derivative classification training/implementation and overview of executive orders impacting the...

DERIVATIVE CLASSIFICATION TRAINING/IMPLEMENTATION AND

OVERVIEW OF EXECUTIVE ORDERS IMPACTING THE NISP

Greg Pannoni, Associate Director, Operations and Industrial SecurityInformation Security Oversight OfficeNational Archives and Records Administration

Overview

• ISOO Goals and Functions

• National Industrial Security Program (NISP) (E.O. 12829)• NISP Policy Advisory Committee and its Working Groups

• Classified National Security Information (E.O. 13526)

− Derivative Classification Training and Implementation

• Structural Reforms to Improve the Security of Classified Networks and the Responsible Sharing and Safeguarding of Classified Information (E.O. 13587)

• Classified National Security Information Program for State, Local, Tribal, Private Sector Entities (SLTPS) (E.O. 13549)

• Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) (E.O. 13556)

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What are ISOO’s Goals?

• Ensure Safeguarding of Classified National Security Information in a Cost-Effective & Efficient Manner

• Eliminate Redundant, Overlapping, or Unnecessary Requirements that Impede National Security Interests

• Ensure Government / Industry Partnership in the Protection of Classified Information

• Hold Classification Activity to the Minimum Necessary to Protect National Security

• Promote Declassification & Public Access to Information as Soon as National Security Considerations Permit

How does ISOO Function?

• Develops, coordinates and issues implementing directives and instructions regarding Executive Orders 13526, 12829, and 13556 that are binding on executive branch agencies.

• Provides oversight and maintains continuous liaison with agency’s on all matters relating to the Government-wide security classification program and the NISP.

• Annually reports relevant data regarding each agency's security classification programs, to include costs, to the President.

• Recommends policy changes to the President through the National Security Advisor.

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NISP POLICY RELATIONSHIPS

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E.O. 12829

NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL SECURITY PROGRAM

E.O. 13587

STRUCTURAL REFORMS TO IMPROVE THE SECURITY OF CLASSIFIED NETWORKS AND THE RESPONSIBLE SHARING OF

CLASSIFIED INFORMATION

E.O. 13526

CLASSIFIED NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

E.O. 13549

Classified National Security Information Program for State, Local, Tribal, &

Private Sector Entities

NISP Policy Advisory Committee (NISPPAC)

• Membership Director ISOO – Chairman Representatives of Government agencies (15 members) Nongovernmental (Industry) representatives (8 members)

• Functions – Advise the Chairman: On all matters concerning the policies of the NISP Serves as a forum to discuss policy issues in dispute

• Authority Executive Order No. 12829, National Industrial Security Program

Subject to Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA), The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), and The Government in the Sunshine Act

NISPPAC Government Representatives

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MembersMembers AgencyAgency

John P. Fitzpatrick, Chair Information Security Oversight Office

Mary Rose McCaffrey Central Intelligence Agency

Drew Winneberger Defense Security Service

Deborah Scholz Department of the Air Force

Patricia Stokes Department of the Army

Eric Dorsey Department of Commerce

Timothy Davis Department of Defense

Richard Donovan Department of Energy

NISPPAC Government Representatives

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MembersMembers AgencyAgency

Christal Fulton Department of Homeland Security

Anna Harrison Department of Justice

Stephen Long Department of the Navy

Kimberly Baugher Department of State

Peter AmbroseNational Aeronautics and Space Administration

Dennis Hanratty National Security Agency

Darlene Fenton Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Richard Hohman Office of the Director of National Intelligence

NISPPAC Industry Members

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MembersMembers Company Company

Scott Conway* Northrop Grumman

Marshall Sanders* Cloud Security Strategies

Frederick Riccardi ManTech

Shawn Daley MIT Lincoln Laboratory

Rosalind Baybutt Pamir Consulting LLC

Mike Witt Ball Aerospace

Rick Graham Huntington -Ingalls

Steve Kipp L3 Corporation

* Term Ends 1 October 2012

NISPPAC Working Groups

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NISPPAC working groups established to review issues and

prepare recommendations for formal NISPPAC decisions.• Permanent

• Certification and Accreditation Working Group

• Personnel Security Clearance Working Group

• Ad-Hoc

• NISPOM Rewrite Working Group

• Threat Information Working Group

• Small and Middle-Sized company Issues Working Group

• Special Access Program Working Group

• Foreign Ownership, Control and Influence (FOCI) Working Group

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Guidance found in:

● Executive Order 13526, “Classified National Security Information” December 29, 2009

● 32 C.F.R. Part 2001, “Classified National Security Information” June 25, 2010

● “Marking Classified National Security Information” January 2012

Derivative ClassificationDerivative Classification

Derivative Classification is:

The incorporating, paraphrasing, restating, or generating in new form information that is already classified, and marking the newly developed material consistent with the classification markings that apply to the source information.

Includes the classification of information based on classification guidance.

It is not the duplication or reproduction of existing classified information.

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Derivative Classification

Persons who apply derivative classification markings shall receive training in the proper application of the derivative classification principles of the Order, with an emphasis on avoiding over-classification, at least once every 2 years.

Derivative classifiers who do not receive such training at least once every two years shall have their authority to apply derivative classification markings suspended until they have received such training.

A waiver may be granted by the agency head, the deputy agency head, or the senior agency official if an individual is unable to receive such training due to unavoidable circumstances

Whenever a waiver is granted, the individual shall receive such training as soon as practicable.

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Training

Minimum Derivative Classification Training Coverage

• Observe and respect original classification decisions

• Classification levels

• Duration of classification

• Identification and Markings (carry forward to newly created documents the pertinent classification markings)

• Classification prohibitions and limitations

• Sanctions

• Classification challenges

• Security Classification Guides

• Information Sharing

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**EMPHASIS ON AVOIDING OVER-CLASSIFICATION**

Classification Standards

Information may be originally classified if:

• An Original Classification Authority (OCA) is classifying the information;

• The information is owned by, produced by or for, or is under the control of the United States Government;

• The information falls within one or more of the classification categories; and

• The OCA determines that the unauthorized disclosure of the information reasonably could be expected to result in damage to national security, to include defense against transnational terrorism, and the OCA is able to identify or describe the damage.

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Classification Levels

● Top Secret - information whose unauthorized disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to the national security.

• Secret - information whose unauthorized disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause serious damage to the national security.

• Confidential - information whose unauthorized disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause damage to the national security.

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Prohibitions and Limitations

• In no case shall information be classified, continue to be maintained as classified, or fail to be declassified in order to:

• Conceal violations of law, inefficiency, or administrative error;

• Prevent embarrassment to a person, organization, or agency;

• Restrain competition; or

• Prevent or delay the release of information that does not require protection in the interest of national security.

• Basic scientific research information not clearly related to the national security shall not be classified.

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Sanctions• U.S. Government employees, and its contractors, shall be subject

to appropriate sanctions if they knowingly, willfully, or negligently:

- disclose to unauthorized persons information properly classified under the Order;

- classify or continue the classification of information in violation of the order or any implementing directive;

- create or continue a special access program contrary to the requirements of the Order; or

- contravene any other provision of the Order or its implementing directive.

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Classification Challenges• Authorized holders of information, including authorized holders outside the classifying agency, are

encouraged and expected to challenge the classification of information they believe is improperly classified.

• Agencies must ensure individuals are not subject to retribution.

• Informal versus Formal Challenges

- Review by an impartial official or panel

- System for processing, tracking and recording formal challenges

- Written response within 60 days. (Affirmative response must identify or describe damage). 90 day non-response/120 day response

- Right to appeal agency decisions to the Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel (120 days)

-

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Derivative classifiers shall, whenever practicable, use a classified addendum whenever classified information constitutes a small portion of an otherwise unclassified document or prepare a product to allow for dissemination at the lowest level of classification possible or in unclassified form.

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Use of a Classified Addendum

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(a) Agencies with original classification authority shall prepare classification guides to facilitate the proper and uniform derivative classification of information. These guides shall conform to standards contained in directives issued under E.O. 13526.

(b) Each guide shall be approved personally and in writing by an official who:

(1) Has program or supervisory responsibility over the information or is the senior agency official; and

(2) Is authorized to classify information originally at the highest level of classification prescribed in the guide.

(c) Agencies shall establish procedures to ensure that classification guides are reviewed and updated as provided in directives issued under E.O. 13526.

Security Classification Guides

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(f) Makes clear that classification guides are not to be used to classify information for more than 25 years except for confidential human source, human intelligence source, or weapons of mass destruction information.

The duration of classification of a document classified by a derivative classifier using a classification guide shall not exceed 25 years from the date of the document, except for:

(1) Information that should clearly and demonstrably be expected to reveal the identity of a confidential human source or a human intelligence source or key design concepts of weapons of mass destruction; and

(2) Specific information incorporated into classification guides in accordance with section 2.2(e) of E.O. 13526.

Security Classification Guides (cont’d)

Classification by Compilation

A determination that information is classified through the compilation of unclassified is a derivative classification action based upon existing original classification guidance. If the compilation of unclassified information reveals a new aspect of information that meets the standards for classification, it shall be referred to an original classification authority with jurisdiction over the information to make an original classification decision.

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Overall classification marking:

Indicates the highest level of classification of any one portion of

the document

Department of Good WorksWashington, D.C. 20006

July 15, 2010

MEMORANDUM FOR AGENCY OFFICIALS

From: Joe Carver, Director

Subject: (U) Examples

1. (S) Paragraph 1 contains information from Paragraph 2 in the source document and is

therefore marked (S).

2. (U) Paragraph 2 contains “Unclassified” information. Therefore, this portion will be

marked with the designation “U” in parentheses preceding the portion.

SECRET

SECRET

Derivative Classification Markings

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Classification authority block:

SECRET


July 15, 2010








SECRET

Classified By: Identity of derivative classifier by name and position or by personal identifier.

Classified By: Stan Smith, Program Analyst

Derived From: Miscellaneous SCG, Dated January 5, 2009

Derived From: Source information

Declassify On: 20300715Declassify On: Declassification instructions


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● Source information (Derived From): Concisely identify the source document or the classification guide on the “Derived From” line, including the agency, and where available, the office of origin, and the date of the source or guide.

● When using multiple source documents, the “Derived From” line shall appear as:

Derived From: Multiple Sources

● The derivative classifier shall include a listing of the source materials on, or attached to, each derivatively classified document. Example:

(U) Sources:1. (U) Dept of Good Works Memorandum dated June 27, 2010, Subj: Examples2. (U) Dept of Good Works Memorandum dated May 20, 2009, Subj: Examples3. (U) Radar SCG dated February 2, 2006


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Declassification Instructions:

In most cases, the declassification date will be carried over from the source document.

Classified By: John E. Doe, Chief Division 5Reason: 1.4(a)

Declassify On: 20150627

Source document

Derivative documentClassified By: Joe Carver, Director

Derived From: Department of Good Works Memorandum dated June 27, 2010, Subj: (U) Examples

Declassify On: 20150627

Source Document 1 - Declassify On: 20350215Source Document 2 - Declassify On: 20320510Source Document 3 - Declassify On: 20291231

When there are multiple sources, the declassification instruction

will be the most restrictive date

Derivative Document - Declassify On: 20350215


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Portion marking:

Portion markings will be carried over from the

source document to the derivatively classified document. All other

portions will be appropriately marked.


July 15, 2010




1. (S) Paragraph 1 contains information that is classified SECRET and is therefore marked (S).

2. (U) Paragraph 2 contains “Unclassified” information. Therefore, this portion will be marked with the designation “U” in parentheses preceding

the portion.


July 15, 2010








Source document

Derivative document


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Declassification Instructions – Use of Exemptions from Automatic Declassification (25X1-25X9):

The 25X exemptions may only be used on the “Declassify On” line if an agency has identified permanently valuable information that needs to be exempted from

automatic declassification at 25 years and has received approval from the Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel (ISCAP) to exempt the

information and to incorporate the exemption into a classification guide. (See 32 C.F.R. Part 2001.26.)

When using an approved exemption, a date or event that has been approved by the ISCAP must be included with the marking and shall not exceed 50 years from the

date of the document.

Classified By: John E. Doe, Chief Division 5

Derived From: SCG title and dateDeclassify On: 25X3, 20540215


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Specific information, the release of which should clearly and demonstrably be expected to:

25X1 - reveal the identify of a confidential human source, a human intelligence source, a relationship with an intelligence or security service of a foreign government or international organization, or a non-human intelligence source; or impair the effectiveness of an intelligence method currently in use, available for use, or under development

25X2 - reveal information that would assist in the development, production, or use of weapons of mass destruction

25X3 - reveal information that would impair U.S. cryptologic systems or activities

25X4 - reveal information that would impair the application of state-of-the-art technology within a U.S. weapon system


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25X5 – reveal formally named or numbered U.S. military war plans that remain in effect, or reveal operational or tactical elements of prior plans that are contained in such active plans25X6 - reveal information, including foreign government information, that would cause serious harm to relations between the United States and a foreign government, or to ongoing diplomatic activities of the United States25X7 - reveal information that would impair the current ability of United States Government officials to protect the President, Vice President, and other protectees for whom protection services, in the interest of the national security, are authorized25X8 - reveal information that would seriously impair current national security emergency preparedness plans or reveal current vulnerabilities of systems, installations, or infrastructures relating to the national security25X9 - violate a statute, treaty, or international agreement that does not permit the automatic or unilateral declassification of information at 25 years.


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Section 3.3(h), E.O. 13526Records that contain information, the release of which should clearly and demonstrably be expected to reveal the following are exempt from automatic declassification at 50 years:

50X1-HUM – the identity of a confidential human source or a human intelligence source

50X2-WMD – key design concepts of weapons of mass destruction

50X__ - in extraordinary cases, additional specific information formally approved by the ISCAP

(50X1-50X9 – match the same categories as the 25X1-25X9 categories)

Section 3.3(h)(3), E.O. 1352675X___ - specific information may be exempted from automatic declassification at 75 years if formally approved by the ISCAP.


25 years

50 years

75 years25X__

_territo

ry

50X___

territory

75X___

territory

ISCAP

from automatic declassification

All other information

50X1-HUM (no date or event required)

50X2-WMD (no date or event required)E.O. 13526 section 3.3(h)(1)(B)

E.O. 13526 section 3.3(h)(1)(A)

ISCAP

ISC

APIdentity of confidential human

source or human intelligence source

Key design concepts of weapons of mass destruction

ISC

AP

Information that meets the standards of

E.O. 13526 section 3.3(b)

25X___ with a date

or event

E.O. 13526 section 3.3(b)

ISC

AP

50X___ with a date

or event

E.O. 13526 section 3.3(h)

(2)

ISC

AP

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The following declassification instructions are no longer valid and, if annotated on the source document, will not be carried over to the derivative document.

• X1, X2, X3, X4, X5, X6, X7, X8• OADR

• MR (never a valid declassification instruction)• Subject to Treaty or International Agreement

The derivative classifier shall calculate a date that is 25 years from the date of the source document when determining the declassification instruction for the derivative document.


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SECRETDepartment of Good Works

Washington, D.C. 20006

July 15, 2010




1. (S) Paragraph 1.

2. (U) Paragraph 2.

Classified By: OCA name and positionReason: 1.4(a)

Declassify On: OADR SECRET



January 21, 2011






2. (U) Paragraph 2 is unclassified.

Classified By: Derivative classifier’s nameDerived From: Dept of Good Works Memo,

dtd July 15, 2010Declassify On: July 15, 2035

SECRET

Source documentDerivative document

The same rules apply when the source document contains any

invalid markings (X1-X8; OADR; MR; Subject to treaty

or international agreement)

The same rules apply when the source document contains any

invalid markings (X1-X8; OADR; MR; Subject to treaty

or international agreement)

Calculate a date that is 25 years from the date of the source document.

Do not carry over “OADR”


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DNI Only or DCI Only are also no longer valid and, if annotated on the source document, will not be carried over to the derivative document.

If the document contains imagery, as described in E.O. 12951, the derivative classifier will mark the derivative document in the following manner:

Declassify on: 25X1, E.O. 12951

If the document does not contain imagery, as described in E.O. 12951, the derivative classifier will calculate a declassification date that is 25

years from the date of the source document.


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July 15, 2010




1. (S) Paragraph 1.

2. (U) Paragraph 2.


Declassify On: DNI OnlySECRET



January 21, 2011






2. (U) Paragraph 2 is unclassified.


dtd July 15, 2010Declassify On: 20350715

SECRET

Source document

Derivative document

Do not carry over “DNI Only”

If the source document contains “DNI Only” or “DCI Only” as a declassification instruction, and there is no imagery in the document, a declassification date will be

calculated 25 years from the date of the source

document.

If the source document contains “DNI Only” or “DCI Only” as a declassification instruction, and there is no imagery in the document, a declassification date will be

calculated 25 years from the date of the source

document.

Calculate a date that is 25 years from the date of the source document.

Derivative Classification Markings (Cont’d)

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Declassification

Instructions:



XxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxXxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx


Declassify On: DCI OnlySECRET

Source documentDerivative document

Do not carry over “DCI Only”



Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx.Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

xxx.


dtd July 15, 2010Declassify On: 25X1, E.O. 12951

SECRET

Secret

Secret

If the source document contains “DNI Only” or “DCI Only” as a declassification instruction, and contains

imagery, the new declassification instruction will read: “Declassify on:

25X1, E.O. 12951”

If the source document contains “DNI Only” or “DCI Only” as a declassification instruction, and contains

imagery, the new declassification instruction will read: “Declassify on:

25X1, E.O. 12951”

The declassification instruction on the derivatively classified document will read: Declassify on: 25X1, E.O. 12951


Reminders

• Only individuals specifically authorized in writing may classify documents originally.

• Only individuals with the appropriate security clearance, who are required by their work to restate classified source information, may derivatively classify information.

• The terms “Top Secret,” “Secret,” and “Confidential” are not to be used to mark executive branch information that has not been properly designated as classified national security information under E.O. 13526.

• Information shall not be classified for any reason unrelated to the protection of the national security.

• Classifiers and authorized holders are responsible for ensuring that information is appropriately classified and properly marked.

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Reminders (continued)

• Individuals who believe that information in their possession is inappropriately classified, or inappropriately unclassified, are expected to bring their concerns to the attention of responsible officials.

• The following markings are not authorized in the “Declassify On” line:

• Originating Agency’s Determination Required” or “OADR” for documents created after 10/14/95;

• “X1”, “X2”, “X3”, “X4”, “X5”, “X6”, “X7”, or “X8” for documents created after 9/22/2003;

• “Manual Review” or “MR;” • “DNI Only” or “DCI Only;”• “Subject to treaty or international agreement;” and• “25X1-human.”

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E.O. 13587

Structural Reforms to Improve the Security of Classified Networks and the Responsible Sharing and Safeguarding

of Classified Information

• Reinforce the importance of responsible information sharing

• Ensure that policies, processes, technical security solutions, oversight, and organizational cultures match information sharing & safeguarding requirements

• Emphasize consistent guidance and implementation across the entire Federal government

• Recognize the importance of shared risk and shared responsibility

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E.O. 13587 Governance Structure

• A Senior Information Sharing and Safeguarding Steering Committee to coordinate interagency efforts and ensuring that Departments and Agencies are held accountable for implementation of information sharing and safeguarding policy and standards.

• A Classified Information Sharing and Safeguarding to provide sustained, full-time focus on sharing and safeguarding of classified national security information.

• Senior representatives of the Department of Defense and the National Security Agency jointly act as the Executive Agent for Safeguarding Classified Information on Computer Networks to develop technical safeguarding policies and standards and conduct assessments of compliance.

• An Insider Threat Task Force to develop a government-wide program for insider threat detection and prevention to improve protection and reduce potential vulnerabilities of classified information from exploitation, compromise or other unauthorized disclosure.

Areas of Focus & Ongoing Improvement

Removable Media

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Initial Operating Capability (IOC) Definition:

● IOC is reached when write privileges are disabled and/or controlled using a hardware or software solution

Final Operating Capability (FOC) Definition:

● FOC includes IOC, and is achieved when a monitoring and alerting function is implemented for all successful / unsuccessful

“write” attempts to removable media devices.

Reducing Anonymity


● FOC includes IOC, and is achieved when:

● 90 percent of users have PKI certificates for identification (or a comparable solution) on classified networks (Secret and Top Secret); and

● Hardware tokens are used for authentication to enable access to high and medium-sensitivity applications (software tokens are sufficient pursuant to Intelligence

Community policy and with coordination with the Steering Committee).

Initial Operating Capability (IOC) Definition: ● IOC is reached when the PKI is established such that:

● Certificates are issued (or a comparable solution) for identification for a minimum of 10 percent of users on classified networks (Secret and Top Secret) and

● PKI tokens are used for authentication to high-sensitivity applications (software tokens are sufficient pursuant to Intelligence Community policy and with

coordination with the Steering Committee).

Insider Threat Program

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Initial Operating Capability (IOC) Definition:

● IOC is reached when an agency has policies, procedures, and an organizational structure that identifies an accountable official(s) for the insider threat program, provides regular insider threat

awareness training to agency personnel, and includes an integrated approach to gathering (electronically and/or manually)

relevant sources of insider threat information for analysis and response.

Insider Threat Program

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● FOC includes IOC, and is achieved when an agency has implemented the capabilities for:

● Monitoring user network activities on all agency networks;

● Inclusion of counterintelligence triggers for user-monitoring tailored to the agency environment;

● Establishing an integrated capability to monitor, audit, gather, and analyze information relevant to insider threat analysis from across the agency; and

● There is a capability for integrated insider threat analysis of current data on user actions collected from automated and/or manual information sources – such as audit data, foreign travel and contact reporting, financial disclosure, facility, access, phone records, and external databases.

Access Control

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Initial Operating Capability (IOC) Definition: IOC is reached when an interoperable infrastructure for integrated access-control capability (hard-token PKI plus “attribute-based” authorization) is operational (Secret and Top Secret) in accordance with the Federal Identity, Credential, and Access Management (FICAM) framework or equivalent guidance appropriate for the subject network fabric.

● Establishes capability for user attribute provisioning to support attribute-based authorization on classified networks.

● Requires this capability to be integrated with the PKI authentication capability.

Scope:

● Minimum of 10 percent of users on classified networks are provisioned with attributes for authorization-related access-control decisions.

● Minimum of 25 percent of classified data repositories designated as highest sensitivity (as defined in NIST SP 800-53, CNSSI 1253, ICD 503 or equivalent guidance appropriate for the subject network fabric) are integrated to use the interoperable access-control infrastructure facilities (PKI integrated with attribute-based access control).

Access Control

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FOC includes IOC, and is achieved when an agency has implemented the capabilities for:

● Federation (exchange) of standardized user authorization attributes on classified networks across organizations;

● Consistent application of fabric-wide access control policy, with timely promulgation of policy changes; and

●Tagging of information resources with access-relevant attributes on ingest, creation, or modification; as applicable.

Scope:

● All users of classified networks.

● All high and medium-sensitivity classified network applications.

Enterprise Audit

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Initial Operating Capability (IOC) Definition: IOC is reached when an agency has the ability to:

● Monitor user-attributable activities (defined as Auditable Events in ICS 500-27) on at least one community-shared information resource on at least one of the agency’s classified networks;

● Analyze identified anomalies (which includes correlating such anomalies with other data sources);

● Report and respond to potential security incidents through collaboration with the appropriate CI, security, law enforcement, or Information Security (INFOSEC) offices;

● Provide automated notifications of security incidents from a community-shared information resource on at least one of the agency’s classified networks to the appropriate offices;

● Deliver an automated flow of audit data from a community-shared information resource on at least one of the agency’s classified networks into an agency-specific audit capability; and

● Provide audit data to other affected organizations.

Enterprise Audit

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FOC includes IOC applied to all classified networks, and is achieved when an agency has implemented the ability to:

● Share user-attributable audit information in a common format collected from high and medium-sensitivity information resources (both internal and community-shared) for users;

● Analyze identified anomalies; and

● Enable a timely response to incidents.

E.O.13549“Classified National Security Information Program for State,

Local, Tribal, and Private Sector Entities” (SLTPS)

• Establishes a program to safeguard and govern access to classified information shared by the Federal Government with SLTPS entities.

• Ensures that security standards for classified information are applied in accordance with national policy.

• Private sector facilities where classified information is or will be used or stored as well as contractors of SLT entities shall be inspected, accredited, and monitored for compliance with the standards established pursuant to the NISP by DoD or another responsible Cognizant Security Agency.

• SLTPS-Policy Advisory Committee created to discuss policy disputes and facilitate or recommend changes to remove undue impediment to information sharing

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Key Elements of the E.O. 13556 (CUI)

• Establishes an open and uniform program.

• Manages all unclassified information within the executive branch that requires safeguarding and dissemination controls.

• The control of this information is pursuant to and consistent with law, regulation, and Government-wide policy.

• Freedom of Information Act (FOIA): “The mere fact that information is designated as CUI shall not have a bearing on determinations pursuant to any law requiring the disclosure of information or permitting disclosure as a matter of discretion, including disclosures to the legislative or judicial branches.” –

Section 2(b)

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Overview of the CUI ProgramOne uniform and consistent policy

applied to a defined and organized body

of information

Approved CUI Categories

1. Agriculture

2. Copyright

3. Critical Infrastructure

4. Emergency Management

5. Export Control

6. Financial

7. Immigration

8. Intelligence

9. Law Enforcement

10. Transportation

11. Nuclear

12. Patent

13. Privacy

14. Proprietary

15. Statistical

16. Tax

17. Legal

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Five Programmatic Areas of the Compliance Plan

Controlled Unclassified Information

Compliance Plan

Processes and procedures of continuous monitoring to ensure compliance with

the EO and Notice

Roles and responsibilities established to guide and direct the program and its requirements

Development, implementation and revision of properly

documented policies that are readily available to all

affected personnel

Education of affected personnel on the appropriate handling of information

including responsibilities and ongoing maintenance

Identify and assess requirements of IT systems and toolsets for program

implementation

CUI Executive AgentCurrent Efforts

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• Development of CUI Supplemental Guidance & Consultation Interagency Representatives of the public State, Local, Tribal Private Sector

• Approval of Additional CUI Categories & Subcategories CUI Registry Updates Continuing Agency Submissions

• Approval of Compliance Plans Target Date Updates Continuing Agency Submissions

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Contact Information

Information Security Oversight OfficeNational Archives and Records Administration700 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Room 100

Washington, DC 20408-0001

(202) 357-5250(202) 357-5907 (fax)

[email protected]@nara.gov

www.archives.gov/isoo

QUESTIONS?

59

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