diffusion and the international context of democratization

7/31/2019 Diffusion and the International Context of Democratization

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Diffusionnd the nternationalContextofDemocratizationKristiankredeGleditschndMichaelD. Ward

Abstract Democracyoesnot volve uigeneris. hespatial lusteringndemoc-racy ndtransitionsuggestshatnternationalactors laya prominentole nforg-ingdemocraciess wellas influencingheir urability. eargue hat emocracyftencomes aboutas a result f changes n the relative owerof importantctors ndgroups s well as their valuations fparticularnstitutions,oth fwhich reofteninfluencedyforces utside hecountrynquestion. he scope and extent fcon-nectionswith ther emocraticountriesna region anstrengthenupportor em-ocratic eformndhelpsustainnstitutionsntransitionalemocracies. esults roma transition odeldemonstratehatnternationalactors an exert strongnfluenceon theprospects or ransitionso democracy,nd thespatial lusteringndemoc-racyandtransitionsannot dequately e explainedbythehypothesizedomesticsocialrequisitesf ndividualountries.

The manytransitions o democraticrule in the so-called "thirdwave" of democ-ratizationhave renewedscholarly nterestn whataffects heprospectsfordemoc-ratization. So far,however,an understanding f thecauses forthe emergenceofdemocraticpolitical institutions as remained elusive. In retrospect,t is easy tolook back on particular ransitions o democracyas ineluctable.However,provid-ing generalizationson circumstances hathave been favorable fordemocratic ran-sitionsrequiresone to see beyond theidiosyncrasiesof individualchanges.Is democracy"caused" by economic or social factors, rby political culture, rdo transitions ome aboutby ust plain luck? The idea thatdemocracyhas certainrequisitescan be tracedto Lipset's thesis that conomic development s a key pre-condition fordemocraticrule.' Otherperspectivesgive prominenceto normsor

We aregratefulor ommentsrom rian 'Hearn,yleBeardsley,athanieleck, cottGates,Havard egre, avidLektzian,on evehouse,anReiter,ennethchultz,eathermith,aivardStrand,ndKaare trom,he ditors,nd wo nonymouseviewers,swell sthe articipantsttheConferencenthenternationaliffusionfDemocracyndMarkets,niversityfCalifornia,osAngeles,March2003, andtheConference n the nternationaliffusionfPolitical nd EconomicLiberalizationt theWeatherheadenter ornternationalffairs,arvardniversity,ambridge,Mass.,October003.1. Lipset 960.Internationalrganization 0,Fall 2006,pp.911-933? 2006byThe O Foundation. DOI: 10.1017/S0020818306060309


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912 Internationalrganizationvaluesheld o favor hedevelopmentnddurabilityf democraticule,2nequalityortherelative trengthfclasses,3 r events t "criticalunctures"na country'spolitical evelopment.4orerecently,rzeworskindLimongindPrzeworskindcolleagueshave claimed hat equisitesevealnothingbout ransitionso democ-racy:theapparent elationshipetween ocial andeconomicfactorsnd demo-craticnstitutionserelytems rom owdemocracys moreikely osurvive ndercertain onditions,ndtransitionsodemocracyhemselvesre random vents.5Thesevarious xplanationslearly iffernd entail uitedifferentredictionsaboutprospects ordemocracy.till, hey reall "similar"nrelating country'sprospectsor emocracyo various actorsnternalosocieties ndpresuminghatevents n other ountries o notaffect olitical nstitutionsr the ikelihood ftransitions.n this rticle,we argue hat nternationalactorsnfluencehepros-pectsfor emocracy,nd that ransitionsrenot imply andom ut remoreikelyinthewakeofchangesnthe xternal nvironment.hetemporalndspatial lus-teringndemocracyndtransitionsuggests iffusion,renduring,ross-boundarydependencieshat nfluencehedevelopmentndpersistencefpolitical nstitu-tions.We reconsiderheroleof diffusionnlight fcurrentheoriesf democra-tization,ndfocus nhow xternalactorsanchange he alance fpower etweenregimesndoppositionorces s wellas the valuationshat ifferentroups oldoverparticularormsfgovernance. lthoughemocratizationan comeabout nmultiple aysandcan involve widerange f differentctors,nternationalon-text nd external hocksgenerally rovide etterndicatorsf theprospects ortransitionhan o the ttributesf ndividualtates.

Democratization: tylizedFactsWe see democracys a formfgovernance here hepower f executivess lim-itedbyother nstitutionsnd wheregovernmentsre selected ither irectlyrindirectlyhroughompetitivelections,with penor unrestrictedntryor an-didates.6 mongmany ffortso measure emocracy,hePolitydataprovide nadditivewenty-one-pointcaleofa state's egree fdemocracy.7igure1 shows

2. See Almond nd Verba1963;andMuller ndSeligson1994.3. See Muller1988;Rueschemeyer,tephens,ndStephens 992;andVanhanen 990.4. See Bollen 1979;CasperandTaylor1996;Moore1993;O'Donnell, Schmitter,ndWhitehead1986;andPrzeworski 988.5. See PrzeworskindLimongi1997;and Przeworskit al. 2000.6. Alternativeefinitionsfdemocracymayemphasize ther eatures,uchas protectionfpoliti-cal rightsr the nclusivenessfparticipation;or verviews,ee Beetham 994;Doorenspleet000;andVanhanen 990. Some definitionsf"substantive"emocracylso include utcomes hat roce-duraldemocracys assumed o eadto; see Shapiro 003.7. We use a modified nd expanded version of thePolity V data, available from http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/-ksg/Polity.html).ccessed 30 June 006. Other mpiricalmeasures fdemocracy-including lvarez t al. 1996;Bollen1990; theFreedomHouse indexdescribedn Gastil1985; and


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Internationalontext f Democratization913

- 10.5-

Proportionfdemocracies-Mean Politycore - 5.4-o3 O0.2 -

-5.1

0 I i -101850 1900 1950 2000Year

FIGURE . Theglobaldistributionfdemocracy,816-1998theglobalaverage f thePolity cale and theproportionf theworld's ndepen-dent tates hat re considered emocratic verthe asttwocenturies.8 hereasonly bout5 percentf the tatesntheworldweredemocraciesn 1816,democ-raciesoutnumberedutocraciesythe ndofthe 1990s.The share fdemocraciesinthe ystem as not ncreased radually,utratherxpandednd contractedvertime nwhatHuntingtonalls three wavesofdemocracy."9The share of countries hat re democracies, owever, ependsnotonlyonchangeswithin xisting tatesbut s also affectedychanges n thenumberfindependenttates. omehaveargued hat waves"ofdemocracyremerelyrti-facts eflectinghegrowthf states ver ime atherhan hangesninstitutions.10However,hedistributionfdemocracyn nineteentatesn continuousxistenceVanhanen990-areonly vailable or smalleret fcountriesr a shorterimentervalhanhePolityata.Althoughefinitionshatmphasizetherriteria,uch s broad articipation,an ead osomewhatifferentlassificationsfdemocraciesn the atenineteenthnd arlywentiethenturieswhenwomenndmany roups ere enied otingights-see axton000-alternativeriteriaordemocracy,uch sparticipationnd rotectionfhumanights,endogo togetherithompetitiveelectionsnthe ontemporaryra.8. The hresholdordemocracy"s here et o score f evenr bove, ollowinghe uggestedthresholdor coherentemocracies";eeJaggersndGurr995, 79.For he lobalmeans, etreatcaseswithnstitutionsintransition"r"interrupted"ithoutegularalues nthePolitycale snondemocraciesnd ssign numericalalue f- 10.9. Huntington991.10. SeeDoorenspleet000; ndAlesina,polaore,ndWacziarg000.


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914 Internationalrganization

.8- 10

Proportionfdemocracies.6- Mean olitycore 5o

2 -50 I I -10

Year

1850 1900 1950 2000Year

FIGURE . Measuresofdemocracyora sampleofnineteenontinuouslyindependenttates, 816-1998from 816 (shown nFigure2) suggests hat here ave beenmanynstitutionalchangeswithintates,videntnperiodswitharge ncreasesnthe hare f coun-tries hat redemocratics wellas periodsn whichmany tates ecame ess dem-ocratic, otably uringhe woworldwars ndtheperiod fdecolonialization.Assessing he hare fdemocracyndchanges ver ime ased onindependentstates lonealso excludesfromhe denominatorll of theworld'spopulationncolonized erritories.igure3 displays cartogramfthedistributionfdemoc-racy,where he elativeizeof state s scaled ccordingopopulationnd ssigneda shade according o its Polity core." Populationsn nonsovereignnd non-democraticntitiesredisplayeds a residual lockfor achgeographicalegion.12Comparinghemapsfor1945 and 2002 illustrates owdemocracy as becomeconsiderablymorewidespreadn both ndustrializednd developing ocieties.Whereasmost tatesnEurope nd LatinAmerica ave democraticnstitutionsn2002,manywere utocraciesn 1945. Eventhoughhe hare fpopulationivingunder emocraticuleremainsower ycomparisonnAfrica ndAsia,many reas

11. WeuseJaggersndGurr's uggestedut-offoints odistinguishetween coherent emocra-cies,""coherentutocracies,"nd"anocracies"; ee Jaggersnd Gurr 995,479.12. Thesecartogramsrebased ona "density qualizing" pproach;ee Gastner nd Newman 004;andhistoricalopulationstimatesrom leditsch 005.


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1945

Autocracy Democracy-10-9 -8 -7 -6 -S -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 102002

.? \P ?

i ""1t P..FIGURE . Cartogramfdemocracies ndautocracies, roportionalopopulationthatwerecolonies n 1945 havebecome democratic tatesby2002. Indeed, heMiddleEast (including rab NorthAfrica) s theonlyregion hat emains omi-natedby autocracies. he growth f theshareofthe world'spopulationivingunder emocraticnstitutionrom 945 to2002is all themore emarkables pop-ulationgrowth as beenhighern the ow-incomeountries ssumed obe lessreceptiveodemocracy.Thenotion fglobal waves" ofdemocracyndautocracyas alerted esearch-ersto thepossiblerole of nternationalnfluences.'3 anypoint o how thesec-ondandthirdwavesofdemocratizationoincidedwith womajorwatershedsnworld istory,amelyhe ndofWorldWar I and the ndoftheColdWar.Merelyattributingemocratizationrautocratizationo some internationalontext,"ow-

13. See Huntington991;andRay 1995.


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916 Internationalrganizationever, xplains ittlewithoutlarifyingherelevantnternationalontextndhowthis nfluences rospects ordemocracy,nd manyof theglobal trendshigh-lighted o notvary onsistentlyith hedistributionfdemocracy.orexample,wars eemto havepreceded oth emocratizationndautocratization,nd theresno obviousrelationshipetweenwar and democracy t the evel of theinter-nationalystem.14 ikewise, ttributingariationndemocracyo shiftsnpoliti-cal ideology rthe hangingositionftheUnited tates in turnegsthe uestionofwhydeologies rforeign olicy octrineshangenways hat ometimes avordemocracyndsometimes avor utocracy.In ourview, nternationalrocesses hatnfluenceemocratizationrenotpar-ticularlyikely obe found t a global evel.Lookingforuniversal lobal nflu-ences hat ffectllcountrieslike sprobablys ill-conceiveds assumingdenticalandindependentrocesseswithin achcountry.heglobal evel s an aggregatethatmasks argeregional ifferencesndvariation. lthough emocracies res-ently ominatensomeregions,utocracyas beenwidespreadn the ameregionsat other imeperiods. igure clearly emonstratesegional lusteringnthedis-tributionfdemocracynboth1945and2002,andsimilar atternsfgeographi-cal clusteringoldfor ther imeperiods s well. Since 1815, heprobabilityhata randomlyhosen ountry illbe a democracys about .75 ifthemajorityf tsneighborsre democracies, utonly0.14 if themajority f its neighborsrenondemocracies.Transitionsodemocracyave also clusteredeographically,ndcountries avebeenfarmore ikely oundergoransitionsodemocracyollowingransitionsnneighboringtates. igure displaysnonparametricocal regressionstimatesfthe ikelihood f transitionsetween emocraticnd autocraticegimesna givenyear,giventheproportionfother tates hat re democracieswithin 500 kmradiusof a country.16 he unconditionalrobabilityhat n autocracywill bereplaced ya democraticegimenanyoneyear s obviously ery mall, n factless than015.However,heestimatedrobabilityhat nautocracy ill becomea democracy,ivenbythe olid ine nFigure , increases harplys an S-curvewithhigher roportionsfdemocratic eighbors.Moreprecisely,he estimatedprobabilityftransitionodemocracyxceeds 1 for countryn a relativelyem-ocratic egion oward heright fthehorizontalxis.The risk hat democracywillbe replaced yan autocracy,ndicated ythedashed ine,displays similarS-shapedrelationship ith heregional ontext. s would be expected rom hesecular rendoward higher roportionfdemocracies,hemaximumrobabil-itythat n autocracywillbecome a democracys roughlywice as highas thehighestikelihood f democracies oing uthoritarian.

14. See Gleditsch 2002a; and Mitchell, Gates, and Hegre 1999.15. For example, Robinson 1996.16. The geographical information s taken fromthe Gleditsch and Ward 2001 minimum distancedata.


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Internationalontext fDemocratization917.12-

.10 Transitionodemocracy-o Transitiono utocracy.08-,= .06

.04-

0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1ProportionfdemocraticeighborsFIGURE . Transitionrobabilitiesyproportionfdemocratic eighbors

The Diffusion fDemocracyChangesnthedistributionfdemocracyouldbe attributedo ncreasesnwealthand other ocialrequisites eldtobe conducive odemocracy. owever,incethedomesticocialandeconomic onditions eemedmportantend ochange lowlyovertime,t s difficulto see how thegreat ariabilityndemocracyould arisefromtable elationshipsetween ocialrequisitesnddemocracylone.Thegeo-graphical atternsuggest hat he ikelihood f a transitionn a countrylsodependson the nternationalontext nd events n other tates.Although therstudies aveshown imilarmpiricalvidence f"diffusion"fdemocracyn thesense of spatial lustering,7 it is less clearwhatthisstemsfrom, r what t isabout emocracynonestate hat nfluenceshe rospectsor emocracynanother.In this rticle,we extend xistingheories f democratizationo therole of nter-nationalnfluences.Thestudyfdemocratizationscomplicatedythemany ossibleways n whichoneregimemaydisappear nd be replacedbyanother,ndbythe difficultiesn

17. See O'Loughlin tal. 1998;and Starr 991.


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918 Internationalrganizationassessing xante whoshouldbe regardeds themain gents rpotentialmoversintransitions.n somecases,themost nterestingeaturenexplainingransitionsretrospectivelys to account orhowa newpolitical oalition eizespoweranddevelopsnew nstitutions,s whenSlobodanMilosevi6was deposed nYugosla-via.However,notherases, utocraticegimesmaywithdrawor easons nrelatedto theforces ndactorsnfluencingnstitutionsn theirftermath,s wasthe asewith he all fthemilitaryunta ndsubsequentestorationfdemocracynArgen-tina fter heFalklandswar. ometransitions,uch s thefall fMilo'evi6, nvolvepopular prising, hileother ransitionsre nitiatedyrulers hemselvesrcar-riedoutbyactors losely ssociatedwith hepreviouseadership.nParaguay,orexample, militaryovernmentade the nitial teps oward emocracy ithit-tlepopular ressure, hereasnUruguay,epresentativesf the rmed orces ndpoliticiansgreed oreturnoopen lectionst a closedmeetingt theNavalClub.Nonetheless,lthought s perhaps stretchotalk bout canonical heoryfdemocratization,widerange fpossibilitiesn which egimeransitionsanoccurmaybe subsumed nder frameworkocusing n power,mobilization,ndtheevaluations f mportantctors.Much of the iteraturendemocratizationrguesthat emocracymerges s an outcome f socialconflict henno single ctor rgroup animpose tsruleonothers.'8 ueno de Mesquita ndcolleagues uggestthatpolitical oalitions urvivenproportiono theratio f the size of thewin-ning oalition o the ize ofthegroup f ndividuals hohave a role n determin-ingthatwinningoalition, he so-called electorate.19nstitutionalizingethodsfor haring ower ndestablishingolitical ights ecomerational ptionswhenthe electoratexpands o that ctors re unable ofully ominater control olit-ical powerby repressivemeansorbydistributingrivate oods.From hisper-spective,xistingtructuralheories fdemocracyoint o factors hatnfluencetherelative ower ndresourcesfgroups,s well as supportor emocraticnsti-tutions. ower tends o be generallymoredispersedmonggroupsn economi-callydeveloped tateswith more dvanced ivision f abor hannagriculturalsocietieswhere and s theprimaryource fwealth.20Similarly,aluesfavoringdemocraticulearemore ikely o be widespreadwhennogroup an achieve tsunrestrictedreferences,ndwhendemocraticolitical ystemsreseen as wellfunctioningelative o autocratic lternativesnd as less of a threatopowerfulinterests.2However, here s no inherenteasonwhy trugglesver nfluencendresourceshouldbe confined ithinheboundaries findividual tates.Accord-ingly, ne can think fdiffusionn terms f howlinkages oexternalctors ndevents nfluenceherelative ower nd the ikely trategiesndchoices of rele-vantgroupsnstrugglesverpolitical nstitutionsnd outcomes.

18. See Olson 1993;Przeworski988;and Vanhanen 990.19. Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003.20. See Boix 2003; andVanhanen 990.21. Forexample,Almond ndVerba1963.


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Internationalontext fDemocratization919

Diffusionnd theRelative owerofActors ndGroupsBothdomesticndexternal vents ndprocesses aninfluencehepowerofspe-cific roups,herebynderminingxisting egimesrassistingroupseeking em-ocratic eforms.he deaofforeign-imposedegimehange epresentsnextremecase ofcoercive xternalnfluence.espitetherecent alls for egime hange nrogue tates,here re few learcaseswhere emocracyasemergeds a result fforeignntervention,ndmost mposed egimes re autocratic.he SovietUnionand tsWarsaw act llies, or xample,ntervenednHungaryn1956 ndCzecho-slovakia n1968partlyutof fear hatocalreformsould ead todemocracyndthe bandonmentfsocialism.Accordingly,mpositionhroughnterventionoesnot eeman importantource fdemocratization.However, oercionmayalso take more ubtleformshandirect ntervention.The fear fSoviet nterventiony tself enerallyufficedo deter olitical eformsinEastern uropeduringheColdWar, ntil he doption fthe o-called inatradoctrine,here ountriesould doittheir ay," nderMikhailGorbachev.22oregenerally,thertates rtransnationalctors anpromoteemocratizationy ctionsthat trengthenomestic ctors eeking emocratic eformnd weaken hepowerof autocraticegimes.23 e hypothesizehatdemocratictateswilltend o sup-port ppositionmovementsndgovernmenteformshatwouldbring boutmoresimilar egimes. ikewise, pposition roupsnautocracieshat re connectedoor nteract ith pen,democraticocieties remore ikely oreceive upportromtransnationalctors.Externalupportanhave a particularlyramaticmpact n therelative owerof groupswhenwe see shiftsn the coalitions hatholdpower n neighboringentities.chelling's tippingmodel"suggestshat mallchangesn external on-textmaysuffice o yieldcascades that an generate criticalmass in politicalcontestation.24uchprocessesreoften eld ohaveplayed ut n the all f social-ism nEastern urope,where he nitial olitical hangesnPolandandHungaryspurredubsequenthangesnCzechoslovakiandEastGermany.25ippingffectsshould ead toa clusteringftransitions,ith netransitionncreasinghe ikeli-hood ofsubsequentransitionsnconnected tates.The militaryomponentf interstateoercion an also have implicationsortheprospects ordemocracy. anyresearchersrgue hat onflictonstrainsheprospects ordemocraticule, ndthat emocracys likely o breakdownunderthe hreat fconflict.26hompson rgues hat nitial oliticalnstitutionsavebeen

22. Ash 1999.23. See Deutsch1954; Keck and Sikkink 999;Randle1991; Smith, agnucco, ndLopez 1998;andSolingen1998.24. Schelling 971.25. See Kuran1989;andLohmann 994.26. Forexample,Gates,Knutsen,ndMoses 1996.


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920 Internationalrganizationshapedbyrulers'need to obtainresources ndmobilizemilitarily.27ustainedrivalrynd threatsostereduthoritarianisms powerbecame morecentralized.By contrast,elative eacefacilitatedolitical luralism,s internalolitical ro-cesses couldunfoldwithmore nsulationrom xternalhreats. arzelandKiserargue hat xternalhreats inderedhedevelopmentfvotingnstitutionss inse-curerulerswereunableto make credible ommitmentsnd contracts ith heruled.28Mansfield ndSnyder old thateaders n transitionalegimeswith rag-ile institutionsre ikely orely n nationalismnddiversionaryonflictoremaininpower, herebyncreasingherisk fdemocraticeversals.29hegeographicalisolation ndprotectionromxternalhreatmay npart xplainwhy arly tepstoward emocracy eremore urablenEngland han nFrance. imilarly,zonesofpeace" firstmergedwhenpowerfultateswereforced o abandon mbitionsofregional egemonynddomination.30ccordingly,e expectdemocraciesobe more ikely oemerge ndthrivenregionswith tablepeace.Diffusionnd Evaluations f nstitutionalrrangementsTheories fdemocratizationanalso be cast n terms f evaluations fparticularinstitutionalrrangements.ven in situations hereno singlegroup anmonop-olize politicalpower, ower haring eednot ead to democraticnstitutions,spowerfulctors ften ear he onsequences funmitigatedopular ule ndresistdemocracy.Manynineteenth-centuryheorists,uch as Mill andMarx, xpectedthe xpansion fsuffrageothe aborclasstoinevitablyeadto massive edistri-bution fprivate ropertynd ncome.31Until he dvent f the hirdwave,manyelites n Southernuropeand Latin America ended o be skeptical f whetherdemocraticnstitutionsouldmaintain rder ndpropertyights.32he war nBos-niawas inpartdriven yanexaggeratediewof the ffectivenessfdemocracy,wheremany thnicerbsbelieved hatheywouldbea perpetuallyepressed inor-ityundermajorityule.33Mostpredictionsboutradicalchangesfollowingheintroductionfmajorityule,however, avefailed omaterializen countrieshathaveundergoneransitionsodemocracy.nitiallyeluctanteaders nautocraciesmaybe morewilling oinitiate ifficulteformsf the xperiencesf other tatessuggest hat he osts ndconsequences f reforms aynotbe as bad as they adfeared,ndthatnumerousormerutocraticulers ave been able tohold on topower r retainnfluencender emocratic ule.Accordingly,ears fdemocracyare likely o weaken s morereferenceountries ecomedemocratic.n many

27. Thompson996.28. Barzel ndKiser 997.29. MansfieldndSnyder 002.30. Thompson 996.31. Muller1999.32. See Alexander 002 onSpain;and Pevehouse 002a and 2002bon LatinAmerica.33. See Muller 000.


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circles, emocracyndgoodgovernanceave ncreasinglyeenseen as a prereq-uisitefor conomicgrowthnddevelopment.uchbeliefs an facilitateemoc-racy,ven hough mpiricalesearchoes notunambiguouslyupport relationshipbetween emocracynd economic erformance.34The likelihood fdemocraticeformxperimentsependsnotonlyontheper-ceivedbenefitsrom emocracy,ut lso the xpected ostsof notbeing democ-racy,which robably ave ncreasedonsiderablyver ime.During heColdWar,ruling countryn an authoritarianashion id notnecessarilymposeparticularproblems or country'standingra leader's bility omaintainieswith therstates,s most ountries erenotdemocracies,speciallynthedeveloping orld.DespiteU.S. rhetoricboutprotectinghefreeworld, emocracy as clearlynota requirementnthe election falliesandaidrecipients.35 he ncreasen democ-racies nthedevelopingworld, owever,hanges he etofcountrieshat stateis likely obecomparedo.With hedecliningtrategicmportancefallies nthedeveloping orld fter heColdWar,many utocraticulershat adenjoyedong-standingnternationalupportoundhemselvesncreasinglysolated.Hence,manyleadersmayseekto initiate emocratic eformsn effortsokeepongoodtermswith herest f theworld rnot o lookbadrelative oother omparabletates.

EmpiricalAnalysisIn this ection,wereexamine ow nternationalndregional actorsnfluencehelikelihood hat country illbe democratic. lthoughhespecificmechanismsthat ead to changes renotdirectlybservable,we can observewhetherransi-tions re more r ess common ollowingactorshat eflecthemechanismsis-cussed n theprevious ection.We examine hesepropositionsn an analysis ftwo-wayransitionsetween emocracyndautocracy. leditschnd Ward ug-gested hat hanges npolitical tructuresould be analyzed s a Markov hainprocess ftransitionetween ifferenttates ver ime.36orsimplicity,e herelimit urselves o twopossible tates, emocracyndautocracy, hichwe defineoperationallyywhethern observation as a valueof7 oraboveonthe nstitu-tionalized emocracycale. n a transition odel, heprobabilityistributionfavariable i,for bservationat time s modeled s a functionf 's prior istoryor state tprevious imeperiods - 1,t - 2,..., t - T. If theobservationsreconditionalnly n thepreviousbservations,ehave first-orderarkov hain.37

34. Forexample, rzeworskindLimongi1993.35. See Meernik, Krueger,and Poe 1998; and Reiter 2001a.36. GleditschndWard1997.37. Harary, orman,ndCartwright965,371-77.


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922 InternationalrganizationThetransition atrixor first-orderarkov hainwith binary utcomes

PooPoilPio Pllwhere oi indicatesheprobabilityfchange rom to1 (thats,Yit 1,yit-1= 0),andPll indicates heprobabilityfremainingt 1 from - 1 to t (thats,Yit, 1,Yit-1= 1).Wecan estimatehe onditionalransitionrobabilitiesiven ome etof covari-ates of nterestxitby

Pr(yit= 1 yi,t-1,xit) = F[[xip + Yi, -,xta]where is either logit r a probitink.38he/ parametersndicate he ffectsfcovariates n theprobabilityfa 1at time given 0 attime - 1,thats,Pr(yit=1Yi,-1 = 0). Theeffects ntheprobabilityf a 1 at time given 1 at time - 1,Pr(yit l yi-1 = 1), aregivenbytheparameters = a + /3. o facilitateom-parisonwithPrzeworski ndLimongi's esults,39e letyit 1 if a state is anautocracyt time andyit= 0 if t s a democracy.n this ase, theestimated/coefficientsan be interpreteds indicatinghe ffectsfa covariate nthe ike-lihood hat democracy illbecome nautocracy; indicates covariate's ffecton the ikelihood hat utocracieswill remain utocracies. incetheprobabilityfor all thepossibleoutcomes t timet givenyi,-1 = 1 must um to unity,helikelihood hat n autocracyttime - 1 will becomea democracyttime is1 - I1, or 1minus heprobabilityhat n autocracy ill endure.We examinediffusion,r the nfluencef internationalactors,hroughourcovariates. hefirsthree ertaino local andglobaldiffusionfregime ypes.flocal diffusionrocesses perate,we should xpect utocraciesobe more ikelyto experienceransitionso democracyhegreaterheproportionf democraticneighboringountriesthat s,y < 0). We identifyhe ocal context ythepro-portion fneighboringtateswithin 500 kmradius hat redemocracies,asedon minimumistance ata.40Similarly,fglobaldiffusionrives ransitionsodemocracy,utocracieshould ecome ess ikelyoremainutocraciess theglobalproportionfdemocracies ncreases.We assume that ransitions aybe conta-giousandincrease he ikelihood f transitionsnneighboringtates.We furtherassumethat emocraticransitionsn other tates o not nfluencehe ikelihoodthatdemocratictateswillbecomeautocracies,utmay nfluence he ikelihoodthat utocracies illbecomedemocracies.nlight fthis,we constrainheparam-

38. See Beck etal. 2001; andYamaguchi 991,chap.3.39. PrzeworskindLimongi1997.40. Gleditschnd Ward2001.Although 500 km thresholds somewhatrbitrary,heresults onot ookdramaticallyifferentor ther istancehresholds;ee also Gleditsch002a,94-95.


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Internationalontext f Democratization923eter/3 or hisvariable obe 0 and ety = a. We use a binaryndicatorfwhethera transitionodemocracyakes lace na neighboringtatewithin 500kmradius.Ourfinal ovariateeflectingiffusionertainsothe oleofconflict. ebelievethat onflictseflectinghreatsoa state's erritoryaydecrease heprospectsordemocracy.hese,however,houldbe distinguishedrom onflictarticipation,whichmayincludedecisions to intervenen conflicts lsewhere n theinter-national ystemhat reunlikely o influenceheprospects ordemocracy.Weconsidernduringerritorialhreatsya simple ount f thenumberfyears hata country as remained t peace on itsterritorys a proxyforthestabilityfpeace. Ourconflict ata are based on theCorrelates f War COW) data,withsomemodificationsndupdates.41Mostprevious tudies n diffusionrtherole of nternationalactors or ran-sitions odemocracy avedisregardedhepotentialmpact f domestic ttributesandprocesses;42we consider oth nternationalnd domestic actors. n aggre-gaterelationshipetween country'snstitutionsndthecountriesn itsregionalcontextlonedoesnotprovideonvincingvidence fdiffusionrocesses, ecausetheprincipal ocial and economic onditions ypothesizedo influence emoc-racy, uchas differencesngrossdomestic roductGDP) percapita, an also beshown ocluster eographically43nd ndividualountriesmaybe respondingocommon rendsatherhan isplayingnterdependentransitions.s such,wefacean inverse ormfGalton's roblemfdistinguishingetweenndependentunc-tional elationshipsnd nterdependentiffusionrocesses:44 hat xistingtud-iesthat o not onsider omesticharacteristicsttributeo diffusion ay ctuallystemfrom eographicallusteringndomestic ttributeshat nfluencerospectsfordemocracy.Weneed todemonstratehat heobserved ffectsfregional on-text nddiffusiono notmerelytem rom lausible mitted omestic actors.Theprimary easure f"socialrequisites"s a country'sDP per apita,whichwemeasure s thenaturalogof the agged evelof real GDP percapita.45Manyresearchersaveargued hatnegative conomicperformancer crises an affecttheprospectsor emocracy.ountrieshat xperienceconomic ecline re morelikely oexperienceegimeransitions,nd economic ecline s often eldto haveunderminedemocracies n thewake of decolonializationndpromotedransi-tionsfromutocracyodemocracynthethirdwave.46We consider heeffect fgrowthn realGDP percapita s a measure f economic erformancendcrises,in the case of negativegrowth.Negativeperformance ayalso stemfromcountry'sxposureoexogenous conomic hocks, uch s changesncommodity

41. Gleditsch004.42. For xample,eeO'Loughlint l. 1998; nd tarr 991.43. Gleditsch002a.44. Galton889.45. Gleditsch002b.Wepreferhe impler aturalog specificationverusingGDP percapita nditssquare s suggested yPrzeworskindLimongi 997,becausewe seenoclearreasonwhydemoc-racy houldbecome ess likely eyond ome evel of ncome.46. See Gasiorowski 995;and Remmer 991.


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924 Internationalrganization

prices,which nturnmay nduce ocialconflicthat an in turn ndermineegimestability.ased on Rodrik's uggestedndicatorfexternalxposure rsensitivi-ty,47 e measure conomic hocksbythevolatilityf a country'serms ftradeovera five-yeareriod,multiplied ya country'sotal rade s a proportionf tsGDP.48 inally, emocracymay lsobe related odomesticonflictndstrife,ndweconsiderwhether statewas involvedna civilwar.49 any ivilwarsrevolvearound ontrol ver hegovernment.ther orms fviolentonflict,uch s seces-sionistmovements,hould lso be expected ounderminexisting egimes. heimplicationsf civilwarfordemocracyreambiguous, owever,incecivilwarscantopple utocracies,ndermineemocracies,nd ead to the mergencefnewautocraticegimes.

Althoughhegeographicndpolitical ata reavailable rom 875to the resent,the vailabilityf dataonlaggedGDP percapita ndeconomic rowthonstrainsoursample otheyears1951 to1998.Economicdataare oftenmissing or evel-opingcountries,ocialist conomies, nd states nvolvedn conflictn thestan-darddata sources hat ave been used n most xisting ork.50 ere,we usemorecomprehensive,xpandedGDP datatoprotectgainst ample election iasesduetononrandom issing ata.51

ResultsThe results f ourbaselinemodel are shown s Model 1 inTable 1. Each rowlisting covariate amedisplays he stimated/3 oefficientndthe mplied =a + p coefficientor hat ovariate n the ubsequentolumn ields. hestandarderrors or he oefficientsre shownnparenthesesn therowbelow.52As can beseen at thebottom fTable 1,the ikelihood atio estofthe nullhypothesisfequal slopesacrossprevious egime tates thats,thatP3 y or that heparam-eters are ointly nsignificant)s clearly ejected.Hence,thecovariates ppearto havedifferentffectsn the ikelihood hat emocracieswillbecome utocra-cies andthe ikelihoodhat utocracieswill remain utocracies.Most of ourhypothesesn diffusion nd democratizationre stronglyup-ported ytheresults orModel 1 in Table 1. As can be seenfrom henegativeestimates or^ and/ in thefourth owofthemainbodyofthetable, higher

47. Rodrik999.48. These ata reunfortunatelyvailablenlyfter 965.49. Gleditsch004.50. Przeworskit l.2000, orxample,nlyncludeountriesn he ennWorldata,eavingutmanyocialistnd evelopingtates. lthoughecan eplicatehe ey ointsnour nalysisn ermsofsignandsignificancefestimatingoefficientssing heAlvarez t al. 1996democracymeasure,this ourcedramaticallyeduces ample ize and introducesossibleproblemsf nonrandomampleattrition.51. Gleditsch 002b.52. The variance or is givenbyVar(&)+ Var(/3) 2Cov(&,/3).


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Internationalontext fDemocratization925TABLE . Results orestimationftransition odel

Model1 Model2 Model 3(1951-98) (1951-98) (1875-1998)Covariates /3 y /3 y /P yConstant 2.276 3.675 1.863 3.682 -1.297 2.871(0.802) (0.552) (0.868) (0.551) (0.234) (0.196)LOGGED GDP PER CAPITA -0.501 -0.064 -0.401 -0.067(0.088) (0.062) (0.099) (0.062)LOGGED ENERGY CONSUMPTION -0.526 -0.073

PER CAPITA (0.126) (0.079)PROPORTIONFNEIGHBORING -0.525 -0.717 -0.483 -0.712 -0.591 -1.04DEMOCRACIES (0.258) (0.21) (0.268) (0.209) (0.197) (0.179)CIVILWAR 0.379 -0.013 0.423 -0.016 0.381 0.07(0.225) (0.157) (0.233) (0.157) (0.192) (0.153)YEARS OF PEACE AT TERRITORY 0.002 -0.004 0.003 -0.005 0.001 -0.002(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)ECONOMICROWTH -0.025 0.003 -0.021 0.003(0.013) (0.008) (0.012) (0.008)GLOBALROPORTIONF -0.512 -2.592 -1.025 -2.590 -0.575 -1.856DEMOCRACIES (1.047) (0.672) (1.091) (0.672) (0.723) (0.559)NEIGHBORINGRANSITION -0.172 -0.176 -0.251TO DEMOCRACY (0.066) (0.066) (0.055)TIME AS DEMOCRACY -0.023 -0.008(0.008) (0.004)TIME AS AUTOCRACY 0.001 0.002(0.002) (0.002)

N 6,159 6,159 8,788ModelLR-X2 6909.6 (df= 15) 6920.8 (df= 17) 9835.1 (df= 15)Test fHo: Constantlopes X2 4412.87 (df= 5) 2417.2 (df= 8) 3293.1 (df= 7)

proportionfdemocraticeighborsignificantlyecreases he ikelihoodhatutoc-racieswillendurethat s, ~ = -0.717) and ncreases he ikelihood hat emoc-racieswillbreak own thats,/3 -0.525). Moreover,transitionn a neighboringcountryignificantlyecreases he ikelihoodhatnautocracy illendure. morepeaceful egionalnvironmentecreases he ikelihoodhat nautocracy ill ndurebutdoesnothavea statisticallyignificantmpact n the ikelihood hat emocra-cieswillbreak own.53inally,wefind vidence hat ransitionsodemocracyremore ikely hehigherheglobalproportionfdemocracies; owever,heglobalproportionfdemocracies oesnot xert significantffect nthe urvival ates53. Additionalests ithhe iehl ndGoertz's000measuref nduringivalsnot hown)ike-wise uggesthatnenduringivalry akesutocracies oreikelyo endureuthasnoconsistenteffectnthe urvivalfdemocracy.


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926 Internationalrganizationofdemocracies.54ontrollingor ountry-specificttributesndglobalcharacter-isticsdoes notremove heeffectsftheregional roportionf democraciesndneighboringransitions.n contrasto PrzeworskindLimongi's onclusion hattransitionsmerge xogenouslys a "deus ex machina" utof thewhims fhis-tory,55heresults orModel 1 in Table 1 showthat utocraciesre significantlyless likely o endure n a regionwithmoredemocratictates,when neighboringstate xperiences transitionodemocracy,ndwhen heres less conflict.56Theeffects f thedomestic ovariates re argely onsistent ith xpectationsandprevious esearch. heresults orModel 1 in Table 1canbe read as support-ingPrzeworskindLimongi's onclusion hat lthough higherGDP per capitadoesdecrease herisk hat emocracieswill breakdown, t doesnot ignificantlyincrease he ikelihood fa transitionrom utocracyodemocracythat s, theestimated is effectivelyero).Likewise, conomicgrowthtrengthenshesur-vival ofdemocracies utdoes notpromoteransitionsnautocracies.ndeed, heestimated coefficients positive. ivilwars ncrease he ikelihoodhat emoc-racieswillbreak ownbuthavenosubstantiveffectnthe ikelihoodhat utoc-racieswillendure. dditional egressionsnot hown) ndicated hat urmeasureofexogenous conomic hockswasnotrelated oregime ype rtransitionsfter1965;however,hismaybe due tothe imited ataavailable.57Itmaybe questioned hetherurdataactually ollow first-orderarkov ro-cess or all the nformationbout ransitionndsurvival robabilitiesan be sum-marized ytheprevious tates fregimes lusthecovariates.Wewereunable oreject henullhypothesishat second-order arkov pecificationidnotfit hedatasignificantlyetter han hefirst-orderarkovprocess orModel 1. This isnotparticularlyurprising,s modelsforhigher-orderarkovprocesses nvari-

54. Thiscontrastsomewhat ith revious esearch,s Reiter 001band Pevehouse 002afindhattheregional roportionfdemocracies oes not nfluencehedurationfdemocracy, hileKadera,Crescenzi, nd Shannon 003 find hat higher lobal proportionfdemocraciesncreases he sur-vivalratesofdemocracies. he firstwostudies, owever, se proportions ithinworld egions sdefined y the COW project ather han ountry-specificeferenceroups, ndnone ofthestudiesconsider othglobalandregionalnfluences.55. PrzeworskindLimongi1997.56. Reestimatingodel3 without astern uropean tates nder oviet nfluencefter 945yieldsa largerndsignificantegative oefficientstimate or he ogofenergy onsumptionercapita, utdoesnotchange ur resultswith espect o the mpact f nternationalactors.57. Wehave also considerednternationalactorsmphasized yother esearchers,oneof whichchanged urmainresults or he mpact f internationalactors. evehouse 002a and 2002barguesthat eaders nnewdemocracies ely n internationalrganizationso"lock-in" oliciesandassuageeliteswhofear nmitigatedopulism. dding evehouse'smeasure f thedemocraticensityf nter-national rganizationsnot hown)yields esults omewhatnconsistentith isexpectations,uggest-ingthat ransitionso democracy re more ikely n autocracies onnected o highly emocraticinternationalrganizations,ut nternationalrganizationso not ppear ohelp oconsolidate emoc-racy.Othershave highlightedhechanging ole of the CatholicChurch,whichhistoricallyftendenounced emocracyndsupportedutocraticulebutbecame nactive romoterfdemocracyftertheSecond VaticanCouncil, 1962-65; see Huntington991. We found hatdemocracyeems morelikely oendurenCatholic ocieties fter heSecondVatican ouncil althoughhedifferences notstatisticallyignificant),ut ransitionsctually eemed ess frequent.


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Internationalontext fDemocratization927

ably nvolve veryhighnumber fparameters."8s a simplerlternative odeloftimedependence, e introducedwo covariates ountinghe time hat oun-trieshaveremained emocracies nd autocracies,espectively,o thefirst-orderMarkovmodel.The results fthis stimationre shown s Model 2 in Table 1.Consistent ith heories fdemocraticonsolidation,59heestimatesn therowforTIMEASDEMOCRACYuggestthattransitions o autocracybecome increasinglyless likely he onger ountries averemained emocratic. owever, he urvivalratesofnondemocracieso notappear odependon time, s the coefficientorTIME AS AUTOCRACY is notdifferentrom . This s perhaps ot urprising,s thenondemocracyategoriesump ogetheruitedifferentegimeshat hare ittle ncommon eyondnotbeingdemocraciesndmaydisplay great eal of nstabil-ity.Using rregularransfersfpower oidentifyegime hangeswithin utocra-cies,GleditschndChoung indvidence hat articularutocraticegimes ecomemore ikely osurvive he onger hey ave heldpower.60heeffectsftheothercovariates, owever,onotqualitativelyhangewhen ontrollingor imedepen-dence,and the mpact fregional ndinternationalactors tillappears ohaveimportantffects ntransitionsodemocracy.61Boix andStokeshaverecentlyrgued hat rzeworskindLimongi's ismissalofmodernizationheory-thats, thatdevelopmentncreases heprospectshatautocracies illbecomedemocratic-isanartifactf imitingheir ata oa post-1951 sample.62incemany ountrieshatdevelopedprior oWorldWar I hadalready urnedemocraticefore 951,a samplebased onthisperiodmayunder-statetherole of developmentn theevolution f democracyn thefirstwave.Accordingly,ne might sk whetherhe results hownherereflect short imeperiod. heCOW project's stimates fenergyonsumptionanserve s a proxyfor conomicwealthprior o 1945.63Model 3 in Table 1 displays heresults orourmodelwhenestimated or he fulltimeperiod1875 to 1998,using oggedenergyonsumptionercapitarather hanGDP percapita.As canbe seen, he^estimate or he og of energy onsumptionercapita s negative, ut stillnotstatisticallyignificant. oreimportantly,he coefficientstimates or heothercovariates emain onsistent,ndourconclusionsegardinghe mportanceftheregional nd internationalontext o notchangewhenwe look at theextendedtimeperiod. o ensure hat heEastern uropean ountrieslonedo notdrive urresults, e reestimatedurModel3 excludingll the astern uropeantates nderSoviet nfluencefter 945.Thisyields larger egative oefficientstimate or

58. BerchtoldndRaftery002.59. Forexample,Gasiorowskind Power1997.60. GleditschndChoung 004.61. Wealsotried nonparametricodel pecification,llowing ornonlinearime ependence,utthis did not notablyimprove on the linear specification.62. Boix andStokes2003.63. We use energy onsumptionfigures rom he COW National MilitaryCapabilities data and extendthe current data (Version 2.1) beyond 1992 with estimates predicted from a linear regression of acountry'soggedGDP percapita nd a time rend.


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928 Internationalrganizationthe og ofenergy onsumptionercapitabutdoes notchangeourresultswithrespect o the mpact f nternationalactors.Wehave shown hat heeffect f differencesn theregional ontextn transi-tionprobabilitiesersistsvenwhen akingnto ccount ountry-specificovari-ates ndcommon rends.heprobabilityhatnautocracy illbecome democracyincreasesmarkedlys moreof itsneighboringtates re democracies rexperi-ence transitionsodemocracy.igure displays nonparametricstimatef themarginalffects verdifferencesn theproportionfneighboringemocracies,basedonModel3 inTable 1,keeping hevalueof other ariables t theirmedi-ans.Substantively,his ranslateso a middle-incomeountryhat oesnotexpe-rience civilwar andhas been an autocracywithoutxperiencingonflict orover hree ecades.The solid ine ndicates hepredictedrobabilitiesfa transi-tion odemocracy hen heres a transitionna neighboringountry.he dashedline ndicates hetransitionrobabilitiesor case without neighboringransi-tion.As can be seen, he ransitionrobabilitiesor typicalutocracyn a givenyearremainow,wellbelow 015,when smallproportionfneighboringtatesaredemocracies-toward he eft ide of the horizontalxis-and there re notransitionsnneighboringtates.When heproportionfneighboringtates xceedsone-half,owever,he ransitionrobabilitiesncrease uitedramatically.he ike-

.30->11Neighboring ransition2 .25- ----- Noneighboringransition2-

0 .20-c .15-

.10-0,. .05-

--------- -----------------0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1Proportionfneighboringemocracies

FIGURE5. Transition robabilitiesby regional context,holdingothercovariatesat themedian


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TABLE . Predicted ersus bserved egimetatusPredicted egime

Model1 Model 2 Model 3Observed egime Autocracy Democracy Autocracy Democracy Autocracy DemocracyAutocracy 2016 72 2016 72 2865 96Democracy 41 4029 41 4029 64 5762

lihoodofa transitionodemocracyxceeds 10whenmore han 5 percentf theneighboringtates redemocraciesnd s evenhigherwhen ther ountriesn theregion xperienceransitionsodemocracy.Recall that hepredicted robabilitiesrom he modelrefer o the ikelihoodof transitionsn a givenyear, nd that he ikelihood f a transitionccurringover a longertimeperiodwill be higher. or an autocracy hathas a mod-erately ighpredictedikelihoodftransitionodemocracynanyonegivenyeargiven tsdomestic nd regional ttributesforexample, 1), the mplied ikeli-hood that twill remain n autocracy orfiveyears s (1 - .1)5,which s lessthan 6.Table 2 compares he observed egimes o thepredictionsfthemodel.Thepercentagefobservationslassifiedorrectlyythemodels anges rom 8.1 to98.2 percent. he shareof democraciesn thesamplecorrectlylassified ariesfrom 6.55 to96.75 percent.More mportantly,hepredictedransitionrobabil-ities re muchhigher or hecaseswherewe observe ransitionshan or he etsofautocracies nddemocraciesngeneral.Overall, heseresults endstrong upport o our claimsaboutthesalience oftheregional ontext n regime hanges.Knowing country'socation nd thecharacteristicsfsurroundingntities ields onsiderableredictiveower. hereis a markedendencyor asestochange nwayssimilarotheir egional ontextover ime, ndtransitionsnonecountryftenpillover oother onnectedtates.Given suchevidenceofdependence nddiffusion etween ountries,heclaimthat egime hange s entirelyandom houldnot be accepted.Althoughransi-tions odemocracyrerelativelyare, hey reclearlymore ommon nder omeconditions hanothers. his undermineshe claim that ransitionso democracyarerandomvents.64

64. See Przeworskital. 2000; and PrzeworskindLimongi 997.


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930 InternationalrganizationConclusionOur results ttest ohowtheprospects ordemocracyrenotexclusively elatedto domestic ttributesut are also affected y external onditionsnd events.Democratizationannot e seenexclusivelys a result ffunctionallyimilar ro-cessesunfoldingndependentlyithin ach country.ather,nternationalventsandprocesses ppearto exert strongnfluencen democratization,onsistentwith ur rgumenthat xternalnfluencesanchange he elative ower factorsandgroups s well as theevaluations r relative ayoffs orparticularnstitu-tional rrangements.omestic olitical rocesses redeeply ffectedywhat oeson in neighboringocieties, ven ifthespecificways n which xternal ventsinfluenceransitionsary rom ontexto context. iffusionrocessesmong tatesinfluencehedistributionfdemocracyn the nternationalystemnd there s astrongssociation etween country'snstitutionsndthe xtentfdemocracynthe urroundingegion.Notonly reregimes enerallyimilarwithinegions, uttheres also a strongendencyor ransitionso mpart regional onvergence.historyfprior egional onflict ecreases he ikelihood hat country illbedemocratic.Manytransitionsnvolve omeelement fsurprisendtheir imingmaynotbefully redictable. urability opredict ther hanges n externalontext uchasconflictndpeaceis also limited tbest, nd tmaybedifficultoaccuratelyore-casthowregions re ikely oevolve overthenearfuture. owever,we can stillmake nferencesbout n increasen the ikelihood ftransitions,onditional ntransitionsn othertates nd nternationalvents hatnfluencehefeatureshap-ingtheprospects ordemocratization.lthought s difficultofully pecifyhefull ange fpossiblemicro-levelrocesses fdemocratizationndshowhow nter-national actorsnfluencehese na model t the ggregateevel, tseems heoret-ically nappropriateotreat hedomesticrena s isolated romr ndependentfthe nternationalontext. ince theregional ontextsmore ermeableochangesin theshort erm han ocioeconomic actors,nternationalnfluencesn democ-racy relikely obe as importants thedomestic socialrequisites."Wedo notthinkhattwill be feasible osort hroughhemultiple aths hrough hich ran-sitionsmay ome bout nd select ne avenue smore ikelyhan thersnadvance.However, urresults llowus tofirmlyeject he deathatnstitutionalhange sdrivenntirelyydomestic rocesses ndunaffectedyregionalnd nternationalevents. tmake ittle ensetoexcludetheregional ontextndassume hat ran-sitions odemocracyre randomndexogenously eterminedhen heregionalcontextppears o exert n important,ynamicnfluencentransitionrocesses.ReferencesAlesina, Alberto, Enrico Spolaore, and Romain Wacziarg. 2000. Economic Integrationand PoliticalDisintegration.American Economic Review 90 (5):1276-96.


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Internationalontext f Democratization931Alexander, erard. 002. TheSourcesofDemocratic onsolidation.thaca,N.Y.: CornellUniversityPress.Almond,GabrielA., andSidneyVerba.1963. TheCivic Culture: oliticalAttitudesndDemocracyn

FiveNations.Boston:Little, rown.Alvarez,MichaelR.,AdamPrzeworski,oseCheibub,nd Fernando imongi. 996.Classifyingolit-ical Regimes. tudies nComparativenternationalevelopment1 (1):3-36.Ash,Timothy arton. 999. Ten YearsAfter. ew York eview fBooks 46:16-19.Barzel,Yoram, ndEdgarKiser.1997. TheDevelopmentnd Declineof MedievalVotingnstitutions:A ComparisonfEngland nd France.Economicnquiry 5 (2):244-60.Beetham, avid,ed. 1994.DefiningndMeasuring emocracy. ondon:Sage.Beck,Nathaniel, avidEpstein, imonJackman,ndSharyn 'Halloran.2001.Alternativeodels ofDynamicsnBinary ime-Series ross-SectionModels: TheExampleofStateFailure.Paperpre-sented t the18thAnnualMeeting f theSociety orPoliticalMethodology,uly, tlanta.Berchtold, ndre, ndAdrianRaftery.002. The Mixture ransition istribution odel forHigh-OrderMarkovChains ndNon-Gaussian imeSeries.Statisticalcience17 (3):328-56.Boix,Carles.2003.DemocracyndRedistribution.ambridge: ambridge niversityress.Boix, Carles, and Susan C. Stokes. 2003. EndogenousDemocratization.WorldPolitics 55 (4):517-49.Bollen,Kenneth . 1979. PoliticalDemocracynd theTiming fDevelopment. merican ociologi-cal Review 4 (4):572-87.- . 1990. Political emocracy: onceptualndMeasurementraps.Comparativetudiesn nter-nationalDevelopment5 (1):7-24.Buenode Mesquita,Bruce,Alastair mith, andolphM. Siverson,nd James . Morrow. 003. TheLogicofPoliticalSurvival. ambridge, ass.:MIT Press.Casper,Gretchen,nd MichelleM. Taylor. 996.Negotiatingemocracy:TransitionsromAuthori-tarianRule.Pittsburgh,enn.:UniversityfPittsburghress.Deutsch,KarlW. 1954. PoliticalCommunityt the nternationalevel: Problems fDefinitionndMeasurement.ardenCity,N.Y.: Doubleday.Diehl,PaulF.,andGaryGoertz. 000. War ndPeace in nternationalivalry. nnArbor:UniversityofMichigan ress.Doorenspleet, enske. 2000. Reassessing he Three Wavesof Democratization.World olitics 52(3):384-406.Galton,Francis.1889. Comment n E. B. Tylor n a Methodof InvestigatingheDevelopmentfInstitutions:pplied oLaws ofMarriagendDescent.Journal ftheRoyalAnthropologicalnsti-tute 8:268-9.Gasiorowski, arkJ.1995. EconomicCrisis nd PoliticalRegimeChange:An EventHistory naly-sis. American oliticalScienceReview 9 (4):882-97.Gasiorowski,MarkJ., ndTimothyower.1997. nstitutionalesignand Democratic onsolidationin theThirdWorld.ComparativeoliticalStudies 0 (2):123-55.Gastil,Raymond . 1985.TheComparative urvey f Freedom: 985.Freedom t ssue 82:3-16.Gates,Scott,Torbjorn . Knutsen,ndJonathonW. Moses. 1996.Democracy nd Peace: A MoreSkepticalView.Journal fPeace Research 3 (1):1-10.Gastner,MichaelT., andMarkE. J.Newman. 004.Diffusion-Based ethod or roducing ensity-EqualizingMaps.ProceedingsftheNationalAcademy fSciences101 (20):7499-504.Gleditsch, ristiankrede. 002a. AllInternationalolitics s Local: TheDiffusion fConflict,nte-gration,ndDemocratization.nnArbor:UniversityfMichigan ress.

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diffusion and the international context of democratization

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