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Majority OpinionBy a vote of 5-4, the U.S. Supreme Court on March 1, 2005 held that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments

forbid the execution of offenders who were under the age of 18 when their crimes were committed.

Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority (Kennedy, Breyer, Ginsburg, Souter, and Stevens, JJ.) stated:

When a juvenile offender commits a heinous crime, the State can exact forfeiture of some of the most basic

liberties, but the State cannot extinguish his life and his potential to attain a mature understanding of his own

humanity.

The Court reaffirmed the necessity of referring to the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress

of a maturing society to determine which punishments are so disproportionate as to be cruel and unusual. The

Court reasoned that the rejection of the juvenile death penalty in the majority of states, the infrequent use of the

punishment even where it remains on the books, and the consistent trend toward abolition of the juvenile deathpenalty demonstrated a national consensus against the practice. The Court determined that today our society

views juveniles as categorically less culpable than the average criminal.

Reliance on AtkinsThe Court outlined the similarities between its analysis of the constitutionality of executing juvenile offenders

and the constitutionality of executing the mentally retarded. Prior to 2002, the Court had refused to categoricallyexempt mentally retarded persons from capital punishment. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989). However,

in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), the Court held that standards of decency had evolved in the 13 yearssince Penry and that a national consensus had formed against such executions, demonstrating that the execution

of the mentally retarded is cruel and unusual punishment.

Before this historic ruling, the Court concluded in 1989 in Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989), that the

execution of 16- and 17-year-old offenders was not constitutionally barred. The Court now concludes that since

Stanford, a national consensus has formed against the execution of juvenile offenders, and the practice violates

societys evolving standards of decency. The Court overruled its decision in Stanford, thereby setting theminimum age for eligibility for the death penalty at 18.

The Court explained that the primary criterion for determining whether a particular punishment violates

societys evolving standards of decency is objective evidence of a national consensus as expressed by

legislative enactments and jury practices. The majority opinion found significant that 30 states prohibit the

juvenile death penalty, including 12 that have rejected the death penalty altogether. The Court counted the stateswith no death penalty, pointing out that a States decision to bar the death penalty altogether of necessitydemonstrates a judgment that the death penalty is inappropriate for all offenders, including juveniles. The Court

further noted that juries sentenced juvenile offenders to death only in rare cases and the execution of juveniles isinfrequent. The Court found a consistent trend toward abolition of the practice of executing juveniles and ruled

that the impropriety of executing juveniles has gained wide recognition.

In addition to considering evidence of a national consensus as expressed by legislative enactments and jurypractices, the court recognized that it must also apply its own independent judgment in determining

whether a particular punishment is disproportionately severe. When ruling that juvenile offenders cannot

with reliability be classified as among the worst offenders, the Court found significant that juveniles are

vulnerable to influence, and susceptible to immature and irresponsible behavior. In light of juvenilesdiminished culpability, neither retribution nor deterrence provides adequate justification for imposing the death

penalty.

Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, said:

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Retribution is not proportional if the laws most severe penalty is imposed on one whose culpability orblameworthiness is diminished, to a substantial degree, by reason of youth and immaturity.

International ConfirmationThe Court further noted that that the execution of juvenile offenders violated several international treaties,

including the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child and the International Covenant on Civil and

Political Rights and stated that the overwhelming weight of international opinion against the juvenile death

penalty provides confirmation for the Courts own conclusion that the death penalty is disproportional

punishment for offenders under 18.

Concurring Opinion

Justice Stevens wrote a concurring opinion, joined by Justice Ginsburg, stating:

Perhaps even more important than our specific holding today is our reaffirmation of the basic principle that

informs the Courts interpretation of the Eighth Amendment. If the meaning of that Amendment had beenfrozen when it was originally drafted, it would impose no impediment to the execution of 7-year-old children

today.

O'Connor's Dissent

Justice OConnor dissented, criticizing the Missouri Supreme Court for failing to follow the precedent

established by the U.S. Supreme Court in Stanford (before the Supreme Court overruled Stanford, the Missouricourt in this case concluded that standards of decency had evolved such that executing juveniles was no longer

constitutional). OConnor agreed that objective evidence presented in Simmons was similar to that presented in

Atkins, but while there was no support for the practice of executing the mentally retarded, at least eight stateshad considered and adopted legislation permitting the execution of 16- and 17-year-old offenders. OConnorargued that the difference in maturity between adults and juveniles was neither universal nor significant enough

to justify a rule excluding juveniles from the death penalty. Justice OConnor did recognize the relevance of

international law, and expressly rejected Justice Scalias contention that international law has no place in

evaluating Eighth Amendment claims.

Scalia's DissentJustice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas and Chief Justice Rehnquist, also dissented, arguing that the Court

improperly substituted its own judgment for that of the people in outlawing executions of juvenile offenders. He

criticized the majority for counting non-death penalty states toward a national consensus against juvenileexecutions. Scalia also rejected the Courts use of international law to confirm its finding of a nationalconsensus, stating that Acknowledgement of foreign approval has no place in the legal opinion of this Court .

. . Like Justice OConnor, Scalia criticized the Court for failing to admonish the Missouri Court for its

flagrant disregard of the Courts ruling in Stanford.

The Courts ruling in Roper v. Simmons affects 72 juvenile offenders in 12 states.