).
Communication technologies have evolved rapidly over the last decades. There are a number
of contemporary wireless personal communication devices (mobile phones, personal
computers, personal digital assistants and other devices) employing advanced communication
technologies that can be used in emergencies. These include cellular networks (NGMN,
2015; APCO 25, 2016), wireless broadband networks (IEEE-SA, 2012), radio links utilising
VHF/UHF voice and data networks (SINCGARS, 2015), and satellite communications (Kose
et al., 2012). Building resilient emergency communication networks that can cover the large
geographical regions in Australia is challenging as these technologies are predominantly
designed for commercial or military use.
In this paper, we provide a literature survey of the current technologies and research activities
to address the communication challenges in emergency operations in Australia. Our main
sources are published research papers, government reports, and international technical
standard documents. A similar survey for emergency communications in the European and
the USA regions is provided in (Baldini et al., 2014). The main differences between this
paper and the study in (Baldini et al., 2014) are the focus on emergency communications in
Australia and recent developments in Software Defined Radio, Software Defined Networking
and fifth generation cellular technology (5G).
Opera t iona l Communica t ion R equ irements
The communications requirements for an emergency operation are scenario dependent. We
summarise below two of the most basic services and their requirements.
1. Voice: This is the primary form of communication. The essential attributes for
emergency voice communication are fast-call setup, high audio quality, emergency
alerting and support for secure/encrypted communications (Budka et al., 2011). Voice
connections require a stringent bound on a maximum drop rate of 5% and a maximum
delay of 40 milliseconds (ms) to ensure comprehension (Department of Homeland
Security, 2007). Voice traffic rate is in the order of kbps. Call setup time needs to be
below 400 ms, much lower than requirements for commercial networks. Voice can be
set up in a group call in emergency situations and call prioritisation is often required
in case of congestion. Push-to-Talk (PTT) is half-duplex voice communication and is
widely used in emergency communications.
2. Data: Data services are becoming more important in modern emergency
communications. These include data messaging, video streaming, location data and
others. Each of these services requires specific Quality of Service (QoS)
requirements. Video requires Mbit/s data rate whereas location services only require
Kbit/s. Messaging is non-interactive data that can contain text or image and generally
requires very low bit rate.
Current Communica t ion Sys tems
Emergency communication systems are traditionally built for and dedicated to one or a few
organisations in each state. The small volumes of equipment in each case results in the
dynamics of a niche market. The configuration and deployment of these networks are
therefore, expensive even with the provision of free wireless spectrum (ACMA, 2012).
Governmen t Rad io Ne tworks
The Government Radio Network (GRN) incorporates multiple inter-linked sites across
Australia, organised at the state level, which provide a range of radio communications
services for government and public services.
Its aim is to consolidate resources into a common network with greater coverage and
reliability than separate smaller networks managed independently by the individual services.
It also offers effective communication between services and agencies, facilitating
coordination of actions when multiple service branches or emergency units are involved.
Most GRNs in Australia are built on the APCO 25 (P25) standard (APCO 25, 2016). P25
requires a fixed network infrastructure with a set of base stations, each covering a range of a
few kilometres depending on the terrain. P25 uses Frequency Division Multiple Access
(FDMA) access method and QPSK-C modulation. Radios can communicate in analogue
mode with other P25 radios. It mainly supports voice but data transmission is also possible
with rate of up to 9.6 kbps. P25 supports a rich set of services including messaging, group
calls, and broadcast. Data is transferred using the Internet Protocol (IP), which allows
running a multitude of applications.
For example, in South Australia all emergency services and some government agencies use
the SA-GRN, a network of over 200 radio sites linked together to form a voice, data and
paging network that covers approximately 96% of the population of South Australia and
more than 226,000 sq km of landmass (SA-AGD, 2015). There are approximately 20,000
active devices across more than 20 agencies. The network is currently undergoing a major
upgrade with an expected completion date in 2017 (SA-AGD, 2015).
The GRN in other states generally exhibit commonality with the SA GRN approach although
there are some differences related to historical developments and local priorities (GRN,
2016). The NSW GRN is also a P25-based solution and is currently one of the largest in the
world. It includes coverage of Canberra and the Australian Capital Territory (ACT). The
Victorian Government Radio Networks include the Melbourne Metropolitan Radio (MMR),
the Victorian StateNet Mobile Radio Network (SMR), and Regional Mobile Radio.
Queensland uses the Government Wireless Network (GWN) and Western Australia uses the
WA Emergency Radio Network (WAERN). Tasmanian emergency services use the Trunk
Mobile Radio Network that employs a Gateway to enable interoperation between otherwise
separate radio communications for their emergency services. Northern Territory Police, Fire
& Emergency Services (NTPFES) employ a P25-based digital radio network solution across
emergency services.
Commerc ia l Ce l l u la r Ne tw orks
Commercial cellular wireless networks like UMTS and LTE have not been designed for
emergency purposes but provide an important communication option during emergencies.
There are significant coverage overlaps between GRNs and commercial cellular networks,
especially in high population density areas. Agencies (e.g. SAPOL mobile data terminals) are
increasingly using commercial cellular networks due to the lack of coverage and low data
rate of the GRNs.
Services that require data communication in South Australia often have a dedicated terminal
for the Telstra NextG network in addition to a GRN adapter. For example, South Australian
Ambulance Services (SAAS) ambulances are fitted with the Motorola XTL-2500 digital
radio and two XTS-2500 hand-held radios for accessing GRN, but also a Motorola Mobile
Data Terminal (MDT) to access the 3G network. These data connections cater for a range of
in-vehicle applications such as incident dispatch and mapping functions integrated with the
South Australia Computer Aided Dispatch (SACAD) system (SA-AGD, 2015).
Governments around the world have been advocating for adapting cellular technology for
emergency communications. The United States Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
white paper for Public Safety and Nationwide Interoperable Broadband Network (FCC,
2010) recommended that emergency communications leverage the advantage of the fourth
generation cellular technology (LTE). Even though FirstNet is building a US wide coast-to-
coast public safety network based on LTE broadband technology (FirstNet, 2016), there are
still major challenges that can hinder efficient operation of such networks. The main
challenges with adopting cellular technology for emergency communication in Australia
include the significant cost of providing universal coverage, and the lack of network
resiliency and severe network congestion during natural disasters such as bushfires (ABC
Adelaide, 2015).
Sa te l l i t e
Satellite networks provide the advantage that they do not rely on terrestrial infrastructure like cellular or GRN networks. They have a very large coverage and therefore, are particularly useful in natural disaster scenarios. Satellite solutions can provide a full suite of voice and data solutions to support operations in the early phase of an emergency. Users accessing satellite services require a dedicated user terminal or satellite dish. Satellite broadband services have limited capabilities compared to terrestrial broadband solutions.
Satellite communications have wider role than facilitating communications in remote areas –
during catastrophic events that disable terrestrial services; there is often no other reliable
option. For example, communications breakdowns occurred during the Pinery bushfire in
South Australia, November 2015 (ABC Adelaide, 2015).
There are now several organisations offering competitive commercial satellite solutions for emergency communications in Australia. For example, Australian Satellite Corporation (ASC) offer a number of turnkey solutions for the emergency response sector, including rapid auto deploy systems and special satellite plans that take into account infrequent operational requirements. Despite these competitive offerings, satellite connections can have high latency due to the transmission times between the user terminal and satellite and the satellite and ground station. Satellite communications are also susceptible to atmospheric conditions such as heavy rain, humidity and bushfire smoke (Vallado et al., 2014). Furthermore, mobile satellite devices are often more expensive, larger, and more power-hungry than their terrestrial counterparts, which makes them less attractive for many first responders.
Two-way Rad io Commun ica t io ns
Two-way radio communications that can be used in emergency situations include HF, VHF
and UHF (non-GRN) technologies. UHF and VHF radios provide short range, line-of-sight
communications. The most common systems use the UHF Citizen Band (CB) that does not
require a license. They typically operate with a range of 15km with a 5W radio, the
maximum legal power for UHF CB radio. While relatively unreliable as a mode of primary
communication in an emergency, they can function as a backup communication method when
other methods fail.
HF radios provide long-range communications person-to-person, or person-to-base.
Compared to UHF units they are more expensive, bulkier, heavier and require a license. HF
radios can operate beyond line-of-sight (BLOS) using one of two possible propagation
modes. The first mode is called a “ground wave” and follows the contour of the ground for a
short distance (1-5 km) depending on conditions, even further if over the sea. The second is
the “sky wave” and reflects off the ionosphere for a narrow band of frequencies that are
dependent on various environmental conditions. These conditions include time of day,
season of the year, time in solar sun spot cycle (an 11-year long cycle), weather effects, as
well as other more subtle phenomena. The achievable ranges depend on angle of incidence,
transmit power and frequency. A particularly useful technique uses what is called the “near
vertical incidence sky wave” (NVIS), which enables communication out of deep gorges and
over mountain ranges.
There are also a number of services on HF that can be useful in remote areas, such as weather
forecasts and radiophone systems (these allow you to connect an HF radio into the standard
telephone network). Although HF radio properties seem to be well suited to emergency
communications scenarios, they do have limitations and in particular, effective use of an HF
radio technology requires considerable knowledge and training.
Cross Techno logy I s sue : In t e roperab i l i t y
In addition to issues specific each individual technology discussed in previous sections,
interoperability between the technologies is a major challenge in emergency communications.
The use of commercial protocols and systems has made the deployment of emergency
communication equipment much easier, but introduces its own challenges. Common
networking equipment is not purpose built to survive the rigours of an emergency
environment, and is usually intended to be installed and maintained by specialist IT staff, not
the emergency crews that have traditionally run such networks. One of the most difficult
aspects of operating emergency networks is the ability to integrate different networking
technologies and to rapidly reconfigure networks to adapt to a changing environment. The
lack of interoperability between communications networks was found to have seriously
impacted on the emergency response in the 2013 Tasmanian bushfire (Hyde, 2013).
There are proprietary devices that can switch communications traffic between packet radio
networks such as Motorola VALR mission critical architecture (Motorola, 2013) and Harris
Corporation’s VIDA mission-critical platform (Harris Corporation, 2012). However, they
still require manual intervention and are often slow. The requirement for at least near real-
time response for many of the supported systems thus presents substantial challenges for
emergency communication systems.
Future Techno log ie s
Significant research efforts (Fantacci et al., 2016; Rawat et al., 2015; Sbeiti et al., 2016;
Mahilescu et al., 2015; Baldini et al., 2014; Ghafoor et al., 2015) have tried to address one or
more of the issues identified in the previous sections. We summarise here the research areas
with real potential for improving emergency communications in Australia, including 802.11
wireless networks, Software Defined Radio (SDR), Software Defined Networking (SDN),
Data Science, device-to-device communications and the fifth generation mobile networks
(5G).
Wire l e s s Mesh Ne tworks (WMN) and Mob i l e Ad -hoc Ne twork (MANET)
A cost effective and infrastructure-less approach to provide temporary coverage in an
expedient manner is to use wireless, mobile temporary and ad-hoc communications (Portman
et al., 2012).
Wireless Mesh Networks (WMNs) and Mobile Ad-hoc Networks (MANETs) can provide
wireless network coverage of large areas without relying on a wired backbone infrastructure
or dedicated access points. In WMNs, a collection of wireless mesh routers provides network
access to wireless clients, similar to access points in traditional wireless local area network
(WLANs). However, communication between these mesh routers is achieved via the wireless
network, typically involving multiple wireless hops. One or multiple mesh routers that are
connected to the Internet can then serve as gateways and provide Internet connectivity for the
entire mesh network.
WMNs/MANETs can be deployed as a temporary network created for a specific incident
only (SAFECOM, 2004). This type of network is necessary when fixed infrastructure
networks are unavailable at the incident scene, either because they have been destroyed or
they simply do not exist. Temporary networks allow first responders to share mission critical
data and to coordinate their recovery efforts.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) can be used to extend the reach of WMNs and MANETs
(Sbeiti et al., 2016). Queensland Fire and Emergency Services (QFES) intend to use the
unmanned aircraft to respond to emergencies by the end of the year. Queensland University
of Technology-based Australian Research Centre for Aerospace Automation (ARCAA)
recently became the first research facility in Australia to gain Civil Aviation Safety Authority
(CASA) certification to fly unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).
Despite the great promises of WMN and MANET technologies as a low cost solution for
emergency communication in Australia, no large-scale deployment is yet known. There are
now several commercial WMN and MANET solutions available (Aruba Networks, 2012).
Among the multiple challenges facing WMN technologies are the complexity, scalability,
security and resiliency issues. Multiple research programs worldwide are addressing these
challenges including the South Australian based Serval project (Gardner-Stephen et al.,
2012).
So f tware De f in ed Rad io
The concept of software-defined radio (SDR) was initiated by Mitola (Mitola, 1993) to signal
the shift from hardware designed radio components (e.g. mixers, filters, amplifiers,
modulators/demodulators, detectors, etc.) to systems where the majority of the functionality
is defined in software. The main idea is to have a single communication device that could run
different waveforms in software.
For emergency communications, such a device will be able to interoperate with different
wireless communication systems. By allowing the possibility of upgrading the waveforms
with the software updates, SDR is a great investment choice for emergency organisations by
prolonging the useful service life of communication systems.
Prototypes of emergency communications systems using SDR have been developed in
Europe and Japan (Baldini et al., 2014b; Ghafoor et al., 2015). Even though the
commercialisation of SDR has recently accelerated with military products from Thales
(AN/PRC-148 JEM) and Harris (Falcon III AN/PRC-152(C)), wide spread deployment of
SDR in emergency communication still faces serious challenges including meeting the
computational requirements, security and RF hardware design issues (Ulversoy et al., 2010).
So f tware De f in ed Ne twork ing
Similar to SDR, Software Defined Networking (SDN) provides a method to
programmatically control networks, making it easier to integrate multiple systems, deploy
new applications and services as well as tune network policy and performance. SDN enables
users of network hardware can fully control their networks without being constrained by the
proprietary controls traditionally inherent in the networking.
Technologies to build SDN networks are now available (McKeown et al., 2009; Gude et al.,
2008) with a range of successful commercial applications developed (Jain et al., 2013; Davy
et al., 2012; Krey et al., 2012). These implementations, however, operate in environments
that are different to emergency operations. They rely on a reliable and fixed infrastructure to
collect information about the network and disseminate instructions to the network elements.
Extending the current SDN technologies to provide reliable and robust communication
networks for emergency operations is the focus of much current research.
In (Mahilescu et al., 2015), a Radio Integration Unit (RIU) was developed to support multiple
network connections with different wireless technologies and thus, allowing for
interoperability between these networks. The RIU unit was built over the SDN OpenvSwitch
implementation and RYU controller. The RIU can make the best decisions when transferring
data over either the GRN network, 3G mobile connections, or even a (more expensive)
satellite connection depending on the coverage, bandwidth requirements and cost
considerations.
Big Da ta and Da ta Sc i ence
Effective responses in emergency situations are reliant on the availability of archived
information as well as on the effective, real-time integration and blending of data streaming
from various channels including sensors, satellites, social media feeds, photos, video and
smart phones (Fosso-Wamba et al., 2012). Data Science techniques such as Machine
Learning algorithms can then be applied to derive insights and make predictions to guide
intervention. Big Data systems such as those developed by Palantir (www.palantir.com) and
Terra Seismic are being used to predict disasters due to human activity and to monitor
satellite data and environmental factors in real time to predict earthquakes, respectively.
Large-scale data processing requires agile, centrally managed networks with decentralised
domains. As mentioned previously, current networks do not meet these as well as scalability
requirements. However, SDN can enable networks for “Big Data” by allowing for changing
traffic patterns, enabling access to geographically distributed servers/databases and
public/private clouds as well as providing bandwidth on demand (Bushong et al., 2013). The
IBM platform Big SQL, is an example where big data analysis based on Hadoop has been
integrated with SDN (Menezes et al., 2014).
Fi f t h Genera t i on Mob i l e Ce l l u la r Techno logy (5G)
As the fourth generation (Long Term Evolution) mobile cellular networks are being rolled
out, research into the fifth generation (5G) is well underway. The first commercial 5G
networks are expected to be available in 2020. Supporting emergency communications is one
of 5G main use cases (NGMN, 2015).
By leveraging advances in SDR, SDN, big data and other technologies 5G is able to provide
robust communications in case of natural disasters such as bushfires and floods. One of the
promising technologies that is being considered in the future 5G standard Long Term
Evolution (LTE) Release 13 and beyond is Device-to-Device communications (D2D). D2D
can be used for different proximity-based services where the users locate their neighbours
and benefit from various services like social apps, and alert messages. More works
(Nishiyama et al., 2014; Gardner-Stephen et al., 2012) have developed a prototype of D2D
relaying smartphone that enables sending out emergency messages from disconnected areas
(e.g., mountains, islands) and sharing of information between people gathered in evacuation
centres. In addition to basic communications (e.g., voice, text messages), Search and Rescue
(SAR) would also be enhanced via location information (NGMN, 2015).
Summary and Conc lus ion
In this paper, we have explored the current state of emergency communication systems in
Australia and provide an overview of the technologies and their limitations. An analysis of
the advantages and value proposition of advanced networking technologies such as WMN,
SDR and SDN has been articulated. This has been done in the context of providing
synergistic benefits through enabling other advanced technologies like Big Data Analytics.
These technologies will become integral parts of the fifth generation mobile networks (5G).
Acknowledgement
The authors would like to acknowledge the support of the Australian Research Council
through grant LP140100489.
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Exploring Barriers to Collaborative Multi-Sector Disaster Management
Efforts in Rural Remote Communities
MM Press New South Wales State Emergency Service Volunteers Association
Dr. Stephen Smith Department of Computing
Faculty of Science and Engineering MACQUARIE UNIVERSITY
NSW 2109 Australia
Paper Presented at the
Australian and New Zealand Disaster and Emergency Management Conference
Broadbeach, Gold Coast (QLD), 30 – 31 May 2016
Exploring Barriers to Collaborative Multi-Sector Disaster Management
Efforts in Rural Remote Communities
ABSTRACT: Despite well-known inequalities, rural communities are rich in social capital
resources. Two of the most prominent services available in New South Wales (NSW) rural
communities are NSW Health and NSW State Emergency Service (NSW SES). Yet there is, in the
authors’ experience, little embedded delivery level collaboration between them. Exploring why
this is the situation may assist in developing collaborative practical strategies to enhance
community resilience in disaster management in these areas. A literature review revealed many
articles discussing these separately, but none concurrently, thus an integration of recognised
issues was attended.
Keywords: Emergency Service Volunteers, Registered Nurses, rural community, New South
Wales State Emergency Service, Social Capital.
Aim:
To investigate the barriers affecting implementation of a multi-sector approach to the Disaster
Management cycle of Prevention, Preparedness, Response and Recovery (PPRR) between
Health and agencies that provide Road Crash Rescue and Community First Response services
in small rural and remote communities.
Background
Rural and remote communities experience socio-economic and health status lower than urban
areas (Allan et al 2010; Bourke et al 2012; Cavaye 2004; Hyett et al 2014; Kenny et al 2013;
McDonnell et al 2012; Rickards 2011; Roufeil & Battye 2008; Sivamalai 2008; Winterton &
Warburton 2011), while average age and community involvement rates are higher (Davis et
al 2012; Hyett et al 2014; Rickards 2011; Winterton & Warburton 2011). A literature review
revealed both a wealth and dearth of information relating to health and emergency first
responder organisations’ in rural and remote communities. This review identified common
elements across all organisations including maintaining and regaining health and wellbeing of
community members through bonding and bridging social capital. There is a research gap
between linking social capital and health and wellbeing in rural and remote communities.
Health and emergency first responder organisations have legislated requirements to
adopt strategies to enhance disaster resilience in rural and remote communities (New South
Wales (NSW) Government 1989). These organisations have employees (Bourke et al 2012;
Roufeil & Battye 2008) and volunteer members (Britton 1991; Linsdell & Rogers 2014;
Moran & Britton 1994; NSW Government 1989; O’Meara et al 2012; Roberts et al 2014)
highly qualified in their individual areas of expertise.
This paper will present the findings of current research along with a conceptual
framework detailing how collaboration and social capital creation could coexist using case
studies and examples from my research as both a Registered Nurse and emergency services
volunteer.
Introduction
Rural communities are known for smaller populations, experiencing limited access to
services, poorer health status and higher percentages of accident and illness than urban
counterparts (Allan et al 2010; Bourke et al 2012; Cavaye 2004; Hyett et al 2014; Kenny et al
2013; McDonnell et al 2012; Rickards 2011; Roufeil & Battye 2008; Sivamalai 2008;
Winterton & Warburton 2011). Rural resources risk being overwhelmed when events occur
that are comparatively smaller in scale and effect than urban centres. These localised
occurrences are rarely termed disasters (Britton 1991). An ‘emergency’ is described as
‘an actual or imminent occurrence (such as fire, flood, storm, earthquake, explosion, terrorist act, accident, epidemic or warlike action) which endangers, or threatens to endanger, the safety or health of persons or animals in the State, or destroys or damages, or threatens to destroy or damage, property in the State’ (NSW Government 2014 p 29).
The stages of emergency are Prevention, Preparation, Response and Recovery (NSW
Government 1989). National Principles for recovery include a fundamental philosophy of the
use of local capacity first, stating ‘linking affected individuals into existing services provided
by local agencies’ (NSW Government 2014, p 2) and that ‘community recovery is best
achieved within a holistic and integrated framework that encompasses the community’ (NSW
Government 2014, p 3). Local capacity incorporates both career and volunteer representatives
from various emergency service combat agencies (NSW Government, 1989; NSW
Government 2012; New South Wales State Emergency Service (NSW SES) 2009). The term
‘combat agency’ is defined by the New South Wales State Emergency Management Plan
(EMPLAN) as ‘the agency primarily responsible for controlling the response to a particular
emergency’ (NSW Government 2012, p 58).
The State Emergency Management Act 1989 (SERM Act 1989) details a State
Emergency Management Plan (EMPLAN) and the NSW Recovery Plan, delineating lead
agencies responsibilities for specific events, designed so no singular agency has overall
accountability for all possible occurring events with emphasis on collaboration, coordination
and information sharing between combat agencies (NSW Government 1989; NSW
Government 2012; NSW Government 2014; NSW Health 2012). The EMPLAN is filtered to
local levels for implementation through Local Emergency Management Committees (LEMC)
(NSW Government 1989; NSW Government 2012; NSW Government 2014). One of LEMC
functions is to ‘facilitate local level emergency management capability through inter-agency
co-ordination, co-operation and information sharing arrangements’ (NSW Government 1989,
p13). Given the four stages of disaster management, it is important to highlight the
significance of community connectedness and linking social capital to manage these local
events.
Resilience, being the ability to recover quickly, includes the necessity of collaborative,
dynamic involvement, management and responsibility of all aspects of a community
comprising individuals, communities, government and businesses. This is relevant in all
phases of a disaster comprising PPRR. Healthy collaboration of sectors must consider several
factors including –
- Respect for variations in roles and responsibilities of the representatives involved;
- Recognition of relationship dynamics of the representatives involved;
- Open communication, and;
- Scrutiny of existing policies and practices.
Failure to address each of these factors may impede the sectors participation (Phills et
al 2008; Caulier-Grice et al 2012). The sectors discussed here are the community sector (rural
community members); the public sector (health services); and the non-profit sector
(emergency service volunteer organisations) (Australian Red Cross (ARC) 2012; Caulier-
Grice et al 2012). Successful rural participation requires encouragement and support of
existing social networks, community engagement processes and the utilisation of locally
available social capital (Neumeier 2011).
Social Capital is considered to be standards of trust and successful exchange between
common networks and operates on several levels, being bonding, bridging and linking (ABS
2002). Bonding social capital refers to the existing strong personal ties and ensuing
prevailing trust; bridging refers to the same characteristics on a broader level whilst linking
develops connections and resource access beyond the immediate community (Australian
Bureau of Statistics (ABS) 2002; Farmer et al 2012; Talbot & Verrinder 2009). Ideally, all
three exist in harmony within a healthy community. Community connections are fundamental
for establishing locally responsive services as it draws together unique rural social capital
resources, maximises the innate, adaptive, innovative nature of rural people and leads to
empowered communities capable of developing sustainable local solutions (Kenny et al
2013). This enablement in practice must maintain compatibility with government
accountability (Cavaye 2004). Dynamic social networks and the usage of power (being the
ability to make a difference) can be employed to create changes to produce improved health
outcomes. There are established links between social capital and disaster management, but
little research examines sustainable, collaborative strategies in rural areas for practice level
implementation of representatives for co-located Health Services and Emergency
Organisations.
This is important as ‘rural and remote health has been largely reactive to specific
problems’ rather than methodically and comprehensively recognising areas of connection and
adaptation (Bourke et al 2012 p497). ‘Rural’ explained by the Australian Institute of Health
and Welfare preferred definition from the Australian Standard Geographic Classification
Remoteness Areas (Australian Government 2015) describes the pertinent areas of discussion
here as ‘outer regional’, ‘remote’ and ‘very remote’, not ‘major cities’ or ‘inner regional’
areas. In many areas across rural/remote NSW, health and emergency services overlap. NSW
Health has streamlined services for rural inhabitants so basic services are available locally,
with collaborative engagement with larger centres for more complex treatment and care.
These are called Multi-Purpose Services (NSW MPS) (Malone & Anderson 2014) while
NSW SES is the largest provider of rural volunteer general rescue capabilities in the state.
This study’s focus is on the New South Wales State Emergency Service (NSW SES), due to
the co-location of NSW SES and NSW MPS in over fifty percent of the states’ total number
of MPS.
Multi-sector collaboration compliments the National Safety and Quality Health Service
Standards (Standard 2 – Partnering with Consumers) (Hyett et al,2014; Kenny et al 2013)
and NSW Health’s CORE values (being Collaboration, Openness, Respect and
Empowerment) to which the New South Wales (NSW) Health services and employees state-
wide adhere. This is also congruent with the Community Engagement strategies of which
NSW State Emergency Service (NSW SES) engage (NSW SES 2015).
Literature Review
Current literature highlights barriers may exist between health and emergency first response
organisations that inhibit collaboration. We propose that improving communication and
collaboration between these organisations will increase social capital in rural and remote
communities and contribute to both health and safety outcomes resulting in enhanced
resilience.
Community Sector
Rural communities experience inequalities relating to health, demographics, economic and
service accessibility (Allan et al 2010; Bourke et al 2012; Cavaye 2004; Hyett et al 2014;
Kenny et al 2013; McDonnell et al 2012; Rickards 2011; Roufeil & Battye 2008; Sivamalai
2008; Winterton & Warburton 2011). Rural community members have become accustomed
to challenges these inequalities present (Allan et al 2010) and consciously support each other
(Bourke et al 2012) or become stoic (Allan et al 2010; Rickards 2011; Warwick-Booth et al
2012; Winterton & Warburton 2011). This is particularly relevant for older community
members who tend to view health relative to the degree of independence and community
connectedness they maintain (Bourke et al 2012; Davis et al 2012; Sivamalai 2008; Warwick-
Booth et al 2012; Winterton & Warburton 2011). Maintenance of social, family and personal
support through community networks allow for reciprocated access to health and community
support. Thus social arrangements contribute significantly to supporting wellbeing. Even the
most senior of these who embrace community activities maintain a measure of social
connectedness and contribute significantly to rural community sustainability (Davis et al
2012; Hyett et al 2014; Rickards 2011; Winterton & Warburton 2011). Enjoyment, valuable
contributory reciprocity, social interaction, respect and cohesion are all important outcomes
of this involvement and is recognised by Davis et al (2012, p345) as resulting in a broader
advantage of ‘productive ageing and sustainable rural communities go hand in hand’.
McManus et al (2012, online) describe rural communities as well placed to build on a
sense of attachment to the local area and develop strong community resilience. Rural
communities exhibit great diversity, a strong sense of belonging and, despite adversity,
healthy social engagement. Rural communities are recognised as being resilient and
resourceful (Rickards 2011; Winterton & Warburton 2011) however these qualities may work
to the communities’ detriment, with some studies indicating that stoicism may contribute to
not seeking or accepting assistance when it may be beneficial (Kenny et al 2014; Rickards
2011; Roufeil & Battye 2008; Winterton & Warburton 2011). Allan et al (2010) and Talbot &
Verrinder (2009) contend that, while positive health outcomes rely on a combination of
social, economic and cultural factors, there remains a strong dependence, trust and respect on
and for local health professionals to either provide appropriate interventions, or to direct them
to other services as needed. Sivamalai (2008) discusses key attributes expected by rural
communities of nurses including enablement of individuals’ independence, open
communication, development of trust, with knowledge of service accessibility, creative with
solutions to circumstantial problems, transparent, capable, receptive, available and
accountable. Sivamalai (2008) continues by acknowledging that for many of these attributes
to be expressed, there is a need for nurses to embrace local activities. Nurses who are well
established are seen as informal community leaders with intimate community knowledge,
thus opening opportunities to positively affect inhabitants’ lives.
Public Sector
Rural health care facilities and employees develop community sustainability through
encouraging engagement, thus embedding social capital (Bennett 2012; Farmer & Kilpatrick
2009). The development of rural community engagement is extremely challenging and
depends on a process of reciprocated trust, strong relationship building with commitment and
effective communication skills (Nimegeer et al 2011). Kenny et al (2013) emphasise rural
communities equate health service sustainability with that of the rural township, and as such
have a long history of involvement with health services in those areas. Frontline staff should
become familiar with the local community (Roufeil & Battye 2008), particularly as
community members’ prefer interaction with a locally based, multi skilled worker, thus
enhancing the possibility of contributing to the provision of a holistic, creative approach to
care (Nimegeer et al 2011).
Registered Nurses (RN) are invaluable to rural environs (Francis & Mills 2011; Mills
et al 2007; Roufeil & Battye 2008) as informal leaders through the intimate knowledge
established RN have (Sivamalai 2008). RN are required to support the community by being
qualified and prepared to independently manage a comprehensive range of health
emergencies (Bourke et al 2012; Malone & Anderson 2014; Roufeil & Battye 2008). RN
emphasised the importance of reciprocated trust, satisfaction, belonging, familiarity,
interactions, networks and connections with, for and in the community (Bourke et al 2012;
Francis & Mills 2011; Hegney et al 2002; Mills 2007; Penz et al 2008). Holding dual roles
by being both community member and professional though has the disadvantage of
experiencing a lack of anonymity and difficulty in maintaining confidentiality (Bourke et al
2012; Mills 2007; Roufeil & Battye 2008). RN living and working in rural areas have strong
bonding social capital networks already in place and are the frontline for accessing resources
from out of the local area (Farmer & Kilpatrick 2009; Farmer et al 2012; Roufeil & Battye
2008; Wood 2010), thus also providing bridging social capital opportunities.
Non-profit sector
Permanent Emergency Service Volunteers (PESV) are relied upon across rural Australia in
many capacities (Baxter-Tomkins & Wallace 2006; Britton 1991; Commonwealth of
Australia 2003; Fahey et al 2002; Linsdell & Rogers 2014; Moran & Britton 1994; O’Meara
et al 2012; Rice & Fallon 2011; Roberts et al 2014). Britton (1991, p410) stated that PESV
‘often perform disaster-relevant tasks similar to those carried out by career officers’ but do so
only after completion of stringent training and accreditation processes (Britton 1991; Linsdell
& Rogers 2014; Moran & Britton 1994; NSW Government 1989; O’Meara et al 2012;
Roberts et al 2014). These requirements are mandated by the State Rescue Board to remain
accredited both as a Unit, and as individual operators (Howard 1999; NSW Government
1989; NSW Government 2015; NSW SES 2015).
New South Wales State Emergency Service (NSW SES) is a versatile combat agency
situated in various units around the state and is governed by legislation under the SERM Act
1989. The primary role of the NSW SES is to respond to crises and disasters relating to
floods, storms and tsunamis (NSW Government 1989; NSW SES 2011; NSW SES 2015).
However up to one third of rurally based units have additional, specific roles including, but
not limited to RCR units which operate in a similar capacity to the NSW Fire and Rescue
Service (NSW Government 1989; NSW SES 2015) and CFR whereby emergency medical
assistance is administered until NSW Ambulance personnel arrive (Howard 1999; NSW SES
2015; O’Meara 2003). Due to the limited numbers of retained Emergency Service career
officers in rural areas, PESV are expected to deal professionally (Fahey 2003; Moran &
Britton 1994; O’Meara 2003) with persons requiring assistance with rescue, medical and
trauma emergencies, and the resultant confidentiality issues that arise from these (O’Meara
2003).
As NSW SES volunteers (NSW SESV) are existing community members bonding
social capital resources exist due to inherent connectedness, by virtue of being a family
member, friend or neighbour. As a NSW SES representative with the community, they
additionally have bridging social capital opportunities. Volunteers often express their need to
volunteer as ‘giving something back to the community’, suggesting a sense of reciprocity
experienced. Manock et al (2012) conducted a small study in a rural township post flood
event with results indicating that family, friends and neighbours were as supportive as NSW
SESV in the response phase (41%, 59%, 65%, 65% respectively), with preparedness and
recovery phases strongly indicating support from the NSW SESV, displaying resilience
through bonding and bridging social capital networks.
Methodology
A detailed literature review was considered the most suitable approach to allow for diverse,
holistic data collection, thus comprehensively capturing detail for analysis. The searches
utilised databases including but not limited to Summon, Google Scholar, Emerald, Academic
Search, ProQuest, CINAHL, Expanded Academic, Medline and Elsevier and involved
combinations of the keywords Emergency Service Volunteers, Registered Nurses, NSW
Health, Australian, rural, attitudes, values, community, NSW SES, New South Wales State
Emergency Service and social capital. The rationale for the content inclusionary criteria was
to ensure as many relevant articles were identified and included in this study as possible, thus
specific parameters only included English language, full text online, scholarly materials, peer
reviewed and without any date limits. The only exclusionary criterion for the content was
newspaper articles, patents and citations. Exclusion subject criteria for all searches included
fire, disaster, medicine, medical, earthquake, environment, all specific disease processes, all
mention of animals and insects, pharmacokinetics, pharmacists, financial, drama, Red Cross,
Table 1. Author/date of articles included
Year of publication Emergency service references Rural Health references Pre 1995
Brittan 1991 Moran 1994 2
1996 - 2000 Howard 1999 1 2001-2005
Fahey 2002 3 Fahey 2003 O’Meara 2003
Hegney 2002 1
2006-2010
Baxter-Tomkins 2009 1 Mills 2007 Sivamalai 2008 Penz 2008 Farmer2009 4
2011 - 2015
Rice 2011 Manock 2012 O’Meara 2012 Mulholland 2012 Timmons 2013 Huynh 2014 Linsdell 2014 Roberts 2014 8
Wood 2010 Francis 2011 Nimegeer 2011 Bennett 2012 Bourke 2012 Farmer 2012 Warwick-Booth 2012 Kenny 2013 Kenny 2014 Malone2014 10
Figure 1. Number of articles utilised by year of publication
hospital, seismic, school, religion, military, caregiver, fund and food. The rationale for these
exclusionary criteria was to eliminate articles relating to major disaster efforts and events.
The literature review revealed that, whilst there are many articles regarding emergency
service volunteers or health service employees in rural communities (see table 1), very few
include rural communities’ involvement, and less specifically relate to NSW SES (see figure
1).
Analysis and Discussion
The National Volunteering Strategy states that ‘Australian communities rely on volunteer
efforts, not only in responding to and recovering from disasters and emergencies, but also in
preventing and preparing for emergencies’ (Australian Government 2011, p 17). Mulholland
et al (2012, online) consider that a multidisciplinary and multifaceted approach to rural
remote health care is needed and should involve the cooperative efforts involving
paramedics, volunteers and hospital staff for both community call outs and potentially
extending to volunteers providing hands-on assistance in emergency situations in the hospital
setting. The Commonwealth of Australia (2003) ‘Volunteering Australia’ report highlighted
the benefits of volunteers working as partners with healthcare organisations. National
volunteering strategy (Australian Government 2011, p17) states ‘the community expect that
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
pre 1995 1996-2000 2001-2005 2006-2010 2011-2015
Emergency ServiceVolunteers
Rural Health
volunteers and emergency organisations will operate at a highly professional standard’ and
that consequently, ‘training requirements for emergency management volunteers have grown
substantially’. Howard (1999 p38) asserted that being a volunteer does not equate with being
an amateur, and that, not only do communities hold volunteers in ‘high regard’ but that the
volunteers expect to act with credibility, as this is a necessary component for the safety of
both themselves, their team and the community.
However, this discussion does not extend to describing career professionals’ opinions
of NSW SESV. Limited research identifies career professionals’ opinions of NSW SESV.
Britton (1991, p399) suggested that permanent volunteers are often seen as ‘second rate
amateurs’ not professionals by career officers in similar capacities while ‘perhaps the most
pervasive myth is that volunteers are unskilled – that ‘unpaid’ somehow equates with
‘unprofessional’’ has more recently been stated in the ‘Volunteering Australia’ report
(Commonwealth of Australia 2003, p8). This report also highlighted impediments that
require management, some of which include privacy and confidentiality of healthcare issues,
Occupational Health and Safety awareness, manual handling matters, respect for
policies/procedures and standards of care (Commonwealth of Australia 2003).
Both RN and NSWSESV who work in rural environments often train to advanced
levels, specifically to increase capability in managing emergency health situations, with
minimum resources. Both are considered mainstays of rural/remote Australian communities.
Healthcare representatives have associated with volunteers in various capacities since the
nineteenth century (Curtis & Ramsden 2015; O’Meara 2003; Wood 2010).
Community members look to nurses as a trusted source of support, leadership and
clinical management at all times, but especially so when local resources are limited. RN are
in an excellent position to enhance community preparedness, engagement and knowledge of
hazards in addition to being qualified in the care of vulnerable populations who are at specific
risk during disasters, thus enhancing community resilience. RN are also well placed to work
with volunteers who are also involved in disaster responses thus being well positioned to
provide collaboration, support, information and guidance (O’Meara 2003).
Links between NSW public and non-profit sectors, in relation to the opportunity to
develop practical strategies relevant throughout the disaster management cycle, are tenuous at
best. Primarily this is due to the mainly qualitative, anecdotal or grey literature currently
existing and the lack of concurrent comparative research in rural communities. The disaster
management strategies and protocol implemented by NSW Health and the emergency
management protocols implemented by the NSW SES may be able to complement each
other. This can only happen with communication and collaboration between the two
organisations’ representatives which correlates with both NSW Health CORE principles and
the NSW SES community engagement principles.
NSW Health is best known for treating and managing illness and injury, though
prevention management is also an important component. NSW SES is best known for its role
in flood, storm, tsunami responses; lesser known capacities for NSW SES are rurally based
RCR and CFR. As legislated by the NSW Government, both these organisations have very
specific roles in these lesser known capacities. Research indicates bonding and bridging
social capital resources are available by both sectors based simply on the location in which
they all reside. There is an inherent connectedness as all live in the same area and share
concern for the wellbeing of each other, whether that be by virtue of being a volunteer,
employee, family member, friend or neighbour.
Kenny (2013) considers that, given the urban to rural health inequalities, a ‘one size fits
all’ policy approach is ineffective. Strong, healthy relationships are required for building and
maintaining resilience during adversity (Roufeil & Battye 2008). Thus factors for healthy
collaboration, as summarised in table 2, require further scrutiny.
Respect for variations in roles and responsibilities
There is little, if any, recognition in the literature of the differing, yet complimentary roles
and responsibilities of the co-located RN and NSW SESV in rural areas, thus it is potentially
a barrier for collaboration little opportunity to develop multi-sectoral respect for individuals’
roles and responsibilities exist.
Recognition of relationship dynamics
Community cohesion identified through descriptions of bonding and bridging social capital
resources is available in rural areas severally by the non-profit and the public sectors. The
community sector feels trust for both sectors’ local representatives. However the lack of
specific literature limits conclusions drawn relating to the status of relationships between the
public and non-profit sectors at delivery levels.
Open communication
Currently, confidentiality issues present challenges, as there is minimal discourse that can be
entered into by the respective organisations without potentially breaching respective
confidentiality clauses.
Scrutiny of existing policies and practices
Both the public and the non-profit sectors have policies mandating disaster management
collaboration with other agencies and the consumer. However, local implementation of these
has been historically dependent on individual communities. Little research explores multi-
sector collaboration in rural areas.
Table 2: Summary of identified Multi-Sector barriers
Collaboration of sectors depends on –
Health Service (Public Sector) Representatives = RNs
Emergency Service Organisation (Non-profit sector) Representatives = Volunteers
Recognition of role and relationship variations
Creative and autonomous practice Highly qualified in their fields Nationally recognised qualifications
Recognition of relationship dynamics
No literature discusses relationship dynamics Rural community heterogeneous characteristics & stoicism may minimise standardised strategies for involvement Rural communities trust both the RN and the NSW SESV severally Renumerated professionals view volunteers as amateurs Both RN and NSW ESV have bonding social capital Both RN and NSW ESV have bridging social capital
Open communication
Confidentiality constraints for both public and non-profit sectors
Scrutiny of existing policies and practices
National Standards 2 Partnering with Consumers NSW Health CORE Values
Community Engagement Framework National Strategy for Disaster Resilience
Conclusion
Barriers to implementation of multi-sector collaborative approaches to the Disaster
Management cycle are multi-faceted. Literature reveals that rural community sector trust both
the public and non-profit sectors individually through the provision of health and safety
services supplied. However there is no research examining these three sectors concurrently,
nor is there research indicating whether the public and non-profit sectors trust each other.
There is however, indications from various researchers that career professionals in similar
locales or performing similar roles view volunteers as amateurs. Other barriers potential
include confidentiality concerns and a lack of awareness of each sectors’ representatives roles
in disaster/emergency management events.
The next challenge is to determine whether existing social capital is being utilised to
maximum extent or whether there may be opportunities for the public and non-profit sectors
to work more cohesively in rural settings. Further research to determine the availability of
linking social capital opportunities between the two grassroots service providers is needed in
relation to disaster management phases of prevention, preparation, response and recovery.
This paper has the potential to open discourse regarding the creation of linkages
between public, non-profit and community sectors in rural areas to develop tailor-made
strategies for future collaborative implementation. This discourse is required to determine
whether development of flexible and creative strategies tailored to meet rural communities’
heterogeneous needs during localised disaster and emergency situations through linking of
locally available social capital is feasible. This can prove crucial as, if recognised, under-
utilised resources can be developed and implemented in rural communities, thus encouraging
linking social capital opportunities through innovative collaboration. This paper lends
credence for the conduction of future studies looking specifically at these services in rural
areas as whilst statistically it revolves around small numbers, for the communities in
question, the ramifications may be significant. Further research will focus on corroborating
these issues and seeking sustainable solutions.
Limitations and Future Research
Limitations of this review include potential researcher bias, as the author is both a rural
healthcare professional and a member of the NSW SES. Another limitation is the variability
of the terminology used by different researchers. To determine some measure of
comparability, interpretive analysis is utilised. However, the key limitation is the lack of
research relating specifically to rurally based NSW SES volunteers, restricting the authors’
ability to draw comprehensive generalised conclusions.
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Humanitarian village, a design innovation for small and medium-scale disasters
ABSTRACT: Asia and the Pacific region have the highest number of total occurrences, fatalities and effects of natural disaster events caused by small-medium disasters particularly flood and cyclone. Data from United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP) 2015 shows that in the past 4 decades there has been a growing number of small and medium-scale disasters which have resulted a total loss of over US$1.15 trillion. However this scale of disaster has received less attention from humanitarian agencies. At the same time the increasing number of natural disasters has increased the demand for humanitarian products and facilities such as shelters, communication devices, health and safety equipment, water and sanitation. There are many types of designs for emergency shelters but most are too technical and neglect the social needs of the occupants, which makes post-disaster life more distressing for survivors. This paper explores the concept of Humanitarian Village as an innovative design for responding to small and medium-scale disasters, focusing on community-led design for better temporary pop-up shelter and village facilities for people impacted by highly distressing scenarios. A technical solution for the design of emergency shelters is proposed and ways to manage small and medium-scale disasters, particularly in the Asia Pacific region are investigated. Keywords: Humanitarian Village, Small-medium Disaster, Design Innovation, Emergency Shelter, Natural Disaster, Asia Pacific
1. Introduction
Asia and the Pacific region have the highest number of total occurrences, fatalities and effects
of natural disaster events caused by the small-medium disasters. While the number of
massive geological disasters such as earthquakes and tsunamis has remained relatively
constant at around 20 a year for the last two decades, the total number of small to medium
natural disasters related to climate change especially flood and cyclones, has quadrupled in
this time (Oxfam 2007). Over the same period, the number of people affected has increased
from around 174 million to an average of over 250 million a year. Furthermore, United
Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP) data 2015
shows a growing number of small and medium scale disasters in the past 4 decades which
have resulted a total loss of over US$1.15 trillion. However this scale of disaster has received
less attention from humanitarian relief organisations and aid agencies, which has resulted in
limited responses and actions taken. At the same time the increasing number of natural
disasters has increased the demand for humanitarian products especially shelter and facilities
such as communication devices, health and safety equipment, water and sanitation.
This paper explores the concept of Humanitarian Village as an innovative design for
responding to small and medium-scale disasters, focusing on community-led design for better
temporary pop-up shelters and village. The Humanitarian Village is a manufactured system
of products, spaces, symbols and services that are designed to be complementary in disaster
response. This includes the provision of facilities in and around shelters such as water and
sanitation, signage, communication and health facilities. This paper aims to examine a better
solution for the design of emergency shelters and also investigate ways to manage small and
medium-scale disasters, particularly in Asia and the Pacific region which has the highest
number of total occurrences, fatalities and impacts. Climate change is now a global concern
therefore the management of small and medium-scale climate-related disasters also have to
be managed globally and include major humanitarian relief organisations and aid agencies.
Results from this study guide the humanitarian relief organisations and aid agencies to pay
attention to this scale of disaster. It also offers insight on the partnership between
governments, big international humanitarian relief organisations and aid agencies in terms of
responding to small and medium-scale disasters in the climate change era.
To explore the concept of Humanitarian Village as an innovative design for
responding to small and medium-scale disasters, this paper uses statistical data including
disaster trends, scale, scope and impacts. The discussion focuses on the review of a number
of designs of emergency shelters with different technologies and materials. Statistical data are
also used to understand how countries prone to small and medium-scale disasters, manage the
disasters, particularly in Asia and the Pacific region. The overall analysis of the emergency
shelters is also based upon the Author's own experience and reflection on post-disaster
response of the Indian Ocean tsunami in Aceh between 2005 and 2009.
2. Statistical data
According to McFarlane and Norris (2006:4) a disaster is “a potentially traumatic event that
is collectively experienced, has an acute onset, and is time delimited; disasters may be
attributed to natural, technological, or human causes”. A report by the Centre for Research on
the Epidemiology of Disasters or CRED (2015) clearly distinguishes the difference between
hazards versus disaster. According to this report, the term hazard refers to a severe or extreme
event such as a flood, storm, earthquake, volcanic eruption, which occur naturally in any part
of the world. Natural hazards only become natural disasters when human lives are lost and
livelihoods damaged or destroyed i.e. impact on human populations. In order to be recorded
as a natural disaster, an event must meet at least one of the following criteria: ten or more
people reported killed; 100 or more people reported affected; declaration of a state of
emergency; or call for international assistance (CRED 2015).
There are two types of disasters, a natural disaster caused by natural events and a
manmade disaster caused by humans such as war, conflict or industrial accidents. In terms of
scale, disasters can be categorised into small, medium and large or in between (small to
medium or medium to large). Small to medium disasters such as flood, cyclone and bush fires
may occur in regular cycles and can be predicted, while medium to large disasters erupt
occasionally and cannot be predicted precisely. Based on the response to disaster, three stages
are identified: the rescue, the relief and the rehabilitation. The rescue stage may takes place
over 1-2 weeks while the relief stage that follows takes up to 2 months or longer depending
on the type of disaster and its impact on the community. The last stage, the rehabilitation, is
the time for survivors or displaced people to go back into their homes and mostly occurs up
to 12 months or more later.
United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific recorded
over 2 million lives lost due to natural disasters between 1970 and 2014 in Asia and the
Pacific region, which equals to 56.6 percent of the fatalities globally (UNESCAP 2015).
Earthquakes and tsunamis were the main causes of death, despite their relatively infrequent
occurrences. Furthermore, UNESCAP also recorded that 6 billion people from the Asia and
the Pacific region were affected by disasters over the same period equalling to 87.6 per cent
of the affected globally. Floods and drought although not the deadliest disasters, affected the
highest number of people at 5 billion, while reports on natural disasters are generally on the
rise, floods, cyclones and storms showed a steep increase in number and were the most
frequent events (OXFAM 2007). Asia and the Pacific regions are vulnerable to many types of
disasters, including floods, cyclones, earthquakes, drought, storm surges and tsunamis. Small
and medium-scale disasters are more frequent than the large-scale disasters that hit the
headlines. Disasters come in different sizes. The public and policy makers are more informed
about the outcome of mass disasters that receive the attention of international media. In fact,
most disasters occur in more limited geographical space and this depends on the hazard that
triggers them. For example, landslides are geographically local but are very widespread
across the globe. The cumulative losses of landslides may be very high even if they seldom
make it to the news. High intensity earthquakes are much less frequent even if the cumulative
impact of smaller earthquake events may be equally large (EUR 2013). During the past
decade, on average, over 200 million people were affected and 70,000 people were killed by
natural disasters annually. Those figures represent 90% and 65% of the world totals,
respectively (CRED 2015)
The statistical data on disasters implicate several issues. First, the number of
disasters especially the small and medium-scale natural disasters has increased in the past
decades. Second, although the number of people killed small and medium-scale disasters is
less than large disasters, the number of people affected is higher. Third, statistical data on
small and medium-scale natural disasters is difficult to find or incomplete. Small and
medium-scale disasters do not attract the established humanitarian relief organisations and
aid agencies. Therefore, small and medium disasters necessitate the same attention with
bigger to massive disasters. The Humanitarian village concept proposed in this paper offers
an alternative post-disaster action in response to small and medium scale disasters. The
concept can be adopted by the humanitarian relief organisations and aid agencies as well as
the government of the affected countries.
3. Review of current emergency shelters
There are several types of post-disaster emergency sheltering options. These include shelter
inside the damaged house, shelter close to the damaged house, shelter nearby relatives or
friends, shelter inside the buildings (vacant or public buildings) and shelter in emergency
compound set up by the military, government, national or international agencies. Babister &
Kelman (2002) identified four types of shelters: repair and reconstruction, host families, mass
shelter and temporary settlements. The International Federation of Red Cross or IFRC (2011)
sets three types of shelters, emergency shelter, transitional shelter and durable housing
(Figure 1).
Fig. 1. Type of shelter Source: IFRC 2011
The increasing number of natural disasters demands better humanitarian products,
including shelter. Many designs of emergency shelters focus on technologies and the cost
involved whereas the social aspects are often overlooked. Oliver-Smith (2007) argued that
construction technique receives more attention than the social aspects of emergency shelter.
Other essential aspect such as layouts and space design also receive less attention (Zetter and
Boano 2009). Shelter also often overlook flexible partitioning alternative to accommodate
certain cultural or religious concerns in some communities. In terms of the size, most
emergency shelters only accommodate up to 5 people which does not fit larger families. The
lack of facilities in and around the shelter is often problematic for residents, creating
distressing situations and diminishing satisfaction. Proving shelter for survivors is not only
about providing a roof over their head but also about helping them to rebuild their lives
(Rahmayati 2016).
The tent at the top right corner in Figure 2 is a standard tents currently used by the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and The International Federation
of Red Cross (IFRC). It is made to fit a family of five in order to fulfil minimum standards of
a family. Few of the designs have been tested; many solutions do not reach the camp field for
evaluation in real life situation (Axelsson 2012).
Fig. 2. Emergency shelter designs Source: Axelsson 2012
Reviewing emergency shelters
Five samples of emergency shelter with different technologies and materials are reviewed in
this paper. The first design is the Cardboard Tubes Shelter (Figure 3), designed by architect
Shigeru Ban and his humanitarian organization, ‘Volunteer Architects Network’ (VAN). Fig. 3. Cardboard tubes shelter
Source: inhabitat.com
This shelter is made from recycled cardboard tubes and has been used in many
disaster cases in the past decades such as in Rwanda, Japan, Turkey, India, Sri Lanka, China,
Haiti, and New Zealand. It is designed for easy assembly by a team of volunteers and the
structure is crucial for helping communities rebuild their lives. The construction is low cost,
simple and effective for shelters, schools, community facilities and places of worship, with
locally sourced materials, such as cardboard, wood, metal and plastic (inhabitat.com).
Fig. 4. IKEA solar-powered shelter Source: inhabitat.com
The second design is the IKEA Solar-Powered Flat-Packed Shelter (Figure 4). These
shed-like shelters are made from polymer panels that are laminated with a thermal insulation.
The flat-pack design allows for rapid transportation and the efficient clip-on design takes less
than four hours to assemble, by connecting the panels to the steel frame. Moreover, the solar
panel roofing allows inhabitants to generate electricity for basic living needs and
communication. The roof deflects solar radiation by 70 percent, cooling the shelter during the
day and insulating warmth within the interior at night. These 188-square-foot shelters can
house up to five people. This shelter has been used mostly in manmade disasters e.g. for
Somali refugees. Recently, in collaboration with the UNHCR, these shelters were proposed
for the Syrian refugees in Lebanon. However, the Lebanese government has been hesitant to
approve the use of the IKEA shelters for the fear that they might prove ‘too permanent’
(inhabitat.com).
The third design is the Sandbag Shelter, using simple sandbag and barbed wire
technology (Figure 5) designed by architect Nader Khalili and the Cal-Earth Institute.
Fig. 5. Sandbag Shelter Source: calearth.org
The technique is designed to fit a variation of situation and geographical conditions
for instance by using the remainder materials from war (sandbags and barbed wire). To create
a safe shelter in most regions of the globe, the concept minimises the use of artificial material
resources and maximises the use of natural resources. They assembly involves the family and
community members to build sustainable shelters with maximum protection against natural
and man-made disasters (calearth.org).
The forth design is ShelterBox Tent (Figure 6) made by Vango, one of the world’s
leading tent manufacturers. It is designed to withstand extreme temperatures, high winds and
heavy rainfalls. Internally, each tent has partitions that allow residents to divide the space as
they see fit. This disaster relief tent can accommodate a family of up to 10 people. Since
2000, this shelter has been used in response to earthquakes, floods, volcanoes, tsunamis,
hurricanes, landslides, typhoons and conflicts, including the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, the
2010 Haiti earthquake, the Syria crisis, and the largest storm to ever make landfall – Typhoon
Haiyan in the Philippines in 2013 (shelterbox.org).
Fig. 6. ShelterBox Tent Source: shelterbox.org
The last design is the Hexayurt Shelter (Figure 7), a disaster relief shelter design
based on a geodesic geometry adapted to construction from standard 4×8 foot sheets of
factory made construction material.
Fig. 7. Hexayurt Shelter Source: hexayurt.com
This building's design is in the Buckminster Fuller lineage of using contiguous
triangles to maximize the load-bearing capability of simple structures. The basic construction
principle is to use full sheets for the walls. Sheets cut from one corner to the opposite corner
creating right triangles. Each pair of right triangles is then assembled into an isosceles
triangle of 8 feet wide and 8 feet in height, thus forming a roof panel. The Hexayurt project
has been running since 2003 and has been positively reviewed by the American RedCross
and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (hexayurt.com).
Emergency shelters design issues and consequential problems
Among the five shelters that have been reviewed above, none is intended for small and
medium scale disasters. All shelters were designed for large-scale disasters including
manmade disasters such as war or conflict. Furthermore, the designs have mostly focused on
the technical aspects like thermal, material, construction, cost, assembly and giving little
consideration to user needs and the local context such as locations and culture requirements
of the occupants. All shelters were designed as single unit and little regard for emergency
village set up system such as complimentary infrastructures, services and facilities in and
around the compound. Davidson et.al. (2007) emphasise the importance of organising such
infrastructures and facilities. Moreover, some of the design is over-complicated or over-
sophisticated thereby demanding certain skills for constructing the shelter that the occupants
may not possess. However, there often a shortage of construction professionals in emergency
situation (Kennedy, Ashmore, et. al 2008). In term of sustainability, the materials of the
shelters cannot be re-used or stored for future disasters. Poor storage system also contributes
to the sustainability problems. Distribution or logistic issues are also crucial for design of
emergency shelters particularly when the shelters are too heavy or need additional
construction, managing in emergency situations becomes more difficult. For example, some
shelters need flat or massive bases or require special storage systems before distribution.
These problems may lead to unsatisfactory shelters.
4. Humanitarian Village design concept for small-medium disasters
In response to the above review, this paper proposes the Humanitarian Village concept as an
innovative design for responding to small and medium-scale disasters, using a community
led-design approach to ensure that the user needs are fulfilled (survivors or displaced people).
The significance of this concept is that it does not merely focus on the design of the shelter
but also the manufacturing system of products, spaces, symbols and services that are
designed to be complementary in small and medium-scale disasters. This includes the
provision of facilities in and around shelters. A number of facilities proposed by the
Humanitarian Village such as communication, medical, education, safety, basic needs,
logistic and comfort products are shown in Figure 8 to14.
Fig. 8. Konnect (Communication) Source: Luke Fazio, Nathanael Hunt, Joanna
Wilson, 2015
Fig. 9. MediTrike (Medical) Source: Yianni Doumas, Thao Nguyen, Stephanie
Vella, 2015
Fig. 10. CLASS (Education) Source: Dan Cabral, Alana Dang, Deep Kansara,
2015
Fig. 11. Halo (Safety) Source: Joel Benton, Ken Reidy, Therese
Hallberg, 2015
Fig. 12. Ultraloo (Sanitation) Source: Loius Mills, Sam Abdelmalek, Andrew
Jenkins, 2015
Fig. 13. Distribution Hub (Logistic) Source: Eamon Butler, Sahun Hanlon, Rachel
Hook, 2015
Fig. 14. Cool Aid (Comfort) Source: Amber Everitt, Jarahad Valeri, Liu Xiootian, 2015
Given the high number of small and medium-scale disaster occurrences, the extent
of people affected and the long term impacts, large international humanitarian organisation
and aid agencies need to become involved in the management and response of this type of
disasters and form effective collaborations with the governments of affected countries. This
paper proposes a strategy to develop a management framework for small and medium-scale
of disasters as shown in the diagram below (Figure 15).
Fig. 15. Strategy for collaboration in managing small and medium-scale disasters
The first step is defining and classifying the small and medium-scale disasters based
on the impacts and duration. Second step is analysing how the disasters were managed
especially by the countries that are prone to small and medium-scale disasters. Approaches
and strategies used by the respective governments should also be examined. The third step is
mapping out the results from the analysis by the region such as East Asia, South-East Asia,
Australia and the Pacific Islands. The fourth step is the analysing of the findings and the last
step involves developing model of strategy for partnership between governments, large
international humanitarian relief organisations and aid agencies.
5. Conclusion
Small and medium-scale disasters related to climate change are growing in number. Floods
and storms in particular are becoming more frequent than geological disasters such as
earthquakes. Most of these disasters are managed by the governments of the affected
countries and major international humanitarian relief organisations and aid agencies are often
not involved. At the same time, the increasing number of disasters has increased the demand
for shelters and humanitarian facilities such as communication devices, health and safety
equipment, water and sanitation. Many of the available shelters and facilities are not
specifically designed for small and medium-scale disasters, but rather focused on technical
aspects such as thermal, material, construction, cost and assembly. Less consideration is
given to contextual factors such as location, culture and lifestyle of the occupants. Other
problems identified include over-complicated or over-sophisticated design, non-durable
material and logistic issues in transporting the shelters to the affected location. Finally, many
emergency camps are not supported by facilities in and around the shelters. These problems
affect both survivors and humanitarian aid organisations.
The Humanitarian Village concept proposed in this paper offers a solution for these
problems. A human-centred design approach is adopted in order to accommodate the needs of
the user and the contextual elements. The design and materials of the shelters and
humanitarian facilities have to be simple, light, respond to the local contexts, and
environmentally friendly (recycle and reusable). It should be made available in time, in
sufficient quantities, on the right spot and facilitated by the right facilities. And all of that at
affordable or agreed upon costs. This idea needs to be materialised into real actions through
collaboration between governments, large international humanitarian relief organisations and
aid agencies. This, as proposed in this paper will be the alternative options for better
management of small and medium-scale of disaster in Asia and the Pacific region.
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The Step by Step bush fire support service: evaluation of a psycho-social recovery and
resilience model
Jane Louise Rich, Centre for Rural and Remote Mental Health, Centre for Resources Health
and Safety, The University of Newcastle, Callaghan 2308, Australia
Angela Booth, Centre for Rural and Remote Mental Health, The University of Newcastle,
Callaghan 2308, Australia
Allison Rowlands, Ministry for Police and Emergency Services, NSW Government, Sydney
2001, Australia
Prasuna Reddy, School of Medicine and Public Health, University of Newcastle, Callaghan
2308, Australia
Anne Crestani, Practice Manager, Gateway Family Services, Katoomba NSW.
Kate Davies, Centre for Rural and Remote Mental Health, The University of Newcastle,
Callaghan 2308, Australia
Paper presented at the
Australian and New Zealand Disaster and Emergency Management Conference
Broadbeach, Gold Coast (QLD), 30-31 May 2016
The Step by Step bush fire support service: evaluation of a psycho-social recovery and
resilience model
Abstract
The Blue Mountains region of NSW was devastated by bushfires in 2013. The Step by Step
Blue Mountains Bushfire Support Service responded quickly to the communities in the
aftermath and remained as a major support service during the recovery period. This paper
presents findings from the qualitative evaluation of the Step by Step service and highlights the
value of the strengths-based approach in disaster recovery services. Utilising a case
management model with a solution-focused and strengths-based approach, Step by Step, a
personalised support worker service, aimed to strengthen individual and household capabilities,
assist in decision making and promote wellbeing. This article presents findings from the
qualitative evaluation which aimed to gain understanding of how the service operated, and
whether the service achieved its objectives and addressed the urgent practical and psychological
needs of the community. Interviews were conducted with clients (n=8), staff (n=4), managers
(n=4) and representatives of stakeholder organisations (n=8) who were involved with the
service, in order to gain a diversity of perspectives and assess needs and challenges for those
involved. Results demonstrated that a strengths-based, solution-focused approach to recovery
was well received by all stakeholder groups. The evaluation demonstrated the importance of a
well-integrated community service sector and the influence that ‘connected communities’ can
have when swiftly implementing an emergency response recovery service.
Keywords: disaster recovery, support, fire, mental health, solution-focused
Introduction
The 2013 bushfires in the Blue Mountains, west of Sydney Australia, were devastating. The
event presented complex challenges to the services and support systems within these small rural
communities in responding to the diverse emergency and long-term needs of people affected
by the bushfires. This paper reports on an evaluation of an innovative recovery service, Step
By Step, which was established to support affected individuals and families. It draws on data
from interviews with consumers, service providers and managers to examine the impact of a
strengths-based approach for affected communities, and the relevance of strengths-based
models to disaster recovery. The paper identifies the importance of multi-faceted disaster
recovery services that recognise the value of material and psychosocial support, and assist the
longer recovery process.
The Step By Step Blue Mountains Bushfire Support Service
In October 2013 severe bushfires burnt over 65,000 hectares and destroyed over two hundred
properties and dwellings throughout the Blue Mountains region, leaving many neighbourhoods
displaced and distressed (NSW Rural Fire Service 2013). The fire was fought by the
communities for ten days and many evacuated people were displaced from their homes,
experiencing isolation, separation from family and friends, fear and trauma, and dislocation
from their communities and services. The New South Wales (NSW) Ministry for Police and
Emergency Service Disaster Welfare Service (MPES DWS) worked with the local community
service system to obtain funds through the Natural Disaster Relief and Recovery Arrangements
to deliver a supported recovery service. Gateway Family Services, a local non-government
agency, was contracted by MPES DWS to establish and implement a recovery support service
(which Gateway named ‘Step by Step’) from November 2013 to May 2014. The service ran
for an additional three months, to August 2014, with support from the Uniting Church. The Step
By Step team included six part-time support workers, one part-time client liaison worker, one
full-time manager and administration support. The team provided an outreach, and drop-in
service. Step By Step aimed to assist affected individuals, families and the broader community
by providing users with a single point of contact to help them navigate and access the range of
available recovery services, utilising a person-centred, solution-focused and strengths-based
approach. At the time there were no other comparable services in the local government area.
Step by Step connected with existing community services and recovery agencies to establish
clear referral pathways, build communication strategies and develop partnerships. Step By Step
was a member of the Wellbeing Sub Committee, a working group of local community services
advising the Recovery Committee at the local government level. Partnerships were formed with
neighbourhood centres and local agencies to so that Step By Step had access to rooms and
facilities to meet with fire-affected clients. Referral pathways and communications links were
also established with the Blue Mountains General Practitioners’ Network, Blue Mountains
District Guidance Officer and School Counselling Teams (Crestani 2014).
The Step by Step model was adapted from a previous service implemented in the
Warrumbungle shire of New South Wales post the January 2013 bushfires (Coombe, Rich,
Booth, Rowlands, Mackenzie and Reddy 2015). In 2013, however, this model was crafted to
provide greater emphasis on community service integration and a strong strength-based
approach in working with clients. This strengths and resource approach has always been
embedded within Gateway’s own practice framework. Gateway is a long established well
connected Blue Mountains service with 20 + years of providing practical and therapeutic
support to vulnerable families. The primary therapeutic model utilised by workers at Gateway
in both case-management and counselling contexts is Solution Focused Brief Therapy. In
addition, evaluation research took place while Step by Step was still an active service in the
community, unlike the Warrumbungle’s service. An earlier publication details the
implementation of Step by Step in the Blue Mountains further (Coombe, Rich et al. 2015).
A strengths-based model
The strengths-based approach to working with individuals and families is well established in
social work and in practices such as counselling and case management, drawing on the principle
that the best starting point to devising solutions is to identify the assets and strengths of the
individual and to build on these (Ligon 2002, Macdonald 2011, Guterman 2014). The strengths-
based approach aligns closely with the asset-based approach to community development, which
applies the principles of empowerment and resilience on a community-wide level to recognise
that communities, even those in distress, have resources and will to help themselves and know
their own needs and how to address them (Saleebey 2006). The intended outcome of a strengths-
based approach to working with individuals, families and communities, is that the process of
working collaboratively to find solutions based on existing strengths builds resilience and
produces outcomes over which people have a greater sense of ownership. While commonly
applied in community development programming approaches, the application of a strengths-
based model is less common in disaster recovery. There is strong evidence to suggest, however,
that the often slow process of recovery is more effective where communities are empowered
and where solutions build on their strengths and priorities (Patterson, Weil and Patel 2010).
Solution Focused Brief Therapy (SFBT) is an approach based on solution building rather than
problem solving. SFBT explores the current and future hopes of the client and has great value
as a preliminary, and often sufficient, intervention. There are now over 32 published research
studies in SFBT which shows the model to be effective in 65-83% of cases typically over 4-5
sessions (Iveson 2002). Following the 2009 bushfires in Victoria, it was shown that an ad hoc
community development approach was empowering for communities, but that the approach to
community development adopted by service providers was not as clearly defined as Step by
Step’s approach in drawing on a strength-based, solution-focused model of recovery.
Evaluation of recovery services provided during the 2009 Victoria bushfire has suggested that
a clearer definition of the theoretical approach may have benefited community recovery yet
may have hindered flexibility (Webber and Jones 2013). With a strength-based approach to
recovery, flexibility and understanding of individual needs are at the forefront. As described by
Gunderson (2012), a community’s ability to recover from a disaster relies heavily on the people
within the community’s ability to cope. It seems logical that this new approach in early crisis
interventions could be applied to disaster recovery (Slawinski 2006).
Although there is limited research on the use of strengths-based models in disaster recovery, a
report produced in response to the 2003 Canberra, Australia bushfires, found that many
participants preferred to see themselves as a ‘survivor’ rather than a ‘victim’ of the fires and
that having a sense of control helped them to move forward (Camilleri, Healy, Macdonald,
Sykes, Winkworth and Woodward 2007). Participants also explained that non-judgemental,
emotional support, being allowed to process what had happened, being able to make a plan, and
feeling good about such a plan, was helpful (Camilleri, Healy et al. 2007). A specific aim of the
strengths-based and solution-focused approach is the way the client is viewed, not as a victim
of an event, but as a person with strengths and capacity.
The Step By Step service drew on the evidence pertaining to strengths-based, solution-focused
recovery and established as its principles that:
the client has autonomy and choice;
the client’s values are respected;
the client’s social and cultural identity is respected;
the clients are supported to identify and work towards their goals;
the client and Step By Step team are partners;
clear and open communication is used;
the approach is flexible and individually-tailored; and
unrealistic expectations are clarified early (Crestani 2014).
Step By Step used this approach to allow the client to be in control of their own recovery process
with the role of the Step By Step worker to facilitate and help the client tap into their own
strengths to move ahead and seek solutions. A solution-focused and strengths-based approach
required the worker to identify the client’s strengths, talents, capabilities and resources. Once
strengths were identified, the worker encouraged the client to develop and use them to work on
particular goals and tasks in the recovery process. A focus on the client’s strengths was
maintained throughout all phases of intervention (Crestani 2014).
A qualitative study was undertaken to identify the extent to which these strengths-based
principles supported clients’ recovery and contributed to the overall recovery process.
Step by Step Patterns of Service
The Step By Step service had a total of 528 clients during its operation. The types of referrals
that Step By Step workers provided their clients varied over the time of service use; initially
most referral types were for the council, financial needs, counselling and practical support such
as food and clothing. By the closure of the service many Step By Step clients reported that they
did not require any assistance and for those that did, it was generally services offered by the
local council, counselling, financial and practical support (Crestani 2014).
Methodology
To examine the perspectives of users and providers involved in the Step By Step program, the
qualitative evaluation identified four categories of participants: Step By Step clients, Step By
Step staff, Step By Step managers and stakeholders from other agencies. To capture a diverse
range of experiences from each category a purposeful sample of clients, staff, managers and
stakeholder agencies was selected. The variables used to identify the diverse sample of clients
included geographical location, family structure, age, insurance status, nationality, occasions
of service and period of service. Invitations to participate in the evaluation were mailed in
randomly selected batches to potential participants. Reminder letters were purposely sent to
participant groups with the lowest response rates to ensure the distribution among the
participants was as equal as possible.
In total, 59 invitation letters were sent to potential participants, with a total of 24 invitees
providing written consent to participate, comprising 8 clients, 4 staff, 4 managers, and 8
stakeholders. Participation in the study was voluntary and ethics approval was granted by the
University of Newcastle Human Research Ethics Committee (H-2014-0173).
Semi-structured interviews with participants were conducted by members of the research team
via telephone, between May to November 2014. Each interview was recorded, transcribed,
anonymised and analysed using NVivo software. Coding themes were drawn directly from the
data, where participants within each category frequently raised similar issues and ideas. A
numerical pseudonym has been assigned to each participant so to attribute quotes transparently
throughout the results.
Findings
Identifying needs: flexibility and emotional support
Client participants reported that their immediate needs such as accommodation, clothing, food
and money had been met early after the disaster, with support from Step By Step staff, other
agencies and their community. However, addressing immediate tangible needs was only one
part of the recovery process and clients identified that Step By Step had helped them to address
ongoing psychological and social needs, with one client suggesting that ‘I think the needs have
now become more psychological’ (client 1). Client participants described the support of the
Step By Step service as reducing feelings of pressure and helping them feel that ‘things are
more under control’ (client 2).
Staff participants similarly recognised that, while the provision of immediate relief was
important, the psychological and social impacts of the loss and displacement were key, ongoing
needs for clients. One staff member noted that ‘often people would come in and the fires had
kind of exacerbated existing relationship problems, or problems with their teenagers at school,
or behavioural stuff’ (staff 2). Staff found a role for themselves in supporting clients to prioritise
their needs and to undertake practical tasks, particularly making phone calls on their behalf,
which was often very stressful for clients.
Stakeholder participants from other agencies saw that Step By Step was important in addressing
‘emotional, financial and physical’ (stakeholder 6) needs and ensuring the flow of information
to affected individuals and families. The flexibility of the support and the fact that ‘Step By
Step could give them the compassion and the emotional support they needed and the direction
to seeking professional help where it was needed’ (stakeholder 6) were also considered
successful in addressing client needs.
‘Walking alongside’ clients: partnership
All eight clients interviewed for the evaluation emphatically responded that they had felt valued
and respected and that their individual needs were addressed, with one client saying that, ‘I was
very much an individual. They helped me with my individual needs’ (client 4). Clients
perceived that their relationship with the Step By Step staff was akin to friendship, which was
seen as important in making clients feel relaxed and normalising the process of help-seeking
for people who may have had no similar experience drawing on support services. The
professionalism within the relationship was also recognised.
It was really good because we spilt our guts differently to what we would have if it had been a friend as such … We just knew that everything we said was confidential and would not be passed on. I think that was part of the issue, the confidentiality; it was like friendship, but a very confidential friendship (client 8.)
Clients did not perceive the relationship between themselves and the Step by Step worker one
of formal counselling, and this was considered positive by clients.
I’m aware it sort of was counselling, but it was different to making an appointment and sitting down and talking to somebody with a cup of tea or something, it was quite different to that… Even them coming to your house, it was private and yet it was sort of more casual than sitting down opposite somebody and talking (client 8).
Staff described their approach to delivering the service in terms aligned with strengths-based
principles, which included ‘recognising the strengths’ (staff 2), ‘walking alongside you, you
tell us what you need’ (staff 3) and ‘very much putting the ball in their court’ (staff 5). This was
reflected in the responses of four Step By Step managers, who strongly emphasised the
strengths-based nature of the model.
We recognise resilience as part of our strengths framework, we recognise the importance of sharing power so that we don’t hold onto power in those relationships; the client needs to have that power (manager 1).
The capacity of clients of the service to take the first steps to seek resources and support was
perceived as a strength, upon which further interventions could build.
Somehow they’d managed to get out of bed, wherever they were staying, and decide ‘we’re going to go to this recovery centre, we’re going to go in there and we’re going to try and find something’. To us that’s evidence of pre-existing resourcefulness (manager 2).
While a model of strengths-based partnership was perceived as effective by users and providers
of the service, it is important to recognise the intensity of the stress, grief, and confusion
experienced by all members of a community in the wake of disaster and how this shaped the
relationships. One client noted the emotional impact on her Step By Step worker, who was
overwhelmed by the positive community response to supporting the client.
She herself couldn’t believe the response that she got when she asked for help from us. She was even overwhelmed – we had one visit where everything was charred and black and all the kids’ toys had been burnt and the kids were too scared to go outside. And then, on her last visit she
saw that all the kids had toys outside and the bikes were everywhere. She stood at the front of the garden and started crying… She was quite emotional (client 3).
Some Step By Step staff reported that, despite working with traumatised clients in the past in
various roles, the devastating effects of the bushfire were something new. Staff noted that it
sometimes felt overwhelming and in this environment it was a challenge to ‘look beyond what
was in front of me and say ‘well okay, how can I assist these people to see the resources within
them and see them grow in resilience and hope’ (staff 4). One staff member noted that it was
difficult to walk away from clients where they were unable to provide assistance or support,
and another noted that it was challenging to go home at the end of the day and revert back to
everyday life.
Step By Step managers recognised the challenges implicit in these intense relationships and
saw that they had a role in supporting staff through means such as clinical supervision and
ensuring leave entitlements were taken. One manager stated that ‘you really need to have good
management and clinical supervision in place that assists workers to manage that and to prevent
burnout’ (manager 2).
Listening and getting the information right
The implementation of a strengths-based, solution-focused model entailed an emphasis on
effective communication. Clients spoke positively about the way staff communicated with
them, noting they felt valued, respected and heard. Staff worked from the starting point that
every client was a capable individual, who was able to be in control of their life, and that the
staff members’ job was to be a support through the recovery process. Staff emphasised the
importance of listening to their clients to really understand their aspirations and needs, whereby:
You tell us what works for you and if there is information that we can get for you then we’ll do that. If there are any other specific needs, like for example, transportation, then we can provide that too (staff 3).
Staff noted that one of their biggest concerns with the overall bushfire response was the
provision of misinformation to affected individuals and families. Two staff noted that other
agencies had informed people that they were ineligible for support, particularly after quick
means testing in the aftermath of the bushfire event. The effect of this was to give ‘people the
impressions that there was no point applying for, or looking further afield on that initial first
week or two’ (staff 2). As such, it became a priority for staff to provide accurate and up-to-date
information to clients, and ensure that the information they provided was relevant to the specific
needs and priorities expressed by clients. Step By Step managers saw that one of the crucial
functions of the service was to support people’s navigation of the disaster recovery system.
Step By Step gave them one point of call to know where the best place was to go and get information. Whereas, I think, people might have ended up at some of these other agencies and it might not have been quite the right place for them to get what they needed (manager 3).
Other agencies similarly noted the importance of providing accurate, timely information to
clients and saw this as an important function of Step By Step. They did note the challenges in
disseminating information in ways that are accessible to diverse audiences, with email
information working for some people, but not others.
Local knowledge and accessibility
Most clients felt that it was important that the Step By Step staff were from the Blue Mountains
region, as there was often an unspoken understanding of the community.
So someone from the community is helping the community means you don’t have to explain what it feels like. This is not across the board, but with Step By Step I found them very sympathetic to bushfire victims. It’s just home and you just know. They already know (client 6).
There was one exception where a client noted that it didn’t matter to them where the workers
came from, as there were already so many external people involved in the response and
recovery.
Staff considered that it was important that they were local to the areas in which they worked,
and that the service itself was locally accessible. Having an informal, convenient space to meet
with people during regular hours was considered important, but so too was the capacity to
provide flexible outreach services, such as home visits. For managers of the service, local
knowledge of staff was considered an asset, but this had to be matched by an appropriate level
of skills and qualifications to do the job, with one manager describing the ideal staff as:
…ideally locals, who know the local community, who are on hand, so to speak, well-trained, experienced in that level of practice, ready to start at a moment’s notice – which is not easy (manager 4).
Other agency stakeholders identified that one of the key lessons is ‘that there ought to be some
preparedness amongst that sector of qualified people’ (stakeholder 1) to ensure that a strong
base of local workers is available in future response and recovery efforts.
Exit strategy: restoration back to ‘normal’
The Step By Step service was a time-bound response to the devastation caused by the Blue
Mountains bushfire event. In keeping with a strengths-based model that prioritises local
resilience, the intention was that local agencies and resources would have the capacity to
provide ongoing support after the closure of Step By Step, and that the majority of recovery
issues would be resolved by the closure. There was a step-down approach adopted to ensure
that current clients were linked with other local community services.
Most clients in this evaluation felt that the Step By Step service was still needed in the
community and they felt that the closure had left a ‘gap’. Clients generally felt that 10 months
of Step By Step service provision was not long enough.
…knowing that the service was there at the end of the phone gave me peace of mind during my most difficult time and I guess that’s what’s hitting now, knowing that the service is going or gone. It takes away some of my peace I guess (client 1).
Service managers agreed that Step By Step should have, ideally, run for at least a 12 month
period, with some managers suggesting an 18 month period would have been better. Managers
were grateful that the Uniting Church had provided a grant to enable an extension to the closure
date, however there was real concern expressed that the service had closed prior to the 12 month
anniversary of the bushfire.
There are going to be a lot of emotional things happening come up at the end of October, and the rapport that a lot of the clients have built up with the Step By Step team isn’t there for them. Now, they’re going to have that 12 month anniversary and those familiar faces aren’t there (manager 3).
Despite concerns about the need for the service to operate for a longer period the step-down
approach was generally perceived as effective, largely because of the ways in which referral
and communication processes had been established with other agencies.
We called it the Continuity of Care and Connection Plan … now that you’ve connected people you can’t disconnect them. So it was really about once we connected with people we then had to connect them to other people (manager 2).
The collaboration and connection with local service networks was considered by managers to
be a key success of the program. Similarly, stakeholders from other agencies saw that the two-
way referral process between Step By Step and their services had worked very well and the
service’s strength-based model was well-respected. One stakeholder noted that:
For our service we are now trying to replicate the Step By Step model because we see that as being best practice in disaster recovery for individuals (stakeholder 7).
Discussion
The importance of recovery services that meet complex needs
Previous experiences of natural disasters in Australia have led to an increased
acknowledgement of the importance of psychosocial aspects of recovery being delivered in
tandem with material relief (Department of Human Services 2009, Camilleri, Healy,
Macdonald, Nicholls, Sykes, Winkworth and Woodward 2012). In particular, the importance
of psychosocial support to promote individual and community resilience has become more
widely recognised. The findings of this evaluation support this conclusion as clients, staff,
managers and stakeholders expressed that people affected by this disaster needed both physical
and emotional support at different times throughout their recovery.
Importantly, Step By Step was not perceived as a counselling or specifically therapeutic
intervention, but as an individualised, responsive and flexible service that was founded on
respectful relationships. By drawing on local knowledge, populating the team with qualified
professionals, offering diverse means of access (including outreach and centre-based visits) and
offering access to material and psychosocial support through connections to a broad service
network, Step By Step addressed complex needs. Step By Step was considered a ‘one-stop
shop’ (stakeholder 5), supporting people to navigate a complex system of services and support.
Step By Step staff were cognisant of the challenges faced by some individuals in seeking help,
particularly when it was their first time doing so, and able to adapt the service to meet the values
of clients. Further, they were mindful that misinformation could have a detrimental effect on
clients’ likelihood to seek further help, and so worked hard to listen carefully and provide as
accurate and up-to-date information as possible.
The findings also reveal that the complex and multi-faceted nature of recovery makes it a slow
process, a timeframe which was underestimated in the original design of Step By Step. Clients
and service providers indicated that the service needed to be available for a longer period in
recognition of the slow nature of recovery for some individuals and communities. This needs
to be balanced against evidence suggesting that interventions aiding disaster recovery should
interfere as little as possible with, and allow for, the natural recovery process (Slawinski 2006).
It is important that communities do not become too dependent on short-term recovery services
and that an exit strategy that considers local sustainability of support mechanisms is in place.
There is a challenge for future recovery services to effectively balance the need to restore
natural processes and sufficiently support the slow process of recovery.
The value of a community-wide, strengths-based model
The findings show that clients found the relationships with the Step By Step workers to be
respectful and that their individual needs were met. A strengths-based model was applied within
the interactions between staff and clients to emphasise the capacity of clients, evidenced by
clients’ perceptions that they were viewed as capable participants in their own recovery. The
use of Solution focused therapeutic interventions (by Step by Step workers), provided a
conversational framework that supported the highlighting and amplification of client strengths,
resilience and resources.
The findings also reveal the ways in which this strengths-based model applied at a broader
community level, aligning with principles of asset-based community development. Local
knowledge and local relationships were considered assets by clients, staff and managers of the
service. Given the speed at which disaster response and recovery services must be established,
having existing knowledge and relationships already in place in the community contributes to
the efficiency and effectiveness of such services. The strength of existing knowledge and
relationships amongst staff was seen to offer enhanced empathy and an unspoken understanding
of the sense of loss and potential for hope within the community.
Managers adopted a strengths-based approach to working with Step By Step staff, promoting
supportive interactions with staff and expressing a high level of confidence in the knowledge
and skills of staff. The strengths-based model seems to have fit within a workplace culture that
recognised the challenges and stresses implicit in this type of work, while focusing on positive
relationships, respectful communication and flexibility.
The ‘Continuity of Care and Connection Plan’ approach to the closure of the service also offers
evidence of a strengths-based model, in this case recognising the strengths of mainstream local
services to provide care and support to residents. The purpose of the Step By Step service was
not to displace existing services, but to complement their work, provide short-term support and
then transition back to non-disaster mechanisms in the community. Step by Step’s transition to
closure focused on maintaining the continuity and quality of client links with ongoing recovery
resources and services. Step by Step developed a relationship with the Blue Mountain’s City
Council Recovery Team, which enabled them to plan and implement clients’ seamless
transitions from Step by Step to the Council Recovery Team. Advanced planning for service
closure was identified as being integral to the successful transfer of clients and building
collaborative relationships with continuing recovery services was key to service closure and
hand-over of key roles and responsibilities (Crestani 2014). Connecting clients to existing and
on-going services was an integral element of the ‘Continuity of Care and Connection Plan’. It
seems that the service was effective in networking and maintaining relationships with other
service providers to support this approach, but, as mentioned previously, the timeframe for
undertaking this transition back to non-disaster mechanisms was underestimated.
Limitations
This evaluation only included participants who accepted the invitation to participate, leading to
potential participation bias in the sample. It is probable that those people with a positive view
of the service were more likely to volunteer to participate than those with a less positive
experience. Further, there may have been recall bias given the delay between the disaster
experience and the conduct of interviews. Therefore, some issues may have become less of a
concern to participants over time.
This qualitative evaluation has not numerically measured the effectiveness of the Step By Step
service. However, the qualitative methodology has provided a means to authentically present
the complex nature of service delivery and disaster recovery from an individualised perspective.
Conclusions
This qualitative evaluation aimed to evaluate the usefulness of and satisfaction with the Step
By Step Blue Mountains Bushfire Support Service from the perspectives of clients, staff,
managers and stakeholders. Overall, findings show that Step by Step positively impacted the
community. In particular, Step by Step achieved this by providing support addressing both
physical and emotional needs of clients, addressing clients as ‘survivors’ rather than ‘victims’,
being a flexible and accessible ‘one-stop-shop’ and employing local qualified and experienced
staff. Step by Step became a critical psychosocial service for the recovering community.
This strengths-based approach to disaster recovery is important in ensuring clients’ needs are
respectfully and effectively met. However, it is a model that has potential to be broader than
the interactions between clients and staff of a service, and can be applied throughout
organisations and as an approach to working with communities. If communities are connected
to available services, government and non-government as Gateway Family Services was in the
Blue Mountains, then potentially communities can have the capacity to respond to disasters
when they occur in the most efficient way possible. Building resilience is vital for communities,
but this resilience can go beyond the individual level, and include resilient services and
networks who then have the capacity to respond to emergencies and community’s needs.
It is important that the broad cross section of organisations/agencies, (both government and
non-government) who are involved in disaster preparedness and recovery have a shared
understanding and working knowledge of strengths approaches and models. Step by Step
experienced some challenges (in the early phase of operations) in promoting the service and
getting information to the impacted community (via the recovery hierarchy) due to limited
understanding and knowledge of how the strengths approach empowers individuals and
community. This limited understanding and knowledge could be explained by the relative
“newness” of using strengths based, SFBT models in post-disaster environments. In addition,
the limited amount of research conducted into the efficacy of using this model as part of psycho-
social recovery interventions.
Finally, the importance of collaboration cannot be understated in disaster recovery.
Collaboration builds resilience within communities, as mentioned above, but it can also provide
learning opportunities. Collaborators in this project have included the government department
responsible for responding to national disasters, the recovery service, clients, stakeholders and
academics. Rigorous evaluation of disaster recovery services is essential to develop the
theoretical knowledge base and its practical application to affected individuals and
communities. For this to be successful, evaluation methodologies need to be ‘built in’ to disaster
recovery service models to facilitate the development of research protocols prior to the onset of
disaster. This would allow evaluations to occur alongside the roll-out of recovery services,
rather than being conducted retrospectively.
Acknowledgements
We whole-heartedly appreciate those who participated in interviews; your experiences and
insights are not only inspirational but critical to the continual improvement of disaster welfare
support services. We are particularly grateful that the clients of the Step by Step Blue Mountains
Bushfire Support Service (SBS) were willing to share their stories of loss, growth and resilience
with us.
We thank Gateway Family Services, especially Anne Crestani, for continual support,
engagement and collaboration with not only the qualitative evaluation but for commitment and
passion in enhancing service access for those in need.
References
Camilleri, P., C. Healy, E. Macdonald, S. Nicholls, J. Sykes, G. Winkworth and M. Woodward (2012). "Recovery from bushfires: The experience of the 2003 Canberra bushfires three years after." Australasian Journal of Paramedicine 8(1): Article 990383.
Camilleri, P., C. Healy, E. Macdonald, J. Sykes, G. Winkworth and M. Woodward (2007). Recovering from the 2003 Canberra bushfire: a work in progress. Canberra, NSW, Australian Catholic University.
Coombe, J., J. Rich, A. Booth, A. Rowlands, L. Mackenzie and P. Reddy (2015). "Supporting rural Australian communities after disaster: the Warrumbungle Bushfire Support Coordination Service." PLoS currents 7.
Crestani, A. (2014). Step By Step Blue Mountains Bushfire Support Service Final Report October 2014. Sydney, NSW, Gateway Family Services and NSW Government: Ministry for Police and Emergency Services.
Crestani, A. (2014). Step By Step Blue Mountains Bushfire Support Service Mid-term Report. Sydney, NSW, Gateway Family Services and NSW Government: Ministry for Police and Emergency Services.
Department of Human Services (2009). After the bushfires Victoria's psychosocial recovery framework. D. o. H. Services. Melbourne, VIC, Victorian Government Department of Human Services: 27.
Guterman, J. T. (2014). Mastering the art of solution-focused counseling. New Jersey, John Wiley & Sons.
Iveson, C. (2002). "Solution-focused brief therapy." Advances in Psychiatric Treatment 8(2): 149-156.
Ligon, J. (2002). Fundamentals of brief treatment: Principles and practices. Social Workers' Desk Reference. A. R. Roberts and G. J. Greene. Oxford, Oxford University Press. 99.
Macdonald, A. (2011). Solution-focused therapy: Theory, research & practice. Los Angeles, Sage.
NSW Rural Fire Service. (2013). "Fire Information." from http://www.rfs.nsw.gov.au/fire-information/fires-near-me.
Patterson, O., F. Weil and K. Patel (2010). "The Role of Community in Disaster Response: Conceptual Models." Population Research and Policy Review 29(2): 127-141.
Saleebey, D. (2006). Community development, neighbourhood empowerment, and individual resilience. The strengths perspective in social work practice. D. Saleebey. London, Allyn and Bacon: 241-260.
Slawinski, T. (2006). "A Strengths-Based Approach to Crisis Response." Journal of Workplace Behavioral Health 21(2): 79-88.
Webber, R. and K. Jones (2013). "Implementing ‘community development’ in a post-disaster situation." Community Development Journal 48(2): 248-263.
Dynamic and Personalised Recommendations for Proactive
Bushfire Risk Management
Ziyuan Wang, Melanie E. Roberts, Laura Rusu IBM Research - Australia Melbourne, VIC 3000 Paper Presented at the Australian and New Zealand Disaster and Emergency Management Conference Broadbeach, Gold Coast (QLD), 30 - 31 May 2016
Dynamic and Personalised Recommendations for Proactive Bushfire Risk Management
ABSTRACT: We introduce a system where a mobile application provides individualised and updated notifications to users about the bushfire risk to their properties and recommends the best actions that individuals could take to reduce the impact. The system collects high quality input data and utilises a model blending technique for risk assessment. The data and model results are stored in the Cloud. The mobile app assists homeowners to become more aware of their risk and suggests measures to mitigate the likely impact of bushfire, such as accessibility of fire fighting equipment on the property, using less flammable building materials, vegetation clearance, or installation of water storage or sprinkler systems. It is hoped this mobile application will be a useful tool for community education, policy development and town planning. Keyword: Dynamic Bushfire Risk; Bushfire Risk Models; Personalised Service; Cloud; Mobile
Introduction
Risk management for natural disasters such as bushfires is an important area of concern to the
Government, its responsible agencies, and communities. From a planning perspective, risk
management activities include managing bushland and public space to reduce the potential for
significant bushfires to establish, and setting planning and design standards to manage the
potential impact of fire on communities. One way in which planning and design standards are
implemented at the local level is through the Bushfire Attack Level (BAL) (NSWRFS, 2012),
where people in bushfire prone areas self-assess the impact of property location, distance to
bushland, and vegetation type to determine a property’s fire risk. Defined minimum design
standards then apply based on the BAL relevant to a property. While useful for high level
planning, the BAL gives only a static view of risks at the time of calculation. It does not
reflect the spatio-temporal dynamic of the fire risk determined by the changing weather
conditions or other relevant factors that change over time.
Dynamic factors, such as weather, are incorporated into fire risk measures through fire
danger ratings and indexes. However, the granularity of the fire danger ratings is coarse (at
fire district level), which does not allow risk analytics to achieve a finer granularity and adapt
at the same time to the dynamics of evolving weather conditions and relevant factors.
Moreover, variability within fire districts can result in ratings that are incongruous with local
experience.
With the aim to overcome these limitations, we describe a system where a mobile
application gives individualised, updated notifications to users (i.e. homeowners or
occupants) about their household’s fire risk, and also makes recommendations on the best
actions individuals could take to reduce that risk. The application helps homeowners to
become aware and act on the controllable factors affecting their risk to bushfire, such as
accessibility for firefighting equipment around the property, use of less flammable building
materials, clearing up vegetation, identification or installation of water storage, pools or
sprinkler systems.
To deliver such capabilities, the system taps into several Cloud-based information sources
in real time (e.g. open data, sensors, social media). It learns from history and previous actions
by the application users in order to recognise patterns and act on them. Most importantly, it
has granularity to the level of an individual property within a fire danger zone, with insights
relevant to the homeowner.
This paper describes the background context and motivation for quantifying bushfire risk
and presents the design and implementation of a proactive risk management system. We
include a case study of using the developed system in the Blue Mountains, Australia, and
discuss future recommendations.
Background
Bushfire risk is commonly understood to be the product of the likelihood of a fire occurring
and the consequence of that fire. The likelihood refers to the probability of a fire with certain
characteristics, such as fire intensity, fire duration, rate of spread, suppression difficulty,
ember activity etc., occurring, while consequence refers to the outcome of the fire in relation
to the object under consideration, in this case the level of damage sustained by a property. The
consequence of a bushfire is highly dependent on the vulnerability of the property to the
mechanisms of bushfire attack. The vulnerability depends on the building material and design,
the proximity of surrounding combustible elements, the presence and effectiveness of human
intervention and the environment in which the event occurs.
The value of quantifying bushfire risk is well established, as it enables Government,
communities, and individuals to understand and proactively manage the risk. Current methods
of quantifying bush fire risk are either applied across large regional areas, e.g. the Forest Fire
Danger Index (FFDI), and thereby neglect variation within the region, or are static measures
invariant with changing fire-weather conditions, e.g. BAL.
Worldwide, a number of fire danger rating systems are used by Government agencies to
assess risk potentials for issuing warnings in fire prone regions (Sharples et al., 2009).
Traditionally, these systems produce numerical fire danger indices by combining different
environmental variables that affect fire behaviour, such as weather data (e.g. temperature,
relative humidity, wind speed and direction), terrain properties (e.g. slope and aspect) and fuel
characteristics (e.g. type and load). Such indices quantify the potential for fires to ignite,
spread and be suppressed. Examples include the National Fire Danger Rating System in the
USA (Deeming et al., 1977), the Canadian Forest Fire Danger Rating System (Stocks et al.,
1989), and the McArthur Fire Danger Rating System in Australia (McArthur, 1967). One
limitation of the Fire Danger Index (FDI) is the coarse spatial resolution. The Bureau of
Meteorology (BOM) provides FDI forecasts and values using a 3 or 6km grid structure (BOM
2016), which does not take into account local variations in weather, topography or fuels. It
can be noted that local variations in elevation, slope, and aspect may cause the FDI values at a
point location to be different from the values indicated by these forecasts conducted across a
large geographical region.
Property and environmental contributions to risk is a well-investigated topic, and numerous
models for the quantification of risk have been developed in Australia and elsewhere. Some
examples of these include Wilson and Ferguson’s (1986) House Survival Likelihood
Function, based on an examination of 450 houses affected by the 1983 Ash Wednesday fire at
Mount Macedon, Victoria; Tolhurst and Howlett’s (2003) House Ignition Likelihood Index,
which is focused on the contribution of weather and local fuel levels to risk; and the
previously mentioned BAL (NSWRFS, 2012). These models all seek to provide a
quantification of bushfire risk at the property level; however, are limited in their ability to be
applied at scale. The House Survival Likelihood Function incorporates weather factors, via
the potential fire intensity, with some functions of defensibility such as occupant presence,
garden vegetation, slope and construction. Presented both as an equation and via a circular
meter (Wilson, 1988), the function provides a simple way to quantify risk. The House Ignition
Likelihood Index predicts the impact of weather and local fuel supplies, providing a detailed
understanding of the available fuel load in the vicinity of the home. This index, however,
requires expert knowledge to implement, which is not typically available within a community
(Tolhurst and Howlett, 2003).
This paper seeks to address the limitations of existing work through the development of a
dynamic risk model based primarily on publicly available data sources and Cloud systems,
where the risk index can be refined through the inclusion of additional data sources, for
example, from the direct entry of information by a home owner. More importantly, it delivers
the personalised risk rating and related mitigation recommendations on a proactive basis
through a mobile application to users.
Methodology
The uses of mobile devices and Cloud systems have become part and parcel of our everyday
life. To maximise the use of our fire risk management system, we designed and developed a
mobile application that is easy to use and accessible in any Android or iOS based mobile
device, as long as there is cellular network and data coverage. Cloud-based information
sources, such as from Government agencies and online open data, are embedded, rather than
relying on disparate data sources, to ensure ongoing availability of the underlying information
leading to the fire risk measurement.
System Architecture
The system consists of two parts: the backend and the frontend. The backend is built on the
Cloud infrastructure (in this case IBM Bluemix1), which allows the application to be accessed
from anywhere as long as Internet access is available. The frontend can be any different client
application, for example iOS or Android mobile applications, or web applications. The
backend and frontend communicate via the Service REST APIs. Figure 1 below shows the
system architecture design.
The backend consists of the following components:
Data receiver: to receive the input data and pre-process the data. The pre-processing
includes data transformation and re-projection of geographic coordinate system where
required.
Risk model and recommender: this is the core component of the system, which will be
described in detail in the next section Risk Model and Recommendation.
Cloud data storage: to store the input data and output of risk analytics. More details
are provided in the subsection Data Management.
1 http://www.ibm.com/cloud-computing/bluemix/
Figure 1: System Architecture and Components
Data Management
Rapid advance in sensor and satellite technologies are increasing the amount of raw data that
needs to be processed and preserved. There is subsequently a demand for scalable, high-
performance and cost effective data storage and data access solutions. To be able to deliver
dynamic risk analytics with the granularity of a single household, a big data solution is
required. In our proposed system, Cloud data storage is used to facilitate data organisation and
analysis. Cloud data storage is designed with the idea of distribution of data and processes in
clusters of machines, which is a major advantage in comparison with traditional storing and
processing data from relational or object databases. Table 1 provides an overview of the input
data to the risk model, in terms of data sources, types and formats, geospatial resolution and
the update rate.
Table 1: Overview on the Input Data for the Risk Model
Data Source Type/Format Resolution Update Rate
Address Open Point/Shapefile NA Static
Elevation Open Raster/GTiff 25 m Static
Vegetation Open Polygon/Shapefile NA > Yearly
Weather BOM/DeepThunder2 Grid 1-5 km 1-15 minute
Drought Factor ADFD Grid/NetCDF 3-6 km Seasonally
House spec User JSON NA Semi-static
Data Processing
We use Spark to access and process both batch and real-time streaming data in a unified way.
Apache Spark is an open-source cluster computing framework3. It has emerged as the next
generation big data processing engine, overtaking Hadoop MapReduce4, which helped ignite
the big data revolution. Spark maintains MapReduce’s linear scalability and fault tolerance,
but extends it by being much faster and easier to program due to its rich APIs in popular
languages such Python, Java, Scala and R. Moreover, its core data abstraction, the Resilient
Distributed Dataset (RDD) goes beyond traditional batch applications to support a variety of
compute-intensive tasks including interactive queries, streaming, machine learning, and graph
processing (Zaharia, et al., 2012).
Risk Model and Recommendation
The bushfire risk of a property is a function of several factors, the local environment, the
property, and the occupants. Factors of the environment include the weather (temperature,
wind speed and wind direction, humidity etc.), topography (e.g. slope), relative location of
bushland from the property, and the nature and extent of local bushland. Key factors of
bushfire risk for the environment and property are incorporated in the bushfire risk model to
quantify bushfire risk at the property level. It is acknowledged that this model is not all-
2 IBM Deep Thunder is software for hyper-local, short-term forecasting and customized weather modeling. http://www-03.ibm.com/ibm/history/ibm100/us/en/icons/deepthunder/ 3 http://spark.apache.org 4 https://hadoop.apache.org
inclusive, and that continued development of the model will further improve the
understanding of localised risk.
Components of the Risk Model
The implemented model for bushfire risk is a combination of a series of modules relating to
different aspects of bushfire risk, with the relative weights of different aspects having been
qualitatively determined. Further development of the modules and quantitative
parameterisation is presently being undertaken. The modules incorporated in the presented
case study are shown in Figure 2, namely the Fire Danger Index (McArthur, 1967), Wilson
House Survival model (Wilson, 1988), a wind vector factor, bushland supporting factor, and
Ignition Likelihood Index (Tolhurst and Howlett, 2003). Specifically, our risk model
considers the fire intensity, the rate of spread on sloping ground, the building material, the
area of bushland, the distance from bushland to the property with consideration for the wind
direction, and detailed profile of the property (refer to Table 2).
The rationale for a modular approach to the fire risk is to support the use of model
blending techniques, which enable the customisation to local factors, and to support a plug-
and-play approach that facilitates continued development of our understanding of bushfire
risk.
Figure 2: Risk model components
The model output is a risk rating of numeric values. To assist users in understanding the
risk, the ratings are categorised into five levels within the mobile app. The set of weights of
each module in our risk model should be tuned to reflect local factors. For example, the
Kilmore East Fire was dominated by weather factors, rather than topographic features (Cruz
et al., 2012), whereas in the January 2003 alpine fires topographic features dominated
(Sharples et al., 2010). In the presented case study (Blue Mountains, NSW) the weights for
each component were manually tuned according to the available datasets. Part of our future
research is to investigate using machine learning techniques to automatically tune weights to
local areas.
Wilson House
Survival
Bushland Supporting
Factor
Fire Danger Index
Wind Vector Factor
Ignition Likelihood
Index
Personalised Recommendations
The mobile app provides personalised recommendations to the user on actions they could take
to reduce their risk rating, specific to their particular profile. The user is able to see how the
bushfire risk might be reduced by taking corrective actions that lead to physical changes to
the contributing factors of the risk model. The mobile app builds a property profile based on
the baseline risk from publicly available datasets together with information provided by the
user, such as building and roof material. Table 2 shows an example of questions asked of a
user to provide a more accurate risk rating. These questions are currently incorporated in the
demonstration, however a richer dataset is currently under development. If a user chooses not
to provide additional details the mobile app would use default settings to compute the risk.
The default is the option that carries the highest risk (least benefit).
Table 2: Example Personalisation Questions to Build a Property Profile
Question Response Options Default and Comments
What total water capacity (volume) for water tanks or standing water is available for fire fighting on the property?
Text entry of volume Default is 0 (no water available)
Are your fittings RFS compliant and a SWS sign erected?
Yes
No
Default is No
Link to RFS site with details of SWS signage and fitting requirements.
This question is jurisdiction dependent; address entered will determine which agency is referred to.
Do you own a fuel powered generator available for pumping water or operating sprinkler systems?
Diesel
Petrol
No
Default is No
What is your roofing material?
Tile
Metal Default is Tile
Do you have a wooden deck? Yes
No Default is Yes
Do you have any shade sails or pergolas?
Yes
No Default is Yes
What material is your fence?
No fence
Metal
Wooden or brush
Wooden or brush
Can a fire truck access the rear of your property?
Yes
No
Tip: Fire appliances typically require a 4m wide clearance.
Links to CFA guidelines on access
Default is No
Case Study and Discussion
Property bushfire risk can be seen as a local process, with site-specific attributes such as
surrounding tree cover and vegetation as crucial contributing factors leading to the risk rating
measurement. We conducted a case study in the Blue Mountains in New South Wales,
Australia. We calculated a series of attributes that are physically based and quantifiable,
including shortest distances between property addresses and the adjacent bushland,
surrounding tree coverage, and local slope. To obtain these variables, we used the most
detailed geospatial data sets available, such as geocoded street addresses, 1km spatial
resolution weather data and 25 m resolution digital terrain models. These variables feed into
our risk model to calculate a composite risk rating for each property address.
The input data for the study area was stored in the cloud (IBM Bluemix) data storage.
Figure 3 shows 43389 properties in Blue Mountains area as points, overlayed on the terrain
information (darker areas being ones with lower elevation), and vegetation types shown as
green shapes. Note that weather data is not shown here.
Figure 3: Visualisation of the Input Data for the Case Study in the Blue Mountains
As explained earlier, the backend of the system computes the risk value for all registered
users using our risk model and presents it to the user via the mobile app. The risk value is
updated over time as the weather forecast changes. When a property risk value is higher than
a pre-defined threshold, the mobile app notifies the user who registered that property in the
app.
Figure 4 shows the visualisation of the risk output for all properties in the study area at a
time instance, where each point represents a risk rating for a property (darker red colours
corresponding to higher levels of risk and lighter yellow and blue to lower risk levels). In this
example, the mobile app will notify those users with properties at high risk (represented by
darker red points) of the upcoming high-risk. Note that Figure 4 illustrates the same study
area as Figure 3 with a different base map for the visualisation.
Our preliminary results showed some interesting clustering of risk. As expected, high risk
properties were predominantly evident in areas immediately adjacent to bushland, which is
consistent with our experience of damage following bushfires. What was unexpected was the
clustering patterns around Katoomba and Blaxland, which we attribute as predominantly wind
driven. A wind change moved through the area in the early afternoon, and thus at 1400
Katoomba and Blaxland experienced different wind directions resulting in high risk clusters
on different sides of town. These results highlight the importance of using a fine spatial scale
with which to understand risk when informing individual actions.
Figure 4: Visualisation of the Risk Rating for All Properties at an Instance of Time
To use the mobile app a user needs to provide the information of their property address.
There is no need for the user to estimate parameters such as slope, vegetation types, and the
distance to the bushland; such information is automatically derived by the system, based on
the address of the user. This approach overcomes the limitations of BAL and FDI, which
require the information to be extracted from different data sources, a rather difficult process
for non-experts.
The recommendation on how to reduce bushfire risk is divided into two categories: a) the
long-term plan and b) the next-day plan, as shown in Figure 5. The long-term plan helps the
user with planning for living in a bushfire prone area, while the next-day plan assists the user
in enacting their bushfire plan, preparing their family and home during high-risk
conditions, in case a bushfire should occur.
Figure 5: Screenshots of Personalised Recommendation by the Mobile App. Left: Long-Term
Plan. Right: Next-Day Plan for a High Risk Day.
The consumption experience of our mobile application can be made more user-friendly, by
reducing the amount of questions, leveraging other data sources. For example, some of the
house profile questions can be answered by pulling the data from the user’s insurance data;
Internet of things (IoT) can provide a variety of personalised data about the house and
environment, as well as social media can be used as a rich data source. Another aspect of user
experience is how quickly the risk assessment is available. Therefore, it is important to
optimise the system data processing. From our extensive testing of the system response time,
the risk model is able to return the risk assessment in less than a second. The computation on
updating the risk assessment of all 43389 properties in the case study is performed in under a
minute.
The scalability of the system is critical in deploying and bringing the mobile app to the
population. As populations grow and transfer, there will be more people living in bushfire-
prone areas without existing knowledge of bushfire risk. Therefore, there is an ongoing need
to educate, inform and find new ways of sharing local information with these communities.
The mobile app would serve as a community education tool to improve individual bushfire
preparedness. To reach the wider population, we envisage making the application available
through App/PlayStore, as well as publishing via the CFA and other relevant Government
Agencies.
Conclusion and Future Work
This paper presents a proactive risk management system where a mobile app sends high-risk
alerts to a user and recommends best actions to reduce the vulnerability to bushfire based on a
high-resolution dynamic risk model. We utilise a model blending technique for risk
assessment, gathered high quality input data and stored on the Cloud. The risk model defines
the risk of damage due to bushfire for a specific property and highlights different actions
through the mobile app that can be taken to mitigate the risk. It is hoped this mobile app will
be a useful tool for community education, policy development and town planning. As part of
future research, the risk model will be further refined to include a wider variety of input data,
and the mobile application will be expanded to include further risk mitigation
recommendations.
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