FRONTLINESEPTEMBER 24, 2010 INDIA’S NATIONAL MAGAZINE RS.20WWW.FRONTLINE.IN

Poisoned groundHindustan Unilever has left Kodaikanal tainted with

mercury from its thermometer factory. Now it isavoiding its responsibilities to its workers and the

environment, aided by lax regulators.

CULTURE SATTRIYA

Dance of the monks 64CRICKET SPOT-FIXING

Out of line 128DEVELOPMENT ISSUES ORISSA

Vedanta stalled 22

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On the CoverThe building atop the Kodai Hill thathoused Hindustan Unilever’s thermome-ter factory.

PHOTOGRAPH: SARAH HIDDLESTON

COVER DESIGN: U. UDAYA SHANKAR

Published by N. RAM, Kasturi Buildings, 859 & 860, Anna Salai, Chennai-600 002 andPrinted by P. Ranga Reddy at Kala Jyothi Process Private Limited, Survey No. 185,Kondapur, Ranga Reddy District-500 133, Andhra Pradesh on behalf of Kasturi & Sons Ltd.,Chennai-600 002.

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DEVELOPMENT ISSUESVedanta stalled 22People’s victory 26

LEGISLATI0NNuclear Liability Bill: Safety last 28Bill and deal 30The Whistle-blower Bill: Restricted reach 32

JAMMU & KASHMIRFirst steps 34Licence to kill 38Key players 41

WORLD AFFAIRSIran’s nuclear status 46India & Japan: Old anxieties 49Nepal: Elusive horizon 51U.S.: White fright 54France: Expulsion of the Romas 57Zimbabwe: Diamonds politics 60

CULTURESattriya dance: A living tradition 64

SPOTLIGHTEmbroidery of Kutch 87The story of Shrujan 90

WILDLIFEA cry from the wild 98

THE STATESKarnataka: Congress resurgence 106Kerala: A lottery row 109

MATHEMATICSBeyond Ramanujan 114

INDIA & CHINAA visa row 119

COMMUNALISMUdaipur: Attack on Muslims 124

CRICKETPakistan: Out of line 128Game in disgrace 132

COLUMNC.P. Chandrasekhar: Patent concerns 43Bhaskar Ghose: Crisis of leadership 85Praful Bidwai: State on the hunt 95

Jayati Ghosh: Unwelcome surprise 101R.K. Raghavan: Cricket’s shame 104

BOOKS 76

LETTERS 122

UPDATEBus burning case: Death sentence upheld 113

COVER STORY Poisoned groundHindustan Unilever is avoiding its respon-sibilities to its workers exposed to mercuryin the thermometer factory it owned in Ko-daikanal. 4

DEVELOPMENT ISSUESThe Union Ministry ofEnvironment and Forestsreverses its approach andrefuses clearance to theVedanta mining project. 22

CULTUREThe neo-Vaishnavitemonasteries of the Majuliisland keep the Sattriyadance form of Assamalive. 64

CRICKETThree no-balls by Pakistanbowlers, and internationalcricket is shaken withcharges of spot-fixing, thenew form of match-fixing.128

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IT was when the men in moon suits arrived that itreally sank in. There they were, with breathing appa-ratus and impermeable all-in-ones, gingerly takingaway the material that had been sitting for five yearsin an open-air scrapyard in the middle of the busiestpart of town. Vegetables and meat had been soldaround it, children and devotees of the neighbouringmosque and church had walked daily just metresfrom what was being treated like a ticking bomb.

It was glass from the factory at the top of thetown’s forest-lined ridge, which produced nearly 10million thermometers1 a year for export to the Westwithout a puff of black smoke in the sky. And it wasbeing taken away using technical gadgets by a crackdecontamination team for special disposal by ex-perts in the United States of America. It was sodangerous that the soil beneath it was going too.

The glass was edged with a poison – mercury.Mercury that looked so harmless and clean and sil-very. Mercury that doctors used in instruments intheir clinics. Mercury that had laced the bodies ofhomebound factory workers.

The levels of mercury to whichworkers were exposed are clear fromthe extent of pollution found on thethermometer factory site andbeyond. Today over 360 kilos ofmercury remain spread over the site,Hindustan Unilever admits.

Hindustan Unilever is avoiding itsresponsibilities to its workers exposedto mercury in the thermometer factoryit owned in Kodaikanal. B Y S A R A H H I D D L E S T O N

Cover Story

THE ENTRANCE TO the Hindustan Unilever thermometerfactory in Kodaikanal, which was closed in 2001. (Top) Theunused factory building.

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Was that why the trees were with-ering near the factory site? Was thatwhy factory workers would get dizzyand ill often? Was that why 23 of themdied, most in their early 30s?

These questions and more were onthe lips of townspeople in Kodaikanal,a hill station retreat set almost 2,200metres high in the flourishing forests

of the Western Ghats of Tamil Nadu. Itwas 2003, and that year mercury-con-taminated waste weighing almost 300tonnes was extracted from the town. Itcould not be ignored.

At that moment, the public eye inTamil Nadu and beyond was focussedon the thermometer factory. The newswas reported2 of how in 2001 the Pala-

ni Hills Conservation Council andGreenpeace had caught the manage-ment selling mercury-contaminatedglass to a local scrap dealer and how,faced with the evidence, the Tamil Na-du Pollution Control Board had askedthe 18-year-old operation to close. Themoment passed with much left un-questioned and unanswered, and

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1. National Environmental Engineering Research Institute (February 2007): “Protocol for Remediation of Mercury Contaminated Site at HLL Thermometer Factory, Kodaikanal”.2. “Dump for a dump, from India to U.S.”, The Statesman, April 17, 2003; “HLL Mercury Waste to leave for NY on May 7”, Business Line, May 5, 2003; “Activists hail reverse dumping”,International Herald Tribune, May 9, 2003; “HUL in a spot over NGO report”, India Business Insight, June 12, 2003; “Thermometer plant acted responsibly, says Banga”, Business Line,June 14, 2003; “Mercury’s victims”, Frontline, August 16, 2003.

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much more cleaning to be done.Nine years after the factory was

closed, Frontline shows that the landlies polluted and the workers havegrounds to fear mercury poisoning.Frontline unravels how a global corpo-ration took advantage of lax laws in adeveloping country to run a second-hand plant full of ageing equipmentthat compromised on safety. We revealhow the company is denying its re-sponsibilities to employees and the en-vironment by relying on questionablescientific studies it commissioned orconducted itself and by withholdingemployees’ medical records. We detailwho was involved, who was ignored,and the abject failure of regulatory au-thorities in the State to do anything tobring the company to heel.

The company is Hindustan Uni-lever, the Indian subsidiary 52 per centof which is owned by the Anglo-Dutchgiant Unilever. Responding to Fron-

tline, it admits to polluting the factorygrounds but denies all otherallegations.

T A I N T E D L I V E SR. Vijaylakshmi3 said it happened afterthree months of work at the mercurythermometer factory when she wasjust 21. The giddiness, the stomachpain, blood in her uri-ne. But she needed theRs.135. So even thoughher husband’s friend, adoctor, asked her notto go back to work, shewent anyway.

“I was strong, liketwice your body. Now Iam like this. Sick, dis-eased, and consumingmedicines all the time.I had a tumour in myuterus…. I am just 38years of age. …I had a

miscarriage just two months ago… Iget periods twice every month…,” shesaid while fixing coffee in her tinyhouse just 200 metres from thefactory.

Vijaylakshmi worked for five yearsas a temporary worker. She is one ofmore than 550 men and women whoclaim that their work at Hindustan

Unilever’s Kodaikanalfactory caused irrepa-rable damage to theirhealth.4 They say thatsince the factoryopened, 23 of their col-leagues have diedyoung,5 and that theircauses of death revealcomplications result-ing from mercury ex-posure: lungproblems, heart prob-lems, and kidney fail-ure.6 Today most of the

3. Interview with R. Vijaylakshmi, former temporary worker at Kodaikanal Mercury Thermometer Factory, March 15, 2010, Kodaikanal.4. Affidavit of M.A. Mahindran, president, Ponds/HLL Ex-Mercury Employees Welfare Association, April 19, 2006, paragraph 33.5. Interviews with former employees, Kodaikanal Mercury Thermometer Factory, March 12-17, 2010, Kodaikanal.6. Details from PowerPoint presentation made during interview with Dr T. Rajgopal, vice president, medical and occupational health, Hindustan Unilever: “Kodai thermometer factory– occupational health surveillance,” March 23, 2010, Chennai.

ON THE FACTORY premises, decontamination experts in “moon suits” and breathing masks remove mercury-bearing waste before sending it to the United States for special disposal, in 2003.

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workers still in Kodaikanal report var-ying symptoms. These include head-ache, skin problems, eye problems,chest pain, dental problems, nosebleed, vomiting, blooded urine,breathing problems, impotency, irreg-ular menstruation, miscarriage, giddi-ness, tremors, and inability to gripeffectively.

“These symptoms are classic symp-toms of occupational mercury poison-ing,” Dr Linda Jones of MasseyUniversity commented over the tele-phone from New Zealand.7 Dr Jones isan expert in neurobehavioural assess-ment in mercury poisoning, tremor as-sessment, and critical healthpsychology. Her study of the effect ofmercury on dental nurses is one of justtwo 30-year studies in the world map-ping the effect of mercury as an occu-pational hazard. A quarter of thewomen Dr Jones has studied needed a

hysterectomy at an early age in a coun-try where a rate of 6 per cent is normal.Of the 43 women that the companysays worked at the factory, 21 complainof irregular periods, uterus or men-strual problems – almost half.8

“Mercury,” Dr Jones says, “is thethird most toxic element in the worldafter arsenic and lead.” What wouldhave put workers most at risk was va-pour from ordinary liquid mercury,which is what the factory used in itsthermometers. At room temperature,mercury gives off vapour the wholetime at low levels. But the more it isheated, the more vapour it gives off,she says. “Mercury vapour,” Dr Jonesexplains, “gets absorbed through themucous membrane [when youbreathe], gets into the blood stream,and goes straight into the brain.”

According to the United StatesAgency for Toxic Substances and Dis-

7. Telephone interview with Dr Linda M. Jones, Senior Lecturer, School of Psychology, Massey University, New Zealand,July 26, 2010.8. Affidavit of S. Raja Mohamed, general secretary, Ponds/HLL Ex-Mercury Employees Welfare Association, Objectionsto the [Experts’] Committee Report, June 30, 2008: “Chart on urine levels of women employees”: 47-53.

R. VIJAYLAKSHMI, WHO was a temporary worker in the factory, on a visit toa dentist. “I was strong, like twice your body. Now I am like this. Sick,diseased, and consuming medicines all the time. I had a tumour in myuterus…. I am just 38 years of age.”

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ease Registry’s Toxicological Profilefor Mercury, “mercury vapours… mayaffect many different areas of the brainand their associated functions.” Short-term exposure, it says, can damage thelining of the mouth and lungs, causingtightness of breath. Other effects in-clude kidney failure, nausea, vomiting,diarrhoea, high blood pressure, skinrashes, and eye irritation.9

In Hindustan Unilever’s study of255 employees, former employees, andsome contract workers shortly afterthe factory was closed in March 2001,company doctors found 78 workershad symptoms of nervous system dis-order, 29 had cardiovascular prob-lems, 16 gastrointestinal problems andseven genito-urinary problems. Fourof them had tremors and two had sei-zures. Some 87 people had dental car-ies and 24 had gum inflammation.10

But the company dismissed thesesymptoms as having nothing to dowith mercury exposure. It paid theworkers a small severance package ofthree months plus a bonus, which isrequired by law when a factory closesunder normal circumstances.11 Thiswas hardly normal closure.

Struggling to make ends meet withtheir health bills, the workers havebanded together to form the 559-strong Ex-Mercury Employees Wel-fare Association. Their president, S.A.Mahindran, filed a Public Interest Li-tigation suit in the Madras High Court.The association wants an economic re-habilitation scheme and a healthcaretreatment and monitoring pro-gramme at the company’s expense foreveryone who ever worked in the facto-ry. It also wants the companyprosecuted.12

Hindustan Unilever denies thatany of the health problems of the

BOTTLES (AT LEFT,a close-up view) thatcontained raw mercurydumped in theundergrowth outsidethe boundary wall at theback of the factorydisregardingprocedures laid downfor the disposal ofhazardous waste.

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9. United States Agency for Toxic Substances and DiseaseRegistry (March 1999): Toxicological Profile for Mercury:13 and 58.10. T. Rajgopal et al (April 2006): “Epidemiological sur-veillance of employees in a mercury thermometer plant”,Indian Journal of Occupational and EnvironmentalHealth, Volume 10.11. Interview with Dr T. Rajgopal, vice president, medicaland occupational health, Hindustan Unilever, March 23,2010, Chennai.12. Affidavit of M.A. Mahindran, president, Ponds/HLLEx-Mercury Employees Welfare Association, February19, 2006.

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workers or their families was the resultof mercury exposure in the factory.13

Four years after the case was filed andnine years after the factory was closed,the workers are still fighting for com-pensation. The last court hearing wasin June 2008.

P O I S O N E D G R O U N DThe levels of mercury to which workerswere exposed are clear from the extentof pollution found on the thermometerfactory site and beyond.

The factory is not any old plot ofland. It sits at the top of a ridge over-looking one of three of Kodaikanal’sShola forests, dense thickets andgrasslands that are now a reserve for-est protected by the Tamil Nadu ForestDepartment. “This is one of the 10most important biodiversity spots inthe world,” says Rajesh Mani fromGreenearth Trust.14 “The Pambar Sho-la has over 30 plant species endemic tothe forest.”

Nestled in the forest greenery, the85,000 square metre15 plot on St. Ma-

DECONTAMINATION WORKERS WITH minimum protective gear at thecontaminated factory site in March 2010.

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S.A. MAHINDRAN, president of theEx-Mercury Employees WelfareAssociation. "The soil is polluted, thewalls are polluted, but the peoplewho work there are not polluted -how?" he asks.

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13. Interview with Dr T. Rajgopal, vice president, med-ical and occupational health, Hindustan Unilever,March 23, 2010, Chennai.14. Interview with Rajesh Mani, Greenearth Trust,March 12, 2010, Kodaikanal.15. URS Dames and Moore (May 8, 2002): “Environ-mental Site Assessment and Risk Assessment for Mer-cury HLL Thermometer Factory Site, Kodaikanal, TamilNadu, India”: 2-1.

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ry’s Road looks innocuous. But over28,000 kilos16 of partially treated mer-cury sludge from the site was hauledout and sent back to the U.S. by theexpert decontamination team in 2003.Today over 360 kilos of mercury re-main spread over the site, HindustanUnilever admits.17 A 25 square metrearea south of the factory had eight kilosof mercury in the soil.18 These figuresare high for mercury, where pollutionlevels are measured by the milligram.

Studies in Sweden cited by theUnited Nations Environment Pro-gramme (UNEP) Global MercuryPartnership suggest that accumulatedmercury in organic forest soils reducesmicrobial activity, affecting the base ofthe food chain on land.19 “The Sholaforest is one of the most intricatethings,” observed Shekar Dattatri,documentary film-maker, at a meetingin Chennai in March this year.20 “Youneed the soil bacteria, the termites, thefungi to keep the forest alive. Our for-

ests have already shrunk. We can’tcompromise on what is left now.”

The factory management cannotaccount for 1.3 tonnes of mercury atall.21 Environmentalists and workersargue this is a gross underestimate. K.Gopalakrishnan, who worked in theaccounts section of the factory, wentthrough various reports on contam-ination levels submitted by HindustanUnilever’s consultants. He saw discre-pancies in the arithmetic, particularlyin the amounts of mercury each ther-mometer contained, so he reworkedthe calculations. He estimated thatover 17 tonnes of mercury haveescaped.22

What townspeople and environ-mentalists fear is that the factory’smercury will convert into an even moredangerous form, methylmercury. Thishappens when mercury is worked onby bacteria in the environment, andwhen taken up by plants or the fish inwater, moves into the food chain.

16. Letter from Assistant Commissioner, Central Excise, Dindigul (C.No.IV/16/28/2002), dated April 29, 2003, to M/sHindustan Lever Ltd: “Permission to export mercury-containing waste”. 17. Email from R. Ram, Corporate Communications, Hindustan Unilever, August 20, 2010.18. URS Dames and Moore (May 8, 2002): “Environmental Site Assessment and Risk Assessment for Mercury HLLThermometer Factory Site, Kodaikanal, Tamil Nadu, India”, Table 9: “Onsite Mercury Distribution and Details ofRemediation Areas”.19. United Nations Environment Programme (2002): Global Mercury Assessmenthttp://www.unep.org/hazardoussubstances/Mercury/MercuryPublications/ReportsPublications/GlobalMercuryAssessmentReportDecember2002/tabid/3617/language/en-US/Default.aspx20. Presentation at Alliance Francaise by Shekar Dattatri, documentary film-maker, March 17, 2010, Chennai.21. URS Dames and Moore (May 8, 2002): “Environmental Site Assessment and Risk Assessment for Mercury HLLThermometer Factory Site, Kodaikanal, Tamil Nadu, India”: 4-3.22. Details from PowerPoint presentation made during interview with K. Gopalakrishnan, former stores-in-charge,Kodaikanal Mercury Thermometer Factory: “Mercury Balance: Account of the lost mercury in Kodaikanal”, March 13,2010, Kodaikanal.

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Methylmercury poisoning made newsheadlines in the mid-1950s after pollu-tion from a mercury-chloride factoryentered the sea in Minamata in Japan.Hundreds of people were poisoned byeating contaminated fish caught in thearea. Some were paralysed, some wentmad, some died.

Parts of Kodaikanal’s thermome-ter factory have concentrations of over500 parts per million (ppm) of mercu-ry in the soil.23 According to the Japa-nese Public Health Association, ifconcentration levels exceed just 1 ppm,there is a risk of contaminating thewater.24 Only a few surface runoff wa-ter samples were taken from the site.But two of them, collected after a heavystorm, showed that rainfall was wash-ing mercury-contaminated soil intowater as silt.25

Dr Masaru Tanaka heads the UN-EP Global Mercury Partnership WasteManagement Area and advises the Ja-panese government on waste manage-ment. Responding from Japan toFrontline’s questions over email,26 hequoted the partnership’s 2002 assess-ment of the dangers of finding mercuryattached to suspended soil: “Mercuryhas a long retention time in soil and asa result, the mercury accumulated insoil may continue to be released tosurface waters and other media forlong periods of time, possibly hun-dreds of years.”

Only limited samples from outsidethe factory have been tested by Hin-dustan Unilever’s consultant. But thedata it collected are enough cause forconcern: samples from bark and moss,which pick up pollution in air, showed

concentrations per kilo of up to 68milligrams of mercury north of the fac-tory and up to 80 milligrams to thesouth.27 Dr Mark Chernaik, a scientistwith the U.S.-based EnvironmentalLaw Alliance, whose opinions havebeen relied upon by the SupremeCourts of India and Pakistan and theEuropean Court of Human Rights, re-viewed the test results at the request ofthe workers.28 He noted that surfacewater samples taken from the Kodailake and parts of the Pambar streamhad mercury readings 30 times higherthan what the U.S. EnvironmentalProtection Agency recommends forfresh water containing fish that hu-mans consume.

Worse, detectable levels of themore lethal methylmercury werefound in three local lakes by a group ofscientists from India’s Department ofAtomic Energy and Jawaharlal NehruTechnological University, Hydera-bad.29 Their findings, which were pub-lished in the journal EnvironmentalPollution in 2006, showed that half of

all mercury levels detected in fish wasmethylmercury. In Japan no detecta-ble levels of methylmercury are accept-able at all, Dr Tanaka confirmed.30

Responding to our questions, Hindus-tan Unilever points to its own consult-ant’s studies showing mercuryconcentrations in the stream and lakeare low overall.

Today Hindustan Unilever haspersuaded the Tamil Nadu PollutionControl Board (TNPCB) that its re-sponsibilities are limited to cleaningthe factory site and no further. It alsomaintains that it need only clean thoseareas where soil concentrations arehigher than 25 milligrams a kg, basedon the land being used for residentialhousing in the future.31 That is 25times the level acceptable in Britain,according to the U.K. EnvironmentAgency soil guideline values.32 And 2.5times the level acceptable in the Neth-erlands, according to its own consult-ant.33 This does not even address thequestion of what levels might be neces-sary to protect a rare forest.

Unilever’s environment policy,which is displayed on its website, ex-pressly states that it will “exercise thesame concern for the environmentwherever we operate”.34

Hindustan Unilever failed to ac-knowledge this policy in response toour questions and maintained it wasconducting soil cleaning as approvedby the TNPCB. It maintained that the“intervention” standards set in Britainand the Netherlands are different fromclean-up standards. It claimed that theDutch intervention value was raised in2006 to 36 milligrams a kg and point-

23. URS Dames and Moore (May 8, 2002): “Environmental Site Assessment and Risk Assessment for Mercury HLL Thermometer Factory Site, Kodaikanal, Tamil Nadu, India”, Table 9:“Onsite Mercury Distribution and Details of Remediation Areas”.24. Japan Public Health Association (October 2001): “Preventive Measures against Environmental Mercury Pollution and Its Health Effects”: 28.25. URS Dames and Moore (May 8, 2002): “Environmental Site Assessment and Risk Assessment for Mercury HLL Thermometer Factory Site, Kodaikanal, Tamil Nadu, India”: 5-4.26. Email from Dr Masaru Tanaka, Lead, United Nations Environment Programme Global Mercury Partnership Waste Management Area, and Chairperson, Waste Management andRecycling Experts’ Committee, Central Environment Council, Ministry of Environment, Government of Japan, August 16, 2010.27. URS Dames and Moore (May 8, 2002): “Environmental Site Assessment and Risk Assessment for Mercury HLL Thermometer Factory Site, Kodaikanal, Tamil Nadu, India”: Tables 7and 8.28. Memo from Dr Mark Chernaik, Environmental Law Alliance, “Critical assessment of documents purporting to support a site-specific target level of 25 mg/kg for the remediation ofmercury-contaminated soils at the HUL factory site in Kodaikanal”, March 5, 2010.29. D. Karunasagar et al (2006): “Studies of mercury pollution in a lake due to a thermometer factory situated in a tourist resort: Kodaikanal, India”, Environmental Pollution (143):153-158.30. Email from Dr Masaru Tanaka, Lead, United Nations Environment Programme Global Mercury Partnership Waste Management Area, and Chairperson, Waste Management andRecycling Experts’ Committee, Central Environment Council, Ministry of Environment, Government of Japan, August 16, 2010.31. Interview with John George, factory manager, Kodaikanal, Hindustan Unilever, March 23, 2010, Chennai.32. U.K. Environment Agency (March 2009): “Soil Guidelines Values for Mercury in Soil”.33. URS Dames and Moore (May 8, 2002): “Environmental Site Assessment and Risk Assessment for Mercury HLL Thermometer Factory Site, Kodaikanal, Tamil Nadu, India”: 5-1.34. Unilever Environment Policy PDF from website.

Soil in parts ofthe factory hasmercuryconcentrations of over 500 parts permillion.

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ed to the lack of standards in India.

C O M P R O M I S E D S A F E T YThe fact is that the mercury thermom-eter factory was relocated to India be-cause it was too dangerous to run inthe West. Machines in the factory,which Unilever inherited with the pur-chase of Chesebrough-Ponds in1986,35 were hand-me-downs broughtto India three years earlier from aPonds’ unit in Watertown, New York.Legislation on mercury handling inthe U.S. had begun to change aftertoxic side effects began to be publi-cised.36 India, where Ponds had a sub-sidiary, had no such problem withmercury as long as drinking water wasnot affected.37

Residents and workers say stan-dards in the Kodaikanal factory beganto deteriorate from 1987, when man-agerial staff brought by Ponds from theU.S. left India following Unilever’s ac-quisition.38 Ironically for HindustanUnilever and its parent company, newlaws were adopted in India around thesame time in the wake of the Bhopalgas calamity of December 2-3, 1984:the Environment (Protection) Act1986, hazardous process amendmentsto the Factories Act 1987, and Hazard-ous Waste Rules 1989.

Did the factory comply with thenew legal requirements?

Workers have told the MadrasHigh Court that Hindustan Unileverfailed to inform workers how danger-ous mercury really was; failed to pro-vide proper personal protectiveequipment, including special NIOSH(National Institute for OccupationalSafety and Health, in the U.S.) carboncartridge masks to filter vapours; andfailed to separate out the dangerousmercury area from the non-mercuryarea.39

Material examined in this investi-gation confirms some of their allega-tions. In the appointment letters,training evaluation and standing or-

RUBY MARTIN AT the grave of her son, Christopher, who worked in thefactory for six years from 1985. In 1990, aged 27, he developed healthproblems, including poor vision, high fever and breathing difficulties. Adoctor he consulted in Tiruchi advised him to work outside the mercury area.He resigned a few months after the company refused to transfer him citingdifficulty in training a person to take his place without production beingaffected. Christopher died in 1997. His health records showed bronchitis butthe workers’ union suspects that mercury vapour was the cause.

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35. Unilever website.36. USEPA website.37. India Water Pollution Act (1974).38. Interview with Girija Viraraghavan and others from the Palani Hills Conservation Council, March 12, 2010, Kodaikanal, and affidavit of M.A. Mahindran, president, Ponds/HLLEx-Mercury Employees Welfare Association, February 19, 2006.39. Affidavit of M.A. Mahindran, president, Ponds/HLL Ex-Mercury Employees Welfare Association, February 19, 2006 and April 19, 2006.

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ders placed before the Madras HighCourt by Hindustan Unilever, nonementions the dangers of mercury orthe precautions necessary.40 Recentdisclosures of equipment obtained un-der the Right to Information Act fromthe Commissioner of Central Excise,Tamil Nadu, show that special filtermasks were neither imported norbought from the domestic market.41

According to former workers, even thecoveralls and soft cloth gloves thatwere provided were often removed – itwas hot and they were keen to preventthe thermometers slipping out of theirhands so as to meet the productiontarget of 75,000 thermometers a day.

Factory layout diagrams42 showhigh-risk mercury sections were rightnext to the washing and packing area,and vapours from the manufacturingprocess and accidental breakagescould move between the two desig-nated areas, affecting temporaryworkers.43

They were not given protectiveclothing, just a cotton overall and acap. S. Amulu washed mercury-ladenuniforms by hand, unprotected.44 Gar-deners tended to the plants unprotect-ed, while the factory’s 25 exhausts blewout toxic vapour.45

Spot assessments of mercury levelsseen by the Indian People’s Tribunalon Environment and Health in 2002show vapour levels were recorded atover four times the level at which mer-cury affects the central nervous system

40. Counter affidavit of M.K. Sharma, vice chairman, Hin-dustan Unilever, April 12, 2006: Annex 16.41. “Statement showing capital goods imported withoutduty”, Office of the Assistant Commissioner of CentralExcise, Dindigul, obtained through Right to InformationAct request, September 24, 2008 and appeal, March 1,2009, by Shweta Narayan.42. Environmental Resource Management (October2006): “Site specific target levels”.43. Affidavit of M.A. Mahindran, president, Ponds/HLLEx-Mercury Employees Welfare Association, April 19,2006, paragraph 31; Affidavit of M.A. Mahindran, presi-dent, Ponds/HLL Ex-Mercury Employees Welfare Associ-ation, November 4, 2006; Ex-Mercury Employees WelfareAssociation, Objections to the [Experts’] Committee re-port, June 30, 2008: “Comparison of urine levels (meanvalues) submitted by the company to the Committee:Hazardous and Non Hazardous Areas”: 54-56.44. Affidavit of S. Raja Mohamed, general secretary,Ponds/HLL Ex-Mercury Employees Welfare Association,June 30, 2008: 17.45. Affidavit of M.A. Mahindran, president, Ponds/HLLEx-Mercury Employees Welfare Association, January 31,2007.

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(0.1 milligram per cubic metre).46 Thisis almost 10 times the 0.05 milligramper cubic metre for a 40-hour workingweek required by the Tamil Nadu gov-ernment. That does not account for theovertime that workers say they regu-larly put in. In 1992, the total yearaverage exceeded 0.05 mg/m3, accord-ing to Hindustan Unilever’s own con-sultant’s report.47 The company toldFrontline that the factory followedlaid-down procedures when mercurylevels in air were exceeded.

But the company failed to informthe authorities when things got dan-gerous, including reporting these mer-cury vapour levels. The Accidents

Register and the Dangerous Occur-rences Register record only one cutfinger and a fire. No mention is madeof the lack of water after drought con-ditions hit Tamil Nadu in 1989.48

Workers were required to wash beforeleaving to remove the mercury vapoursthat would have settled on their hairand skin. But from 1989 they were senthome unwashed, they have told theMadras High Court.49

Hindustan Unilever denies theseallegations and maintains that it had“comprehensive occupational healthand safety systems… including em-ployee training and awareness, use ofpersonal protective equipment and

adherence to safety procedures.”The company, contrary to its

claims, also failed to dispose of itswaste properly. Instead, HindustanUnilever buried it or kept it in unusedbuildings. The company’s own con-sultant’s report details how around 45tonnes of glass scrap from the purport-ed non-mercury area was buried infour shallow pits onsite. It says thatcontaminated glass from the mercuryarea was packed untreated in drumsand kept festering in its old bakery.50

In 1990, a mercury recovery systemwas introduced. But by the company’sown admission, it was inefficient andleft a glass sludge less tainted but nev-

THE SCRAPYARD AT Moonjikkal in Kodaikanal where the mercury-containing waste from the factory was dumped.

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46. Justice S.N. Bhargava, Retired Chief Justice, Sikkim High Court, and State Human Rights Commission Chairperson, Manipur, et al (June 2003): “Indian People’s Tribunal Reporton the alleged Environmental Pollution and Health Impacts Caused by the Hindustan Lever Thermometer Factory at Kodaikanal”: 34.47. URS Dames and Moore (May 8, 2002): “Environmental Site Assessment and Risk Assessment for Mercury HLL Thermometer Factory Site, Kodaikanal, Tamil Nadu, India”: Table 3Air Monitoring Data.48. Counter affidavit of M.K. Sharma, vice chairman, Hindustan Unilever, April 12, 2006: “Register of Accidents and Register of Dangerous Occurrences”: Annex 19.49. Affidavit of K. Gopalakrishnan, August 18, 2006.50. URS Dames and Moore (May 8, 2002): “Environmental Site Assessment and Risk Assessment for Mercury HLL Thermometer Factory Site, Kodaikanal, Tamil Nadu, India”: 2-3.

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ertheless contaminated.51 It thenbroke down.52 In 1999 a new systemwas introduced that was better but notat all foolproof, the consultant’s reportconcedes.53

In fact, the company did not havepermission to store so much waste on-site. From August 1994, consent to thecompany was limited by the regulatorsto 1,200 kilos of treated mercurysludge a year. But the fine print in theconsent form stated that a factory canonly hold waste exceeding 10,000 kgfor 90 days.54 But over 28,000 kg weresent back to the U.S. in 2003.55

Q U E S T I O N A B L E A S S E S S M E N T SPost-shutdown, Hindustan Unileverhas avoided independent assessment.Instead, it has relied on questionablescientific studies it commissioned orconducted itself.

The contamination and risk as-sessment study was undertaken by theSingapore-based company URSDames and Moore and commissionedand paid for by its client HindustanUnilever.56 In this exercise, HindustanUnilever was able to involve itself inthe collection and analysis of data.More than two-thirds of all the sam-ples taken from the site were collectedby Hindustan Unilever and taken foranalysis in its own laboratories inMumbai.57 Significantly, the samplesthe company was responsible for ana-lysing were from some of the worst-contaminated areas such as the bakerybuilding, where untreated mercuryglass scrap had been left.58 More im-portantly, Hindustan Unilever’sMumbai labs were ill-equipped to dealwith the task in hand, as Dames andMoore acknowledges.59 Just how far isevident from the manifold differencesin the results reported in certain sam-ples, detailed in a table at the back of

51. URS Dames and Moore (May 8, 2002): “Environmental Site Assessment and Risk Assessment for Mercury HLL Thermometer Factory Site, Kodaikanal, Tamil Nadu, India”: 2-3.52. Interview with Girija Viraraghavan and others from the Palani Hills Conservation Council, March 12, 2010, Kodaikanal.53. URS Dames and Moore (May 8, 2002): “Environmental Site Assessment and Risk Assessment for Mercury HLL Thermometer Factory Site, Kodaikanal, Tamil Nadu, India”: 2-3.54. Counter affidavit of M.K. Sharma, vice president, Hindustan Unilever, April 12, 2006: “Permission to collect and store hazardous waste from TNPCB, August 9, 1994”: Annex 12.55. Letter from Assistant Commissioner, Central Excise, Dindigul (C.NO.4/16/28/2002), dated April 29, 2003, to M/s Hindustan Lever Ltd: “Permission to export mercury-containingwaste”. 56. URS Dames and Moore (May 8, 2002): “Environmental Site Assessment and Risk Assessment for Mercury HLL Thermometer Factory Site, Kodaikanal, Tamil Nadu, India”: 1-1.57. URS Dames and Moore (May 8, 2002): “Environmental Site Assessment and Risk Assessment for Mercury HLL Thermometer Factory Site, Kodaikanal, Tamil Nadu, India”: Tables5, 6, 7, 8 and 10.58. URS Dames and Moore (May 8, 2002): “Environmental Site Assessment and Risk Assessment for Mercury HLL Thermometer Factory Site, Kodaikanal, Tamil Nadu, India”: 1-1.59. URS Dames and Moore (May 8, 2002): “Environmental Site Assessment and Risk Assessment for Mercury HLL Thermometer Factory Site, Kodaikanal, Tamil Nadu, India”: 1-2.

THE TNPCB’S LETTER to Hindustan Unilever granting permission forcleaning up the soil on the factory site to standards agreed by the TNPCB. Ina letter to the Union Ministry of Environment and Forests in March 2010, theTNPCB said that standards had not been finalised.

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the consultant’s report.60

This risk assessment study failed toundertake important hydrologicalstudies determining movement of pol-lutants through groundwater, whichmay move in a different direction fromsurface water.61 In a place like Kodai-kanal, which sits on a rock massif, thiswould be important. According to DrTanaka, soil sampling has a specifictechnique based on a grid system: ateach point samples should be takenfrom the surface and at a 50 cm depth,mixed, divided, and then weighed.62

There is no evidence that such assess-ment took place. The Indian People’sTribunal notes that offsite sampling inthis case was patchy, unorganised, and“insufficient to indicate that the report

presents a proper environmental as-sessment.”63 Methylmercury assess-ments were made from surfacesamples, but bottom samples wouldhave been more appropriate, accord-ing to specifications suggested by theJapanese Public Health Association’s2001 report.64 No account has beengiven of why particular samples on andoffsite were singled out for methylmer-cury testing.

“The soil is polluted, the walls arepolluted, but the people who workedthere are not polluted – how?” askedMahindran, incredulous at the compa-ny’s refusal to acknowledge healthcomplaints from hundreds ofworkers.65

Just as it did with the environment

study, Hindustan Unilever avoided in-dependent investigation of workers’health. After the factory was closed, itsmedical and occupational health vicepresident, Dr T. Rajagopal, undertooka study of around 250 employees andex-employees, found that they had aconsiderable number of health symp-toms, and dismissed these. That studywas published in the Indian Journal ofOccupational Health and Environ-mental Medicine, of which Dr Rajago-pal is on the editorial advisory board.66

Shockingly, the article appeared with-out declaration of conflict of interest.Nor was the fact that the population inquestion was drawn from the compa-ny’s own workforce disclosed. In thismanner, the company gave the work-ers and itself a clean bill of health.

Faced with a court case, the com-pany turned to doctors from the Indi-an Toxicological Research Centre(ITRC), the National Institute of Oc-cupational Health, and the All-IndiaInstitute of Medical Sciences to reviewtheir study.67 Not one of them had ac-cess to complete sets of individualmedical records; nor did they meet anyof the workers. Their opinions werefavourable to the company that ap-proached them. The Madras HighCourt did not let this questionable pro-cedure go unnoticed. The Bench was inthe process of considering who to askfor an independent review and disap-proved of the company jumping thegun.68

The court eventually ordered thatan expert committee of doctors shouldvisit Kodaikanal to find out whetherthe workers’ health problems were “re-latable to mercury exposure”. The an-swer that came back – “not specificonly to mercury exposure” – was not to

60. URS Dames and Moore (8 May 2002): “Environmental Site Assessment and Risk Assessment for Mercury HLL Thermometer Factory Site, Kodaikanal, Tamil Nadu, India”: Table 5.61. Background source conversation, July 2010.62. Email from Dr Masaru Tanaka, Lead, United Nations Environment Programme Global Mercury Partnership Waste Management Area, and Chairperson, Waste Management andRecycling Experts Committee, Central Environment Council, Ministry of Environment, Government of Japan, August 16, 2010.63. Justice S.N. Bhargava, Retired Chief Justice, Sikkim High Court, and State Human Rights Commission Chairperson, Manipur, et al (June 2003): “Indian People’s Tribunal Reporton the alleged Environmental Pollution and Health Impacts Caused by the Hindustan Lever Thermometer Factory at Kodaikanal”: 30.64. Justice S.N. Bhargava, Retired Chief Justice, Sikkim High Court, and State Human Rights Commission Chairperson, Manipur, et al (June 2003): “Indian People’s Tribunal Reporton the alleged Environmental Pollution and Health Impacts Caused by the Hindustan Lever Thermometer Factory at Kodaikanal”: 32; and Japan Public Health Association (October2001): “Preventive Measures against Environmental Mercury Pollution and Its Health Effects”: 28.65. Interview with M.A. Mahindran, president, Ponds/HLL Ex-Mercury Employees Welfare Association, March 12, 2010, Kodaikanal.66. Indian Journal of Occupational and Environmental Medicine, Volume 11, Issue 3, December 2007.67. Report of the Indian Toxicological Research Centre: “Review of health records/exposure data”; Letter of Dr H.N. Saiyed, National Institute of Occupational and Social Health,September 11, 2006; Letter of Dr C.S. Pandav and Dr R.M. Pandey, All-India Institute of Medical Sciences, October 3, 2006.68. Affidavit of S. Raja Mohamed, general secretary, Ponds/HLL Ex-Mercury Employees Welfare Association, June 30, 2008: 12.

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the question asked.69 Not one of thedoctors was a neurologist, who accord-ing to the Japanese Public Health As-sociation is the only specialist qualifiedto assess symptoms of brain damage.70

The team was headed by Dr A.K. Sri-vastava – the same doctor from theITRC who had already submitted hisopinion supporting Hindustan Uni-lever’s case.

The doctors’ team saw 20 of theclose to 200 workers and their familieslined up outside their room, selected atthe last minute by the workers them-selves. The tests the committee useddo not match up to those Dr Jonesuses, such as a tweezer dexterity testand a peg placement test.71

There also appears to have been anunaccounted for change in the brief.The Madras High Court had instruct-ed the committee to undertake a com-prehensive review, with anepidemiological study. But accordingto Dr Jayaprakash Muliyil, a commu-nity health specialist on the commit-tee, it undertook a rapid assessment tosee “if there was evidence for a study.”72

Dr Muliyil also clarified that althoughhe could not say whether any of theworkers suffer specifically from mer-cury poisoning, it was not possible torule it out either. In fact, he feels it is“highly likely” that they are.73

The Ex-Mercury Employees Wel-fare Association has contended beforethe High Court that the expert com-mittee failed to hold an independentinquiry and resorted to incomplete ex-amination, predetermined opinion,abdication of the duty placed on it bythe court, flawed science, and errone-ous conclusions.74

It has also charged the company incourt with not being truthful in its sub-

missions to the expert committee. In-formation collected by workers revealsthat medical records denied to themwere supplied to the committee forcertain workers, particularly for wom-en. Eighteen of them hold letters fromthe company informing them thattheir medical records do not exist.75

Hindustan Unilever’s explanation toFrontline is that women’s readings onrecord are averages based around thegroup mean.

Crucially, 306 workers were de-nied access to their own medicalhealth records.76 This is significant notjust because workers have been deniedwhat is their right, but also becauseHindustan Unilever has relied onthese data to defend itself. Reportsviewed by us from the company, thedoctors who reviewed their study, andthe court-appointed expert committeeall state that workers’ symptoms didnot match up with test results in theirmedical records showing ‘safe’ levels ofmercury in urine. Therefore, they sur-mise, their symptoms must be attrib-utable to some other problem.77 Theyalso maintain that because mercurypasses through the body quickly, it isnow too late to know for sure if work-ers are poisoned.

But these assumptions display justhow little expertise has been broughtto bear on the issue.

“In my opinion,” Dr Jones explains,“if any one individual is exposed, it’simportant to look at symptoms. In apopulation study they are always goingto use an indicator like urine for ele-mental mercury and say if they have 40or 50 micrograms of mercury per litre,which is the standard internationalcut-off value for mercury in urine, thenthere’s no worry. But actually a person

can have five [micrograms] or fewerand still have symptoms [of poison-ing] because of this individualvariation.”78

Limits for mercury in urine andblood are “a bit of a problem,” she says,because it is not possible to tell wheth-er the mercury reading representswhat is being stored in the body orpassing out of it. When it comes todetermining and treating mercury poi-soning, Dr Jones is clear: “What youreally need to be doing is assessing thesymptoms, mood, tremor, gait, some-times personality change and culturalwithdrawal.”79 She also suggests thatepidemiological methods such asthose used in Hindustan Unilever’sstudy were likely to hide the clinicalcases, the people who were really sick,because they focussed around the av-

69. Affidavit of S. Raja Mohamed, general secretary, Ponds/HLL Ex-Mercury Employees Welfare Association, June 30, 2008: 1.70. Japan Public Health Association (October 2001): “Preventive Measures against Environmental Mercury Pollution and its Health Effects”: 56.71. Telephone interview with Dr Linda M. Jones, Senior Lecturer, School of Psychology, Massey University, New Zealand, July 26, 2010.72. Interview with Dr Jayaprakash Muliyil, Principal, Christian Medical College, Vellore, July 24, 2010, Vellore.73. Interview with Dr Jayaprakash Muliyil, Principal, Christian Medical College, Vellore, July 24, 2010, Vellore.74. Affidavit of S. Raja Mohamed, June 30, 2008.75. Calculated from records held by the Ponds/HLL Ex-Mercury Employees Welfare Association.76. Affidavit of S. Raja Mohamed, general secretary, Ponds/HLL Ex-Mercury Employees Welfare Association, Objections to the [Experts’] Committee Report, June 30, 2008: “Chart onurine levels of women employees”: 47-5377. T. Rajgopal et al (April 2006): “Epidemiological surveillance of employees in a mercury thermometer plant”, Indian Journal of Occupational and Environmental Health, Volume 10;Report of the Indian Toxicological Research Centre: “Review of health records/exposure data”; Letter of Dr. H.N. Saiyed, National Institute of Occupational and Social Health,September 11, 2006; Letter of Dr C.S. Pandav and Dr R.M. Pandey, All-India Institute of Medical Sciences, October 3, 2006; and Report of the Committee of Experts, December 24, 2007.78. Telephone interview with Dr Linda M. Jones, Senior Lecturer, School of Psychology, Massey University, New Zealand, July 26, 2010.79. Telephone interview with Dr Linda M. Jones, Senior Lecturer, School of Psychology, Massey University, New Zealand, July 26, 2010.

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erage levels of a group of people.80

The individual data that someworkers managed to get from Hindus-tan Unilever show one-off readings atextreme levels between 100 and 200micrograms.81 Of the 152 medical re-ports received, 98 workers had read-ings exceeding 50 micrograms, theMadras High Court has heard. TheIndian government has not laid downsafe levels for mercury in blood or uri-ne, but these readings are two to fourtimes what is internationallyacceptable.82

“Those are huge readings,” com-ments Dr Jones. “When you are talkingabout numbers like 100 that is not alevel that’s acceptable.”83 It is not toolate to track poisoning either, she

adds: “For the group of women that Iam following at the moment, it’s 30years since their exposure…. So 10years is nothing.”84

E V A S I O N & R E G U L A T O R YF A I L U R EHindustan Unilever, and Ponds beforeit, took advantage of the insensitivityof the law and the lack of critical exam-ination by regulators. The regulatorsfailed to do their duty even under theprevalent law.

The factory was given permissionto set up in Kodaikanal on shakygrounds to begin with. The Ponds In-dia management got special permis-sion from the Central government toset up on the grounds that it was a

non-polluting glass manufacturingunit.85 No formal site selection orscreening process was undertaken toassess and minimise the impact of amercury thermometer plant in an eco-sensitive area.

When Hindustan Unilever tookover, the same kind of evasion contin-ued. It failed to declare its Kodaikanalfactory to the Factories Inspectorate asa dangerous operation, even thoughglass-manufacturing units were listedas such in law after the December 1984calamity at Bhopal.86 In 2000, the fac-tory declared itself dangerous in itsrenewal licence but not in its 2001annual report.87 Today the companymaintains that factory operations “didnot fall in the scope of dangerous oper-

THE PAMBAR STREAM in Kodaikanal. A U.S.-based scientist who reviewed test results at the request of the workersnoted that surface water samples from parts of the stream and the Kodai lake had mercury readings 30 timeshigher than what the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency recommends for fresh water containing fish that peopleconsume. Hindustan Unilever maintains that it is within safe levels.

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80. Telephone interview with Dr Linda M. Jones, Senior Lecturer, School of Psychology, Massey University, New Zealand, July 26, 2010.81. Affidavit of S. Raja Mohamed, general secretary, Ponds/HLL Ex-Mercury Employees Welfare Association, Objections to the [Experts’] Committee report, June 30, 2008: “Details ofthe 13 ex-workers examined by the committee”: 57-59.82. Telephone interview with Dr Linda M. Jones, Senior Lecturer, School of Psychology, Massey University, New Zealand, July 26, 2010.83. Telephone interview with Dr Linda M. Jones, Senior Lecturer, School of Psychology, Massey University, New Zealand, July 26, 2010.84. Telephone interview with Dr Linda M. Jones, Senior Lecturer, School of Psychology, Massey University, New Zealand, July 26, 2010.85. Counter affidavit of M.K. Sharma, vice chairman, Hindustan Unilever, April 12, 2006: “Form 100% Export Oriented Unit Application for licence or permission for establishment” toDepartment of Industry, Central Government, New Delhi, in the name of Pond’s Exports Ltd and “Approval”, September 4, 1982: Annex 11.86. From the records of the Tamil Nadu Factories Inspectorate produced before the court following the order of the Madras High Court on March 27, 2006: 3.87. From the records of the Tamil Nadu Factories Inspectorate produced before the court following the order of the Madras High Court on March 27, 2006: 4.

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ation under the Factories Act”. If thiswas the case, why would the companyhave needed to obtain certificates offitness for some employees? And whywould it have bothered to includethree of these, from 1986, 1998, and1999, to defend itself before theCourt?88

The Tamil Nadu government au-thorities were hardly sensitive to thehazards present in the thermometermanufacturing process. The TamilNadu Factories Inspectorate keptminimal data on the company’s oper-ations, as records produced before thecourt reveal.89 In 1995, the Chief In-spector of Factories noted new build-ings had been built without sanction,but this was only spotted because thecompany applied to the inspectorate toremove them.90 In 1998, Dr W.R.S.

Thangasamy, Certifying Surgeon ofthe Factories Inspectorate, visited thefactory. He concluded that “no work-ers were found to be working in directcontact with mercury and there is nochance for mercury poisoning,” with-out mentioning medical tests or re-ports.91 After the factory closed, theDeputy Inspector of Factories, Sivaka-si, examined 75 workers, their medicalhistories, and any past test reports inseven hours (excluding lunch).92 Thatis a rate of one worker every fiveminutes.

Nor did the Pollution ControlBoard fare much better. Records of avisit to the Kodaikanal factory inMarch 1999 show random air-mon-itoring samples were taken but notfrom all emission points. No samplewas taken for mercury. In June 1999, a

sample was taken to test for mercuryand has been filed by the companybefore the Madras High Court to showthe environment was safe for work-ers.93 Significantly, no contemporane-ous records of methylmercurysampling, effluent sampling, watersampling, soil sampling, onsite haz-ardous waste disposal procedures, ex-posure pathways, or safetycontingency plans while the factorywas in operation have been producedby the company before the High Court.

Having failed to interpret andmonitor the law in the spirit in which itwas written while the factory was inoperation, the TNPCB failed to ensurethat Hindustan Unilever fulfilled itsobligations under the ‘polluter pays’principle. It even disregarded the in-structions of a special five-member

88. Respondent affidavit of M.K. Sharma, vice chairman, Hindustan Unilever, October 11, 2006: Annex 3.89. From the records of the Tamil Nadu Factories Inspectorate produced before the court following the order of the Madras High Court on March 27, 2006.90. From the records of the Tamil Nadu Factories Inspectorate produced before the court following the order of the Madras High Court on March 27, 2006: 2.91. Counter affidavit of M.K. Sharma, vice chairman, Hindustan Unilever, April 12, 2006: “Health Survey” by Dr W.R.S. Thangasamy, Certifying Surgeon of the Factories Inspectorate,July 16, 1998: Annex 20.92. Affidavit of M.A. Mahindran, president, Ponds/HLL Ex-Mercury Employees Welfare Association, February 19, 2006: paragraph 29.93. Counter affidavit of M.K. Sharma, vice chairman, Hindustan Unilever, April 12, 2006: “TNPCB Ambient Air Quality Survey”, March 22, 1999, and “TNPCB Advance EnvironmentalLaboratory, Madurai Results” collected June 23, 1999: Annex 19.

A VIEW OF the Kodai lake. Scientists from the DAE and the JNTU, Hyderabad, found detectable levels ofmethylmercury in this and two other lakes. The company says the mercury concentrations are low overall.

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monitoring committee of the SupremeCourt in 2004 to “fix liability” on Hin-dustan Unilever, appoint an inde-pendent consultant to review clean-upprocedures, and form a local area com-mittee of respected members of Kodai-kanal’s community who wouldmonitor compliance with SupremeCourt directives.94

Instead, the TNPCB allowed Hin-dustan Unilever to contract Environ-mental Resource Management (ERM)and the National Environmental Engi-neering Research Institute (NEERI)to make secondary assessments of de-contamination targets and techniques.This meant that a member of the Su-preme Court Monitoring Committee,Dr Tapan Chakrabarti,95 head of NEE-RI’s Biotech division, was now drawninto this contracted exercise.

The TNPCB then cut out local resi-dents from decontamination discus-sions after they objected to HindustanUnilever engaging NEERI, which hadresulted in the removal of some con-taminated materials without propertechnical assessment.96

The objection of two Tamil Nadu-based members of the monitoringcommittee, Dr D.B. Boralkar and DrClaude Alvares, that the SupremeCourt’s directions had “not been car-ried out in letter or in spirit,”97 was notenough to change things. Right to In-formation Act requests reveal that DrBoralkar and Dr Alvares were droppedfrom future meetings and that, insteadof involving local residents, a ‘scientificexperts’ committee was set up.

In June 2008, the clean-up stan-dards for the factory were suddenlydowngraded and the go-ahead wasgiven for decontamination without in-forming the local community, the local

forest department, or the municipaladministration.98 The TNPCB, Hin-dustan Unilever, and its paid consult-ants had been meeting behind closeddoors from 2005 onwards.99 The newstandard allowed over twice the levelof mercury suggested by Dames andMoore of the Dutch standard of 10mg/kg. No scientific justification for thechange in clean-up target levels hasbeen given.

Now, the TNPCB has claimed tothe Government of India’s Ministry ofEnvironment and Forests that thestandards were never finalised, infor-mation obtained under the Right toInformation Act reveals.100 But Fron-tline has a copy of the letter from theTNPCB giving approval to HindustanUnilever to remediate to the standardsdiscussed, allowing the polluter a freehand on its own site.

D O I N G W E L L B Y D O I N G G O O D ?Responding to our written questions,the company admits breach of estab-lished procedure in the sale of mercu-ry-contaminated glass to a local scrapdealer. It also admits to polluting thesoil on its Kodaikanal factory groundswith 366 kg of mercury. It admits toengaging, paying for, and conductingkey scientific assessments itself but de-nies these are questionable. It main-tains that the journal article publishedby its own doctors was peer-reviewedand hence there was no need for decla-ration of conflict of interest.

The company maintains it hasshared medical records with the em-ployees, but admits only those fromhigh-risk areas. It admits it has reliedon year averages for women. It deniesthat the factory was a hazardous oper-ation under law or that it compro-

mised on safety and endangeredworkers’ health. It points to records ofmonitoring undertaken at the factory,periodic evaluations of regulators, andthe conclusions of the expert commit-tee of doctors as evidence that it has nofurther obligations towards its em-ployees for polluting the environmentor for their health problems.

It denies polluting the forest andlakes beyond its boundary walls, andmaintains that its only remaining obli-gation to the wider community in Ko-daikanal is to clean the soil to astandard its own consultants set. Itdenies that the pollution control boardhas already agreed to this standard.

“HUL,” a company spokespersonasserted, “has acted as swiftly as pos-sible while fully engaging the relevantstakeholders and authorities con-cerned to ensure quick and appropri-ate remedial measures.”

In 2006, Hindustan Unileverclaimed before the Madras High Courtthat it had incurred costs of Rs.22crore in the clean-up process. Hindus-tan Unilever had profits of Rs.2,202crore at the end of the 2010 financialyear.101 Its 75-year anniversary issueproclaims that the company is “DoingWell by Doing Good.”

“Companies should have social re-sponsibilities,” reflects Dr Tanaka,speaking about the lessons learned inJapan from the Minamata case. “Po-tential polluters have to always mon-itor carefully environmental effects….Polluters and administrators must ac-tually visit the site and hear the voicesof the locals. Protection of humanhealth should be prioritised and pollu-ters and administrators must take de-cisions based on information that isavailable.”102 !

94. Supreme Court Monitoring Committee (September 2004): “Report of the visit of the SCMC to Tamil Nadu”.95. Supreme Court Monitoring Committee (September 2004): “Report of the visit of the SCMC to Tamil Nadu”: 1.96. Last recorded meeting, May 3, 2005, from minutes obtained under Right to Information Act request dated January 13, 2010, by Shweta Narayan, and granted February (undated)2010.97. Letter to R. Ramachandran, TNPCB, from Dr Claude Alvares, August 16, 2005, obtained under Right to Information Act request dated January 13, 2010, by Shweta Narayan, andgranted February (undated) 2010.98. Letter T4/TNPCB/HWM/F-27566/DGL/2008 from R. Ramachandran, TNPCB, to factory manager, Hindustan Unilever, June 19, 2008.99. Minutes of meeting, April, June, December 2007, obtained under Right to Information Act request dated January 13, 2010, by Shweta Narayan, and granted February (undated)2010.100. TNPCB status note to Ministry of Environment and Forests, New Delhi, March 2010, and information obtained under Right to Information Act request dated March 30, 2010, byShweta Narayan, and granted April 1, 2010.101. Hindustan Unilever Annual Report 2009-2010.102. Email from Dr Masaru Tanaka, Lead, United Nations Environment Programme Global Mercury Partnership Waste Management Area, and Chairperson, Waste Management andRecycling Experts Committee, Central Environment Council, Ministry of Environment, Government of Japan, August 16, 2010.