digest pil cases

7/22/2019 Digest PIL Cases

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May 2, 1997 (272 SCRA 18)

Petitioners: Taada and Coseteng as members of the Senate and taxpayers, et. al.

Respondents: Angara and Romulo, et. al.

Facts:

- April 15, 1994: Respondent Rizalino Navarro, then Sec. of the Department of Trade and Industry, representing the

Government of the Republic of the Philippines, signed in Marrakesh, Morocco, the Final Act Embodying the Results of

the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Negotiations (Final Act).

- On December 14, 1994, the Philippine Senate adopted Resolution No. 97 which Resolved, as it is hereby resolved, that

the Senate concur, as it hereby concurs, in the ratification by the President of the Philippines (Fidel V. Ramos) of the

Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization.

- The WTO Agreement ratified by the President of the Philippines is composed of the Agreement Proper and the

associated legal instruments included in Annexes one (1), two (2) and three (3) of that Agreement which are integral

parts thereof.

- The Final Act signed by Secretary Navarro embodies not only the WTO Agreement (and its integral annexes

aforementioned) but also (1) the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions and (2) the Understanding on Commitments in

Financial Services.

- Instant petition was filed: nullification of the Philippine ratification of the WTO Agreement.

Issue: Whether or not the provisions of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization and the Agreements

and Associated Legal Instruments included in Annexes one (1), two (2) and three (3) of that agreement cited by

petitioners directly contravene or undermine the letter, spirit and intent of Section 19, Article II and Sections 10 and 12,

Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.

Sec. 19. The State shall develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos.

Sec. 10. x x x. The Congress shall enact measures that will encourage the formation and operation of enterprises whos

capital is wholly owned by Filipinos. In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and

patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.

Sec. 12. The State shall promote the preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced goods,

and adopt measures that help make them competitive.


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PIMENTEL VS. EXEC SECRETARY

G.R. No. 158088, July 6, 2005

ROME STATUTE

Signing of Treaty vs. Ratification

Significance of Ratification

Who has power to ratify

FACTS:

The Rome Statute established the ICC which shall have the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most

serious crimes of international concern xxx and shall be complementary to the national criminal jurisdictions. The

Philippines, through Charge d Affairs Enrique A. Manalo of the Philippine Mission to the UN, signed the Rome Statuteon

Dec. 28, 2000. Its provisions, however, require that it be subject to ratification, acceptance or approval of the signatory

states. Petitioners now file this petition to compel the Office of the President to transmit the signed copy of the Rome

Statute to the Senate for its concurrence.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Executive Secretary and the DFA have a ministerial duty to transmit to the Senate the copy of the

Rome Statute

HELD:

We rule in the negative.

In our system of government, the President, being the head of state, is regarded as the sole organ and authority in

external relations and is the countrys sole representative with foreign nations. As thechief architect of foreign policy,

the President acts as the countrys mouthpiece with respect to international affairs. Hence, the President is vested with

the authority to deal with foreign states and governments, extend or withhold recognition, maintain diplomaticrelations, enter into treaties, and otherwise transact the business of foreign relations. In the realm of treaty-making, the

President has the sole authority to negotiate with other states.

Nonetheless, while the President has the sole authority to negotiate and enter into treaties, the Constitution provides a

limitation to his power by requiring the concurrence of 2/3 of all the members of the Senate for the validity of the treaty

entered into by him. Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides that no treaty or internationalagreement

shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.


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The participation of the legislative branch in the treaty-making process was deemed essential to provide a check on the

executive in the field of foreign relations. By requiring the concurrence of the legislature in the treaties entered into by

the President, the Constitution ensures a healthy system of checks and balance necessary in the nations pursuit of

political maturity and growth.

Signing vs. Ratification of Treaty

It should be underscored that the signing of the treaty and the ratification are two separate and distinct steps in thetreaty-making process. As earlier discussed, the signature is primarily intended as a means of authenticating the

instrument and as a symbol of the good faith of the parties. It is usually performed by the states authorized

representative in the diplomatic mission. Ratification, on the other hand, is the formal act by which a state confirms and

accepts the provisions of a treaty concluded by its representative. It is generally held to be an executive act, undertaken

by the head of the state or of the government.

Purpose of Ratification

Petitioners submission that the Philippines is bound under treaty law and international law to ratify the treaty which it

has signed is without basis. The signature does not signify the final consent of the state to the treaty. It is the ratificationthat binds the state to the provisions thereof. In fact, the Rome Statute itself requires that the signature of the

representatives of the states be subject to ratification, acceptance or approval of the signatory states. Ratification is the

act by which the provisions of a treaty are formally confirmed and approved by a State. By ratifying a treaty signed in its

behalf, a state expresses its willingness to be bound by the provisions of such treaty. After the treaty is signed by the

states representative, the President, being accountable to the people, is burdened with the responsibility and the duty

to carefully study the contents of the treaty and ensure that they are not inimical to the interest of the state and its

people. Thus, the President has the discretion even after the signing of the treaty by the Philippine representative

whether or not to ratify the same. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties does not contemplate to defeat or

even restrain this power of the head of states. If that were so, the requirement of ratification of treaties would be

pointless and futile. It has been held that a state has no legal or even moral duty to ratify a treaty which has been signedby its plenipotentiaries. There is no legal obligation to ratify a treaty, but it goes without saying that the refusal must be

based on substantial grounds and not on superficial or whimsical reasons. Otherwise, the other state would be justified

in taking offense.

President has the Power to Ratify Treaties

It should be emphasized that under our Constitution, the power to ratify is vested in the President, subject to the

concurrence of the Senate. The role of the Senate, however, is limited only to giving or withholding its consent, or

concurrence, to the ratification. Hence, it is within the authority of the President to refuse to submit a treaty to the

Senate or, having secured its consent for its ratification, refuse to ratify it. Although the refusal of a state to ratify a

treaty which has been signed in its behalf is a serious step that should not be taken lightly, such decision is within the

competence of the President alone, which cannot be encroached by this Court via a writ of mandamus. This Court has

no jurisdiction over actions seeking to enjoin the President in the performance of his official duties. The Court,

therefore, cannot issue the writ of mandamus prayed for by the petitioners as it is beyond its jurisdiction to compel the

executive branch of the government to transmit the signed text of Rome Statute to the Senate.


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International Law and the Constitutionality of the Milk Code of the Philippines

In the very fresh en banc constitutional case of PHARMACEUTICAL and HEALTH CARE ASSOCIATION of the PHILIPPINES

vs. HEALTH SECRETARY FRANCISCO T. DUQUE III, et. al., G.R. NO. 173034, October 9, 2007, the Philippine Supreme

Court PARTIALLY GRANTED the petition by declaring NULL AND VOID Sections 4(f), 11 and 46 ofAdministrative Order No

2006-0012, dated May 12, 2006, for beingultra vires and prohibited the Department of Health from implementing the

said provisions.

With regard to the issue of whether petitioner may prosecute the case as the real party-in-interest, the Court held that

the modern view is that an association has standing to complain of injuries to its members. This view fuses the legal

identity of an association with that of its members. An association has standing to file suit for its workers despite its lack

of direct interest if its members are affected by the action. An organization has standing to assert the concerns of its

constituents.

Petitioner assails the RIRR for allegedly going beyond the provisions of the Milk Code, thereby amending and expanding

the coverage of said law. The defense of the DOH is that the RIRR implements not only the Milk Code but also various

international instruments regarding infant and young child nutrition. It is respondents' position that said international

instruments are deemed part of the law of the land and therefore the DOH may implement them through the RIRR.

The Court however held that the international instruments invoked by respondents, namely, (1) The United Nations

Convention on the Rights of the Child; (2) The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; and (3)

the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, only provide in general terms that

steps must be taken by State Parties to diminish infant and child mortality and inform society of the advantages of

breastfeeding, ensure the health and well-being of families, and ensure that women are provided with services and

nutrition in connection with pregnancy and lactation; however, they do not contain specific provisions regarding the use

or marketing of breastmilk substitutes. The international instruments that have specific provisions regarding breastmilk

substitutes are the ICMBS and various WHA Resolutions.

Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the sphere of domestic law either

by transformation or incorporation. The transformation method requires that an international law be transformed into a

domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation. The incorporation method applies when, by

mere constitutional declaration, international law is deemed to have the force of domestic law.


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Treaties become part of the law of the land through transformationpursuant to Article VII, Section 21 of the

Constitution which provides that*n+o treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in

by at least two-thirds of all the members of the Senate.Thus, treaties or conventional international law must go

through a process prescribed by the Constitution for it to be transformed into municipal law that can be applied to

domestic conflicts.

The Court held that the ICMBS and WHA Resolutions are not treaties as they have not been concurred in by at least two

thirds of all members of the Senate as required under Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.

However, according to the Court, the ICMBS which was adopted by the WHA in 1981 had been transformed into

domestic law through local legislation, the Milk Code. Consequently, it is the Milk Code that has the force and effect of

law in this jurisdiction and not the ICMBS per se. The Milk Code is almost a verbatim reproduction of the ICMBS, but the

Court noted that the Milk Code did not adopt the provision in the ICMBS absolutely prohibiting advertising or other

forms of promotion to the general public of products within the scope of the ICMBS. Instead, the Milk Code expressly

provides that advertising, promotion, or other marketing materials may be allowed if such materials are duly authorized

and approved by the Inter-Agency Committee (IAC).

Section 2, Article II of the 1987 Constitution provides that the Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national

policy, adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the landand adheres to the

policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity with all nations. The provisions embodies

the incorporationmethod.

Generally accepted principles of international law, by virtue of the incorporation clause of the Constitution, form part of

the laws of the land even if they do not derive from treaty obligations. The classical formulation in international law sees

those customary rules accepted as bindingresult from the combination of two elements: the established, widespread,

and consistent practice on the part of States; and apsychological element known as the opinion juris sive

necessitates(opinion as to law or necessity). Implicit in the latter element is a belief that the practice in question is

rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it.

Generally accepted principles of international law refers to norms of general or customary international law which are

binding on all states, i.e., renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy, the principle of sovereign immunity, a

person's right to life, liberty and due process, andpacta sunt servanda, among others. The concept of generally

accepted principles of law has also been depicted in this wise:

Customary international means a general and consistentpractice of states followed by them from a sense of legal

obligation *opinio juris+.This statement contains the two basic elements of custom: the material factor, that is, how

states behave, and the psychological or subjective factor, that is, why they behave the way they do. The initial factor for

determining the existence of custom is the actual behavior of states. This includes several elements: duration,


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consistency, and generality of the practice of states. Once the existence of state practice has been established, it

becomes necessary to determine why states behave the way they do. Do states behave the way they do because they

consider it obligatory to behave thus or do they do it only as a matter of courtesy? Opinio juris, or the belief that a

certain form of behavior is obligatory, is what makes practice an international rule. Without it, practice is not law.

It is propounded that WHA Resolutions may constitute soft law or non-binding norms, principles and practices that

influence state behavior. Soft law does not fall into any of the categories of international law set forth in Article 38,

Chapter III of the 1946 Statute of the International Court of Justice.It is, however, an expression of non-binding norms,

principles, and practices that influence state behavior. Certain declarations and resolutions of the UN General Assembly

fall under this category. The most notable is the UN Declaration of Human Rights, which this Court has enforced in

various cases, specifically, Government of Hongkong Special Administrative Region v. Olalia,Mejoff v. Director of

Prisons, Mijares v. Raada and Shangri-la International Hotel Management, Ltd. v. Developers Group of Companies, Inc.

The Court stressed that for an international rule to be considered as customary law, it must be established that such rule

is being followed by states because they consider it obligatory to comply with such rules (opinio juris). However,

according to the Court, the respondents have not presented any evidence to prove that the WHA Resolutions, althoughsigned by most of the member states, were in fact enforced or practiced by at least a majority of the member states;

neither have respondents proven that any compliance by member states with said WHA Resolutions was obligatory in

nature. Respondents failed to establish that the provisions of pertinent WHA Resolutions are customary international

law that may be deemed part of the law of the land. Consequently, legislation is necessary to transform the provisions o

the WHA Resolutions into domestic law. The provisions of the WHA Resolutions cannot be considered as part of the law

of the land that can be implemented by executive agencies without the need of a law enacted by the legislature.

May the DOH may implement the provisions of the WHA Resolutions by virtue of its powers and functions under the

Revised Administrative Code even in the absence of a domestic law?

Section 3, Chapter 1, Title IX of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987 provides that the DOH shall define the national

health policy and implement a national health plan within the framework of the government's general policies and

plans, and issue orders and regulations concerning the implementation of established health policies.

The crucial issue was whether the absolute prohibition on advertising and other forms of promotion of breastmilk

substitutes provided in some WHA Resolutions has been adopted as part of the national health policy.

Respondents submit that the national policy on infant and young child feeding is embodied in A.O. No. 2005-0014, dated

May 23, 2005. Basically, the Administrative Order declared the following policy guidelines: (1) ideal breastfeeding


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practices, such as early initiation of breastfeeding, exclusive breastfeeding for the first six months, extended

breastfeeding up to two years and beyond; (2) appropriate complementary feeding, which is to start at age six months;

(3) micronutrient supplementation; (4) universal salt iodization; (5) the exercise of other feeding options; and (6) feeding

in exceptionally difficult circumstances. Indeed, the primacy of breastfeeding for children is emphasized as a national

health policy. However, nowhere in A.O. No. 2005-0014 is it declared that as part of such health policy, the

advertisement or promotion of breastmilk substitutes should be absolutely prohibited. Hence, the Court held that the

national policy of protection, promotion and support of breastfeeding cannot automatically be equated with a total ban

on advertising for breastmilk substitutes.The Milk Code does not contain a total ban on the advertising and promotion obreastmilk substitutes but instead specifically creates an IAC which will regulate said advertising and promotion. A total

ban policy could be implemented only pursuant to a law amending the Milk Code passed by the constitutionally

authorized branch of government, the legislature. The Court emphasized that only the provisions of the Milk Code,

but not those of subsequent WHA Resolutions, can be validly implemented by the DOH through the subject RIRR.

The Court held that the Sec. 3 of the Milk Code's coverage is not limited only to children 0-12 months old. Section 3 of

the Milk Code. The coverage of the Milk Code is not dependent on the age of the child but on thekind of product being

marketed to the public. The law treats infant formula, bottle-fed complementary food, and breastmilk substitute as

separate and distinct product categories.

Section 4(h) of the Milk Code defines infant formula as a breastmilk substitute x x xto satisfy the normal nutritional

requirements of infants up to between four to six months of age, and adapted to their physiological characteristics;

while under Section 4(b), bottle-fed complementary food refers to any food, whether manufactured or locally

prepared, suitable as a complement to breastmilk or infant formula, when either becomes insufficient to satisfy the

nutritional requirements of the infant. An infant under Section 4(e) is a person falling within the age bracket 0-12months. It is the nourishment of this group of infants or children aged 0-12 months that is sought to be promoted and

protected by the Milk Code.

But there is another target group. Breastmilk substitute is defined under Section 4(a) as any food being marketed or

otherwise presented as a partial or total replacement for breastmilk, whether or not suitable for that purpose.This

section conspicuously lacks reference to any particular age-group of children. Hence, the provision of the Milk Code

cannot be considered exclusive for children aged 0-12 months. In other words, breastmilk substitutes may also be

intended for young children more than 12 months of age. Therefore, by regulating breastmilk substitutes, the Milk Codealso intends to protect and promote the nourishment of children more than 12 months old. Evidently, as long as what is

being marketed falls within the scope of the Milk Code as provided in Section 3, then it can be subject to regulation

pursuant to said law, even if the product is to be used by children aged over 12 months.

To resolve the question of whether the labeling requirements and advertising regulations under the RIRR are valid, the

Court had to discuss the nature, purpose, and depth of the regulatory powers of the DOH, as defined in general under


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the 1987 Administrative Code, and as delegated in particular under the Milk Code. Health is a legitimate subject matter

for regulation by the DOH (and certain other administrative agencies) in exercise of police powers delegated to it. The

sheer span of jurisprudence on that matter precludes the need to further discuss it.. However, health information,

particularly advertising materials on apparently non-toxic products like breastmilk substitutes and supplements, is a

relatively new area for regulation by the DOH. The 1987 Administrative Code tasked respondent DOH to carry out the

state policy pronounced under Section 15, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, which is to protect and promote the right

to health of the people and instill health consciousness among them.To that end, it was granted under Section 3 of the

Administrative Code the power to (6) propagate health information andeducate the population on important health,medical and environmental matters which have health implications.When it comes to information regarding nutrition

of infants and young children, however, the Milk Code specifically delegated to the Ministry of Health (hereinafter

referred to as DOH) the power to ensure that there is adequate, consistent and objective information on breastfeeding

and use of breastmilk substitutes, supplements and related products; and the power tocontrol such information.

Further, DOH is authorized by the Milk Code tocontrol the content of any information on breastmilk vis--vis breastmilk

substitutes, supplement and related products. The DOH is also authorized to control the purpose of the information and

to whom such information may be disseminated under Sections 6 through 9 of the Milk Code to ensure that the

information that would reach pregnant women, mothers of infants, and health professionals and workers in the health

care system is restricted to scientific and factual matters and shall not imply or create a belief that bottlefeeding is

equivalent or superior to breastfeeding. It bears emphasis, however, that the DOH's power under the Milk Codeto control information regarding breastmilk vis-a-vis breastmilk substitutes is not absoluteas the power to control does

not encompass the power to absolutely prohibit the advertising, marketing, and promotion of breastmilk substitutes.

Nonetheless, the Court held that the framers of the constitution were well aware that trade must be subjected to some

form of regulation for the public good. Despite the fact that our present Constitution enshrines freeenterprise as a

policy, it nonetheless reserves to the government the power to intervene whenever necessary to promote the general

welfare. Free enterprise does not call for removal of protective regulations.It must be clearly explained and proven by

competent evidence just exactly how such protective regulation would result in the restraint of trade. In this case,

petitioner failed to show that the proscription of milk manufacturers participation in any policymaking body (Section

4(i)), classes and seminars for women and children (Section 22); the giving of assistance, support and logistics or training

(Section 32); and the giving of donations (Section 52) would unreasonably hamper the trade of breastmilk substitutes.

Petitioner has not established that the proscribed activities are indispensable to the trade of breastmilk substitutes.

Petitioner failed to demonstrate that the aforementioned provisions of the RIRR are unreasonable and oppressive for

being in restraint of trade.

In fine, the Court held that except Sections 4(f), 11 and 46, the rest of the provisions of the RIRR are in consonance with

the objective, purpose and intent of the Milk Code, constituting reasonable regulation of an industry which affects publi

health and welfare and, as such, the rest of the RIRR do not constitute illegal restraint of trade nor are they violative of

the due process clause of the Constitution.

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