SECTION 3

Section 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law.

(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.

KATZ VS US

Brief Fact Summary. The petitioner, Katz (the “petitioner”), was convicted of transmitting wagering information over telephone lines in violation of federal law. The government had entered into evidence the petitioner’s end of telephone conversations that the government had obtained by placing a listening device to the phone booth that the petitioner used. The Court of Appeals rejected the petitioner’s contention that the evidence should be suppressed.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. The protection of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution (“Constitution”), against unreasonable searches and seizures, follows the person and not the place.

Facts. The petitioner used a public telephone booth to transmit wagering information from Los Angeles to Boston and Miami in violation of federal law. After extensive surveillance, the FBI placed a listening device to the top of the telephone booth and recorded the petitioner’s end of the telephone conversations which was then used as evidence against him at his trial. The petitioner moved to have the evidence suppressed under the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution, and that motion was denied. The Court of Appeals rejected the contention that the evidence is inadmissible. Certiorari was granted.

Issue. Whether the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution protects telephone conversations conducted in a phone booth and secretly recorded from introduction as evidence against a person?

Held. Justice Potter Stewart filed the majority opinion. The petitioner strenuously asserted that the phone booth was a constitutionally protected area. However, the Fourth Amendment protects persons and not places from

unreasonable intrusion. Even in a public place, a person may have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his person. Although the petitioner did not seek to hide his self from public view when he entered the telephone booth, he did seek to keep out the uninvited ear. He did not relinquish his right to do so simply because he went to a place where he could be seen. A person who enters into a telephone booth may expect the protection of the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution as he assumes that the words he utters into the telephone will not be broadcast to the world. Once this is acknowledged, it is clear that the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution protects persons and not areas from unreasonable searches and seizures. The Government’s activities in electronically listening to and recording the petitioner’s telephone conversations constituted a search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment and absent a search warrant predicated upon sufficient probable cause, all evidence obtained is inadmissible.

Dissent. Justice Hugo Black (“J. Black”) filed a dissenting opinion. J. Black observed that eavesdropping was an ancient practice that the Framers were certainly aware of when they drafted the United States Constitution (“Constitution”). Had they wished to prohibit this activity under the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution they would have added such language that would have effectively done so. By clever wording, the Supreme Court finds it plausible to argue that language aimed specifically at searches and seizures of things that can be searched and seized may, to protect privacy, be applied to eavesdropped evidence of conversations.Concurrence. Justice John Harlan (“J. Harlan”) filed a dissenting opinion. The Fourth Amendment of the Constitution protects persons, not places. There is a twofold requirement for what protection is afforded to those people. First, that a person has exhibited an actual expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. The critical fact in this case is that a person who enters a telephone booth shuts the door behind him, pays the toll, and is surely entitled to assume that his conversation is not being intercepted. On the other hand, conversations out in the open public would not be protected against being overheard as the expectation of privacy would not be reasonable.

Discussion. The Fourth Amendment of the Constitution provides constitutional protection to individuals and not to particular places. The two-part test for this protection is introduced by J. Harlan. First, the person must have exhibited an actual expectation of privacy and, second, that expectation must be reasonable.

SALCEDO-ORTANEZ V CA

7NOVG.R. No. 110662 | August 4, 1994 | J. Padilla Facts:Private respondent Rafael Ortanez filed with the Quezon City RTC a complaint for annulment of marriage with damages against petitioner Teresita Salcedo-Ortanez, on grounds of lack of marriage license and/or psychological incapacity of the petitioner.

Among the exhibits offered by private respondent were three (3) cassette tapes of alleged telephone conversations between petitioner and unidentified persons.

Teresita submitted her Objection/Comment to Rafael’s oral offer of evidence. However, the trial court admitted all of private respondent’s offered evidence and later on denied her motion for reconsideration, prompting petitioner to file a petition for certiorari with the CA to assail the admission in evidence of the aforementioned cassette tapes.These tape recordings were made and obtained when private respondent allowed his friends from the military to wire tap his home telephone.

CA denied the petition because (1) Tape recordings are not inadmissible per se. They and any other variant thereof can be admitted in evidence for certain purposes, depending on how they are presented and offered and on how the trial judge utilizes them in the interest of truth and fairness and the even handed administration of justice; and (2) A petition for certiorari is notoriously inappropriate to rectify a supposed error in admitting evidence adduced during trial. The ruling on admissibility is interlocutory; neither does it impinge on jurisdiction. If it is erroneous, the ruling should be questioned in the appeal from the judgment on the merits and not through the special civil action of certiorari. The error, assuming gratuitously that it exists, cannot be anymore than an error of law, properly correctible by appeal and not by certiorari.Petitioner then filed the present petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

 

Issue:W/N the recordings of the telephone conversations are admissible in evidence

W/N the remedy of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court was properly availed of by the petitioner in the Court of Appeals

 

Held:1. No. Rep. Act No. 4200 entitled “An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wire Tapping and Other Related Violations of the Privacy of Communication, and for other purposes” expressly makes such tape recordings inadmissible in evidence thus:Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape-recorder, or however otherwise described. . . .

Sec. 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the existence, contents, substance, purport, or meaning of the same or any part thereof, or any information therein contained, obtained or secured by any person in violation of the preceding sections of this Act shall not be admissible in evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or administrative hearing or investigation.

Absent a clear showing that both parties to the telephone conversations allowed the recording of the same, the inadmissibility of the subject tapes is mandatory under Rep. Act No. 4200.

2. Yes and no. The extraordinary writ of certiorari is generally not available to challenge an interlocutory order of a trial court. The proper remedy in such cases is an ordinary appeal from an adverse judgment, incorporating in said appeal the grounds for assailing the interlocutory order.However, where the assailed interlocutory order is patently erroneous and the remedy of appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious relief, the Court may allow certiorari as a mode of redress.

ZULUETA VS MARTIN

CASE FACTS: Petitioner, Cecilia Zulueta went to the clinic of her husband, private respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin. In the presence of her mother, a driver and Martin’s secretary, petitioner forcibly opened the drawers and cabinets in the clinic and took 157 documents consisting of private correspondence between Martin and his alleged paramours. The documents were seized for use as evidence in a case for legal separation and for disqualification from the practice of medicine which Zulueta had filed against Martin. Martin filed an action for recovery of the documents and for damages against Zulueta. The RTC decided in favor of Martin, declaring him the capital & exclusive owner of properties described. The court ordered Zulueta

to return the properties to Martin and pay him nominal and moral damages and attorney’s fees, and cost of the suit. Furthermore, Zulueta and her attorneys were enjoined from barred from using or submitting/admitting as evidence the documents and papers in question. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: WON- the documents and papers in question are admissible in evidence?

HELD / RATIO: NO, the Supreme Court itself held that the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional injunction declaring the “privacy of communication and correspondence are inviolable”, (Sec. 3, Par. 1, Art. III of the 1987 Constitution) is no less applicable simply because it is the wife who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the provision in the Constitution is if there is a lawful order from a court or when public safety or order requires otherwise as provided by law. (Sec.3, Par. 2, Art. III of the 1987 Constitution).

The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify anyone of them breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her.

The law ensures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists (Section 22, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court). Neither may be examined without the consent of the other as to any communication received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save for specified exceptions (Section 24, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court). PETITION IS DENIED.

SECTION 17

Section 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress

of grievances.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DELFIN RONDERO

G.R. 125687, December 9, 1999EXCLUSIONARY RULEFACTS: The accused was seen by the victim’s father with an ice pick and washing his bloodied hands at the well. The 9 year old victim was later found dead and half naked with lacerations in her vagina but no sperm. He was convicted of homicide only. For his conviction, several circumstantial pieces of evidence were submitted including strands of his hair for comparison with the strands of hair found in the victim’s right hand at the scene of the crime as well as blood-stained undershirt and short pants taken from his house. The accused-appellant avers the acquisition of his hair strands without his express written consent and without the presence of his counsel, which, he contends is a violation of his Constitutional right against self-incrimination under Sections 12 and 17, Article III of the Constitution, to wit:Sec. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited.(3) Any confession or admission in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.Sec. 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.ISSUE: WON the evidence gathered, particularly accused-appellant’s hair strands can be admitted as evidence against him?HELD: Yes. Under the above-quoted provisions, what is actually proscribed is the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communication from the accused-appellant and not the inclusion of his body in evidence when it may be material. For instance, substance

emitted from the body of the accused may be received as evidence in prosecution for acts of lasciviousness and morphine forced out of the mouth of the accused may also be used as evidence against him. Consequently, although accused-appellant insists that hair samples were forcibly taken from him and submitted to the NBI for forensic examination, the hair samples may be admitted in evidence against him, for what is proscribed is the use of testimonial compulsion or any evidence communicative in nature acquired from the accused under duress.On the other hand, the blood-stained undershirt and short pants taken from the accused are inadmissible in evidence. They were taken without the proper search warrant from the police officers. Accused-appellant’s wife testified that the police officers, after arresting her husband in their house, took the garments from the clothesline without proper authority. This was never rebutted by the prosecution. Under the libertarian exclusionary rule known as the “fruit of the poisonous tree,” evidence illegally obtained by the state should not be used to gain other evidence because the illegally obtained evidence taints all evidence subsequently obtained. Simply put, accused-appellant’s garments, having been seized in violation of his constitutional right against illegal searches and seizure, are inadmissible in court as evidence.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ANGELITO YATCO

G.R. No. 138388.  March 19, 2002FACTS:

1.)    Juan Consunji, Alfonso Panganiban, and another whose identity is still unknown, were charged with having conspired together in the murder of one Jose Ramos.

2.)    During the progress of the trial, counsel for the defendant Panganiban interposed a general objection to any evidence on such confession made by defendant Consunji on the ground that it was hearsay and therefore incompetent as against the other accused Panganiban.

3.)    The lower court ordered the exclusion of the objected evidence but on a different ground which is “the prosecution could not be permitted to introduce the confessions of defendants Juan Consunji and Alfonso Panganiban to prove conspiracy between them, without prior proof of such conspiracy by a number of definite acts, conditions, and circumstances”.

4.)    OSG filed a petition for cetiorari before the SC for the review and annulment of the lower Court's order completely excluding any evidence on the extrajudicial confessions of the accused Juan Consunji and Alfonso Panganiban without prior proof of conspiracy.

4.)Issue #1: WON the lower court is correct in excluding the prosecution’s evidence (extra-judicial confession by Consunji)?

Ruling: No. We believe that the lower Court committed a grave abuse of discretion in ordering the complete exclusion of the prosecution's evidence on the alleged confessions of the accused Juan Consunji at the stage of the trial when the ruling was made. Section 14, Rule 123, Rules of Court, is specific as to the admissibility of the extrajudicial confession of an accused, freely and voluntarily made, as evidence against him.SEC. 14. Confession. - The declaration of an accused expressly acknowledging the truth of his guilt as to the offense charged, may be given in evidence against him.Under the rule of multiple admissibility of evidence, even if Consunji's confession may not be competent as against his co-accused Panganiban, being hearsay as to the latter, or to prove conspiracy between them without the conspiracy being established by other evidence, the confession of Consunji was, nevertheless, admissible as evidence of the declarant's own guilt and should be admitted.Rule on admissibilityThe practice of excluding evidence on doubtful objections to its materiality or technical objections to the form of the questions should be avoided. In a case of any intricacy it is impossible for a judge of first instance, in the early stages of the development of the proof, to know with any certainty whether testimony is relevant or not; and where there is no indication of bad faith on the part of the Attorney offering the evidence, the court may as a rule safely accept the testimony upon the statement of the attorney that the proof offered will be connected later. At any rate, in the final determination and consideration of the case, the trial Court should be able to distinguish the admissible from the inadmissible, and reject what, under the rules of evidence, should be excluded. There is greater reason to adhere to such policy in criminal cases where questions arise as to admissibility of evidence for the prosecution, for the unjustified exclusion of evidence may lead to the erroneous acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the charges, from which the People can no longer appeal.Issue #2: WON section 12 of Rule 123 is applicable in the case at bar?Ruling: No. The rule cited by the Court below in support of its exclusion of the proffered evidence is Sec. 12 of Rule 123, providing that the act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. Manifestly, the rule refers to statements made by one conspirator during the pendency of the unlawful enterprises ("during its existence") and in furtherance of its object, and not to a confession made, as in this case, long after the conspiracy had been brought to an end. Besides, the prosecution had not yet offered the confessions to prove conspiracy between the two accused, nor as evidence against both of them. In fact, the alleged confessions (both in writing and in tape recordings) had not yet even been identified, much less formally offered in evidence. For all we know, the prosecution might still be able to adduce other proof of conspiracy between

Consunji and Panganiban before their confessions are formally offered in evidence. Assuming, therefore, that section 12 of Rule 123also applies to the confessions in question, it was premature for the respondent Court to exclude them completely on the ground that there was no prior proof of conspiracy.Issue #3: WON the court has the power to disregard evidence?Ruling: The court does not have the said power. The exclusion of the proferred confessions was not made on the basis of the objection interposed by Panganiban's counsel, but upon an altogether different ground, which the Court issued motu proprio. Panganiban's counsel objected to Consunji's confession as evidence of the guilt of the other accused Panganiban, on the ground that it was hearsay as to the latter. But the Court, instead of ruling on this objection, put up its own objection to the confessions — that it could not be admitted to prove conspiracy between Consunji and Panganiban without prior evidence of such conspiracy by a number of indefinite acts, conditions, circumstances, etc. and completely excluded the confessions on that ground. By so doing, the Court overlooked that the right to object is a mere privilege which the parties may waive; and if the ground for objection is known and not reasonably made, the objection is deemed waived and the Court has no power, on its own motion, to disregard the evidence.

VILLAFLOR VS. SUMMERS

Facts: In a criminal case pending before the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila, Emeteria Villaflor and Florentino Souingco were charged with the crime of adultery. On trial before the Hon. Pedro Concepcion, Judge of First Instance, upon the petition of the assistant fiscal for the city of Manila, the court ordered Emeteria Villaflor to submit her body to the examination of one or two competent doctors to determine if she was pregnant or not. Villaflor refused to obey the order on the ground that such examination of her person was a violation of the constitutional provision in contempt of court and was ordered to be committed to Bilibid Prison until she should permit the medical examination required by the court. Villaflor filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

Issue: Whether or Not the physical examination was a violation of the petitioner’s constitutional rights against self-incrimination.

Ruling: The writ of habeas corpus prayed for is hereby denied. The costs shall be taxed against the petitioner. So ordered.

Ratio: No. It is not a violation of her constitutional rights. The rule that the constitutional guaranty, that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, is limited to a prohibition against compulsory testimonial self-incrimination. The corollary to the proposition is that, an ocular inspection of the body of the accused is permissible. 

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. PAYNOR

REGALADO, J.:

For the fatal stabbing of Carmelita Aguinaldo at Barangay Rizal, Roxas, Isabela, herein accused-appellant Lindes Paynor, alias Jess, was charged with the crime of murder in Criminal Case No. 23-285 of Branch 23, Regional Trial Court of Roxas, Isabela.

The factual backdrop of this tragic occurrence, culled from the records of the trial court and the testimonies adduced therein, commenced at around 4:00 P.M. of September 18, 1991 when a middle-aged teacher, Carmelita Aguinaldo, was stabbed and killed inside her classroom at the Roxas Central Elementary School. A ten-year old pupil, by the name of Fresnaida Magaway, narrated how the events unfolded.

She testified that in the afternoon of September 18, 1991 she was assigned as a cleaner and, while sweeping the ground near her classroom, she noticed a man who was holding a pointed knife, near the classroom of the victim. The man entered the room of the teacher, stabbed her, and went out of the room headed west towards the fence of the school, carrying the pointed bladed weapon in his hand and passing in front of the witness. Shortly thereafter, Ms. Aguinaldo emerged from the room saying Manang, nabagsol na kon, literally meaning, Manang, I am stabbed, then she fell to the ground.[1]

The immediate reaction of this young witness was to seek help from her teachers, so she went into the classroom of her teacher, Ms. Hermogena Uy, and told her about Ms. Aguinaldo. She then took her belongings from the classroom and proceeded immediately to where Ms. Aguinaldo fell down and there she saw Mrs. Leticia Navarro embracing the victim, with Mrs. Elizabeth Dumlao by their side. A tricycle came and the teachers rushed the victim to the nearby hospital. She followed her teachers to the hospital, where Ms. Aguinaldo was pronounced dead on arrival.

Fernando Castillo, a policeman, who had responded to the crime report, testified that he went to the hospital and inquired whether someone saw the stabbing. According to him, Fresnaida Magaway came forward and told them that she saw a man in blue maong pants, and white T-shirt printed in front, using slippers and a brown hat, and with a green towel wrapped around his

neck. He entered the school yard and went to the room of Ms. Aguinaldo where he stabbed her with a pointed bladed weapon. She further said that if the man would be presented to her, she could recognize him.[2]

The police investigators then went to the house of the family of the deceased and asked the family members if they had a suspect in the killing of Ms. Aguinaldo. The family of the deceased pointed to appellant, the jilted boyfriend of the victims sister, as a possible suspect. The policemen then proceeded to the house of appellant, but they were informed that he was at the Tagalag auto repair shop having his motorcycle repaired.[3]

At the Tagalag auto repair shop, the policemen saw appellant wearing maong pants, white T-shirt with markings in front, with a yellow towel wrapped around his neck and a brown hat on his head. Appellant was invited by them to their station where he was identified by Fresnaida Magaway as the person who stabbed and killed Ms. Aguinaldo. On the strength of said positive identification, appellant was detained at the police station.

An information was filed on September 19, 1991, charging appellant with the murder of Carmelita Aguinaldo, with evident premeditation and treachery as attendant circumstances, by the infliction of a fatal stab wound on her chest, and committed at the time and on the date and place earlier narrated.[4]

No preliminary investigation having been conducted prior to the filling of that information, appellants counsel filed a motion for preliminary investigation on September 23, 1991 with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 16, at Ilagan, Isabela. On October 18, 1991, presiding Judge Teodulo E. Mirasol issued an order directing the Provincial Prosecutor to conduct a preliminary investigation.

Denying appellants motion for his release from detention in the meantime, said court issued an order on November 8, 1991 that -

x x x the court is of the opinion that the arrest is lawful, considering that the accused was arrested immediately after the commission of the offense, the police officers acting with promptness after a credible information furnished them by a credible witness. That the police acted with personal knowledge of facts fed them by a witness who has no sufficient time to reflect on what she was going to tell the police (is) indicative of truthfulness in pointing to the accused as the author of the stabbing.[5]

On November 22, 1991, a resolution was issued by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor maintaining the information filed on September 19, 1991. On December 12, 1991, appellant was duly arraigned and, on his plea of not guilty to the charge for murder the court below thereafter proceeded with the trial.

The prosecution based its case primarily on the testimony of a lone eyewitness, and this in the person of a ten-year old girl, Fresnaida Magaway. Considering that doubts may be entertained in view of her tender years, and for a graphic illustration and clearer appreciation of what actually transpired on the afternoon of 18 September 1991 as seen through the eyes of this eyewitness, we quote the pertinent transcripts of stenographic notes of her testimony:

Q Do you know the name of that man whom you pointed to the court?

A Yes, sir.

Q Will you please tell his name if you know?

A Jessie Paynor, sir.

Q Can you recall the attire and appearance of the accused whom you pointed to when he stabbed Ms. Aguinaldo in her room on September 18, 1991, at 4:00 oclock in the afternoon?

A He ha(d) a white t-shirt, denim pants and he ha(d) a woven hat and a green towel. (The witness demonstrating as if the towel was wrapped around her neck)[6]

xxx xxx xxx

Q Did you not tell Mrs. Uy that you saw the man who stabbed Mrs. Aguinaldo?

A I told her sir, but I did not tell the name.

Q Do you know the name of the person at the time you told Mrs. Uy the identity of the assailant?

A Jessie, sir.

Q Yes, did you mention the name of Jessie to Mrs. Uy when you told Mrs. Uy that you saw the stabbing of Mrs. Aguinaldo?

A No sir.

Q Can you tell this court why you failed to inform Mrs. Uy your teacher, the identity of the assailant?

A I did not tell her sir because I followed Mrs. Aguinaldo.

Q You did not tell her or you failed to tell her because you immediately followed where Mrs. Aguinaldo was brought to, is that what you mean?

A Yes, sir.

Q Now, that person whom you identified as Jess, from the way you testify, you already know him, is that correct, at the time of the stabbing?

A Yes, sir.[7]

x x x

Q Now how did you notice if it is true that you recognized for the third time that he was walking to and fro in front of your room and the room of Mrs. Aguinaldo the identity of the assailant of Mrs. Aguinaldo?

A Because he was walking to and fro my attention was attracted.

Q So when the third time that you noticed him walking to and fro, could you tell the court what special feature of that person walking to and fro attracted your attention?

A I saw the face, sir.

Q Is that the only thing that you saw in that person, his face?

A I saw the apparel, sir.

Q And it was at the fourth time that he walked to and fro when he entered the room of Mrs. Aguinaldo?

A Yes, sir.

Q And during that time he was walking to and fro you already saw him holding a knife, is that correct?

A Not yet, sir.

Q At what point in time did you see him if you saw him h(o)ld a knife?

A I did not yet see the knife he used to stab Mrs. Aguinaldo, sir.

COURT:

Q Yes, did you see any knife in his possession during or after the incident?

A After Mrs. Aguinaldo was stabbed I saw him holding the knife because he was facing me at that time.

Q So that was the only time that you saw him, I mean the assailant, holding a knife when he passed by you?

A Yes, sir.

Q And when the assailant came out of the room of Mrs. Aguinaldo how did he leave the room, he ran, he walk(ed), or what?

A After maam Aguinaldo was stabbed the assailant ran away, sir.[8]

As earlier stated, both in the police station and then in open court, the young girl positively identified appellant as the person she saw on September 18, 1991 who stabbed and killed the victim, Mrs. Carmelita Aguinaldo.

Appellant denied having been anywhere near the school on September 18, 1991 and insisted that he was at the Tagalag auto repair shop, busy having his motorcycle repaired. Testifying in his defense, appellant blandly declared that he went to the repair shop at 2:10 in the afternoon of that day, to have his motorcycle repaired; that he had to push his motorcycle to the shop and when they tested it there, it would not start; that the owner suggested and he agreed that the engine be overhauled; that he was at that shop all the time, helping in the overhauling until 5:00 P.M. when policemen arrived and invited him to go with them to the police station.[9]

The testimony of appellant was corroborated by Cecilio Tagalag who testified that the former was at their motor shop from 2:00 to 5:00 p.m. on September 18, 1991 and left only when he was picked up by the police authorities at around 5:00 oclock that afternoon.[10]

The trial court rendered judgment on April 21, l994, finding against appellant and commending the lone eyewitness for the prosecution, Fresnaida Magaway. These words of said court therein are worth repeating, before the dispositive portion that follows:

Cross examined on several occasions, this young girl stuc(k) to the testimony that it was the accused whom she saw enter the room, then left followed by the victim shouting for help. During these gruelling and excruciating cross-examinations, she never faltered. She never showed any sign of fear. She never wavered, she stuc(k) to her testimony.

This girl is no ordinary girl. She is made of metal far better than some adults. For adults are always mindful of their safety and their families. Even if they have actually seen a person shot to death, stabbed to death, or mauled to death, they would not come out in the open and volunteer the information that they saw the killing. Either they keep quiet, or deny having witnessed such incident. But this girl is different. She volunteered to describe the attire of the accused.

x x x

If only witnesses who see actual killings, have the guts and the courage of this girl, all unsolved criminal cases would be solved. This girl shames the adults, especially those who do not come out (in) the open when they witness crimes. If only those witnesses were Fresnaida Magaway, all crimes would have been solved, and the malefactors sent to jail. This girl is an

epitome of courage and guts. Fearless and intelligent, she has done what adults shu(n) to do.[11]

x x x

AS A CONSEQUENCE OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder provided for and penalized by article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, and imposes upon him the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, together with all the necessary penalties provided by law, to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of P50,000.00 pesos, without however, subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay cost.[12]

Appellant now seeks the reversal of that verdict, claiming that the trial court erred: (1) in giving credence to the testimony of Fresnaida Magaway in convicting him in spite of the material flaws, contradictions, and improbabilities inherent in her testimony; (2) in admitting in evidence the following physical evidence: white T-shirt, denim pants, green towel, and hat, in spite of the clear violation of the Miranda doctrine during the custodial investigation of the accused; (3) in convicting him based on mere circumstantial evidence from an account of one highly questionable witness; and (4) in convicting him of the offense charged despite failure of the prosecution to prove the qualifying circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation.[13]

Appellant specifically laments the mode by which Fresnaida Magaway identified him, theorizing that if the witness really knew him, she should have mentioned his name the moment she was asked by the police as to who stabbed the victim, instead of resorting to a descriptive identification.[14]

He likewise also argues that there was a violation of the Miranda rights of an accused when he was identified by the witness while he was seated on a bench of the investigation room. The manner employed by the investigators in obtaining his T-shirt, pants, towel, slippers, and hat, according to appellant, was a further violation of his rights as these items were taken from him in the absence of his counsel.

The defense also asserts that the lower court relied upon the testimony of a highly questionable witness in the person of Fresnaida Magaway, and that the conviction of appellant was based purely on circumstantial evidence which should not have been taken as proof beyond reasonable doubt that he really stabbed the victim to death. The final contention is that the prosecution failed to prove either that there was treachery employed by the accused in the killing of the victim or that there was evident premeditation on his part to take her life.

On the allegation of inconsistency and flaws in the testimony of a single eyewitness, a thorough review of the transcripts of stenographic notes, particularly those on the testimony of witness Fresnaida Magaway, does not reveal any major inconsistency. Instead, the Court is regaled by the unswerving and consistent position of the witness that appellant was the only one whom she saw on that occasion and that he stabbed and killed her teacher, Mrs. Aguinaldo. Any minor lapses therein tend to buttress, rather than weaken, her credibility since they show that she was neither coached nor were her answers contrived.[15]

The contention of appellant that the expected reaction of the witness should have been to identify him by name is an obvious non sequitur. What should be considered as a general or common rule is that witnesses to a crime react in different ways. In the instant case, the youthful witness was unable to immediately reveal the name of appellant to the police as she was evidently scared or confused and, as she explained, she also failed to name appellant at that time since her concern and thoughts were of her teacher whom she followed to the hospital. Surely, we can not fault the young girl for her confusion and fear, it being her first time to witness such a crime of violence.

The important thing is that when she testified at the trial, she was firm, spontaneous and categorical in her declaration that it was appellant whom she saw that afternoon, and that it was he who entered the classroom of her teacher and stabbed the latter with a pointed bladed weapon. The witness stood by her declaration, unshaken throughout the entire trial, and never showed any hesitation in her testimony.

Another fact worth stressing is that the witness had no motive whatsoever to fabricate a serious charge against appellant. When there is no showing that the principal witness for the prosecution was actuated by an improper motive, the presumption is that he was not so actuated, and his testimony is thus entitled to full faith and credit.[16]

Appellant then asseverates that there was a violation of his rights while under custodial investigation, in light of the Miranda doctrine, when allegedly the police investigators unceremoniously stripped him of his clothing and personal items, and the same were later introduced as evidence during the trial. The Court is not persuaded. The protection of the accused under custodial investigation, which is invoked by appellant, refers to testimonial compulsion. Section 12, Article III of the Constitution provides that such accused shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent, the right to counsel, and the right to waive the right to counsel in the presence of counsel, and that any confession or admission obtained in violation of his rights shall be inadmissible in evidence against him. As held in People vs. Gamboa,[17] this constitutional right applies only against testimonial compulsion and not when the body of the accused is proposed to be examined. In fact, an accused may validly be compelled to be photographed

or measured, or his garments or shoes removed or replaced, or to move his body to enable the foregoing things to be done, without running afoul of the proscription against testimonial compulsion.[18]

The desperate ploy of appellant that the evidence against him was purely circumstantial does not even warrant refutation. It was definitely established by the prosecution that appellant was actually the one who treacherously attacked the victim. Eyewitness Magaway unequivocally stated and lucidly described how she saw appellant actually stabbing Mrs. Aguinaldo,[19] and even demonstrated during the ocular inspection the specific part of the room where the crime was committed and where she herself was when she witnessed the dastardly deed.[20] As already explained, the defense failed to show that the witness had ill motives in testifying against appellant and there is no doubt in the mind of this Court that the witness really had no personal ill feelings against him. The conclusion that irresistibly emerges, therefore, is that the witness was just honestly relating what she really saw on September 18, 1991, and that she so testified because of her desire for justice and redress for the terrible wrong against her teacher.

The fourth error assigned by appellant that evident premeditation and treachery were not proved merits some comment. It is correct that evident premeditation was not established. There is no evidence or showing on record when and how appellant planned and prepared for the killing of the victim. His allegation that there was no treachery, however, is a different matter. The attack against Mrs. Aguinaldo was so sudden that, although she was stabbed by appellant while she was facing him, the unexpected attack in itself constituted treachery. The victim was caught unaware and did not have any opportunity to defend herself. Also, from the means and methods adopted by appellant to commit the crime, it would be incredible to assume that the same were not deliberately adopted to insure the consummation of the felony.

Lastly, there can be no sensible debate that appellants defense of alibi has to be rejected. It is elementary that for this discredited defense, credible and tangible proof of physical impossibility for the accused to be at the scene of the crime is indispensable.[21] In the present case, the court below found that appellant was then just one kilometer away from the scene of the crime.[22] Furthermore, the defense of alibi can not prevail over the positive identification of the accused by an eyewitness who had no improper motive to falsely testify.[23]

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed in toto, with costs against accused-appellant Lindes Paynor.

SO ORDERED

SECTION 6Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired

except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national

security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law.

RICARDO SILVERIO VS. C.A

G.R. No. 94284                    April 8, 1991Ricardo C. Silverio, petitionervs.The Court of Appeals, Hon. Benigno G. Gaviola, as Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch IX, and People of the Philippines, respondents

Facts            On October 14, 1985, petitioner was charged with violation of Section 20 (4) of the Revised Securities Act. In due time, he posted bail for his provisional liberty. On January 26, 1988, respondent People of the Philippines filed an urgent ex parte Motion to cancel the passport of and to issue a hold-departure order against accused-petitioner on the ground that he had gone abroad several times without the necessary Court approval resulting in postponements of the arraignment and scheduled hearings. On April 4, 1988, the Regional Trial Court issued and order directing the Department of Foreign Affairs to cancel petititoner’s passport or to deny his application therefor, and the Commission on Immigration to prevent petitioner from leaving the country.

Issues            Whether or not the cancellation of the petitioner’s passport violated his constitutional right to travel.

Ruling            Petitioner thus theorizes that under the 1987 Constitution, Courts can impair the right to travel only on the grounds of “national security, public safety, or public health.”

            Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution should by no means be construed as delimiting the inherent power of the Courts to use all means necessary to carry their orders into effect in criminal cases pending before them. When by law jurisdiction is conferred on a Court or judicial officer, all auxillary writs, processes and other means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such Court or officer.            Petitioner is facing a criminal charge. He has posted bail but has violated the conditions thereof by failing to appear before the Court when required. Warrants for his arrest have been issued. Those orders and processes would be rendered nugatory if an accused were to be allowed to leave or to remain, at his pleasure, outside the territorial confines of the country. Holding an accused in a criminal case within the reach of the Courts by preventing his departure from the Philippines must be considered as a valid restriction on his right to travel so that he may be dealt with in accordance with law. The offended party in any criminal proceeding is the People of the Philippines. It is to their best interest that criminal prosecutions should run their course and proceed to finality without undue delay, with an accused holding himself amenable at all times to Court Orders and processes.

YAP VS. CA, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Facts: 

Petitioner Francisco Yap was convicted of the crime of estafa for misappropriating amounts equivalent to P5,500,000.00. After the records of the case were transmitted to the Court of Appeals, he filed a motion to fix bail pending appeal. The CA granted the motion and allowed Yap to post bail in the amount of P5,500,000 on condition that he will secure “a certification/guaranty from the Mayor of the place of his residence that he is a resident of the area and that he will remain to be so until final judgment is rendered or in case he transfers residence, it must be with prior notice to the court and private complainant.” He sought the reduction of the bail but it was denied. Hence, he appealed to the SC. He contended that the CA, by setting bail at a prohibitory amount, effectively denied him his right to bail. He also contests the condition imposed by the CA that he secure a certification/guaranty, claiming that the same violates his liberty of abode and travel.

Issue: 

1. Whether the proposed bail of P5,500,000.00 was violative of petitioner's right against excessive bail.

2. Whether the condition imposed by the CA violative of the liberty of abode and right to travel.

Held: 

1. The setting of the amount at P5,500,000.00 is unreasonable, excessive, and constitutes an effective denial of petitioner’s right to bail. The purpose for bail is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at the trial, or whenever so required by the court. The amount should be high enough to assure the presence of the accused when required but no higher than is reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose. To fix bail at an amount equivalent to the civil liability of which petitioner is charged (in this case, P5,500,000.00) is to permit the impression that the amount paid as bail is an exaction of the civil liability that accused is charged of; this we cannot allow because bail is not intended as a punishment, nor as a satisfaction of civil liability which should necessarily await the judgment of the appellate court.

2. The right to change abode and travel within the Philippines, being invoked by petitioner, are not absolute rights.  Section 6, Article III of the 1987 Constitution states:

The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court.  Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law.

The order of the Court of Appeals releasing petitioner on bail constitutes such lawful order as contemplated by the above provision. The condition imposed by the Court of Appeals is simply consistent with the nature and function of a bail bond, which is to ensure that petitioner will make himself available at all times whenever the Court requires his presence. Besides, a closer look at the questioned condition will show that petitioner is not prevented from changing abode; he is merely required to inform the court in case he does so.  (Yap vs Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141529, June 6, 2001)

SECTION 7Section 7. The right of the people to information on matters

of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official

records, and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may

be provided by law.

Valmonte Vs Belmonte

 FACTS : Petitioners in this special civil action for mandamus with preliminary injunction invoke their right to information and pray that respondent be directed: (a) to furnish petitioners the list of the names of the Batasang Pambansa members belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban who were able to secure clean loans immediately before the February 7 election thru the intercession/marginal note of the then First Lady Imelda Marcos; and/or (b) to furnish petitioners with certified true copies of the documents evidencing their respective loans; and/or (c) to allow petitioners access to the public records for the subject information On June 20, 1986, apparently not having yet received the reply of the Government Service and Insurance System (GSIS) Deputy General Counsel, petitioner Valmonte wrote respondent another letter, saying that for failure to receive a reply, "(W)e are now considering ourselves free to do whatever action necessary within the premises to pursue our desired objective in pursuance of public interest."

 ISSUE : WON Valmonte, et. al. are entitled as citizens and taxpayers to inquire upon GSIS records on behest loans given by the former First Lady Imelda Marcos to Batasang Pambansa members belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban political parties.

 HELD : Respondent has failed to cite any law granting the GSIS the privilege of confidentiality as regards the documents subject of this petition. His position is apparently based merely on considerations of policy. The judiciary does not settle policy issues. The Court can only declare what the law is, and not what the law should be. Under our system of government, policy issues are within the domain of the

political branches of the government, and of the people themselves as the repository of all State power. The concerned borrowers themselves may not succeed if they choose to invoke their right to privacy, considering the public offices they were holding at the time the loans were alleged to have been granted. It cannot be denied that because of the interest they generate and their newsworthiness, public figures, most especially those holding responsible positions in government, enjoy a more limited right to privacy as compared to ordinary individuals, their actions being subject to closer public scrutiny The "transactions" used here I suppose is generic and, therefore, it can cover both steps leading to a contract, and already a consummated contract, Considering the intent of the framers of the Constitution which, though not binding upon the Court, are nevertheless persuasive, and considering further that government-owned and controlled corporations, whether performing proprietary or governmental functions are accountable to the people, the Court is convinced that transactions entered into by the GSIS, a government-controlled corporation created by special legislation are within the ambit of the people's right to be informed pursuant to the constitutional policy of transparency in government dealings. Although citizens are afforded the right to information and, pursuant thereto, are entitled to "access to official records," the Constitution does not accord them a right to compel custodians of official records to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the like in their desire to acquire information on matters of public concern.

GONZALES VS. NARVASA

G.R. No. 140835, August 14 2000

FACTS:

Petitioner Ramon A. Gonzales, in his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer, filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus filed on December 9, 1999, assailing the constitutionality of the creation of the Preparatory Commission on Constitutional Reform (PCCR) and of the positions of presidential consultants, advisers and assistants. The Preparatory Commission on

Constitutional Reform (PCCR) was created by President Estrada on November 26, 1998 by virtue of Executive Order No. 43 (E.O. No. 43) in order “to study and recommend proposed amendments and/or revisions to the 1987 Constitution, and the manner of implementing the same.” Petitioner disputes the constitutionality of the PCCR based on the grounds that it is a public office which only the legislature can create by way of a law.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner has a legal standing to assail the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 43

HELD:

The Court dismissed the petition. A citizen acquires standing only if he can establish that he has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action. Petitioner has not shown that he has sustained or is in danger of sustaining any personal injury attributable to the creation of the PCCR. If at all, it is only Congress, not petitioner, which can claim any “injury” in this case since, according to petitioner, the President has encroached upon the legislature’s powers to create a public office and to propose amendments to the Charter by forming the PCCR. Petitioner has sustained no direct, or even any indirect, injury. Neither does he claim that his rights or privileges have been or are in danger of being violated, nor that he shall be subjected to any penalties or burdens as a result of the PCCR’s activities. Clearly, petitioner has failed to establish his locus standi so as to enable him to seek judicial redress as a citizen.

Furthermore, a taxpayer is deemed to have the standing to raise a constitutional issue when it is established that public funds have been disbursed in alleged contravention of the law or the Constitution. It is readily apparent that there is no exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending power. The PCCR was created by the President by virtue of E.O. No. 43, as amended by E.O. No. 70. Under section 7 of E.O. No. 43, the amount of P3 million is “appropriated” for its operational expenses “to be sourced from the funds of the Office of the President.” Being that case, petitioner must show that he is a real party in interest - that he will stand to be benefited or injured by the judgment or that he will be entitled to the avails of the suit. Nowhere in his pleadings does petitioner presume to make such a representation.

CHAVEZ VS PCGG

FACTS:

Petitioner asks this Court to define the nature and the extent of the peoples constitutional right to information on matters of public concern. Does this right include access to the terms of government negotiations prior to their consummation or conclusion? May the government, through the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), be required to reveal the proposed terms of a compromise agreement with the Marcos heirs as regards their alleged ill-gotten wealth? More specifically, are the General Agreement and Supplemental Agreement, both dated December 28, 1993 and executed between the PCGG and the Marcos heirs, valid and binding?

Petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, as taxpayer, citizen and former government official who initiated the prosecution of the Marcoses and their cronies who committed unmitigated plunder of the public treasury and the systematic subjugation of the countrys economy, alleges that what impelled him to bring this action were several news reports[2] bannered in a number of broadsheets sometime in September 1997. These news items referred to (1) the alleged discovery of billions of dollars of Marcos assets deposited in various coded accounts in Swiss banks; and (2) the reported execution of a compromise, between the government (through PCGG) and the Marcos heirs, on how to split or share these assets.

Petitioner, invoking his constitutional right to information[3] and the correlative duty of the state to disclose publicly all its transactions involving the national interest,[4] demands that respondents make public any and all negotiations and agreements pertaining to PCGGs task of recovering the Marcoses ill-gotten wealth. He claims that any compromise on the alleged billions of ill-gotten wealth involves an issue of paramount public interest, since it has a debilitating effect on the countrys economy that would be greatly prejudicial to the national interest of the Filipino people. Hence, the people in general have a right to know the transactions or deals being contrived and effected by the government.

Respondents, on the other hand, do not deny forging a compromise agreement with the Marcos heirs. They claim, though, that petitioners action is premature, because there is no showing that he has asked the PCGG to disclose the negotiations and the Agreements. And even if he has, PCGG

may not yet be compelled to make any disclosure, since the proposed terms and conditions of the Agreements have not become effective and binding.

Acting on a motion of petitioner, the Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order[10] dated March 23, 1998, enjoining respondents, their agents and/or representatives from entering into, or perfecting and/or executing any agreement with the heirs of the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos relating to and concerning their ill-gotten wealth.

ISSUE: WON this Court could require the PCGG to disclose to the public the details of any agreement, perfected or not, with the Marcoses.

RULING AND RATIO:

YES. Considering the intent of the framers of the Constitution, we believe that it is incumbent upon the PCGG and its officers, as well as other government representatives, to disclose sufficient public information on any proposed settlement they have decided to take up with the ostensible owners and holders of ill-gotten wealth. Such information, though, must pertain to definite propositions of the government, not necessarily to intra-agency or inter-agency recommendations or communications[44] during the stage when common assertions are still in the process of being formulated or are in the exploratory stage. There is a need, of course, to observe the same restrictions on disclosure of information in general, as discussed earlier -- such as on matters involving national security, diplomatic or foreign relations, intelligence and other classified information.

In seeking the public disclosure of negotiations and agreements pertaining to a compromise settlement with the Marcoses as regards their alleged ill-gotten wealth, petitioner invokes the following provisions of the Constitution:

Sec. 7 [Article III]. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.

Sec. 28 [Article II]. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.

Respondents opposite view is that the above constitutional provisions refer to completed and operative official acts, not to those still being considered. As regards the assailed Agreements entered into by the PCGG with the Marcoses, there is yet no right of action that has accrued, because said Agreements have not been approved by the President, and the Marcos heirs have failed to fulfill their express undertaking therein. Thus, the Agreements have not become effective. Respondents add that they are not aware of any ongoing negotiation for another compromise with the Marcoses regarding their alleged ill-gotten assets.

The information and the transactions referred to in the subject provisions of the Constitution have as yet no defined scope and extent. There are no specific laws prescribing the exact limitations within which the right may be exercised or the correlative state duty may be obliged. However, the following are some of the recognized restrictions: (1) national security matters and intelligence information, (2) trade secrets and banking transactions, (3) criminal matters, and (4) other confidential information.

Limitations to the Right: (1) National Security Matters

At the very least, this jurisdiction recognizes the common law holding that there is a governmental privilege against public disclosure with respect to state secrets regarding military, diplomatic and other national security matters.[24] But where there is no need to protect such state secrets, the privilege may not be invoked to withhold documents and other information,[25] provided that they are examined in strict confidence and given scrupulous protection.

Likewise, information on inter-government exchanges prior to the conclusion of treaties and executive agreements may be subject to reasonable safeguards for the sake of national interest.[26]

(2) Trade Secrets and Banking Transactions

The drafters of the Constitution also unequivocally affirmed that, aside from national security matters and intelligence information, trade or industrial secrets (pursuant to the Intellectual Property Code[27]and other related laws) as well as banking transactions (pursuant to the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act[28]) are also exempted from compulsory disclosure.[29]

(3) Criminal Matters

Also excluded are classified law enforcement matters, such as those relating to the apprehension, the prosecution and the detention of criminals,[30] which courts may not inquire into prior to such arrest, detention and prosecution. Efforts at effective law enforcement would be seriously jeopardized by free public access to, for example, police information regarding rescue operations, the whereabouts of fugitives, or leads on covert criminal activities.

(4) Other Confidential Information

The Ethical Standards Act[31] further prohibits public officials and employees from using or divulging confidential or classified information officially known to them by reason of their office and not made available to the public.[32]

Other acknowledged limitations to information access include diplomatic correspondence, closed door Cabinet meetings and executive sessions of either house of Congress, as well as the internal deliberations of the Supreme Court.[33]

Scope: Matters of Public Concern and Transactions Involving Public Interest

In Valmonte v. Belmonte Jr.,[34] the Court emphasized that the information sought must be matters of public concern, access to which may be limited by law. Similarly, the state policy of full public disclosure extends only to

transactions involving public interest and may also be subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law. As to the meanings of the terms public interest and public concern, the Court, in Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission,[35] elucidated:

In determining whether or not a particular information is of public concern there is no rigid test which can be applied. Public concern like public interest is a term that eludes exact definition. Both terms embrace a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know, either because these directly affect their lives, or simply because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen. In the final analysis, it is for the courts to determine on a case by case basis whether the matter at issue is of interest or importance, as it relates to or affects the public.

Considered a public concern in the above-mentioned case was the legitimate concern of citizens to ensure that government positions requiring civil service eligibility are occupied only by persons who are eligibles. So was the need to give the general public adequate notification of various laws that regulate and affect the actions and conduct of citizens, as held in Taada. Likewise did the public nature of the loanable funds of the GSIS and the public office held by the alleged borrowers (members of the defunct Batasang Pambansa) qualify the information sought in Valmonte as matters of public interest and concern. In Aquino-Sarmiento v. Morato,[36] the Court also held that official acts of public officers done in pursuit of their official functions are public in character; hence, the records pertaining to such official acts and decisions are within the ambit of the constitutional right of access to public records.

From the foregoing disquisition, it is crystal clear to the Court that the General and Supplemental Agreements, both dated December 28, 1993, which the PCGG entered into with the Marcos heirs, are violative of the Constitution and the laws aforementioned.

Vda de Urbano v GSIS (2001)

Facts

In 1971, petitioners mortgaged their 200 sqm property in Q.C. to Gsis to secure a housing loan. Since they were unable to pay the loan, GSIS foreclosed the mortgage in 1988. GSIS bid 154k on the property and emerged as the highest bidder.

In 1984, the petitioners tried to reclaim their property. They wrote to the GSIS Acquired Assets Department signifying their intent to reclaim. On October 16, GSIS told them to pay the redemption price of 154k in full before Nov 18, 1984.

The petitioners asked for more time to recover the property while the Acquired Assets Dpeartment subsequently told them to pay 174k in cash with an extension of 30 days to the November date. Failure to do so forfeited the reclamation of the property and sold in a public bidding.

The petitioners wrote again requesting for remortgage through repurchase of the property. The Gsis AAD declined.

The petitioners wrote to the Board for an approval to file a loan worth 240,000 with the GSIS real estate department to repurchase their foreclosed property. Despite attempts from Vice Governor Mathay to adjust to a more liberal arrangement for the petitioners, the the petitioners were unable to pay. GSIS then issued a TCT in its favor.

The respondent De La Cruz entered the picture and offered to purchase the property for 250,000 spot cash. Without knowledge of the rival offer, the petitioners then offered a 50,000 downpayment with the 124k balance to be paid in 5 years.  He also enclosed 10k in check as earnest money. The Board informed them that it had adopted reolution 881 that declined their offer to repurchase.

At the same time, GSIS negotiated with Dela Cruz for the purchase of the property. They accepted her offer of purchase. A new TCT was issued to her.

The petitioners, on the other hand, had their loan request rescinded because a certificate of award or sale was not issued in favor of the applicant. Moreover, the applicant, Urbano the petitioner, was 81 years old and no longer a member of the GSIS. It wasn’t given due consideration.

Having learned about the transaction with dela Cruz, the petitioners  requested the formal investigation with the GSIS regarding the sale. Not satisfied, they filed a case with the RTC of QC branch 102.

The petition was dismissed. The same view was upheld by the court of appeals.

Hence this petition.

Issues:

1. Do petitioners have a right to repurchase the subject property?

2. Does GSIS have a duty to dispose of the subject property through public bidding?

3. Was Gsis in bad faith in dealing with petitioners?

Ruling: Petition Dismissed

Ratio:

1. No

Charter of the GSIS was PD 1146 which stipulated the power of the GSIS to acquire, utilize, and dispose of real or personal properties in the Philippines or elsewhere. It was amended by PD 1981 which gave the GSIS the power to compromise or release any claim or settled liability to the system.

SC- The laws granted the GSIS Board the power to exercise discretion in determining the terms and condition of financial accommodations to its members with the dual purpose of making the GSIS more responsive  to the needs of GSIS members.  The laws also stipulated that the Board could exercise discretion on whether to accept or reject petitioner’s offer to repurchase the subject property taking into account the dual purpose enunciated in the whereas clause of PD 1981 which made the GSIS more responsive to the needs of its members.

With regard to the Board’s exercise of discretion, in Natino v IAC,  the Court also held that repurchase of foreclosed property after redemption period imposes no such obligation on the purchaser  (the board in this case) to re-sell the property since the property belongs to him (the board as well)

The board’s denial of petitioner’s request to purchase the subject property was not based on whim but on a factual assessment of the financial capacity of the petitioners to make good their repeated offers to purchase the subject property. Based on the circumstances, the petitioners were repeatedly unable to fulfill their obligations to pay. In the comments of the AAD manager, the observation was that the petitioners lacked the capacity to pay up.

The petitioners are not entitled to a request for repurchase as a matter of right. The Board exercised its discretion in accordance with law in denying their requests and the GSIS can’t be faulted for their failure to repurchase as it acted under the petitioner’s application under Operation Pabahay. The sale to respondent can’t be annulled on such invoked “right”.

2. No. The agreement with de la Cruz was valid.

Pets.- aver that Sec. 79 of PD 1445 and the COA Circular 86-264 mandated the GSIS to dispose of the assets through public bidding and only upon its failure, through a public sale.

GSIS contended that SEC 79 of PD 1445 did not apply because it covered unserviceable govt property and not acquired assets.

SC- Gsis was right. Why? The provision (SEC 79) applies only to unserviceable govt property or those no longer needed. The house was obviously not unserviceable. And it was still used by petitioners.

With regard to COA Circular 86-264 or the “General guidelines on the divestment or disposal of assets of government owned corporations” the law stipulated that it availed of an exception to the requirement of disposition through public bidding and such exception applied to sales of merchandise held for sale in the regular course of business.  The Court read it in relation to Coa circular 89-296 which provided for  “Audit Guidelines on the Disposal of Property and other Assets of Government Agencies”, which also did not apply the public bidding disposal requirement to merchandise or inventory held for sale in the regular course of business nor to the disposal by gov’t financial institutions of foreclosed assets or collaterals acquired in the regular course of business and not transferred to the Govt under proclamation no 50.

The modes of disposal included Public auction and sale thru negotiation.

Doctrine: With regard to these 2 laws, the Court held  the question whether the subject property was covered by the said Circular or falls under its exception. It held that 89-296 was to be interpreted with 86-264 in adherence with stat con wherein statutes that relate to the same thing ought to be taken in consideration in construing any one of them, and it is an established rule of law that all acts in pari material are to be taken together as if they were one law.

Moreover, the court looked into the intent of both laws and held that these were used to generate more revenue for GOCC’S through the disposition of its non-preforming assets. (Look into PD 50 or the asset privatization trust in the case) According to the court, the policy intent on the disposition of acquired assets then governed the case at bar.

Was the property covered by the public bidding exceptions in these laws? The court said yes, which meant that their sale negotiation fell under the regular course of business, and thus did not offend the requirements of the said coa circulars.   

3. No.

GSIS denial of petitioners’ further requests for repurchase of subject property was based on a factual determination of the petitioners’ financial capacity

and the GSIS charter, PD 1146. Also, GSIS sold the property to dela Cruz only after giving them one year to repurchase.

The petitioners, on the strength of the Valmonte case, can’t also impute bad faith on GSIS when it was secretly negotiating with Dela Cruz. In the Valmonte case, the court held that the constitutional right to information was limited to matters of public concern to transactions involving public interest.The sale of the property was not imbued by public interests as it was a purely private transaction. Pets. Can’t  demand to be informed of such public negotiation since they had no interest on the subject property since they failed to comply with the GSIS terms of repurchase and the denial to repurchase under the GSIS terms.

SECTION 8Section 8. The right of the people, including those

employed in the public and private sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law

shall not be abridged.

LIRAG TEXTILE MILLS VS BLANCO & CIR

FACTS:

Submitted for review is the Resolution of the Court of Industrial Relations en banc affirming the Decision in Case No. 4219-ULP finding petitioner Lirag Textile Mills, Inc. (LITEX, for brevity) to have committed an unfair labor practice act in dismissing its employee, respondent Epifanio D. Blanco, for union activities and ordering his restatement with back wages.

The records disclose that since 1957 there had existed in LITEX a union known as Litex Employees Association (LEA, for short). Private respondent Epifanio D. Blanco, who was employed by LITEX on April 3, 1959, joined that union a few months thereafter. On January 2, 1960, LEA entered into its first collective bargaining agreement with LITEX for a period of two (2) years, which was subsequently renewed for three (3) years, or up to March 31, 1965. The agreement contained a closed-shop provision as follows:

Section 1. Union Security. — The COMPANY recognizes the UNION AS THE SOLE and exclusive collective bargaining representative of all its employees and/or members.

Section 2. Union Shop. — It is mutually agreed between the COMPANY and the UNION that newly-hired employees on probationary basis in accordance with Section 2, Article III of this AGREEMENT, are required as a condition or prerequisite of continued employment on a regular basis to join and be member of the UNION in good standing. It is a continuing condition of employment with the COMPANY that employees coming under this AGREEMENT should be and must remain as good standing members of the UNION. The UNION therefore may from time to time recommend to the COMPANY, the separation from the service of any of its members for reasons that he or she is no longer a member of the UNION in good standing. Accordingly, those losing their membership in the UNION could not be retained in the employ of the COMPANY.

The constitution and by-laws of the union also provided, inter alia:

Sec. 5, Art. III — Expulsion — By a majority vote of the Board of Officers, including the President's, any member of the union may be expelled therefrom for any of the following grounds:

1. Being affiliated with other labor union.

2. Refusal to obey constitution and by-laws and the duly enacted rules and regulations of the union.

3. Acts prejudicial to the interest of the union and/or its members.

xxx xxx xxx

Sometime in January, 1964, BLANCO and several employees organized the Confederation of Industrial and Allied Labor Organization (CIALO). On April 1, 1964, CIALO filed a petition for certification election at LITEX before the Court of Industrial Relations (Case No. 1332-MC) The petition was dismissed, however, and said Court certified LEA as the sole bargaining representative of the rank and file employees of LITEX. 2

In the same month of April, 1964, LEA's grievance committee conducted an investigation of its members suspected of having joined CIALO.

On April 24, 1964, BLANCO was dismissed by LITEX for violation of company rules and regulations.

On April 27, 1964, LEA addressed a letter to LITEX recommending the immediate dismissal of 18 members named therein, who had been found to have violated the Union's constitution and by laws and the Revised Collective Bargaining Agreement by joining CIALO. BLANCO's name was not included in the list presumably because he had been dismissed by the company on April 24, 1964, or three days before.

On October 17, 1966, the Court of Industrial Relations rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, in the case of complainant Epifanio Blanco, the court finds respondents to have violated the Industrial Peace Act and hereby orders them to cease and desist from committing the censurable acts herein found, to reinstate him to his former or equivalent position without loss of seniority and other privileges, and to pay him backwages at the rate of fifty (50) per cent from the time of his dismissal up to his reinstatement.

With respect to all the other complainants, for lack of merit and insufficiency of evidence, the complaint is hereby DISMISSED.

Respondent court rationalized its holding in respect of BLANCO, thus:

Exhibit "A — Blanco", an unobjected piece of material evidence, shows beyond doubt that the consequent act of respondent company interfered with the exercise of the employee's right to self-organization. Blanco was not even investigated by the company to find out whether or not he did refuse to be searched, as this is the only regulation alleged to have been violated (Exhibit "A-Blanco"). Under the circumstances, the concurrence of other grounds, stale as they were, reeks with pretext and cannot justify the dismissal. It is

explicitly clear that the prevailing reason for his separation from the service was his union activities.

ISSUE:

WON the Respondent Court erred in holding that the dismissal of respondent Epifanio Blanco for violation of company rules was an unfair labor practice just because the violation was at the same time a union activity, and in justifying this holding to consider a just warning for inefficiency and post violations for misconduct for which he was warned the first time, and for subsequent misconducts for which he was twice suspended, as a result of which he was given a definite last warning, as "stale" grounds although the last violation for which he was dismissed occurred within nine (9) months from the time the definite last warning was issued to him.

RULING AND RATIO:

YES. The Court has held that closed-shop is a valid form of union security and such provision in a collective bargaining agreement is not a restriction of the right of freedom of association guaranteed by the Constitution. 10 Respondent Court upheld the validity of the closed-shop agreement of LEA and LITEX, when it ruled as legal the dismissal of complainants except respondent, pursuant thereto. Respondent Court should have also upheld as legal the separation from the service of BLANCO on the same ground in the face of evidence that he committed the same violation.

There is no justifiable reason to single out BLANCO. He was in an Identical position as the five other complainants. If his name was not included in the list of 18 employees recommended for dismissal it was because he had been dismissed three days before by the company. And if he had not been dismissed by the company, his dismissal would have been demanded by LEA considering that he was one of those investigated by LEA's grievance committee which had approved the recommendation to dismiss them on the charge of being members of another union. In fact, in paragraph 4 of the Complaint (supra) BLANCO made common cause with the other complainants for having been dismissed "for no other reason than their willingness to join the CIALO union and/or affiliation therein and union activities so as to discourage membership thereto ... ." BLANCO admitted his affiliation with CIALO. There is evidence, too, that he, together with his co-employees organized a rival union, CIALO, in contravention of the collective bargaining agreement and the constitution and by-laws of LEA, of which they were then members. These acts of BLANCO and his co-workers of organizing a rival union and distributing leaflets and propaganda papers,

clearly constituted a ground for expulsion under Section 5 of LEA's constitution and by-laws, quoted hereinabove.

It is noteworthy that one of the grounds of dismissal cited by LITEX in its letter of April 23, 1964 was BLANCO's refusal to be searched upon entrance at the company gate in violation of company rules and regulations.

It is true that BLANCO denied that he refused to be searched. 17 Even granting, however, that he could not be dismissed on the ground of refusal to be searched for lack of sufficient proof, he can still be legally dismissed for his affiliation with CIALO which is specifically prohibited by the CBA and the Constitution and by-laws of LEA, in respect of which, evidence had been satisfactorily adduced.

BEL AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION VS DIONISIO

FACTS:

On January 22, 1972, plaintiff filed a complaint against the defendant in the municipal court of Makati, Rizal, for the collection of the amount of P 2,100 plus penalty of 12% per annum and P 751.30 as attorney's fees and expenses of litigation. The sum of P 2,100 represents the association dues assessed on the lot owned by the defendant as member of the plaintiff association. On February 16, 1972, defendant filed an answer traversing all the material allegations of the complaint and set up the following special defenses; 1) That there is no privity of contract between the plaintiff and the defendant; 2) that the collection of alleged dues from its members is in reality an unlawful exercise of the power of taxation which is beyond the corporate power of the plaintiff, 3) that the amount sought to be collected is unreasonable and oppressive, 4) that the assessment of the dues upon the defendant in so far as he has not voluntarily affiliated with plaintiff is illegal, immoral, contrary to law and public policy, and 5) that the acts of plaintiff in compelling the defendant to be a member is unconstitutional and outside the scope of its corporate power. Defendant therefore sets up the counterclaim of P 2,000 as attorney's fees and expenses of litigation. On May 19, 1972, the parties submitted the following stipulation of facts and prayed for judgment to be rendered therein in accordance with said stipulation of facts:

2. That the By-laws of the association, copy of which as amended is attached hereto as Annex 'B', provides for automatic membership in

the association for every owner and purchaser of lots located inside the Bel Air Village as defined and bounded in the Articles of Incorporation;

3. That without applying for membership in plaintiff association, defendant in this case, like the other members, automatically became a member because he is the registered owner of a lot located inside the Bel Air Village;

ISSUE: WON the lien of the property collides with the constitutional guarantee of freedom of association.

WON the petitioner is bound by such annotation in the TCT No. 81136.

RULING AND RATIO:

I. NO. The contention that this lien collides with the constitutional guarantee of freedom of association is not tenable. The transaction between the defendants and the original seller (defendant's immediate predecessor) of the land covered by TCT No. 81136 is a sale and the conditions have been validly imposed by the said vendor/the same not being contrary to law, morals and good customs and public policy. The fact that it has been approved by the Land Registration Commission did not make it a governmental act subject to the constitutional restriction against infringement of the right of association. The constitutional proscription that no person can be compelled to be a member of an association against his will applies only to government acts and not to private transactions like the one in question.

The defendant cannot legally maintain that he is compelled to be a member of the association against his will because the limitation is imposed upon his ownership of property. If he does not desire to comply with the annotation or lien in question he can at any time exercise his inviolable freedom of disposing of the property and free himself from the burden of becoming a member of the plaintiff association. After all, it is not imposed upon him personally but upon his ownership of the property. The

limitation and restriction is a limitation that follows the land whoever is its owner. It does not inhere in the person of the defendant.

The Court therefore holds that the lien or encumbrance or limitation imposed upon TCT No. 81136 is valid.

II. YES. There is no dispute that Transfer Certificate of Title No. 81136 covering the subject parcel of land issued in the name of the petitioner contains an annotation to the effect that the lot owner becomes an automatic member of the respondent Bel-Air Association and must abide by such rules and regulations laid down by the Association in the interest of the sanitation, security and the general welfare of the community. It is likewise not disputed that the provision on automatic membership was expressly annotated on the petitioner's Transfer Certificate of Title and on the title of his predecessor-in-interest.

When the petitioner voluntarily bought the subject parcel of land it was understood that he took the same free of all encumbrances except notations at the back of the certificate of title, among them, that he automatically becomes a member of the respondent association.One of the obligations of a member of the respondent association is to pay certain amounts for the operation and activities of the association which is being collected by the Board of Governors.

The mode of payment as well as the purposes for which the dues are intended clearly indicate that the dues are not in the concept of a property tax as claimed by the petitioner. They are shares in the common expenses for necessary services. A property tax is assessed according to the value of the property (Philippine Transit Association v. Treasurer of the City of Manila, et al. 83 Phil. 722 [1949]) but the basis of the sharing in this case is the area of the lot. The basis appears reasonable. The dues are fees which a member of the respondent association is required to pay as his contribution to the expenses incurred by the respondent association in hiring security guards, cleaning and maintaining streets, street lights and other community projects for the benefit of all residents within the Bel-Air Village. These expenses are necessary, valid, and reasonable for the particular community involved.