dias 1 institut for statskundskab small states and european security anders wivel associate...

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Institut for Statskundskab

Small States and European Security

Anders WivelAssociate Professor, PhDDepartment of Political ScienceUniversity of Copenhagen

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Today’s programme

1) Small states and European security: Exploring the issues at stake

2) Exploring the case of the Nordic countries


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Exploring the issues at stake: the historical legacy

Accepting that in international relations ‘the strong do

what they have the power to do and the weak accept

what they have to accept’ (Thucydides [1954] 1972:

302), small states have tended to pursue pragmatic

and reactive security policies.


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Exploring the issues at stake: the nineteenth century

In the nineteenth century, the Congress of Vienna recognized the special role of the United Kingdom, Prussia, Austria, France and Russia, and for almost a century the great powers set the rules of the game by meeting ‘in concert on a regular basis in order to discuss questions of concern, and to draw up agreements and treaties’ (Neumann and Gstöhl 2006: 5).

Small states were those states that were not great powers, i.e. the states left to obey the rules of the game, because they were too weak to be taken seriously when the rules were negotiated.


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Exploring the issues at stake: the twentieth century I

In the first half of the twentieth century, conditions seemed to worsen for small states as the development of new weapons technology widened the gap between great powers and small states.

As noted by Annette Baker Fox in her classic study of the power of small states, ‘[d]uring World War II it was widely asserted that the day of the small power was over. Not only could such a state have no security under modern conditions of war; it could have no future in the peace that presumably one day would follow’ (Fox 2006 [1959]: 39).


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Exploring the issues at stake: the twentieth century II

Superpower rivalry following the end of the war and simultaneously intensified and ameliorated the security predicament of small states.

On the one hand, the institutions of international society were strengthened.

On the other hand, a world with two superpowers of continental size and global reach was also a world of even greater power disparity than had been the case before the war.


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Exploring the issues at stake: after the Cold War

Group discussion I

• Which security threats, opportunities and demands have characterized small state security in Europe in the first 25 years after the end of the Cold War?

• What are the differences and similarities between Europe and other parts of the world?


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Exploring the issues at stake: What has changed about small state security?

In Europe, the context of small state security changed in at least six ways in the first two and a half decades after the end of the Cold War. This created a ‘new’ security environment.

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New in the sense ’Europeanized’• The European Union organize security on a

European scale. This creates new expectations and responsibilities.

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New in the sense ’globalized’• Global threats: terrorism, finance, climate• Coalitions of the willing• A new role for NATO

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New in the sense ‘little threat of military conquest’• Europe may still be divided into small states

and great powers but the threat of military invasion is greatly diminished.

• This is different from the past, but also different from the situation in other parts of the world, including regions very close to Europe.

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New in the sense ‘heavily institutionalized’• International institutions creates common

rules for all the actors. This benefits the weaker actors, because it restricts the actions of the strong.

• The rules at the very least necessitates an explanation, when states do not follow them.

• Also, rules may give the weaker actors ‘voice-opportunities’.

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New in the sense ‘more small states than ever able to pursue their interests as defined by domestic elites’• Today, small states in Europe have much

more freedom of manoeuvre than has been the case throughout history.

• This is because there is little threat of military conquest to most small states in the region, and because of the opportunities provided by European institutions.

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New in the sense multi-dimensional• Military hard security, non-state-violence,

economic security, accidents and natural hazards ‘Comprehensive’, multi-functional security

agendas (Bailes et al. 2014)New demands for activities and

contributionsNew opportunities for ‘niche’-influence

New opportunities rather than challenges?


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The return of traditional power politics?

• The return of territorial politics• spheres of influence and interest• Military conflict and territorial disputes

(Ukraine, Georgia)


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• The return of the state• Financial crisis• Defence politics• Legitimacy/public opinion


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• The return of geopolitics• East/West divide: The importance of Russia• North/South Divide: Africa/the Middle East

and the Arctic


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Exploring the case of the Nordic countries

Five points about current Nordic security policies

1. All Nordic countries are generally supportive of the current liberal world order

2. The willingness of the Nordic countries to support these values with military means varies along a continuum with Denmark at one end and Finland at the other

3. The ability of the Nordic states to support these values with military means varies along a continuum with Denmark at one end and Iceland at the other.

4. All Nordic countries engage in debates on international security, even when they have no direct national interests in the issues discussed

5. All Nordic countries are small European states facing the same dilemmas on when, how and why to engage in these issues of global order and indirect threat, but with marginally different cost-benefit analyses due to their different geopolitical locations and institutional affiliations.


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The Nordic dimension has been important in the security policies of the countries of the region in at least two ways:• one related to the Nordic security complex• the other related to the Nordic security community.


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• From the instigation of the bipolar era in 1945, it no longer made geopolitical sense to speak of an independent Nordic security complex.

• Paradoxically, at the same time as the Nordic security complex disappeared as a meaningful geopolitical entity by the end of the Second World War, it was re-launched as a political instrument.

• The ‘Nordic balance’-argument was primarily a useful policy instrument for Denmark and Norway.



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The idea of a Nordic security community has been used politically by the Nordic states:

In the aftermath of the Second World War, the idea of security community was used to convey a message to the two superpowers that the Nordic region was an area of low tension with small states focused on cooperation and non-provocation. In this way the Nordic security community served as a both real and normative basis for the ‘Nordic balance’.

Also, the Nordic security community served as a platform for a Nordic bloc in international relations.


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The Nordic reaction to the post-Cold War unipolar world order has been accommodating, initially accepting if not welcoming, and gradually contributing actively to promoting the basic values of this order: liberal democracy, rule of law and human rights.

The active Nordic support for the unipolar world order might be seen as a surprise considering the high-profile Nordic identity politics of the Cold War. ‘Nordic’ was, and to some extent continues to be a code for ‘different from the United States and the old European great powers’.


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A closer look unveils at least two reasons, why we should not be surprised at all:

1. High profile Nordic ‘uniqueness’ during the Cold War was conditioned on a security order based on European institutionalization and US military power, ironically the very same features of the Cold War order that the Nordic bloc felt ‘different from’ and ‘better than’.

2. Although occasionally hidden in official rhetoric, the Nordic states were already well integrated into the unipolar order, which was globalized as a consequence of the collapse of the Soviet Union.


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Four out of five Nordic states have real military capbilities.

They generally agree on which global security challenges are the most important: terrorism, climate change and environmental disasters, demographic changes, pandemics, poverty, economic and financial meltdown, limited energy resources, organized crime.


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However, they differ in regard to which means they see as legitimate and useful tools to meet these challenges.

Denmark sees the use of military forces as a necessary and useful tool to meet global challenges, and, at the same time, to position Denmark actively in international relations.

The other Nordic states view the use of military force as more closely connected to the defence of national values and territory.


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These different views on the use of military force and international order reflect three more fundamental differences between the Nordic states:

1. The importance of the legalization of world politics2. Territoriality3. Most fundamentally, the Nordic states differ on what

international order it is that they are willing to defend. Denmark lives in the unipolar world order (emphasizing unipolar), whereas the other Nordic states live in the unipolar world order (emphasizing order).


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Group discussion II

• What are the main similarities and differences between the Nordic countries and other small states in Europe?

• What lessons might other small states learn from the experiences of the Nordic countries?


dias 1 institut for statskundskab small states and european security anders wivel associate...

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