dimensions of power and is implementation

Dimensions of power and IS implementation

Gurpreet Dhillon*

IS Department, School of Business, Virginia Commonwealth University, 1015 Floyd Avenue, Richmond, VA 23284, USA

Received 5 June 2001; received in revised form 15 September 2002; accepted 21 February 2003

Abstract

This paper analyzes the failure of an initiative of the Nevada Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) and Public Safety. It

argues that an inability to understand power relationships during systems analysis, design, and implementation has serious

implication on the well being of an organization and its business processes; thus, it is a key factor in IS’s project failure. The

argument is conducted by evaluating various dimensions of power. Lessons are drawn that return to the importance of

considering organizational power issues in implementing a successful computer-based system and in realizing an information

technology enabled strategic change initiative.

# 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Keywords: Organizational power; IS implementation; Strategic change; Project failure; Business processes

1. Introduction

The purpose of this paper is to show the value of

applying the dimensions of power framework to under-

stand the failure of a Project, specifically an initiative

of the Nevada Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV)

and Public Safety. It is important to analyze IS project

failures from a power perspective, since power provides

the energy to realize change; when computer-based

systems are implemented, they either cause or enable

change. Furthermore, an organization’s inability to

mobilize power results in ‘strategic paralysis.’ Power

within organizations should not necessarily be looked

upon as negative, but as a force that affects outcomes.

Knights and Morgan [19] call this—the productive side

of power that results in positive outcomes.

Project Genesis affords an interesting and a rich

context in which to analyze power relationships within

an organization and their impact on the success and

failure of IS implementations. This case study was

chosen for two reasons. First, Project Genesis has not

been designated a failure per se, neither is the project a

complete success. There were considerable problems

when the system went live on 7 September 1999, but

since the system still exists and shall continue to do so,

any analysis of the situation is valuable both for theory

and practice. Second, it affords a rich context, marred

with political undertones. In all certainty, it is the

power and politics that have resulted in DMV’s inabil-

ity to implement the IS successfully.

The sequence of events that unfolded at Nevada

DMV following the insertion of Project Genesis

positions the implementation in the same category

as a majority of other IS implementation disasters.

Prominent examples of such projects are the baggage

handling systems at Denver (USA) and Chep Lap Kok

(Hong Kong) airports [28], the London Ambulance

Dispatch Systems (UK) [2], and the BP Chemicals

global integrated system [15].

Information & Management 41 (2004) 635–644

* Tel.: þ1-804-828-3183; fax: þ1-804-828-3199.

E-mail address: [email protected] (G. Dhillon).

0378-7206/$ – see front matter # 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

doi:10.1016/j.im.2003.02.001

2. Interpreting power

This section presents a broad classification of pre-

vious studies in understanding power within organiza-

tions.

There is little consensus among researchers and

practitioners about the relationship of organizational

power and IS analysis and design. Power has been

considered to reside in the organizational resources

and hence connotes the ability to get others to do what

is wanted of them. This conception of power considers

conflict to be central to a situation when power is

exercised. Research performed by Lukes [22] and

other management theorists (e.g. [5,24]) who focused

on the identification of a power basis that helped actors

in influencing decision making by defeating opposi-

tion, is illustrative of power being considered in terms

of resources. Within the field of IS, information and

power were considered to be synonymous, and hence

those who operate computer-based systems were

viewed as instrumental in influencing power relation-

ships (e.g. see [23]). This view has, however, been

challenged and it has been proven in a number of

empirical studies that IT departments (and informa-

tion centers) seem to have little impact on organiza-

tional decision making (e.g. see [29]).

There is also a body of research that opposes this

view—they feel that power stems from the organiza-

tion’s decision-making processes in the form of pro-

cedures that could be used to prevent some from fully

participating in the process. Organization theorists

subscribing to this viewpoint include Bachrach and

Baratz [1], who questioned the resource-based view of

power on the basis of accessibility of decision-making

processes to all stakeholders. Within the IS domain,

it could be argued that the burgeoning literature on

process orientation and the resulting management

approaches to radical change have actually designed

change initiatives around the process view of power. For

example, Edwards and Peppard [7] attempt to classify

various business processes and suggest that managers

should pay more attention to specific profit generating

processes, hence implicitly underplaying the role of

certain stakeholders and their participation in organi-

zational decision making. This is evidenced in the BP

Chemicals’ Commercial System project [15].

Within the literature there are a number of research-

ers who oppose the resource based and process based

views of power. Pettigrew [25], Clegg [3], and Frost and

Egri [10] in particular, show the importance of under-

standing different meanings within an organization.

They suggest that various groups use differing mean-

ings to legitimize their own decisions and demands,

while de-legitimizing others. Earlier works by Lukes

can also be classified in this category, although Clegg

[4] seems to disagree with Lukes’s conception of power

because of his exclusive focus on radicalizing and

hence considering intentions as causes. Lukes view

of power can be termed a ‘voluntaristic’ approach.

Within the IS field the works of Keen [17] and Markus

seem to be influenced by Lukes three-dimensional

model of power. Silva and Backhouse [30], however,

use Clegg’s philosophy when they argue that IS success

cannot come about unless systems are institutionalized

into organizations.

There is yet another emergent view stemming from

the work of Foucault (e.g. [8,9]), who argues that

power is a ‘technique’ that achieves its effects through

its disciplinary character, thereby residing in the

values, traditions, cultures, and structures of an orga-

nization. In the literature, this has been termed the

‘power of the system.’ Even though individuals may

benefit from this, they find it difficult to change it—

power is vested in the status quo and all organizational

decisions are made within its context. Within the IS

domain, Foucault’s work inspired Zuboff’s [35] ana-

lysis of managerial techniques of control and surveil-

lance. Her thesis is that because of IS implementation

and the power vested in these systems, the divide

between the managers and employees increases, the

former become increasingly isolated while the later

become suspicious.

Hardy [13] brings together the four dimensions of

power (resource, process, meaning, and system based)

into a framework. She contends that—since the power

residing in the systems is ‘‘beyond the reach of

tampering by organizational members,’’ emphasis

should be placed on using the power residing in the

resources, processes, and meanings to bring about

strategic change. Contenders of radical change would

however disagree with this assertion (see, for example,

[12]). In fact a properly planned change initiative does

result in shifting/modifying the power, however the

success rates of such rationally planned approaches

are rather dismal. Support to Hardy’s argument is lent

by Ward and Elvin [34] who propose a ‘learning and

636 G. Dhillon / Information & Management 41 (2004) 635–644

control’ framework where each ‘learning’ cycle

results in a modified system. It can, therefore, be

argued that a successful implementation of an IS, that

is nothing more than a change initiative, will occur

when power residing in the resources, processes, and

meaning can be effectively leveraged.

3. Analyzing Project Genesis

Project Genesis at Nevada DMV affords a rich

context for analyzing the impact of organizational

power relations on the implementation of computer-

based IS. The situation was particularly relevant for

undertaking a study, since Project Genesis was part of

a larger strategic change initiative.

The implementation of IS at the DMV caused signi-

ficant inconvenience to the public. There was also much

negative publicity linked with Project Genesis. As

a consequence, many stakeholders were unwilling to

comment on it. We were, however, able to gain access

to and interview key stakeholders in the organization.

Interviews were conducted in two stages. In the

first, we interviewed project managers, consultants,

and key DMV officials between September and

December 1999. This was a time when DMV was

actively involved in ‘fixing’ the computer-based sys-

tems. The second round were conducted a year later,

between September and December 2000; DMV opera-

tions had been somewhat normalized by then. At this

time, DMV officials were more willing to talk and

give details. In all, about 90 man hours of interview

time was used to collect data. The research method

was interpretive in nature and the focus was on under-

standing the deep seated organizational issues (cf. [21]).

Issues related to power relationships were used to

guide the researcher [33].

3.1. Project Genesis and the DMV

The Department of Motor Vehicles is one of the

State of Nevada’s largest units, employing almost

2200 people in 36 offices statewide. The department’s

responsibilities include enforcing statutes regarding

vehicles and watercraft, licensing motor vehicle car-

riers. It is accountable for all functions of the Public

Service Commission, the Driver’s License division

and the Nevada Highway Patrol. The department is

organized into several divisions: motor vehicle, motor

carrier, driver’s license, Nevada Highway Patrol, gaso-

line and special tax, administrative services, investiga-

tion and training. Currently the DMV handles 131,000

vehicle registration renewals and 10,000 new vehicle

registrations a month. It also handles 6000 new driver’s

licenses and 30,000 license renewals per month, about

65% of them from Southern Nevada.

3.2. The nature and scope of systems developed

In order to keep up with growth, a team of indivi-

duals including State employees, legislators, consul-

tants, and citizens began a study on the status and

improvements needed for the division. Named Project

Genesis, this reengineering project focused on custo-

mer service. The team found that from 1970 to 1980

Nevada’s population had increased 63%, while from

1980 to 1990 it increased 50% and since then it had

increased over 25%. The team looked at the current

processes and noted:

‘‘DMV has evolved to meet the needs of the State

and to carry out State and federal responsibilities.

Over the time those needs and requirement have

changed; new statutes have been implemented;

programs have been added and, unfortunately, ser-

vices have become fragmented. From the customers

perspective DMV is a confusing maze of processes

that are slow, backlogged, labor intensive, and

separated.’’ [26]

The computer-based system used by the DMV was

complex and difficult to use, since the technicians had

to access several different systems to obtain informa-

tion regarding both driver and vehicle registration. If

the information was not in the system, then the tech-

nician had to leave his or her station and search for

the information on microfiche. Additional steps had to

be undertaken because the computer systems did not

have the functionality to support all existing activities.

Technicians recorded information by hand, copied

documentation, and made receipts. They also had to

make manual calculations during car registration—

titles and driver’s licenses were treated separately.

When customers walked into the DMV to register

their vehicle or change their driver’s license, they even

had to stand in different lines for each transaction.

In fact there were two separate computer systems at

G. Dhillon / Information & Management 41 (2004) 635–644 637

the DMV. They had been designed in the early 1970s

by an outside agent. One was equipped to handle the

driver’s license and the other with registration. Each

system held almost the same information, and this

duplication was both costly and difficult to maintain.

A customer may have changed the address on their

driver’s license, yet their registration would still be

sent to the old address.

Except for mail-in title requests and mail-in regis-

trations, all transactions had to take place at a DMV

office. However, it was expensive for the DMV to

maintain offices in convenient locations, especially

since the State of Nevada in general and the Southern

Nevada region in particular had been growing at a

phenomenal rate. Besides, it was also expensive for

customers, since long waiting lines are not only

irritating but also a potential loss in earnings. The

Project Genesis team noted that, in order to maintain

existing levels of service, DMV would need to add 23

new positions a year. By the year 2015, five new

facilities would also need to be built in Clark County

alone in order to meet demands of the growing popu-

lation. Using State demographics, the team noted a

cost avoidance of US$ 133 million in salary savings

from 2002 to 2015 if a new computer-based system

dealing with the myriad of problems was developed. It

was hoped that following the implementation, the

number of new facilities in Clark County would drop

from five to one, saving an additional US$ 40 million

for the 2002–2015 period. The total cost avoidance

would then be US$ 173 million. The cost of the Project

Genesis was estimated at US$ 34 million. The project,

it was concluded, would pay for itself by the year

2007.

The team met with DMV employees, benchmarked

other States’ DMV systems, including Oregon (which

was an unsuccessful implementation) and California

and reviewed information from industry professionals.

With the idea of becoming a customer driven organi-

zation, the team recommended a three-phase plan to

create an integrated system that would allow for

efficient customer contact, both at the DMV and off

site locations. Two consulting firms were hired to work

with the DMV. Deloitte and Touche were hired for

US$ 10 million to write the new integrated systems

program and BEST consulting was hired to implement

the change management program, including designing

training programs to coincide with the new system.

The role of BEST consulting however was never

clarified. It became evident in the interviews that there

were political reasons why BEST were retained.

System development at the Nevada DMV was

divided into three phases. During the foundation phase,

emphasis was placed on four components: system

development, continuous improvement, organizational

change, and change management. Functional require-

ments for the integrated system were developed. A

detailed plan of requirements was designed. This

included the creation of a data model, providing infor-

mation for the programming team. At this time an

implementation schedule was created.

Phase II focused on establishing a ‘One Stop Custo-

mer Service.’ DMV was in the midst of this phase of

implementation when they started to use the systems.

The base integrated system was designed, developed,

and implemented. This was to provide a core system

that was a platform on which to build the next stage.

Kiosks were to be implemented; they would provide

information to customers about driver’s license, regis-

tration, and title requirements. A phone-processing

center would also be implemented, with customers

able to dial a 1-800 number and receive answers to

their specific questions. This would alleviate the traffic

at DMV offices. An Integrated Voice Response Unit

(IVRU) was to be established for inquiry purposes.

Furthermore, a court interface would be designed.

Through automatic transfer of data, courts would

be able to obtain conviction information. There were

plans to design ‘alternative service methods’ in phase

III. Technologies such as digital document imaging,

online and phone registration and renewals, and renew-

als by outside vendors, such as smog checking stations,

were to be incorporated.

3.3. Analyzing failure aspects of Project Genesis

The purpose of the new system was to make the

organizational structures and processes more custo-

mer-oriented. The computer-based system was con-

sidered to be the main driver to bring about this

change. 7 September 1999 was set as the implementa-

tion date. It was to integrate driver licensing and

registration information. The new system was also

to be capable of giving additional useful information,

not available on the old legacy system, such as smog

check results, mail-in registration information, organ


donor notice, and complete address change history.

When a customer arrived at a DMV station, the

technician would be able to answer all of their ques-

tions without needing to send the customer to another

line. It would also no longer be necessary to leave their

station to look up information on Microfiche.

However, since the implementation, waits in lines at

the Nevada DMV increased from 40 min to over 7 h.

Numerous problems that occurred included: vehicle

titles with blanks where information such as odometer

readings should have been entered; overcharging

of registration on vehicles purchased between 1984

and 1985—incorrect fees ranged from US$ 8 to over

US$ 100 extra; commercial driver’s licenses that

should have been suspended due to driving under

the influence arrests with convictions were noted as

‘‘in good standing.’’ The system did not show any

convictions. In many instances, the problem could

have been adjusted by inputting the correct data,

but unfortunately, when the DMV technician tried

to do so, the system would not allow the override.

Clearly the failure of the computer-based systems at

DMV was not only a matter of technical issues, there

were other softer concerns that caused the disaster.

To a large extent the organization was not able to

mobilize and target power to achieve effective action.

Successful implementations are those where the struc-

ture, systems, people, and culture have been aligned.

3.3.1. Resource based power and Project Genesis

For Project Genesis, it was hoped that the imple-

mentation of a computer-based IS would form the

basis of moving Nevada DMV towards customer

orientation and hence increase its effectiveness. One

of the primary ways was to reengineer a traditionally

functional organization to a process based one, with

each organizational process being well integrated

with the others. Analyzing this move from a power

perspective, the organization was relying exclusively

on the power of resources to change their structure,

systems, people and the culture (see Table 1). Clearly,

the changes needed to be adequately aligned. How-

ever, if we consider process orientation as one of the

primary investment objectives, then the use of com-

puter-based systems to bring about such a change

seems dubious. In the case of Nevada DMV, practi-

cally no effort was made to institute proactive orga-

nizational change: it was hoped that the computer

system would help in integrating two distinct func-

tionalities. Although a consulting firm was hired to

help in the change management program, their role

appears to have been oriented more towards training.

Any change in the structure demands a change in the

skills of the people and the nature and scope of

their jobs. This may necessitate a need to hire more

staff. In Project Genesis, although there was clearly a

need to hire more staff, the hiring freeze imposed

by the past Governor resulted in a number of posi-

tions remaining unfilled. Another issue is the skewed

emphasis on saving costs by not hiring new staff.

In fact, cost saving emerged as the primary invest-

ment objective rather than better customer service.

The rationale was that the new computer-based

system would result in a total cost avoidance of

Table 1

Analyzing power issues for strategic change at Nevada DMV

Intended outcome following

Mobilizing power of resources Mobilizing power of processes Mobilizing power of meaning

Changes in

structure

Move from a functional structure

to an integrated one

Creation of a customer service fulfillment

process

Creation of a few ‘wizards’

among the DMV technical staff

Changes in systems Resource allocation to develop a

new computer-based system

Integrating various DMV functionalities,

including driver licensing and registration

Creation of one stop customer

service

Changes in people Hiring freeze and lack of staff Training needs of employees Surfacing political agendas of

legislature

Changes in culture Cost saving enabled by a hiring

freeze as a source of funding for

the Genesis Project

Organizational reengineering to facilitate

increased customer orientation

Development of a communication

infrastructure to support cross

functional communication


US$ 173 million, while the cost was estimated at

US$ 34 million.

In May 1999, the Ways and Means Committee

rejected a plea for 50 additional new employees on

the grounds that the DMV had a large number of

vacant positions that they had not filled previously.

Therefore, it did not make sense to approve hiring of

additional staff.1 The result was serious understaffing.

This lead to another problem—the training of

employees. The original cross training of employees

triggered long waiting lines and a backlog of mail-in

registration. Offices could not hire additional staff to

cover counters, etc. while employees were out of the

office in training. In situations where there were

normally five to six employees working in the driver’s

license department, there were only one or two cover-

ing while the rest were being trained.

As additional training continued, each office lacked

two staff members who were sent to become

‘‘wizards’’. This was followed by full office training,

which consisted of a day learning Windows, and

another learning Genesis. During this time, no addi-

tional temporary staff was used. Moreover, the Gen-

esis training (8 h) was not consistent with the system

that they would be using online. This caused much

confusion. The system had too many bugs during

training, so comprehension of the material was diffi-

cult and employees would not be using the same

system that they were taught.

3.3.2. Process based power and Project Genesis

The premise of the consultants and the DMV was

that they could increase service effectiveness through

process orientation. Since this would entail mobilizing

power residing in the processes, it would presumably

lead to achieving DMV’s investment objective. How-

ever, the investment objective evolved from customer

service improvement to cost saving.

In all the system development and implementation

activities, there was an attempt to create a customer

service fulfillment process. To a large extent, this

aligned with the main investment objective of moving

away from a functional structure to a more integrated

process oriented one. Nevada DMV’s focus on bring-

ing together two different functionalities, licensing

and registration, and to integrate their procedures with

those of the police department dispatch computers

and the Law Enforcement Message Switch System are

an example of an organization’s ability to mobilize

process power.

The organization fell short of carrying through

their power, and hence realizing a positive outcome.

All 500 technicians had to be trained in areas about

which they had no real knowledge. This involved a

formal training class followed up by counter experi-

ence. Considering the ability of an organization

to mobilize process power and realize a preferred

outcome, a skewed emphasis on training without

adequately aligning resulted in unsatisfactory imple-

mentation. The employees did not seem to have been

made aware of the process orientation and the impact

it would have on the nature and scope of their work

practices, a lack of alignment among the structure,

system, people, and cultural aspects caused more

problems than solutions.

3.3.3. Meaning power and Project Genesis

It has been argued that power residing in the mean-

ings is as important as the resources and process power

in order to realize a strategic action. Hence, an orga-

nization should make a considered effort to mobilize

the power of meanings in aligning structures, systems,

people, and culture. The creation of ‘wizards’ as a

means of bringing about structural change could be

considered as an attempt to bring about successful

change; however the ‘wizards’ caused more confusion

and potential conflict, than a successful implementa-

tion. The meaning of the wizards and their relationship

to organizational processes was not well defined.

3.3.4. System based power and Project Genesis

Power of a system is often beyond the reach of

organizational members. Scholars like Knights [18]

and Deetz [6] have also considered power of systems

to be the status quo. Hence, one has to rely on the

power residing in the resources, processes, and mean-

ing to realize any change in the systems. Therefore,

managers need to orient their energies against the

power of systems in order to bring about change.

In Nevada DMV’s Project, problems existed at two

levels. First, the managers were not able to leverage

the individual power systems. Second, the result was

an unsatisfactory implementation.

1 As noted by Assemblywoman Chris Giunchigliani, there were

83 vacant positions in April 1999.


4. Summary and discussion

4.1. Summary

It is not our intent to underplay a range of technical

and organizational project management issues that are

critical for the success of an IS project. As Jiang and

Klein [16] note, system success is a multi-dimensional

trait and cannot be described by a single measure. So,

clearly the success of any project and implementation

of IS in particular is founded on addressing a broad

spectrum of both technical and organizational issues.

At a technical level, the Genesis system was marred

with ‘bugs.’ Indeed they were more complicated than

expected. Periodically Deloitte and Touche prioritized

the bugs and fixed the ten most important ones. But

there was pressure on the concerned stakeholders to

remain within budget and time constraints.

There were problems at a formal and informal level

as to how the system was designed. This was a con-

sequence of the manner in which various power aspects

were mobilized and their systematic position vis-a-vis

the technical systems development. Russel [27]

reported that in early 1999, the Nevada DMV chief

told the lawmakers that they would have to find nearly

US$ 4 million over and above the budget if they did not

approve the reorganization. The Assembly Ways and

Means Committee was told that the Genesis computer

system was the answer in streamlining the DMV

services. Indeed the design of Genesis was based on

the assumption that DMV reorganization would occur

and that there would be four divisions within DMV:

registration and licensing, title transfers, mail-in

requests, management and enforcement of department

regulations. The decision makers at DMV placed an

undue emphasis on mobilizing the resource and pro-

cess power to derive a preferred outcome, i.e. changes

in the system. Furthermore, their plans were based on

hypothetical assumptions. The Ways and Means Com-

mittee had rejected an earlier request to reorganize the

825 employee department, which would have resulted

in a 10% raise to the managers and hiring of 50 new

employees. In the meanwhile, the development of the

Genesis computer system had been progressing with

all data flows having been written with the four DMV

divisions in mind.

When Project Genesis failed, the State Governor

announced an emergency 5-point plan to alleviate the

problem of long queues and backlogs. First, an emer-

gency hire of 42 temporary staff was announced—

these were to be trained and assigned to the ‘renew by

mail’ or ‘phone department’ in Carson City. Second,

a 24 h operation of mail-in service was declared.

Third, a 30 day grace period for registration renewals

was established—this would apply to those who had

mailed in their renewal or had unsuccessfully tried

to renew their registration. The 30 day grace period did

not apply to new registrations or those who had not

attempted to renew. Fourth, a statewide telephone hot-

line for DMV related questions was established—the

hotline was to be used to check the status of renewals or

to answer simple questions. Fifth, faster implementa-

tion of new technologies was advocated—the DMV

was to tackle improvements in customer service during

the ongoing fiscal year, rather than over the following

2 years. This was to include registration renewals

at emissions inspection stations and transactions by

telephone and the Internet.

Given the analysis of the failed implementation, the

efficacy of at least some aspects of the 5-point plan are

questionable. Since the Nevada DMV was unable to

address some fundamental issues, over reliance on

faster implementation of new technologies should not

be considered a preferred route. Mainstream IS litera-

ture has suggested that it is more important to address

the organizational change management issues prior

to any technological implementation. As Lee [20]

notes:

‘‘Due to the complimentary nature of IT with many

other variables, one has to know what variables to

manage and how to manage them in order to make

IT investments profitable. One has to identify all

other variables affected by technologies and align

them to explore the full potential of IT.’’

Organizational power is one of the important vari-

ables that should be understood properly and lever-

aged in order to ensure IT implementation success.

Jasperson et al. [14] while exploring the relationship

between power and IT impacts conclude:

‘‘. . .expectations regarding changes to power struc-

tures and power can serve as an important factor in

decisions to adopt, promote, or develop ITeven if the

actions that result are not themselves particularly

power-laden or political. IT can be used to create


symbols and meaning that reinforce current power

structures or to mold altered structures. Power is

clearly a complex phenomenon that can be viewed

and best understood from multiple layers.’’

4.2. Lessons

Based on the analysis of the case study, three broad

lessons can be learnt from Project Genesis.

4.2.1. Lesson #1: Understanding of resource,

process, and meaning power is a precursor to

successful IS implementation

Although there is widespread debate as to what

particular conception of power (resource, process,

and meaning) is correct, an understanding of all dimen-

sions of power is essential. Fulmer [11], for example,

notes that human factors have been left out of any

discussion on strategic management. Clearly the imple-

mentation of an IS is a key component in positioning a

firm for future competitive advantage. In a similar vein

Walsh et al. [32], Silva et al. [31] have argued that an

understanding of power is essential.

Nevada DMV failed to understand the dimensions

of power and to establish a means to mobilize it. What

is needed is a deep-seated review of the problems and

these can only be solved by taking into account the

various power dimensions.

4.2.2. Lesson #2: In addition to understanding the

dimensions of power (resource, process, and

meaning), it is important to address various

alignment questions pertaining to the changes in

structure, systems, people, and the culture

Since the implementation of IS both enables and

results in change, there is a concurrent need to con-

sider changes. In Project Genesis, there were problems

at two levels. First, the employees did not know how to

use the system. The Nevada DMV case clearly illus-

trates that thought had not gone into proper training.

There was an implicit assumption that the system

would be easy to use and that training a few indivi-

duals as wizards would be enough. Second, the soft-

ware was not ready to be implemented on a statewide

basis. There were too many bugs in the system. Even if

the technicians knew how to process certain informa-

tion, such as registration, they were literally unable to

override the computer mistakes. One could argue that

adequate system testing could have solved the pro-

blem. True, however, if the system does not fit in with

the structure and is not acceptable by the people and

adversely affects the prevalent culture, testing alone is

not going to help.

4.2.3. Lesson #3: An adequate consideration and

understanding of power vested in the system is

essential for any successful IS implementation

Various researchers have argued that power vested

within the organizational system, which is often diffi-

cult to alter, tends to reflect the values, culture, and the

prevalent structures within an institution. Researchers

have argued that for a strategic change to be realized,

effort should be employed to reduce the power vested

in the system.

In the Nevada DMV managers and consultants did

not consider aspects of power residing in the system.

Clearly had the Nevada DMV not been in a hurry they

could have tested the program properly first in Las

Vegas, Reno, and a rural office. This would have

eliminated some of the problems. The test offices,

even if they had difficulties, would not have affected

the entire State. Instead installation occurred concur-

rently and did not work. Classic systems analysis lays

a significant emphasis on requirements. In Nevada

DMV, a proper requirements analysis was not under-

taken—organizational redesign had not been under-

taken and the whole Genesis system was based on

hypothetical requirements.

The implementation of a new system is time con-

suming and cumbersome. It should be noted that

Project Genesis was implemented within budget.

Due to the organizational structure of the DMV and

the fact that it is a public agency, many political forces

were behind the implementation. Taxpayers need to be

shown that the money was spent properly and a system

was created. The on-time implementation backfired. If

the project had been delayed, costs would be less.

Currently the State has to pay for additional overtime

of regular DMV employees, and the contracting of

42 temporary staff as well as other aspects of Guinn’s

5-point plan.

With implementation of the high potential project

much interest was evinced by other agencies. Law

enforcement received no training on the use of the

Genesis system. In addition, the use of consultants,

Deloitte, and Touche and BEST, to create and integrate


the new system may have been a mistake. Neither had

any experience dealing with a DMV system, and

Deloitte and Touche continued to have control of

prioritizing the bugs, ultimately deciding the order

in which the software would be corrected. In addition,

the State had previously sued BEST for their work on

another project in the Taxation department, yet it was

willing to pay BEST an additional 600,000 to help

remedy the situation.

5. Conclusion

Good project management goes far beyond the

technical development of a system. Indeed it is far

more important to understand the human behavioral

aspects of analysis, design and management of sys-

tems. In particular, an understanding of power in the

resources, processes, and meanings needed to align

changes in the structure, systems, people, and culture.

It goes without saying that had the DMV administra-

tion carefully analyzed and understood the various

dimensions of power, they would have been in a better

position to realize the necessary changes.

Acknowledgements

Acknowledgements are due to Becky Solomon, a

graduate student at University of Nevada, Las Vegas,

who helped with the data collection.

References

[1] P. Bachrach, M.S. Baratz, The two faces of power, American

Political Science Review 56, 1962, pp. 947–952.

[2] P. Beynon-Davis, Information systems failure: the case of the

London ambulance service computer aided dispatch project,

European Journal of Information System 4, 1995, pp. 171–

184.

[3] S. Clegg, Power, Rule and Domination, Routledge and Kegan

Page, London.

[4] S. Clegg, Frameworks of Power, Sage, London, 1989.

[5] M. Crozier, The Bureaucratic Phenomenon, Chicago Uni-

versity Press, Chicago, 1964.

[6] S. Deetz. Democracy in the Age of Corporate Colonializa-

tion: Developments in Communication and Politics of

Everyday Life, State University of New York, Albany, NY,

1992.

[7] C. Edwards, J. Peppard, Forging a link between business

strategy and business reengineering, European Management

Journal 12 (4), 1994, pp. 407–416.

[8] M. Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison,

Vintage Books, New York, 1979.

[9] M. Foucault, The subject and power, in: H.L. Dreyfus, P.

Rainbow (Eds.), Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and

Hermeneutics, Harvester Press, Brighton, 1982, pp. 208–226.

[10] P.J. Frost, C.P. Egri, Power, politics and influence, in: F.M.

Jablin, et al. (Eds.), Handbook of Organizational Communica-

tions: An Interdisciplinary Perspective, Sage, London, 1987.

[11] W.E. Fulmer, Human resource management: the right hand of

strategic implementation, Human Resource Planning 12 (4),

1989, pp. 1–11.

[12] M. Hammer, J. Champy, Reengineering the Corporation:

Manifesto for a Business Revolution, Harper Business Press,

New York, NY, 1993.

[13] C. Hardy, Understanding power: bringing about strategic

change, British Journal of Management 7 (Special Issue),

1996, pp. S3–S16.

[14] J. Jasperson et al., Review: power and information technol-

ogy research: a metatriangulation review, MIS Quarterly 26

(4), 2002, pp. 397–459.

[15] T. Jelassi, S. Dutta, N. Valentine, BP Chemicals’ Commercial

System: IT risk and project management, in: C. Ciborra, T.

Jelassi (Eds.), Strategic Information Systems: A European

Perspective, Wiley, Chichester, 1994.

[16] J.J. Jiang, G. Klein, Risks to different aspects of system

success, Information & Management 36, 1999, pp. 263–272.

[17] P.G. Keen, Information systems and organizational change,

Communications of the ACM 24 (1), 1981, pp. 24–33.

[18] D. Knights, Changing spaces: the disruptive impact if a new

epistemological location for the study of management,

Academy of Management Review 17 (3), 1992, pp. 514–536.

[19] D. Knights, G. Morgan, Strategic discourse and subjectivity:

towards a critical analysis of corporate strategy in organiza-

tions, Organization Studies 12 (3), 1991, pp. 251–273.

[20] C.S. Lee, Modeling the business value of information

technology, Information & Management 39, 2001, pp. 191–

210.

[21] R. Lee, S. Leifer, J. Durgee, Deep structures: real information

requirements determination, Information & Management 27

(5), 1994, pp. 275–285.

[22] S. Lukes, Power: A Radical View, Macmillan, London, 1974.

[23] M.L. Markus, Power, politics and MIS implementation,

Communications of the ACM 26 (6), 1983, pp. 430–444.

[24] D. Mechanic, Sources of power of lower participants in

complex organizations, Administrative Science Quarterly 7

(3), 1962, pp. 349–364.

[25] A.M. Pettigrew, On studying organizational cultures, Admin-

istrative Science Quarterly 24, 1979, pp. 570–581.

[26] Project Genesis, Project Genesis Documentation, Nevada

DMV, 1996.

[27] K. Russel, Committee Skeptical of DMV Reorganization

Plan, in: Las Vegas Sun, Las Vegas, 1999.

[28] R. Saludo, L. Siu-Lan, What Went Wrong? Learning from the

Foul-Ups at Chek Lap Kok, Asiaweek, 1998.


[29] C.S. Saunders, R.W. Scamell, Organizational power and the

information services department: a reexamination, Commu-

nications of the ACM 29 (2), 1986, pp. 142–147.

[30] L. Silva, J. Backhouse, Becoming part of the furniture: the

institutionalization of information systems, in: A. Lee, J.

Liebenau, J. DeGross (Eds.), Information Systems and Quali-

tative Research, Chapman & Hall, London, 1997, pp. 389–414.

[31] L. Silva, G. Dhillon, J. Backhouse, Developing a networked

authority: nature and significance of power relationships, in:

Proceedings of the Fifth European Conference on Information

Systems, Cork, Ireland, 19–21 June 1997.

[32] K. Walsh et al., Power and advantage in organizations,

Organization Studies 2 (2), 1981, pp. 131–152.

[33] G. Walsham, Interpretive case studies in IS research: nature

and method, European Journal of Information Systems 4 (2),

1995, pp. 74–81.

[34] J. Ward, R. Elvin, A new framework for managing IT-enabled

business change, Information Systems Journal 9 (3), 1999, pp.

197–221.

[35] S. Zuboff, In the Age of the Smart Machine, Basic Books,

New York, 1988.

Gurpreet Dhillon is an associate profes-

sor of Information Systems in the School

of Business, Virginia Commonwealth

University, Richmond, USA. He holds a

PhD in IS (1995) from the London School

of Economics and Political Science, UK.

He is an author of five books and has

published in several journals including

Information Systems Research, Commu-

nications of the ACM, Computers &

Security, European Journal of Informa-

tion Systems, Information Systems Journal, and International

Journal of Information Management among others. His research

interests include management of information security, ethical, and

legal implications of information systems and aspects of informa-

tion systems planning and project management.


dimensions of power and is implementation

Documents