dept. of economics u niversity of a laska a nchorage voluntary approaches to transitioning from...
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Dept. of Economics
UNIVERSITY of ALASKA
ANCHORAGE
Voluntary Approaches to Transitioning fromCompetitive Fisheries to Rights-Based
Management:An Experimental Analysis
or
Bringing the Field into the Lab
Gunnar KnappJim Murphy
Dept. of Economics
UNIVERSITY of ALASKA
ANCHORAGEEvolution of fisheries management institutionsInstitution Characteristics Problem
Open-Access(Common Pool)
No regulation Over-fishing(“Tragedy of the Commons”)
Dept. of Economics
UNIVERSITY of ALASKA
ANCHORAGEEvolution of fisheries management institutionsInstitution Characteristics Problem
Open-Access(Common Pool)
No regulation Over-fishing(“Tragedy of the Commons”)
RegulatedOpen-Access
Limit on total catch Race for fish;Excess inputs
Dept. of Economics
UNIVERSITY of ALASKA
ANCHORAGEEvolution of fisheries management institutionsInstitution Characteristics Problem
Open-Access(Common Pool)
No regulation Over-fishing(“Tragedy of the Commons”)
RegulatedOpen-Access
Limit on total catch Race for fish;Excess inputs
Limited entryInput restrictions
Race for fish;“Capital stuffing” of unrestricted inputs
Problems with Limited Entry Management in Alaska’s Bristol Bay Salmon Fishery . . . Race for Fish
Fishermen get in each other’s way competing for the best place to catch fish (“Derby fishing)
(Photograph by Bart Eaton)
Although boats are restricted to 32’ in length, over time fishermen have built wider and taller boats in an effort to catch a larger share of the available fish.
Boat costs have increased without any corresponding increase in catches.
Old 32’ boat (1970s)New 32’ boat (1990s)
(Photograph by Norm Van Vactor)
Problems with Limited Entry Management in Alaska’s Bristol Bay Salmon Fishery . . .“Capital Stuffing”
Evolution of fisheries management institutionsInstitution Characteristics Problem
Open-Access(Common Pool)
No regulation Over-fishing(“Tragedy of the Commons”)
RegulatedOpen-Access
Limit on total catch Race for fish;Excess inputs
Limited entryInput restrictions
Race for fish;“Capital stuffing” of unrestricted inputs
Rights-Based Limits on individual catches(Individual quotas)
Allocation issues(who gets the quotas?)Transition issues
Our Research Focus:Voluntary Transition to Rights-Based Management APPROACH:
• Divide the total quota between a derby fishery and a rights-based fishery
• Give fishermen a choice between fisheries• Base quotas on the number of fishermen choosing each fishery
LOGIC:• Opportunity to demonstrate benefits• “Win-win” • Reduced opposition
QUESTION:• Does voluntary transition lead to easier and quicker adoption?
Experimental Methodology
Basic math of the derby fishery problem:
p price of harvest
qi individual harvest
xi input choice
ci (xi) cost function
max i i ipq c xStandard profit max:
Maximizing profits in a derby
i ii
j j
xq Q
x
p price of harvest
qi individual harvest
xi input choice
ci (xi) cost function
max i i ipq c xStandard profit max:
i skill
Q aggregate quota
where:
Share of total harvest
Potential experimental approach:Nonlinear social dilemma payoff table
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 101 9.56 12.46 13.69 14.25 14.48 14.52 14.44 14.28 14.06 13.81 0.142 6.23 9.13 10.69 11.58 12.10 12.38 12.49 12.50 12.43 12.29 0.293 4.56 7.13 8.69 9.68 10.31 10.71 10.94 11.05 11.06 11.01 0.434 3.56 5.79 7.26 8.25 8.92 9.38 9.66 9.83 9.91 9.91 0.575 2.90 4.84 6.19 7.14 7.81 8.28 8.60 8.81 8.92 8.96 0.716 2.42 4.13 5.35 6.25 6.90 7.38 7.71 7.93 8.06 8.13 0.867 2.06 3.57 4.69 5.52 6.15 6.61 6.94 7.17 7.31 7.39 1.00
64 -0.13 -0.27 -0.42 -0.57 -0.74 -0.91 -1.09 -1.28 -1.47 -1.67 9.1465 -0.13 -0.28 -0.43 -0.59 -0.76 -0.93 -1.12 -1.31 -1.51 -1.71 9.2966 -0.14 -0.29 -0.44 -0.61 -0.78 -0.96 -1.14 -1.34 -1.54 -1.74 9.4367 -0.14 -0.30 -0.46 -0.62 -0.80 -0.98 -1.17 -1.37 -1.57 -1.78 9.5768 -0.15 -0.30 -0.47 -0.64 -0.82 -1.00 -1.20 -1.39 -1.60 -1.81 9.7169 -0.15 -0.31 -0.48 -0.65 -0.84 -1.03 -1.22 -1.42 -1.63 -1.84 9.8670 -0.16 -0.32 -0.49 -0.67 -0.85 -1.05 -1.24 -1.45 -1.66 -1.88 10.00
My Input Choice
To
tal
Inp
ut
Ch
oic
e o
f O
ther
Gro
up
Mem
ber
s
Averag
e Inp
ut C
ho
ice of O
ther G
rou
p M
emb
ers
Concerns about payoff tables
We don’t live in a world of payoff tables• A lot of numbers, hard to read• Too abstract??
Frames how a person should think about the game• May affect extent of cooperative behavior
How to address heterogeneity of fishing skill?
Harvesting experiment
8 subjects per group 20 cups of beans in large bowl Revenue is $1/cup.
Subjects need to purchase “gear” to harvest the beans.• Select a measuring cup• Larger gear costs more.
Experiment supplies
20 cups of pinto beans
Measuring scoops
Subjects harvest beans by scooping them into a pitcher on the floor
Gear (measuring cups)
Scoop Size(cups)
Cost(scoops)
Cost(cups)
1/8 0.551/4 1.091/3 1.461/2 2.192/3 2.923/4 3.281 4.38
TotalPer Person 2.5 cups
Cost of your harvesting scoop is:
4.375
Amount of beans in the bowl20.0 cups
RoundTreatment
1Treatment
2Treatment
3Practice Skill Skill Skill
1Skill Skill Skill2
34
Derby
Derby Derby5678
Choice between Derby &
Individual Quota
Choice between Derby &
Individual Quota
91011121314
Skill1516
Experiment Summary:
3 treatments4 sessions per
treatment16 rounds per session
Derby video
An unanticipated but interesting result:Significant rent dissipation occurs as beans are spilled
05
10P
erce
nt o
f ob
serv
atio
ns
10 20 30 40 50Percent of Beans Spilled
Mean = 27%
$5.40 per period spilled
(= $0.68/person)
There is wide heterogeneity in “fishing” skill, highly correlated across rounds
05
1015
2025
Per
cent
of
sub
ject
s
.05 .1 .15 .2Share of Total Catch in the Skill Treatment
We can predict catch shares accurately as a function of “skill” and cup choices (we can estimate catch functions)
0.1
.2.3
Sha
re o
f Ca
tch
0 .1 .2 .3 .4Share of Power
Share of Catch vs. Share of Power
010
2030
Per
cent
0 1/8 1/4 1/3 1/2 2/3 3/4 1Cup Size
Distribution of Cup Choices
Rent dissipation occurs through capital stuffing:Subjects choose scoops larger than 1/8 cup
“Nash” Prediction (with homogeneous subjects):
1/2 cup if no spills
1/3 cup if 25% spilled
05
1015
20P
erce
nt
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2EarningsUSD
Derby Earnings – Rents are almost fully dissipated
Mean = $0.15
17% were < 0
Derby Summary
Predicted(with no spills,
subject homogeneity) Mean Observed
Harvest / person 2.50 1.81 (73%)Spills are an
externality
Cup size 1/2 cup(cost=2.19)
1/3 cup(mean cost=1.66)
Earnings 0.31(16% efficiency)
0.15(8% efficiency)
IFQ video
Voluntary transition: hypotheses
Given the option to choose between a competitive fishery and a quota fishery, some but not all subjects will choose the quota fishery
Over time, the number of subjects choosing the quota fishery will increase
Average gear use (harvest cost) will be lower in both the quota and the competitive fishery than in a competitive-only fishery
Average profits will be higher in both the quota and the competitive fishery than in a competitive-only fishery
RESULTS:Some but not all subjects chose the quota fishery.Over time, the number of subjects choosing the quota fishery
increased. Average Number of Subjects Choosing Quota Fishery
(Average for four experiments, IHQ80 Treatment*)
0.0
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
6.0
7.0
8.0
8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
period
num
ber
of s
ubje
cts
*Beans were allocated between bowls so that the
volume of beans per subject was always 25% higher in the competitive fishery than in the
quota fishery.
RESULTS: Average gear use (harvest cost) are lower in the quota fishery and (in later periods) in the competitive fishery
Average Cup Size by Period(Average for four experiments, IHQ80 treatment experiments)
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
0.35
0.40
0.45
0.50
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
period
Ave
rage
cup
siz
e
Competive,mandatory 1/4 cupscoop
Competitive,optional scoop size
Competitive bowl
Quota bowl
RESULTS: Average profits are higher in both the quota and the competitive fishery than in a competitive-only fishery
Average Earnings by Period(Average for four experiments, IHQ80 treatment experiments)
0.00
0.50
1.00
1.50
2.00
2.50
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
period
Ave
rag
e ea
rnin
gs (
cups
)
Competive,mandatory 1/4cup scoop
Competitive,optional scoopsize
Quota bowl
Average, bothbowls
Competitivebowl