Arabay Inc

Arabay Inc. v. CFI of Zamboanga

Case No. 16

G.R. No. L-37684 (September 10, 1975)

Chapter VI Page 259, Footnote No. 43

FACTS:

The Municipality of Dipolog enacted Ordinance No. 19 that charged tax for

the selling and distribution of gasoline, lubricating oils, diesel fuel oils, and petroleumbased products. Arabay Inc., distributor of gas, oil and other petroleum products,

contested the validity of such on the ground that the tax is beyond the power of a

municipality to levy under Sec. 2 of RA No. 2264, which provides that municipalities

may not impose tax on articles subject to specific tax except gasoline.

ISSUE:

W/NArabay Inc. is entitled to a refund.

HELD:

The ordinance levied a sales tax not only because of the character of the

ordinance as a sales tax ordinance, but also because the phraseology of the

provision reveals in clear terms the intention to impose a tax on sale. It is evident from

the terms that the amount of the tax that may be collected is directly dependent

upon to the volume of sales. Since Sec. 2 of the Local Autonomy Act prohibits the

municipality from imposing sales and specific tax, with the exception of gasoline,

there subsists the right of Arabay Inc. to a refund. The reasonable and practical

interpretation of the terms of the proviso in question resulted in the conclusion that

Congress, in excluding gasoline, deliberately and intentionally meant to put it within

the power of such local governments to impose whatever type or form of taxes.

LATIN MAXIM:

6c, 11e, 12a, 14, 20a

Almeda v. Florentino

Case No. 10

G.R. No.L-23800 (December 21, 1965)

Chapter VI, Page 265, Footnote No. 67

FACTS:

RA183, the charter of Pasay City (enacted June 21, 1947), provides in its Sec. 14

that the Board shall have a secretary who shall be appointed by it to serve during the

term of office of the members thereof On June 18, 1960, RA 2709 amended Sec. 12

of RA 183. On the strength of Par. 2 of Sec. 12 of the Pasay City Charter, as amended,

the Vice-Mayor of Pasay City appointed Petitioner Almeda as secretary of the

Municipal Board of said City. The very next day, the Board refused to recognize

Petitioner as its secretary and, in turn, appointed Respondent Florentino to the position,

purportedly under Sec. 14 of the City Charter.

ISSUE:

Which law applies on the matter of the appointment of the Secretary of the

Municipal Board of Pasay City?

HELD:

The petition was dismissed. There is nothing in RA 2709 that indicates any

intention on the part of the Legislature to repeal, alter, or modify in any way the

provisions of Sec. 14 of R.A 183. Repeals by implication are not favored, unless it is

manifested that the legislature so intended.

LATIN MAXIM:

9c, 37, 49, 50

Sitchon, et al. v. Aquino

Case No. 147

G.R. No. L-8500 (February 27, 1956)

FACTS:

Respondent Aquino, the City Engineer of Manila, demolished the houses of

the six petitioners in this class suit, because their houses were public nuisances built

on public streets and river beds.

Petitioners contend that under the Civil Code, Art. 701 and 702, it is the district

health officer who should remove public nuisances. Respondent, on the other hand,

argues that RA 409, the Revised Charter of the City of Manila, grants the power to

remove public nuisances to the City Engineer.

ISSUE:

Whose job it is to determine and demolish public nuisances, the health officer

under the Civil Code or the city engineer under RA 409.

HELD:

The City Engineer, under RA 409, has jurisdiction. The Civil Code is a general

law applicable throughout the Philippines, whereas RA 409 is a special law that

pertains solely to the City of Manila. When a general and a special law are in conflict,

the latter prevails.

LATIN MAXIM:

50

De Joya v. Lantin

Case No. 31

G.R. No. L-24037 (April 27, 1967)

FACTS:

Respondent Francindy Commercial purchased bales of textile from Cebu

Company Ernerose Commercial. However, the Bureau of Customs discovered that

the goods to be delivered by Ernerose were different from those declared. Customs

took custody of the shipment.

Francindy Commercial filed a petition in the Court of First Instance for

Customs to release the goods. Francindy insisted that the CFI had jurisdiction on

the basis of the Judiciary Act and not the Bureau of Customs. RA 1937 and 1125, on

the other hand, vest exclusive jurisdiction over seizure and forfeiture proceedings to

the Bureau of Customs.

ISSUE:

Who has jurisdiction over the shipment.

HELD:

The Bureau of Customs does. RA 1937 and 1125 are special laws, whereas the

Judiciary Act is a general law. In case of conflict, special laws prevail over general

ones.

LATIN MAXIM:

50

Ortigas & Co. v. Feati Bank & Trust

Case No. 193

G.R. No. L-24670 (December 14, 1979)

Chapter VIII, Page 312, Footnote No. 133

FACTS:

Appellee began laying the foundation and commenced the construction of

a building on Lots Nos. 5 and 6, to be devoted to banking purposes. Appellant

demanded that appellee stop the construction of the commercial building on the

said lots. The latter refused to comply, contending that the building was being

constructed in accordance with the zoning regulations, defendant having filed

building and planning permit applications with the Municipality of Mandaluyong.

ISSUE:

W/Nthe resolution of the Municipal Council of Mandaluyong declaring Lots

Nos. 5 and 6, among others, as part of the commercial and industrial zone of the

municipality, prevailed over the building restrictions imposed by plaintiff-appellant on

the lots in question and if Resolution No. 27 s-1960 is a valid exercise of police power.

HELD:

The trial court held that the subject restrictions were subordinate to Municipal

Resolution No. 27. It upheld the classification by the Municipal Council of the area

along EDSA Avenue as a commercial and industrial zone, and held that the same

rendered "ineffective and unenforceable" the restrictions in question as against

defendant.

Resolution No. 27 was passed in the valid exercise of police power to

safeguard or promote the health, safety, peace, good order and general welfare of

the people in the locality.

Even if the subject building restrictions were assumed by the defendant as

vendee of Lots Nos. 5 and 6, in the deeds of sale and in the TCTs the contractual

obligations so assumed cannot prevail over Municipal Resolution No. 27.

LATIN MAXIM:

6c, 46e

China Banking Corporation v. Ortega

Case No. 21

G.R. No. L-34964 (January 31, 1973)

FACTS:

A complaint was filed against B&B Forest Development Corporation for the

collection of a sum of money. The trial court declared the said corporation in default.

The Plaintiff sought the garnishment of the bank deposit of B&B Forest with current

Petitioner Bank. Thus, a notice of garnishment was issued by the Deputy Sheriff and

served on Petitioner Bank through its cashier, Tan Kim Liong. He refused to disclose

the sought information, citing the provisions of RA 1405 which prohibits the disclosure

of any information relative to bank deposits to any person except upon written

permission of the depositor. Furthermore, RA 1405 also imposes criminal liability on any

official or employee of a banking institution who breaks the confidential nature of this

law.

ISSUE:

W/N a banking institution may validly refuse to comply with a court process

garnishing the bank deposit of a judgment debtor, by invoking RA 1405.

HELD:

No. It was not the intention of the lawmakers to place bank deposits beyond

the reach of execution to satisfy a final judgment. The discussion of the conference

committee report of the two houses of Congress indicates that the prohibition

against examination of or inquiry into a bank deposit under RA 1405 does not

preclude its being garnished to insure satisfaction of a judgment.

LATIN MAXIM:

9a, 11e, 12b, 30b, 35, 38b, 43, b2