dimensions of power and is implementation
TRANSCRIPT
Dimensions of power and IS implementation
Gurpreet Dhillon*
IS Department, School of Business, Virginia Commonwealth University, 1015 Floyd Avenue, Richmond, VA 23284, USA
Received 5 June 2001; received in revised form 15 September 2002; accepted 21 February 2003
Abstract
This paper analyzes the failure of an initiative of the Nevada Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) and Public Safety. It
argues that an inability to understand power relationships during systems analysis, design, and implementation has serious
implication on the well being of an organization and its business processes; thus, it is a key factor in IS’s project failure. The
argument is conducted by evaluating various dimensions of power. Lessons are drawn that return to the importance of
considering organizational power issues in implementing a successful computer-based system and in realizing an information
technology enabled strategic change initiative.
# 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Organizational power; IS implementation; Strategic change; Project failure; Business processes
1. Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to show the value of
applying the dimensions of power framework to under-
stand the failure of a Project, specifically an initiative
of the Nevada Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV)
and Public Safety. It is important to analyze IS project
failures from a power perspective, since power provides
the energy to realize change; when computer-based
systems are implemented, they either cause or enable
change. Furthermore, an organization’s inability to
mobilize power results in ‘strategic paralysis.’ Power
within organizations should not necessarily be looked
upon as negative, but as a force that affects outcomes.
Knights and Morgan [19] call this—the productive side
of power that results in positive outcomes.
Project Genesis affords an interesting and a rich
context in which to analyze power relationships within
an organization and their impact on the success and
failure of IS implementations. This case study was
chosen for two reasons. First, Project Genesis has not
been designated a failure per se, neither is the project a
complete success. There were considerable problems
when the system went live on 7 September 1999, but
since the system still exists and shall continue to do so,
any analysis of the situation is valuable both for theory
and practice. Second, it affords a rich context, marred
with political undertones. In all certainty, it is the
power and politics that have resulted in DMV’s inabil-
ity to implement the IS successfully.
The sequence of events that unfolded at Nevada
DMV following the insertion of Project Genesis
positions the implementation in the same category
as a majority of other IS implementation disasters.
Prominent examples of such projects are the baggage
handling systems at Denver (USA) and Chep Lap Kok
(Hong Kong) airports [28], the London Ambulance
Dispatch Systems (UK) [2], and the BP Chemicals
global integrated system [15].
Information & Management 41 (2004) 635–644
* Tel.: þ1-804-828-3183; fax: þ1-804-828-3199.
E-mail address: [email protected] (G. Dhillon).
0378-7206/$ – see front matter # 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.im.2003.02.001
2. Interpreting power
This section presents a broad classification of pre-
vious studies in understanding power within organiza-
tions.
There is little consensus among researchers and
practitioners about the relationship of organizational
power and IS analysis and design. Power has been
considered to reside in the organizational resources
and hence connotes the ability to get others to do what
is wanted of them. This conception of power considers
conflict to be central to a situation when power is
exercised. Research performed by Lukes [22] and
other management theorists (e.g. [5,24]) who focused
on the identification of a power basis that helped actors
in influencing decision making by defeating opposi-
tion, is illustrative of power being considered in terms
of resources. Within the field of IS, information and
power were considered to be synonymous, and hence
those who operate computer-based systems were
viewed as instrumental in influencing power relation-
ships (e.g. see [23]). This view has, however, been
challenged and it has been proven in a number of
empirical studies that IT departments (and informa-
tion centers) seem to have little impact on organiza-
tional decision making (e.g. see [29]).
There is also a body of research that opposes this
view—they feel that power stems from the organiza-
tion’s decision-making processes in the form of pro-
cedures that could be used to prevent some from fully
participating in the process. Organization theorists
subscribing to this viewpoint include Bachrach and
Baratz [1], who questioned the resource-based view of
power on the basis of accessibility of decision-making
processes to all stakeholders. Within the IS domain,
it could be argued that the burgeoning literature on
process orientation and the resulting management
approaches to radical change have actually designed
change initiatives around the process view of power. For
example, Edwards and Peppard [7] attempt to classify
various business processes and suggest that managers
should pay more attention to specific profit generating
processes, hence implicitly underplaying the role of
certain stakeholders and their participation in organi-
zational decision making. This is evidenced in the BP
Chemicals’ Commercial System project [15].
Within the literature there are a number of research-
ers who oppose the resource based and process based
views of power. Pettigrew [25], Clegg [3], and Frost and
Egri [10] in particular, show the importance of under-
standing different meanings within an organization.
They suggest that various groups use differing mean-
ings to legitimize their own decisions and demands,
while de-legitimizing others. Earlier works by Lukes
can also be classified in this category, although Clegg
[4] seems to disagree with Lukes’s conception of power
because of his exclusive focus on radicalizing and
hence considering intentions as causes. Lukes view
of power can be termed a ‘voluntaristic’ approach.
Within the IS field the works of Keen [17] and Markus
seem to be influenced by Lukes three-dimensional
model of power. Silva and Backhouse [30], however,
use Clegg’s philosophy when they argue that IS success
cannot come about unless systems are institutionalized
into organizations.
There is yet another emergent view stemming from
the work of Foucault (e.g. [8,9]), who argues that
power is a ‘technique’ that achieves its effects through
its disciplinary character, thereby residing in the
values, traditions, cultures, and structures of an orga-
nization. In the literature, this has been termed the
‘power of the system.’ Even though individuals may
benefit from this, they find it difficult to change it—
power is vested in the status quo and all organizational
decisions are made within its context. Within the IS
domain, Foucault’s work inspired Zuboff’s [35] ana-
lysis of managerial techniques of control and surveil-
lance. Her thesis is that because of IS implementation
and the power vested in these systems, the divide
between the managers and employees increases, the
former become increasingly isolated while the later
become suspicious.
Hardy [13] brings together the four dimensions of
power (resource, process, meaning, and system based)
into a framework. She contends that—since the power
residing in the systems is ‘‘beyond the reach of
tampering by organizational members,’’ emphasis
should be placed on using the power residing in the
resources, processes, and meanings to bring about
strategic change. Contenders of radical change would
however disagree with this assertion (see, for example,
[12]). In fact a properly planned change initiative does
result in shifting/modifying the power, however the
success rates of such rationally planned approaches
are rather dismal. Support to Hardy’s argument is lent
by Ward and Elvin [34] who propose a ‘learning and
636 G. Dhillon / Information & Management 41 (2004) 635–644
control’ framework where each ‘learning’ cycle
results in a modified system. It can, therefore, be
argued that a successful implementation of an IS, that
is nothing more than a change initiative, will occur
when power residing in the resources, processes, and
meaning can be effectively leveraged.
3. Analyzing Project Genesis
Project Genesis at Nevada DMV affords a rich
context for analyzing the impact of organizational
power relations on the implementation of computer-
based IS. The situation was particularly relevant for
undertaking a study, since Project Genesis was part of
a larger strategic change initiative.
The implementation of IS at the DMV caused signi-
ficant inconvenience to the public. There was also much
negative publicity linked with Project Genesis. As
a consequence, many stakeholders were unwilling to
comment on it. We were, however, able to gain access
to and interview key stakeholders in the organization.
Interviews were conducted in two stages. In the
first, we interviewed project managers, consultants,
and key DMV officials between September and
December 1999. This was a time when DMV was
actively involved in ‘fixing’ the computer-based sys-
tems. The second round were conducted a year later,
between September and December 2000; DMV opera-
tions had been somewhat normalized by then. At this
time, DMV officials were more willing to talk and
give details. In all, about 90 man hours of interview
time was used to collect data. The research method
was interpretive in nature and the focus was on under-
standing the deep seated organizational issues (cf. [21]).
Issues related to power relationships were used to
guide the researcher [33].
3.1. Project Genesis and the DMV
The Department of Motor Vehicles is one of the
State of Nevada’s largest units, employing almost
2200 people in 36 offices statewide. The department’s
responsibilities include enforcing statutes regarding
vehicles and watercraft, licensing motor vehicle car-
riers. It is accountable for all functions of the Public
Service Commission, the Driver’s License division
and the Nevada Highway Patrol. The department is
organized into several divisions: motor vehicle, motor
carrier, driver’s license, Nevada Highway Patrol, gaso-
line and special tax, administrative services, investiga-
tion and training. Currently the DMV handles 131,000
vehicle registration renewals and 10,000 new vehicle
registrations a month. It also handles 6000 new driver’s
licenses and 30,000 license renewals per month, about
65% of them from Southern Nevada.
3.2. The nature and scope of systems developed
In order to keep up with growth, a team of indivi-
duals including State employees, legislators, consul-
tants, and citizens began a study on the status and
improvements needed for the division. Named Project
Genesis, this reengineering project focused on custo-
mer service. The team found that from 1970 to 1980
Nevada’s population had increased 63%, while from
1980 to 1990 it increased 50% and since then it had
increased over 25%. The team looked at the current
processes and noted:
‘‘DMV has evolved to meet the needs of the State
and to carry out State and federal responsibilities.
Over the time those needs and requirement have
changed; new statutes have been implemented;
programs have been added and, unfortunately, ser-
vices have become fragmented. From the customers
perspective DMV is a confusing maze of processes
that are slow, backlogged, labor intensive, and
separated.’’ [26]
The computer-based system used by the DMV was
complex and difficult to use, since the technicians had
to access several different systems to obtain informa-
tion regarding both driver and vehicle registration. If
the information was not in the system, then the tech-
nician had to leave his or her station and search for
the information on microfiche. Additional steps had to
be undertaken because the computer systems did not
have the functionality to support all existing activities.
Technicians recorded information by hand, copied
documentation, and made receipts. They also had to
make manual calculations during car registration—
titles and driver’s licenses were treated separately.
When customers walked into the DMV to register
their vehicle or change their driver’s license, they even
had to stand in different lines for each transaction.
In fact there were two separate computer systems at
G. Dhillon / Information & Management 41 (2004) 635–644 637
the DMV. They had been designed in the early 1970s
by an outside agent. One was equipped to handle the
driver’s license and the other with registration. Each
system held almost the same information, and this
duplication was both costly and difficult to maintain.
A customer may have changed the address on their
driver’s license, yet their registration would still be
sent to the old address.
Except for mail-in title requests and mail-in regis-
trations, all transactions had to take place at a DMV
office. However, it was expensive for the DMV to
maintain offices in convenient locations, especially
since the State of Nevada in general and the Southern
Nevada region in particular had been growing at a
phenomenal rate. Besides, it was also expensive for
customers, since long waiting lines are not only
irritating but also a potential loss in earnings. The
Project Genesis team noted that, in order to maintain
existing levels of service, DMV would need to add 23
new positions a year. By the year 2015, five new
facilities would also need to be built in Clark County
alone in order to meet demands of the growing popu-
lation. Using State demographics, the team noted a
cost avoidance of US$ 133 million in salary savings
from 2002 to 2015 if a new computer-based system
dealing with the myriad of problems was developed. It
was hoped that following the implementation, the
number of new facilities in Clark County would drop
from five to one, saving an additional US$ 40 million
for the 2002–2015 period. The total cost avoidance
would then be US$ 173 million. The cost of the Project
Genesis was estimated at US$ 34 million. The project,
it was concluded, would pay for itself by the year
2007.
The team met with DMV employees, benchmarked
other States’ DMV systems, including Oregon (which
was an unsuccessful implementation) and California
and reviewed information from industry professionals.
With the idea of becoming a customer driven organi-
zation, the team recommended a three-phase plan to
create an integrated system that would allow for
efficient customer contact, both at the DMV and off
site locations. Two consulting firms were hired to work
with the DMV. Deloitte and Touche were hired for
US$ 10 million to write the new integrated systems
program and BEST consulting was hired to implement
the change management program, including designing
training programs to coincide with the new system.
The role of BEST consulting however was never
clarified. It became evident in the interviews that there
were political reasons why BEST were retained.
System development at the Nevada DMV was
divided into three phases. During the foundation phase,
emphasis was placed on four components: system
development, continuous improvement, organizational
change, and change management. Functional require-
ments for the integrated system were developed. A
detailed plan of requirements was designed. This
included the creation of a data model, providing infor-
mation for the programming team. At this time an
implementation schedule was created.
Phase II focused on establishing a ‘One Stop Custo-
mer Service.’ DMV was in the midst of this phase of
implementation when they started to use the systems.
The base integrated system was designed, developed,
and implemented. This was to provide a core system
that was a platform on which to build the next stage.
Kiosks were to be implemented; they would provide
information to customers about driver’s license, regis-
tration, and title requirements. A phone-processing
center would also be implemented, with customers
able to dial a 1-800 number and receive answers to
their specific questions. This would alleviate the traffic
at DMV offices. An Integrated Voice Response Unit
(IVRU) was to be established for inquiry purposes.
Furthermore, a court interface would be designed.
Through automatic transfer of data, courts would
be able to obtain conviction information. There were
plans to design ‘alternative service methods’ in phase
III. Technologies such as digital document imaging,
online and phone registration and renewals, and renew-
als by outside vendors, such as smog checking stations,
were to be incorporated.
3.3. Analyzing failure aspects of Project Genesis
The purpose of the new system was to make the
organizational structures and processes more custo-
mer-oriented. The computer-based system was con-
sidered to be the main driver to bring about this
change. 7 September 1999 was set as the implementa-
tion date. It was to integrate driver licensing and
registration information. The new system was also
to be capable of giving additional useful information,
not available on the old legacy system, such as smog
check results, mail-in registration information, organ
638 G. Dhillon / Information & Management 41 (2004) 635–644
donor notice, and complete address change history.
When a customer arrived at a DMV station, the
technician would be able to answer all of their ques-
tions without needing to send the customer to another
line. It would also no longer be necessary to leave their
station to look up information on Microfiche.
However, since the implementation, waits in lines at
the Nevada DMV increased from 40 min to over 7 h.
Numerous problems that occurred included: vehicle
titles with blanks where information such as odometer
readings should have been entered; overcharging
of registration on vehicles purchased between 1984
and 1985—incorrect fees ranged from US$ 8 to over
US$ 100 extra; commercial driver’s licenses that
should have been suspended due to driving under
the influence arrests with convictions were noted as
‘‘in good standing.’’ The system did not show any
convictions. In many instances, the problem could
have been adjusted by inputting the correct data,
but unfortunately, when the DMV technician tried
to do so, the system would not allow the override.
Clearly the failure of the computer-based systems at
DMV was not only a matter of technical issues, there
were other softer concerns that caused the disaster.
To a large extent the organization was not able to
mobilize and target power to achieve effective action.
Successful implementations are those where the struc-
ture, systems, people, and culture have been aligned.
3.3.1. Resource based power and Project Genesis
For Project Genesis, it was hoped that the imple-
mentation of a computer-based IS would form the
basis of moving Nevada DMV towards customer
orientation and hence increase its effectiveness. One
of the primary ways was to reengineer a traditionally
functional organization to a process based one, with
each organizational process being well integrated
with the others. Analyzing this move from a power
perspective, the organization was relying exclusively
on the power of resources to change their structure,
systems, people and the culture (see Table 1). Clearly,
the changes needed to be adequately aligned. How-
ever, if we consider process orientation as one of the
primary investment objectives, then the use of com-
puter-based systems to bring about such a change
seems dubious. In the case of Nevada DMV, practi-
cally no effort was made to institute proactive orga-
nizational change: it was hoped that the computer
system would help in integrating two distinct func-
tionalities. Although a consulting firm was hired to
help in the change management program, their role
appears to have been oriented more towards training.
Any change in the structure demands a change in the
skills of the people and the nature and scope of
their jobs. This may necessitate a need to hire more
staff. In Project Genesis, although there was clearly a
need to hire more staff, the hiring freeze imposed
by the past Governor resulted in a number of posi-
tions remaining unfilled. Another issue is the skewed
emphasis on saving costs by not hiring new staff.
In fact, cost saving emerged as the primary invest-
ment objective rather than better customer service.
The rationale was that the new computer-based
system would result in a total cost avoidance of
Table 1
Analyzing power issues for strategic change at Nevada DMV
Intended outcome following
Mobilizing power of resources Mobilizing power of processes Mobilizing power of meaning
Changes in
structure
Move from a functional structure
to an integrated one
Creation of a customer service fulfillment
process
Creation of a few ‘wizards’
among the DMV technical staff
Changes in systems Resource allocation to develop a
new computer-based system
Integrating various DMV functionalities,
including driver licensing and registration
Creation of one stop customer
service
Changes in people Hiring freeze and lack of staff Training needs of employees Surfacing political agendas of
legislature
Changes in culture Cost saving enabled by a hiring
freeze as a source of funding for
the Genesis Project
Organizational reengineering to facilitate
increased customer orientation
Development of a communication
infrastructure to support cross
functional communication
G. Dhillon / Information & Management 41 (2004) 635–644 639
US$ 173 million, while the cost was estimated at
US$ 34 million.
In May 1999, the Ways and Means Committee
rejected a plea for 50 additional new employees on
the grounds that the DMV had a large number of
vacant positions that they had not filled previously.
Therefore, it did not make sense to approve hiring of
additional staff.1 The result was serious understaffing.
This lead to another problem—the training of
employees. The original cross training of employees
triggered long waiting lines and a backlog of mail-in
registration. Offices could not hire additional staff to
cover counters, etc. while employees were out of the
office in training. In situations where there were
normally five to six employees working in the driver’s
license department, there were only one or two cover-
ing while the rest were being trained.
As additional training continued, each office lacked
two staff members who were sent to become
‘‘wizards’’. This was followed by full office training,
which consisted of a day learning Windows, and
another learning Genesis. During this time, no addi-
tional temporary staff was used. Moreover, the Gen-
esis training (8 h) was not consistent with the system
that they would be using online. This caused much
confusion. The system had too many bugs during
training, so comprehension of the material was diffi-
cult and employees would not be using the same
system that they were taught.
3.3.2. Process based power and Project Genesis
The premise of the consultants and the DMV was
that they could increase service effectiveness through
process orientation. Since this would entail mobilizing
power residing in the processes, it would presumably
lead to achieving DMV’s investment objective. How-
ever, the investment objective evolved from customer
service improvement to cost saving.
In all the system development and implementation
activities, there was an attempt to create a customer
service fulfillment process. To a large extent, this
aligned with the main investment objective of moving
away from a functional structure to a more integrated
process oriented one. Nevada DMV’s focus on bring-
ing together two different functionalities, licensing
and registration, and to integrate their procedures with
those of the police department dispatch computers
and the Law Enforcement Message Switch System are
an example of an organization’s ability to mobilize
process power.
The organization fell short of carrying through
their power, and hence realizing a positive outcome.
All 500 technicians had to be trained in areas about
which they had no real knowledge. This involved a
formal training class followed up by counter experi-
ence. Considering the ability of an organization
to mobilize process power and realize a preferred
outcome, a skewed emphasis on training without
adequately aligning resulted in unsatisfactory imple-
mentation. The employees did not seem to have been
made aware of the process orientation and the impact
it would have on the nature and scope of their work
practices, a lack of alignment among the structure,
system, people, and cultural aspects caused more
problems than solutions.
3.3.3. Meaning power and Project Genesis
It has been argued that power residing in the mean-
ings is as important as the resources and process power
in order to realize a strategic action. Hence, an orga-
nization should make a considered effort to mobilize
the power of meanings in aligning structures, systems,
people, and culture. The creation of ‘wizards’ as a
means of bringing about structural change could be
considered as an attempt to bring about successful
change; however the ‘wizards’ caused more confusion
and potential conflict, than a successful implementa-
tion. The meaning of the wizards and their relationship
to organizational processes was not well defined.
3.3.4. System based power and Project Genesis
Power of a system is often beyond the reach of
organizational members. Scholars like Knights [18]
and Deetz [6] have also considered power of systems
to be the status quo. Hence, one has to rely on the
power residing in the resources, processes, and mean-
ing to realize any change in the systems. Therefore,
managers need to orient their energies against the
power of systems in order to bring about change.
In Nevada DMV’s Project, problems existed at two
levels. First, the managers were not able to leverage
the individual power systems. Second, the result was
an unsatisfactory implementation.
1 As noted by Assemblywoman Chris Giunchigliani, there were
83 vacant positions in April 1999.
640 G. Dhillon / Information & Management 41 (2004) 635–644
4. Summary and discussion
4.1. Summary
It is not our intent to underplay a range of technical
and organizational project management issues that are
critical for the success of an IS project. As Jiang and
Klein [16] note, system success is a multi-dimensional
trait and cannot be described by a single measure. So,
clearly the success of any project and implementation
of IS in particular is founded on addressing a broad
spectrum of both technical and organizational issues.
At a technical level, the Genesis system was marred
with ‘bugs.’ Indeed they were more complicated than
expected. Periodically Deloitte and Touche prioritized
the bugs and fixed the ten most important ones. But
there was pressure on the concerned stakeholders to
remain within budget and time constraints.
There were problems at a formal and informal level
as to how the system was designed. This was a con-
sequence of the manner in which various power aspects
were mobilized and their systematic position vis-a-vis
the technical systems development. Russel [27]
reported that in early 1999, the Nevada DMV chief
told the lawmakers that they would have to find nearly
US$ 4 million over and above the budget if they did not
approve the reorganization. The Assembly Ways and
Means Committee was told that the Genesis computer
system was the answer in streamlining the DMV
services. Indeed the design of Genesis was based on
the assumption that DMV reorganization would occur
and that there would be four divisions within DMV:
registration and licensing, title transfers, mail-in
requests, management and enforcement of department
regulations. The decision makers at DMV placed an
undue emphasis on mobilizing the resource and pro-
cess power to derive a preferred outcome, i.e. changes
in the system. Furthermore, their plans were based on
hypothetical assumptions. The Ways and Means Com-
mittee had rejected an earlier request to reorganize the
825 employee department, which would have resulted
in a 10% raise to the managers and hiring of 50 new
employees. In the meanwhile, the development of the
Genesis computer system had been progressing with
all data flows having been written with the four DMV
divisions in mind.
When Project Genesis failed, the State Governor
announced an emergency 5-point plan to alleviate the
problem of long queues and backlogs. First, an emer-
gency hire of 42 temporary staff was announced—
these were to be trained and assigned to the ‘renew by
mail’ or ‘phone department’ in Carson City. Second,
a 24 h operation of mail-in service was declared.
Third, a 30 day grace period for registration renewals
was established—this would apply to those who had
mailed in their renewal or had unsuccessfully tried
to renew their registration. The 30 day grace period did
not apply to new registrations or those who had not
attempted to renew. Fourth, a statewide telephone hot-
line for DMV related questions was established—the
hotline was to be used to check the status of renewals or
to answer simple questions. Fifth, faster implementa-
tion of new technologies was advocated—the DMV
was to tackle improvements in customer service during
the ongoing fiscal year, rather than over the following
2 years. This was to include registration renewals
at emissions inspection stations and transactions by
telephone and the Internet.
Given the analysis of the failed implementation, the
efficacy of at least some aspects of the 5-point plan are
questionable. Since the Nevada DMV was unable to
address some fundamental issues, over reliance on
faster implementation of new technologies should not
be considered a preferred route. Mainstream IS litera-
ture has suggested that it is more important to address
the organizational change management issues prior
to any technological implementation. As Lee [20]
notes:
‘‘Due to the complimentary nature of IT with many
other variables, one has to know what variables to
manage and how to manage them in order to make
IT investments profitable. One has to identify all
other variables affected by technologies and align
them to explore the full potential of IT.’’
Organizational power is one of the important vari-
ables that should be understood properly and lever-
aged in order to ensure IT implementation success.
Jasperson et al. [14] while exploring the relationship
between power and IT impacts conclude:
‘‘. . .expectations regarding changes to power struc-
tures and power can serve as an important factor in
decisions to adopt, promote, or develop ITeven if the
actions that result are not themselves particularly
power-laden or political. IT can be used to create
G. Dhillon / Information & Management 41 (2004) 635–644 641
symbols and meaning that reinforce current power
structures or to mold altered structures. Power is
clearly a complex phenomenon that can be viewed
and best understood from multiple layers.’’
4.2. Lessons
Based on the analysis of the case study, three broad
lessons can be learnt from Project Genesis.
4.2.1. Lesson #1: Understanding of resource,
process, and meaning power is a precursor to
successful IS implementation
Although there is widespread debate as to what
particular conception of power (resource, process,
and meaning) is correct, an understanding of all dimen-
sions of power is essential. Fulmer [11], for example,
notes that human factors have been left out of any
discussion on strategic management. Clearly the imple-
mentation of an IS is a key component in positioning a
firm for future competitive advantage. In a similar vein
Walsh et al. [32], Silva et al. [31] have argued that an
understanding of power is essential.
Nevada DMV failed to understand the dimensions
of power and to establish a means to mobilize it. What
is needed is a deep-seated review of the problems and
these can only be solved by taking into account the
various power dimensions.
4.2.2. Lesson #2: In addition to understanding the
dimensions of power (resource, process, and
meaning), it is important to address various
alignment questions pertaining to the changes in
structure, systems, people, and the culture
Since the implementation of IS both enables and
results in change, there is a concurrent need to con-
sider changes. In Project Genesis, there were problems
at two levels. First, the employees did not know how to
use the system. The Nevada DMV case clearly illus-
trates that thought had not gone into proper training.
There was an implicit assumption that the system
would be easy to use and that training a few indivi-
duals as wizards would be enough. Second, the soft-
ware was not ready to be implemented on a statewide
basis. There were too many bugs in the system. Even if
the technicians knew how to process certain informa-
tion, such as registration, they were literally unable to
override the computer mistakes. One could argue that
adequate system testing could have solved the pro-
blem. True, however, if the system does not fit in with
the structure and is not acceptable by the people and
adversely affects the prevalent culture, testing alone is
not going to help.
4.2.3. Lesson #3: An adequate consideration and
understanding of power vested in the system is
essential for any successful IS implementation
Various researchers have argued that power vested
within the organizational system, which is often diffi-
cult to alter, tends to reflect the values, culture, and the
prevalent structures within an institution. Researchers
have argued that for a strategic change to be realized,
effort should be employed to reduce the power vested
in the system.
In the Nevada DMV managers and consultants did
not consider aspects of power residing in the system.
Clearly had the Nevada DMV not been in a hurry they
could have tested the program properly first in Las
Vegas, Reno, and a rural office. This would have
eliminated some of the problems. The test offices,
even if they had difficulties, would not have affected
the entire State. Instead installation occurred concur-
rently and did not work. Classic systems analysis lays
a significant emphasis on requirements. In Nevada
DMV, a proper requirements analysis was not under-
taken—organizational redesign had not been under-
taken and the whole Genesis system was based on
hypothetical requirements.
The implementation of a new system is time con-
suming and cumbersome. It should be noted that
Project Genesis was implemented within budget.
Due to the organizational structure of the DMV and
the fact that it is a public agency, many political forces
were behind the implementation. Taxpayers need to be
shown that the money was spent properly and a system
was created. The on-time implementation backfired. If
the project had been delayed, costs would be less.
Currently the State has to pay for additional overtime
of regular DMV employees, and the contracting of
42 temporary staff as well as other aspects of Guinn’s
5-point plan.
With implementation of the high potential project
much interest was evinced by other agencies. Law
enforcement received no training on the use of the
Genesis system. In addition, the use of consultants,
Deloitte, and Touche and BEST, to create and integrate
642 G. Dhillon / Information & Management 41 (2004) 635–644
the new system may have been a mistake. Neither had
any experience dealing with a DMV system, and
Deloitte and Touche continued to have control of
prioritizing the bugs, ultimately deciding the order
in which the software would be corrected. In addition,
the State had previously sued BEST for their work on
another project in the Taxation department, yet it was
willing to pay BEST an additional 600,000 to help
remedy the situation.
5. Conclusion
Good project management goes far beyond the
technical development of a system. Indeed it is far
more important to understand the human behavioral
aspects of analysis, design and management of sys-
tems. In particular, an understanding of power in the
resources, processes, and meanings needed to align
changes in the structure, systems, people, and culture.
It goes without saying that had the DMV administra-
tion carefully analyzed and understood the various
dimensions of power, they would have been in a better
position to realize the necessary changes.
Acknowledgements
Acknowledgements are due to Becky Solomon, a
graduate student at University of Nevada, Las Vegas,
who helped with the data collection.
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Gurpreet Dhillon is an associate profes-
sor of Information Systems in the School
of Business, Virginia Commonwealth
University, Richmond, USA. He holds a
PhD in IS (1995) from the London School
of Economics and Political Science, UK.
He is an author of five books and has
published in several journals including
Information Systems Research, Commu-
nications of the ACM, Computers &
Security, European Journal of Informa-
tion Systems, Information Systems Journal, and International
Journal of Information Management among others. His research
interests include management of information security, ethical, and
legal implications of information systems and aspects of informa-
tion systems planning and project management.
644 G. Dhillon / Information & Management 41 (2004) 635–644