Dialogues between International and Public Law

A conference organised by BIICL and Melbourne Law School,30 June – 1 July 2016, London

Report of Proceedings

Dialogues between International and Public Law

A conference organised by BIICL and Melbourne Law School,30 June – 1 July 2016, London

Report of Proceedings

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Contents Page

Introduction 3

Summary Report of Proceedings 4

Conference Opening: How the Dialogues Began 4

Keynote Address by Lord Peter Goldsmith QC PC, Debevoise & Plimpton: Dialogues Between International and Public Law 6

Panel 1: The relationship between public international law and public Law – why is it important in practice and in theory? 10

• Chair:SirBernardRixQC,20EssexSt Chambers 10

• SirFrankBerman,KCMGQC,BIICL:“InternationalandPublicLaw:Perspectives from Government and Private Legal Practice” 10

• ProfessorCherylSaunders,MelbourneLawSchool:“PubliclawandPublic International Law: a Public Law Perspective on Interdependence” 13

• ProfessorGerrySimpson,LondonSchoolofEconomicsandMelbourneLawSchool:“InternationalLawasPublicLaw” 17

Panel 2: Impacts of public international law on public law 22

• Chair:ProfessorRobertMcCorquodale,BIICL 22

• DrVeronicaFikfak,HomertonCollege,CambridgeUniversity:“Englishcourts’ ‘internalisation’oftheEuropeanConventiononHumanRights?–BetweenTheory and Practice” 22

• ProfessorMichaelCrommelin,MelbourneLawSchool:“ThePacific‘Solution’ to the Refugee Crisis: A Case Study” 26

• ProfessorDapoAkande,OxfordUniversity:“Non-justiciabilityandthe ForeignActofStateDoctrine” 30

Panel 3: Public law influences on public international law 34

• Chair:ProfessorDanSarooshi,OxfordUniversityandEssexCourtChambers 34

• SirJeffreyJowellQC,BlackstoneChambers:”TheInternationalisationofthe Right to Administrative Justice” 34

• Aimee-JaneLee,Debevoise&Plimpton:”TheRoleofPublicLawNotionsof Proportionality in Investment Arbitration and in Contemporary Treaty Practice” 37

• BenJuratowitch,FreshfieldsBruckhausDeringer:“IndividualRightsinDisputes Between States” 42

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Panel 4: Conceptsof”public”in“public”internationaland“public”law 47

• Chair:JillBarrett,BIICL 47

• ProfessorDavidFeldmanQC,CambridgeUniversity:“TheVaryingMeaningof ‘Public’inPublicLawandPublicInternationalLaw” 48

• ProfessorDrArminvonBogdandy,MaxPlanckInstituteforComparativePublic LawandInternationalLaw,Heidelberg;andUniversityofFrankfurt “FromPublicInternationaltoInternationalPublicLaw.TranslatingWorldPublic Opinion into International Public Authority” 50

• DrJasonVaruhas,MelbourneLawSchool:“AgainstthePublic–PrivateLaw Divide: Pluralism and Public Law” 53

Panel 5: Complications of Pluralism 59

• Chair:ProfessorDawnOliver,UniversityCollegeLondon 59

• AlistairMcGlone,InternationalEnvironmentalLawConsultant:“CaseStudyon CompliancebyEUInstitutionswithInternationalObligationsArisingUnderthe Aarhus Convention” 59

• DrJarrodHepburn,MelbourneLawSchool:“ParallelExpropriationNormsin International Law and Australian Law” 63

Panel6:Futuredirections 68

• Chair:RtHonSirStanleyBurntonQC,OneEssexCourtChambers 68

• TimEickeQC,EssexCourtChambers:“TheFuturePotentialforHumanRightsand PublicLawIssuestoFeatureinInvestmentTreatyNegotiationsandArbitrations” 68

• DouglasWilson,Foreign&CommonwealthOffice:“IssuesontheHorizon: InternationalLawPositionsasanActofForeignPolicy?” 71

• ProfessorThomasPoole,LondonSchoolofEconomics:“FutureNarrativeson StateSovereignty:WhereareweHeading?” 72

• DrAntoniosTzanakopoulos,OxfordUniversity:“WhatCanweTakeAway FromTheseDialogues?” 74

Annex1:Speakerbiographies 78

Annex2:Conferenceprogramme 87

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Introduction

Thistwo-dayconferencebroughttogetherforthefirsttimeleadingacademicandpractisinglawyers topoolknowledgeandshareperspectiveson thechangingrelationshipbetweenpublicinternationallawanddomesticpubliclawindifferentjurisdictions.

Organised by the British Institute of International and Comparative Law (BIICL) and the Melbourne Law School (MLS), the aim of the conference was to generate constructive dialogue on how national public law and public international law and practice should, and must,co-exist,combiningtheorywithcasestudiesandtheexperienceofpractitioners.

The conference was attended by 97 people, including prominent academics in international lawandpubliclawfieldsfromanumberofcountries,experiencedpractitionersfromprivatepractice and government legal practice, and serving and retired members of the senior British andAustralianjudiciary.IttookplaceatWoburnHouseConferenceCentre,20–24TavistockSquare,London,WC1H9HQ.

Thisreportsummarisestheproceedings.1

1 This reportwaswrittenbyYvonneYueWangandZoeHough, Students ofMelbourne LawSchool andResearchInternsontheWattsPublicInternationalLawProgramme,BIICL,underthesupervisionofJillBarrett.Theauthorsaregratefultotheconferencespeakersforreviewingthesummariesoftheirremarksindraft.

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Summary Report of Conference Proceedings

Conference opening remarks: how the Dialogues began

Jill Barrett, the ArthurWatts Senior Research Fellow in Public International Law at BIICLopenedtheconferencebydescribingitasthehighpointofthefirstfiveyearsofcollaborationbetweenBIICL andMLS.Developing this relationship has beenan important part of theArthurWattspublicinternationallawprogrammefromitsinception,sovisitingMLStoinitiatetheprogrammewasoneofherfirstandmostenjoyableduties.

Ms Barrett recounted her firstmeetingwith ProfessorCheryl Saunders in herMelbourneUniversityoffice in2012,duringwhich theydiscovereda common interest ina rangeofissuesattheinterfaceoftheirtwofieldsofspecialisation–internationallawandpubliclaw.Forexample,theyhadbothbeeninvolvedinimplementingreformsonparliamentarycontrolof treaties.The ideaofa jointconferencewhichbrings togetherpeople frombothpubliclawand international lawfieldswas thusconceived, in the realmof fantasy,orso it thenseemed.

Meanwhile,otherelementsoftheArthurWattscollaborativeprogrammeproceeded,andintotaltenstudentsfromMLShaveworkedatBIICLasresearchinternsontheWattsprogramme.

Jill Barrett opening the conference

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Theninthandtentharewithustoday:ZoeHoughandYvonneYueWang,andtheyarepartoftheteamthathasbeenworkinghardtopreparefortheconference.

In addition, members of MLS staff have come to BIICL to conduct research and collaborate on seminars.Bywayofexample,Dr JasonVaruhas is currently in residencepursuinghisresearchon“MappingPublicLaw”,asaVisitingFellowatBIICL.

MsBarrettstatedthatgraduallyherfantasyofworkingwithProfessorSaunderstoconvenea conference on the international law/public law interface became a reality, with the help of a number of people at BIICL and MLS, and in particular the sponsors for the conference: FreshfieldsBruckhausDeringerandDebevoise&Plimpton.Shealso thankedEssexCourtChambersforsponsoringtherefreshmentsandthespeakers’dinner.

MsBarrettremarkedthatitbroughtherenormouspleasuretoseeProfessorSaundersandhercolleagues present at the conference, including Professor Michael Crommelin and Dr Jarrod HepburnwhocametoLondonspeciallyforthisevent.ShethenintroducedSirBernardRix,former Lord Justice of Appeal in the Court of Appeal, and now a practising arbitrator at 20 EssexSt,asChairforthekeynoteaddressandpanelonediscussions.

SirBernardRixremarkedthat,onapersonalnote,hehadvisitedMelbournearoundChristmastimelastyearandfoundit tobeafinecity.Hethenintroducedthekeynotespeaker,LordPeterGoldsmith,whowastheUK’sAttorneyGeneralfrom2001–2007,andbeforethat,amostdistinguishedbarrister.LordGoldsmithisnowtheCo-ManagingPartnerandChairofEuropeanandAsianLitigationatDebevoise&Plimpton.LordGoldsmithalsofoundedtheBarofEnglandandWales’sProBonoUnit,ofwhichheisnowPresident.

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Keynote address: Dialogues between International and Public Law

Lord Peter Goldsmith QC PC, Debevoise & Plimpton

The “Dialogues between International and Public Law” conference was opened with akeynoteaddressdeliveredby LordPeterGoldsmithQCPC,describedafterwardsby theChair,SirBernardRix,asan“uptodate,topical,comprehensive,informativeandchallengingaddress.”

LordGoldsmithopenedbyremarkingthattheBrexitreferendumresultofthepreviousweekhad thrown the importance of dialogues between international and public law into sharp relief.ThiswasdemonstratedbythefactthatoneofthekeythemesofthereferendumdebatewasthenatureandextentofthepowersexercisedbytheEuropeanUnionandthelocus,orplace, where decisions on matters related to the public interest across a spectrum of issues shouldbetaken.Hestatedthatformanyvoters,thedelegationofcertainpublicpowersfromtheUKtotheEUwasadeterminativefactor.

LordGoldsmithwent on to say that, although the EUwas born out of international law,havingbeenestablishedby international treaties, theMemberStatesexpresslyagreed inthosetreatiestopooltheirsovereignpowersintheEUinthebeliefthatthecommongoodwasbetterachievedbyStatesworking inconcert. Thus, theEU institutionsexercisemanypublic functions and the relationship between the institutions, and between the institutions and theMemberStates, isgovernedbydetailedruleswhichcouldbedescribedasEuropean

Lord Peter Goldsmith QC PC

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publicoradministrativelaw.ItisthereforenotaccuratetodescribetheEUasaninternationalorganisationorapurelyinternationalbody.It isasui generis union, often described as a supranationalorganisation.

Thus,althoughtheEUwascreatedbyinternationallaw,ithasdevelopedsomegovernanceorconstitutionalfeatureswhichreplicatethoseofadomesticbody.TheexistentialandoftenfractiousdebatesthatculminatedinthevotetoleavetheEUandwhichcontinuetofomentinotherEUMemberStatesareinlargepartabouttheattributionofsuchpubliccharacteristicsandpowerstowhatwasoriginallyconceivedofasaninternationalorganisation.Theinteractionbetween international and public law is therefore not only a current and contemporary topic, itiscriticaltoourunderstandingofpublicgovernancetoday.

Focusingon theconference theme,heobserved that theword“public” isa termderivedfrom theLatinword for“of thepeople”.However, theuseof thiscommon term todenote“public” international law and domestic “public” law disguises a difference, at least innature,betweenthetwolegalregimes.Traditionally,publicinternationallawgovernedtherelationshipbetweensovereignStates;itoperatedonahorizontalplane.Incontrast,domesticpublic law operated in a vertical manner, governing the relationship between individuals and government.However, this traditionaldistinctionno longer reflectscontemporarypractice.Publicinternationallawisnolongersolelythereserveofsovereignstates.National,regional,internationalandsupranationalorganisations,certainindividuals,includinginvestors,NGOs,andevencriminalorganisationsandterroristscanbethesubjectsofpublicinternationallawtodifferentextentsandindifferentguises.

The other key idea contained in the title of the conference is that of “dialogues”. LordGoldsmith suggested that the word “dialogues” contains many facets. At one level, adialogueisaconversationoranexchangeofoftencontrastingviews.Italsopresupposesaconversationorinteractionwiththeaimofresolvingaconflict.Otheressentialfacetstotheconceptof“dialogue”inthecontextoftheinteractionbetweeninternationalandpubliclawareilluminatedbyaskingthequestion:Whoaretheinterlocutorsinthisdialogue?Inhisview,the interlocutors include the courts, both national and international, national and international legislators,academicsandpractitioners.

LordGoldsmiththensetoutthreemainideaswhichheconsideredcentraltotheconference.These were the:

1. upward transmissionof legalconcepts fromdomesticpublic law topublic internationallaw;

2. downwardtransmissionofconceptsfrominternationallawtodomesticpubliclaw;

3. ever closer boundaries between public international law and public law, which canlead to multiple legal orders applying to the same situation concurrently and potentially irreconcilably.

First,whentalkingabouttheupwardtransmissionoflegalconceptsfromdomesticpubliclawto international law, Lord Goldsmith commented that it was perhaps trite to say that domestic publiclawplaysasignificantroleinthedevelopmentofinternationalnorms.Itisinfluentialatboththesubstantiveandprocedurallevel.Indeed,thegeneralprinciplesoflawofcivilised

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nationsareoneofthesourcesofinternationallawarticulatedinArticle38(1)oftheStatuteoftheInternationalCourtofJustice(“ICJ”).

As JamesCrawfordwrote in the8th EditionofBrownlie’s Principles of Public International Law:

Aninternationaltribunalchooses,editsandadaptselementsfromotherdevelopedsystems.The result is a body of international law, the content of which has been influenced by domesticlawbutwhichisstillitsowncreation.2

This is demonstrated by the fact that the principle of good faith, derived from domestic law, is deployed with increasing regularity before the ICJ and before investor-state tribunals.Estoppel,res judicata andacquiescence,amongotherprinciplesderivedfromdomesticlegalsystems,havealsobeenreferredtoattheinternationallevel.

Oneofthemostsignificantexamplesofthisinteractionisthedoctrineofproportionality.Itisadoctrine that has its genesis in the German administrative courts of the late eighteenth century andtodayhasenteredthelexiconofconstitutional,administrativeandinternationaltribunals,including theWorld TradeOrganisationand investor-statearbitration tribunals. Indeed, ithas gone full circle: having been transmitted from civil law systems to international tribunals, itsprevalenceinthejurisprudenceoftheEuropeanCourtofHumanRights(ECtHR)hasledtoitsdiffusionbackdowntothedomesticlevelandintothepracticeofcommonlawcourts.Forexample,thecourtsofEnglandandWaleshaveincorporatedaproportionalitytestintothegeneral standard for judicial review, irrespectiveofwhether thecasehasaEuropeanConventiononHumanRights(ECHR)dimension.Initially,itonlyappliedtheproportionalitytestwhenapplyingrightscontainedintheECHR.

Lord Goldsmith then moved to his second point about the downward transmission of concepts frominternationallawtodomesticpubliclaw.Atthemostbasiclevel,internationallawhasadirectimpactatthedomesticlevelwhenitisincorporatedintodomesticlaw.Perhapsthemostcommonexampleofthistodayistheincorporationofinternationalhumanrightstreatiesintodomesticlaw,allowinganindividualtomakeaclaimforbreachofinternationalobligationsinadomesticcourt.

However, there are also more indirect ways in which the norms of public international law can impact upon domestic public law, such as when the interpretation of domestic standards is informedorinfluencedbyinternationalobligations.ThiswasillustratedinarecentlandmarkclimatechangecaseintheNetherlands,Urgenda Foundation v The Netherlands. The Hague DistrictCourtfoundtheDutchStateliableforfailingtotakeadequatemeasurestopreventdangerous climate change and ordered it to reduce emissions by 25 per cent by 2020 as compared to1990.3 Importantly, the decision was not based on international climate change rules, but on a domestic tort action under the Dutch Civil Code that provides that the Stateowesadutyofcaretoitscitizens.Thecourtheldthatwheninterpretingthescopeof

2 James Crawford, Brownlie’s Princi ples of International Law(8thedn,OUP2012)35.3 Urgenda Foundation v the State of the Netherlands (Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment)

C/09/456689/HAZA13-1396(Englishtranslation).

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theState’s(domesticlaw)dutyofcare,itwasrequiredtotaketheState’sinternationallawobligations into account,4 including its climate change commitments and contributions under theKyotoProtocol.

ThethirdissuethatLordGoldsmithtoucheduponconcernedtheidentificationofthelocusofpublicpower,hierarchiesandpluralism.Ithasalreadybeendemonstratedthatlegalprinciplesare transmitted between international and public law and that this transmission goes in both directions.However,itcanbeseenthattherehasbeenanexpansionoftheareasinwhichpublic international law operates. The diminishing boundaries between international andpublic law give rise to an increasing possibility of multiple legal norms or regimes applying concurrentlytothesamesituation,potentiallyirreconcilably.

Forexample, in the investor-Statecontext, there isagrowingbodyof claims inwhichaninvestorhaschallengedataxassessmentinallegedbreachofabilateraltaxtreatybeforean investment treaty tribunal, on the basis that the alleged breach of the tax treaty alsoamountstoabreachofthatState’sobligationsunderaninvestmenttreaty.TheKadi 5 saga, aseriesofcasesbeforetheCourtofJusticeoftheEuropeanUnion(“CJEU”) arising out of a conflictbetweensanctionsimposedpursuanttoUNSecurityCouncilmeasuresandhumanrightsnormsobligations,isanotherillustration.AparticularlystrikingexampleisthecaseofMicula v Romania, whereRomaniawithdrewcertainfinancialincentivesinordertocomplywith the EU State aid requirements only to be challenged by investors claiming that thewithdrawalofthoseincentivesamountedtoabreachoftheirprotectionsundertheSweden-Romaniabilateralinvestmenttreaty.Thus,Romaniafounditselfsubjecttodirectlyconflictinginternationalobligations.6Thisisjustoneexampleofagrowingproblem.Sometimestheseconflicts can be solved by the application of conflict of laws rules and doctrines such as the marginofappreciation.However,LordGoldsmithpredictsthatthisproblemwillincreasinglyoccuronboththeinternationalanddomesticplanes.

4 Ibid,para4.43.5 Case C–402/05 P and C–415/05, P. Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and

Commission [2008]ECRI–6351.6 Ioan Micula, Viorel Micula, S.C. European Food S.A, S.C. Starmill S.R.L. and S.C. Multi pack S.R.L. v

RomaniaICSIDCaseNo.ARB/05/20.

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Panel 1: The relationship between Public International law and Public Law – why is it important in practice and in theory?

SirFrankBermanspeakingonpanel1LtoR:ProfessorCherylSaunders,SirBernardRix,SirFrankBerman

Chair: Sir Bernard Rix QC (formerly Lord Justice Rix), 20 Essex St Chambers

Sir Bernard Rix expressed his pleasure in introducing the speakers on this panel: threeinternationalandconstitutionallawyersofimmenseinternationaldistinction.

Sir Frank Berman KCMG QC, BIICLInternational and Public Law: Perspectives from Government and Private Legal Practice

SirFrankBermanopenedhis remarksbystating, inhis roleasChairmanof theBoardofTrusteesatBIICL,thatBIICLisveryproudoftheArthurWattsFellowshipinPublicInternationalLaw,whichwas the generating power behind the “Dialogues between International andPublicLaw”conference.BIICLisalsoextremelypleasedthatalong-runningandsignificantpartnership has been established with Melbourne Law School and is delighted and grateful thatthishasallbeenmadepossiblebytheimmensegenerosityofAllanMyersQC.

SirFrankremarkedthatyoucouldhardlyhaveamorepregnantmomentthannowinaBritishandAustraliancontexttohaveaconferenceondialoguesbetweeninternationalandpublic

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law.TheUK is in themidstofan immenseconstitutionalandpolitical crisis, following thevotetoleavetheEU,whichwaslargelybroughtaboutbythetensionbetweeninternationalobligations,domesticpoliticsandpublicexpectations.IntheAustraliancontext, therealsoexistsatensionbetweenAustralia’sinternationalobligationsincertainareasandthedomesticpoliticalscene,whichhascontributedtoabruisingperiodinAustraliandomesticpolitics.

Inorder toset thescene for the followingdialogues,SirFrankofferedareflectionon theForeignOffice, as itwas calledwhen he joined it in 1965,7 in order to provide a point of comparison with the current situation. In providing this reflection, Sir Frank dealt withthesourcesandbooks thatwererelieduponby theForeignOfficeat the time, the topicsof international law thatwere of interest to the ForeignOffice, and the situation of bothinternationalandnationalcourts.

In1965itwasextremelyrare,althoughnotunthinkable,fortheForeignOfficetobeinvolvedinanyprocessintheEnglishdomesticcourts.However,asLordBinghamwrotein2005:

... to an extent almost unimaginable even thirty years ago, national courts in this and other countries are called upon to consider and resolve issues turning on the correct understanding and application of international law, not on an occasional basis, now and then, but routinely and often in cases of great importance.8

Incontrast,SirFrankcouldrecallonlytwosubstantialpiecesoflitigationinwhichtheForeignOfficewasinvolvedduringhisearlycareer.OnewastheAnisminic9 case,ajudicialreviewof an ouster clause in the ForeignCompensationAct 1950. The otherwas the series ofCarl Zeiss cases,10whichraisedsignificantissuesofrecognitionandterritorialstatus.Therewere certain other cases that emerged over the course of the years, such as Trendtex11 and Phili ppine Admiral12, both of which laid the basis for the introduction of a restricted, not absolute, doctrine of sovereign immunity in the English common law. Theywerealso thebeginning of a new attitude towards the reception of customary international law into the Englishcommonlawsystem.

These cases were followed by I Congresso del Partido13 in1983 and the Tin Council cases14 in1989,whichshowedwhatSirFrankdescribedas”theextraordinarilyobtuseattitudeofEnglishlawasitthenstoodtowardsthestatusandworkingsofinternationalorganisations”.

7 TheForeignOfficemergedwiththeCommonwealthOfficein1968tobecometheForeign&CommonwealthOffice(FCO).TheFCOisnowsometimescalledthe“ForeignOffice”forshort.

8 LordBingham,‘Foreword’inShaheedFatima,Using International Law in Domestic Courts (Hart Publishing 2005).

9 Anisminic Ltd v Foreign Compensation Commission[1969]2AC147,[1969]2WLR163.10 Carl-Zeiss-Stiftung v Rayner and Keeler Ltd[1965]1AllER300(CA);Carl-Zeiss-Stiftung v Rayner

and Keeler Ltd(1964)RPC299(Ch);Carl-Zeiss-StiftungvRaynerandKeelerLtd(No2)[1966]2AllER536(HLS).

11 Trendtex Trading Corp v Central Bank of Nigeria[1977]1QB529.12 Owners of the Phili ppine Admiral v Wallem Shipping (Hong Kong) Ltd[1977]AC373(PC).13 Playa Larga v I Congreso del Partido[1983]1AC244(HL).14 Maclaine Watson & Co v International Tin Council(No.1)[1988]3AllER257(CA);Maclaine Watson

& Co Ltd v International Tin Council (No. 2)[1988]3AllER257(CA);JH Rayner (Mincing Lane) Ltd v Department of Trade and Industry[1990]2AC418(HL).

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It was not until the 1990s that it was settled that what created the legal personality of international organisations was the fact that international law conferred the status of a legal entityonthebodyconcerned.However,SirFrankrecalledthat inhis timeasForeignandCommonwealthOfficeLegalAdviser,aroleheheldfrom1981to1999, therewereonlytwoother cases inwhich theFCOwasdirectly involved:ex parte Rees-Mogg (about the ratificationof theMaastrichtTreaty)15 and the Pergau Dam case(anothercaseof judicialreview,butrelatingtooverseasdevelopmentassistance).16 Whencomparedwiththecurrentsituation,wheretheFCOispreoccupiedwithmorethan92liveitemsoflitigation,itisclearthat thepicture has changed totally. The current cases include civil claims fordamages,judicialreview,employmentlaw,freedomofinformation,sanctions,privilegesandimmunitiesandFCOinterventionsincasesbroughtagainstothergovernmentdepartments.

Itisnotonlythevolumeoflitigationthathaschangeddramatically.TheFCO’sinvolvementwithstatutes isalsoremarkablydifferent.SirFrankrecalledonlyafewstatuteswithwhichthe ForeignOfficewas substantially involved in the early stagesof his career: theBritishNationality Act 1948; the Foreign Compensation Act 1950; and the Foreign EnlistmentAct1870. TheDiplomaticPrivilegesActhadjustbeenenactedin1964.TheInternationalOrganisationsAct1968andStateImmunitiesAct1978hadnotyetbeenenacted.Therewasaninformalparliamentaryconventioninrelationtotheratificationoftreaties.Thisisnowgoverned by the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010, which put on a statutory footingwhattheFCOhadbeendoinginpracticeforyears–a”half-baked”reforminSirFrank’sview.

The books that were relied upon by the ForeignOffice in the 1960s also illuminate thechangesthathaveoccurredinthisarea.AccordingtoSirFrank,1961wasavintageyearforinternationallawbooksasthatwastheyearthatHart’sConcept of Law17 was published, abookwhich,forthefirsttime,anchoredinternationallawanditsplaceinabroaderlegallandscape froma jurisprudential viewpoint. Itwasalso the year that LordMcNair’s newtreatise The Law of Treaties18 waspublished,whichhasnotbeeneditedsince.However,alloftheleadingbooksofthetimewerestillwrestlingwiththequestionofwhetherinternationallaw was a system as opposed to a series of discrete islands in an unregulated sea, and with thejusticiabilityofinternationaldisputes.

OneofthebookswhichmostclearlyillustratesthechangedsceneisInternational Law and the Practitioner bySirFrancisVallat,19FOLegalAdviserinthemid1960s,whichsoughttoawakenpractitionerstowhatinternationallawmeantfortheminpractice.Therewerefoursubstantivechapters,twodealingwithinternationalclaims,oneonFOcertificatesandoneonthereciprocalenforcementofjudgments.Thesechapterswouldlookcompletelydifferenttoday.Thechapteronreciprocalenforcementofjudgmentswouldnotexist,asthatareaof

15 R v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs Ex p Lord Rees-Mogg[1993]EWHCAdmin4,[1994]QB552.

16 R v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs Ex p World Development Movement Ltd [1994]EWHCAdmin1[1995]1WLR386.

17 HLA Hart, The Concept of Law(OUP1961).18 LordMcNair,The Law of Treaties(ClarendonPress1961).19 SirFrancisVallat,International Law and the Practitioner(ManchesterUniversityPress1966).

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lawisnowcoveredbyotherrules.WithregardtoFOcertificates,theirusewentintodecline,althoughsomethingcertificate-likehassprungbackintolife.Also,internationalclaimsarenottalkedaboutanymoreastheyarelikelytobedealtwithbyinternationalarbitration.Thereisnowanentirelynewsystemwherebyinvestors’rightsareprotectedbytreatyandtherearemechanismsforpracticalenforcement.

The issues thatwereof internationalconcernat the time includedthe following: the1958Conventions on the Law of the Sea, immunities, State responsibility, the law of treaties, succession of States and governments, special missions, the relationship between States and internationalorganisations,andthemostfavourednationclause.Itisinterestingtonotethatmanyoftheseareasandideaswentquiet,onlytoemergeinlateryears.Forexample,theprinciples surrounding State responsibility were not fully fledged until the 1990s and most favourednationclausesareagainbeinglookedatbytheInternationalLawCommission.

Inconcluding,SirFrankstatedthatinternationallawtodayisnotaseriesofdiscreteitems;itisnowaninternationallegalsystem.Thereareconsequencesthatresultfromthefactthatitisasystemthathasaimstowardscompleteness.Oneoftheseconsequencesisthatthereisnonaturallimittoeitherinternationallawordomesticlaw.Thereisnoboundarybetweenthem;theyflowintooneanotherwithouttherebeinganyarbitraryorusefulfrontierbetweenthem.Theremaybetensionbutthereisnofrontier.

He also made the point that domestic courts are often called upon to resolve issues of internationallawandapplytheanswertoaconcretesituation.Thusdomesticjudgeshaveacreative and constructive role to play in the international legal sphere, which demonstrates thatthethemeoftheconferenceisavalidone.Itisnotjustanintellectualdialoguebetweeninternational and public law, but a real one, which is created by the realities of the international system.

Professor Cheryl Saunders, Melbourne Law SchoolPublic Law and Public International Law: a Public Law Perspective on Interdependence

ProfessorCherylSaundersopenedherremarksbyexpressingherhopethatthe“Dialoguesbetween International and Public Law” conference will serve to deepen the intellectual engagementbetween the two institutions.Sheremarked that the interfacebetweenpublicdomestic and international lawmakes a clear grasp of both essential for a goodpubliclawyerinthetwenty-firstcentury.However,itcanbedifficulttoexplainthisinterfaceinawaythat does not simply treat the two bodies of law as silos, lining them up against each other, andmovingfromonetotheother,withoutfullyunderstandingthewhole.Thusthereisaneedforadeeperunderstandingbetweenspecialistsinthetwoareasoflaw.

The concept of dialogue is central to this conference as it emphasises the importance of genuine engagement between these two branches of law, leading to a mutual appreciation oftheirrespectivefunctionsandconcerns.Whilethereisnothingnewintheideathatpublicand international law are increasingly interdependent, experts in the two sub-disciplinessometimestalkpasteachotherwithoutrealisingthattheyaredoingso.Thisisnotsurprisingasbotharerichandcomplexbodiesofknowledge.Additionally,thereareinevitablydifferent

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perspectivesduetothedifferentinterestsofthetwospheres.Oneexampleofthesedifferentinterests is that domestic and international lawyers place different emphases on the concept and role of the State and its institutions. For domestic public lawyers, the State revolvesarounditspeopleandtheinstitutionsthroughwhichStatepowerisexercisedareassumedtoderivetheirlegitimacyfromthepeople.Theinstitutionsarealsosupposedtoberesponsivetotheneedsofthepeople.Domesticpubliclawprovidestheframeworkoflawandpracticethroughwhichtheseassumptionsoperate.Theseframeworksdifferbetween,andsometimeswithin,States.Incontrast,forpublicinternationallawyers,StatesareviewedasthecriticalbuildingblockintheinternationallegalorderandtheinstitutionsoftheStatearethosewithwhichtheinternationalcommunitymustdeal.

Whilethesetwoperspectivesoftencomplementeachother,tensionsariseonoccasion,ofteninadvertently.ThiscanbeseenmostobviouslywheninternationalassistanceisprovidedinbuildingorrebuildingfragileStates.Nationalinstitutionsofafamiliarkindmaybeprioritisedeven if they prove to be impractical or ineffective on the ground. A further example ofoccasional tension is that domestic and international lawyers naturally tend to prioritise the bodyoflawinwhichtheyprimarilywork.Whileinternationallawyersareentitledtoexpectdomestic compliance once international law is established, domestic public lawyers focus on the intricacies of public law and practice, occasionally treating international law as an optionalextra.

Thesedifferences inassumptions tendtosurface inconstitutionbuildingexercises,suchasinrelationtotheincorporationofinternationallegalstandardsintonewconstitutions.Thesedifferences have also been evident in the immediate aftermath of the Brexit referendum.InternationalandEUlawyershavefocusedonthemeaningandoperationofArticle50ofthe Lisbon Treaty,20 while domestic public lawyers have debated how Article 50 could and shouldbeinvokedasamatterofUKconstitutionallawandwhethertheprerogativealoneisadequateforthepurpose.

Inordertoprovidethenecessarybackgroundfortherestoftheconference,ProfessorSaundersbrieflysketchedsomeof theways inwhich the interdependencebetween internationalandpubliclawoccursandsomeofthereactionstothisinterdependencefromwithinthesub-disciplineofdomesticpubliclaw.Shealsoanalysedtheextremelyfluidpositionthathasbeenreachedinthe relationship between domestic and international legal regimes and pointed out some of the waysinwhichcollaborationbetweenthetworegimesismoreimportantthanever.

Assuming, for the sake of argument, that public law classically provided the exclusivesource of law and practice that constituted the framework of government for the State,Professor Saunders stated that the main change in this position has come from the growth of internationallawandthereachofinternationalinstitutions.Therearenumerouswellknownfeaturesofthisdevelopment.First,theexpansionofthebreadthofinternationallawintermsofthemattersforwhichitnowprovides,suchashumanrights.Second,theexpansioninthedepth of international law, which is characterised by the reach of international law to include

20 Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the EuropeanCommunity2007/C306/01(adopted13December2007,enteredintoforce1December2009).

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individuals,groups,andorganisationsassubjectsforsomepurposes.Third,theadoptionofmechanisms to enhance the effectiveness of international law in relation to particular regimes, such as international courts and arbitration tribunals, monitoring and other complaints bodies, and sanctions. Finally, the development of schemes for regional integration of a quasi-constitutionalkind,theEUbeingtheparadigmcase.

These developments affect the public law of all States, although to varying degrees and in sometimessubtleways.Theymouldthesubstanceofdomesticlawandremovesomemattersfromdomesticpoliticsanddisputeresolution.TheyhaveanadditionalsubstantialimpactonStateswhicharemaking,orsubstantiallychanging,theirconstitutionsincircumstancesthatlendthemselvestointernationalassistance.Inthesecases,internationalnormsincreasinglyaffectboththeprocessofconstitution-makingaswellastheconstitutionwhichtheprocesscreates.

Professor Saunders stated that these effects of internationalisation are augmented by the equallypotent,butevenmoreamorphous,forcesofglobalisation,definedhereasincludinginformationtechnology.Theseforcesencourageandfacilitatethereadytransmissionofideasaboutpubliclawacrossjurisdictionallines.Theyalsoprovidethesettingforthewidespreadborrowing of practices, institutions and norms, both between domestic orders and between domestic orders and the international order, sometimes in ways that pay little regard to establishedlegaltradition.

These examples suggest that the changing scene in domestic public law in this age ofinternationalisationhasbeen“top-down”;flowingfromdevelopmentsinpublicinternationallaw. However, in some instances, actions by individual States invoke the interface withinternationalpubliclawinnovelways,orshouldberegardedasdoingso.OneexampleistheveryrecentuseofinternationalguaranteestoreinforcethepeaceaccordsinColombia.Another recent illustration is the deliberate invocation of a treaty by the Government of Guatemalatoassistinfightingcorruption.Bothofthesesituationsinvolveunusualandcreativeusesofinternationallaw.

Nevertheless,domesticpubliclawhaschangedinsomerespectstoacknowledgeitsgrowinginterdependencewith international law. The increasing emphasis ondevolutionof powerwithintheStateisonepossibleexample,althoughthereareadditionalcauses.Inaddition,ithasforalongtimebeenarguedthattheincreasinginaccessibilityofdecision-makingatthesupranationalandinternational levelshasencouragedaturn to“glocalisation”.Moreobviously,contemporaryconstitutionsarenowverylikelytomakeexplicitprovisionfortherelationship between domestic and international law; the way in which a State may enter into international commitments, the manner in which sovereignty might be transferred to supranational or international bodies, and the circumstances in which domestic courts are authorised to refer to foreign and international law, either generally or in relation to particular regimes.Ithasalsobeensuggestedthat theconstituentpowerhasbecomeat leastpartlyinternationalisedandthatdomesticconstitutionsarenotpurelydomesticatallbutinterlinkedinaglobalconstitutionalnetwork.EitherorbothoftheseclaimshavesignificantimplicationsforthenatureofaconstitutionanditsrolewithinaStatetothepointthattheyraisequestionsaboutwhethertheveryconceptofaconstitutionischangingbeforeoureyes.

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In a further development, a body of public law literature has engaged with the concept of constitutional and legal pluralism as a way of managing some of the uncertainties about the hierarchiesofnormsofaconstitutionalkindthatemanatefromdifferentsourceswithinasingleState,butwithadifferent logicanddifferentclaims to legitimacy. Internationalisationhasalso had implications for comparative public law, strengthening claims about convergence andsimplifyingthecomparativetask.Muchofthisscholarshipoffersimportantinsightsintothechangesthathavetakenplaceindomesticpubliclawinthefaceofinternationalisationandthecorrespondingchallenges.ThesechallengesincludethefactthatStatesovereigntyis no longer absolute; international law is more important from a domestic perspective; and internationalapprovaldoesplaysome,albeitambiguous,roleinsomeconstitution-makingprocesses.Furthermore,therearefascinatingquestionsaboutthehierarchybetweendomestic,supranationalandinternationalcourts.

WhilesomeconvergenceofsystemsofStatelawhasundoubtedlyoccurred,generalisationsof that kind tend to oversimplify what is in fact a very complex and somewhat obscurepicture from the standpointofdomesticpublic law.Predictionsof thedemiseof theStatearepremature.TheconceptoftheStateisanimperfectvehicleforgoverningcommunities.Indeed,inpartsoftheworlditisafictitiousvehiclesustainedbytheinternationalorder.Alltoooftenitexploitsratherthansustainsthecommunitiesitismeanttoserve.However,forthemomentitiswhatistheretoprovideaframeworkfordemocracyandlimitedconstitutionalgovernmentandtogivesubstantiveeffecttointernationallaw.

Professor Saunders also made the point that the degree of internationalisation, and thus theextentoftheimpactofinternationallawondomesticlaw,variesdramaticallybetweentheStatesof theworld. Internationalisation is at itsmost profound inStates thatarepartofadeeplyintegratedregionalscheme,suchasinEurope,orinStatesthatarefragileorunstableanddependentoninternationalsupport.InternationalisationisalsostronginStatesthat welcome it in order to support a domestic democratisation agenda, as is the case in manypartsofLatinAmerica.However,itismuchweakerinStatesthataredeveloped,stable,capableofsignificantself-relianceandnotinadeeplyintegratedregionalarrangement,suchasAustralia,muchofAsiaandNorthAmerica.Furthermore,evenwhereinternationalisationseemssuperficiallysubstantive,theremaybeaquestionaboutitseffectivenessinpractice.Forexample,itismucheasiertoinsertelaboratebillsofrightscompletewithproportionalitytestsintonewnationalconstitutionsthantoensurethattheyhavesubstantiveeffect.Equally,thereisnothinginourexperiencesofartosuggestthattheinternationalisationofauthorityfornationalconstitutionsisworkingverywellinpractice;itisdepressinglyhardtofindsuccessstoriesamongst thequite largenumberofconstitution-buildingexercises inrecentyears inwhichinternationalbodieshaveplayedaleadershiprole.

The claims for the convergence of systems of public law also require a more nuancedapproach.Itistruethatoldparadigmsarebreakingdown,suchasthedichotomiesbetweencommonlawandcivillawandbetweenmonismanddualism.Nevertheless,theystillretainsomeexplanatorypower.Whilethereisconvergence,itislargelytakingplaceatalevelofgeneralityinprinciplessuchastheseparationofpowers,representativedemocracy,judicialreview,freedomofspeech,judicialindependence,administrativejusticeandproportionality.However, within each of these general principles, institutional design and normative requirementsvaryinwaysthatarestillverysignificantforStatesystemsofdomesticpublic

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law.Thereisalsosignificantvariationinthemanywaysinwhichdomesticsystemsmanagetherelationshipwithinternationallawandestablishitsstatus.Cross-systemicborrowing,whichis undoubtedly occurring, merely adds to the diversity by introducing irritants into systems of publiclaw.Noneofthisistodenythatadegreeofconvergenceisoccurring,butitisalsocomplementedbydivergence.Nevertheless,diversitybetweenthesystemsofpubliclawinthevariousStatesoftheworldisnotnecessarilyaproblem.Theworldisaverylongwayfromhavingreachednirvanainsystemsofdomesticpubliclawandtheneedsandexpectationsofthecommunitieswhichpubliclawshouldservecontinuetodifferinvariousways.Diversity,continuingexperimentation,andresponsivenesstolocalcircumstancesareessentialfortheadequateperformanceofsystemsofpubliclaw.

In conclusion, Professor Saunders stated that the impact of international law in collaboration withglobalisationhashadaprofoundeffectondomesticpubliclawinmanyexcitingandveryconstructiveways.Whilethisphenomenonisnotnewfromahistoricalperspective,ithasnowreachedanovelstageintermsofglobalreach,degreeandsubstantiveeffect.However,thepointthathasbeenreachedisambiguous.Theprogressisbynomeanslinear.

Indeed, the pace and nature of internationalisation is patchy across the globe and the interfaceofpublicandinternationallawhasmanyofthehallmarksofunplannedevolution.There are plenty of theories, but they are not necessarily persuasive on a global scale.Furthermore, there are areas in which the relationship between the two branches is notworkingsatisfactorilyfromapracticalpointofview.Thewayforwardisunclearinnormativeterms, not least because of the diversity of conditions of the 190 or so States with which internationallawmustdeal.Theseconsiderationssuggestthatthereisagreaterneedthaneverforcollaborationbetweendomesticandinternationalpubliclaw.Thebetterinformedthatcollaborationis,themoreeffectiveitislikelytobe.Thegoalsofcollaborationmightbeputverygenerallyintermsoftheneedtoworkoutaneffectivemodus vivendi between the two areas of law based on an appreciation of the credentials, possibilities and contributions ofeach.Fromthestandpointofdomesticlaw,ProfessorSaundersishopefulthatwouldhavethe effect of encouraging vibrant institutions that support democracy and the rule of law, termswhichalsovarybetweenStatesystemsandtraditions.Within thoseparametersanynumberofindividualchallengesmightbeidentified.Thesechallengesincludetheneedforcollaboration to ensure the domestic legitimacy and effectiveness of new constitutions even in conditions of substantial international assistance, to ensure the domestic accountability of Stateactorsinsupranationalandinternationalforums,andtodealwiththedisquietaboutthetensionbetweendemocraticdecision-makingandlocaldisputeresolutionandinternationallaw.

Professor Gerry Simpson, London School of Economics International Law as Public Law

The relationshipbetween international lawandpublic law isacomplicatedone. Indeed,international lawyers have been reluctant to even settle on a name for this other body of lawwithwhich theyare in a relationship. Various terms havebeen usedover the years,includinginternallaw,domesticlaw,nationallaw,Statelawandmunicipallaw.Thevirtueofpubliclawasalabelisitsexpansiveness;thepromisethatthisisnotsomucharelationship

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between international law and public law, but instead a relationship between, at least two, public laws.ProfessorSimpsonproposed toexamine thesituation from theperspectiveofinternationallaw,followedbypubliclaw,beforelookingattheideaof“publicness”itself.

Professor Simpson stated that those from the international law side of the picture are used to thinkingabouttherelationshipanditsimplicationsfortheinternationallegalorder.Indeed,this relationship is examined from the first year of law school in any public internationallawcourse.It isknownthat international lawisconcernedwithdomesticlawinnumerousplaces.Forexample,decisionsoflocalcourtscancontributetotheformationofinternationallaw.ProfessorSimpsonalsoremarkedthathehasobservedovertheyearsthatinternationallawyersarequitecomfortablewithreferringtothedecisionsofdomesticcourtswithoutgoingthroughanysortofanalysisofArticle3821tojustifywhytheyaredoingso;thereisaninstincttousedomesticdecisions.Additionally,domesticlawinfluencesthegeneralprinciplesoflawthatarearticulatedinArticle38.Whiletheremaybegeneralprinciplesofinternationallawitself, most of the general principles that international lawyers encounter have been derived from domestic law. Furthermore, local decisions can be a material source of customaryinternational law itself.A further illustrationof the relationship is the fact that the statusofdomesticlawcannotbeusedasjustificationforresistingtheapplicationofinternationallawasthisisnotpermittedunderArticle27oftheViennaConvention.22

Fromtheviewpointofthepubliclawside,therehasbeenalongstandingdebateastothestatusofinternationallawinnationallegalorders.BrownliebeginsoneofhiseditionsofPrinciplesof Public International Law with a statement that constitutive and declaratory theories of recognitionhelpelaboratetherelationshipbetweeninternationallawanddomesticlaw.23

ProfessorSimpsonbelievesthatfromthepubliclawside,thereisacomplexpictureinwhichconstitutionaldecisionsarenotalwaysfullyreflectedinjudicialorientation;itisnotalwaysclear fromsimply lookingat theconstitutionhow judgeswillactuallyapproachparticularquestions involving international law. He also questioned the usefulness of theories ofincorporationandtransformationasithasalwaysappearedtohimthatdomesticcourtstakeahybridapproachtoquestionsinvolvingthosetheories.However,inthecontextofpubliclawintheUnitedKingdom,UKcourtshaverecentlytakenasurprisinglydeferentialapproachtoone particular aspect of international law, namely the status of Security Council Resolutions, as seen in Al-Jedda.24

LawyersandjudgesintheUKhavebecomeincreasinglyusedtonegotiatingaroundcompetinglegalorders.ItishardnowtomaintainaDiceyancommitmenttosomeArchimedeanpointofsovereigntyinthefaceofthismultiplicityoflegalorders.Britishlawyersmightbeexposedtointernational,European,ScotsandUKlaw.

21 StatuteoftheInternationalCourtofJustice1945,Art38(1)(c).22 ViennaConventionontheLawofTreaties1969.SeealsoArt27oftheViennaConventionontheLawof

TreatiesbetweenStatesandInternationalOrganizationsorbetweenInternationalOrganizations1986.23 Brownlie’s Princi ples of International Law (7thedn,OUP2008).24 Al-Jedda v Secretary of State for the Home Department[2014]AC253(SC).

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Inthelightofthistwo-waystreet,thereareafewpointstomakeaboutinternationallawasapubliclaworder.Thefirstpointconcernsterminology.Internationallawstylesitselfaspublicinternationallawinordertodistinguishitselffrominternationalcommerciallaw,banking,saleofgoodslawandprivateinternationallaw.Thisdistinctionisveryimportant,butitisalsoadistinction thatreadilybreaksdownunderanysortofexamination. Indeed, thedistinctionimmediatelydissolveswhenonereadsnineteenthcentury international lawyers likeJamesLorimer,theScottishnaturallawyer.

Second, if public lawyering is now a practice of working around different legal orders,then international lawyersarepublic lawyersparexcellence.Practitioners in internationalcriminallaw,forexample,havebecomeveryusedtothinkingofinternationalcriminallawasacollaboration,oranamalgam,betweeninternationallawanddomesticlaw.Todiscussinternationalcriminallawistodiscussmajorpubliclawandcriminallawcasesfromdomesticjurisdictions, like Eichmann25 and Pinochet26 alongsidemajor international law cases likeMilošević27andGöring.28

Third,internationallawis,inaway,apubliclawofpubliclaws;alawamongsovereigns.This isparadoxicalbecauseinternational lawisalsoaquintessentiallyprivate lawregimeorganisingrelationsbetween190-oddfullysovereignprivateagents.Thisiswhythesystemisoftendescribedascontractual.Thus,itispossibletoencountertwointernationallaws,eachwithadifferentsensibilityaboutthepublicinpubliclaw.Thefirstisapluralisticorneutraloradministrativeorco-operativeinternationallaw.It isalesspublic,publicinternationallaw.Thesecondisapublicinternationallawwhichismorelikeapublicinternationallawsystemwithdesignatedpublicaims.Therelationshipbetweenthesetwointernationallawsisattheheartofwhatitmeanstodointernationallawinrecenttimes.

There has been a push to enhance and embolden this public wing of public international lawandtocreatesomesubstantivelypublicwayofdoingpublicinternationallaw.Itseemstoinvolveaconsciousefforttomakepublicinternationallawmorepublicandhascomeinseveraldifferentvariants.Thefirstof thesehasbeenaprogrammeto lift international lawinto some administrative realm by enacting a series of manoeuvres derived from natural justiceorjudicialrestraintonexecutivepowerinthedomesticrealm,whichhasbeencalledglobaladministrative lawover the last10–15years.Therehasalsobeenamoreexplicitprojectofconstitutionalism,aneffort toderive fundamentalnorms fromexistingpractices.Additionally, there has been a movement to organise international machinery along public law lines, such as the assumption of institutional hierarchies or the long flagged possibility that therelationshipbetweentheUNSecurityCouncil(“UNSC”)andtheICJmightbeorganisedusing some sort of separation of powers that involves judicial restraint ofUNSCactivity.While thismightbedescribedas fragmentation, inpublic international law, thevertical isalwayspushingupagainstthehorizontal.

25 AG v Adolf Eichmann Criminal Case No. 40/61(DCJerusalem).26 R v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate Ex p Pinochet Ugarte (No.2)[2000]1AC119(HL);

R v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate Ex p Pinochet Ugarte (No.3)[2000]1AC147(HL).27 Prosecutor v MiloševićICTY-02-54.28 Judgment of the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal(1947)41AJIL172.

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Tocircleback,onemightsaythatpublicinternationallawisadisciplineorganisedarounda series of decisions about how public it ought to be or what sort of public it ought to be orpursue. Theanswer to thesequestionsmaycomedown to temperamentor training.Adiplomatic lawyermight accentuate the international law of inter-sovereign co-operation,in which the public idea of public international law is attenuated or mediated, by the sheer durability of anarchy, while an academic lawyer steeped in constitutional law or trained as a certain sort of public lawyer will want to map onto international law ideas derived from nationalpubliclaw.Indeed,thesedifferentapproachesmaybewhytheideaofthetwosortsofinternationallawstartedtodevelopinthefirstplace.

Professor Simpson concluded by reminding the audience that through all this discussion, whether one thinks of international law as public or not, it’s important to keep sight ofinternational law’s sheer distinctiveness as a legal project.We don’twant to arrive at apositionwhere“everyimageofinternationallawthatisnotrecognisedbypubliclawasoneofitsownconcernsthreatenstodisappearirretrievably.”

Questions and Answers

One question from the floor concerned the public understanding and perception ofinternationallaw.Itwasobservedthatwhilstthespeakershavepresentedapictureofgradualevolution of international law norms into a distinct, coherent system of law as informed by domestic legal norms, and which has an ongoing communicative relationship with its domestic counterparts,thepublichasnotcaughtupwiththisunderstanding.ThiswassuggestedasthereasonforthepublicperceptionthattheHumanRightsAct1998diminishesthesovereigntyofParliament.ItwasalsosuggestedthatthistypeofthinkinghadaffectedtheoutcomeoftheBrexitreferendum.

Professor Cheryl Saunders agreed that public understanding is a difficult and importantissuewhichneedstobeaddressed.Thepublic,atleastinAustralia,isoftenunfamiliarwithdomesticpolicies, letalonethecountry’s international lawarrangements. Itseemsthatweonlyhavetwochoices,namely,toeducatethepublicbyopeningupthetreaty-makingandparliamentaryprocesses,ortoaskthepublictotrustblindlythatthegovernmentknowswhatitisdoing.ProfessorSaundersnotedthatthelatteroptionisnotdesirableinthelongrun.

SirFrankremarkedthathewasintriguedtohear theword“evolution”beinginvokedinaDarwiniansense.Hewasoftheviewthattheprocessofmakinginternationallawisaconsciousoneledbypeople insideinstitutions.Whathefoundextraordinary in theaftermathof theBrexitreferendumwasthatpeopledonottrustthesepoliticalinstitutionsatall;yettheyhavevoted to return power to those very institutions that they do not trust! Sir Bernard observed that whenStatesaremakingtreaties,theyareengagedinacontractualandvoluntaryprocess.Ifonelooksattheprocessofjudicialdecision-makingorthewritingofjuristshowever,evolutionmaynotbeabadword.SirBernardremarkedhumorouslythatwhenhisjudgmentfellintothehandsofacademics,hewouldsometimesfindhimselfreadinganarticleaboutitayearlaterandrealising“ah,sothisiswhatIdecided!”Thisisaveryevolutionaryprocess.

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ProfessorSimpsonobservedthatthereareatleastthreekindsofinternationallawyers,namelythose:

1. whowantStatestoco-operateandco-existbetter;

2. whohaveaprogrammaticviewandthinkofinternationallawasatooltopursueparticularideological or moral aims; and

3. whowanttolimitthesovereigntyofStatesandwhothinkofsovereigntyasthekeyadversaryinthebattleoverpublicorderintheworld.

Hesaidthathetoowasstruckbytherhetoricof“gettingthecountryback”andwassurprisedtofindthatasizableportionoftheBritishpublicviewstheEUlegalorderasoverlyintrusive.He suggested that many bodies of private international law may in fact restrict States’sovereigntytoamuchlargerextentthanEUlaworpublicinternationallaw.

In addition, there were discussions with regard to the characterisation of public international law asacontractualarrangementbetweenStates,andrelatedissuesofconsentandjusticiability.Professor Simpson clarified that hedid notmean to suggest that public international lawcanbeunderstoodsolelyasacontractualarrangementbetweenStates.Indeed,thereareaspectsofinternationallawwhichgobeyondthevoluntaryprocess;theanti-genocidenormforexample,isoftenviewedasasuperiornorm.

SirFrankencouragedustotakeapracticalviewofinternationallaw.Insofarastherearelegal or factual disputes between parties, there is room for peaceful adjudication by aninternationaltribunal.Questionsofjusticiabilityoughtnottobedeterminedbyeitherpartytothedispute,butbytherelevanttribunal.SirFrankexpressedtheview,however,thattheauthorityofinternationallawrestsontheconsentoftheStatestowhichitapplies.SirBernardexpressedsimilarsentimentsregardingthesignificanceofconsent.ProfessorSimpsonaddedthat the interpretation of consent might differ from the point of view of those who want States togetalongbetter inaco-operativemanner,or thosewhohaveaprogrammaticviewofinternationallawandwanttosavetheworld.

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Panel 2: Impacts of public international law on public law

Chair: Professor Robert McCorquodale, BIICL

ProfessorMcCorquodaleintroducedthesecondpanelasfocusingontheimpactsofpublicinternational lawondomesticpublic law.Hereferred to therecentEUreferendumwhereamajorityoftheUKvoterseffectivelyrejectedpartoftheinternationallawwhichcurrentlyappliestotheUK.Heremarkedthatbothpublicinternationallawandpubliclawstrivetodeliver order in society and they routinely engage with a number of similar issues, one of whichishumanrights.

Dr Veronika Fikfak, Cambridge UniversityEnglish Courts’ ‘Internalisation’ of the European Convention on Human Rights? Between Theory and Practice

DrFikfakintroducedherthemeasexploringthepossibilitythatEnglishcommonlawcanbedevelopedby the judiciary toprotect individualhuman rightseven if theHumanRightsAct1988(“theHRA”)isrepealed.ThisissueisdistinctfromBrexit,butremainsparticularlypertinentgiventheresultoftheEUreferendumandtheensuinguncertaintieswithregardstotheUK’sfuturerelationshipwiththeEUandthehumanrightslawthatappliesthroughtheEUlegalorder.DrFikfakreferredtoaspeechoftheRightHonourableTheresaMayearlierinthemorning,duringwhichitwasindicatedthatshewouldnotnowbeseekingfortheUKtowithdrawfrom

DrVeronicaFikfakspeakingonpanel2LtoR:ProfessorDapoAkande,ProfessorRobertMcCorquodale,DrFikfak,ProfessorMichaelCrommelin

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theEuropeanConventiononHumanRights(“ECHR”or“theConvention”).However,MrsMaydidnotstateherintentionswithregardtothequestionofarepealoftheHRA.

DrFikfaknotedthatrecentdevelopmentsintheUKSupremeCourtsuggestthateveniftheHRA is repealed, domestic common law can still provide a basis for the protection of human rights. Thequestion iswhether theEnglishCourtshave internalised theECHR through theEnglishcommonlawinawaythat is independentof theHRA,andwhichwouldminimisethe effect of a possible repeal of the HRA? If the answer is yes, then this would be a prime exampleofinternationallawhavinganimpactondomesticconstitutionallaw.

DrFikfakreferredustotheconceptofinternalisationordomesticationofinternationallawas framed by scholars such as Koh29 and Slaughter,30 who argued that the only way for international law to be applied effectively in the domestic legal system is for it to form part ofthatdomesticlaw.Itisnotarguedhoweverthatthisprocessneedstotakeplacethroughthe legislature. Rather, it is proposed that the domesticationof international human rightslawcanoccur through transnationalactors.One suchgroupofactors is judges sitting inthedomesticcourts.Theprocessofdomesticationcantakeplacethroughjudicialcreativity.Judges act to preserve and enhance the reputation of the international community in response topeerpressure,andtheyencourageotherstofollowsuit.Itisimportanttonotethatwhatends up being applied is domestic law adapted to international law norms, rather than internationallawitself.Mostimportantly,judgesareseen,notonlyasnationalactors,butalso as international participants in the international legal order who provide the catalysts for thevoluntarydomesticationofinternationallaw.

InordertodeterminewhethertheviewadvancedbyKohandSlaughterholdstrueinEnglishlaw,DrFikfakposedthreequestions:

1. CantheprotectionofhumanrightsbeachievedindependentlyoftheHRA?

2. DoesthetypeofprotectionprovidedbyEnglishcommonlawmirrortheprotectionaffordedby the Convention?

3. Arejudgesperformingtheroleofaninternationalparticipantbecauseofthecompliancepull, communitarian peer pressure or reputation cost? Is so, what is the community they are speakingto?

Turningnowtothefirstquestion,DrFikfakreferredustothecasesofOsborn,31 Kennedy,32 and the Guardian News and Mediacase.33 Inallof thesecases, judgesareencouragingcounseltolookatcommonlawasanindependentbasisfordomestichumanrightsprotection.LordReedremarkedinOsbornthat“theprotectionofhumanrightsisnotadistinctareaofthelaw,basedonthecaselawoftheEuropeanCourtofHumanRights,butpermeatesourlegalsystem.”34 In Kennedy,LordMancecriticisedthetendencyforcounseltorelyexclusively

29 HKoh,‘WhydoNationsObeyInternationalLaw?’(1997)106YaleLJ2599.30 ASlaughter,’JudicialGlobalization’(2000)40VirginiaJournalofInternationalLaw1103.31 Osborn v Parole Board[2013]UKSC61.32 Kennedy v Charity Commission[2014]UKSC20.33 R (Guardian News and Media Ltd) v City of Westminster Magistrates’ Court [2012]EWCACiv420.34 Osborne(n31)para55.

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ontheConventionrightssincethepassingoftheHRA,notingthat“thenaturalstartingpointinanydisputeistostartwithdomesticlaw.”35 In the Guardian News and Media case, Lord Toulsonnoted that “thedevelopmentof thecommon lawdidnot come toanendon thepassingoftheHumanRightsAct1998.Itisinvigoroushealthandflourishinginmanypartsoftheworldwhichsharecommonlegaltraditions.”36

Dr Fikfak argued that these judicial enunciations suggest that there is a strong emphasison the capacity of the common law to provide a domestic legal basis for the protection of humanrights.Thecommon lawprotectionofhumanrightshascontinued toexistand it isbeingdevelopedinparalleltotheConventionrights.Itisclearthatjudgeswanttoencouragecounseltorelyoncommonlawrightsandinturndevelopthoserightsfurther.Itissuggestedthat, if the HRA is ever repealed, we may still be able to achieve some of the same human rightsprotectionsthroughthecommonlaw.Mostimportantly,inHS2, common law rights have been recognised by the Supreme Court as constitutional rights, the standing of which can be comparedtoMagnaCarta.37 The constitutional hierarchy of the law is such that it cannot be setasidebytheHRAorotherstatutes.LordPhillipsstatedextra-judiciallythatifParliamentrepealstheHRA,thejudiciarywillbewillingtothrow“thegauntletbacktoParliament.”38 This meansthatcommonlawrightsnowenjoyalevelofconstitutionalprotectionandarenotasvulnerabletopoliticalchangesastheHRA.

Withrespecttothesecondquestion,DrFikfakfirstdirectedustoMoohan, a case concerning the prisoners’ right to vote.39 It was argued by counsel that instead of relying on the Convention,theCourtshouldacknowledgeafundamentalorconstitutionalrightofuniversalandequalsuffrageincommonlaw,asinformedbytheprinciplesofdemocracyandtheruleoflaw,andinternationalnorms.Thisargumentwasrejectedonthebasisthattherighttovoteis traditionallya rightderived fromstatutesand it is therefore inappropriate for judges todevelopacommonlawbasisfortheright.40DrFikfakthennotedthatthepictureisdifferentinrelationtothecommonlawrighttoprivacy.ItisundeniablethatcommonlawhasbeendevelopedundertheHRA.InDouglas41 and Campbell42theconceptofbreachofconfidencehasbeendevelopedconsistentlywiththeUK’sinternationalobligations.InA v B,LordWoolfCJremarkedthatConventionrightshavebeenabsorbedintothecommonlaw.43Furthermore,in Ash v McKennitt,BuxtonLJheldthatArticles8and10“aretheverycontentofthedomestictortthattheEnglishCourthastoenforce.”44 In Google v Vidal-Hall, the Court of Appeal held thattherearetwoseparateanddistinctcausesofaction:anactionforbreachofconfidence,andoneforthemisuseofprivateinformation.45

35 Kennedy (n32)para46.36 R (Guardian News and Media Ltd)(n33),[88](ToulsonLJ).37 R (Buckinghamshire CC) v Secretary of State for Transport [2014]UKSC3,[207](LordNeubergerand

LordMance).38 PoliticalandConstitutionalReformCommittee,Constitutional Role of the Judiciary if there were a Codified

Constitution(HC2013-14,802)17(Sweet&Maxwell2013)(LordPhillips).39 Moohan v Lord Advocate[2014]UKSC67.40 Ibid,para34(LordHodge),para56(LadyHale).41 Douglas v Hello! Ltd (No 6)[2005]EWCACiv595.42 Campbell v MGN Ltd[2004]UKHL22.43 A v B plc [2003]QB195,[4](LordWoolfCJ).44 Ash v McKennitt[2006]EWCACiv1714,[11](BuxtonLJ).45 Google Inc v Vidal-Hall[2015]EWCACiv311,para21.

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Separately,DrFikfakarguedthattherecognitionofproportionalityasacommonlawgroundofreviewhasledtotheimplicitrecognitionofnewcommonlawrights.InPham,46 it was held thattheGovernment’sdecisiontodepriveacitizenofhisorherfundamentalstatusasaBritishcitizenissubjecttoahigherintensityreview,47 and that if the Government wishes to deprive anindividualofhisorhercitizenship,itmustdosoinaproportionatemanner.48DrFikfakremarkedthatifwethinkoftheproportionalitytestasengagingrights,thenitsuseinPham impliestheexistenceofarightnottobearbitrarilydeprivedofone’scitizenship.DrFikfakthen referred to LordMance’sobservations inKennedy that “in someareas, thecommonlaw may go further than the Convention, and in some areas it may also be inspired by the Conventionrightsandjurisprudence...Andintime,ofcourse,asynthesismayemerge.”49 She consideredtheseobservationstobeapt.

The thirdquestionwaswhether these common lawdevelopmentsoccurredasa result ofcompliancepullorpeerpressurefromtheinternationalcommunity.ArelatedquestionwaswithwhommighttheEnglishcourtshavebeenengagedindialogue?DrFikfakobservedthatwhatisapparentfromthecaselawisthateventhoughEnglishjudgesspeakoftheabsorptionofConventionrightsintothecommonlaw,theyinfactmakelittlereferencetotheConventionjurisprudence. Instead, they rely heavily on case law from common law jurisdictions. Forinstance, in Campbell, the House of Lords adopted the test formulated by the High Court of Australia in Lenah Game Meats without detailed analysis, even though it was argued bytheapplicantthatthetestdiffersfromtheStrasbourgapproachinrelationtoArticle8.50 Similarly, in the Guardian News case, Toulson LJ relied on case law of the Canadian Supreme Court,theSouthAfricanConstitutionalCourt,andtheUnitedStatesfederalcourts.51DrFikfakopined that this relianceoncommon lawauthoritiesdemonstrates that theEnglishCourtsareengaging inadialogue, notwith its Europeanaudience,butwithother courts in theinternationalcommonlawcommunity.

DrFikfakconcludedthat,first,recentdevelopmentsinEnglishlawsuggestare-confirmationand re-invigoration for the common law to act as an alternative basis for human rightsprotection.Second,thecommonlawprovidesanadaptabilityforthedevelopmentsofrightsindependently fromtheHRA.Third,commonlawrightsnowenjoyaspecialconstitutionalstatus in English law. There are limits however to the common law approach. CommonlawrightsarenotConventionrights.Theywillnotachieve thesame thingsasConventionrightswouldachieve.Mostimportantly,notedDrFikfak,theimpactofinternationallawhasspurred judges todevelopcommon lawrightsand in thewordsofLordPhillips,speakingextra-judicially,tothrow“thegauntletbacktoParliament”iftheHRAisrepealed.

46 Pham v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2015]UKSC19.47 Ibid,para97.48 Ibid,para120.49 Kennedy(n31),para46.50 Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd(2001)HCA63,[42];adoptedin

Campbell(aboven42),para135.51 R (Guardian News and Media Ltd) (n33).

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Professor Michael Crommelin, Melbourne Law SchoolThe Pacific “Solution” to the Refugee Crisis: A Case Study

ProfessorCrommelin beganby introducing thearchitecture of theAustralianConstitution.He noted that although Australia has no Bill of Rights, the courts have been able to rely on structural features of the Australian Government to protect human rights, by preventing the concentrationofpublicauthority.Thefirstfeatureisthefederalsystemofgovernmentwhichcomprisesmultiplepolities,Commonwealthandstate,allofwhichhavelimitedauthority.Thesecondistheprincipleofseparationofpowers.Whilethedoctrineofresponsiblegovernmentseverely compromises the separation of powers between the legislative and executivebranches of the government, the peculiar Australian doctrine of the strict separation of the judicialpoweroftheCommonwealthofferssomeprotectionforhumanrightsbylimitingthepowerofboththeCommonwealthParliamentandtheCommonwealthExecutivetoinfringethoserights.

Professor Crommelin observed that globalisation presents significant challenges to thecapacityoftheConstitutionalmodelinAustraliatoofferprotectionforhumanrights.Insomerespects, Australia is a dualist State. The Commonwealth Executive has authority for theconduct of international relations, including international rights and obligations, but these rightsandobligationsrequirelegislativeimplementationbeforetheycanbeincorporatedintodomesticlaw.TheHighCourtofAustraliahasstatedthattheCommonwealthParliamenthastheauthoritytodothatasvariousaspectsofAustralia’sinternationalrelationsfallwithintheParliament’spowertomakelawsinrelationtoexternalaffairs.ThereisasymbioticrelationshipbetweentheCommonwealthExecutive’sauthoritytoconductinternationalrelationsandtheCommonwealthLegislature’sauthoritytoincorporaterightsandobligationsarisingfromtheserelationshipsintoAustralianlaw.ItwasremarkedthatthereareproblemswiththesymbioticrelationshipbecausethelimitsontheCommonwealthpowers,bothlegislativeandexecutive,arenotyetadequatelydetermined.

Professor Crommelin then discussed the M68caseasan illustrativeexample.52 By way of background,in2012AustraliaadoptedapolicyofoffshoreregionalprocessingofasylumseekerswhoattempttoenterAustraliabysea.TheamendmenttotheMigrationAct195853 establishedaregimewherebyanon-citizenwhoentersAustraliabyseawithoutavisamustbedetainedbyanofficeroftheCommonwealthandtakentoaregionalprocessingcountrypendingdeterminationofhisorherrefugeestatus.ThisregimerequiresAustralia tomakearrangements with other countries for the establishment and operation of offshore processing centres.Thesearrangements,ineffect,amounttotheoutsourcingofAustralia’sobligationsundertheRefugeeConventiontootherPacificStatesandprivatecontractors.On3August2013,AustraliaandNaurusignedamemorandumofunderstanding(“theMOU”)relatingtotheestablishmentandoperationofaregionalprocessingcentreinNauru.ThepreambletotheMOUrecordsthatAustraliaandNauruarebothStatepartiestotheRefugeeConvention.AustraliaundertakestomeetallcostsundertheMOU,whileNauruundertakestomeettheinternational obligations for refugeeprotection. Successful applicantsmaybeallowed to

52 Plaintiff M68/2015 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection[2016]HCA1.53 MigrationAct1958(Australia).

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settle inNauru.AustraliamustassistNaurutosettleapplicants inNauruorinasafethirdcountry.Forunsuccessfulapplications,Australiamustreturnthemtotheirhomecountryortothirdcountries.

In2014,AustraliaandNauruconcludedfurtherdetailedadministrativearrangementsdealingwith the transferofasylumseekers fromAustralia toNauru, thegovernanceof theNaururegionalprocessingcentreand theoperationof theprocessingcentrebyNauruofficers,Australian officers and a private service provider engaged under contract by Australia.ThesearrangementsconfirmedthatthedeterminationofrefugeestatuswillbemadeunderNaurulaw,withtheassistanceoftheprivateserviceprovider.Further,on24March2014,theCommonwealth government entered into a contractwith Transfield ServicesAustraliaProprietaryLtd(“theTransfieldContract”).Thecompanyoffersabroadrangeofservices,includingall securityservicesat theNauruprocessingcentre.TheAustralianGovernmentretains tight control over theprovisionof all these services under the TransfieldContract,througha“step-inright”,namelytheGovernmentmay,atitscompletediscretion,givenoticetoTransfieldthatitwilltakeoverallitsresponsibilitiesunderthecontract.

In the M68 case54, the plaintiff, a Bangladeshi national, was on board a vessel when it was interceptedbyAustralianofficers.ShewastakentotheChristmasIslandmigrationzoneandthentotheprocessingcentreonNauru.ShewasgrantedaregionalprocessingvisabyanofficeroftheNauruGovernmentonthebasisofanapplicationmadeonherbehalf,withoutherconsent,byanofficerof theAustralianGovernment. Thevisa stipulates that shemustresideattheNaururegionalprocessingcentre.SheappliedtotheNauruGovernmentforrecognitionasarefugeeundertherelevantNaurulegislation.Beforeherapplicationcouldbedetermined,shewasbroughttoAustraliaformedicalreview.

WhileinAustralia, theplaintiff initiatedproceedingsintheoriginal jurisdictionof theHighCourt, challenging the legalityof theMOUbetweenAustraliaandNauru, the TransfieldContractandherdetention inNauru.Thecasewas initially framedasachallenge to thelegalityoftheexerciseoftheCommonwealthexecutivepowerinestablishingandoperatingtheNaururegionalprocessingcentrebymeansof theMOU, theTransfieldContractandtheadministrativearrangements.Shortlybefore thehearing,however, theCommonwealthParliamentpassedanotheramendmenttotheMigrationAct1958,insertinganewsection,section198AHA,whichauthorisedtheCommonwealthExecutivetoimplementtheseoffshoreregionalprocessingarrangements.Theplaintiffamendedherclaimtoincludeachallengeto theCommonwealth legislativepower inenacting section198AHA.Thenewlyenactedprovision received royal assent on 30 June 2015; however, it purported to have retrospective effectfrom18August2012,beforetheMOUwasenteredinto.

ProfessorCrommelinfirstdiscussedthescopeofexecutivepower.Despitetheamendment,theHighCourtwasaskedwhethertheconductoftheCommonwealthExecutiveinsigningtheMOU,asdistinctfromgivingeffecttoitsprovisions,wasauthorisedbysection61oftheConstitution.55Section61statesthattheexecutivepoweroftheCommonwealthextendstotheexecutionandmaintenanceofthisConstitutionandofthelawsoftheCommonwealth.

54 Plaintiff M68/2015(n52).55 CommonwealthofAustraliaConstitutionAct1900(“theAustralianConstitution”)section61.

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It has long been recognised that the language of the section offers little assistance to the identification of the scopeof the power.Nonetheless, theHCAhas held in recent casesthat section 61 provides at least the starting point for the determination of the scope of Commonwealth executive power by identifying its two essential components, namelystatutoryandnon-statutoryexecutivepowers.Itisrelativelystraightforwardtodeterminethescopeofstatutoryexecutivepowers–itinvolvesstatutoryinterpretationconstrainedbytheConstitutionalrequirementthatthestatutebealawwithrespecttoasubjectwithinthelimitedauthorityoftheCommonwealthParliament.

In contrast, non-statutory executive power is heterogeneous, ambulatory and elusive. Itincludes theadministrationof thedepartmentsof the statesof theCommonwealth. Italsoencompasseswhathasbecomeknownas“thenationhoodpower”,whichisauthoritythatisappropriate to thepositionof theCommonwealthExecutiveunder theConstitutionandto thespheresof responsibilityvested in itby theConstitution.Thenationhoodpowerhasbothnationalandinternationaldimensions,reflectingAustralia’sindependentstatehoodininternational law and the role of Commonwealth as the national level of government within theAustralianFederalUnion.Itsscopemaybeinformed,butnotdetermined,byresort totheconceptoftheroyalprerogative.TheHighCourtofAustraliahasnotyetmarkedouttheboundsofthenon-statutoryexecutivepower,butithasrecognisedsomeofitscomponents,andtheseincludeaspectsofinternationalrelations,suchastheextraditionofanAustraliancitizenfromaforeignStatetoAustralia,theconclusionoftreatiesandthedeclarationofwarandpeace.

Nevertheless,theHighCourthasconfirmedthatthenon-statutorypoweroftheCommonwealthtoenterintodomesticcontractsandtospendpublicmoniesisnotunlimitedinscope.ProfessorCrommelinnotedthattworecentcasesareparticularlyinstructiveinthisregard.Botharosefrom an attempt by the Commonwealth to establish a school chaplaincy programme in Australianschools.Atfirst,theCommonwealthusednon-statutoryexecutivepowersinvolvingcontractswithprivateprovidersandpublicexpendituretosetuptheprogramme.Thevalidityofthisapproachwaschallengedsuccessfullybythelitigant,MrWilliams,inthefirstWilliams case.56Undaunted,theCommonwealthresortedtolegislativepower;butthevalidityofthelegislationitselfwasagainchallengedsuccessfullybyMrWilliams,inthesecondWilliams case.57Inthesecases,theHighCourtrejectedvariousassertionsputtoitbytheCommonwealthregarding the scopeof its non-statutory executive power. TheHighCourt did not outlinethe limitsof thenon-statutorypower,but itdid indicate thingswhich felloutside the limits.First,despiteAustralia’sEnglishconstitutionalheritage,thereisnoreasontoassumethattheexecutivepoweroftheCommonwealthtoenterintocontractsisthesameasthepoweroftheBritishExecutive.Second,theCourtrejectedthepropositionthatthecapacityoftheExecutivetoenterintocontractsisequivalenttothatofanindividual.Third,theCourtdeniedthatthenon-statutoryExecutivepowerincludesallofthesubjectmattersoftheCommonwealthlegislativepower.Theessentialreasonwhytheseextensivenon-statutorypowersweredeniedwasthat

56 Ronald Williams v the Commonwealth of Australia & Ors(2012)248CLR156;[2012]HCA23(“thefirstWilliamscase”).

57 Ronald Williams v the Commonwealth of Australia & Ors(2014)252CLR416;[2014]HCA23(“thesecondWilliamscase”).

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they were incompatible with the federal nature of the Australian federal union, and with the relationsexistingbetweendifferentbranchesoftheCommonwealthgovernment.

Professor Crommelin noted that regrettably in the M86 case, the High Court passed up the opportunitytoconsidertheapplicationofthoseprinciplestoCommonwealthnon-statutorypowerexercisedinthefieldofinternationalrelations.ThemajorityoftheCourtheldinsteadthattheMigrationAct1958authorisedtheconclusionoftheMOU,thereforeavoidingtheneedtoconsidernon-statutoryexecutivepower.

Turning to the legislative power in the M68 case, the Commonwealth relied on three sources ofauthorityforParliamenttoenacttheretrospectivelyoperatingprovision,namelythealiens’power,theexternalaffairspowerandthepowerwithrespecttotheIslandsofthePacific.SixmembersoftheCourtupheldtheconstitutionalvalidityofsection198AHAonthebasisthatthepowertomakelawsinrespectofaliensextendedtotheCommonwealth’sparticipationin the implementationof theoffshore regionalprocessing scheme inNauru. Significantly,onememberoftheCourt,GagelerJ,heldthatsection198AHAwasalsoalawinrespectofexternalaffairs,insofarasitauthorisedtheCommonwealthExecutivetotakeactionsoutsideAustraliainrelationtoanagreementbetweentheExecutiveandanotherforeigngovernment.Inotherwords,theMOUandtheadministrativearrangementswouldapparentlyoperateinthe same way as a treaty, giving Parliament the power to determine their terms without any explicitlimitations.

Professor Crommelin thenmoved on to discuss Commonwealth judicial power in light oftheHighCourt’sdecisioninM68.ItwasobservedthatanessentialelementoftheAustraliadoctrineofstrictseparationofpoweristheprohibitionoftheexerciseofjudicialpowerbyanybodyotherthanaproperlyconstitutedCourt.ThisdoctrineeffectivelycurtailsthepoweroftheCommonwealthParliamentandExecutive.TheCourtscontrolthedeprivationoflibertyinAustraliainrelationtobothadministrativedetentionandlegislativedetention.Insofarasadministrativedetentionisconcerned,thepositionisclear.NoofficeroftheCommonwealthExecutivemay,withoutajudicialwarrant,placeanypersonincustody.Ifsuchdetentionistooccur,itrequireslegislativeauthority.Thepositioninrelationtolegislativedetentionismuchlessclear.ThedoctrineofstrictseparationofpowerdoeslimitthelegislativeauthorityoftheCommonwealthParliament,subjecttotwoimportantexceptions:thedefencepowerandthealiens’power.BothoftheseexceptionsarelimitedbytheLimprinciple.58 Parliament has the powertomakelawsforthedeportationofaliens,andassuchithastheincidentalpowertodetainalienstotheextentnecessarytomakethedeportationeffective.

In M68, the High Court refused to accept the argument that outside Australia the power to detain aliens is unconstrained by the Lim principle.Nevertheless, theCourt held that theLimprinciplewasofnoavailtotheplaintiff.FourmembersoftheCourtdrewadistinctionbetween the detention of the plaintiff by the Commonwealth and the participation of the Commonwealth in theplaintiff’s detentionbyNauru. The first required theapplicationofthe Limprinciple, theseconddidnot.According toProfessorCrommelin, thisdistinction isunedifyingandhassubstantialweaknesses.Itisdifficulttoreconcilethejustificationforthe

58 Chu Kheng Lim v Minister for Immigration(1992)176CLR1.

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distinctionwiththewillingnessbythesamemembersoftheCourttoextendtheoperationofthealiens’powertoCommonwealthactivitiesinNauru.

ProfessorCrommelinconcludedbysayingthatonesignificantimpactofinternationallawonAustralianpubliclawisthedemonstrationofinadequaciesintheprotectionofhumanrightsthroughtherelianceonthestructuralfeaturesoftheConstitution.Alargepartoftheproblemstems from the failure of the High Court to apply the principles, which it has developed to determine the scope of Commonwealth powers in the domestic context, to Australia’sinvolvementintheinternationalarena.TheM68caseisthemostrecentexampleofthisfailure.Themystiquesurroundingtheconductofforeignrelationsmustsurelynowberegardedastheproductofabygoneera.ThereisnojustificationfordifferentialtreatmentfortheexerciseofpublicpowerbyAustralianinstitutionsdomesticallyandinternationally.ForAustralia,themostsignificant issue isundoubtedly theextentofCommonwealthexecutivepowerwith regardto the conduct of international relations. Unconstrained, this power threatens Australian’sconstitutionalfoundationsandonlythecourtscandevisethenecessaryconstraints.

Professor Dapo Akande, Oxford University Non-justiciability and the Foreign Act of State Doctrine

ProfessorAkandeframedhisaddressasconcerningtheroleplayedbypublicinternationallawindomesticproceedingsinvolvingtheprinciplesofForeignActofStateandButtesnon-justiciability.59 The Foreign Act of State doctrine is engagedwhen the court is invited topronounce on the legality of an act of a foreign government in the course of rendering its judgment.Typically, it isappliedwhentheforeignStateisnotapartytotheproceedings.EnglishCourtsandcourtsinothercommonlawjurisdictionshavedevelopedthedoctrineofForeignActofState,whichprovidesthatthecourtwillnotadjudicateonthelegalityofanactofaforeignStatewhenitiscommittedontheterritoryofthatforeignState.Separately,EnglishCourts have also developed the principle of Buttesnon-justiciability,accordingtowhich,“theCourtswillnotadjudicateonthetransactionsof foreign,sovereignStates.”60 These are to bedistinguishedfromtheprincipleswhichmightpreventthecourtfromadjudicatingontheactionsofthedomesticexecutiveintheconductofforeignaffairs,commonlyreferredtoasthe Crown Act of State doctrine, which originates from the case of Buron v Denman.61 In cases wheretheexecutiveisallegedtohavebeencomplicitintheactofaforeignState,boththeCrownActofStateandForeignActofStateprinciplesmaybetriggeredonthefacts.

ProfessorAkandenoted thatbothof thesedoctrinesarecurrentlyunderconsiderationbytheUnitedKingdomSupremeCourt in two separate cases,Belhaj v Straw62 and Serdar Mohammed.63 In Belhaj,thequestionsfacingtheCourtare:first,whethertheForeignActofStatedoctrineexistsasamatterofEnglishlaw;second,ifitdoes,whatisthelegalbasisforthisdoctrine;andthird,arethereanylimitationsorexceptionstothisdoctrine?Theunderlying

59 Buttes Gas & Oil v Hammer[1982]AC888(HL).60 Ibid.61 (1848)2Ex16.62 Belhaj v Straw & Ors[2013]EWHC4111(QB).63 Serdar Mohammed v Secretary of State for Defence [2015]EWCACiv843.

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claim in BelhajisthatseveralseniorUKofficialsareliableforthetortureofMrBelhajandhis wife through their alleged involvement in a common design to effect the rendition of Mr BelhajandhiswifebacktoLibya,togetherwithagentsofotherStates,whenitwasunderthecontrolofGaddafi.TheUKGovernmentarguedthattheForeignActofStateprincipleappliedandthattheCourtshouldbebarredfromhearingthesubstantialclaim.

ProfessorAkandethenexplainedtheoperationoftheForeignActofStatedoctrineanditsrelationship with Buttesnon-justiciability.TheForeignActofStatedoctrineisconcernedwiththe conduct of a foreign State within its territory, whereas the Buttesnon-justiciabilitydoctrineappliesmoregenerallyinthattheCourtwillnotadjudicateonthetransactionsofaforeignsovereign,regardlessofwhereittookplace.Therearequestionsraisedastowhetherthesedoctrinesaremerging intoone. In theTin Council case,64 forexample,KerrLJ referred tothemcompendiouslyas“actofstatenon-justiciability”.Inamorerecentcase,Yuko Capital Sarl, the Court of Appeal held that the Buttesnon-justiciabilitydoctrine“has,onthewhole,not come through as a doctrine separate from the act of state principle itself, but rather has toalargeextentsubsumeditastheparadigmrestatementofthatprinciple.”65 In spite of their closerelationships,ProfessorAkandenotedthatthesedoctrinesareunderpinnedbydifferentconsiderations. First,whereas the ForeignActofStatedoctrinehasa territorial limitation,the Buttes justiciability is concernedonly about the transactions betweenStates. Second,theForeignActofStatedoctrineoperatesasaruleofdecision,whichmeansthattheCourtassumes that the relevant act of the foreign State is valid and applies it as the basis for its decision. Incontrast, theoperationof theButtesnon-justiciabilityprinciple is such that theCourt must decline to decide on whether the relevant acts of the foreign State(s) are lawful or not, as demonstrated in the case of Shergill v Khaira.66 This second difference has potential implications for the right of access to a court enshrined underArticle6 of the EuropeanConventionofHumanRights.IfthecourtappliestheprincipleofButtes non-justiciability,thatrightisimplicatedinamannersimilartowhencourtsrefusejurisdictiononthebasisofStateimmunity.Incontrast,ProfessorAkandeargued,theremaynotbeaviolationoftherightofaccess when the court continues to entertain the substantive claim but deems the act of the foreigngovernmentvalidundertheForeignActofStatedoctrine.

TurningtotherelevanceofinternationallawwithregardtotheForeignActofStatedoctrine,ProfessorAkanderaisedtwoissues,namely:

1. Whether theForeignActofStatedoctrine isbasedondeference to the sovereigntyofa foreignStateandis thereforepotentiallyrequiredbyorunderpinnedbyprinciplesofinternational law?

2. TowhatextentisthereaninternationallawexceptiontotheForeignActofStatedoctrine.Inotherwords,canthecourtsinquireintothelegalityofaforeignactofStatewhenitisalleged to be contrary to international law?

64 Maclaine Watson v International Tin Council[1988]3AllER257(CA),375.65 Yukos Capital Sarl v OJSC Rosneft Oil Co (No 2)[2014]QB458,[66].66 Shergill v Khaira & Ors[2014]UKSC33.

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ProfessorAkandeexplainedthattheForeignActofStatedoctrinemaybesaidtobebasedon domestic constitutional principles which govern the relationships between the different branchesoftheUKState,oralternatively,basedonthecourt’sdeferencetothecompetenceofforeignsovereigns.InBelhaj,theCourtofAppealconsideredthattheForeignActofStatedoctrineisbasedonaconsiderationofsovereignequality.However,itnotedthatthedoctrineisnot requiredby international law.TheSupremeCourtwillbe interested in theextent towhichtheForeignActofStatedoctrineisbeingappliedinothercommonlawlegalsystems,suchastheUSA,Australia,SouthAfricaandNewZealand.Itissometimesstatedthatthedoctrineisapeculiarlycommonlawprinciple.Ifthisisthecase,itcanhardlyberegardedasaprincipleofinternationallaw.However,ProfessorAkandenotedthatthereisliteraturewhichsuggeststhatcivillawcountrieshavedevisedtheorieswithcomparableconsequencestothedoctrine.For instance, inhis report to the InstitutdeDroit International,ProfessorConfortiremarkedthatthedoctrineofForeignActofStateisnotexclusivetocommonlawcountries,but is also applied in continental systems as evidenced by a series of cases from the Italian CourtofCassation.

ThequestionintheUKhoweveristowhatextenthavetheCourtsregardedthemselvesasapplying thedoctrinesof theForeignActofStateandButtes justiciabilityon thebasisofinternational law, or alternatively, on the basis of Constitutional law? In Shergill v Khaira, the UKSupremeCourtseemedtosuggestthattheButtes principle is based on the constitutional limitoftheCourt’scompetenceasagainsttheExecutiveinmattersaffectingtheUK’srelationswithforeignStates.Thisisanobiter dictum statement which the Supreme Court would need to revisit in the Belhajcase.Quiteseparatelyhowever,theHighCourtofAustraliaindicatedin Potter v Broken HillthatthebasisfortheCourt’senquiryintothevalidityoftheexecutiveactofaforeignStatedependsontheapplicationofawell-knownprincipleofinternationallaw.67TheUSSupremeCourtappearedtohaverejectedinternationallawasthebasisforthesedoctrinesinthe1960s.EnglishCourtshavebeeninconsistentmorerecentlyinrelationtothebasisforthesedoctrines.Ontheonehand,thedoctrinesaregroundedwithreferencetosovereignequality,butontheother,thereisareluctancebytheCourtstoholdthattheseprincipleshavebeenderivedfrominternationallaw.

TurningtothequestionofwhetherthereareinternationallawexceptionstotheForeignActofStatedoctrine,ProfessorAkandenotedthatoneargumentwhichhasbeenmadeintheBelhajcaseisthatthereoughttobeaninternationallawexceptionor,atleast,ahumanrightsexceptiontothegeneralapplicationoftheForeignActofStateprinciple.ProfessorAkandenotedthatwhilethereisnotacoherent,generalinternationallawexception,therearecertaincircumstanceswheredomesticcourtswouldbeentitledto,orevenrequiredto,enquireintothelegalityoftheactofaforeignStateunderinternationallaw.Bywayofexample,inthecontextof refugeeprotection, inorder togiveeffect to theUK’s internationalobligationsundertheRefugeeConvention,itwouldbenecessarytolookintothelevelofprotection(orotherwise)whichcanbeaffordedbyanotherState. Anotherexamplewouldbecriminalprosecutions under the CAT,68wherethedomesticCourt isrequiredunder theConventiontoenquireintothelegalityoftheactofaforeigngovernment.Inaddition,therearecases

67 Potter v Broken Hill Pty Co Ltd(1906)3CLR479,510.68 ConventionAgainstTortureandOtherCruel,InhumanorDegradingTreatmentorPunishment(adopted10

December1984,enteredintoforce26June1987)1465UNTS85(CAT).

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where States are obliged not to recognise as lawful a situation which has arisen as a result of a breach of jus cogens.ProfessorAkandealsoreferredtothedecisionbytheHouseofLordsin the Kuwait AirwayscasetoenquireintothelegalityofthetransferoftheassetsofKuwaitAirwaysbyIraq,whichwasinconformitywithUK’sinternationalobligationsasaState. 69

Questions and Answers

OnecommentfromthefloorsuggestedthatweshouldbemindfuloftheEnglishcourts’abilitytoprotect human rights through theuseof international law in statutory interpretation.DrFikfakemphasisedinreplythattherelianceoncommonlawrightsandtheuseofinternationallawinstatutoryinterpretationarenotmutuallyexclusive.ProfessorvonBogdandyexpressedhisconcernthatiftheUKwithdrawsfromtheConventionitself,thecourtsmightbeunableor unwilling to sustain the same level of protection for human rights as a matter of political reality.DrFikfaksharedmanyoftheconcernsexpressedbutnotedthatshewastryingtolimithersessiontothepossibilityofarepealoftheHRA,notaUKwithdrawalfromtheConventionitself.DrFikfakwasalsoaskedtoelaborateonareaswherecommonlawmayprovideagreater levelofprotection than theConvention jurisprudence.DrFikfaknoted inresponsethat the common law may give greater protection in relation to certain areas, such as the right againsttorture,butithasfailedtoprovideprotectioninrelationtotherighttovote.

AquestionwasaskedaboutthetypeofinternationallawtheHouseofLordswasreferringtoin the Kuwait Airwayscase.Morespecifically,whentheCourtheldthatitcouldadjudicateontheactofaforeignState,wasitabletodosobecauseoftheexistenceofaninternationallawrule or because a parallel legal determination has already been made in international law? ProfessorAkandeansweredthathisreadingofthecaseisthattheCourtwasguidedbytheSecurityCouncilrulingonthesameissue.Inasense,thedomesticcourtismerelyrepeatingthejudgmentgivenattheinternationallevel.IfweconsidertheconceptsofsovereignequalityastheunderlyingrationaleforhavingtheForeignActofStatedoctrine,thenthedomesticcourt’sreiterationofaninternationalrulingisunlikelytoinfringethatdoctrine.

ProfessorMcCorquodaleaskedwhetherGagelerJ’sjudgmentintheM68 case posed any dangerfortheapplicationofinternationallawinAustralianpubliclaw.ProfessorCrommelinnotedthatGagelerJ’sjudgmentisinterestingfortworeasons.First,GagelerJprovidedanextensiveaccountof thescopeofCommonwealthexecutivepowerbothdomesticallyandinternationally even though itwas not called for in the case. Second,Gageler J tookanexpansiveviewoftheCommonwealthexecutivepower.ItwasheldthattheCommonwealthexecutivepowertoconductexternalaffairsappliesnotonlyinrelationtointernationaltreatiesbutalsoanyinternationalarrangements,contractuallybindingornot.WhentheCourtdecidedin the Tasmanian Dams case70 that theCommonwealthexternalaffairspower includes theimplementationofinternationaltreatyobligations,therewasahugepoliticalbacklash.Asaresultofthesymbioticrelationship,anextensioninthescopeofexecutivepowerwouldhavearesoundingeffectonthelegislativeauthorityoftheCommonwealthParliament.ProfessorCrommelinconcludedthatiftheCourtweretoadoptGagelerJ’sapproach,therecouldwellbeanotherenormouspoliticalbacklash.

69 Kuwait Airways Corporation v Iraqi Airways Company and Others[2002]UKHL19.70 Commonwealth v Tasmania(1983)158CLR1.

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ProfessorDanSarooshispeakingonPanel3LtoR:SirJeffreyJowell,ProfessorSarooshi,Aimee-JaneLee

Panel 3: Public law influences on public international law

Chair: Professor Dan Sarooshi, Oxford University and Essex Court Chambers

Professor Sarooshi introduced the panel as concerning the influence of domestic public law onpublicinternationallaw,whetherappliedinthecontextofinternationalorganisations,suchastheEU,orbydomesticorinternationalcourtsandtribunals.Givenrecentevents,hesaid,thementionofBrexitiscompulsory!However,evenleavingtheBrexitchallengesaside,thereareseriousquestionsastohowsignificantpubliclawconstraintsformulatedatthedomesticlevel should be applied to States and international organisations by international courts andarbitral tribunals.Prior to introducingthespeakersforpanel three,ProfessorSarooshicongratulatedBIICLforthequalityofthespeakerspresentattheconference.

Sir Jeffrey Jowell QC, Blackstone Chambers The Internationalisation of the Right to Administrative Justice

Sir Jeffrey Jowell began by noting that the process through which entitlements gain internationalacceptance,perhapsfirstthroughsoftlawandthenhardlaw,isnotsubjecttorigorousmeasurement.Itmustbeassessedbyreferencetobothprinciplesandtopractice.Theprincipleofadministrativejusticeisalsoknownas“justadministrativeaction”or“goodadministration”.It is tobedistinguishedfrom“goodgovernance”,whichhasdifferentand

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morevariedconnotations.Itrequiresallpublicofficialstoactwithinthelaw,toactfairly,andtoactreasonably.Itpermitseveryonetoassertthosestandardsandtochallengedecisionsthataremadeabouttheirliveswhichfallshortofthosestandards.Thestandardsthemselvesare to protect individuals against decisions which are arbitrary, offensive to human dignity, orunnecessarilyoppressive.

SirJeffreynotedthatwefindtheemergenceinternationallyofjustadministrationstandardsfrom three particular sources: the interstices of established human rights instruments; the principleoftheruleoflaw;andtherecognitionofjustadministrationindomesticConstitutionsandthecommonlaw.

First,thereareanumberofestablishedrightsthatspeaktothenotionofadministrativejustice:the right to a fair trial before an independent and impartial tribunal; no punishment without law;nodeprivationoflibertyunlessprescribedbylaw;equaltreatment;notortureorinhumanordegradingtreatment.

Second,theruleoflawasasourcecontainsanumberofaspectsofadministrativejustice.Theruleoflawisoftensaidtobeexcessivelyvague;forexample,JeremyWaldronregardsitasacontestedconceptoraworkinprogress.However,lookingatanumberofdifferentsources,includingTomBingham’sworkThe Rule of Law,71 in which he lays out eight ingredients for theruleoflaw,itcanbeseenthatthereisnothingvagueaboutthem.Thereisnothingvagueabout the notion of legality, that everyone should be under the law, that the law should be implementedand,asfaraspublicofficialsgo,theyshouldactwithintheirconferredpowers.In addition, legal certainty is important; there ought to be fair warning before the law is changed.Thereis thenotionofequalityorequalapplicationof thelaw.Thereisalsothenotionofaccesstojustice,whichprovidesforafairtrialbeforeanindependentjudiciaryorotherindependentbodies.Theaccesstojusticeprincipleimpliesthatindividualsshouldbeabletochallengedecisionsmadeaboutthem.Thisistheessenceofadministrativejustice.

Turningnowtotheinternationalrecognitionofadministrativejustice,itisoftensaidthattheruleoflawandthenotionofadministrativejusticeareonlyavailablefortheGlobalNorthordevelopednations.ItissometimesclaimedbycountriessuchasChinaorHungarythattheyupholdtheruleoflaw,butweseeonlycertainaspectsoftheruleoflawbeingupheld.Forinstance, in terms of legality, when the law of the ruling party cannot be challenged, it is in reality a system of rule by law rather than the rule oflaw.

SirJeffreynotedthattworecentdevelopmentssuggesttheconceptionofadministrativejusticeisgrowinginacceptanceglobally.ThefirstistheReportontheRuleofLawproducedbytheCouncilofEurope’sCommissionforDemocracythroughLaw(“theVeniceCommission”)in2011.72Bywayofbackground,attheinceptionoftheCommission,therewastremendousscepticismfromcivillawcountriesinEuropewhosaidthattheydidnotsubscribetothesamenotionoftheruleoflaw,whichisacommonlawtradition.WhentheBinghamingredients

71 Lord Bingham, The Rule of Law(AllenLane2010).72 EuropeanCommissionforDemocracyThroughLaw,“ReportontheRuleoflaw”(adoptedbytheVenice

Commissionatits86thPlenarySession,25–26March2011),StudyNo.512/2009.

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wereenunciatedin thefinalreport,however, itwasrealisedthatallmemberStatesof theCouncilofEuropesubscribedtotheseelements.Sincethen,the2011reporthasbeencitedfrequentlyassoftlaw,andithasbroughttogether46nationsoftheCouncil,havingbeenendorsedbytheCouncilitself.Morerecently,ithasbeendecidedbytheVeniceCommissiontosupplementthe2011ReportwithachecklistsothatStatescanchecktheiradherencetotheruleoflawinapracticalway(“theChecklist”).73TheChecklistwasadoptedon11–12March2016andunanimouslyendorsedbyallmembersoftheCouncilofEurope. Amongsttheelementswhichhavebeenacceptedarelegality,legalcertainty,equality,accesstojusticeandfairtrial.Thesearebrokendownintofurtheraspects.Oneaspectisthepreventionofabuseormisuseofpowers.Thisparticularsectioneffectivelyprovidesthatadministrativepowersexercisedbypublicofficialsmustbeopentochallenge.Theexerciseofpowerwhichleads to a substantively unfair or unreasonable, irrational or oppressive decision violates the ruleoflaw.ItiscontrarytotheruleoflawfortheExecutiveexerciseofdiscretionarypowertobeunfettered.Thus, the lawshould indicate thescopeofanysuchdiscretion toprotectagainstarbitrariness.Diceyopinedthattheruleoflawrequiredtheremovalofalldiscretion.This viewwascriticisedby subsequent scholarsand the consensusnow seems tobe thatdiscretionshouldbeallowed,but itneeds tobeconstrainedandcontrolled.Theexerciseofdiscretionarypowershouldbecontrolledby judicialorother independent review,andremediesforthemisuseofpowershouldbeclearandeasilyaccessible.

SirJeffreyreferredustoanotherdevelopmentintheinternationalarenathroughtheUnitedNations. In2010UNSecretary-General BanKi-moonproposedan initiative for the ruleof law,whichwasendorsedbyallStatespresentat theGeneralAssembly.74 Further, theSecretary-Generallaunchedthepost-2015developmentagenda,75 which included 17 goals and169targetsonsustainabledevelopment.Forexample,Goal16setsoutthepromotionof“peacefulandinclusivesocietiesforsustainabledevelopment,provideaccesstojusticeforallandbuildeffective,accountableandinclusiveinstitutionsatalllevels”.76Target16.3thenrequiresStatesto“[p]romotetheruleoflawatthenationalandinternationallevelsandensureequalaccesstojusticeforall.”77OthertargetsunderGoal16alsospeaktothe“thick”notionoftheruleoflaw.

Sir Jeffrey then discussed the extraordinary development of the constitutionalisation ofadministrativejustice.TheprocessbeganwiththeNamibianConstitutionpublishedin1994.78 SomeofthepeoplewhohelpedtodrafttheNamibianConstitutionwentontoassistwiththedraftingoftheSouthAfricanConstitution.79Article18oftheNamibianConstitutionrequirestheStatetoactfairlyandreasonably(aformulationtakenfromtheenunciationofLordDiplock

73 European Commission for Democracy Through Law, “Rule of Law Checklist” (adopted by the VeniceCommissionatits106thPlenarySession,11-12March2016),StudyNo.711/2013.

74 UNGARes65/32(10January2011)UNDocA/RES/65/32.75 UNGARes70/1(21October2015)UNDocA/RES/70/1.76 Ibid,25.77 Ibid.78 TheConstitutionoftheRepublicofNamibia(“theNamibianConstitution”).79 ConstitutionoftheRepublicofSouthAfrica1996(“theSouthAfricanConstitution”).

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in the GCHQ case80).81 Persons aggrieved should have access to redress. This provisionwentontobedevelopedfurther inboth the interimandfinalversionof theSouthAfricanConstitution.Article33(1)oftheSouthAfricanConstitutionprovidesthat“everyonehastherighttoadministrativeactionthatislawful,reasonableandprocedurallyfair.”82 Article 33(2) furtherrequireswrittenreasonstobegivenwhentheindividual’srightshavebeenadverselyaffectedbyadministrativeactionoftheState.83Theobligationofadministrativejusticecanbefound in the Constitution of Kenya,84 Malawi,85the Cayman Islands,86 Maldives,87Zimbabwe88 andFiji.89 ThisAfricanexporthasevenbeenadoptedbytheEuropeanUnion,intheCharteroftheEU,astherightto“goodadministration”.

Thisbegsthequestionofwhethertheseaspirationsarebeingimplemented.Itistruethatlawsmustbeaccompaniedbyacultureofcompliance.SirJeffreyremarkedthatnonetheless,weshould not understate the effect of these constitutional provisions because they legitimate the standardsoftheruleoflaw.HereferredtotheConstitutionalCourtofSouthAfricaasacaseinpoint.TheConstitutionalCourthasupheldtheruleoflawinaseriesofdecisionsinvolvingthecountry’sPresident. Theconstitutionalauthorityof PresidentMandelawaschallengedsuccessfully in Court,90adecisionheacceptedwithgrace.MrMbekiwassimilarlychallengedsuccessfullyduringhispresidencyoverhisfailuretorolloutanti-viraldrugs.91

SirJeffreyconcludedthattheacceptanceofadministrativejusticeattheinternationallevelandtheprovisionofmechanismsforitsenforcementlegitimatethenotionthatofficialpowerisnotunconstrained.Heremindedusthatadministrativejusticeasaninternationalstandardisbasedontheclaimthatallpublicofficialsshouldbeheldaccountableforthepowertheyexerciseonourbehalfandtheabuseofthosepowersmustbechallengeable.

Aimee-Jane Lee, Debevoise & PlimptonWhat is the Role of Public Law Notions of Proportionality in Investment Arbitration and Contemporary Treaty Practice?

Aimee-Jane Lee introduced her presentation as concerning the public law notion ofproportionality in the context of investment arbitrations. She discussed the followingquestions:

80 Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service[1983]UKHL6(“theGCHQcase”).81 TheNamibianConstitution(n77),Art18.82 TheSouthAfricanConstitution1996(n78),Art33(1).83 Ibid,Art33(2).84 TheConstitutionofKenya,Arts165(7)and172.85 ConstitutionoftheRepublicofMalawi1994,s43.86 TheCaymanIslandsConstitutionOrder2009,s19.87 ConstitutionoftheRepublicofMaldives2008,Art43.88 Zimbabwe’sConstitutionof2013,s68.89 ConstitutionoftheRepublicofFiji2013,s16.90 Executive Council of the Western Cape Legislature v President of the Republic of South Africa 1995

(4)SA877(CC).91 Minister of Health and Others v Treatment Action Campaign and Others 2002(5)SA721(CC).

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1. Wherehavenotionsofproportionalityarisen,both indomesticand international legalsystems?

2. Howhavearbitraltribunalsadoptedthisconceptwhenresolvinginternationalinvestmentdisputes?

3. Shouldproportionalitytakeonanincreasedroleininvestmenttreatyarbitration,andifso,howcanitsapplicationbemadelegallyandpracticallyworkable?

By way of introduction, she noted that proportionality analysis has emerged as a common tool indecision-makingatbothnationaland international levels.Conflicts frequentlyarisebetween competing rights and in the face of such conflicts and the statutory silence as to how they are to be resolved, proportionality analysis has been used to prioritise competing rights.MsLeethenidentifiedherfocusasthenotionofproportionalityasitarisesindisputesconcerning the State’s exercise of public power, that is, when an aggrieved party seeksto challenge theStatemeasureallegedly impactingon his or her right or interest. In thiscontext,proportionalitycanassistinthetribunal’sdeterminationofthelegitimacyoftheStatemeasure.Atitsmostbasic,proportionalityassessmentinvolvesajudgmentofthemeansandtheendoftheimpugnedStateaction;itevolvesaroundthecentralquestionofwhethertheStatetooksufficientaccountof thelegalpositionof theimpactedparties,giventhepolicyobjectivesthatthemeasureisdesignedtoachieve.

Ms Lee observed that the notion of proportionality has arisen in various domestic legal systems.Thenotionofproportionalityanalysishas its roots inGermanadministrative law,and the principle has had constitutional status inGermany since1965. It has also beenincorporated into other domestic legal systems as can be seen in an analysis of constitutional rights.For instance, theCanadianSupremeCourt inconsideringtheCanadianCharterofRightsandFreedoms92 adopted an approach which involves, inter alia, an assessment of the proportionalitybetweentheeffectsoftheStatemeasureontherightsandtheStateobjectives.Similarly, the Constitutional Court of South Africa has held that the limitation of constitutional rights for a purpose that is reasonable and necessary in a democratic society involves the weighingupofcompetingvaluesand,ultimately,anassessmentbasedonproportionality.

Notions of proportionality can also be found in the international sphere. As amatter ofpublicinternationallaw,proportionalityisawell-establishedrequirementforStatestocomplywithwhentakinglawfulcounter-measures.Article51of theInternationalLawCommissionDraftArticlesstipulatesthat“countermeasuresmustbecommensuratewiththeinjurysuffered,takingintoaccountthegravityoftheinternationallywrongfulactandtherightsinquestion.”93 As a matter of customary international law, any measure taken in self-defence must beproportionatetotheinitialarmedattack.

Thenotionofproportionalityhasbeenadoptedintreaty-basedinternationallegalsystems.TheCourtofJusticeoftheEuropeanUnion(“theCJEU”)utilisesproportionalityanalysistoresolve conflicts between domestic State measures and primary and secondary sources of

92 TheConstitutionAct1982,PartICanadianCharterofRightsandFreedoms.93 ILC,‘DraftArticlesontheResponsibilityofStatesforInternationallyWrongfulActs‘(adoptedatthe53rd

session,2001)UNDocA/56/10.

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EUlaw,aswellasfundamentalrightsandfreedoms.TheCJEUadoptsathree-stepapproach:itlooksatthesuitabilityofthemeasure,thenitsnecessity,andfinallyapplyingproportionalityinastrictersense,balancingtheeffectsagainstthepolicymeasure.ProportionalityalsoplaysacentralroleinrelationtoresolvingthedisputesbetweenrightsgrantedundertheECHR94 andtheexerciseofpublicpowerbyMemberStates.TheEuropeanCourtofHumanRightshas adopted some form of balancing approach in respect of every right, but in particular inrelationtoArticles8,9,10,11and14oftheConvention.Broadlyspeaking,Statesmayinterfere or restrict a Convention right provided that such interference is prescribed by law and is necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security or public safety, or for the prevention of disorder or crime, or for the protection of health or morals, or for the protectionof therightsor freedomsofothers. Indeterminingwhat isnecessary, theCourtaffords the State a degree of discretion. Themargin of appreciation shrinks or expandsdepending on the range of measures adopted by other Member States and the relative practicalitiesoftherights.

MsLeeremarkedthattheuseofproportionalityisnotlimitedtothehumanrightscontext;ithasalsobeenadoptedinthecontextofinternationaleconomiclaw.ArticleXXoftheGeneralAgreementonTariffsandTrade(“GATT”)95providesalistofexceptionstotheobligationsundertheagreement.Thereisanecessitytestincorporatedintothevariousexceptions.Thetestinitiallyfocusedontheleastrestrictivemeasurerequiredtoachievethepolicymeasure.In the Korea-Beef case96 however, the appellate body introduced a balancing approach in lightof the regulatorygoal.Whenconsidering theexceptions, thepanelnowweighs thecontribution to thepolicyobjectiveagainst its traderestrictiveness, taking intoaccount theimportanceof theunderlyingpolicyobjectives.Additionally, theavailabilityofalternativemeasuresisexamined.AmeasurewouldnotbeconsiderednecessaryiftherearealternativemeasureswhicharelessinconsistentwiththatState’sGATTobligations.

Fromthisreviewofthelandscapeofproportionalityanalysisindomesticandinternationallegal systems, someoverarchingcommon featuresemerge. First, thecourtor tribunalwillconsiderthesuitabilityofthemeasureasapreliminarystepinassessingitsrelevance.Thisinvolvesanassessmentofwhether thepolicy is suitable for the identifiedStateobjective,whether the purpose is a legitimate area for public regulation, and whether the measure wouldcontributetowardstheachievementofthatobjective.Second,therelevantadjudicatorwillexaminethenecessityoftheStatemeasure,specifically,whethertherearelessintrusivemeanstoachievethesameobjective.

Ms Lee then considered proportionality in the context of international investment treatyarbitration.Here,proportionalityconcernsthefindingofareasonablebalancebetweentherightsoftheinvestorsandthatoftheState.Whilstnotyetasettledpractice,tribunalshavebeen increasingly willing to apply notions of proportionality, in particular when considering claimsofexpropriation,fairandequitabletreatmentandnon-precludedmeasures.

94 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention onHumanRights,asamended)(“ECHR”).

95 WTO,“TheGeneralAgreementonTariffsandTrade”(adopted1Jan1948).96 WTO,Korea-MeasuresAffectingImportsofFresh,ChilledandFrozenBeef-ReportoftheAppellateBody

(11December2000)WT/DS161/AB/R;WT/DS169/AB/R.

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Bywayofbackground,investmenttreatylawalmostalwaysrequirestheStatetocompensateinvestorswhentherehasbeenanexpropriation.Inassessingwhetheranexpropriationhasoccurred,some tribunalsusean“effects test”.Thedeterminative factor is theeffectof themeasureontheinvestor’sinvestment,inotherwords,whethertheinvestorhasbeendeprivedofthevalueofhisorherinvestmentasaresultofthemeasure.Othertribunalsadoptwhatiscalledthe“policepowersdoctrine”,whichacknowledgestheState’spowertorestrictprivatepropertyrightsforthepurposeofachievinglegitimatepublicpurposes.Broadlyspeaking,it requires the tribunal todetermine theeffectsof themeasureand tobalance theeffectsagainsttheobjectivethatthemeasurewasseekingtoachieve.Thenotionofproportionalitythus emerges. The Tecmed case97 has often been cited as the case which incorporated proportionalityintotherubricsofinternationalinvestmentlaw.Therelevantmeasureatissuein TecmedwastherefusalbytheMexicanGovernmenttorenewalicencetooperateawastelandfill.Thetribunalheldthatthereneedstobeareasonablerelationshipofproportionalitybetweentheeffectsontheinvestorandtheaimssoughttobeachievedbytheexpropriatorymeasure. It went on to find that the State’s measurewas not proportionate as Tecmed’sminorinfringementsintheoperationofthelandfilldidnotgiverisetoasufficientlyseriousorurgentsituation,crisisorsocialemergencytojustifytheState’smeasure,whichdeprivedTecmedofthevalueofitsinvestmentsinthelandfilloperation.Interestingly,whilstthetribunalmadeexplicitreferencetotheproportionalityjurisprudenceoftheEuropeanCourtofHumanRights, it did not apply the proportionality test as formulated by the Strasbourg Court, omitting suitabilityandnecessityanalyses.

The Tecmed approachhasbeen subsequently usedbyotherarbitral tribunals. In LG&E v Argentina, the tribunal held that the assessment of expropriation involves balancing twocompeting interests, namely the investor’s right to ownership and the power of the Statetoadopt itsownpolicies.98Thisrequiresconsiderationof themeasure’seconomicimpacts(including the duration and severity of such impacts) and the practical impacts on the investorintermsofhisorherenjoymentoftherightoftheownership.UltimatelyinLG&E, the investor’sclaimfailedatthefirsthurdle,namelythattherewasnopermanentdeprivationofinvestmentvalue.ItwasthereforeunnecessaryforthetribunaltoconsidertheproportionalityofArgentina’sconduct.ThetribunalhoweverdidendorsetheuseoftheproportionalitytestinTecmedtodistinguishbetweennon-compensableregulationandcompensableexpropriation.Subsequently inEl Paso Energy99,alsoamatterarising fromtheArgentinefinancialcrisis,the tribunal applied approach adopted in Tecmed and LG&E, reaffirming the need for aproportionality test to be carried out between the public purpose fostered by the regulation andthemeasure’sinterferencewiththeinvestor’spropertyrights.

Turning to the use of proportionality in relation to fair and equitable treatment,Ms Leestated that unlike expropriation, the phrase “fair and equitable treatment” has alwaysbeen interpretedby the investment treaty tribunalsasanall-encompassing standard,andtribunalsfrequentlyengageinsomeformofweighingwhenconsideringallegedbreaches.Morerecentlyhowever, thisweighingprocesshasbeenlinkedexplicitly to theconceptof

97 Ténicas Medioambientales Tecmed SA v MexicoICSIDCaseNo.ARB(AF)/00/2.98 ICSIDCaseNo.ARB/02/1.99 El Paso Energy International Company v ArgentinaICSIDCaseNo.ARB/03/15.

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proportionality. InMTD v Chile100, the tribunal observed that fair and equitable treatmentisabroad,widely-acceptedfundamentalstandardinvolvinggoodfaith,dueprocess,non-discriminationandproportionality.

More recently, the test of proportionality has been directly adopted in Occidental v Ecuador.101 OccidentalenteredintoaparticipationcontractwithEcuadorinrelationtotheexplorationandexploitationofanoilfield.Itcommittedatechnicalbreachofthecontractbyassigningsome rights and economic interests of the contract to a third party without obtaining the requiredministerialapproval.Asaresult,Ecuador terminated thecontractandseized theoil field, alongwithOccidental’s propertiesandassets. In finding that theStateacted inbreach of domestic law, customary international law and the investment treaty, the tribunal expresslyacknowledged that theobligations for fairandequitable treatment, underbothEcuadorian domestic law and public international law, importedwith it the need for thetribunaltoconsiderproportionalityandtheavailabilityofalternativemeasures.ThetribunalwentontoobservethatwhenStatesseektoimposeaseveresanction,suchastheterminationofacontractandseizureofanoilfield,theStateneedstodemonstratethattherehasbeensufficientlyseriousharm,or that therehasbeenapersistentorflagrantbreach,or that forreasons of good governance or deterrence it was necessary to impose a severe sanction evenwhen theharmwasnotserious.Further inapplying this test, the tribunal focusedontwothings:first,whethertherewasameaningfulalternativeshortoftermination;andsecond,whether, in any event, the terminationwas a proportionate response. It found that thereweremeaningfulalternativesandEcuador’s sanctionwasdisproportionate to the typeofinfringementcommittedbyOccidental.Whilstlesserformsofsanctionmightbedefensible,the tribunal found that in light of the magnitude of the total loss to the investment suffered by Occidental,terminationwasadisproportionateresponsetoarelativelyminorwrongdoing.Thetribunalacknowledgedthateverycasewouldturnonitsownfacts,quotingLordSteyn’sfamousenunciationwhengivinghis imprimatur to the importation into English lawof theprincipleofproportionalitythat“inlaw,contextiseverything.”102

Ms Lee concluded that there is a place for proportionality to be used more broadly in internationalinvestmentlaw.First,proportionalityrepresentsbestpracticefortheresolutionofnormativeconflictsinapluralisticlegalenvironment.Second,proportionalitycanassistinthedevelopmentoftheruleoflawbyprovidingaconsistentframeworkfortheassessmentofconflictingrights.Theuniformadoptionofproportionalityasanadjudicationtoolindefinedcircumstancescouldincreasethecoherenceandpredictabilityoftribunals’rulings,therebyenhancingtheruleoflaw.Onemusthavealsoregardtothelegalandpracticalimplicationsofthisdevelopment.Theuseofproportionalityanalysesmayconcentratejudicialpowersinarbitratorsbygrantingthemagreaterdegreeofdiscretion,whichmayexacerbateexistingcriticismsofthetribunals’legitimacyanddemocraticdeficit.Therearealsodifficultiesarisingfrom the transposition of proportionality as a general public international law concept to

100 MTD Equity Sdn Bhd and MTD Chile SA v Chile ICSIDCaseNo.ARB/01/7.101 Occidental Petroleum Corporation and Occidental Exploration and Production Company v Ecuador

ICSIDCaseNo.ARB/06/11102 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex parte Daly[2001]3AllER433(HL)447,cited

in Occidental Petroleum Corp(n101)para451.

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internationalinvestmentlaw,duetothevariationofformulationsandthelackofaconstitutionalvaluesystemattheinternationallawlevel.Finally,aswehaveseenfromtheapplicationofproportionality by different tribunals, there is the potential for proportionality analyses to increaseinconsistency.Ultimately,theextenttowhichtheroleofproportionalityevolveswillbe determined by future investment treaties, and how, in those treaties, States decide to, or notto,usetheconceptofproportionalitytoresolveconflictingrights.

Ben Juratowitch, Freshfields Bruckhaus DeringerIndividual Rights in Disputes between States

IndisputesbetweenStates, the rightsof individualsare sometimesat stake.DameRoslynHiggins observed in 1977 that: “When a state delimits its territorial boundaries, grantsnationalityunderitsownrulesandassertsterritorialandextendedjurisdictionoveritsnationals,individualsaremanifestlyaffected.”103 The effects on individuals of disputes between States hasnotreceivedsufficientattention.

The primary reason for this is that the rights of individuals were typically governed by domestic lawinaverticalrelationshipwiththeState,towhosejurisdictiontheyweresubject.However,therightsofStatesweregovernedbypublicinternationallawinahorizontalrelationshipwithotherStates.Thesejuridicalplaneswereonlyrarelyregardedasintersecting,andiftheydiditwasonlyeveratrightangles.

Oneway inwhich the two juridicalplanes intersectedwas throughdiplomaticprotection,through which States, for centuries, have protected their nationals from the nefarious treatment ofotherStates.Thiswasbasedonthewell-knownfictionthatitwastheState’srightthatwasbeingasserted,nottheindividual’s,asthoughtheconceptofnationalityisaconduitthroughwhich the rights of an individual metamorphosise into the rights of a State. These casesconcern situations in which a State has made a decision to intervene to protect the interests of anindividual.Themodernalternativestodiplomaticprotectionaretreatiesonhumanrightsandinvestment,which,DrJuratowitchsaid,havebloomedlikeathousandflowers,orweeds,dependingonone’spointofview.Thesetreatiesoftengrantindividualsorcorporationsdirectrights against States under international law, leading to the suggestion that there is now a systemof“globaladministrativelaw”.

Dr Juratowitch’s topic was how the rights and interests of individuals are considered, ornot, when they are affected by international litigation between States, the direct rights and obligationsofthoseStatesbeingthesubjectmatterofthatdispute.Onequestioninthiscontextiswhether,andifsohow,publiclawprinciplescouldbedrawnuponininter-Statedisputesto improve the way international courts and tribunals deal with the rights of individuals who arenotsubjecttotheirjurisdiction.InordertoexplorethisissueDrJuratowitchdiscussedthreecasesandofferedseveralmoregeneralobservations.

103RosalynHiggins‘ConceptualThinkingabouttheIndividualinInternationalLaw’(1978)24NewYorkLawSchoolLawReview11.

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Thefirstcasementionedwasthe1923AdvisoryOpiniononCertain Questions Relating to Settlers of German Origin,104inwhichthePermanentCourtofInternationalJustice(“PCIJ”)consideredthatinternationallawrequiredPolandtorespectprivatepropertyrightsconferredon German farmers under Prussian law in areas that had been German prior to and during theFirstWorldWar,butbecamePolishafterthewar.ThefarmershadbeenGermannationalsat the beginning of the war, but lost their German nationality at the conclusion of the war andbecamePolishnationals.PolandsoughttooustthemfromtheirfarmsonthebasisthattheacquisitionofsovereigntyovertheterritorybyPolandresettheprivatelawrightsthathadbeenconferredonthembyGermany.ThecasecametothePCIJforanadvisoryopinion,whichindicatedthatPolandhadbehavedunlawfullyunderinternationallaw.Thisexamplefrom almost a century ago brings to mind what has happened on the Crimean Peninsula since 2014. There isadisputebetween theRussian FederationandUkraineabout sovereigntyoverthepeninsulaandsovereignrightsandjurisdictionoverthemaritimeareassurroundingit.Oneof thefirst things that theRussianFederationdiduponannexation in2014was toeviscerateexistingpropertyrightsunderUkrainianlawoverhydrocarbonsthoughttoexistonthecontinentalshelf,andconferprivatelawrightstothesameresourcesonRussianState-ownedentities underRussian law.Whateverone thinkson thequestionofwhichState isthe proper sovereign over Crimea, private law rights do not, under public international law, automaticallyriseorfalldependingonwhichStateissovereign.

The second examplewas the 2009 case ofCosta Rica v Nicaragua.105 An 1858 treatybetweenCostaRicaandNicaraguaestablishedNicaraguansovereigntyovertherelevantpartof theSanJuanriver,butalsopreservedCostaRica’snavigationrightson thatsameriver.ThescopeofthoserightsofCostaRicaformedthesubjectofthedisputemorethanacenturylater.TheCourtfoundthattheinhabitantsoftheCostaRicanbankoftheSanJuanwereentitled to use the river tomeet “theessential needsof everyday lifewhich requireexpeditious transportation, such as transport to and from school or formedical care.”106 Nicaragua was required to respect subsistence fishing by Costa Ricans living along theriverbankasacustomaryrightoftheStateofCostaRica.Thisresultwasreachedbothbyinterpreting the treatyandby focusingonNicaragua’s failure toobject to the river-borneactivitiesofCostaRicansoveraverylongperiod.

The thirdexamplewas theprovisionalmeasuresphaseof theArctic Sunrise case brought bytheNetherlandsagainstRussiabeforetheInternationalTribunalfortheLawoftheSea(“ITLOS”),107inwhichRussiachosenottoparticipate.TheArctic Sunrise was a Greenpeace ship flying the Dutch flag and protesting against a Russian oil platform in the Arctic, within the ExclusiveEconomicZoneoftheRussianFederation.Russiaarrestedthevesselandeveryoneonboardonchargesofpiracy.TheNetherlands thensoughtaprovisionalmeasure fromITLOSrequiringthereleaseofthevesselanditscrew,althoughonlytwoofthe30detained

104 Advisory Opinion on Certain Questions Relating to Settler of German Origin in the Territory Ceded by Germany to Poland 1923PCIJRepSeriesBNo6.

105 Case concerning the Dispute regarding Navigational and Related Rights (Costa Rica v Nicaragua), Judgment,[2009]ICJRep213.

106Ibid,para78.107 The Arctic Sunrise Case (Kingdom of the Netherlands v Russian Federation) (Provisional Measures,

Orderof22November2013)ITLOSReports2013,22.

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crewmembershadDutchnationality,andsomeofthemwereRussian.ITLOSorderedRussiato release the Arctic Sunriseandallofitspersonnelregardlessoftheirnationality,subjecttotheNetherlandspostingabondof3.6millioneuros.TheITLOSordercontainednodiscussionoftherightsofindividualsotherthanitsreferencetoanargumentbytheNetherlandsthat:“Thesettlementofsuchdisputesbetweentwostatesshouldnotinfringeupontheenjoymentofindividualrightsandfreedomsofthecrewofthevesselsconcerned.”108

As these cases demonstrate, individual rights and interests are sometimes considered in, and canbedeterminativeof,disputesbetweenStates.However,thereasoninginmostofthesecasesissparse.Publicinternationallawlackscoherentconceptualandproceduralframeworksfortheproperconsiderationoftherightsofindividualsininter-Statedisputes.Whilstthecasesmentioned so far have demonstrated at least some consideration of individual rights, there aremanymorecaseswheretherewasnoconsiderationatall.

Thecompleteabsenceofrespectforthefishingrightsofprivateindividualsinthemaritimeboundarydelimitationdecisionof aChamber of the InternationalCourt of Justice (“ICJ”or“theCourt”) in theGulf of Mainecasebetween theUnitedStatesandCanada isoneprominent example.109 Since then, the Court has taken amore sympathetic approach tohistoricfishingrightsasarelevantconsiderationinmaritimeboundarydelimitation.

Theextenttowhichpubliclawprinciplescouldbedrawnonbyinternationaltribunalsmakingdecisionsininter-Statedisputeswhichwillaffecttherightsandinterestsofindividualsisworthyofconsideration.InthefirstchapterofThe Changing Constitution,110SirJeffreyidentifiedthreegroundsofjudicialreview: legality,proceduralproprietyandreasonableness.Principlesofthiskindarelurkingintheintersticesofthesedecisions,likeatentativemoleyettoemergefromitsburrow.

In Costa Rica v Nicaragua theCourtheldthatinconcludingtheirtreatyin1858,NicaraguaandCostaRicamustbepresumedtohaveintendedtopreserve“aminimalrightofnavigationfor thepurposesof continuing to liveanormal life in thevillagesalong the river.”111 This presumption is sensible from the perspective of public law, but it does not come from the rulesgoverning the interpretationof treatiesreflected inArticles31and32of theViennaConvention,112 notwithstanding the lip service the Court paid to these rules in finding itspresumption.

Perhaps the most robust example is the oldest. In its 1923 AdvisoryOpinion, albeit onthe foundation of the Polish Minorities Treaty rather than any general principle, the Court held that:“It iscontrary to theprincipleofequality that [Poland]subjects thesettlers toadiscriminatingandinjurioustreatmenttowhichothercitizensholdingcontractsofsaleorlease

108Ibid,para87.109 Case Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Canada/United

States of America)[1984]ICJRep246.110 Sir Jeffrey Jowell, The Changing Constitution(1stedn,OUP1985).111 Costa Rica v Nicaragua(n105)para79.112ViennaConventionontheLawofTreaties(concluded23May1969)1155UNTS331,Arts31and32.

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arenotsubject.”113WhileDrJuratowitchwasnotproposingthatinter-StatecasescouldorshouldinvolvejudicialreviewofthetreatmentofindividualsbyStates,internationaltribunalsandcourtscouldusefullydevelop,andmakemoreexplicit,theirreasoningincaseswhereindividualrightsareaffected.

Pursuing the rule of law on the international and domestic planes may involve different considerations,buttheessenceoftheruleoflawisthesameonbothplanes.Infurtheringtherule of law on the international plane by resolving legal disputes between States, international courts and tribunals should be careful to respect the rule of law as it applies to individuals withinthoseStates.Whilstsomeofthemhavedoneso,noneofthemhasreallyexplainedtheconceptualbasisonwhichithasdoneso.Itmaybehelpfultorefertotheinternationalapplicationoftheruleoflaw.114 Dr Juratowitch stated that the rule of law on the international planesurelyrequiresthatifrightsaretobeaffected,thepositionofrights-holdersmustbeconsidered,even if thedecision-maker isnotdirectlyexercising jurisdictionover that right-holder.

In concluding, Dr Juratowitch reminded the audience that no set of domestic public law rules hasyetreachednirvana;itisnotaperfectlyformedsystemfromwhichready-madeprinciplesmaybeplagiarisedbyinternationallawevenifinternationallawwantedtodoso.Bothsidesofthedancefloor,publiclawandinternationallaw,aremodestandfrankabouttheirowninadequacies.Thequestionis,notwithstandingtheirdifferences,cantheyhelpeachothertofillthegaps?DrJuratowitchventuredahopeful,albeittentative,yes.

Questions and Answers

The Chair, Professor Sarooshi, commented that an emerging theme in these panel discussions isthewayinwhichpubliclawhasbeentreatedattheinternationallevel.Thegreatparadigmshift is theapplicationof international law indomesticcourts.Wesee theproliferationofcases involving international lawacrossalldisciplinesofdomestic law.Thisprocess lendsitselftothedevelopmentofinternationallawfromthebottomup.

Speaking from the floor, Professor Colin Warbrick challenged Dr Juratowitch on hischaracterisationofindividuals’interestsasrightsunderpublicinternationallaw.DrJuratowitchindicated that the fact that a right was conferred under domestic law, or under an instrument of internationallawoverwhichaninternationalcourtortribunalwasnotexercisingjurisdiction,didnotmeanthatitwasnotaright.Itmightnotbearightunderpublicinternationallaw,ormightnotbearightunderaninstrumentofpublicinternationallawoverwhichjurisdictionwasbeingexercised,but itwas stilla right.Whether theywere rightsor interests,and insomecasesitmayindeedonlybeintereststhatwererelevant,thequestionremainedastowhether,andifsoonwhatconceptualbasis,aninternationalcourtortribunalshouldtakeaccountofthem.IntheCosta Ricacase,theCourttookintoaccountindividualinterestsby

113AdvisoryOpinionof1923(n104),36–37.114RobertMcCorquodale,‘DefiningtheInternationalRuleofLaw:DefyingGravity?’,65ICLQ(2016)277,

292.

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findingthattheStatehadarightundertheTreatyforitsnationalstoperformcertainactivities;it made up the presumption in favour of the protection of individuals in order to achieve this outcome.TherewasnolegalbasisfortheCourttointerprettheTreatyinthisway.Therealdisagreement seems to liewith theextent towhich thearchitectureofpublic internationallaw shouldallowindividualrightsandintereststobetakenintoaccountindisputesbetweenStates.AnotherquestionaddressedtoDrJuratowitchwaswhethertheabsenceofreferencetoindividual rights in rulings was simply the result of the failure of counsel to advance individual rightsinarguments.DrJuratowitchopinedthatthereisadeeper,structuralproblemwiththearchitecture of public international law which has traditionally been rooted in the relationship betweenStates.ItoperatesonthehorizontalplanebetweenStateactors,whereindividualrightsare,atbest,derivative.Counselhavesimplybeenoperatingwithinthisstructure.

ProfessorSaundersaddressedaquestiontoMsLeeaboutthemethodbywhichthearbitraltribunals have incorporated the concept of proportionality into investment law, in particular, whetherthiswasthroughaninterpretationofthetextofthetreaties.MsLeerespondedthatthenotionofproportionalityisnotexpresslystatedininvestmenttreaties,ratherithasbeendevelopedbythetribunalsthroughtheinterpretationofbroadly-framedtreatyprovisions.Theconceptof“fairandequitabletreatment”,forexample,allowsacertainlatitudefortribunalsto develop the contents of that standard. As to thewidespread use of proportionality ininvestment treaty law, Ms Lee stated it would improve the consistency of approach by arbitral tribunals,butwithflexibility,onegetsinconsistency.

JillBarrettposedtwoquestionstoSirJeffrey.MsBarrettaskediftherighttogoodadministrationshouldplaceagreateremphasisontheinstitutionalrequirementsforadministratorstomakegoodadministrativedecisionsinthefirstplace.Itwasobservedthattherightofindividualstogood administration as presented seems to focus on the ex post effect of a bad administrative decision,suchasprovidingtheindividualwithaccesstoajudicialremedy.Separately,MsBarrettenquirediftheprinciplesofgoodadministrationshouldbeappliedtointernationalorganisations,andifso,whowouldtheright-holdersbe?Shouldindividualshaverightsvis-à-vis international organisations or should the holders of the right to good administration be the Statemembersoftheorganisation?SirJeffreyremarkedthatfirst,thefocusofadministrativejusticeisnotjustpost hoc,rather,itprovidesforastandardwhichhelpstoadvisedecision-makersinformulatingbetteradministrativedecisionsonageneralbasis.Further,SirJeffreyarguedthattheconceptofadministrativejusticeshouldbeappliedtoorganisationsexercisingpublicpowersatalllevels,domesticandinternational.Individualsaffectedbythedecisionof an international organisation should have access to their dossier, the right to be given a reasonforthedecisionandtherighttoremedies.

DrAntoniosTzanakopoulosaskedwhetherthegroupingofconceptssuchaslegality,legalcertaintyandtherightofaccesstojudicialremediesundertheumbrellanotionof“theruleoflaw”addsanyvaluetothesedistinctrights.SirJeffreynotedemphaticallythatwhatunitesthesedistinctiverightsisthattheyallseektomovearbitrarinesstoaccountability.Whileeachingredientmoves the law inadifferentway, theultimateobjective is toprovide for legalaccountability.

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Panel 4: Concepts of “public” in “public” international and “public” law

Chair: Jill Barrett, the Arthur Watts Senior Research Fellow in Public International Law, BIICL

JillBarrettexplainedthattheaimofthispanelwastocomparetheconceptof“public”whichisintegraltobothpublicinternationallawandpubliclaw.Shecommentedthattheconceptofpublicpower isbecomingincreasinglyconfusedwhenviewedagainst thebackdropoftrends such as the privatisation of public services, the greater participation of the public in governmental decision-making, and the ability for individuals all around the world tocommunicatedirectlythroughtheinternetwithouttheirStatesactingasintermediaries.PublicLawandInternationalLawfacethesameexternalchallengesyettheirresponseshavesofarbeenquiteunconnected.Shehopedthatthesediscussionswouldidentifycommonalitiesanddifferences between their responses, which would in turn contribute to the development of thinkinginbothlegalfields.

MsBarrettsuggestedthatwhilepubliclawyershadbeenactivelythinkingabouttheconceptof“public”forsometime,atleastsincethemajorprivatisationsofthe1980s,internationallawyersseemsomewhatbehindthegame.Inpubliclaw,intheUKandelsewhere,consciousefforts have been made to adapt the law to apply to new forms of governance and changing relationshipsbetweenpublicandprivatesectors.Inpublicinternationallaw,sometraditionalcertaintieshavestartedtocrumblearoundtheedges,forexample,thenotionthatthesolesubjectsofinternationallawareStatesandinternationalorganisations,andthatitimpinges

JillBarrettspeakingonPanel4LtoR:DrJasonVaruhas,JillBarrett,ProfessorArminvonBogdandy,

ProfessorDavidFeldman

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onprivateactorsonlythroughnational legalsystems.Thevariousdevelopmentsinhumanrights, investment treaty arbitrations and international criminal law show that international law is capable of penetrating through the public/private divide in terms of actors, albeit in limited fields.Otherdevelopments,suchas the increasinginfluenceofsoft lawinstruments,whichcan be made by anyone, raise the possibility that the traditional distinction between States andnon-Stateactorscouldfadeevenfurther.Thequestioniswherewouldthestructuresofaccountability be in these changing landscapes?

Sheintroducedthespeakerswhoseexpertiseonthissubjectspansbothcommonlawandcivillawsystems,aswellaspubliclawandinternationallaw.

Professor David Feldman QC, Cambridge University The Varying Meaning of “Public” in Public law and Public International Law

Professor Feldman began by introducing his work as concerned with boundaries:boundaries between criminal and civil procedures; criminal and civil law; public and privatelaw;internationalandmunicipallaw;andpoliticsandlaw.ProfessorFeldmanstatedcompendiouslythat“theboundariesarewithoutexception,fluid,contestedandpermeable.”Heencouragedtheaudiencetotakeheedoftwosetsofdichotomies:first,theimportantandpowerful distinction between rulers and ruled; and second, the distinction between power andauthority(or“legitimacy”,assomewoulddescribethelatter).Oneoftherolesofpubliclawyersistotrytoexposefalsenotionssuchas“popularsovereignty”whichisdesignedtopresenttherelationshipbetweenrulersandruledasoneofco-operationandmutualinterests,ratherthanoneofexploitation.

ProfessorFeldmanremarkedthatonedistinctivefeatureofpublicinternationallawisthatitisasetof ruleswhichoperatesbetweenrulers,where there isnoruler-ruledrelationshipat itscore.ProfessorFeldmanobservedthatasinternationallawisconcernedonlywiththepublicrelationshipsbetweenstates,theuseoftheterm“public”beforeinternationallawisredundantandcanserveonlytodifferentiateitselffromprivateinternationallaw,ortheconflictoflaws.

ItwassuggestedbyProfessorFeldmanthattheuseoftheprivate/publicdivideinmunicipallaw isobjective-directed,orwhatDworkinwould call policy-based, rather thanprinciple-based.IfonelooksatthevariouswaysinwhichdomesticlawintheUKhastriedtodistinguishthepublicfromtheprivate,onenoticesthatwhatusedtobeextraordinaryremedies,suchastheprerogativewritsofcertiorari,prohibitionandmandamus,havebecome“publiclawremedies”,thatistosay,thescopeofthoseremediesarenowbeingdefinedbyreferenceto the type of matters, supposedly public, for which they are particularly appropriate.Anotherexampleisthedevelopmentofthejudicialreviewprocedureasadistinctivelypublicprocedure,whichraisesthequestionofwhattypesofproceduresareappropriateforjudicialreview as supposed to ordinary proceedings. The answer to that question, according toProfessorFeldman,doesnotlieinanythingthatisinnatetothenotionofpubliclaworpublicprocedure, but to whom one wishes to advantage or disadvantage through the applicable procedures. The question iswhether onewants the public body to have any proceduraladvantages over individual claimants in judicial review proceedings, when compared toordinaryproceedings.

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Inthislight,theapplicationforjudicialreviewcanbeseenasasetofproceduralruleswhichgives thepublicbodyanadvantageover individualclaimants.Fromthepointof theviewof thepublicbody, ina ruler-ruled scenario, the rulersmust considerhowmuch theyarewilling to concede in order to sustain an appearance of effectiveness and legitimacy, while maintainingasmuchadvantageaspossible.ProfessorFeldmanremarkedthattheruleoflawcan be seen as a situation where the rulers are willing to submit themselves to the discipline oflaw,forwhateverpurposes.Ifandwhentherulersdecidenottodothat,thentheruleoflawisonitswayout.ThetensionsurroundingthedegreetowhichStatessubmitthemselvestotheruleoflawneversettles.

ProfessorFeldmanexplainedthattherearetechniquesthatmightassistusindemarcatingthevariousboundariesofpubliclaw.Bywayofexample,indeterminingwhetherEUlawhasdirecteffectonemanationsoftheState,weareobligedtoconsiderthenotionofaState.The shape of the State is itself contested and fluid, and has been reshaped fundamentally in thelast35years.Inworkingouttheboundariesofpubliclaw,theHumanRightsAct1998suggests thatwecould lookatwhetheraprivatebody isexercising functionsofapublicnature.ProfessorFeldmanarguedthatthereisnosuchthingasa“publicnature”.HewentontoquoteMaxWeber’sremarkthatStatescannotbeidentifiedbyreferencetotheirexerciseoffunctionsbecausethereisnoStatethathasalwaysexercisedeveryfunctionwhichmightbethoughtofasa“Statefunction”,andthereisnofunctionthatwillalwaysbeexercisedbyeveryState.Theprocessofprivatisationandpublic-privatepartnerships thereforepresentsparticularissueswhichcannotbesimplyresolvedbyappealingtothe“publicnature”test.He further observed that there is no shared criterion for the notion of publicness across many different sub-fields of public law, such as public procurement law, constitutional law andhumanrightslaw(eventhoughitisdubiouswhetherhumanrightslawispartofpubliclaw).This is why the House of Lords decision in YL v Birmingham City Council (Secretary of State for Constitutional Affairs intervening)115isanexampleofanincoherentdecision.

ProfessorFeldmanwenton tosuggest thatwecouldassess thenatureofan institutionbylooking at whether it exercises any coercive authority. This may mean that we assert aparticular type of legal regime over the assertion of coercive authority, or it may mean that it isunconstitutionalfortheStatetoprivatiseitsexerciseofcoercivepower.Bywayofexample,the Supreme Court of Israel held in 2009116 that it was unconstitutional for the government to privatise prisons because human dignity is protected under the Basic Law, and thus, if the State subjects people to coercive loss of liberty, itmust retain the legal andpoliticalresponsibilityfortheexerciseofthatcoercivepower.

ProfessorFeldmanconcludedbyremarkingthattheideaofpublicness,whetherindomesticor international law, isalwayscontested,and isamatterofclassificationwhichdoesnotansweranyquestions.Rather,itprovidesuswithawayofaskingthequestion.Inordertoanswerthequestion,wemustfirstknowwheretheproblemis,whatsortofproblemitis,andthecontext(social,economic,military,political)inwhichtheproblemarises.Heendedbyquoting thecontinuityannounceron theBBCHomeServicebefore JohnEbdon’sweeklyinvestigation of the BBC Sound Archives, to the effect that he had once again come to no veryseriousconclusion.

115 [2007]UKHL27,[2008]AC95,HL.116 Academic Center of Law and Business v Minister of FinanceHCJ2605/05.

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Professor Dr Armin von Bogdandy, Max Planck Institute Heidelberg From Public International to International Public Law: Translating World Public Opinion into International Public Authority

ProfessorvonBogdandyintroducedhistalkasconcerning“internationalpubliclaw”,wherethepublicnesselementismuchstronger.HereferredustoaresearchpaperdevelopedbytheMaxPlanckInstituteonthistopicwhichwillbepublishedthisyearintheEuropeanJournalofInternationalLaw.117ProfessorvonBogdandydiscussedtheempiricalfindingsoftheBerlinSocialScienceCentreinastudyofworldpublicopinion.118Thereisasignificantpartofworldpublic opinion that regards international institutionswith considerable ambivalence.Onekeyinsightfromthestudyisanapparentcontradictioninpublicattitudes.Ontheonehand,manypeopleperceivethatinternationalinstitutionshavebecomepowerfulandquiteafewoftheiractivitiesraiseseriousdoubts.ProfessorvonBogdandycommentedthatthecurrentofBritishpublicopinionthatinternationalinstitutionssuchastheEUhavetoomuchpower,asevidencedbytherecentBrexitreferendum,isnotuniquetoBritainortheEU.Rather,itisawidely-heldpublicopinionacrosstheglobeandrelatestootherinstitutionssuchastheWorldTradeOrganisation,theEuropeanCourtofHumanRights,theOECDandtheInternationalMonetaryFund.Ontheotherhand,manypeoplebelievethattheseinstitutionsshouldactmore effectively to further common interests, such as environmental protection, immigration, financialstabilityandthedistributionofwealth.

In response to the legitimacy concerns and regulatory demands outlined, Professor von Bogdandy proposed a theory of “international public law”, the purpose of which is toidentify, reconstruct and develop the segment of public international law which governs the exerciseofinternationalpublicauthority.Heremarkedthatswitchingtheorderof“public”and “international” is not a slip of the pen; rather it expresses the overall thrust of thetheory,whichistoadvanceapubliclawparadigmininternationallaw.Theaimistogivean expression toworldpublic opinion in the languageof international law. Internationalpublic law stands for the reconstruction and development of the legal regimes governing the activitiesofinternationalinstitutionsinlightoftheirpublicness.Inthisway,arguedProfessorvon Bogdandy, legal scholarship may contribute towards the increased legitimacy and effectivenessoftheinstitutions’activities.

Professor von Bogdandy defined the exercise of international public authority as “theadoptionofanactwhichaffectsthefreedomsofothersinpursuanceofacommoninterest.”ThisunderstandinghelpsustosingleoutactivitiesthatrequiremodesoflegitimationwhichgobeyondtheconsentofMemberStatestotheinstitution’sfoundationalact.Eventhoughviews within public opinion may diverge on many important issues, it seems to be common ground that public authority should advance public interests and that it should do so in a way whichmeritsobedience.119Thesetwinrequirements,andtheiruneasyrelationship,arethekey

117Armin vonBogdandy,MatthiasGoldmanand IngoVenzke, ‘FromPublic International to InternationalPublicLaw:TranslatingWorldPublicOpinionintoInternationalPublicAuthority’(2016)EJIL(forthcoming).Adraftversionofthispaperdated18September2015isavailableonSSRNat<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2662391>.Allsubsequentpinpointreferencesaremadeonthebasisoftheworkingpaper.

118vonBogdandy(n117)2.119 Ibid,4.

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characteristicsofcontemporarypubliclawinmostdomesticlegalorders.Therefore,publiclawtheories,doctrinesandexperiencesmayhelptokeepthedevelopmentofinternationalpublic law in sync with world public opinion. Notwithstanding the differences betweendomestic and international public law (not least because the latter is not supported by an overarchingcentralauthority),learningcanstilloccuracrossdifferentlevelsofgovernance.

ProfessorvonBogdandy’sexplainedthefivekeyelementstohistheoryofinternationalpubliclaw, as:120

1. Internationalpubliclawisinspiredby,anddependenton,domesticpubliclaw,butitisnotfusedwithit.Thisapproachcatersforboththeautonomyandinterdependenceofdomesticandinternationallegalorders.

2. Internationalpubliclawforeseesaspecificroleforinternationalpublicinstitutions,whichistoauthoritativelyadvancecommoninterests.Thefactthatlegalsystemsarepluralisticdoesnotpreventtheadvancementofacommoninterest.Rather,internationalpubliclawprovidesaninstitutionalframeworkforsuchpoliciestobedevelopedevenintheabsenceofaworldauthority,orotherregionalforasuchastheEuropeanUnion.

3. International public authority is exercised through actswhich claim to pursue commoninterests,andthisrequiresapubliclawframework.

4. Freedomisthemainrationale.Ithasapoliticalandanindividualdimension.Itspoliticaldimension (which seems to be at the heart of the EU referendum) entitles people tocollectivelyexercisepublicpower.Theindividualdimension,ontheotherhand,isreflectedinhumanrights.Freedomprovidestheguidanceforthereconstructionoftheinternationallegalframeworkinthatpublicauthoritiesneedtounderstandfreedomfrombothitspoliticalandindividualdimensions.

5. Internationalpubliclawaimsatdoctrinalreconstructionsandthetranslationofcomplexsocialrelationshipsintoalanguageoflegality.Thissetsouttheframework’smethodology.Whilstfewlawyersgloballyhavemasteredthetechniqueofsocialresearchandpoliticaltheory,theysharethetechniqueofinterpretation.

Hewentontodiscusswhatmakesanauthorityorinternationallaw“public.”121 It is undeniable that international institutionssuchastheUnitedNationsor theWorldBankoperateundera different legal regime as compared to transnational corporations such as JP Morgan or Blackwater.Thepublic/privatedivide,withallitsproblems,providesanimportantstockofknowledgetoelaboratethisdifference.Granted,thereareattemptsatbuildingoverarchinglegal regimes,122suchasinthefieldofhumanrights,however,evenassomehumanrightsapplytoprivateinstitutions,manydifferencesremain.

The distinction between public and private responds to a fundamental differentiation in modern societies.123Mostofuswillagreethat,whatevertheeventualdefinitions,privateactions,inparticularprivateeconomicactivitiesandpublicactionbelongtodifferentsocialspheres.As

120 Ibid,22–3.121Ibid,26.122Ibid.123Ibid.

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such,theyrespondtodifferentoperationalformsoflogicandjustificatoryrequirements.Publiclawandprivate lawprovidethelegalbasis foractivitieswhichfollowdifferentrationales.Privatelawallowsactorstoactsolelyinthepursuitofself-interest,whereaspubliclawrequiresahigherstandard,oftencoinedasthepursuitofthecommongood.

There have been attempts to overcome the public/private divide, the most notable of which is Statesocialism,theconsequencesofwhichisahighlydysfunctionalsociety.124 The apparent hybridity of some institutions, which is often advanced as an argument against that distinction, ratherreinforcesit.Anyobservationofhybridityrequiresanunderstandingoftheindividualcomponents that render somethinghybrid. Theexistenceofdifficult casesof classificationdoesnotunderminetheutilityoftheconceptualdifferentiation.

Publicness can be defined through the public interest.125 In order to proceed further, we must reflecton themeaningofaconcept.ProfessorvonBogdandyagreedwithProfessorFeldmanthataconceptmustbeunderstoodwithregard to its functions.Conceptsenableus to understand and deal with reality by purposefully organising the law according to anoverarching idea.TheoverallaimofProfessorvonBogdandyandhiscolleagues is toprovide a legal concept in line with calls in world public opinion for effective and legitimate international institutionsthatadvancethecommongood.Thepubliccharacterofanact isderivedfromitsrelationtothepublicinterest.Thus,whetheranactbelongstoprivatelaworpubliclawdependsonthesocialspherefromwhichitoriginates.Iftheimpugnedactivityisfromaspherewhereself-interestisasufficientjustification,theactisprivate.Ontheotherhand,iftheactbelongstoaspherewherecommoninterestsarepursued,itispublic.

Anactisconsideredpublic,arguedProfessorvonBogdandy,whenitsenablingnormrequirestheactortopursuethecommongood.126 The flip side of the coin is that that actor can claim that the legalbasis for theactmandates it toadvance thepublic interest.Thus it turnsonaninterpretationoftheenablingnorm.Thefirststepofinterpretationistodeterminewhichnormtheactor invokes,explicitlyor implicitly,as thebasis for its legalaction.Thesecondstepinvolvesaconsiderationofwhetherthenormrequiresthepursuitofacommoninterest.Forthepurposeofthisinterpretativeexercise,otherconditionsoflegalitythattheactmustmeet are irrelevant; the focus is on whether there is a claim of a mandate to pursue a public interest.Astheproposedpublicnesscriteriononlydefinesthelegalregimewhichdeterminesthe conditions of the legality of the act, further substantive or procedural principles are not requiredatthisstageoftheanalysis.

ProfessorvonBogdandycontendedthatthiscomplexdefinitionalsoservesanotherfunction,which is to distinguish the public interest from the activities of public interest groups, such asGreenpeace.127Whereassuchgroupsclaim toact in furtheranceof thepublic interest,theylackaspecificandpublicmandatebeyonditsownmembers.Incontrast,internationalorganisationsareentitledtoadvancepublicpoliciesinthepursuanceofthecommoninterest.Foranacttoqualifyaspublic,therefore,itsufficesthatthereisareasonablepresumptionthat

124Ibid,27.125Ibid,27–8.126Ibid,29.127Ibid,30.

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theinternationalinstitutionisactingunderapublicinterestmandate.Whetherthemandatedoesexistorwhetheritiswideenoughtocovertheparticularactivitiesare,differentquestionswhichdonotconcernthequalificationofpublicness.Fromthisstartingpoint,onecanbuildinternationalpubliclegalregimesandindeedmanyhavebeenbuiltoverthelasttenyears.

Thenextquestionthenishowcanonedefineacommonorpublicinterestinapluralistworldsociety?128AsKelsen,criticallegalstudies,andfeministlegaltheorieshaveshown,todefinesomethingaspublicisahighlypoliticalissuewhichhasimportantrepercussions.Intheend,itisonlythecommunityitselfanditsinstitutionwhichcandefinepublicinterests.Anactcanclaim to articulate a public interest if it is mandated to act on behalf of a community, or a communityof communities.Although therearemanydeepcleavages in thediscussionofwhatamounts toacommunity, there iswideconsensus thatacommunityrequiresat leastan institutional framework for thearticulationofacommon interest.The term internationalcommunity,thoughvague,iswellestablishedininternationallawandpolitics.

Professor von Bogdandy summed up by reiterating that publicness is established by reference to the legal basis which the act invokes, explicitly or implicitly; if that basis equips aninternationalinstitutionwiththeauthoritytodefineandpursueacommoninterest,thenthatauthorityshouldbequalifiedaspublic.129

Dr Jason Varuhas, Melbourne Law School Against the Public-Private Law Divide: Pluralism and Public Law

DrJasonVaruhasarguedthatalthoughtheideaofafundamentaldistinctionbetweenthenature of public and private law has an intuitive appeal, it ought to be avoided as an analytical toolandthatnolegalornormativesignificanceshouldbeplacedonsuchadistinction,norontheideaofpubliclaw.Bywayofanintroduction,hedefinedthescopeofhisdiscussionsasrelatingtodomesticlawincommonlawjurisdictions,inparticularEnglishlaw.Hepresentedthree reasons as to why his arguments are also relevant to international law:

1. manycritiquesofthedivideleveredinthedomesticspherewillalsoapplytotheinvocationof publicness on the international plane;

2. inorderforinternationallawyerstodrawonaspectsofthedomesticlawasguidingmodelsfor the development of emerging international law areas, such as the global administrative law,itisimportanttohaveafirmgraspofthenatureofdomesticconcepts;and

3. theinfluenceofinternationallawhasbeenapersuasivefactorinthedomesticorder,whichhasrenderedthesearchofadistinctiveideaofpubliclawelusive.

DrVaruhasnotedthathisargumentswouldbedevelopedinthreeparts,namely:

1. theideaofpubliclawasdistinctfromprivatelawlacksatheoreticalanchorincommonlaw systems;

128Ibid.129Ibid,31.

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2. theideaofpubliclawisboundupinaninterminabletheoreticaldisagreementwhichrobsit of any practical utility; and

3. theappealtoaunitaryideaofpubliclawisfundamentallyoutofstepwiththecontemporarynatureofpubliclawwhichisahighlypluralisticandvariedfieldofdoctrines.

Turningtothelackofatheoreticalanchorindomesticlaw,itwasnotedthatinordertofashiona distinctive idea of public law, one needs to identify the public sphere to which distinctive normswouldapply.Thesearchforthisanchorhasencounteredseriousdifficultiesincommonlawsystems.ClaimsforadistinctiveideaofpubliclawtypicallyrestsontheideaoftheStateandthattheStateoughttobegovernedbyitsownuniquesetofnorms.YetthecommonlawknowsnoideaoftheState.Further,legaldevelopmentsincommonlawhaveproceededonthe basis of disparate forms of actions and paid little attention to the relationship between the claimantandthedefendant.Thismaybecontrastedwithlegaldevelopmentsincontinentaljurisdictions,whichproceededaccordingtocategoriesofjuridicalrelationshipssuchasthatbetweenthecitizenandtheState.

Moreover,incommonlawsystems,theprinciplethatpublicofficialsaresubjecttoordinaryprivatelawascitizenshavemilitatedagainstthedevelopmentofadistinctivefieldofpubliclaw.DrVaruhasgave theexampleofa tort claimbroughtagainstapublicofficial forawrongcommittedduringtheexerciseofpublicpowers.Theclaimwouldhavebeenbroughtagainsttheindividualofficerandtheclaimwouldbegovernedbythelawoftort.Thisraisesanimportantpoint thatEnglishlawhastraditionallyfocusedonthelawofpersons, totheexclusionofanabstractideaoftheState.ThisfurtherimpededthedevelopmentofpubliclawasagainsttheState.

DrVaruhasdescribedthegrowthofthemodernadministrativeStateincommonlawjurisdictionsaroundthemiddleofthelastcentury,whichcausedEnglishjudgesandacademicstothinkmore deeply about the idea of the State, and the relationship between public entities and individuals.JustasJohnAllisondiscussed,130 thisledtoagreatironythatjustasdistinctiveideasofpublicnesswerebeingexplored,thebravenewworldofprivatisation,contractingout,andthemarketisationofpublicserviceshadbegun.Theseprocesseshaveonlyintensifiedover time, rendering thepublic realm increasingly indistinct.On theotherhand,conceptswhich are often associated with public side of the divide such as fair dealing, checkedpower, participation, social responsibility and the public interest increasingly inform, through legal regulations or otherwise, the work of non-governmental entities, reflecting evolvingunderstandingsofthenatureandroleofthesenon-governmentalentities,suchasfirmsandsocieties.

A further complication are phenomena such as devolution and the ceding of sovereignty to internationalandsuper-nationalentities,whichhasledtoaworldoffragmentedgovernancestructureswithmultiplenodesofgovernmentalpower.Withinthispost-nationallegalorder,thesearchforaunitary,home-grownideaoftheStateappearstobeincreasinglyanachronisticandelusive.DrVaruhasthenremindedusthatmanydomesticprocesseswhichhaverenderedthepublic/privatedivideindistincthavealsotakenplaceattheinternationalandgloballevel.

130JohnWFAllison,A Continental Distinction in the Common Law(OUP1996)107–8.

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DrVaruhasconcludedbysayingthattotheextentthattherewasadistinctionbetweenpublicandprivatelaw,theyhavebecomeinextricablyintermingledinmoderntimes.

Turningtothesecondpillarofhisarguments,DrVaruhascontendedthatevenifwecouldidentify a theoretical basis for the distinctive idea of public law, the normative implications of invokingsuchan ideaare far fromclear. In fact, thereare intensedisagreementsas towhatshouldfollowfromamatterbeingclassifiedasbeingpublic.Sometheoristsconsiderpublic law as being concerned with the control of public power and as guarding against the abuseofthatpower,whileothersseethemaintaskofpubliclawasfacilitatingthebeneficentexerciseofpublicpowerforthecollectivegood.Foryetothers,publiclawisconcernedwiththeprotectionofindividualfundamentalrights.Giventhesecontestedviewsoftheconceptofpubliclaw,itisdifficulttoseehowtheinvocationofamatterasbeing“public”canbedeployedasananalyticaltooltohelpusanswerconcretequestions.Whatoftenhappensisthattheconceptofpubliclawisbeingreliedonbythecourtwithoutitsnaturebeingelaborated.Inthisway,theinvocationof“publiclaw”becomesapoorsubstituteforjustificatoryreasoningwhileboilerplateappealstotheconceptmaskthenormativecommitmentsunderpinningitsapplication.Furthermore,thereisinsufficientdisciplinearoundtheuseoftheconceptforittoplayameaningfulroleinalegaldialogue.Ifoneconsidersthatthegoalofaparticularbodyofnormsinaparticularcontextoughttobetheprotectionoftheindividualrights,or,alternatively, the protection of the public good, one should defend that position on its merits withconcretelegalarguments.Theconceptof“public”isotioseandlikelytoobscureanddistortourthinking.

Moving on to the third and final pillar of his arguments, which concerns the plurality ofcontemporarypublic law,DrVaruhasnoted that thepremiseunderlying the invocationofthe public/private lawdistinction as an idea to guide legal decision-making is that eachofpublicandprivatelawhasadegreeofinherentunity.Specifically,thereseemstobeaperceptionthatpubliclawisunifiedbyacommonsetofideas,functions,norms,methods,methodologies, and these are fundamentally different to their counterparts which characterise andunifyprivatelaw.Theseunitaryideascanthenbeusedtoguidelegaldevelopmentsandresolvelegalquestionsacrosstheterrainofthefieldclassifiedaspubliclaw.

Claimsofunitybasedon thenatureofpublic lawas itcurrentlyexistsareplainlywrong.Publiclawisapluralisticandhighlyvariedfieldthatcannotbereducedtoonesetoffunctionsor ideas,andanyattempt toargueotherwise is invariably reductionist. To theextent thatclaimsofunitymaybenormative,theyareunattractive.Differentfieldsofpubliclawperformdistinctly valuable functions, and a great deal would be lost if we tried to reduce public law toonesetoffunctions.

DrVaruhasemphasisedthatcontemporarypublic lawcontainsapluralityofmeaningfullydistinct sub-fields, each with its own doctrines, functions and defining characteristics. AsProfessorRichardRawlingshas said,eachof thesefieldshas itsown“genetic imprint”.131

131RichardRawlings,‘ModellingJudicialReview’(2008)CLP95,121.

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Dr Varuhas invited us to look at the fields of law often streamed via the judicial reviewprocedure in English law.Claimsmaybe brought basedon the common lawof judicialreview,orthelawundertheHumanRightsAct1998,orEUlaw,orasaprivateaction,suchas claims of false imprisonment, against public officials. Though these areas of lawmaybe categorised as fields of public law, there are fundamental differences between them.Differentfieldshavedifferentbasicfunctions.Theprincipalfunctionof thecommonlawofjudicialreviewis toensurepublicpowersareexercisedproperlyandfor thepublicgoalsforwhichtheyareconferred.Incontrast,theprincipalfunctionoftheHRAistoprotectbasicindividualrightsandinterestsinthefaceofpublicpower.Fieldsofprivatelawsuchastorthavelongperformedasimilarfunction.Separately,theprincipalfunctionofcoredoctrinesofEUlawappliedindomesticjudicialreviewproceedings,suchasdirecteffect,indirecteffect,incidentalhorizontaleffectandFrancovich liability132 are underpinned with an integrationist ethos that is concerned to ensure the penetration of supranational norms into the domestic legalorder. Then therearealso reviewsbrought in respectof specificdirectives, suchasenvironmentallawdirectives.Thesedirectivesarecharacterisedbytheirparticularconcerns,such as the environmental protection, with their allied principles, such as the Precautionary Principleandsustainabledevelopment. Invariably theconductof the review is shapedbythesebackgroundconsiderations.

In addition, different fields protect different interests. For example, many EU norms areconcernedwith theprotectionofeconomic interestsor to facilitatewealthmaximisation inasinglemarket.Ofteneconomicnormsaregivenpriorityaheadofdignitynorms,as theViking133 and Laval134 judgments have made clear.Whereas in human rights claims, theprincipalconcernisdignitynorms.Traditionallyatleast,thecommonlawhasbeenconcernedwith ensuring that public powers are performed for the public interest as Parliament had intended.

Further,differentfieldsderivefromdifferentsourcesoflaw.ThelawundertheHRAderivesfromonestatute,whereascommonlawjudicialrevieworiginatesfromthecommonlawandtakes place in the shadowofmultiple parent statutes,which shapes how it is applied indifferentcontexts.EU lawandhumanrights laware influencedbydifferentsupranationalordersandindifferentareastheremaybefurthersourcesofnorms.Forexample, judicialreviewofrefugeestatuswhichtakesplaceinthecontextoftheRefugeeConvention135 is an autonomousfieldofitsown,characterisedbyitsowndistinctivenorms.Wheretheinterestofachildisatstake,theUNConventionontheRightsofaChild136 is drawn on either as a relevantconsiderationorasatoolininterpretingstatutes.Similarly,underhumanrightslaw,whenthereisanadjudicationunderArticle3pursuanttotheHRA,theCourtwilltakeinto

132 C-6/90 Francovich v Italy[1991]ECRI-5357.133 C-438/05 International Transport Workers’ Federation and Finnish Seamen’s Union [2007] ECR I-

10779.134 C-341/05 Laval un Partneri [2007]ECRI-11767.135ConventionRelatingtotheStatusofRefugees(adopted28July1951,enteredintoforce22April1954)

189UNTS137(RefugeeConvention).136Conventionon theRightsof theChild (adopted20November1989,entered into force2September

1990)1577UNTS3(CROC).

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accountEuropeanCourtofHumanRight’sjurisprudence,bringingwithit,referencestonormsin the CAT137andtheStandardMinimumRulesfortheTreatmentofPrisoners.138

Asillustratedbythiswhistle-stopaccountofthediversefieldsof“public”law,concludedDrVaruhas,unitaryaccountsofthepubliclawarewhollyoutofstepwiththereality.Therearedifferentfunctionstothesub-fieldsofpubliclaw,justascontract,equityandtorteachperformtheirdistinctivefunction.

Questions and answers

A member of the audience suggested that we could blend aspects of domestic common law andcivillawsystemstoanswersomequestionsposedontheinternationalplane.DrVaruhaswas sceptical about the idea of distilling values from different domestic legal orders, given that invariablywhen two setsof ideasconflict,onewouldnecessarilypre-empt theother.Theconceptualdividewehad justheardbetween the twocommon lawyersand thecivillawyeronthepanelissuggestiveofthepotentialdifficultieswemayface.ProfessorFeldmanexpressedsimilarreservations.

SirStanleyBurntonsuggestedthattheuseoftheword“public”inthedomesticlegalcontextismisleadingaswhatwearereallydiscussingistheexerciseofgovernmentalfunctions.SirStanleyremarkedfurtherthatthedichotomybetweenpubliclawandpublicinternationallaw,whilst valid at the beginning of the last century, no longer serves any useful function as a tool oflaw.ProfessorvonBogdandyrespondedbysayingthatitisnotpossibletodissolvethedichotomybetweenpubliclawandinternationalpubliclawaslongaswestayaslawyers.Thisisbecauseanylegalanalysismustcommencewiththequestionofclassification.

In response toProfessorvonBogdandy’sassertion thatdichotomiesarealways importantforlegalanalysis,DrVaruhascommentedasfollows:whilstthecategorisationoflawscanservepracticalpurposes,thereisadangerofexpositorycategoriestakingonanormativesignificance unthinkingly. He was not advocating the disapplication of distinct norms togovernmentalinstitutions,buthearguedthattheintroductionintoEnglishlaw,principallybyLordDiplock,of theapproachthatpubliclawisanorganisingideaishighlyproblematic.DrVaruhas remarked that,quotingHarlowandRawlings139 specific situations shouldcallfor thoughtful, specific answers, and not themechanical application of the totemicword“public”.Therecouldbecertainnormswhichareparticularlyappropriatetobeappliedtogovernmentalbodies,whichshouldnotbeapplied toother institutions.Butweshouldnotcutofftheideathattheymayhaveapplicationoutsideofgovernmentalbodies.Hereferredus to the recent Supreme Court decision in Braganza,140 where the Court read across to

137 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (adopted 10 December1984,enteredintoforce26June1987)1465UNTS85(CAT).

138UNCongressonthePreventionofCrimeandtheTreatmentofOffenders‘StandardMinimumRulesfortheTreatmentofPrisoners,’approvedbytheESCbyRes663C(XXIV)(31July1957)andRes2076(LXII)(13May1977).

139 C Harlow and R Rawlings, Law and Administration(3rdedn,CUP2009).140 Braganza (Appellant) v BP Shipping Limited and another (Respondents) [2015]UKSC17.

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aprivate contractual context, doctrinesofWednesbury unreasonableness and procedural proprietarytogoverntheexerciseofcontractualdiscretion,becausetheyareusefulnorms.ProfessorFeldmansummedupelegantlybydepictingtherelationshipbetweenpublicandpublic international law as one of permeability which carries on through a series of channels withfilterswhichcontrolwhatnormsmayenterthesystem.

ProfessorDawnOliveraskedthepanelwhether,intheirview,internationalinstitutionslackthe necessary democratic accountability, and whether it is then appropriate to use domestic ideasofpubliclawontheinternationallevel.ProfessorvonBogdandy replied by contending that international institutions are democratic because they have the consent of democratic States.Heagreedthatinmanyrespectsaccountabilityneedstobeimproved,howeveritisequallyimportantforinternationalinstitutionstolearnfromthereservoirofknowledgefromdomesticpublic legalorders.ProfessorFeldmanagreedwith thedifficultiesofdemocraticaccountabilityraisedbyProfessorOliver.

Professor Cheryl Saunders commended Professor von Bogdandy and his team for their effort attryingtoidentifyaframeworkwhichappliestointernationalinstitutions.Sheremarkedthatwhileatacertainlevelofdetail,theconceptof“worldpublicopinion”maybeinchoate,itis entirely plausible that many people do share a mistrust of international institutions, but at thesametime,wantthemtohavemorepowersinpursuingaglobalcommongood.Inthislight,sheinvitedProfessorvonBogdandytoelaborateonhowtheframeworkfitsinwiththepractical realitiesof the international legal system. Professor vonBogdandynoted that inadvancing an international public law paradigm, he is not advocating a mechanical, totemic approach.Therationalityfortheinterpretationoflawisoftenlocal.Inorganisingourideas,dichotomiesareveryuseful.Whatmanycitizensseeasdisembeddedeconomicactivitiesneedtobereconstruedinfurtheranceofthecommongood.Thisprocessneedstotakeplacethroughinternationalpublicinstitutions.

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Panel 5: Complications of Pluralism

Chair: Professor Dawn Oliver, University College London

ProfessorDawnOliverintroducedpanelfiveasconcerningthevariouswaysinwhichdomesticpubliclawandpublicinternationallawcomeintoconflictorareintensionwitheachother.Thespeakersonpanelfiveexaminehowsuchconflictsariseandhowtheycanbedealtwithbywayofcasestudies.ThefirstcasestudyfocusesonthedevelopmentofconflictingnormsinrelationtotheAarhusConvention.Thesecondcasestudyrelatestoparallelexpropriationnormsininternationalanddomesticlaw.Unfortunately,thethirdspeaker,JansenCalamitafromBIICL,wasnotpresentduetoillness.Hispresentationon“Thedisconnectbetweentheapproach to remedies in investment treaty law and the approach to remedies under systems ofpubliclaw”wasthereforenotdelivered.

Alistair McGlone, International Environmental Law Consultant Princi ple 10: Implementation at the Global, Regional, EU and National Levels

Mr McGlone began by stating that one of the most interesting insights he obtained with regard toBrexitwasfromhiscat.ThecatsaidthathehadnotseriouslyengagedwithinternationallawbutheheldstrongviewsaboutBrexit.Thecatexplainedthatweshouldrepeatedlyasktoleave,butwhenthedooropens,weshouldsitthereandstareatit.

AlistairMcGlonespeakingonPanel5–left:DrJarrodHepburn

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Turningtothesubstanceofthesession,MrMcGloneexplainedthatthe Rio Declaration on EnvironmentandDevelopment141wasthecentrepieceoftheEarthSummit1992.Itcomprises27principlesthatwereintendedtoguidefuturesustainabledevelopmentaroundtheworld.TheRioDeclarationisnotlegallybindingeventhoughitwasdraftedintreaty-likelanguage.The story of how Principle 10 of the Declaration has been implemented at different levels is oneofcomplexity,withmanyparallellegalprovisionsatglobal,regionalandnationallevels.Whereproliferationhascreatedtensions,ithassofarbeenresolvedbytheinterventionoftheAarhusConventionComplianceCommittee(“ACCC”),theCourtofJusticeoftheEuropeanUnion(“CJEU”),andthenationalcourts.Whatseemstobeinprospecthowever,asaresultofthevoteforBrexit,isthatsomeorallofthepieceswillbesweptoffthetable,andthegamewillre-startagainwithuncertainrules.

Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration provides that:

Environmental issues are best handledwith the participation of all concerned citizens,attherelevantlevel.Atthenationallevel,eachindividualshallhaveappropriateaccessto information concerning the environment that is held by public authorities, including informationonhazardousmaterialsandactivitiesintheircommunities,andtheopportunitytoparticipate indecision-makingprocesses.Statesshall facilitateandencouragepublicawareness and participation bymaking information widely available. Effective accessto judicial and administrative proceedings, including redress and remedy, shall beprovided.142

Mr McGlone stated that Principle 10 is about environmental democracy and addresses public lawfromtheinternationallevel.Ithasthreekeycomponents,namely:accesstoinformation;public participation in decision-making; and access to justice in environmental matters.At its core, the principle concerns itselfwith accountability. By allowing the participationof all concerned citizens, the Principle seeks to improve the transparency and quality ofenvironmental decision-making, to promote the effective enforcement of decisions and tolegitimiseenvironmentalnorms.

Principle10hasbeenimplementeddifferentlyatdifferentlevels.Atthegloballevel,theUnitedNationsEnvironmentProgramme(“UNEP”)introducedtheBaliGuidelines143 which attempt todrivethematrixofcompliancewithPrinciple10.InEuropeandsomeoftheformerUSSR,it is implemented at the regional level by the Aarhus Convention,144 which was negotiated undertheauspicesoftheUnitedNationsEconomicCommissionforEurope(“UNECE”)andadoptedin1998.Inaddition,itisimplementedbylargepackagesoflawattheEUlevel,whichareincorporatedintodomesticUKlawinmanydifferentpiecesoflegislation.TheEUandUKbecamepartiestotheAarhusConventionin2005.

141UNGARioDeclarationonEnvironmentandDevelopment(RiodeJaneiro,3-14June1992)UNDocA/CONF151/26(volI).

142Ibid,Principle10.143UNEP‘GuidelinesfortheDevelopmentofNationalLegislationonAccesstoInformation,PublicParticipation

andAccess to Justice inEnvironmentalMatters’ (adoptedbydecisionSSXI/5,partAof26February2010)(BaliGuidelines).

144Convention onAccess to Information, Public Participation inDecision-MakingandAccess to Justice inEnvironmentalMatters(adopted28June1998,enteredintoforce30October2001)2161UNTS447(AarhusConvention).

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TheAarhusConvention,adoptedin1998,hasthreemainpillarswhichmirrorthestructureofPrinciple10oftheRioDeclaration.ThisoperationalisationofPrinciple10isoverseenbytheACCC,ofwhichMrMcGloneisamember.TheACCCwasestablishedasanarrangement“ofanon-confrontational,non-judicialandconsultativenatureforreviewingcompliance”145 inorderto“promoteandimprovecompliancewiththeConvention.”146 It is designed to be amid-waypositionbetween judicial decision-makingand intergovernmental negotiations.Themembersare fully independentvis-à-vis theConventionPartiesand theyserve in theircapacityas“personsofhighmoralcharacterandrecognizedcompetencein thefields towhichtheConventionrelates,includingpersonshavinglegalexperience.”147 Mr McGlone notedthatheisnotaUKrepresentativeontheACCC;membersareindependent.

MrMcGloneobservedthatwhiletheCommittee’sprocedurescanbetriggeredinanumberofways,mostproceedingsareinitiatedbymembersofthepublic.Inthissense,theprocedureismoreakintoahumanrightsmechanism.FindingsoftheCommitteearesenttotheMeetingofthePartiesoftheAarhusConvention,whichmay,andalmostalwaysdoes,endorsethem.TheACCC’sfindingsinfluenceEUlaw148andarealsorecognisedinnationalcourts.149

In 2005, the EU became a member of the Aarhus Convention as a regional economicintegrationorganization(“REIO”).150Itmadeadeclarationastotheextentofitscompetencepursuant to Article 19, which stipulates that REIOs and Member States have separateobligations arising under the Convention.151 Article 9(3) of the Convention requires that“membersofthepublichaveaccesstoadministrativeorjudicialprocedurestochallengeactsand omissions by private persons and public authorities which contravene provisions of its nationallawrelatingtotheenvironment.”152

Client Earth, an environmental NGO, approached the ACCC with a communicationconcerningtheEU’sfailuretoallowaccesstojusticeformembersofthepublictochallengedecisions of EU institutions which are in contravention of EU environmental law.153 The allegationwassupportedbyreference toanumberofEU judicialdecisions including theGreenpeace case,154 in which Greenpeace and members of the public sought an annulment of the decisionadoptedbytheEuropeanCommissiontoprovidefinancialassistancefromtheEuropeanRegionalDevelopmentFundfortheconstructionofpowerstationsontheCanaryIslands,withoutrequiringanEnvironmentalImpactAssessment(EIA)tobeconducted.TheCJEUheldthattheclaimantshadnostandingunderthePlaumann test, as set out below:

145Ibid,Art15.146UNESCDecisionI/7ReviewofCompliance(Lucca,Italy,21-23October2002)UNDocECE/MPPP/2/

Add.8.147Ibid,2.148Joined Cases C 404/12 P and C 405/12 P Council of the European Union v Stichting Natuur en Milieu

(2015)(GrandChamber),<http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&num=C-404/12%20P>.149 Walton v Scottish Ministers[2012]UKSC44,[2013]PTSR51,perLordCarnwath.150CouncilDecision2005/370/EC.151AarhusConvention(n144),Art19.152AarhusConvention(n144),Art9(3).153ACCC/C/2008/32(PartI).154 Case T-585/93 Stichting Greenpeace Council (Greenpeace International) v Commission (FirstChamber)

ECJ1995II-02205;Case C-321/95 P Stichting Greenpeace Council and Others v CommissionECJ1998I-01651.

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Persons other than those to whom a decision is addressed may only claim to be individually concerned if that decision affects them by reason of certain attributes which are peculiar to them or by reason of circumstances in which they are differentiated from all other persons and by virtue of these factors distinguishes them individually just as in the case of thepersonaddressed.155

In Case C32 (Part I),156 the ACCC found that the public must have access to administrative or judicialreviewproceduresforsomeactsandomissionsbyEUinstitutions,andtheexistingEUjurisprudencewastoostricttomeettherequirementsoftheAarhusConvention.Importantly,theACCCnotedthatiftheexistingEUjurisprudencecontinued,theEUwouldbeinbreachofArticle9of theAarhusConvention.MrMcGlonestatedACCCdidnotfind theEU tobeinnon-complianceoftheAarhusConventionbecauseitwantedtotakeintoaccounttheoutcome of the Stichting Natuur case,157whichwasbeingconsideredbytheCJEU.

AftertherecentjudgmentinStichting Natuur, the ACCC resumed its deliberations, and, on 27June2016,postedPart IIof itsdraftfindings inCase C32 on the Aarhus Convention website.158MrMcGloneemphasisedthatthefindingswereindraftformonlyandlettershadbeenwrittentothePartyconcernedandthecommunicantinvitingtheircomments.

Inshort,thedraftfindingssaidthattheStichting Natuur case did not resolve the issue with regardtothelackofaccess.TheGeneralCourtheldin2012thatasArticle10(1)oftheEURegulation to implement the Aarhus Convention159 provided an internal review procedure in respect of an “administrative act”, itwas incompatiblewithArticle9(3) of theAarhusConvention.160ThisACCagreedwiththeGeneralCourt.However,onappealin2015,theCourt of Justice (Grand Chamber) held that the General Court had no business considering whether the Article 10(1) of the Aarhus Regulation complied with Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Conventionbecause“itwasnotsufficientlyclearthattheformerwasintendedtoimplementthelatter.”161

ThedraftfindingsforPartIIincludedtwosetsofrecommendations.First,ifandtotheextentthat thePartyconcerned intends to relyon theAarhusRegulationorotherEU legislationto implement its obligations under Article 9, paragraphs 3 and 4, of the Convention, the Committee recommends to the Party concerned that:

(a) theAarhusRegulationisamendedinaway,oranynewEUlegislationisdraftedinaway,thatwouldleaveitcleartotheECJthatlegislationisintendedtoimplementarticle9,para3 of the Convention; and

155 Case 25/62 Plaumann v Commission[1963]ECR95,107.156ACCC/C/2008/32(PartI).157 Case T-338/08 Stichting Natuur en Milieu and Pesticides Action Network Europe v Commission(Judg-

mentoftheGeneralCourt(SeventhChamber)of14June2012)<www.curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=T-338/08&language=EN>; Joined Cases C-404/12 P and C-405/12 P Council of European Union and European Commission v Stichting Natuur en Milieu and Pesticides Action Network Europe (Judgment of the Grand Chamberof13January2015)<http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&num=C-404/12%20P>.

158ACCC/C/2008/32(PartII).159Regulation(EC)No1367/2006,L264/13(6September2006)(theAarhusRegulation).160 Case T-338/08 Stichting Natuur en Milieu(n157).161 Joined Cases C-404/12 P and C-405/12 P (n157).

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(b) new or amended legislation implementing the Aarhus Convention uses wording that clearly and fully transposes the Convention; in particular, it would be important to correct failures in implementation that are caused by the use of words or terms that do not fully correspondtothetermsoftheConvention.

Second,ifandtotheextentthatthePartyconcernedisgoingtorelyonthejurisprudenceoftheCJEUtoensurethattheobligationsarisingunderArticle9,paragraphs3and4oftheConvention are implemented, the Committee recommends to the Party concerned that the CJEU:

(a)assessesthelegalityoftheEU’simplementingmeasuresinthelightofthoseobligationsand acts accordingly; and

(b) interprets EU law in awaywhich, to the fullest extent possible, is consistentwith theobjectiveslaiddowninarticle9,paragraphs3and4.

MrMcGloneremarkedthatinlightofBrexititwillbeinterestingtoseewhethertheUKwillremain party to the Aarhus Convention and, if not, what that means for communications lodgedwiththeACCCwithrespecttotheUK.IftheUKleavestheEUbutremainspartytotheAarhusConvention,thenalotofnewUKdomesticlegislationmightneedtobeenactedtoimplementobligationscurrentlycoveredbyEUlaw.IftheUKleavestheAarhusConventionaswellastheEU,thenwewouldneedtoworkoutwhatPrinciple10oftheRioDeclarationmeansforus,fromscratch.

Dr Jarrod Hepburn, Melbourne Law School “Parallel Expropriation Norms in International and Domestic Law”

In order to shed light on some of the complications of pluralism, Dr Jarrod Hepburn focused on expropriation, one instance in which there are parallel norms in both domestic andinternationallaw.Hestatedthatthepotentialforparallelnormshasbeengeneratedbytheexpansionofinternationallawinvariousdirections,bothinitsscope,rangeofactorsandsubjects.Theextensionofrightstoindividualsininternationallawhasbeenthemostfertilegroundforparallelnorms,mostnotablyinhumanrightsandinvestmentprotection.Hisfocustoday is on parallel norms concerning the protection of property rights in both international investmentlawandAustraliandomesticconstitutionallaw.

IntheAustraliancontext,theprotectionofpropertyrightsisfoundinsection51(xxxi)oftheConstitution, which states that:

TheParliamentshall…havepowertomakelaws…withrespectto…theacquisitionofpropertyonjusttermsfromanyStateorpersonforanypurposeinrespectofwhichtheParliamenthaspowertomakelaws.162

Thefocus,therefore,isontheconceptsof“acquisition”and“justterms”.

162CommonwealthofAustraliaConstitutionAct1990(“theAustralianConstitution”)section51(xxxi).

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The picture is not as clear in international lawas there is effectively no canonical norm.Therearethousandsofinvestmenttreatiesandacustomarylawprohibitiononexpropriation,althoughthereisnounanimousagreementonthescopeofthisprohibition.However,aheavilylitigatedprovisiononexpropriationininternationallawisArticle1110oftheNAFTA.163WhileadirectcomparisonwiththeAustralianconstitutionalprovisionwillnotbemade,examiningthe litigation concerning Article 1110 (and cases relating to other investment treaties) provides aninsightintointernationalinvestmenttribunals’generalapproachtoexpropriation.

In general, this analysis shows that international law provides greater protection for investors than Australian domestic law. This is due to numerous factors including the contrastingfocusesonacquisitionasopposedtodeprivation,ataxationexceptioninAustraliandomesticlaw, forfeiture cases, the narrower width of certain Australian administrative law doctrines comparedtoequivalentsininternationallaw,andthelackofpropertyrightsprotectionsinAustralianstateconstitutions.

OneofthedifferencesbetweentheAustralianandinternationalapproachtoexpropriationistheideaofacquisition.InAustralia,theuseoftheword”acquisition”insection51(xxxi)oftheConstitution means that the focus is on what the State has gained, not what the investor has lost.ThiswasdemonstratedinJT International,164 thecaseconcerningAustralia’s tobaccoplainpackaginglaws.TheHighCourtofAustraliaeffectivelystatedinthatcasethattherewasadeprivationof the investor’spropertyrights,but that thisalonewasnotsufficient tomake out an “acquisition” by the government.165 However, this position is more nuanced than it may appear at first. In other cases, theHighCourt has clarified that a “slight orinsubstantial”acquisitionisenoughandtheredoesnotneedtobeanexactcorrespondencebetweenwhathasbeenacquiredandwhathasbeenlost.Inaddition,thereasoningoftheCourtsometimesappearstobeformalisticwhendecidingwhetheranacquisitionhasbeenmadeout.Oneexampleof this isNewcrest Mining,166 in which the Court constructed an acquisitionbydecidingthat,byprohibitingminingonthelandinquestion,thegovernmenthadacquiredthelandfreefromNewcrestMining’srighttominetheminerals.DrHepburnviewedthisconstructionassomewhatformalistic.Whilethemeaningofacquisitionisthusnotentirelyclear,DrHepburnstatedthatitisgenerallymoredifficulttomakeoutanacquisitionunderAustralianlawthanadeprivationofpropertyrightsunderaninvestmenttreaty.

Another area inwhich there are different norms is that of taxation. In theHighCourt ofAustraliatherehasbeenawidedeferencetotaxationpowersinexpropriationcases.Indeed,Justice McHugh stated in Mutual Pools that any law “with respect to taxation” is not anacquisition.167 In contrast, international tribunals do seem to havea tendency to examinewhetherthemeasurethattheStateispresentingasataxationmeasureisactuallyataxationmeasure.ThiscanbeseeninMurphy v Ecuador,168 where the tribunal found that a payment

163NorthAmericanFreeTradeAgreement(adopted17December1992,enteredintoforce11January1994)32ILM289(NAFTA)Art1110.

164 JT International SA v Commonwealth[2012]HCA43,(2012)250CLR1.165Ibid,42.166 Newcrest Mining Limited v Thornton[2012]HCA60;(2012)248CLR555.167 Mutual Pools & Staff Pty Ltd v the Commonwealth of Australia(1996)190CLR513.168Murphy Exploration and Production Company International v Republic of Ecuador ICSIDCaseNo

ARB/08/4.

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of99percentofprofitstotheStatewasnotinrealityataxandthereforeitbreachedthebilateralinvestmenttreatyinquestion.WhiletheHighCourtofAustraliamaywelladopta“bonafides”testifthesituationarose,thereiscurrentlyadifferenceinapproachbetweentheHighCourtandinternationalarbitrationtribunals.

Forfeiture is the third area in which different norms can be seen in the Australian andinternationalcontexts.InAustralia,any law relating to the forfeiture of property will not amount toanacquisition,even where an innocent third party has been affected169 or where the law isdisproportionate.170 However, when the recent bilateral investment treaty case Ickale171 is analysed,itcanbeseenthatproportionalityisrelevantintheinternationalsphere.Inthiscase,theproportionalityofwhatwasseizedandtheallegedmisdeedswasconsidered.ThisisfurtherevidencethattheAustralianapproachtoexpropriationismuchmoredeferentialtoStatemeasures.

Additionally,outsideof the federalconstitutionalcontext,otheravenues for redressunderAustralianlawarealsolimited.Inadministrativelaw,Australianlawwouldbefarlesswillingtorecognisesubstantivelegitimateexpectations.Also,therearenopropertyprotectionsinAustralian state constitutions, although states may have separate statutory compensation schemes.

ThereisacuriousdevelopmentintheASEAN-Australia-NewZealandFreeTradeAgreement(AANZFTA)172 which means that in certain instances, Australian law appears to grant more protectiontoforeigninvestorsthaninternationallawdoes.ThisisbecauseAANZFTAcontainsageneralexceptionsclausewhichapplies tobothdirectand indirectexpropriation.Thusdirectexpropriationislikelytobean“acquisition”,butmaynotbreachAANZFTA.

Thus, it is clear that there is a misalignment between the Australian and international approach to expropriation; Australian law is both under- and over- protective when compared tointernational law. The key question then becomes, does this misalignment matter? Anindividual’sanswertothisquestionmaydependonwhethertheyacceptthegrandbargainof investment treaties, which are supposed to be predicated on the idea that foreign investors would not bring their capital to a new environment unless the State grants them the protections ofaninvestmenttreaty.However,theempiricalevidenceonthispredicationismixed,withsome suggesting that investment treatiesmake no difference at all and that investors areconsideringotherfactorswhentheyinvest.Nevertheless,ifthepredicationisaccepted,thenthemisalignmentisnotoverlyconcerningasitprovidesadditionalprotectionforinvestors.

Anothermatter forconcern is the fact that theexistenceof two remediesgives rise to thepossibilityoftwoclaims;proceedingsinbothdomesticandinternationalforums.However,theseriskscanbemanagedthroughtoolsthatforceaclaimanttochooseoneparticularforumordealwithdoublerecovery.Furthermore,somepeoplemayviewthedifferenceinnorms

169 Burton v Honan(1952)86CLR169(HCA).170 Attorney General for the Northern Territory v Emmerson[2014]HCA13,(2014)253CLR393.171 Içkale Inşaat Limited Şirketi v TurkmenistanICSIDCaseNoARB/10/24.172ASEAN-Australia-NewZealandFreeTradeAgreement(signed27February2009)(AANZFTA).

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asirrationalanddiscriminatory.DrHepburnarguedthatthereseemstobenojustificationforAustraliatoofferadditionalprotectiontoforeigninvestors,asisthecaseinAANZFTA,andthat it could be seen to be economically unwise for States to grant economic advantages to foreignersagainsttheirowninterests.

Dr Hepburn remarked that another potential problem is the increased risk of violatinginternationallaw.Ifoneassumesthatdomesticofficialsaremorefamiliarwiththeirownlawthaninternationallaw,whichstudiessuggestisthecase,thentheremaybeariskofofficialsimplementing a measure which complies with domestic law, but is in breach of international obligations.Whileincreasingtheeducationofofficialsontherelevantinternationalobligationsmaymitigatethisrisk,analignmentofthetwoparallelnormswouldgreatlydiminishit.Thereis also an argument that aligning the two bodies of law would allow for virtuous competition betweeninstitutions.

If alignment is seen as preferable, there are two methods by which this alignment could be achieved.First, international lawcouldbealignedwithdomesticstandards.Thiscouldbedone by arbitrators utilising a ”comparative public law” approach, which would involve findinggeneralprinciplesofpubliclawliabilityandidentifyingthesituationswhereStatesareresponsibletoprivatecitizens.Thisapproachwouldnotnecessarilyalignthebilateralinvestment treaty(“BIT”)provisionswiththedomestic lawof thehostStateas it involvesa“lowestcommondenominator”approachtoidentifyingcommongeneralprinciples,butitisanapproachthatispossible.TheotherwayinwhichinternationallawcouldbealignedwithdomesticstandardsisbytheStatesthemselvesrenegotiatingtreaties.TheUSAhaseffectivelydonethisinrecenttimesbyincludinglanguageinitsinvestmenttreatiesthatcloselytracksitsdomesticprovisions.

Secondly, domestic law could be aligned with international standards. To do this in theAustraliancontextwouldrequireareinterpretationoftheconstitutionalprovision,whichcouldbeconstrainedbythetextastheword“acquisition”ispresent.However,thereisanargumentthattheHighCourtispreparedtointerpret“acquisitionmoreflexiblyincertaincasestogettothe result it desires, as seen in Newcrest Mining.173 This could lead to proportionality having a greaterimpactintheinterpretationofsection51(xxxi),whichwouldarguablyleadtogreaterharmonisationbetweenAustraliandomesticlawandinternationallaw.

Questions and answers

MsBarrettaskedDrHepburniftheissuelieswiththefactthattheAustralianConstitutionmaygive recognition to certain public interests that sometimes come into conflict with the rights ofinvestors,whereastheinvestmenttreatiesdonot,ordosoinadequately.Perhapsthathassomething to do with the way that Australian constitutional and legislative processes provide forgreaterpublicparticipationthanthetreaty-makingprocessdoes.Theresultingtreatythusdoesnotalwayscateradequatelyforthepublicinterest.DrHepburnagreedthatalthoughthe AustralianConstitution is very specific, there are similar issues arising in theUS and

173 Newcrest Mining(n166).

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Canadiancontext.Wehaveseenalotofre-orientationoftheinvestmenttreatiesinrecentyears.Inaddition,therearelongstandingdebatesastotheroleofhumanrightsininvestor-Statedisputes.

Professor vonBogdandyaskedMrMcGlone to explain the element of publicness in theACCCdecision-makingprocessand the sourceof authority for theACCC.MrMcGlonenoted that the public engagement in theACCC communication process is extensive. Theprocesscanbetriggeredbythepublic.Membersofthepubliccanattendthesessions.DraftfindingsarepublishedontheACCCwebsite(andthereforeavailabletothepublic)atthesametimeasthePartiesaregivenachancetocommentonthem.Therealquestionisoneofimpact.Empirically,itseemsthatwhentheACCCissuesafinding,Partiesdocomply.Thismayhave something to do with the transparent and public nature of the ACCC communication process.

ProfessorvonBogdandyalsoposedaquestiontoDrHepburnregardingthecurrentstatusofdevelopmentofinternationalinvestmenttreatylaw.Heobservedthatthereisanurgentneedattheinternationallawlevelforinvestmenttreatylawtobere-alignedfromtheperspectiveofpublicopinion.Henotesthatthenewtreatiesbeingnegotiated,namelyTTIP174andCETA,175 seemtohavecutdownonthelevelsofprotectionaffordedtothepublic.Thisseemstobethetypeofre-alignmentthatisrequiredforinvestmenttreatylawtoregainpubliclegitimacy.DrHepburnarguedthattherehasbeenagreatdealofre-orientationtakingplaceinthelasttenyearsorso.Generallyspeaking,manyofthechangeshavetheeffectofreducingprotectionforforeigninvestors.However,noneofthesechangesaffecttheproceduraladvantagesforforeigninvestors,asdomesticinvestorsdonothaveaccesstothetreatyarbitrationprocess.Theultimatequestioniswhetherweconsiderthereisaplacefortheinstitutionofarbitrationitself.

Sir Stanley Burnton commented that the focus on international arbitration stems from the fact thatinmanycountries,thedomesticlitigationprocesscannotbereliedupontoprovidejustresults forforeigninvestors.Theprocessof investment treatyarbitrationprovidesaccess tojusticeforforeigninvestorseventhoughthereisnoguaranteethattheawardcanbeenforced.Inthissense,Australiamaybeanexceptionbecauseitisacountrywiththeruleoflawandadequatejudicialresources,soitislessclearthatthereisajustificationforprovidingforeigninvestorswithaseparatemechanismforsettlingdisputes.

Sir Frank noted that the idea of providing just compensation for expropriation is not acreatureofmoderninvestmenttreaties.Theprotectionoftheinterestsofforeigners,tradersandmerchantsgoesbacktothefoundationsofinternationallaw.Theprotectionofpropertyis notonlyamatterof investment lawbutanaspectof human rights law. Theonly validquestioniswhetherthecompensationforunlawfulexpropriationshouldbedifferentfromthecompensationforlawfulexpropriation.

174TheTransatlanticTradeandInvestmentPartnershipbetweentheEUandtheUSA.175TheComprehensiveEconomicandTradeAgreement.

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Panel 6: Future Directions

TimEickespeakingonPanel6(farleft)–LtoR:DouglasWilson,SirStanleyBurnton,DrAntoniosTzanakopoulos,ProfessorTomPoole

Chair: Rt Hon Sir Stanley Burnton QC, One Essex Court

SirStanleyBurntonintroducedthespeakersforpanelsixandcommendedthemforundertakingthechallengingtaskofdrawingconclusionsfromtheinterestingandfruitfuldiscussionsthathadtakenplaceduringtheconference.SirStanleycongratulatedTimEickeQCforhisrecentappointmentasajudgeoftheEuropeanCourtofHumanRightsandexpressedhissincerehope thatasaUK-nominatedJudge,MrEickewouldserveat theStrasbourgCourt foraconsiderabletimetocome.

Tim Eicke QC, Essex Court Chambers “The Future Potential for Human Rights and Public Law Issues to Feature in Investment Treaty Negotiations and Arbitrations”

TimEickeQCproposedthatthebestwaytoreflectontheearliersessionsoftheconferencewouldbetoposesomequestionsinlightofthediscussions.MrEickeechoedLordGoldsmith’squeryregardingthelocusofwheredecisionsonthepublicinterestshouldbemadeandtheattributionofpublicpower toprivatearbitrators. Thepublic’sperceptionof thecedingofsovereignty, raised from the floor in panel one, is an issue that also arises in the area of

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investor-Statedisputes.MrEickewasstruckbyProfessorSaunder’sobservationthatthereisan increased reach and scope for disputes arising as a result of the privatisation of previously State-controlled activities such as the administration of prisons or the building of nuclearpowerstations.ThisalsoresonatedwithSirFrank’scommentabouttheabsenceofboundariesbetweenpubliclawandinternationallaw.

Mr Eicke was curious as to whether the seemingly distinct areas of public and publicinternationallaware(orremain)really“discreteislands”,adoptingtheillustrativeexpressionofSir Frank,orwhether there canbeadialoguebeyond thosedisciplines for thepublicgoodintheabsenceofboundaries?Inposingthisquestion,hedrewfromsomeoftheissuesidentifiedbyProfessorvonBogdandyinpanelfour.

MrEickedrewourattentiontotheobviouscomparisonbetweentheinternationalprotectionofhumanrightsandinvestmenttreatyarbitrations.Drawingfromhiswealthofexperienceasanadvocate,heremarkedthatinvestmenttreatyarbitration,likehumanrights,isanareaoflaw which operates vertically to protect individuals against State conduct by providing them withaccesstoanindependentandbindingdisputesettlementprocess.Therearehoweversomenotabledifferences.First,whilehumanrightsprotectionsareuniversallyavailable toallwithin therespectiveState’s jurisdiction, theenhanceddisputeresolutionprocessunderinvestmenttreatiesisonlyavailabletoforeigninvestorspursuanttothetreaty.Further,thereisusuallynorequirementforforeigninvestorstoexhaustdomesticremedies.Thisisincontrast withhumanrightstreaties,whichalmostinvariablyrequireexhaustionofdomesticremedies.Inaddition,inthehumanrightscontext,aproductivedialoguehasbeendevelopedbetweenthe Strasbourg Court and domestic courts over common issues which may affect the public good. Ifone looksat these features in isolation, itmaybeunderstandable that thepublicappears tofind itdifficult toaccept that foreign investorsareentitled toahigher levelofaccessandprotection.

MrEickequestionedifthedifferencesbetweentheobjectivesunderlyinghumanrightslawand investor-State dispute resolutionare sufficient to justify thedifferential treatments andresults.While the primary objective of human rights protection is tomaintain and furthertherealisationoffundamentalfreedoms,thepurposeofinvestment-Statedisputeresolutionpursuant to investment treaties is said to be to create conditions favourable for the fostering offoreigninvestments.However,theybothrelatetotheprotectionandenforcementofprivaterightsheldbyindividualsagainstarbitraryStateaction.Investmenttreatiesareoftendraftedinvagueandgeneralterms,frequentlymoresothanthelanguageoftheEuropeanConvention.Thereisclearlyanequalneedtocommunicatetothepublicwhythesemechanismscanservethepublicgood,ratherthantakingawayfromit.

ItwasnotedbyMrEickethattheproblemmaybecomemoreacuteasweseeanincreasedneedforStatestoprotecttheirownnationalsecurityandotherpublicinterests.Inthecontextof investor-Statedispute resolution, it is for thearbitrators,without thebenefitof theviewsofthedomesticcourts,todecidethequestionofnecessityundertherelevantprovisionsofthe treaty. Is the tribunalentitled toverifyorsecond-guessquestionsofpublic interest?By contrast, theStrasbourgCourthasthebenefitofthedomesticEnglishcourts,whichbynow,havingspentaconsiderableperiodoftimeworkingonseekingtoachievetheappropriatebalance between the need for a fair hearing and the need to protect the interests of national

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security, will have considered the competing interests by reference to a much fuller body of evidence than that which could ever be put before arbitral tribunals or, for that matter, any internationaldisputesettlementmechanism.

MrEickewascuriousastowhythereisareluctance–ifnothostility–onthepartofStatestotheintroductionofanexhaustionofdomesticremediesclausewhennegotiatingnewinvestor-Stateagreements.Infact,itisnoteworthythateventodayinvestment treaties usually contain a “fork in the road” clausewhich excludes access to domestic remedies in the event ofanarbitration. Incontrast, theECHRbenefitsgreatly from thedetailedassessmentsof thedomesticcourts.ThequestionwaswhywecouldnotlearnfromtheStrasbourgexperienceintheinvestor-Statecontext?

MrEickeobservedthatwhileboththeStrasbourgCourtandtheproposedinvestment-Statedispute settlement mechanism in the draft Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (“TTIP”)aresubjecttopubliccriticismsinrelationtotheperceivedlossofsovereignty,onecurious featureof these criticisms is that some themost vociferousobjectors to investmentdisputesettlementtendtobeamongthestaunchestsupportersoftheStrasbourgCourt.MrEickewonderedifthereverseisalsotrue,andifso,whetherthemotivationforthesecriticismsistrulythedeficienciesofthedisputesettlementsystem?

MrEickeconcludedbyremarkingthatthedialogueinthetitleoftheconferencecouldworkinmultipleways.Itstruckhimthatanswerscanbefoundinanincreaseddialoguebetweenpubliclaw,investor-Statedisputesettlementandhumanrightslaw,andthosewhopracticeinit.ThedialoguebetweentheUKSupremeCourtandtheStrasbourgCourtisnowawell-developed one, and it helps both courts to anticipate issues which are of concern to the public.Furtherdialoguesmayassistthedeterminationofthesameproblembydifferentlegalorders.HereferredustoarecentapplicationoftheBosphorus principle176bytheEuropeanCourt of Human Rights in the Avotiņš v Latvia decision,177anotherexampleof a dialogue, in thatcasebetweenitandtheCJEU,seekingtoavoidconflicts.Bycontrast,theEuropeanCourtofHumanRights’sOpinion 2/13178wasperhapsanexampleofamissedopportunityofadialogueinthecontextoftheEU’sefforts,mandatedundertheTreatyonEuropeanUnion,tobecomeapartytotheECHR.Weseesimilarissues,describedsometimeseitherasafailure,atleastsofar,ofadialogueorevenasarefusaltoengageinadialogue,inthecontextoftheengagementofboththeStrasbourgCourtandtheLuxemburgCourtwiththeobligationsimposedonStatesinthecontextofsanctionsadoptedbytheUNSecurityCouncil;seemostrecently theGrandChamber judgment inAl-Dulimi (and the separate opinions attached thereto).179

176 Bosphorus Hava Yolları Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim ıirketi v Ireland,ApplicationNo45036/98,42EHRR1.177 Case of Avotiņš v Latvia,ApplicationNo17502/07,Judgmentof23May2016178ECJOpinion2/13,OpinionoftheCourt(FullCourt)of18December2014,OJC260,7.9.2013.179 Al-Dulimi and Montana Managment Inc v Switzerland, ApplicationNo5809/08GrandChamber

Judgmentof21June2016.

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Douglas Wilson, Foreign & Commonwealth Office“Issues on the Horizon: International Law Positions as an Act of Foreign Policy?”

MrWilsonbeganbyprovidinga supplement toSir Frank’s vividdescriptionsof how theForeignOfficeusedtobe,withhispersonalsenseofwhattheForeignandCommonwealthOffice(FCO)isliketoday.HeremindedusthattheFCOtodayisbuiltonthelegacyofeminentlegalpractitionerslikeSirFrank.TheFCOrecruitslegaladviserstoHerMajesty’sDiplomaticService and this attracts talented lawyers from private practice and other government departmentsinequalmeasure.MrWilsonnotedthatwhenhefirstjoinedtheFCOin2001,fouryearsbeforeLordBingham’scelebrated remarks in2005,180 a legal case was still a significantevent.Today,thereare96activecasesofalldescriptions,andthisnumberdoesnotincludethecasesthathavebeendismissedatthepre-actionstageorcaseswhicharemanagedbytheFCOasUKagentattheEuropeanCourtofHumanRights.ThelawyersatFCOroutinelydrawfromamuchwiderrangeofstatutes,suchastheConstitutionalReformandGovernanceAct2010(onwhichJillBarrett ledduringhertimeattheFCO),generalstatuteswhichapplyacrossallgovernmentdepartmentssuchastheFreedomofInformationAct2000,theDataProtectionAct1998,theEqualitiesAct2010,aswellaslegislationwhichis more particular to the conduct of foreign affairs such as the Modern Slavery Act 2015, theAviationandMaritimeSecurityAct1990,andforthetimebeingatleast,theEuropeanCommunitiesAct1972.

RecallingthekeynotespeechbyLordGoldsmith,MrWilsonremarkedthathedidnotrealisetenyearsago thatpublic lawandpublic international lawwouldbeso intricately linked.Yearsago,inFCOLegalAdviserstherewasadefaultmantrawheneveranissueofdomesticlawcameup–”wedon’tdothathere–we’reinternationallawyers”,butthatapproachisnotviablenow.TheFCO’sadviceon internationalaffairs todaycoversabroadrangeofapplicabledomestic laws.While theFCO’sfocusremains thatofpublic international law,almostalllegalmattersrequireconsiderationofthefundamentalsofdomesticpubliclaw.AllFCOlegaladvisersneedagroundinginpubliclaw.Inaddition,theFCOdealswithareasof law such as tort, commercial and criminal law, for which it draws on resources from other governmentdepartmentsand,whennecessary,externallegalservices.MrWilsonaskedustoconsidertheexampleofapotentialdecisiontouseforce.TheFCOwouldnotonlycanvassissues arising from public international law such as jus ad bellum,butalsothelawofjudicialreview,theEuropeanConventiononHumanRightsandtheHumanRightsAct,UKcriminallawandinternationalcriminallaw,aswellasparliamentaryprocedures.TherewasnowapracticeofprovidingasummaryoftheGovernment’slegalpositiontoParliamentpriortoadebateonaproposeduseofforce.

MrWilson agreedwith the fundamental premise that there needs to bemultiple strandsof interactions, communications and cross-fertilisations between public law and publicinternational law. He referred to the three categories of international lawyer defined byProfessor Simpson during the panel one discussion, remarking that public internationallaw has made a vast contribution towards a safer and more prosperous world by bringing

180LordBingham, ‘Foreword’ in S Fatima,Using International Law in Domestic Courts (Hart Publishing 2005).

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about greater co-operation and understanding between States. “Make the law stick” isa fundamentalaimof FCO legaladvisers,and soa largepartofwhat theydo is toactalongsidepolicy officials andministers to ensure that the legal aspects of the policy areconsideredfromtheoutset.Thismeanshelpingthemdefendtheirpositioninpublicwithlegaltools,butalsoprovidingthemwithfullandfranklegaladviceontherelevantparameters.The international legal system needs to retain a level of respect and trust in order to induce compliance.Forthetimebeing,StatesremaintheprimarymoversofinternationallawandcustomaryinternationallawisstillformedbythepracticeofStates.

MrWilsoncommented that if there isaperceptionbyelectedpoliticians that theycannotchange laws as a result of restrictions arising from international legal obligations, tensions willarise.Someviewpublic international lawasbeing insufficiently flexibleandagile toaccommodate the goals and policies of those that have been democratically elected to effect change.Withoutendorsingthisvieworotherwise, it is important toacknowledgethat thisperceptionexists.

Sometimes thegovernmenthas tomakepoliticalchoicesas towhether,and if sohow, toapply a rule of international law or a particular ruling of an international court or tribunal or otherbody.Sometribunalrulingsaremoreauthoritativethanothers.Inmostlegalsystems,theexecutivehasa certain leeway inmaking foreignpolicy. International law isa valueandaninterest.Adecisiononhowtoapplyinternationallawmayitselfbeanactofforeignpolicy.

MrWilsonposedaquestionastothebasisonwhich,asamatterofdomesticpubliclaw,thegovernment’spositionwithregardtoaparticularquestionofinternationallawshouldbesubjecttoscrutinyandreviewbythecourts.Inotherwords,isagovernmentdecisiononaquestionofinternationallawakintoanactofforeignpolicy,towhichthecourtsnormallyshowadegreeofdeference,orisitjustlikeanyotherlegalquestion?Arethereboundariesbeyondwhich public law should not normally go in scrutinising the legal decisions of government in thesphereofforeignaffairs?Ifso,whatshouldbetheboundaries?MrWilsonstressedthathewascertainlynotarguingthatthereshouldbenolimitstoexecutivediscretioninthisfield,butthatfurtherthoughtisneededonwheretheparametersofjusticiabilityshouldbe.

Professor Thomas Poole, London School of Economics“Future Narratives on State Sovereignty: Where Are We Heading?”

ProfessorThomasPooleremarkedthathewouldbeprovidingsomebriefreflectionsonthediscussionsfromtheperspectiveofapubliclawyer.ProfessorPoolewantedtofocusonthreetopics, namely the history of common law, the concept of public law and the internationalisation ofpubliclawanditsinstitutionaldimension.ItwasnotedthattheunderlyingthemeistheStatecentred-nessofourthinking,andthestorieswetellourselvesaslawyersandscholars.

Turningfirsttothehistoryofthecommonlaw,ProfessorPoolerecalledSirFrank’sremarkthattherewerevery fewcasesheard in theEnglishcourts involving international lawfromthe1950sto1980s.Incontrast,wehaveanincrediblenumberofcasesgoingthroughtheEnglishcourtstoday,asProfessorDapoAkandeandDouglasWilsonspokesoknowledgeablyabout.

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ProfessorPoolestatedthatwetendtothinkoflawinsilosandgiveourselvesanarrativewithorigin,growthanddevelopment inorder toorientateourselves. Itwas suggested thatweneedtogobeyondthesejuristicdevicesandtothinkabouttherelationshipbetweencommonlawontheonehand,andthevariousbodiesoftransnationallawsontheother.Whatwehave to remember is that common law, as described by Lord Hoffmann in Bancoult No.2,181 hasalwaysbeenamphibiousinnature.

Professor Poole raised the point that British institutions, including British courts, have been engaging with transnational matters profoundly throughout British history, and it is largely our State-centredthinkingandtendencytoparochialismthathaveobscuredthisobviousfact.ThePrivyCouncilhasdealtwithahostofmatterswhichwemighttodaycategoriseundersubjectheadings such as the conflict of laws, transnational law, jus gentium, and some of these caseshadsubstantialfeedbackintodomesticpubliclaw.Oneleadingcaseonthedoctrineof parliamentary sovereignty and constituent power is Madzimbamuto v Lardner-Burke,182 a Privy Council decision that arose out of the unilateral declaration of independence in SouthernRhodesia.Itwasprofferedthatcommonlawmaybemuchmorefluid,contestedandpermeablethanourState-centredperspective,anditmaybemuchmoreamenabletorelevantdialogueswithinternationalandtransnationalbodiesandinstitutionsthanwethink.

ProfessorPoolecharacterisedpublic lawas lawwhichrelates to the juridicalconstructionof a particular form of civil association, one which may be described as moral or political association. It concerns the relationship amongst citizens as opposed to the relationshipbetweenindividuals.Publiclawassistsintheidentificationofmatterswhichareres publica, matterswhichareofficialandpertainingtotheCommonwealth.ProfessorPoolearguedthatwithout the concept of public law, there is no way for us to understand authority, to conceptualise how we might be obliged to do something or to distinguish between a valid command and theordersofagunmanorbandit. Inasense, theconceptofpublicness isa legalfiction,somethingHobbeswoulddescribeasastructurewhichgivesrisetoanartificialperson.ThisconceptionisconsistentwithProfessorFeldman’scharacterisationofpubliclawasanagentoffalseconsciousnessandasaconjurerwhichtransformstheoppositionbetweentherulerandtheruledtoastoryofco-operationandunity.Allpubliclawisself-imposedbyrulersonthemselves,asFeldmanpointedout.Itwasacknowledgedthatthisconceptualstructurecanandhasbeenusedtoshieldrulersfromoversightsor liability.However, it isultimately theideaofpubliclawandauthoritythatexplainsthedifferencebetweenapoliceofficervalidlyarrestingapersonfortryingtostealacar,andthatsamepoliceofficerconductinganarrestbecausesheorhedoesnotlikethelookofaperson’sface.

Professor Poole went on to state that to deny the autonomous sphere of public law, as Dr Jason Varuhascameclosetodoinginhispresentation,woulddoenormousviolencetothedeep-seatedconceptualstructurewheresocialactionstakeplaceandrendernotionsoflegitimateandillegitimateexerciseofauthority,andtheideaoffreedomitselfmeaningless.Wetendtoassociate, at least since the early modern State theorists such as Bodin, Grotius and Hobbes,

181R (On The Application of Bancoult) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2008]UKHL61

182Madzimbamuto v Lardner-Burke[1969]1AC645.

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thedelegationofauthoritythroughchainsofofficialswiththeparticularpoliticalformoftheState.Inonesense,thereisnoreasonforthechainofauthoritytooperatewithintheStatestructure,as,afterall,asProfessorFeldmannoted, there isnoconceptualreasonwhythechainofauthoritycanonlyoperatewithintheStatestructure.

Movingon the internationalisationofpublic law, it isamistake to ignoreoroverlook theinstitutionaldimensionof thisprocessorphenomenon.Thosescholarswhohaveobservedtheseinternationaltrendsseemtoagreethattheytendtoempowertheexecutiveandjudiciaryontheonehand,andtodiminishordowngradetheroleofparliamentontheother.AstheAmerican jurist RobertCover describes inNomos and Narrative,183 there are patterns of developmentswithinthelaw.Inanylegalsystemorbodyoflaw,thereisastructureofnorms,namely rules, principles, practices and presumptions, and also stories we tell ourselves about thenatureandpurposeofthosenorms.Publiclawcannotbemadesenseofifwelookatthedoctrineonitsown.Wemustconsiderhowthenormsandnarrativesfit.

ProfessorPoolereferredustotheideaofcosmopolitanism(whichis toanextentreflectedinProfessorvonBogdandy’spaperandProfessorJowell’sintervention)andnotedthatifweidentifynormsandseektoapplythemwherepublicpowerisexercised,thenasmuchasitconcernsitselfwithnarrativeatall,itiscorrespondinglyacosmopolitanone.Publiclawyersunderstandthatpubliclawisnotjustamatterofprinciple,asProfessorSaundersmentioned,butalsoruleswhicharespecificallyrootedtoaspecificculture,institutionandsetofmorals.Thiscanbeexacerbatingtoacertainkindofcosmopolitan,butparliamentshavetraditionallyexercisedmediatingfunctions.InthelanguageofProfessorFeldman,Parliamentisboththerulerandtheruled.Courtscannotdothisverywell,notleastbecausetheyarerightlyremovedfromtherulerandtheruled.

ProfessorPooleconcluded thatwhatweneed is, first,moreplausiblenarrativeand legalaccounts to navigatebetweendomesticand international norms.Second,weneedmoreplausibletellersofthosestories.Itcannotbejustjurists,diplomatsandinternationalsecretariats,butthepoliticalclassmoregenerally.Otherwise,valuableinternationalprojectswouldnotbeunderstoodasalegitimateexerciseofcollectivepoliticalauthority,butratherasaspeciesofalienationoroppression.

Dr Antonios Tzanakopoulos, University of Oxford“What Can We Take Away From These Dialogues?””

DrAntoniosTzanakopoulosreferredtoLordGoldsmith’skeynoteaddresswhichsetthestagefortheensuingpaneldiscussionsbeautifully.DrTzanakopoulosthensuggestedthatthestructureofupwardanddownwardtransmissionsleftsomethingtobedesiredintermsofcomplexity.DrTzanakopouloswantedustothinkmorecomprehensivelyabouttherelationshipbetweendomestic and international law and the interaction between international and domestic law asitemergesfromtherelationship.

183RobertCover‘TheSupremeCourt,1982Term-Foreword:NomosandNarrative’(1983)2705FacultyScholarshipSeries<http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/2705>.

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Dr Tzanakopoulos stated that in reality, it is difficult to distinguish between upward anddownwardtransmissions.InternationallawimposesonStatesinternationalobligationstoactinaparticularwaytowardseachother.Nevertheless,mostinternationallawinstrumentswhicharebeingmadetodayaremadeupofinward-lookingnormsandobligations,thatis,Statesagree at the international level to apply particular rules in their respective domestic legal order.Ifwelookathumanrightslaw,internationaleconomiclaw,internationalinvestmentlaw,internationalcriminallaw,orevenaspectsofthelawoftheseawhereStatesarerequiredtosetupsearchandrescueareasandprovidenavigationaidsintheirterritorialwaters,wefindthat the rules of international law often relate to the obligations of States to act domestically, iestandard-setting.Thewaterismurkierifwetakeintoaccounttheinfinitenumbersofwaysthroughwhichinternationalobligationsmaybeincorporatedintothedomesticlegalorder.ThereisnofullymonistordualistState.TheUKisdualistintreatiesbutmonistincustomaryinternationallaw.Neithersystemoperatesinitspureform:therearemoderatingmechanismssuchasthedoctrineofconsistentinterpretationandnon-justiciabilitywhichoperatetobluntthesharpedgesofbothmonistanddualistapproachesintheirpureform.

DrTzanakopoulosintroducedtheconceptofconsubstantialnorms,atermderivedfromthecon-substantialityoftheHolyTrinityineasternorthodoxtheology.Consubstantialnormsarerules stemming from different legal orders (eg the international and the domestic one), but ineffecthavethesameunderlyingsubstance.Heproposedthatwereconsidercasessuchas Kadi184inthislight,wheretheEuropeanCourtofJusticewasabletocircumventtheneedtoimplementinternationallawbyappealinginsteadtoprimaryEUlawforthereviewofadomesticactagainsttherelevantEUlaw.AndyettherulethattheCourtappliedwasthatprotecting the right of access to a court and the right to an effective remedy: these rights are protectedinbyandlargethesamewaybothininternationalanddomesticlaw.Theyareconsubstantialnorms. In fact,domesticand internationalhumanrights law influenceeachotherconstantly,creatingafeedbackloop.Thisbothconfirmstheexistenceofconsubstantialnormsandunderlinesthedifficultyindiscerningupwardanddownwardtransmissions:bothhappenconstantly.

Continuing on in this context, Dr Tzanakopoulosmade specific reference to the constantfeedbackbetweendomesticand international law.Bywayofexample,wecan trace thehistoryofhumanrightsdevelopmentfromthefirstBillsofRightsoftheeighteenthcenturytotheUnitedNationserawhenthesewerepassedintointernationalconventionsandtransitionedinto customary international law. Subsequently, these norms influenced the formation ofdomesticconstitutions innewly independent states suchasNamibiaandSouthAfrica,aswell as many European States emerging from dictatorships. These domestic constitutionshadinturnbeenre-internationalisedthroughthecreationofnewregional treatiesandtheinterpretation of consubstantial norms at the international level, until certain rights and values reach the stage of jus cogens.Therefore,weobservethisconstantprocessoffeedbackeffectsbetweendifferentinternationalanddomesticlegalorders.Conceptssuchas“goodfaith”and“proportionality”havetriggeredasimilarseriesof feedbackeffectsbetweeninternationalanddomesticlegalorders.

184CaseC–402/05PandC–415/05, Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commission[2008]ECRI–6351.

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DrTzanakopoulosobservedthatournaturalbiasmeansthatwewouldalwaystendtothinkof certain concepts as originating from our areas of specialisation, be it public law or public internationallaw,wheninrealityitmaybefromeither.DrTzanakopoulosencouragedustoacknowledgethisfluidityandpermeability(tousethewordsofProfessorFeldman)andtoembracethecontradictions.Itisimportanttocontinueadialogueastohowconceptsemergeanddevelop,andtolearnfromeachother.

Concluding Remarks by the Chair

SirStanleyBurntonconcludedthepanel,andtheconference,byremarkinghowfarthelawhas developed with regard to public international law and public law in the last century or so.ItwasnotlongagothattheonlyactorsininternationallawwereStates;individualsandminoritygroupshadnostanding.Atthebeginningofthelastcentury,accordingtoDicey,publiclawwasatoolfortyrannyandthereforenotlawatall.IfwelookatEnglishlawfromthebeginningofthiscentury,allcaseswithahintofinternationallawwerenon-justiciableasjudgescouldnotpossiblyinterprettreatiesorexamineforeignpolicies.Thecurrentdebatesabout the process surrounding if, and how, notice under Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty can be given illustrates the importance of the interaction between public and public international law.

Questions and Answers

One question from the floor was why there are insufficient efforts by States to regulateglobalisednon-Statesourcesofpower(suchastransnationalcorporations)andglobalisedsectors(suchas thebankingandfinancialservicessector).DrTzanakopoulosrepliedthatalthough States possess the power to enter into international agreements with regard to the regulationoftransnationalprivatepower,theylackthepoliticalwilltodoso.

Separately,DrVaruhascommentedonProfessorPoole’sviewontheconceptofpubliclawandtheperceiveddangertofreedomintheabsenceoftheconceptofpublicness.DrVaruhaspointedoutthateventhoughtheideaofpubliclawwaslostinEnglishlawforsome250years,freedomcontinuedtoreign.ProfessorPoolerespondedbydrawingadistinctionbetweenthepubliclawjurisdictionofthecourtsandtheideaofpubliclawgenerally.HeurgedDrVaruhastolookatthewholepictureofpubliclawinitstotality,includingitsinstitutions,processesandunderlyingrationale.ProfessorPooleemphasisedthatpubliclawhasalwaysexistedsincethebirthofthemodernState.

Finally,onememberoftheaudienceaskedthepanelwhythereissuchalargevolumeofpublicinternationallawmattersbeinglitigatedintheUK,whencomparedtootherEuropeannations.SirStanleyrepliedwithpoisethat“webelieveintheruleoflaw.”

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This report was written by:

Yvonne Yue Wang, LLM Candidate, Melbourne Law School; andZoe Hough, JD Candidate, Melbourne Law School;Research Interns on the Watts Public International Law Programme, BIICL,

andeditedbyJillBarrett,ArthurWattsSeniorResearchFellowinPublicInternationalLaw,BIICL.

August 2016

ZoeHough YvonneWang

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Annex 1

Speaker Biographies

Professor Dapo Akande

DapoAkande is Professorof Public International Lawat theUniversityofOxford,wherehe isalsoYamaniFellowatStPeter’sCollegeandCo-Directorof theOxford Institute forEthics,LawandArmedConflict&theOxfordMartinProgrammeonHumanRightsforFutureGenerations.DapohasheldvisitingprofessorshipsatYaleLawSchool(wherehewasalsoRobinnaFoundationInternationalFellow);theUniversityofMiamiSchoolofLaw,andCatolicaGlobalLawSchool,Lisbon.HeisamemberoftheEditorialBoardsoftheAmerican Journal of International Law and the European Journal of International Law; of the Advisory Council of the British Institute of International and Comparative Law (BIICL); and the International AdvisoryPanelfortheAmericanLawInstitute’sprojectontheRestatementFourth,TheForeignRelationsLawoftheUnitedStates.Heisfoundingeditorofthescholarlyblog:EJIL:Talk!

DapohasadvisedStates,internationalorganisationsandnon-governmentalorganisationsonmattersofinternationallaw.Hehasadvisedandassistedcounselorprovidedexpertopinionsincasesbeforeseveralinternationaltribunalsandnationalcourts.HehasworkedwiththeUnitedNationsorgans,theAfricanUnionCommissionandtheCommonwealthSecretariaton issues relating to international humanitarian law, human rights law, international criminal lawandterrorism.

Jill Barrett

JillBarrettistheArthurWattsSeniorResearchFellowinPublicInternationalLawatBIICL,wheresheleadstheWattsprogrammeofinternationallawresearchandevents.Shespecialisesinthelawoftreaties,thepolarregions,andlawofthesea,andleadstheBIICLresearchprojecton theObligationsofStates inUndelimitedMaritimeAreas.Hermost recentpublicationsinclude Barrett and Barnes (eds), Law of the Sea: UNCLOS as a Living Treaty, (BIICL 2016) and“SecuringthePolarRegionsthroughinternationallaw”inFooteretal(eds)Security and International Law(Hart2016).ShewasVisitingProfessoratKobeUniversity,Japan,in2013,whereshetaughtinternationallawtopostgraduatestudents,andisnowVisitingReaderintheSchoolofLawatQueenMaryUniversityofLondon.

JillwaspreviouslyLegalCounsellorattheForeign&CommonwealthOffice.Duringher20-yearFCOcareersheadvisedonlegalaspectsofUKforeignpolicy,oftenattheintersectionofinternationallawandpubliclaw.SheledtheGovernment’sworkoncreatinganewstatutoryregime for parliamentary scrutiny of treaties, resulting in the provisions on Ratification ofTreaties in the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010: see her article on ‘The UnitedKingdomandParliamentaryScrutinyofTreaties:RecentReforms’(ICLQ2011).

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Sir Frank Berman KCMG QC

Sir Frank Berman KCMG QC is a barrister at Essex Court Chambers specialising ininternationalarbitrationandadvisoryworkininternationallaw.HeisalsoaVisitingProfessorofInternationalLawatOxfordUniversityandtheUniversityofCapeTownandhasbeenamemberofthePermanentCourtofArbitrationsince2010.HeistheChairmanoftheBoardofTrusteesatBIICL. Sir Frank has enjoyeda longand varied career in international lawanddiplomacy.HejoinedtheHMDiplomaticServicein1965andwastheLegalAdvisertotheForeignandCommonwealthOfficefrom1991–1999.DuringhisFCOcareerheservedinBerlin,Bonnand at theUN inNewYork, conducted cases before the ICJ and arbitral tribunals andtookpart innumerous internationalnegotiations,His research interests include the lawoftreaties, the use of force, settlement of disputes, international humanitarian law and the law ofinternationalorganisations.

Professor Dr Armin von Bogdandy

ArminvonBogdandyisthedirectoroftheMaxPlanckInstituteforComparativePublicLawandInternationalLawinHeidelbergandProfessorforPublicLawattheUniversityinFrankfurt/Main. He is one of Germany’s most renowned researchers in the field of constitutional,Europeanandpublicinternationallaw.Hisresearchconcernsthestructuralchangesaffectingpubliclaw,betheytheoretical,doctrinal,orpractical.

HehasbeenPresidentoftheOECDNuclearEnergyTribunalaswellasamemberoftheGerman Science Council (Wissenschaftsrat)and theScientificCommitteeof theEuropeanUnion Agency for Fundamental Rights. He has also held visiting positions at the NewYorkUniversity School of Law, the EuropeanUniversity Institute, the XiamenAcademyofInternationalLaw,andtheUniversidadNacionalAutonómadeMéxico,amongstothers.

The Rt Hon Sir Stanley Burnton QC

SirStanleyBurnton is currentlyanarbitratoratOneEssexCourt.He isalsoChairof theBoardofTrusteesoftheBritishandIrishLegalInformationInstituteandatrusteeofBIICL.HeisanHonoraryFellowofStEdmundHall,OxfordandaVisitingProfessoratQueenMaryUniversityofLondon.

HereturnedtoOneEssexCourtafterretiringasaJudgeoftheCourtofAppealinOctober2012,where hewas appointed in 2008.He sat in both the civil and criminal divisionsof theCourtofAppeal.Previously,hesatasadeputyHighCourt judge in theChanceryDivisionfrom1994untilhewasappointedtotheHighCourtBench(Queen’sBenchDivision)inJuly2000.HewasnominatedtotheAdministrativeCourtshortlyafterhisappointment.As a judgeof theAdministrativeCourt hemadea number of the early decisions on theEuropeanConventiononHumanRightsasincorporatedinEnglishLawbytheHumanRightsAct1998.Hewasinvolvedinanumberofpublicinternationallawcasesascounsel(suchastheInternationalTinCouncillitigation)andasajudge.

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Professor Michael Crommelin

TheZelmanCowenProfessorofLawatMelbourneLawSchool,MichaelCrommelin’sareasofexpertiseincludetheareasofenergyandresourceslaw,comparativelawandconstitutionallaw.Hisrecentpublicationsinclude‘PowersoftheHeadofState’and‘ReformingAustralianFederalDemocracy’(UniversityofMelbourneLegalStudiesResearchPapers).HeservedasDeanofMelbourneLawSchoolfrom1989to2007andhasheldvisitingappointmentsatanumberofuniversities,includingtheUniversityofOslo,theUniversityofBritishColumbia,theUniversityofCalgaryandGeorgetownUniversity.In2009,Michaelwasmadeanofficerofthe Order of Australia for service to the law and to legal education, particularly as a tertiary educatorandthroughthedevelopmentofminingandpetroleumlawinAustralia.

Tim Eicke QC

TimEickeisabarristeratEssexCourtchambersandisaleadingadvocateintheareasofPublicandConstitutional Law,EuropeanUnionLaw, InternationalHumanRights LawandPublicInternationalLaw.Timhasparticularexpertiseincasesinvolvingtheinter-relationshipandinteractionbetweentwoormoreofthese(attimescompeting)areasoflaw.

He is the Editor of European Human Rights Reports and regularly provides training and gives presentations in relation to his areas of expertise. He is a highly experienced andinternationally respected advocate and his extensive litigation practice involves frequentappearances in the highest domestic as well as international courts and tribunals, acting for applicants, respondents and interveners, including the High Court, the Court of Appeal, UKSupremeCourt,theCourtofJusticeoftheEuropeanUnionandtheEuropeanCourtofHumanRightsaswellasinvestor-statearbitration.UntilhisappointmentasQC,TimwasamemberoftheAttorneyGeneral’sA-Panelofcounselandhe continues to be instructed by theUKGovernmentincomplexanddifficultcases.

InJune2016theCouncilofEuropeParliamentaryAssembly(PACE)electedTimEickeasthenextjudgeinrespectoftheUKattheEuropeanCourtofHumanRights(ECtHR).Hetookupthisnewofficeon7September2016.

Professor David Feldman QC

Professor David Feldman is the Rouse Ball Professor of English Law at the University ofCambridge,aFellowofDowningCollegeandanAcademicAssociateof39EssexChambers,London.Hisresearchcoversawiderangeofpubliclawfields,includingtheideaandpracticeof constitutionalism,ways inwhichhuman rights lawaffectsadministrative justiceand theinterplayofprinciplesofnational, internationalandEU law inprotectinghuman rights inadministrativeprocesses tocombat terrorism,amongstmanyothers.Hehasauthoredandeditedseveralbooks,mostrecentlyThe Cambridge Companion to Public Law (CUP2015)(withMarkElliott).

Hepreviouslytaughtat theUniversitiesofBristolandBirmingham,wherehewasDeanofLawfrom1997–2000.HehasheldvisitingpositionsattheAustralianNationalUniversity,

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theUniversityofMelbourneandtheUniversityofNottingham.HewasthefirstLegalAdvisertotheUKParliament’sJointSelectCommitteeonHumanRightsfrom2000–2004andsatasanInternationalJudgeoftheConstitutionalCourtofBosniaandHerzegovinafrom2002–2010,takingontheroleofaVice-Presidentfrom2006–2009.

Dr Veronica Fikfak

DrVeronikaFikfak isaFellowandLecturerat theUniversityofCambridgeandanESRCFutureResearchLeader.SheholdsaMagisterJurisandaDPhilfromtheUniversityofOxford.Her research interestsare in the fieldsofpublic law, human rightsand international law.She is particularly interested in the interface between domestic and international law and is currentlywritingamonographontheroleofnationaljudgesinrelationtointernationallawforCambridgeUniversityPress.Herfirstbook(co-authored)ontheengagementoftheUKParliamentonquestionsofwarParliament’sSecretWarisforthcomingfromHartBloomsburyattheendoftheyear.

DrFikfakpreviouslyworkedat the ICJ, the LawCommissionofEnglandandWales,andat the EuropeanCourt ofHumanRights. She is aMemberof the LauterpachtCentre forInternationalLawandCambridge’sCentreforPublicLaw.HerresearchiscurrentlyfundedbytheESRCandtheBritishAcademy.

Lord Peter Goldsmith QC PC

LordPeterGoldsmithQCPC is theLondonCo-ManagingPartnerandChairofEuropeanandAsianLitigationatDebevoise&Plimpton.Heactsforavarietyofclients,alongsidehisroleaschairofthefirm’sEuropeanandAsianlitigationpractices,inarbitrationandlitigationin theUKandother countries.He is aQCandappears regularly in court aswell as inarbitration.HeconductsarbitrationsunderallthemajorinstitutionsincludingLCIA,ICCandSIACandinadhocarbitrationsandhasalsobeenappointedorconfirmedasanarbitratorbytheseinstitutions.Significantareasofworkincludepubliclawandpublicinternationallaw,includingjudicialreviewandhumanrightslaw,amongstmanyothers.

Lord Goldsmith served as Attorney General from 2001–2007, acting as chief legal adviser to thegovernmentonmattersofdomestic,Europeanandinternationallaw.HerepresentedthegovernmentinnumerouscasesinbothUKandinternationalcourts.LordGoldsmithpractisedfrom Fountain Court Chambers from 1972–2001, specialising principally in commercial,corporateandinternationallitigationandappellatework.HebecameQueen’sCounselin1987andhas judicialexperienceasaCrownCourtRecorderandaDeputyHighCourtJudge.

LordGoldsmithwasmadeaLifePeerin1999andPrivyCounsellorin2001.In1996,hefoundedtheBarofEnglandandWales’ProBonoUnit,ofwhichheisnowPresident.HeisaBencherofGray’sInn.In2013LordGoldsmithwasavisitingprofessorofEuropeanLegalStudiesatColumbiaUniversity,NewYork.

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Dr Jarrod Hepburn

DrJarrodHepburnisaMcKenziePostdoctoralResearchFellowatMelbourneLawSchool.His research interests lie largely in international economic law, international human rights lawandpubliclaw.Hismonograph,examiningtheroleofdomesticlawininvestmenttreatyarbitration,willbepublishedbyOxfordUniversityPressin2016.

Dr Hepburn has previously been a Lecturer at the University of Exeter, specialising ininvestmenttreatyarbitration,contractlawandcompanylaw.HehasalsotaughtinarangeofareasoflawattheUniversityofMelbourneandStCatherine’sCollegeattheUniversityofOxfordandhasbeenavisitingresearcherattheMaxPlanckInstituteforComparativeandInternationalPrivateLawinHamburg.

Sir Jeffrey Jowell KCMG QC

ProfessorSirJeffreyJowellisabarristeratBlackstoneChambersandEmeritusProfessorofPublicLawatUniversityCollegeLondon,wherehewastwiceDeanoftheLawFacultyandaViceProvost.HewastheFounderDirectoroftheBinghamCentrefortheRuleofLawsinceits launchinDecember2010untilOctober2015.ThescopeofJeffrey’sworkincludesjudicialreview,humanrightsandplanning.Heisaleadingauthorityonpublic,constitutionalandadministrativelaw.

He has acted as constitutional advisor to a number of national governments in the Commonwealth,AsiaandintheMiddleEast, includingassistingwiththeconstitutionsandpublic lawofSouthAfrica,Jersey,Gibraltar, theCaymanIslandsand theMaldives.From2000–2011JeffreyservedastheUK’smemberontheCouncilofEurope’sCommissionforDemocracythroughLaw(TheVeniceCommission)whereheadvisedonruleoflawissuesinanumberofEuropeanStates.

Ben Juratowitch

Ben Juratowitch is the head of Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer’s public international lawpracticegloballyandapartnerintheinternationalarbitrationgroup.HeisbasedinParis.He represents clients before the ICJ and international arbitral tribunals, including in cases concerning sovereignty over territory, boundary delimitation, the law of the sea, the application of investment treaties,andabroad rangeof commercialdisputes.He teachesanannualcourseofseminarsoninternationaldisputesettlementattheUniversityofParisDescartesandhasbeenavisitingfellowintheFacultyofLawattheLondonSchoolofEconomics.

Aimee-Jane Lee

Aimee-JaneLeeisaninternationalcounselinDebevoise&Plimpton’sInternationalDisputeResolutionGroup.Herpracticefocusesoninternationalcommercialarbitrationandlitigation,andpublicinternationallaw.Sheadvisesprivateclientsandstatesacrossmultiplejurisdictions

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and a number of industries, including mining, construction, hospitality, advertising and, especially,energy.Herareasofexpertiseincludetheinternationalprotectionofinvestments,maritime boundary issues, treaty drafting and interpretation, the interaction between public internationallawanddomesticlaw,internationalsanctionsandhumanrights.

Following a six-month secondment to the legal department of Liberty, the human rightsorganisation,shehascontinuedtowork,probono,onhumanrightsissues,notablyinrelationtoproceedingsbeforetheEuropeanCourtofHumanRightsandsubmissionstotheUnitedNations.

Professor Robert McCorquodale

ProfessorRobertMcCorquodalehasbeen theDirectorofBIICL since January2008.HeisCo-GeneralEditorofBIICL’smajorpublication: the International and Comparative Law Quarterly.HeisalsoProfessorof InternationalLawandHumanRightsat theUniversityofNottinghamandabarristeratBrickCourtChambers,London,wherehepracticesinpublicinternationallaw.

ProfessorMcCorquodale’sresearchisalsoprimarilyinpublicinternationallaw.Thisincludesmatters of international human rights law, the role of non-state actors, the right of self-determination,andonbusinessandhumanrightsissues.Hehaspublishedwidelyontheseareas, including his Cases and Materials on International Law (5th ed,OUP2011)withMartinDixonandSarahWilliams),andhasassistedgovernments,corporations,internationalorganisations, non-governmental organisations and peoples concerning international lawandhumanrightsissues.PreviouslyhewasaFellowandLecturerinLawatSt.John’sCollege,University of Cambridge and at the Australian National University in Canberra. Beforeembarkingonanacademiccareer,heworkedasa solicitor incommercial litigationwithKing&WoodMallesonsinSydneyandHerbertSmithFreehillsinLondon.

Alistair McGlone

Alistair McGlone is an international environmental law consultant and a director of Alistair McGlone and Associates Limited, a consultancy that focuses on environmental law, training andjournalism.AlistairisalsoamemberoftheAarhusConventionComplianceCommittee,whichadministerstheConvention’suniqueComplianceMechanism.Previously,AlistairwasHeadofInternationalEnvironmentalLawattheDepartmentofEnvironment,FoodandRuralAffairs.Inthisrole,hewasoneoftheleadEUnegotiatorsontheRioDeclaration.HealsoledtheEUduringthenegotiationsthatledtotheadoptionoftheKyotoProtocolproceduresandmechanismsrelatingtocomplianceandchairedthegroupthatpreparedthetextfoundingtheBaselcompliancecommittee.

Professor Dawn Oliver

DawnOliverisEmeritusProfessorofConstitutionalLawatUniversityCollegeLondon.HerresearchinterestsareinthefieldsofUKandcomparativepubliclaw,andinparticularinUK

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constitutionalreformandlawandpolitics.ShewasChairoftheUKConstitutionalLawGroup2005–2010,andamemberoftheExecutiveCommitteeoftheInternationalAssociationofConstitutionalLaw2007-2010.ShehasbeenamemberoftheStudyofParliamentGroupsince1991,andwasitsPresidentfrom2010–2013.ShewaselectedaFellowoftheBritishAcademy in2005. In2011shewasTreasurerof theHonourableSocietyof theMiddleTemple, thefirstwomanandfirstcareeracademic tohaveheld thatpost.ShewasmadeQueen’sCounsel,honoriscausa,in2013.

Professor Thomas Poole

ThomasPooleisProfessorofLawattheLondonSchoolofEconomics.Hisresearchinterestsareinpubliclaw,constitutionaltheoryandcomparativepubliclaw.Hisrecentpublicationsinclude his monograph Reason of State: Law, Prerogative and Empire(CUP2015)andhisco-editedbookLaw, liberty and state: Oakeshott, Hayek and Schmitt on the Rule of Law (CUP2015).Heteachespubliclaw,administrativelaw,civillibertiesandhumanrights,andlawandpoliticalthought.

Thomas Poole studied at University College London, Oxford University andManchesterUniversity.BeforecomingtotheLSEin2006,hetaughtatNottinghamUniversity.HehasheldvisitingpositionsattheUniversityofNewSouthWales(2003–2004and2005–2006),theEuropeanUniversityInstitute(2007),MelbourneUniversity(2008),theUniversityofToronto(2008),PrincetonUniversity(2008)andUniversitéParisIIPanthéon-Assas(2013–2014).

Sir Bernard Rix

EducatedatNewCollegeOxford(ofwhichheisanHonoraryFellow)andHarvardLawSchool, Sir Bernard was called to the Bar by the Inner Temple in 1970 (Bencher 1990, Treasurer2005)andbecameQueen’sCounsel in1981.Asabarrister,hespecialised ininternationalcommercial lawandarbitraldisputes.From1993–2000,hewasajudgeoftheHighCourtofJustice(Queen’sBenchDivision)andfrom2000–2013,heservedasLordJusticeofAppeal in theCourtofAppeal. In theCourtofAppeal,hegaveawide rangeofjudgmentsincommerciallaw,banking,insurance,shipping,energydisputesandprivateandpublic international law.TheyincludeR (Al-Skeini) v Secretary of State for Defence [2007]QBandYukos v. Rosneft (No 2)[2013]1AllER(Comm)327.Henowpractisesasanarbitratorandaccreditedmediatorat20EssexStreet.HesitsontheCourtofAppealof the Cayman Islands, the Singapore International Commercial Court and is a Professor of InternationalCommercialLawatQueenMary,UniversityofLondon.HeisamemberoftheAdvisory Council and former trustee of BIICL, member and former chairman of the Advisory CounciloftheCentreforCommercialLawStudiesatQMUL,haslongbeenassociatedwiththeLPO,andischairmanofCoexistHouse.

Professor Dan Sarooshi

DanSarooshiisProfessorofPublicInternationalLawattheUniversityofOxford,whereheis alsoSenior Research FellowofQueen’sCollegeand co-General Editorof theOxford

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MonographsinInternationalLawSeries.Hisbookshavebeenawardedthe 2001 American SocietyofInternationalLaw(“ASIL”)CertificateofMerit,the2006ASILCertificateofMerit,the2006MyresMcDougalPrizebytheAmerican Society for the Policy Sciences, and the 1999GuggenheimPrize.Heisco-editingwithHEJudge Christopher Greenwood the new 10th edition of Oppenheim’s International Law (tobepublishedbyOUP).

ProfessorSarooshiisalsoabarristeratEssexCourtChambers.Hehasbeeninstructedby9governments(includingtheUKandUSA),12internationalorganisations,andanumberofcorporationsinimportantcasesbeforetheUKSupremeCourt,EnglishCourtofAppeal,EnglishHighCourt,InternationalCourtofJustice,EuropeanCourtofHumanRights,HongKongCourtof FinalAppeal,SupremeCourtof theBahamas,WorldTradeOrganizationand the UN Special Tribunal for Lebanon; and in international arbitration proceedingsconductedpursuanttoICSID(includingbyoperationoftheECT),ICSIDAF,ICC,UNCITRAL,IUSCTandLCIARules.HehasbeenappointedasamemberoftheUKAttorneyGeneral’sPublicInternationalLawA-PanelofCounseltorepresenttheUKin“the most complex public international law cases in various courts”.

Professor Cheryl Saunders

Cheryl Saunders is Laureate Professor Emeritus at the University of Melbourne and thefounding director of itsCentre forComparativeConstitutional Studies. She is a PresidentEmeritusof the InternationalAssociationofConstitutional Lawandaneditorof thePublic Law Review.Shehasspecialist interests inconstitutional lawandcomparativepublic law,including federalism and intergovernmental relations and constitutional design and change, inallofwhichshehaspublishedextensively.

CherylhasheldvisitingpositionsatuniversitiesaroundtheworldincludingOxford,Cambridge,Paris II, Georgetown, Indiana (Bloomington), Hong Kong, Copenhagen, Fribourg, CapeTownandAuckland.SheisalsoaformerPresidentoftheAdministrativeReviewCouncilofAustralia.SheisanofficeroftheOrderofAustraliaandaChevalierdansl’OrdreNationaldelaLegiond’HonneurofFrance.

Professor Gerry Simpson

GerrySimpsonwasappointedtoaChairinPublicInternationalLawatLSEinJanuary2016.His current research projects include an ARC-funded project on ColdWar InternationalLaw(withMattCraven,SOASandSundhyaPahuja,Melbourne)andacounter-historyofInternationalCriminalJustice.Heisalsocurrentlywritingabouttheliterarylifeofinternationallaw.HeisaneditorofThe London Review of International Law.

HepreviouslytaughtattheUniversityofMelbourne,wherehewastheDirectoroftheAsia-PacificCentreforMilitaryLawfrom2010–2014,theAustralianNationalUniversityandtheLSE.HeistheauthorofGreat Powers and Outlaw States (Cambridge 2004) and Law, War and Crime: War Crimes Trials and the Reinvention of International Law(Polity2007),andco-editor (with Kevin Jon Heller) of Hidden Histories(Oxford2014) and (with Raimond Gaita) of Who’s Afraid of International Law?(Monash2016(forthcoming)).

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Dr Antonios Tzanakopoulos

AntoniosisAssociateProfessorofPublicInternationalLawattheFacultyofLawandFellowin LawatStAnne’sCollege,Oxford.Antonios isageneral international lawyerandhaspublished in a number of areas reflecting his varied research interests, including the Security Council, international dispute settlement, the law of treaties, the law of the sea, international investmentlaw,andothers.HeregularlyprovidesadvicetoStates,internationalorganisationsandprivateentitiesonmattersofpublicinternationallaw.Hehasactedascounsel,advisor,orassistant,andhasprovidedexpertopinions, inanumberofcasesbefore internationalanddomesticcourtsandtribunals,includingtheInternationalCourtofJustice,EUcourts,theEuropeanCourtofHumanRights,adhocandICSIDarbitraltribunals,andtheHighCourtofEnglandandWales.Hehasalsoprovidedtrainingoninternationallawtodomesticjudges,aswellasdiplomats,militaryofficers,andothergovernmentofficials.

Dr Jason Varuhas

DrJasonVaruhasisAssociateProfessorattheMelbourneLawSchoolandamemberoftheCentreforComparativeConstitutionalStudies.HeisalsoAssociateFellowoftheCentreforPublicLaw,UniversityofCambridge,andBye-FellowofChrist’sCollege,Cambridge.Jason’sresearchand teaching interestscross thepublic law-private lawdivide;his specialisms lieinadministrative law, the lawof torts,andthe lawofremedies.Hiscurrentresearchworkincludesmajorprojectson“mapping”publiclawandthe”socialisation”ofprivatelaw.Hehas severalbooks inpress includinghis sole-authoredwork,Damages and Human Rights (HartPublishing2016)Heisafounderandco-convenorofthebiennialseriesofPublicLawConferences.He has previously held academic positions at theUniversity ofNewSouthWalesandtheUniversityofCambridge,aswellasavisitingpositionatYaleUniversity.

Douglas Wilson

DouglasWilsonistheLegalDirectoroftheForeignandCommonwealthOffice,arolehehasheldsinceAugust2014.HewaspreviouslyHeadofInternationalandEuropeanLawattheAttorneyGeneral’sOffice.Beforethat,DouglasspentnearlyfouryearsattheUKMissiontotheUNinNewYork,asFirstSecretary(Legal)andthenastheDeputyHeadofthePoliticalSection.DouglaswasalsopostedtotheBritishEmbassyinBaghdadasLegalAdviserandHead of the Human Rights and Justice Section, and has served in various home postings asanAssistantLegalAdviserintheForeignandCommonwealthOffice.HequalifiedasabarristerinLondon,havingstudiedlawattheUniversitiesofGlasgowandCambridge,andCopenhagenBusinessSchool.

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Annex 2

Conference Programme

THURSDAY 30 JUNE

10.30 – 11.00 Registration and tea/coffee

11.00 – 11.30 Keynote Address Lord Peter Goldsmith QC PC, Debevoise&PlimptonandformerUKAttorneyGeneralChair:SirBernardRixQC(formerlyLordJusticeRix),20EssexStChambers.

11.30 – 13.00 Panel 1The relationship between Public International law and Public Law – why is it important in practice and in theory?

This panelwill examine the importanceof the relationship from theperspectiveof publicinternational law and from the perspective of public law, to set the scene for the whole conference.Speakerswillofferanoverviewofwaysinwhichtheirareaoflawhaschangedunderconditionsofglobalisationtointrudeintotheother:forexample,toextendtonon-Stateactors,inthecaseofpublicinternationallaw,andtoinvolveincreasinglevelsofextraterritorialaction,inthecaseofpubliclaw.Theywillexplorewhetherthesedevelopmentsarelinearorinvolve a degree of ebb and flow, and the issues they raise for scholars and practitioners in bothfields.

Speakers:Sir Frank Berman, KCMG QC, BIICL: “International and Public Law: Perspectives fromGovernment and Private Legal Practice”Professor Cheryl Saunders,Melbourne Law School: “Public law and Public InternationalLaw: a Public Law Perspective on Interdependence”Professor Gerry Simpson, London School of Economics and Melbourne Law School:“InternationalLawasPublicLaw”Chair:SirBernardRixQC(formerlyLordJusticeRix),20EssexStChambers

13.00 – 14.00 Lunch (provided for all participants)

14.00 – 15.30 Panel 2Impacts of public international law on public law

Thispanelwillexaminesomeof theprincipalways inwhichpublic international lawandpractice intrude into domestic public law, placing pressures on the way in which international affairsareconducted.Itwillrangefromtheimpactofinternationallawindomesticpubliclawwithparticular,butnotexclusive,referenceto internationalhumanrights law,andtheevolving scopeof non-justiciability doctrines, as an aspect of the response of public lawsystemstointernationalisationandglobalisation.

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Speakers:DrVeronicaFikfak,HomertonCollege,CambridgeUniversity:“Englishcourts’‘internalisation’oftheEuropeanConventiononHumanRights?–Betweentheoryandpractice”ProfessorMichaelCrommelin,MelbourneLawSchool:“ThePacific‘Solution’totheRefugeeCrisis: A Case Study”ProfessorDapoAkande,OxfordUniversity:”Non-justiciabilityandtheForeignActofStateDoctrine”Chair:ProfessorRobertMcCorquodale,BIICL

15.30 – 16.00 Tea break

16.00 – 17.30 Panel 3Public law influences on public international law

This panelwill examine the rationale for the extension of domestic public law principlesintotheinternationalsphereandthescopeforandlimitsofthisdevelopment.Theprinciplesin question include (but are not limited to) democratic legitimacy; legal and politicalaccountability;subsidiarity;theseparationofpowersandtheruleoflaw.Itwilldiscusstheirapplicationto“globaladministrativelaw”,andtheinternationalisationoftherighttogoodadministration.

Speakers:Sir Jeffrey Jowell QC, Blackstone Chambers: ”The Internationalisation of the Right toAdministrative Justice”Aimee-JaneLee,Debevoise&Plimpton:“TheRoleofPublicLawNotionsofProportionalityinInvestmentArbitrationandinContemporaryTreatyPractice’BenJuratowitch,FreshfieldsBruckhausDeringer:“IndividualRightsinDisputesBetween States”Chair:ProfessorDanSarooshi,OxfordUniversityandEssexCourtChambers

17.30 – 18.30 Reception for all conference participants

19.00 Speakers’ Dinner (at nearby restaurant) After dinner speech by Lord Mance, Justice of the Supreme Court

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FRIDAY 1 JULY

9.00 – 9.30 Registrations (for new arrivals) and tea/coffee

9.30 – 11.00 Panel 4Concepts of “public” in “public” international and “public” law

Thispanelwillexploretheconceptofthe“public”aspectofeachofthetwobranchesoflaw:their commonality (if any); differences among domestic public law traditions; the interface between the public and the private in each; the impacts on both areas of law of privatisation; and other shifts in train, such as the increasing ability of corporations and individuals to communicateandtransactdirectlythroughelectronicmeans,withoutthemediationofStates.The case of the horizontal application of human rights will also be considered to drawadditionalinsightsfromboth.

Speakers:ProfessorDrArmin vonBogdandy,MaxPlanck Institute forComparativePublic LawandInternational Law, Heidelberg; and University of Frankfurt: ”From Public Internationalto International Public Law. Translating World Public Opinion into International PublicAuthority”ProfessorDavidFeldmanQC,CambridgeUniversity:“TheVaryingMeaningof‘public’inPublic Law and Public International Law”DrJasonVaruhas,MelbourneLawSchool:“AgainstthePublic-PrivateLawDivide:Pluralismand Public Law”Chair: Jill Barrett, BIICL

11.00 – 11.30 Coffee break

11.30 – 13.00 Panel 5

Complications of pluralism

Thispanelwillexaminethevariouswaysinwhichdomesticpubliclawandpublicinternationallawcome intoconflictandare in tensionwitheachother. Itwill lookatcaseswhere theinfluenceor impact isa two-ormulti-waystreet.Examples include theuseof internationalinvestor-Statedisputesettlementprocedureswheretherearealsoimplicationsarisingoutofthe same disputes in domestic public law; the (typical) dependence of international law on State implementation; and the (atypical) dependence of international law on implementation bytheEU.ThewayinternationallawpenetratesthedomesticpubliclawoftheEU,andviaEUlawintothepublic lawofMemberStates,willbediscussedinthecontextof theUK’spreparationsforBrexit.

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Speakers:AlistairMcGlone, internationalenvironmental lawconsultant, formerDefra lawyer:“CaseStudy onCompliance by EU Institutionswith InternationalObligationsArisingUnder theAarhus Convention”JansenCalamita,BIICL:“The Disconnect Between the Approach to Remedies in Investment TreatyLawandtheApproachtoRemediesUnderSystemsofPublicLaw”DrJarrodHepburn,MelbourneLawSchool:“ParallelExpropriationNormsinInternationalLaw and Australian Law”Chair:ProfessorDawnOliver,UniversityCollegeLondon

13.00 – 14.00 Lunch (provided for all participants)

14.00 – 15.30 Panel 6

Future directions

Thisfinalsessionwilldrawconclusions fromtheearlierproceedings,highlightkey insightsandexaminepossiblefuturedirectionsintermsof:(a)thelikelytrajectoriesoftheinterfacebetween domestic and international law; (b) ways of ameliorating difficulties; and (c)suggestionsforamoreeffectiveworkingrelationshipbetweendomesticpubliclawyersandpublicinternationallawyers.TheChairwillfacilitateaninteractiveconversationbetweenthepanelmembersandallparticipants.

Speakers:TimEickeQC,EssexCourtChambers:“TheFuturePotentialforHumanRightsandPublicLawIssuestoFeatureinInvestmentTreatyNegotiationsandArbitrations”DouglasWilson,Foreign&CommonwealthOffice:“IssuesontheHorizon:InternationalLawPositionsasanActofForeignPolicy?”ProfessorThomasPoole,LondonSchoolofEconomics:”FutureNarrativesonStateSovereignty:WhereareweHeading?”Dr Antonios Tzanakopoulos, Oxford University: “What Can we Take Away From TheseDialogues?”Chair:RtHonSirStanleyBurntonQC,OneEssexCourtChambers

15.30 – 15.45 Chair’s concluding remarks by Rt Hon Sir Stanley Burnton QC

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British Institute of International and Comparative Law (BIICL)Asaleadingindependentlegalresearchorganisationwithcharitablestatus,unaffiliatedtoanyuniversity,BIICListheonlybodyofitskindintheUKandoneofveryfewintheworld.TheInstituteisfocusedonappliedlegalresearchandservesasaninvaluablefocalpointforthestudyofinternationalandcomparativelaw.Establishedover50yearsago,ithasitsheadquartersincentralLondon.BIICLworkscloselywiththeAmericanSocietyofInternationalLaw(ASIL).

Melbourne Law School (MLS)Since2012BIICLhasbeenwelcomingVisitingResearchFellowsandpost-graduatelawstudentsfromMelbourneLawSchooltoparticipateinBIICL’sArthurWattsFellowship’sprogrammeofpublicinternationallawresearchandeventsonsubjectsrangingfromtheAntarcticTreatySystemtotheParisConventiononIndustrialProperty.BIICL extends its gratitude toAllanMyersAOwho has helpedmake this programmepossible through hisgenerousfundingandongoingsupport,andProfessorCarolynEvans,DeanofMelbourneLawSchoolforheractivesupportwhichhasalsohelpedmakethispartnershipsuchagreatsuccess.

Sponsorship

Conference generously co-sponsored by

Speaker Dinner and conference lunches sponsored by