Dewey's Early Aesthetics

Experience and Nature.

Dewey begins to develop both an aesthetic theory and a theory of art in his 1925 Paul Carus lectures, Experience and Nature (Dewey 1925a). However this needs to be teased out through close reading and is not evident in chapter titles or even in the index. Early in the book, he emphasizes the importance of direct enjoyment of song, dance and story-telling in human experience, noting how even philosophers who stress pleasure, such as utilitarians, have failed to address this domain (p. 78). He observes that early humans were more interested in direct satisfaction than in prudence. Thus bodies were decorated first, and clothed later. Similarly, early men made a game of fishing and hunting. In general, useful labor was transformed by ceremony into enjoyable art. Although the activities of play and ritual were intended to have practical effect, their aesthetic impact was even more important.

Dewey uses these historical claims to support a broadening of the field of aesthetics today. Although some would see popular fiction and other sources of mass entertainment as a travesty of art, these, as well as even more elementary things, such as jokes, beating drums, and blowing whistles, have the same quality of immediate finality as things generally called aesthetic.

A nascent aesthetic theory can be found in Dewey's fifth chapter, “Nature, Communication and Meaning.” Here he presents an aestheticized theory of language and of essences. The heart of language is not expression of something that comes before. Rather, it is participation in communication. Thus meaning is not private. In the process of cooperative action through language the thing referred to gains both meaning and heightened potential. Whereas animism refers this to the immediate relation of thing and person, poetry gives it a legitimate form. The potential of a thing is its essence, and to perceive a thing is to acknowledge that potential. Essence, or pronounced meaning, is the object of aesthetic intuition. Here, feeling and understanding are one (Dewey 1925a, p. 183). The essence of a thing is identified with the “consummatory consequences” and emerges from the various meanings attributed to it.

In communication, then, things reveal themselves to men. Within human experience all natural events are adapted to meet the needs of conversation. The arts are forms of communication. Communication is enjoyed for its own sake in dance, song and drama, where it is both instrumental and final. Art is critical of life because it fixes standards of enjoyment, and thus determines what should be desired. Moreover, the level of the arts in a community determines its direction.

Dewey has the most to say about aesthetics in Chapter Nine, “Experience, Nature and Art.” The structure of the argument is unfortunately, vague when compared to his later masterpiece, Art as Experience (1934). He begins with the Greeks who saw experience as exemplified in technical skill, and hence as equivalent to art, but who unfortunately downgraded experience when compared to reason. For them, everything in experience, and in art, was contingent. Modern thought sees art as simply an addition to nature, although it eulogizes art—especially fine art. Like the Greeks, it denigrates the practical, but it does so because it considers it subjectively distorted.

Dewey has two main points in this chapter: that science is an art, and that art is a “practice.” The only distinction between modes of practice should be between those that are intelligent and give immediate enjoyment through charged meaning, including fine art, and those that do not (Dewey

1925a, p. 358). If this distinction was maintained art would then be seen as the culmination of natural processes, and “science” (improperly so called) as merely a helpful means for achieving this end. The various dualisms of nature and experience, art and science, and so forth, would disappear.

Dewey believed that art unifies the necessary and the free aspects of nature, and thus that artistic acts are both inevitable and spontaneous. Unexpected combination is required for art: order and proportion are not the whole story. The more extensive the uniformities of nature in art, the greater the art, as long as they are fused with our wonder for the new.

Dewey reiterates that there is no real distinction between useful and fine art. The merely useful is not really art, but routine. Also, those arts that are only final are mere amusements. There are of course activities, including much of what we call labor, that have no immediate enjoyable meaning. We call such activities useful, but they are really detrimental to human well-being. Humans have a great need to appreciate the meaning in things and this is hindered by labor as it is structured in our society.

Dewey thinks that what is generally called fine art includes self-indulgent self-expression without regard to communication, experimentation in new techniques that produce bizarre products, and production of commodities for the wealthy. True fine art produces an object that gives us continuously renewed delight. A genuine aesthetic object is not only something that gives consummatory experience but also helps to produce further satisfaction. Any activity that does this, even if not found within the traditional list of arts, is fine art.

Fine art is not just an end in itself: it improves apprehension, enlarges vision, refines discrimination, and creates standards. Both the artistic and the aesthetic involve perception in which the instrumental and the consummatory intersect. Art gives us the object replete with meaning. Aesthetic experience, unlike sensual gratification, is informed with meaning. Artistic sense involves grasping potentialities. And artists are gifted persons who integrate focused and defined perception with skill in a progressive way.

For Dewey, both useful and fine arts involve interpenetration of means and ends. Things are only called “useful” because they are thought to belong to menial arts, or are related to common people. Things called “fine” are often decorative or ostentatious. One might think that things are merely useful when perception of meaning is incidental. However, this may not be helpful, for in art perception is always used for something beyond itself. Moreover, such useful things as pots may be intrinsically enjoyable. The basic distinction is between good and bad art: good art requires interpenetration of fulfillment and usefulness, and bad art fails in this.

Dewey holds that thinking itself is an art. Propositions that express knowledge are as much works of art as statues and symphonies. Conclusions are matters of condensed meaning, while premises result from analysis of conclusions into their grounds. Scientific method is the art of constructing true perceptions. Science is not seen as art in our society because it is artificially protected, is limited to a particular class of persons, and is seen as brutal and mechanical. This is coupled with the view that criticism a pedantic expression of merely personal taste. Dewey believes that this dichotomy needs to be overcome, and that to do this we need discriminating judgment.

Dewey rejects the theory that art is a mere medium for emotion. This does not mean he believes that emotion is irrelevant to art. Emotion is evoked by objects, and is a response to an objective situation. The origin of artistic creation is in emotional response to a situation. Contrary to Clive Bell (1914), he holds that significant form can only refer to forms that give significance to everyday subject-matters. Art does not create these forms. The forms that give us pleasure do so because of their structure. Dewey was not anti-formalist, however. Although formalist art-works

can be sterile or pedantic, they may also enlarge and enrich our world by way of training our perception.

The following and final chapter, “Existence, Value and Criticism,” develops Dewey's theory of criticism. There, he argues against putting values in a separate realm from nature, and against understanding nature in simply mechanistic terms. Instead, he advises a return to Greek concepts of potentiality and actuality, although without the Greek tendency to see natural ends as perfections. He thinks it important to develop a theory of criticism that would allow us to discriminate amongst goods. This theory would not be limited to the arts. Criticism is also found in morals and in religious belief. Philosophy, he argues, is a form of criticism too: it is criticism of criticism. Indeed, as soon as one begins to talk about values, and to define them, one is doing criticism. Criticism requires inquiry into the conditions and consequences of the object valued. It is needed to enhance perception and to allow for appreciation of the same thing over time. It accomplishes this by uncovering new meanings.

Dewey insisted that criticism is not just a matter of formal writings. It happens every day in every aspect of our experience. Formal criticism simply develops the element of criticism found in appreciation. Philosophy shows that there is no difference in principle between scientific, moral and aesthetic appreciation. Each involves a transition from natural goods to goods reflectively validated.

Dewey rejects the idea that values, including aesthetic values, are merely personal affairs. There is no consensus in aesthetic theories because aesthetic phenomena have been segregated from other aspects of life. Standards may be used to judge immediate goods, but standards are just likings on the part of specific creatures, and it is meaningless to ask which of them is stronger. Common sense tells us that there are immediate goods and that there are principles by which they may be judged. It does not accept a rigid separation of knowledge and aesthetic appreciation. But it fails to see that system is needed for adequate judgments. Aesthetic criticism allows us to choose knowingly, for it reveals conditions and consequences, and it allows our likings to be expressed in an informed way.

Dewey has two main points in this chapter: that science is an art, and that art is a “practice.” The only distinction between modes of practice should be between those that are intelligent and give immediate enjoyment through charged meaning, including fine art, and those that do not (Dewey 1925a, p. 358). If this distinction was maintained art would then be seen as the culmination of natural processes, and “science” (improperly so called) as merely a helpful means for achieving this end. The various dualisms of nature and experience, art and science, and so forth, would disappear.

Dewey believed that art unifies the necessary and the free aspects of nature, and thus that artistic acts are both inevitable and spontaneous. Unexpected combination is required for art: order and proportion are not the whole story. The more extensive the uniformities of nature in art, the greater the art, as long as they are fused with our wonder for the new.

Dewey reiterates that there is no real distinction between useful and fine art. The merely useful is not really art, but routine. Also, those arts that are only final are mere amusements. There are of course activities, including much of what we call labor, that have no immediate enjoyable meaning. We call such activities useful, but they are really detrimental to human well-being. Humans have a great need to appreciate the meaning in things and this is hindered by labor as it is structured in our society.

Dewey thinks that what is generally called fine art includes self-indulgent self-expression without regard to communication, experimentation in new techniques that produce bizarre products, and production of commodities for the wealthy. True fine art produces an object that

gives us continuously renewed delight. A genuine aesthetic object is not only something that gives consummatory experience but also helps to produce further satisfaction. Any activity that does this, even if not found within the traditional list of arts, is fine art.

Fine art is not just an end in itself: it improves apprehension, enlarges vision, refines discrimination, and creates standards. Both the artistic and the aesthetic involve perception in which the instrumental and the consummatory intersect. Art gives us the object replete with meaning. Aesthetic experience, unlike sensual gratification, is informed with meaning. Artistic sense involves grasping potentialities. And artists are gifted persons who integrate focused and defined perception with skill in a progressive way.

For Dewey, both useful and fine arts involve interpenetration of means and ends. Things are only called “useful” because they are thought to belong to menial arts, or are related to common people. Things called “fine” are often decorative or ostentatious. One might think that things are merely useful when perception of meaning is incidental. However, this may not be helpful, for in art perception is always used for something beyond itself. Moreover, such useful things as pots may be intrinsically enjoyable. The basic distinction is between good and bad art: good art requires interpenetration of fulfillment and usefulness, and bad art fails in this.

Dewey holds that thinking itself is an art. Propositions that express knowledge are as much works of art as statues and symphonies. Conclusions are matters of condensed meaning, while premises result from analysis of conclusions into their grounds. Scientific method is the art of constructing true perceptions. Science is not seen as art in our society because it is artificially protected, is limited to a particular class of persons, and is seen as brutal and mechanical. This is coupled with the view that criticism a pedantic expression of merely personal taste. Dewey believes that this dichotomy needs to be overcome, and that to do this we need discriminating judgment.

Dewey rejects the theory that art is a mere medium for emotion. This does not mean he believes that emotion is irrelevant to art. Emotion is evoked by objects, and is a response to an objective situation. The origin of artistic creation is in emotional response to a situation. Contrary to Clive Bell (1914), he holds that significant form can only refer to forms that give significance to everyday subject-matters. Art does not create these forms. The forms that give us pleasure do so because of their structure. Dewey was not anti-formalist, however. Although formalist art-works can be sterile or pedantic, they may also enlarge and enrich our world by way of training our perception.

The following and final chapter, “Existence, Value and Criticism,” develops Dewey's theory of criticism. There, he argues against putting values in a separate realm from nature, and against understanding nature in simply mechanistic terms. Instead, he advises a return to Greek concepts of potentiality and actuality, although without the Greek tendency to see natural ends as perfections. He thinks it important to develop a theory of criticism that would allow us to discriminate amongst goods. This theory would not be limited to the arts. Criticism is also found in morals and in religious belief. Philosophy, he argues, is a form of criticism too: it is criticism of criticism. Indeed, as soon as one begins to talk about values, and to define them, one is doing criticism. Criticism requires inquiry into the conditions and consequences of the object valued. It is needed to enhance perception and to allow for appreciation of the same thing over time. It accomplishes this by uncovering new meanings.

Dewey insisted that criticism is not just a matter of formal writings. It happens every day in every aspect of our experience. Formal criticism simply develops the element of criticism found in appreciation. Philosophy shows that there is no difference in principle between scientific, moral and aesthetic appreciation. Each involves a transition from natural goods to goods reflectively validated.

Dewey rejects the idea that values, including aesthetic values, are merely personal affairs. There is no consensus in aesthetic theories because aesthetic phenomena have been segregated from other aspects of life. Standards may be used to judge immediate goods, but standards are just likings on the part of specific creatures, and it is meaningless to ask which of them is stronger. Common sense tells us that there are immediate goods and that there are principles by which they may be judged. It does not accept a rigid separation of knowledge and aesthetic appreciation. But it fails to see that system is needed for adequate judgments. Aesthetic criticism allows us to choose knowingly, for it reveals conditions and consequences, and it allows our likings to be expressed in an informed way.