department of trade & industry the united kingdom's civil ... · united kingdom's...

REPORT BY THE COMPTROLLER AND AUDITOR GENERALHC 359 Session 2003-2004: 16 March 2004

Department of Trade & Industry

The United Kingdom's Civil Space Activities

The National Audit Officescrutinises public spending

on behalf of Parliament.

The Comptroller and Auditor General, Sir John Bourn, is an Officer of the

House of Commons. He is the head of theNational Audit Office, which employs some800 staff. He, and the National Audit Office,

are totally independent of Government.He certifies the accounts of all Government

departments and a wide range of other publicsector bodies; and he has statutory authority

to report to Parliament on the economy, efficiency and effectiveness

with which departments and other bodieshave used their resources.

Our work saves the taxpayer millions ofpounds every year. At least £8 for every

£1 spent running the Office.

LONDON: The Stationery Office£9.25

Ordered by theHouse of Commons

to be printed on 15 March 2004

REPORT BY THE COMPTROLLER AND AUDITOR GENERALHC 359 Session 2003-2004: 16 March 2004

Department of Trade and Industry

The United Kingdom's Civil Space Activities

This report has been prepared under Section 6 of theNational Audit Act 1983 for presentation to the Houseof Commons in accordance with Section 9 of the Act.

John Bourn National Audit OfficeComptroller and Auditor General 15 March 2004

The National Audit Office study team consisted of:

Jon Cable, Jason Smith and Robert Cope under thedirection of Nick Sloan.

This report can be found on the National Audit Officeweb site at www.nao.org.uk

For further information about the National Audit Officeplease contact:

National Audit OfficePress Office157-197 Buckingham Palace RoadVictoriaLondonSW1W 9SP

Tel: 020 7798 7400

Email: [email protected]

© National Audit OfficeArtist's impression of one of the satellites within the ESA and EU's plannedGalileo constellation.

ContentsExecutive summary 1

Part 1

The Partnership model 9

International partnerships 9

Organisational structures for managing 11space programmes

The role of BNSC Headquarters 14

Part 2

Strategic oversight of space activities 15

The Space Strategy Council 15

The Space Strategy for the United Kingdom 16

Monitoring performance 18

Part 3

Support for the space industry 21

The concept of fair return 21

Funding the DTI Space national programme 22

Support for small businesses 28

Part 4

Management of the national 29space programmes

Project appraisal 29

Project management 29

Programme monitoring and evaluation 31

Appendices

1. Methodology 33

2. International comparison 35

3. Successful outcomes of the United Kingdom's 36space activities

4. Glossary of terms 38

DTI: THE UNITED KINGDOM'S CIVIL SPACE ACTIVITIES

Photographic credits:Front cover and pages 6-7: ESA - Ducros. Title and contents pages: ESA - J. Huart. Page 1: ESA - Illustration by Medialab. Pages 3, 5, 20 and 36: Surrey Satellite Technology Ltd. Pages 4 and 14: ESA/A. Van Der Geest. Page 8 and 37: ESA. Page 13: ESA - J. Huart.Pages 25-27: ESA 2001. Illustration by Medialab. Page 32: ESA/EADs Astrium/Boostec Industries.

executivesummary


1

exec

utiv

e su

mm

ary

1 The Government has taken a distinctive approach to space by identifying thescientific, commercial and social objectives for which space activities are themost effective tool, rather than considering the exploration of space as an end initself. In its latest civil space strategy for the period 2003-06, the Government hasagreed the following objectives for its investment in space:

� enhance the United Kingdom's standing in astronomy, planetary andenvironmental sciences;

� stimulate increased productivity by promoting the use of space ingovernment, science and commerce; and

� develop innovative space systems, to deliver a sustainable improvement inthe quality of life.

2 The Government spent a total of £160.2 million on its civil space activities in2002-03, and has a planned expenditure of £178.2 million for 2003-04. TheUnited Kingdom's expenditure on civil space is small and tightly focusedcompared to those of several key players, primarily the United States but alsoEuropean nations such as France and Germany. United Kingdom civil spaceactivities are delivered through a range of Departments, Agencies and ResearchCouncils. These bodies co-ordinate policy and programmes through the BritishNational Space Centre (BNSC) Partnership and are listed in Figure 1.

3 Exploiting space is expensive and a considerable amount of space activity isundertaken by nations collaborating on projects. In Europe, the maincollaborative body is the European Space Agency (ESA), an organisation of 15 member states, including the United Kingdom, in existence since 1975, and with a budget of Euro 3,648 million (£2,293m) in 2002. Figure 2 provides an analysis of the expenditure on space for 2002-03 by the Government.

4 The majority of the Government's space expenditure is directed to ESA and to theinter-governmental organisation EUMETSAT which provides and operates Europe'sweather forecasting satellites. The remaining 35 per cent is spent on the UnitedKingdom's domestic or national space programmes. The benefits from investmentin the national programmes are important, enabling the United Kingdom'sscientific and industrial communities to develop and play a leading role in somekey space projects.

Mars Express in orbit around Mars

5 This report examines:

� whether the BNSC Partnership model is the best way to manage the UnitedKingdom's civil space activities;

� whether the BNSC Partnership has a clear strategy for its space activities andis able to assess performance against that strategy;

� whether the BNSC Partnership is providing the best possible support to thespace industry to make the most of the opportunities in ESA and beyond; and

� whether the national programmes of DTI Space, PPARC and NERC are managed to ensure they deliver the best possible benefits for theUnited Kingdom.

2

exec

utiv

e su

mm

ary


Members of the BNSC Partnership and their objectives1

Source: BNSC Headquarters

Partner

Particle Physics and Astronomy ResearchCouncil (PPARC)

Natural Environment Research Council (NERC)

Office of Science and Technology (OST)

Department of Trade and Industry (DTI)

Meteorological Office

Ministry of Defence (MOD)

Department for Transport (DfT)

Department for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA)

Council for the Central Laboratory of theResearch Councils (CCLRC)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Objectives in Space

Invests in space in its pursuit of high quality basic research in astronomy, planetary science and particle physics

Space data are vital for improving the understanding of the Earth system andreducing uncertainties in environmental prediction

Interests in science policy and funding the Research Councils

Focused on increasing productivity in the economy through expanding the use ofinnovative space products and services, and developing competitive industry todeliver space infrastructure and services in the global market

Relies on international space infrastructure for global space data for meeting its keyperformance targets for weather forecasting and service quality

Ensuring the effective harmonisation of civil and military investment in spacetechnologies, collaboration on multiple-use items and guidance about opportunitiesfor United Kingdom firms in the space defence sector, especially the United States

Interests in space to meet transport policy needs and is investing in the developmentof European satellite navigation services in partnership with DTI and industry

Important user of space services which underpin national environmental prioritiessuch as climate change research and agriculture policy. Has invested directly in thedevelopment of space infrastructure and services

Has capabilities and facilities for space engineering at Rutherford Appleton Laboratory

Responsible for some aspects of international cooperation on space activities

Government expenditure on space2


Body / Programme Funded

European Space Agency

EUMETSAT

Domestic Programmes

Total

Outturn for 2002-03

89.7

13.9

56.6

160.2

Percentage of Total

56

8.7

35.3

100

3

exec

utiv

e su

mm

ary


6 Two teams of consultants contributed to the production of this report (Appendix 1). First, we commissioned Social Research Associates (SRa) to carryout a survey of the key players in industry and academia involved in spaceprojects. Secondly, ESYS plc performed an analysis of the performance measuresneeded to monitor the space strategy. ESYS plc also conducted some internationalcomparisons of the United Kingdom's space activities with Canada, Italy,Germany and Norway (Appendix 2).

The Partnership model7 Some nations manage their space activities through a single space agency

where policy, funding and implementation are undertaken by one body. TheUnited Kingdom's partnership approach is more unusual but having been inexistence since 1985 is a forerunner of recent joined-up Government initiatives.The suitability of the partnership arrangement for managing its space activitiesgenerates significant debate in industry and academia. Our analysis shows thatthe partnership approach is a cost effective way of securing the benefits ofnational and international co-operation on space programmes. This is because itensures that partners consider the benefits of expenditure on space againstalternative investments, while also avoiding duplication.

8 BNSC Headquarters is responsible for co-ordinating the work of the Partnershipand we found that its overheads of £580,000 are low particularly whencompared with the value of contracts which the United Kingdom wins fromESA - some £242 million for the three years to 1 January 2003. Seniorrepresentatives of member organisations comprising the BNSC Partnershippraised the co-ordinating work of the Headquarters. We found that the staff inBNSC Headquarters have a good range of scientific, technical and administrativeskills. The Headquarters would benefit, however, from having more staff skilledin strategic planning, commercial activities and marketing, and BNSC is seekingto strengthen its skills in these areas, within the resources available, includingthrough the DTI interchange programme and in partnership with industry throughthe Space Industry Best Practice Club.

Strategic oversight of space activities9 The BNSC Partnership has been subject to a number of external reviews in recent

years. One review resulted in the creation of a new oversight body, the SpaceStrategy Council, which brings together the senior members of the partnerorganisations. Initial indications are that it works well as a forum for exchangingknowledge between the partners but that it will need to provide a more long termfocus, for example, on options for United Kingdom participation in programmesresulting from the European White Paper on Space.

10 The structure of the current space strategy follows best practice, as set out bythe Office of Government Commerce, and provides an overarching view of theissues facing the Partnership. It relies on the individual Partners' plans for amore detailed analysis of options. Respondents to our survey thought thestrategy vague though they may not have been aware of the part played by moredetailed Partner plans at the next level. For example, although the strategyrecognises the close relationship between the United Kingdom's outlook onspace and that of the European Union it might show more fully how the BNSCPartnership intends to benefit from the increased activity undertaken by theEuropean Union in space. The Partnership played a significant role instimulating the European Union's recent interest in space and in engenderinglinks between ESA and the European Union.

NigeriaSat-1, supported under the DTI SpaceMOSAIC programme, under construction at theSurrey Space Centre in Guildford, United Kingdom.

4

exec

utiv

e su

mm

ary


11 Overall, when benchmarked against Italy, Germany, Canada and Norway wefound that the space programmes in the United Kingdom resulted from the widestranging process of consultation. BNSC Headquarters consults advisory boards toensure that it takes account of the views of space stakeholders and experts whenmaking investment decisions and informing the Partnership's strategy. BNSCvalues the separate advice of these boards and their ability to deal with points ofcommon interest. The chairmen of the advisory boards told us that there had beenno significant exchange of views between the boards. A co-ordinated responsefrom the advisory boards would be particularly valuable when considering theSpace Strategy, by identifying programmes of interest to more than one board. In 2002, BNSC decided that the chairmen of the boards should provideindependent briefing for the Space Strategy Council which they consider isimproving co-operation between the boards. BNSC has also instigated meetingsbetween itself and the chairmen of the advisory boards to improve liaisonbetween the boards.

12 The BNSC Partnership is aware that it needs some new measures to trackperformance against its high level objectives, for example, the impact of space onthe wider economy, set out in its space strategy which was published inDecember 2003. Advised by a firm of consultants the National Audit Office hasmade some suggestions on the types of measures needed which the BNSCPartnership has agreed to consider.

Support for the space industry13 The United Kingdom has a small but competitive space industry. One advantage

of being a member of ESA is that a nation's space industry can benefit fromcontracts issued by ESA for developing space instruments and other work. Eachmember state expects to receive contracts to the equivalent value of itsaccumulated contributions over time (less ESA overheads) subject to a minimumthreshold, currently 90 per cent - the concept of juste retour. According to ESA'sdata the United Kingdom has been at or slightly over its anticipated level of returnand the contracts won have been predominantly of a high technological quality.In 2001, following up a concern raised by a British company, BNSC found that ESAappeared to have been understating the level of sub-contracts won by non-UnitedKingdom firms within United Kingdom led contracts, which had led to an overstatement of the United Kingdom's overall return under juste retour. BNSCrequired ESA to analyse all contracts of that type and to make appropriate changesto the United Kingdom's level of return. The data corrected to date has led to a re-classification of Euro 10 million (£6.9 million) of contracts from the UnitedKingdom to other members of ESA. While the impact of this change on the abilityof United Kingdom firms to win contracts from ESA cannot be measured there wasa modest risk that this could have affected the ability of United Kingdom firms towin new business in 2001 and 2002. Under the cumulative system operated thevalue of any business lost is likely to be recovered in future years.

14 Between 2001-02 and 2003-04, the budget for the DTI national programmedecreased by 62 per cent from £21.7 million to £8.4 million. While DTI can pointto a number of important industrial achievements that have been supported withfunding from the national programme the substantial cut in national programmefunding and the implications of that cut for the space industry are not analysedin detail in the Space Strategy. Most respondents to our survey felt that the scaleof investment in DTI's national programme was too low, but any discussion onfunding has to take account of the constraint on overall Government expenditureimposed by its biennial spending reviews.

15 We examined a sample of DTI's business cases produced over the last five years.This examination highlighted weaknesses in option appraisal and the treatmentof risks and assessment of benefits. An example where the risks could have beenhighlighted more fully in the business case was the Beagle 2 lander included on

ESA's Envisat mission, which has had significant United Kingdom involvement, in the cleanroom at

ESA's ESTEC centre in the Netherlands.

5

exec

utiv

e su

mm

ary


ESA's Mars Express mission. In this case technical risks were identified and asensible approach taken to risk mitigation during project implementation. But theresidual risks in the project were not set out in the appraisal of the case made byBNSC for public funding - although ESA on behalf of BNSC accepted all had beendone to mitigate those risks by March 2003 when formally accepting Beagle 2onto the Mars Express mission.

16 The United Kingdom's space industry has an excellent reputation in a number offields such as the development of small satellites. The BNSC Partnership looks toprovide sufficient information, guidance and funding to enable industry to flourishparticularly when competing for contracts from ESA. Within its financial andoperational constraints the BNSC Partnership performs this role well althoughsmall firms have a concern about the support on offer. For example, our survey ofthe space sector highlighted that 36 per cent of small firms were not aware that theBNSC Headquarters provides support when firms are bidding for ESA contracts.Our survey found that large firms were better placed to take advantage of thissupport. A wide range of support is available from BNSC Headquarters, tradeassociations and ESA for small firms. However, new entrants to the market areunlikely to be members of a trade association and can be unfamiliar with ESAprocedures. In practice BNSC Headquarters has provided support mainly to thosesmall firms bidding for ESA contracts for space missions, the 'upstream' element ofindustry. They are considering extending support offered to small firms addingvalue from their 'downstream' activities, for example space data analysis, in future.

Management of the national space programmes17 The DTI Space national programmes cover; Applications Technology Support

(ATS); Satellite Telecommunications and Navigation; Earth Observation; theMOSAIC small satellite programme; and publicity and education. NERC andPPARC also have their own national space programmes. NERC's is geared towardsimproving understanding of the natural environment, while PPARC invests inspace to carry out research in astronomy, planetary science and particle physics.

18 The appraisal and approval of new projects are good. The management ofindividual space projects across these three organisations varies as evidenced bythe differing levels of oversight accorded to different programmes, depending ontheir cost, risks, content and overall timescale. A number of the DTI Spaceprojects have suffered delays often as a result of external factors such asunexpected changes in the market or delays with launches. Delays, either in thedevelopment of a mission or its launch, are a significant and well understood risk,because missions are inherently complex. But delays still act to defer the intendedscientific and commercial benefits. NERC's two main projects to developinstruments for space are currently running to budget although both have hadsignificant delays to their launch largely because of events outside NERC'scontrol. PPARC is funding 20 missions in 2003-04. It provided cost and time datafor the build phase of eight missions which showed that while only some have anincrease in cost against budget in real terms most are significantly late againstoriginal or planned launch dates, again largely because of factors outsidePPARC's control. Such factors emphasise the need for the policy that PPARC nowhas of making contingency provision for such delays at the outset of a project.

19 All three bodies can point to many important commercial or scientific outcomesfrom their space programmes, though there have been few complete evaluationsof those programmes. DTI Space has individual evaluations underway or plannedfor all but one of its four main development programmes. There are no immediateplans for further evaluation of the ATS programme which has been included in astudy of benefits and spillovers from the National Space programme byindependent consultants to the DTI. A full evaluation of the NERC space activitiesis planned for 2005-06. PPARC considers evaluation on a mission by missionbasis to be the most appropriate.

An SSTL engineer at the Surrey Space Centreprepares BILSAT-1, supported under the DTI Space MOSAIC programme, for shipment.

6

exec

utiv

e su

mm

ary


20 The United Kingdom's space activities have a number of strengths: lean, user-focused programmesbuilt up from wide consultation; good relations between domestic partners and with internationalcolleagues; well-received support for a competitive space industry; and a history of delivery ofsuccessful projects. But there are a number of areas where the co-ordination of space activities couldusefully be strengthened, to make sure the opportunities for productive investment in space areclearly identified and analysed, and the benefits flow as intended. We recommend that:

On strategic planning and monitoring� The Space Strategy Council should give more emphasis to some of the longer-term issues for the

United Kingdom's space activities - for example, the implications of greater European Unionresources applied to programmes aimed at commercial and public policy applications of space.

� The long-term nature of space projects militates in favour of a greater degree of stability in thefunding of industry support programmes than has recently been the case. The level of that fundingshould be based on a clear analysis of intermediate outcomes, such as winning high intellectualcontent ESA contracts, and contribution to achieving the strategic space objectives.

� The Partnership should measure their performance against the objectives laid down in the newSpace Strategy, filling the gaps in their information base and building on the framework producedby our consultants.

On support for industry� The maintenance of accurate juste retour statistics is important to the national interest of the United

Kingdom, being a key indicator of the success of our investment in ESA. DTI Space should continueto press ESA to ensure that any mis-allocations by ESA are identified and corrected, so as tominimise any effect on United Kingdom firms.

� DTI Space should give added emphasis to the needs of small firms that are new to the spacesector. They should also consider giving added emphasis to those firms providing valueadded services in the downstream element of the space industry.

On the management of national programmes� In the business cases we examined we found that DTI Space made the case for

strategic intervention well, setting clear objectives. However, it needs to developa more consistent approach to the analysis of the risks to implementation to ensurethat all projects are delivered within time and cost targets.

� PPARC provided the National Audit Office with cost and time data for the build phasefor eight out of the 20 missions it is funding in 2003-04. PPARC does not currently have a systemin place which enables it to readily produce historical data on cost and time against estimates forall of its projects but plans to have such a system in place for current and future projects byApril 2005. The ability to maintain cost and time data is fundamental and should be introduced assoon as possible.

� DTI Space and PPARC should consider whether more systematic evaluations of their respectivenational programmes might be more appropriate than the present project by project assessment andshould continue to work closely with NERC to ensure joined up programme planning.

Recommendations

Artist's impression of ESA's X-Ray Multi Mirror mission (XMM) in which the United Kingdom has had significant involvement. See Appendix 3

Part 1


The Partnership model

9

part

one

1.1 This section of the report describes the institutionalarrangements that co-ordinate the United Kingdom'scivil space programmes. There are a variety oforganisational arrangements that exist amongst nationsthat have space programmes. The partnership approachis appropriate given the United Kingdom's policyemphasis on the uses and users of space.

International partnerships1.2 The BNSC Partnership, shown in Figure 3, is a voluntary

collection of ten Government Departments, Agencies,and Research Councils whose combined plannedexpenditure on civil space for 2003-04 is £178.2 milliontogether with one non-Governmental organisation. Over 80 per cent of the funding for space activities isprovided by the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI),either directly or through the Office of Science andTechnology (OST).

1.3 For the period 2003-04 some 65 per cent of the UnitedKingdom's total space expenditure is allocated to fundprogrammes undertaken by either the European SpaceAgency (ESA) or EUMETSAT, an inter-governmentalorganisation which is responsible for providing andoperating the European system of meteorologicalsatellites. A large proportion of the remaining 35 per centof the expenditure is directed towards the UnitedKingdom's national programmes which are aimed at bothpositioning the scientific and industrial communities totake maximum advantage from current and future ESAprogrammes, scientific exploration and covering gaps inESA activities in areas of particular interest or benefit to theUnited Kingdom. The national programmes consist of aseries of projects funded by the DTI Space Sector Team(DTI Space), the Particle Physics and Astronomy ResearchCouncil (PPARC) and the Natural Environment ResearchCouncil (NERC).

Members of the BNSC Partnership3


Type of Partner

Funding

Consulting

Advising

Partner

Department of Trade and Industry (DTI)Office of Science and Technology (OST)Natural Environment Research Council (NERC)Particle Physics and Astronomy Research Council (PPARC)The Meteorological OfficeMinistry of Defence (MOD)Department for Transport (DfT)Department of the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA)Council for the Central Laboratory of the Research Councils (CCLRC)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

United Kingdom Industrial Space Committee (UKISC)

NOTE

Funding Partners are those Government bodies that invest in space technology either directly or by making financial resources availableto the Partnership. Consulting partners are those Government bodies that have an interest in the use or development of space policy andtechnology. Advising partners are non-governmental organisations who have expertise and interest in space policy or technology e.g.UKISC, the trade association of the space industry in the United Kingdom.

10

part

one


1.4 The BNSC Partnership although in many respects a virtualorganisation, is co-ordinated through BNSC Headquarters,a body that has always been hosted by DTI but includesrepresentation from a number of partners. The BNSCHeadquarters provides a single point of representation forthe United Kingdom at international forums, such as ESA,and advises on the long term strategic view of the benefitsof spending in space.

1.5 Participation in ESA is fundamental to the achievementof the United Kingdom's objectives for space activity. Itgives access to programmes of a scale which would be

difficult to fund on either a national or bilateral basis.Established in 1975, ESA has the overall objective ofshaping the direction and development of Europe'sspace capability, ensuring that investment in space is ofbenefit to European citizens.

1.6 ESA has fifteen full members and five co-operating states(Canada, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Luxembourgand Greece). The latest figures available show that thetotal ESA expenditure for 2002 was Euro 3,648 million(£2,293m1) and Figure 5 provides a breakdown of themajor contributors to ESA.

Contributions to ESA by member state in 2002 (£m)5

Source: ESA Annual Report 2002

Mandatory Optional Total

Contributor % Total (£m) % Total (£m) % Total (£m)

France 17.1 80 31.1 536 26.9 616Germany 25.0 118 25.7 443 24.5 561Italy 13.5 63 15.1 261 14.1 324Belgium 3.3 15 7.7 133 6.5 149United Kingdom 14.0 66 4.6 80 6.3 145Spain 6.9 32 3.8 66 4.3 99Other 20.4 96 12.0 207 13.2 303Third Parties - - - - 4.2 96

Total 100.0 470 100.0 1,726 100.0 2,293

NOTE

The 'Other' category includes nine member states whose combined contribution is 13.2 per cent of the total ESA contributions; TheNetherlands, Switzerland, Sweden, Denmark, Austria, Norway, Finland, Portugal and Republic of Ireland. The category for 'Third Parties'represents the co-operating states. The figures used are for 2002. For 2003-05 the United Kingdom will contribute 17.22 per cent of themandatory budget.

Civil space expenditure co-ordinated through the BNSC Partnership (£m)4


Outturn figures for 2002-03 Planned expenditure for 2003-04

Partner ESA Non-ESA Total (£m) ESA Non-ESA Total (£m)

PPARC 29.0 20.0 49.0 44.0 18.0 62.0NERC 10.0 10.0 41.0 11.1 52.1DTI 60.7 24.3 85.0 25.2 8.9 34.1Met. Office 13.9 13.9 22.8 22.8MOD 2.3 2.3 2.2 2.2DfT 0.0 5.0 5.0

Total 89.7 70.5 160.2 115.2 63.0 178.2

NOTE

Following a DTI review PPARC and NERC were made financially responsible for the whole of the United Kingdom's contribution to theESA Science and Earth Observation science budgets respectively. The transfer of the budget from the DTI was effective from 2003-04 andis the reason why the forecast ESA expenditure across PPARC, NERC and DTI has altered significantly from the outturn for 2002-03. Thefigures for the Met. Office represent the United Kingdom's subscription to EUMETSAT. We are unable to quantify the level of public fundingprovided direct by Universities for space research and activities.

1 Corresponding average annual exchange rates are used through-out the report, except where a longer-term average is more appropriate.

11

part

one


1.7 ESA's mandatory activities (space science, technologyand the general budget) are funded by a financialcontribution from all the member states, calculated byreference to each country's national income. In addition,ESA also has four major categories of optionalprogrammes. Each country decides in which optionalprogramme it wishes to participate. The BNSC Partnershipparticipates significantly in two, Telecommunications(including Navigation) and Earth Observation.

1.8 The BNSC Partners select those ESA optionalprogrammes in which the United Kingdom shouldparticipate through a process which starts with analysisof the prospects for optional programmes, includesconsultation with specialist scientific and advisoryboards, and concludes, for major decisions, with advicefrom the BNSC Partnership's Space Strategy Council andapproval by ministers or the Treasury, where required.This process therefore provides for both specialist viewson the specific merits of optional programmes and thoseof the Partners more widely on overall priorities. Wecompared the breadth and depth of the BNSCPartnership's consultation on its space strategy with thatused by four other ESA member and co-operatingmember states. We concluded that relative to thesenations the Partnership has implemented a wide reachingprocess to capture the views of the main stakeholders onthe Space Strategy. Our own survey of industry andacademia involved in space projects in the UnitedKingdom showed that 55 per cent of respondents hadparticipated directly in the space strategy consultationprocess although not all respondents were content withthe outcome of the consultations.

1.9 Our survey of the space sector also questionedrespondents about the openness and effectiveness of theprocess for optional programme selection. 42 per centof respondents thought that the process was sufficientlyopen and effective, 30 per cent indicated that thisprocess was not open or effective enough and28 per cent made no comment. Our survey showed thatit was primarily Small and Medium-sized Enterprises(SMEs) that expressed concern over the process bywhich BNSC Headquarters generated, compared andevaluated the options for optional programme selection.

Organisational structures formanaging space programmes1.10 Internationally, organisational forms range from large

unitary space agencies such as NASA in the United Statesto alternative approaches where the responsibility forspace activities is shared across several Governmentdepartments (Appendix 2). The responsibility for spaceactivities in the United Kingdom has always fallenbetween several departments. In 1971 the Department ofTrade and Industry assumed lead responsibility for civilspace activities and the Ministry of Defence responsibilityfor research, development and procurement of spaceequipment. This arrangement proved too fragmented andin 1985 led to the formation of the BNSC Partnership. Thisorganisation was given the responsibility for co-ordinating the use of the funds allocated to civil spacedevelopments for the United Kingdom.

1.11 There are mixed views over the most appropriateapproach for the management of the space programmes.Our survey showed that some 35 per cent of therespondents thought that the BNSC Partnership was theright means by which to manage the United Kingdom'sspace programmes, 36 per cent wanted an alternativeand 28 per cent did not express an opinion. Two thirdsof respondents, however, stated that the creation of anagency for the United Kingdom was unrealistic,concluding that the BNSC Partnership should bestrengthened rather than replaced.

12

part

one


1.12 The United Kingdom has a space strategy that is derivedfrom clear scientific, social and commercial strategicobjectives. Space activities are chosen only when theyare the most effective means to achieve widerGovernment objectives. This approach places the usersand the uses of space firmly at the forefront of the policy.In view of that policy in Figure 6 we assess the strengthsand weaknesses of three possible organisational formsfor the United Kingdom space programme: an executivespace agency; Government Departments taking forwardspace activities individually; and a partnership approach.

1.13 This analysis shows that a partnership approach cansecure most of the possible benefits of national andinternational co-operation, with low managementoverheads and avoiding duplication. The main risk withthis approach is that it could miss opportunities in spacewhich only a broader programme would identify. Theavailable evidence suggests that this risk has notmaterialised to date. One indicator of the effectiveness ofnational space investment is to relate it to industryturnover. Analysis produced by ESYS in Figure 7 showsthat when compared with Germany, Italy and France, allof whom have space agencies, the United Kingdom hasthe second best return on investment with a ratio ofnearly 1.6:1 in 2001 (the latest year that figures areavailable). This analysis is based on the manufacturingelements of the space sector thereby excluding satelliteoperators and service providers which would increase

Options for organising and managing the United Kingdom's space activities6

Option Strengths Weaknesses

Space agency e.g. NASA � Would provide a clear and coherentview of space activities to bodies such as ESA.

� Control, in one body, over the implementation of space activities with centralised decision making and resource allocation.

� A perception in the space community that an agency could secure an increased budget for space.

Space activities taken forward by � No overheads associated withindividual Government bodies management of a co-ordinating bodywithout a co-ordinating body such as an agency or a partnership.

� Space projects compete against other non-space strategic priorities for departmental funding therefore are subject to broader competitive pressures.

The partnership approach � Clear and coherent view of the United Kingdom's space activities provided to ESA.

� Reinforces the user led philosophy of the United Kingdom.

� Low headquarters overheads.

� Consultation with users is likely to be more far reaching, transparent and cost effective than alternatives.

� Space projects compete against other non-space strategic priorities for departmental funding therefore are subject to broader competitive pressures.

� Increases the likelihood that space isfunded as 'an end in itself' ratherthan as a solution to users' problems.

� Development of policy is likely to bedivorced from the users of space inother Government Departments.

� Increase in the cost of managingspace activities is likely.

� The authority of the BNSC Partnershipis limited; it cannot override thedecision making processes of anyindividual Partner.

� Focus on uses/users may lead tomissed opportunities in developingresearch/technology areas.

� Space investment is long term yet maybe affected by short term departmentalconsiderations when prioritised withother non-space related options.

� Fragmented approach to therelationship with ESA.

� Potential for duplication of activity bydepartments and other users of space.

� No forum to discuss the long term strategic implications of space spending.

� Space investment is long term yetmay be affected by short termdepartmental considerations whenprioritised with other non-spacerelated options.

Sources: The BNSC Review (2001), ESYS and SRa

13

part

one


the return. The majority of non-scientific national spaceinvestment is used to support manufacturing firms andtheir suppliers involved in the design and construction ofsatellites rather than those companies who provide aservice using the operational satellite.

1.14 There is a risk that the BNSC Partnership secures a lesscoherent approach than the alternative of a spaceagency. We found, however, that in practice thePartnership had allowed the United Kingdom to presenta single face to ESA and other international spaceforums. This has proved to be an advantage in successfulnegotiations with other member states on, for example,the Galileo programme, a joint initiative between ESAand the European Union. The BNSC Headquarters wereinstrumental in brokering the solution that enabled thisoversubscribed programme to proceed. The UnitedKingdom is funding just over 17 per cent of theprogramme - and hence, under juste retour, expects anequivalent return to industry, potentially worth some£95 million in contracts over the development phase ofthe programme to 2005. Figure 8 provides an overviewof the Galileo programme and some of the significantbenefits that the United Kingdom expects to secure fromparticipating in that programme.

Ratio of national investment in space to industry turnover (2000 and 2001)

7

Source: ESYS

2000 2001

2.0

1.5

1.0

0.5

0UK France Germany Italy

The Galileo Programme8

The United Kingdom, via the BNSCPartnership, has committed to a significantinvestment in Galileo, a pan-Europeansatellite navigation programme.

Galileo is a joint initiative between ESA andthe EU, the aim of which is to provide a civilsatellite system for navigation, to be fullyoperational by 2008. It will consist of 30 satellites each orbiting the earth at analtitude of over 23,500 kilometres, providingexcellent global coverage. The need to have itsown system of satellite navigation wasrecognised as a strategic requirement in Europeas far back as the early 1990's but currentlysatellite users in Europe have no option but totake their positions from the United States' GPSor Russian GLONASS systems, both of whichare operated by the military and give noguarantee of an uninterrupted service. Galileois designed to complement, and be interoperable with, the existing satellite navigation systems.

The total cost of developing Galileo is estimated at Euro 3.2 billion (£2.03bn) and of this Euro 1.1 billion (£0.7bn) will be spent ondevelopment and validation of the technology which is due to be completed by the end of 2005. Following the development phaseGalileo will be financed via a Public Private Partnership. The United Kingdom's total direct financial contribution, principally via the DTI and DfT, to the development phase is Euro 123.13 million (£78.3m). It is anticipated that there will be extensive opportunities forgrowth in the market for satellite positioning and Galileo is forecast to provide substantial economic and social benefits to European andUnited Kingdom citizens. The BNSC Partnership is forecasting an increase in business opportunities for both upstream and downstreamsuppliers with a likely increase in net economic benefit to the United Kingdom of £6.3 billion by 2020. The benefit is calculated againstthe additional option of an enhancement of the existing GPS system with no development of Galileo.

Sources: ESA website and 'The UK Cost Benefit Analysis for Galileo' (2001); ESYS

14

part

one


The role of BNSC Headquarters1.15 The activities of the Partnership are co-ordinated by a

team of 14 at a total annual cost of £580,000. This is alow overhead especially when compared with the valuein contracts returned from ESA, which representedapproximately Euro 381 million (£242.3m) for the threeyears to 1 January 2003.

1.16 A key function of the BNSC Headquarters is to ensureeffective co-ordination of the activities of the Partners. It is through BNSC Headquarters that the Partners develop links between their interests and avoid eitherprogramme duplication or gaps. We interviewed seniorrepresentatives of the member organisations comprisingthe BNSC Partnership, who praised the co-ordinating work of the Headquarters. Our survey showedrespondents to be generally positive about their dealings with the Headquarters and concluded that the BNSCHeadquarters' staff were supportive of stakeholder needs.

1.17 BNSC Headquarters either have or can readily draw onstaff with a range of scientific, technical and administrativeskills. And when space missions can take up to 15 years tomove from inception to exploitation, continuity of staffwithin the BNSC Headquarters is a significant advantagein dealing with ESA and other national and internationalforums; the average length of service of the Headquarters'senior team is 5 ½ years. Our survey also showed,however, that respondents thought that BNSCHeadquarters would benefit from having more staff withbusiness experience rather than solely civil service ortechnical experience. Areas where respondents thoughtskills needed sharpening included strategic planning,including greater appreciation of the potential commercialterms, and better marketing, so that BNSC Headquarterscould project a stronger image of United Kingdom spaceactivity. BNSC staff do, however, benefit from DTI

interchange activities and partner with industry inskills training organised jointly with the Space

Industry Best Practice Club.

ESA's Envisat mission, which has had significant United Kingdom involvement, in the cleanroom at

ESA's ESTEC centre in the Netherlands.

Part 2

15

part

two

2.1 This part of the report examines how the BNSCPartnership approaches the strategic oversight of theUnited Kingdom's space activities. It finds that while thePartnership has most of the key components for effectivestrategic management in place it needs to extend itsanalysis of the potential to benefit from European Unionspace programmes, and improve its assessment of theperformance of the Partnership against its objectives.

The Space Strategy Council2.2 In December 2002, the BNSC Partnership replaced the

previous body charged with overseeing space activities(the Resources Board) with the Space Strategy Council.This body is charged with overseeing the developmentand implementation of the United Kingdom's spacestrategy. The terms of reference of the Space StrategyCouncil are fully described in Figure 9.

2.3 The majority of the Partners believe that the core tasks ofthe Space Strategy Council should be to act as a forumfor knowledge exchange between the Partners, and tobuild the commitment of Partners to the agreed strategy,through the direct involvement of Partner ChiefExecutives, or equivalents. Knowledge exchange, wefound, is something that it does well.

2.4 Although the Space Strategy Council is able to establishand agree a cross-Government space strategy for theUnited Kingdom, it is not one that binds partners toexecutive action. Partners remain free to specify theirown space activities, and must respond to the prioritiesset by, for example, their Research Councils, or theirMinisters. Similarly, in reviewing and evaluatingprogress against the space strategy, the Council has nopower to alter Partner plans or resourcing in response toemerging problems or opportunities - it can merelyinfluence the views of Partners. The MeteorologicalOffice, for example, told us that they found it hard tofacilitate, through the Partnership, the United Kingdom'sposition on JASON2 - an optional EUMETSATprogramme. JASON2 is a joint mission between Europeand the United States of America to study ocean surfaceroughness which, among other benefits, will helpimprove weather forecasts. The role of theMeteorological Office was to establish and co-ordinatethe United Kingdom's position on the programme anddetermine the scope of inter-departmental funding,which it did by preparing a strategic paper for thePartnership to consider. The final decision was taken2.5 years after the production of this paper. The Partnersinitially noted that there was a lack of operationalcustomers for the programme, but were ultimately

Part 2 Strategic oversight of space activities


The United Kingdom Space Strategy Council terms of reference9


1 The Space Strategy Council will establish and agree the strategic plan for space, evaluate progress against this and keep itupdated as appropriate to developments in the Partners, in international forums and in the marketplace.

2 It will provide strategic guidance to the Government bodies which make up the BNSC Partnership and advise the DirectorGeneral of the BNSC Headquarters on strategy, policy and balance of the forward programme.

3 Funding Partners will keep the Council informed on their individual strategies, implementation plans and programmes, insofaras these relate to space activities and will take account of the strategy for space and relevant views expressed by the Council indetermining their own policy and plans.

4 The Council will provide a forum for knowledge exchange among the partners.

5 The Council will review the BNSC Partnership performance against the objectives and outcomes expressed in the strategic plan.

6 The Council will take cognisance of the work of the Finance Deputies Committee and other Boards and Committees whichprovide BNSC with financial and sectoral advice.

16

part

two


persuaded of its merits, with DEFRA, NERC, and theMinistry of Defence providing funds in addition to theMeteorological Office.

2.5 Some members of the Space Strategy Council observedthat the provision of long-term strategic guidance, asopposed to advice provided on short-term activities,could be improved. The Government decided to invest inthe Galileo programme in autumn 2001. The ResourcesBoard, which had responsibility for oversight of spaceactivities until December 2002, did not devotesignificant attention to the major strategic implications ofGalileo for European navigation and communications. Itwas, however, the subject of intense co-ordinationinitially between BNSC and DfT, and subsequently on aGovernment-wide basis led by the Cabinet Office. Wefound that from 2003 the Space Strategy Council hasbegun to discuss more immediate issues arising fromGalileo on a regular basis.

The Space Strategy for the United Kingdom

The Headquarters uses advisory boardseffectively to inform its strategy, but inter-board co-ordination could be improved

2.6 The BNSC Headquarters uses four advisory boards toensure that it takes account of the views of widerstakeholders and experts in the field of space in makinginvestment decisions, and informing the space strategy.Individual members of the BNSC Partnership use similarbodies to gain expert input into their space activities.The four advisory boards of the BNSC Headquarterscover Telecommunications and Navigation, EarthObservation, Space Science and Space Technology.

2.7 Respondents to our survey thought that there was a lackof co-ordination between the advisory boards. From ourdiscussions with BNSC Headquarters we found that ithas tried to encourage cross-representation between thevarious advisory boards to improve co-ordination andby including this in their terms of reference. BNSCHeadquarters has only had limited success to date inpromoting the co-ordination between the variousadvisory boards in this manner. Board chairmen are,however taking a positive approach to inter-boardcommunication and are now required to reportregularly to the Space Strategy Council. The Partnershipplans to establish a new advisory board to co-ordinateand cover European Union issues.

The structure of the Space Strategy followsbest practice

2.8 The Space Strategy is owned by the BNSC Partnershipand its objective is to provide an overarching rationaleto enable the United Kingdom to co-ordinate its policyinterests in civil space. The Office of GovernmentCommerce issued a set of guidelines as part of itsSuccessful Delivery Toolkit (2003), outlining the bestpractice points to be followed when drafting strategies.We rated the Space Strategy against eight key areas ofbest practice on a scale of one to three, where three isthe highest rating. The summarised results of this scoringare shown in Figure 10.

2.9 Our review shows that many elements of the SpaceStrategy accord with good practice. However, the moreanalytical elements that would give force to the strategyproposed, and which pave the way for implementation,are weaker, because some greater detail is contained inPartner strategy documents. This may partly explain thecomments of those 66 per cent of respondents who

Scoring the United Kingdom's Space Strategy against OGC best practice guidance10

OGC Strategy Best Practice Rating

1 A clear mission statement, establishing the purpose of the organisation, its business and values. 3

2 A thorough examination of the key issues facing the organisation that the strategy should address usually completed by way of a SWOT analysis. 1

3 A statement of the key themes or objectives of the strategy. 3

4 A clear description of why these themes or objectives are important, and the main changes to be achieved within each strategic theme. 3

5 A statement of the desired outcomes from each strategic theme often referred to as the vision. 3

6 Clear identification of the changes that need to be made to move the organisation in the desired direction. 2

7 Thorough analysis of options for the future that are to be progressed. 1

8 Overall, the strategy formulation process should be open to consultation with all the key stakeholders. 3

Source: OGC Successful Delivery Toolkit (2003)

17

part

two


stated that greater focus was needed. Although somerespondents were disappointed with the content of theStrategy a number praised the consultation process.When we compared this process to Italy, Germany,Canada and Norway we found that the UnitedKingdom, through its partnership approach, had themost far reaching public consultation process.

The importance of European space activity isnot sufficiently analysed

2.10 The United Kingdom has engaged well with theEuropean Union at a strategic level, having participatedfully in the recent Space Green Paper consultationprocess by the European Commission, co-ordinating theGovernment's formal response, and has taken theleadership in a number of key areas in the advisorystructure for the Global Monitoring for Environment andSecurity (GMES) programme. The United Kingdom,through BNSC Headquarters, was instrumental instarting discussions on alignment between the EuropeanCommission and ESA on space issues (Figure 11) andshowing commitment to the development of a EuropeanUnion space policy. The United Kingdom hassubsequently played a more informal role in theEuropean Commission's development of its SpaceStrategy. The Partnership's Space Strategy recognises theclose relationship between the United Kingdom'soutlook on space and the European Space Strategy andthere is a commitment to influencing the development ofthe European Space Strategy in line with UnitedKingdom objectives. The BNSC Partnership continues totake an active part in discussion on the future role of theEuropean Union in space and in particular in theconsultation process on the European Union's White

Paper. The Partnership recognises that it willsubsequently need to review its space strategy to ensurethat it fully reflects the growing strategic importance ofthe European Union in space.

2.11 We also found that, unlike Norway and Germany, forexample, the BNSC Headquarters does not have a co-ordinated strategy designed to exploit the significantfunding opportunities arising from the European Union'sFramework Programmes. Rather, DTI Space relies uponthe past experience that United Kingdom firms performwell in competition for Framework Programme fundingby building on collaborations and networks developedat ESA. It does, however, seek to publicise opportunities,and explain how to take part and also seeks to influencethe development of programmes. The BNSC Partnershipis committed to the three main themes underFramework Programme 6 (Galileo, SatelliteCommunications and GMES) having nationalprogrammes to underpin them. Under FrameworkProgramme 6, Euro 215 million (£136.7m) is availablefor spending, principally on space applications acrossEurope. Significantly, Framework Programmes are notlimited by the need to apply an equal geographicalreturn or juste retour in the same manner as the ESAprogrammes. A constraint however, is the fact that muchof the funding available under the FrameworkProgramme needs matching industry investmentwhereas much of the ESA work is fully funded.

2.12 The Science and Technology Select Committeereviewed the United Kingdom's exploitation of theFramework Programmes in "UK Science and Europe:Value for Money" (sixth report 2003). They concludedthat the Government must provide less fragmentedsupport to those applying for project funding. BNSCHeadquarters currently allocates less than 10 per cent ofa staff member to act as point of contact for firmsrequiring information about forthcoming procurementcalls and other more general information. And whileUnited Kingdom involvement in the three main themesof the current Framework Programme covers most of thefunding, there is no coverage in the Space Strategy ofthe other areas of the Programme or of our approach tofuture Programmes.

2.13 We also found that United Kingdom working levelrepresentation at the European Commission on spacematters was less extensive than that of severalcomparator nations. The United Kingdom had norepresentation on the team at the European Commissionthat produced the White Paper on space but was able toinfluence the future direction of policy through directcontacts with the Commission. Other countries withmuch larger space programmes have strongerrepresentation in Brussels; France and Germany havingthree and seven people in post respectively. The BNSCHeadquarters is, however, making efforts to encourage

The United Kingdom, through the BNSC Partnership,was instrumental in encouraging the development ofthe European Union's strategic interest in spacealongside the European Space Agency.

11

The promotion of a 'concordat' between the EuropeanCommission and the European Space Agency was firstsuggested by the United Kingdom and formallyannounced in November 1997 as one of its priorities forthe forthcoming Presidency of the European Union. Thesubsequent negotiations between the EuropeanCommission and the European Space Agency wereprolonged, but culminated successfully in the approval ofa formal Framework Agreement in December 2003 andthe United Kingdom had a notable influence over thesedevelopments. The European Commission, in consultationwith the European Space Agency, published its GreenPaper on European Union Space Policy in January 2003thereby launching a public debate on the future of spacepolicy in Europe. This consultation process will be used toshape a comprehensive European Union Space Policy,detailed in the White Paper published in November 2003.


18

part

two


the inclusion of staff from the United Kingdom in theGalileo management team to help represent its viewsmore effectively.

Monitoring performance

2.14 The Space Strategy Council will need to consider howbest to review progress against the Space Strategy.Partners operate their own, different, performancemonitoring systems, which cannot readily fuelconsolidated performance reporting. However, there aresome detailed points of weakness in Partners' systemsand there has not yet been any identification of factorsthat are important to the performance of the Partnershipas a whole, as distinct from that of individual Partners.On the last point, previous National Audit Office studieshave shown that robust measurement of performance isnecessary to promote effective joint working. The SpaceStrategy Council is committed to addressing the issue ofperformance monitoring.

2.15 Although the BNSC Headquarters does not produce acomprehensive assessment of performance for thePartnership it undertakes reviews and assessmentswhich could form the foundation of a measurementframework. For example, it tracked the Key Actionsrequired to meet the objectives outlined in the 1999Space Strategy "New Frontiers: United Kingdom SpaceStrategy 1999-2002". Progress was reported on theBNSC website every six months. But this reporting wasdescriptive and lacked quantitative indicators or targets.BNSC Headquarters recognises that there is a need formore systematic monitoring of ESA programmes, andthe Space Strategy contains some suggested objectivesand desired outcomes.

2.16 Our consultants have had initial discussions with BNSCHeadquarters, PPARC and NERC to develop a range ofpossible output and outcome performance measures thatcould be used in conjunction with more indepthprogramme reviews, surveys and case studies tocomplement the strategic objectives of the BNSCPartnership. An important element of the consultants' workwas the establishment of possible critical performanceareas linked to the achievement of the Space Strategy(Figure 12).

2.17 The framework produced by our consultants consistedof 39 potential measures needed to indicate progressagainst the critical performance areas, and henceagainst the space strategy. Our analysis (Figure 13)shows that most of the data for the proposed measuresare either currently available or available with somemodification to existing data collection systems.

Critical performance areas for the BNSC Partnership12

Source: ESYS

Categorisation of the proposed performance measures13

Source: National Audit Office analysis of ESYS research

33% New data

36% Data available

26% Changes to

data required

5% Data used

■ Delivery of world class research

■ Promotion of space as a source of innovative servicesin the United Kingdom

■ Development of technologies to deliver advancedsystems and services

■ Design and development of advanced space systemsand services that drive innovation

■ Effectiveness of BNSC Headquarters in developingrelationships across Government

■ Effectiveness of BNSC Headquarters in acting onbehalf of the Partnership on regulatory issues

■ Delivery of trained people

■ How effectively the Partnership promotes andsupports UK space organisations

■ Growing the delivery of new services provided byway of space technology

■ Effectiveness of the BNSC Headquarters in acting onbehalf of the Partnership in international forums

■ Financial management

19

part

two


2.18 While the specification of the set of indicators needed toform a rounded view of progress is open to debate,it is clear that there are significant gaps in thePartnership's current information base. Examples ofthose gaps include:

� A key objective of the current space strategy is tostimulate increased productivity by promoting theuse of space in Government, science andcommerce. The Partnership does not currently haveinformation available on the impact of space onproductivity generally or on the success of thePartnership in promoting the use of space. ThePartnership is considering ways in which it could useand augment data already available in the spacesector to this end.

� Assessing the outcomes of science investment is animportant area for the Space Strategy Council giventheir strategic imperative to enhance the UnitedKingdom's standing in astronomy, planetary andenvironmental science. Space is recognised by bothPPARC and NERC as one of the essential tools forthe delivery of improved scientific understanding,but it is not the only tool. PPARC and NERC considerthat it would be difficult therefore for them to reportsystematically on the use of space across all of theirscience activities. They consider that this could bebetter approached through periodic programmeevaluation, case studies or the analysis of outcomesfrom flagship space projects.

� Another objective of the Space Strategy Council isdeveloping innovative space systems to deliversustainable improvement in the quality of life. Totrack progress the Council must have information onthe development and implementation of emergingspace technologies. Although there is some annualreporting on technology priorities through the SpaceTechnology Advisory Board there is no systematicanalysis from technology investment through todevelopment of a mature product.

2.19 Some of the objectives and success factors identifiedcannot be satisfactorily tracked by indicators alone -issues such as associating commercial or scientificsuccess with space programmes need periodic deeperprogramme evaluation studies to deal with thecomplexities of linking activity and outcomes. A combination of management indicators andevaluation findings would be suitable for staff-level co-ordination and monitoring of the Space Strategy. The information suitable for presentation to the SpaceStrategy Council would consist of the most importantindicators and findings, with an established exceptionreporting arrangement for other important information.

ESA's Infrared Space Observatory (ISO) mission, launched in 1995 tocollect data on, among others, newly-formed stars and brown dwarfs.

Part 3


Support for the spaceindustry

21

part

thre

e

3.1 In this part we examine the nature of the support thatDTI Space and other partners provide to industry andhow the United Kingdom performs under the ESAsystem of juste retour. We find that the funding of theDTI Space national programme has fallen in absoluteterms and in relation to the ESA programme. We alsofind that DTI Space and other partners support industrywell but there is scope for the focus of their support fornew entrant small firms to be reviewed.

3.2 Although the United Kingdom has a strong andcompetitive industrial base it has been affected by asevere global downturn in the telecommunicationsmarket. This has led the commercial market to contractand industry has had to rely on institutional rather thancommercial programmes to maintain its businesses.

3.3 The space industry employs over 15,000 skilled staff inover 400 companies. According to the latest figuresavailable in the "Size and Health of UK Industry Survey"from ESYS (2001), the space industry generated a totalturnover approaching £2.95 billion in 2000-01. Spacerelated business activities are commonly classified aseither upstream or downstream. The upstream activitiesconsist of the main space contractors and theirsuppliers, together with smaller companies specialisingin research and consultancy. The upstream revenues aredominated by one major contractor, Astrium, whoseturnover in 2000-01 represented some 47 per cent ofthe total for the upstream sector.

3.4 Downstream activities consist of satellitecommunication services and equipment providers,earth observation services and space insurance. Thedownstream turnover in 2000-01 was dominated by therevenues of British Sky Broadcasting and Pace who havebenefited from the growth in direct-to-home satellitetelevision, which accounted for £1.19 billion of the totaldownstream turnover of £2.49 billion.

The concept of fair return3.5 ESA is the single biggest source of civil public sector

contracts for the United Kingdom's space industry. Thesystem of juste retour ensures that member states shouldreceive a return in work contracts proportionate to theircontribution to the ESA budget. It is designed to ensurethat contracts are not being consistently awarded tolarger countries with more developed space industries.ESA manages the contract returns on a five year cyclewith the aim of member states receiving industrialcontracts to the value of 90 per cent of their contributionto ESA programmes. As shown in Figure 14 the UnitedKingdom has traditionally been over-returned.

3.6 From 1 January 2000, ESA moved to a new system so asto break the link with accumulated under or over returnsin some member states. The opportunity was also takenonly to record contributions once the full amount ofindustrial contracts at the prime and at the sub-contractlevel have been granted. This change ensures thatcontributions are a fair reflection of the outcome of acompetitive tendering process at all levels across largeand small countries. To reflect these changes the existingjuste retour statistics, which were cumulative from1975, were discontinued and a new set begun from1 January 2000.

United Kingdom rate of return 1997-200314

1999 2000 2001 20032002

Co-

effic

ient

Source: National Audit Office analysis of BNSC Headquarters data

0.9

1

1.1

1.2

1.3

Year

Cumulative juste retour co-efficient 1997-2003

1998

22

part

thre

e


3.7 There are two broad types of contract that industrycompetes for in ESA programmes. First, there is workthat contributes directly to the development of ESAprogrammes which is of a high intellectual value. This isoften termed 'noble' work as it has challengingdevelopment content with exploitation and skillspotential beyond the immediate project. Secondly, thereare service contracts, which usually have little or noscientific content - for example, providing the facilitiesmanagement service for an ESA location. Such contractsare considered to have lower added value and receive alower weighting factor (normally 25 per cent) in theAgency's juste retour statistics. Our survey found thatthere was a perception in the space sector that too littleof the work won is considered 'noble'. BNSCHeadquarters is confident however that there is nojustification for this perception. For the three year periodto 30 June 2003 they calculate that contracts of thehighest technological quality accounted for between 90and 95 per cent of the return to the United Kingdom.

3.8 During the 1990's the level of return to the UnitedKingdom lay within the range of 1.05 to 1.08; however,as Figure 14 shows, the return has been more volatilesince 2000. This volatility reflects the changes to therules of juste retour from 1 January 2000, and the impactof some industrial restructuring in the United Kingdom.It also reflects ESA misallocation to nations of the valueof some service contracts, which has had the effect ofoverstating the United Kingdom's overall return. Theerrors identified so far are primarily in contracts wherefirms from the United Kingdom had subcontracted workto non United Kingdom firms.

3.9 It is important that analysis received from ESA on justeretour is accurate. Information on contracts won byUnited Kingdom firms is a key indicator of the valuederived from ESA membership and any erroneousoverstatement of the level of contracts won might,because of the way juste retour works, restrict the abilityof United Kingdom firms to win future contracts. In2002, following up on a concern raised by a Britishcompany, BNSC Headquarters found that there had beena misallocation of industrial return to the UnitedKingdom of service contracts for three major ESA sites, inGermany, Italy and the Netherlands. For the last twoyears BNSC Headquarters has been working with ESA toanalyse all relevant contracts, to make corrections and toimprove the forms designed to input the data so as toimprove the quality of the information recorded. Thiswork is near to completion and has so far led toa reallocation of approximately Euro 10 million(£6.9 million) from the United Kingdom to other ESA

members, which represents three per cent of the value ofall United Kingdom contracts won since January 2000.No clear evidence is available on whether the over-statement cost United Kingdom firms any contracts withESA. BNSC Headquarters has not identified specific bidswhich might otherwise have been successful, but firmswill have factored in the apparent position on justeretour when considering the merits of bidding forcontracts. As the United Kingdom was over-returnedunder juste retour during the period in question the riskof losing contracts was real but, given the size of themisallocation identified to date, modest. Under thecumulative system operated, the value of any businesslost in this period is likely to be recovered in future years.With the support of BNSC, ESA have now put in placeprocesses to minimise the risk of a misallocationoccurring again in the future. BNSC will continue tomonitor the quality of ESA information and to press forrapid correction when errors are identified.

Funding the DTI Space nationalprogramme3.10 An important aim of the DTI Space national programme

is positioning industry in order to exploit the widereconomic benefits of ESA programmes, within theconstraints of juste retour. An internal review of theBNSC Partnership undertaken in 2001 described theprocess of allocating funds between the variousprogrammes within the DTI Space national programmeas 'lacking in structure'. On the basis of their assessmentof the sector, our consultants also concluded thatDTI Space needs to adopt a longer term strategic viewof its national programme activities and back this upwith programmes that industry can rely on for stabilityand support over a long term time horizon to preventthe programme from becoming fragmented. In addition,work recently undertaken by consultants for DTI Spaceconcluded that one of the main weaknesses of thenational programme is that the individual programmesthemselves are spread too thinly.

3.11 The benefits from investment in the national programmeare important. Figure 15 provides an example of how anorganisation was awarded a significant contract by ESAas a result of a feasibility study funded under thenational programme. However, many respondents toour survey indicated that the United Kingdom was atrisk of failing to secure the proper levels of benefits fromESA in the future given the declining proportion ofinvestment in the national programme.

3.12 The budget for the DTI Space national programme, asshown in Figure 16, has decreased by 62 per cent from£21.7 million in 2001-02 to £8.4 million in 2003-04. Incomparison over the same period the funding of ESAprogrammes has risen by 17.5 per cent from £97 millionto £114 million. Any discussion on the level of fundingfor the DTI Space national programme has to takeaccount of the constraint on overall Governmentexpenditure imposed under its biennial spendingreview. The size of the DTI Space national programme,however, will affect the extent to which the BNSCPartnership will be able to help United Kingdom firmsachieve the benefits from ESA membership. There was astrong consensus amongst the respondents to our surveythat the scale of investment in the DTI Space nationalprogramme is currently too low, but decisions on publicexpenditure totals and allocation are the responsibilityof Government Ministers.

3.13 We found from DTI Space that the reduction in thefunding of the national programme broadly resultedfrom three factors. First, DTI had decreased the budgetfor space by £7.5 million from 2001-02. The fundsreleased were used to fund non-space work within theDepartment. Secondly, there had been an increase infunding demands from ESA. The increase resulted bothfrom a general downturn in the space business -companies were delivering ESA contracts much earlierthan planned - and an increase in mandatorycontributions of 25 per cent. This effect of the downturnshould of course even out over time. And thirdly the increasing strength of the Euro against Sterling had reduced the spending power of the Pound by 11.7 per cent over the last four years. The last two factorsincreased the cost of ESA contributions and crowdedout elements of the national programme, between themaccounting for a reduction of £5.8 million in thenational programme budget.

3.14 Exchange rate risk arises because ESA contributions arecalculated and paid in Euros. The Office of Science andTechnology bears the risk from the effects of any currencyfluctuations for the ESA subscriptions made by bothPPARC and NERC. The Office of Science and Technologymay benefit from reduction in subscription resulting frompositive changes in the exchange rate or falls in nationalincome. The DTI Space programme does not have thesame protection.

3.15 The DTI Space Plan for 2004-09, currently beingprepared by DTI Space, will provide a basis for DTI toconsider project proposals against a more stable five-year programme of activity, at a level of funding yetto be finalised but likely to be above that applied in2003-04. We reviewed the latest draft of the plan andfound that it provides a good overall framework forfuture investment by the DTI in their nationalprogramme, subject to more detailed option analysisjustifying programme content once the broad thrust ofthe Plan has been approved.

3.16 DTI spent £21.7million on its national programmes in2001-02. The majority of these funds were distributedthrough grants to assist firms to position themselves foropportunities in the priority areas identified by theDepartment for winning additional business, primarilywithin Europe. For each new initiative DTI Space set outin a business case or ROAME statement, the rationaleand objectives of each programme, the additionaleconomic benefit that justified Governmentintervention, and the process by which the programmewould be monitored and evaluated. We reviewed seven DTI Space ROAME statements against current HM Treasury guidance and identified a number ofstrengths and weaknesses - although not all aspects ofthat guidance were extant at the time the ROAME's wereproduced. Figure 17 provides a diagram of the analysiswith ROAME's marked out of three, this being thehighest score indicating strength.

23

part

thre

e


A United Kingdom consortium was awarded asignificant contract as a result of a feasibility studyfunded under the DTI national programme.

15

A consortium led by Surrey Satellite Technology Ltd (SSTL)was awarded an ESA contract worth Euro 30 million(£20.7m) to lead the development of the technologydemonstrator satellite for the ESA Galileo programme. The contract is to develop a satellite to be launched by ESAin late 2005 to secure the radio frequencies to be used bythe satellites. This is an important contribution, as thefrequencies need to be secured for use by the end of 2005to complete the deployment and validation phase on time.The successful bid by SSTL was based around a project todevelop a small low cost communications satellite fundedthrough the DTI Space MOSAIC programme. This projectwas initially provided with £4.25 million and to leverage the benefits of this work DTI Space funded a feasibility studyunder the Satcom national programme on a navigationsatellite to be used as a candidate for the ESA mission.

Source: BNSC Headquarters press release, June 2003

24

part

thre

e


3.17 Our analysis shows that while the strategic cases forintervention were well made, and clear objectives set,factors relating to the implementation of theprogrammes, including the treatment of risk, could havebeen strengthened. The Beagle 2 project illustrates thepotential implications of these weaknesses (Figure 18).Although in many respects a successful project, the costof completion of the project rose by 57 per cent to£42.5 million over two years to August 2001. Theoriginal grant of £5 million by DTI Space increased to£18.3 million over this period.

3.18 These generic weaknesses in the ROAMEs have notprevented the DTI Space national programmecontributing to some notable commercial successes forthe United Kingdom. For example, DTI Space madegrants of £600,000 to Thales Avionics in support of thedevelopment of systems that allow commercial aircrafttravellers to make long-distance phone calls(SKYFONE). The long term commercial success of thesesystems has generated more than £100 million ofexports for the United Kingdom.

TotalMOSAICPublicity and

Education

OtherATS EO Satcom

24

22

20

18

16

14

12

10

8

6

4

2

0

XExpenditure on the DTI Space national programme

Expe

ndit

ure

(£m

)

Programme


16

2001-02 2002-03 2003-04

3.5

3

2.5

2

1.5

1

0.5

0

XAnalysis of ROAME Statements

Scor

e

Criteria

Source: National Audit Office analysis of DTI Space ROAMEs

17

Rationale Objectives Appraisal Financialplan

Implementationplan

Evaluationplan

25

part

thre

e


The European Space Agency's (ESA) Mars Express missionwas launched in June 2003 and reached Mars inDecember 2003. The objective of the mission is tounderstand better the creation and evolution of theMartian landscape by undertaking experiments both onthe planet's atmosphere and on its surface. The missioncontains seven instruments designed to undertake a rangeof experiments all but one of which are to remainattached to the mother spacecraft. The United Kingdom'smajor contribution to the mission was a Mars lander -Beagle 2 - but the United Kingdom also made asignificant contribution to the construction of MarsExpress. Beagle 2 left the mother ship on 19 Decemberand was due to land on Mars early on Christmas Day2003 to undertake experiments testing the Martian surfaceand subsurface including identifying whether water hadever existed on Mars and to search for evidence of past orpresent life. To date, the project team have been unable tomake any contact with the lander and on 6 February2004 the Beagle 2 Management Board met and followingan assessment of the situation accepted that there waslittle hope of contact being established with the lander.This box summarises the history of the Beagle 2 projectand the implications of its apparent failure.

In 1996, a planned Russian mission to Marsincorporating European instruments failed soon afterlaunch. In response ESA introduced the Mars Expressmission which would make use of similar instruments tothose lost on the Russian mission. ESA also invitedproposals for a lander to be provided, at nationalexpense, for Mars Express. Professor Colin Pillinger withthe assistance of Astrium and the University of Leicesterformed a consortium made up of the Open University,the University of Leicester, Astrium and Martin Baker Ltdto develop a Mars lander. Later, over 100 companiesbecame involved in the supply chain supporting the project. Initially the project was funded from private sources.

When the Beagle 2 project was first conceived, in 1997,Professor Pillinger approached PPARC for funding butPPARC were unable to provide support at that stagebecause of a lack of uncommitted funds. ProfessorPillinger then proposed his idea in a response to ESA'sinvitation to the European space community for proposalsfor a lander. In April 1998, the consortium estimated thecost of the overall project would be £27 million includingthe cost of the lander and the instruments it wouldcontain. ESA subjected the proposal to close independentscrutiny and in August 1998 judged the proposal to bewell constructed and clearly presented. At the time theBeagle 2 proposal was in competition with two otherproposals for landers from other member states. The ESAScience Peer Review then gave the Beagle 2 the highestpriority of the three proposals considered.

After the ESA selection the consortium again approachedPPARC for funding but now solely in support ofdeveloping the scientific instruments. The Beagle 2 teamreported that they would seek funding for the lander itselffrom other sources. PPARC subjected the proposal to theirnormal peer review process which in January 1999

judged the science that Beagle 2 was offering as Alphaplus (the highest rating possible). The objectives of Beagle 2 are to:

� search for evidence indicating whether there waspreviously life on Mars;

� search for evidence of current life on Mars;

� measure the composition of the Martianatmosphere;

� examine the geology of the Martian surface;

� study the features of the surface ofMars at the landing site and theway that land formation wascreated; and

� appraise the environmentalconditions on Mars.

As a result of thefindings of thisscience reviewPPARC agreed toprovide funding of£2.77 million to theconsortium to part fund thedevelopment of theinstrumentation proposed forBeagle 2. Also in 1999, because of theincrease in the estimated cost of theoverall project to £28.5 million, Matra MarconiSpace (the predecessor of Astrium) on behalf of theconsortium approached BNSC for funding who agreedto provide £5 million to them over the three years to2001-02.

In November 1999, ESA confirmed that Beagle 2 wouldbe included in the Mars Express mission. In August 2000,the Director of Science at ESA requested an independentreview to evaluate the progress of the Beagle 2development and assess the current status of the keylander elements. This review was headed up by JohnCasani of NASA's Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) who hadheld senior positions in many of NASA's major spacemissions and had been the Chairman of the JPL'sindependent review of NASA's failed Mars Polar Landermission. The Casani Review reported to ESA in September2000. Its key findings were:

� there was no margin available in the proposed mass(i.e. the weight) of the lander;

� the contingency in the schedule which theconsortium had to meet to fulfil the launch date ofJune 2003 was inadequate;

� that the management of the consortiumarrangement was fragile;

� that although the project had a risk managementplan, unless mass (i.e. weight) and schedulemargins were restored risk management, in theclassical sense, would continue to be non-existent;

Beagle 218

26

part

thre

e


� that if each of the findings were satisfactorilyaddressed, then the design of the lander's systemsand sub-systems would be satisfactory - with theexception of the airbags designed to cushion thelanding of Beagle 2 on Mars;

The report concluded that if its findings were fullyaddressed, the project was "challenging but eminentlydoable". The consortium produced and implemented adetailed action plan in response to these findings.

In May 2000, the consortium approached BNSC forfurther funding as the project had not raised thefunding it had expected from external sponsors. BNSCprovided £5 million as a grant and the Open Universityand Astrium agreed to underwrite the project by afurther £7 million. In the summer of 2001, theconsortium approached BNSC for further funding tounderwrite development cost escalation - the estimateof the total project cost to the United Kingdom of thelander and the instruments had risen to £42.5 million.In August 2001, BNSC offered a further £8.3 million tothe consortium making a total contribution to Beagle 2by BNSC (including PPARC) of £21.07 million. Inaddition, the Open University has also committed £6.3 million of its own money on this project. Tostrengthen the management of the project BNSC madeit a condition of this additional funding that Astriumshould take full responsibility for delivery of the Beagle2 project to cost and schedule under a fixed pricecontract and that fixed price contracts should be usedfor all future contracts awarded by the consortium.From this point BNSC and ESA monitored the project atleast every two weeks through attending the project'smanagement meetings. While the technical risks toBeagle 2 had been highlighted by the Casani Reviewand were subsequently mitigated by Astrium under thefixed price contract negotiated by BNSC, the writtensubmissions which BNSC put to the DTI and the Officeof Science and Technology to request funding did notinclude explicit assessment of the risks to the projectnor any quantification of the possible outcomes of theproject. BNSC considers that until the actions itattached to the funding had taken effect it would nothave been realistic to have quantified the likelyoutcomes of the project at that stage.

BNSC was hopeful that the consortium's plan to raisesponsorship - which was based on external marketingadvice - would mean that BNSC would recoup at leastsome of the funding which they had committed tounderwriting the project. In practice no sponsorshiphas been obtained to date except from Astrium. Themoney which PPARC and the DTI through BNSC haveprovided for Beagle 2 has primarily not been additionalmoney granted to space activities but funding agreedthrough an assessment of the priority of Beagle 2against other United Kingdom space programmes,although these issues were not addressed in theBNSC's submissions to DTI to seek approval forfunding the project.

The next key review of the project was a joint reviewat senior level by BNSC and ESA in March 2002. Thisreview confirmed that the problems associated withthe airbags, the system's mass (weight) and the timeschedule were still the main areas of concern. Thereview concluded that the airbags were the mostcritical of the remaining technical risks but that all therisks were seen as manageable and much betterunderstood than a year before. As a result of thatreview BNSC and ESA decided that the Beagle 2project should continue.

During the first six months of 2002, drop testsinvolving the airbags had identified that failure wouldoccur unless the impact velocity and gas pressureinside the airbags could be reduced. Astrium usedsubsequent tests to establish the conditions underwhich the airbags could survive and alsostarted work on a new, more efficientdesign of the parachute needed toslow down the descent of thelander onto Mars. Astriumapproached BNSC for anadditional £1.5 million offunding for riskreduction work to comeup with a newparachute. This fundingwas approved by the DTIin July 2002 and wasadditional to the fixed cost ofthe lander of £42.5 million. Furthertesting of a new design of theparachute took place between July andSeptember 2002 and ended successfully.Further testing of the other related elements ofthe descent and landing system including theairbags was also completed successfully.

In March 2003, ESA commissioned a FlightAcceptance Review of Beagle 2 which independentlyreviewed the technical performance and verificationof the Beagle 2 lander. This review reported in April2003 and concluded that Beagle 2 could be formally accepted for integration onto the MarsExpress spacecraft.

The Mars Express mission has coincided with thecurrent NASA Mars Exploration Rover mission. Therelative closeness of Mars to the Earth in 2003provided a particularly strong opportunity formissions to Mars and ESA took that opportunity tomount its Mars Express mission. This mission couldprovide insight into planned ESA missions to otherplanets in the future and could influence the ESA'splanned Aurora mission which is to implement a longterm plan for the robotic and human exploration ofthe solar system with Mars, the Moon and asteroids asthe most likely targets. NASA's current mission toMars is part of a longer term NASA programme forexploring Mars.

Beagle 2 with shield in action; designed to protect it from heat generated by friction with the martian atmosphere.

27

part

thre

e


There has been co-operation between ESA and NASA onthe current missions. For example, NASA has madefacilities available to the Beagle 2 consortium to test theairbags. There has also been close co-operation on theissue of communications between the differing spacecraftand the vehicles/landers due to land on Mars. This co-operation has been expedited, in part, by theInternational Mars Exploration Working Group of whichNASA, ESA and BNSC are some of the members. Thescience being undertaken by the current NASA missionand that proposed by Beagle 2 was also designed to becomplementary - most notably to identify whether therehad once been water on Mars. The landers wereintended to operate at different locations but overlapbetween the scientific equipment of the two missionswould have allowed a comparison of the conditions atthose separate locations.

Beagle 2 has given the United Kingdom spaceindustry and scientific community a lead

in a number of technological areas -for example, in the miniaturisation

of instrumentation and robotics.The miniaturisation of the massspectrometer system, designedto test for gases, included onBeagle 2 undertaken by theOpen University hasresulted in the award of£2.5 million from theWellcome Trust to theOpen University to develop

possible uses in the field ofmedicine. While such

advancements provide noguarantee of future business it does mean

that a number of United Kingdom firms includingAstrium should be in a good position to win contractsrequiring similar technologies in the future. Another spin-off from the United Kingdom's involvement in Beagle 2has seen the Open University benefit from theconstruction of an aseptic ("clean room") facility at theUniversity funded by ESA. More generally, Beagle 2 alsoexcited wide public interest in its science andengineering activities and a number of educationprogrammes have been based on the mission.

Beagle 2 was expected to send back data from itsexperiments for a period of at least six months from afterit landed. BNSC judge that there are about six teams ofscientists in the United Kingdom and a number of otherteams abroad who will now need to change the focus ofthe scientific studies. In some cases the United Kingdomteams are to be engaged in studies generated by thesuccess of the remainder of the Mars Express missionwhile some overseas teams are to be engaged in theNASA Mars studies.

The United Kingdom proposed that the ESA InspectorGeneral undertake a full independent review of allaspects of the Beagle 2 project and on 11 February 2004the United Kingdom and ESA announced a Commissionof Inquiry to be chaired by the ESA Inspector General.The inquiry will investigate whether it can be establishedwhy Beagle 2 may have failed to respond tocommunication commands and to identify any lessonswhich can be applied to future missions. TheCommission of Inquiry is expected to report by the endof March 2004.

Conclusion

Beagle 2 represented a high risk, high reward project.Although it failed in its prime task it has produced anumber of benefits for the United Kingdom's spaceindustry and scientific community. The prospects forvaluable science were assessed and confirmed under theusual arrangements for rating the value of potentialprojects. And the technical risks surrounding the projectwere sensibly approached and mitigated. But two aspectsof the project approach and management showed roomfor improvement.

In the written submissions appraising the case forsupporting the project BNSC did not discuss the materialrisks to success alongside the costs and benefits. Therisks, and steps taken to mitigate these risks, which hadbeen fully considered, should have been covered in theformal appraisal submissions.

Before mid-2001, i.e. before BNSC was in a position totake a lead in the contractual arrangements and verifythe cost estimates, project costs rose to 57 per cent morethan those originally estimated by the Beagle 2consortium which reflected weaknesses in the initial costestimation. The use of cost plus contracts in the early partof development exposed the project to cost growth riskswhich were not adequately dealt with by contingency.Later contracts were let on a fixed price basis. ESA andits member states should ensure that the national spaceorganisations are strongly involved in the formation andmanagement of consortia established for the provision ofinstruments from the outset of projects.

Additional consideration needs to be given in these areasif high risk, but high benefit, projects are to be fairlyappraised and tightly managed.

28

part

thre

e


Support for small businesses3.19 The DTI Space programme has the general objective

of helping to increase the productivity andcompetitiveness of the space sector. It aims to expandthe use of innovative space products and services, andto develop a competitive industry able to deliver spaceinfrastructure and services in a global market. As themajority of expenditure on space is channelled throughESA, DTI place a great deal of emphasis on ensuring thatthe ESA industrial policy is both fair and transparent -achieving this through attendance at the Agency'sIndustrial Policy Committee. The United Kingdom was,for example, instrumental in obtaining revisions to theESA rules on Industrial Policy regarding juste retour,outlined at paragraph 3.6 in this report. One of the mainobjectives of the Committee is to ratify all ESA contracts,within the mandatory and optional programmes, thatare over Euro 2 million in value (£1.27m). We found thatBNSC places a great deal of emphasis on industrialconsultation and briefs firms on matters arising at theCommittee, holding regular meetings with industry.BNSC estimates that these meetings reach up to90 per cent of the United Kingdom's industrial base.

Larger firms are better placed to takeadvantage of the support provided by BNSC

3.20 DTI has performance objectives requiring them to raisethe competitiveness and productivity of firms generally;improve the performance of the science andengineering base; and facilitate the creation, growth andproductivity of small businesses in particular. Smallfirms play an essential role, according to evidenceprovided to the Trade and Industry Committee by theirTrade Association ASTOS, within both the UnitedKingdom and European space industries. They offerhighly focused expertise that is complementary to thebroader expertise offered by larger firms.

3.21 We found that given its constraints on resources BNSCsupports industry well with some notable successes inbidding for ESA contracts, such as the bid by SurreySatellite Technology Ltd for the Galileo programmedemonstration satellite. Small firms can gain advice fromBNSC when bidding for ESA contracts and more detailedsupport if they should enter into dispute with ESA. Oursurvey highlighted that 64 per cent of respondents wereaware of the support, in the form of advice andinformation that BNSC can provide to them when biddingfor ESA contracts. Of those that had used BNSC support,43 per cent found it very useful or quite useful, while aquarter found it of little use. Respondents informed us thatBNSC should be more proactive in advising them aboutforthcoming opportunities at ESA and also acting asbrokers for forthcoming ESA contracts that require a largenumber of firms to form a consortium to make asuccessful bid. In addition to the support provided byBNSC help is available for small firms from their tradeassociation and from ESA who have specific programmeopportunities for small firms together with selectivecontract clauses to favour them in some instances.

3.22 Our survey also found indications that larger firms werebetter placed to benefit from the activities of BNSC thansmaller ones. Respondents to our survey indicated that thelatter would welcome more support and advice whenbidding for ESA contracts, finding the process both difficultand expensive. This issue is of course compounded forthose firms that are new entrants to the market for ESAcontracts. New entrants are unlikely to be members of atrade association and can be unfamiliar with ESAprocedures. This is more likely to be a problem for thosefirms in the downstream market. BNSC indicated that theyhave tended to concentrate their emphasis on the supplyside across the Partnership, at the operator level in thetelecommunications field and emphasise support for thedownstream applications in Earth Observation. In practicethis has tended to place more emphasis on supportingupstream SMEs. BNSC accepts that it should now examinethe focus of their support.

Part 4


Management of the national space programmes

29

part

four

4.1 This part of the report examines how well DTI Space,NERC and PPARC manage their parts of the UnitedKingdom's national space activities. While programmeand project appraisal is generally well managed, allthree bodies need to improve the monitoring andevaluation of their programmes.

4.2 The DTI Space national programme aims to expand theuse of space products and services, and to promotecompetitive industry in the supply of space infrastructure.NERC's national programme is geared towards improvingunderstanding of the behaviour of the naturalenvironment, while PPARC invests in space to carry outresearch in astronomy, planetary science and particlephysics. Figure 19 outlines the main components withinthe DTI Space, NERC and PPARC programmes.

Project appraisal4.3 In most cases the three bodies have effective processes

for appraising new projects within the individualprogrammes. Announcements of Opportunity are issuedfor most projects and in most cases the submissionsreceived in response to those Announcements aresubject to close scrutiny and appraisal by externalexperts. The one exception has been the DTI SpaceApplications Technology Support programme whichonly recently introduced an Announcement ofOpportunity process following advice from the SpaceTechnology Advisory Board and a recommendationfrom the Trade and Industry Select Committee. In thiscase, to date, tenders have been assessed solely by DTISpace staff. They plan to increase the level ofindependent assessment of bids in future.

Project management4.4 All DTI Space national programme projects are now

funded by fixed price grants. Any additional costs thatmay arise therefore fall upon the companies in receipt ofthe grant, rather than DTI Space. We found that manyprojects within the DTI Space national programme fallbehind schedule. For example, all three projects withinthe MOSAIC small satellite programme have fallenbehind by approximately one and a half years, and halfof the completed first round Telecommunications andNavigation programme activities had slipped bybetween 4 months and 12 months. While these delayswere often the result of external factors such asunexpected changes in the market or launch delaysimposed by other countries they still have the effect ofdeferring the achievement of intended scientific andcommercial benefits. Our analysis of the ROAMEsfound that DTI Space had not addressed the risks of suchevents occurring, or identified risk managementstrategies. However, all the MOSAIC projects, beinglarge and complex, addressed the subject of riskmanagement at project kick-off and adopted projectmanagement techniques to highlight and manageongoing risk issues.

4.5 Most of NERC's current space projects, notably itsCentres of Excellence and New Observing Techniquesprogrammes, sponsor research and are for fixed sums offunding typically over a two to five year period.Oversight of each Centre of Excellence is undertaken byan external Steering Committee made up of experts fromthe scientific field concerned, as well as users andindustry representatives and by the receipt at NERCeach year of a detailed written Technical Annexupdating progress made in the year and detailingobjectives for the following year. These arrangementsprovide for a rounded overview of project progress.Monitoring of smaller projects is less extensive,although generally adequate relative to their size. Thereis no external review of these projects and NERC shouldconsider the use of external review of self-assessments.

30

part

four


4.6 In addition to its research projects NERC is currentlyfunding two main projects for developing newinstrumentation for Earth Observation, known asHIRDLS and GERB (Figure 20). The performance ofthese two projects against time and cost shows that bothare currently within their original budget (includingcontingencies) but both show significant slippageagainst the original timetable. These delays are largelybecause of problems outside the United Kingdom'sinfluence. As the HIRDLS case study shows such delaysnot only threaten scientific advancement they also havespecific commercial implications for the organisationsinvolved in developing the instrumentation and need tobe factored into the initial risk analyses and anyassociated risk management plans. The HIRDLS projectdoes have a risk register which considers such issues,which was produced part way through completion ofthe project.

4.7 Oversight of PPARC projects is generally undertaken byProject Steering Groups known as Oversight Committeeswhich consist of staff from the organisations involved indeveloping the instrument, an observer from PPARC andan independent observer. The largest current PPARCsponsored project known as Herschel-Planck (Figure 21)also has an external project manager appointed byPPARC. In making this external appointment PPARC aimto ensure that the project benefits from an experiencedand independent project manager well versed inmanaging complex, high value projects.

4.8 During 2003-04 PPARC is providing funding for 20missions at various stages of completion, including thepost-launch phase. PPARC has provided the NationalAudit Office with current cost and time data againstoriginal budgets and time profiles for the build phase foreight of these missions. These were the more complexand current projects: information was not provided forthe remaining 12 which had individual costs of up to

£1.6 million. This was because they were consideredtoo small, or had not progressed sufficiently far todeviate from the expected profile, or because the buildphase had been completed over 10 years ago sincewhen PPARC's management procedures had changed.Of the eight projects reviewed, three have beendelivered or are expected to be delivered within budget.The forecast costs of the remaining five projects haveincreased from £38.8 million at project approval to£48.05 million. However, £4.7 million of the increase isdue to inflation which was deliberately excluded fromthe approved budget for older projects. Most of theremaining cost increase of £4.55 million has beencaused by delays to launches. In total, seven of the eightprojects show delays against either the original orplanned launch date. The majority of the factors causingthese launch delays have been outside PPARC's controlwhich shows again the need for strong risk assessmentof the possible causes of delays at the outset of a project.PPARC now has a policy of making contingencyprovision for such delays at the outset of a project.

4.9 Most of the development of new instruments involves the two Councils making grants or placingcontracts with academic institutions. Very little of thiswork is directly placed with industry althoughacademics often use their grants to procure specificgoods and services from industry. The BNSC Partnershiphas stated that they wish to promote improved links between industry and academia to increase thevalue for money afforded by contract placement andthis has been particularly notable in, for example, the DTI Space Applications Technology Supportprogramme. NERC is now seeking to encourage suchlinks in some specific parts of its programme. PPARCemploys a consultant to promote links betweenacademia and industry across all of its programmesincluding space.

The national programmes of the BNSC Headquarters, NERC and PPARC19


Organisation National programme title Budget 03-04 (£m)

DTI Space The Applications Technology Support programme (ATS) 1.55

DTI Space The Telecommunications and Navigation programme - known as S@TCOM 1.3

DTI Space The MOSAIC programme 2.0

DTI Space Earth Observation programme 1.95

DTI Space Publicity and Education 0.2

NERC Earth Observation programme 11.1

PPARC Space Science programme: Solar Science, Astronomy and Particle Astro Physics. 18

Programme monitoring and evaluation4.10 NERC's latest forecast is that it will spend £11.1 million

in 2003-04 on its Earth Observation space programme.Of this sum £7.1 million is directly overseen by the staffresponsible for managing NERC's space programme.The remaining £4 million is NERC's estimate of the costof other space based activity which is sponsored byother parts of NERC including blue skies and directedgrants, services and facilities, and work undertaken byits own Research Centres such as the Centre for Ecologyand Hydrology. PPARC's space science staff oversee the development of space instrumentation and relatedprojects which are currently forecast to make up £11.8 million of PPARC's total forecast national spaceprogramme of £20 million for 2003-04. The remaining£8.2 million of expenditure, which is primarily researchundertaken on the basis of data produced by thisinstrumentation, is overseen by staff across many partsof PPARC and is again an estimate produced by

PPARC's space science team. Both PPARC and NERC'sestimates of their total space activity (including activityoutside the directed space programmes) could be underor over estimates, and they should improve theirprocesses to validate the quality of the estimation. Goodestimates are needed to inform the preparation andmonitoring of the Space Strategy.

4.11 Given that space is a long term activity the evaluation ofthe outcomes of space programmes is vital to ensurethat the impact of investment can be monitored. Wefound that to date NERC had been unable to undertakemuch systematic evaluation of its Earth Observationwork due to the long term nature of the projects that itfunds, many of which have not yet had time to yield theintended results. NERC has now agreed a sectoralapproach to evaluating all its investments in EarthObservation. This will encompass both an evaluation ofthe ESA EO programme (carried out at a European level)together with an evaluation of its national expenditure.PPARC has undertaken an 'End of Build' review on

NERC's instrument projects HIRDLS and GERB

31

part

four


20

Sources: NERC

High Resolution Dynamics Limb Sounder (HIRDLS)

This is an instrument designed to measure the level of gases in the Earth's atmosphere to enable scientists to understand the processes affecting climate change. The project is a jointdevelopment between the United Kingdom and the UnitedStates. Within the United Kingdom there are four organisationsinvolved; Oxford University, Reading University, EADS Astriumand the Rutherford Appleton Laboratory.

When NERC took over responsibility for the project in April 1994 it instigated a full review of the project to establish a technical and cost baseline. The budget includingcontingency was set at £19.874 million at 1994-95 prices. The current forecast is that the project will cost £19.835 million.Monitoring of the project is overseen by a Project SteeringGroup consisting of representatives from each of the fourorganisations involved in the instrument's development, fromNERC, and an independent member. This group meets on average four times a year and receives detailed information on the development of the instrument and progress againsttime and cost forecasts.

The original launch date for the mission of which HIRDLS wouldbe part was December 1998; however, in 1992 NASArestructured its entire Earth Observation Science programmebecause of budgetary problems. This resulted in a four yeardelay in the planned launch date to December 2002 and achange of spacecraft. In 2001, NASA announced a further delayin the planned launch date to June 2003 because of difficultiesin the development of the instrumentation being produced bythe United States part of the project. This delay required OxfordUniversity to extend the contracts of its team working onHIRDLS. Difficulties in integrating the instruments on to thespacecraft have further delayed the launch which is now likelyto be in March 2004, over six years after the original plannedlaunch date. This additional delay will require staff in the United Kingdom to have their contracts extended yet further.

Geostationary Earth Radiation Budget (GERB)

This instrument was the first to measure the Earth's radiationbalance from a geostationary orbit. The instrument investigatesthe effects of clouds, water vapour and oceans on climatechange. Initial work was carried out by British Aerospace at Bristol; however, the estimated development cost of £12 million was outside the scope of NERC's budget. The headof the project asked the Rutherford Appleton Laboratory todevelop a consortium to fund the project. A consortium wasformed with representatives from RAL, Imperial College,London and the University of Leicester from the UnitedKingdom and representatives from Belgium and Italy.

The instrument was launched in August 2002 on ESA's MSG1mission. Data from the instrument is currently being processedin the United Kingdom and Belgium for eventual disseminationto the entire Earth Observation community. It is too early toassess the impact that the GERB instrument has had on thelevel of scientific understanding of climate change.

NERC provided funding of £6.4 million, includingcontingency, at 1995-96 prices to fund the United Kingdom'scontribution of the total cost of £9 million. To meet this overallbudget the project went through a major descoping exercise in1996-97. The United Kingdom's cost for the development ofthe instrument came in £10,000 under the budget.

The original launch date was planned for mid-2000; however,problems at ESA and EUMETSAT delayed the launch untilAugust 2002; a total delay of two and a quarter years. The GERB instrument development was delayed by thebankruptcy of the telescope manufacturer in Belgium in 1997, but this did not cause a delay to the ESA programme or the launch of MSG1.

32

part

four


some of its major projects usually soon after launch andhas also commissioned some 'End of Mission' reviewson completion of particular phases of projects. Wefound that these reviews, when undertaken, wererigorous. PPARC has not to date been systematic inundertaking subsequent evaluations of the science thatthose missions have produced and has not undertakenan overall evaluation of the outcomes of its activities inspace other than on a mission by mission basis.

4.12 For the DTI Space programmes individual evaluationsare underway or planned for the SatelliteTelecommunications, Earth Observation and MOSAICprogrammes although there is no overall evaluationplanned for the Applications Technology Supportprogramme. All of the DTI Space programmes havebeen included in an ongoing study being conducted forthe DTI by SQW Ltd which is examining the outcomesachieved by the various programmes.

4.13 Despite the lack of systematic evaluations of a numberof the national programmes, the National Audit Officehas collected evidence of some of the commercialsuccesses which industry has achieved as a result of thenational programmes and the scientific achievements ofthe NERC and PPARC space programmes. Some of thesesuccesses are included in Appendix 3.

PPARC's project: Herschel-Planck21

The European Space Agency's Herschel-Planck iscurrently PPARC's most expensive space mission. Dueto launch in 2007 it embraces two separate telescopesas follows. The Herschel Telescope (formerly known asFIRST) is an infrared telescope, 3 metres in diameterwhich will be the largest telescope yet flown. It willprovide a general purpose facility for a large part of theastronomical community. The scientific goals are toallow scientists to undertake surveys to enable them toproduce models of galaxy formation and evolution andundertake studies of the life cycles of stars. Planck isanother telescope, data from which should reveal theinitial conditions for the evolution of structure in theUniverse. The telescopes are being developed by alarge consortium embracing the Rutherford AppletonLaboratory, University of Wales, Imperial CollegeLondon, Cambridge University, Jodrell Bank, and fourcompanies; Surrey Satellite Technology Ltd, ATC,Astrium and SEA.

The budget for the project was approved by the PPARCCouncil in February 1999 at £23.5 million including £1.5 million contingency and to date PPARC is forecasting that the projectwill remain within budget. In addition, the launch date was approved by the PPARC Council, as April 2007 and at present this isstill on target to be met.

The project is overseen by a Herschel-Planck Steering Committee which includes representatives from each of the academicinstitutions involved in developing the instruments, a representative from PPARC and other independent members but does notinclude any representatives from industry. In addition the project also has an external Programme Director appointed by PPARC to manage the programme.

Source: PPARC

Herschel's primary mirror during construction

We designed a study methodology aiming to give anoverview, from a variety of perspectives, on the UnitedKingdom's space activities in an attempt to test theperceptions of stakeholders to the space programmes againstmore tangible information on performance also collected.

Semi-structured interviewsWe held semi-structured interviews with key staff members atDTI Space, PPARC and NERC to gain an understanding of theirrole in determining the strategy for space and the managementof space activities. We also met with representatives from the other seven Government Partners: the Council for theCentral Laboratory of the Research Councils, Foreign andCommonwealth Office, Department for Environment, Foodand Rural Affairs, Department for Transport, Office of Scienceand Technology, Ministry of Defence and the MeteorologicalOffice. This was to establish the role they play in thePartnership. In addition, interviews were held with thechairmen of the four advisory boards to BNSC.

Project visitsWe visited a number of firms and academic institutions thathad been in receipt of grants from or employed by DTI Space,PPARC or NERC in order to learn how they had benefitedfrom Government funding:

Case studiesWe used some of the project visits to gather information for anumber of case studies of specific projects including Beagle2, Galileo and the MOSAIC small satellite programme. Thepurpose of these case studies was to provide us with aspecific focus for the report, provide illustrations of the waythat Partners operate and highlight some of the tangiblebenefits that can accrue from the investment in space.

Survey of the space sectorWe employed Social Research Associates to survey the viewsof academic and industrial members of the wider spacecommunity about issues such as the effectiveness of theBNSC Partnership, the quality of the Space Strategy andsupport to industry in bidding for ESA contracts. A 20 per centsample was drawn from the 365 organisations listed in the2002-03 edition of the United Kingdom Space Directorypublished by BNSC Headquarters. This was adjusted toensure that all those organisations with substantial interests inspace were covered. The table below illustrates how thissample was constructed.

The overall response was 68 per cent - the original targetsample was boosted by organisations from a reserve list tocompensate for any non-response.


33

appe

ndix

one

Appendix 1 Methodology

■ AEA Technology

■ Astrium Ltd

■ ChannelMaster Ltd

■ ESYS Consulting Plc

■ Inmarsat Ventures

■ Sira Electro-Optics Ltd

■ Surrey SatelliteTechnology Ltd

■ Thales Avionics

■ University of Cardiff

■ UCL, Centre for Polar Observation and Modelling

■ University of Leicester,Space Research Centre

■ University of Oxford,Centre for Observationand Modelling ofEarthquakes andTectonics

■ University of Reading,Data AssimilationResearch Centre

■ University of Reading,Environmental SystemsScience Centre

International comparisonsWe employed ESYS to conduct international comparisons witha selection of ESA countries (Appendix 2). This was to informus of the way other countries formulate their strategies forspace, their approach to opportunities from ESA, and how theyrun their national activities.

Performance measurementframeworkWe employed ESYS to critique the BNSC Partnership's currentapproach to measuring performance against its strategy, and topropose a new framework to help capture the outcomes ofinvestment in space activities. This work was carried out withthe full support but limited involvement of BNSCHeadquarters, PPARC and NERC.

Expert panelWe invited experts from the space sector to sit on an expertpanel to provide advice and guidance on our methodology andemerging findings. The following were members of the panel:

We also visited the Swedish National Space Board (SNSB) andmet the former Director-General, Kirstin Fredga and Per Tegnerwho is the current Director General of the SNSB and chairmanof ESA Council. We invited their comments on the UnitedKingdom's approach to space and gained insight into theoperations of the SNSB.

34

appe

ndix

one


Prof Richard Brook SIRA Electro-Optics Ltd

Prof Barry Evans University of Surrey

Mr Geoff King Geoff King Associates

Dr Chris Welch University of Kingston

Prof Duncan Wingham University College London

Category of Respondent Population Target Number Actual Interviews Actual as a %Size Interviews Conducted Sample

Major players 5 20 14 18

Firms with substantial space activity 10 30 23 26

Small and Medium Enterprises 350 50 33 37

Academics 40 30 15 17

Asked for interview - - 3 2

Total 405 130 88 100

Source: SRa

Source: National Audit Office analysis; ESYS

35


appe

ndix

two

Appendix 2 International comparison

Organisationalapproach tomanagement of space

Strategicobjectives

Expenditure - ESA(£m) for 2002

Expenditure - NonESA (£m) for 2002

Space industry

A partnership ofDepartments,Agencies andResearch Councilsco-ordinated bythe BritishNational SpaceCentre

Enhance theUnited Kingdom'sstanding inscience, stimulateindustrialproductivity and deliverimprovements inthe quality of life

89.7

70.5

A diverseindustrial basewith expertise in many areasincludingtelecoms,navigation, earthobservation andsmall satellites.Industry isdominated by one large prime

Space agencymanages the spaceprogramme underthe Ministry ofResearch

Developinternationalinfluence. Improveresearch and thedevelopment ofapplications.Reduce the cost of space flight

364.7

94.3

Germany broadlyshares the sameindustrial structureas the UnitedKingdom albeitwith moreemphasis on spacetransportationsystems andmanned missionssuch as theInternationalSpace Station

Space agencymanages thespace programmeunder the Ministryfor Scientific andTechnologicalResearch

Expand spaceknowledge.Support thedevelopment ofindustry andresearch bodies,promoting synergybetween them

220

176

Similar industrialcapabilities to theUnited Kingdomwith strongsatellitecommunicationsand earthobservationcapabilities.Dominated bytwo largecompanies andseveral smallmediumenterprises

A not-for-profitspace centremanages the co-ordination of thespace programme.Space policy isdirected by theMinistry ofIndustry

Develop asustainableindustry withparticularemphasis onexports. Use spacefor the benefit ofnational users

16.6

4.8

Althoughindustrial base ismuch smaller thanthe UnitedKingdom's it is comparable in terms of its focus on earthobservation, andtelecoms

Space agencymanages activityunder the Ministryof Industry,Science andTechnology

Promote spacedevelopment,advanceknowledge anddeliver tangiblesocio-economicbenefits forCanadians

6.3

144.6

Canadian industryis focused ontelecoms and earthobservation withstrong interests inrobotics and space science

A small spaceboard which is anagency of theMinistry ofIndustryEmployment andCommunications

To advance spacescience, developindustrial capacity,facilitate regionaldevelopment and to co-operatefully with ESA tohelp achieve all of the above

40.4

11

Small spaceindustrydominated bythree firms.Despite the smallsize firms areinvolved in mostkey sectorsincludinglaunchers. Mainemphasis onsatellites for earthobservation, andmicrogravity

United Kingdom Germany Italy Norway Canada Sweden

There are a number of areas in which the United Kingdomhas been successful following investment in space activitiesby the British National Space Centre Partnership.

Telecommunications1 Astrium Ltd was successful in winning the contract to

build the Inmarsat 4 satellite in May 2000. The value ofthe contract to Astrium was £450 million. DTI Spacesupported Astrium Ltd, co-funding the company overeight years with £2.2 million through the EuropeanSpace Agency's ARTES 4 budget.

2 The European Space Agency ARTES 3 programme hashelped a project to deliver educational material toteachers and pupils via satellite. A United Kingdomconsortium launched the Expresso for Schools service in2000 providing weekly news and features relevant tochildren's coursework.

Small satellites3 The United Kingdom has a world leading capability in

small satellites and DTI Space has fostered thiscapability by co-funding three demonstration missionsunder its MOSAIC programme. Surrey SatelliteTechnology Ltd, from this initial funding, has launchedthe world's first small satellite constellation dedicated tomonitoring global disasters with satellites procured bythe United Kingdom, Algeria, Turkey and Nigeria. It hasgenerated around £50 million of income with thepotential to more than double this as more countriesbecome involved.

Technology4 DTI Space co-funded the seed corn investment that

established the suitability of lithium ion cells for use inspace. This funding led to twenty five contract orders forlithium ion batteries for space by mid 2002 from aninternational customer base producing £5 million ofincome for AEA Technology.

5 QinetiQ have succeeded in winning at least fourcontracts on European Space Agency missions to provideion propulsion systems. Ion propulsion is seen as one ofthe key technologies for the future, enabling satellites tobe smaller in size and travel greater distance.

Space policy development6 The British National Space Centre Partnership proposed

and agreed with the European Space Agency memberstates a framework for the Living Planet programmeconsisting, uniquely, of both core and smalleropportunity missions. This allows more attention to bepaid to peer review, networking between science andindustry and greater consideration of value for money inscience and market led actions.

36

appe

ndix


Appendix 3

appe

ndix

thre

e

Successful outcomes of the UnitedKingdom's space activities

The UK-DMC spacecraft, funded through the DTI MOSAIC programme,complete and ready for shipment to the launch site.

37

Space science7 Rosetta is a European Space Agency mission to orbit and

land on a comet, being one of the most ambitious andcomplex robotic space projects ever undertaken. TheUnited Kingdom's scientists have a major role in thedevelopment of instruments for both the orbiter andlander elements of the mission. These developmentsfurther consolidate the United Kingdom's expertise ininstrument miniaturisation.

8 Astronomers using the United Kingdom led Long WaveSpectrometer of ESA's ISO mission have found in theOrion Nebula larger amounts of water than thatpreviously measured in other interstellar clouds. Thisdiscovery may be linked to the origin of water in theSolar System and on the Earth itself.

9 The European Space Agency SOHO mission waslaunched in 1995 and the spacecraft failed after threeyears in orbit around the sun. Engineers from Astrium wereinstrumental in regaining control of the spacecraft therebyallowing a further five years of operation. The mission hasled to substantial improvements in the understanding ofthe sun and the solar terrestrial relationship.

10 Using instruments developed in the United KingdomESA's x-ray telescope XMM-Newton has detected x-raysfrom close to the edge of super massive black holesbelieved to lie at the core of active galaxies and hasprovided unique insights into the physical processeswhich take place in these black holes.

Earth observation11 The DTI Space Service Mission Support (SMS)

programme is aimed at developing expertise relating toservice and operational ESA Earth Observation missions.The final evaluation of six projects from the 2001 roundindicated an initial return of approximately £3 million insales against a BNSC Headquarters investment of£808,000. Income could rise to more than £30 millionover the coming years.

NERC Centres of Excellence12 The Centre for Polar Observation and Modelling has

analysed a decade of data from ESA's ERS satellitecombined with other satellite data to demonstrate theextent of the thinning of the ice sheet in West Antarcticaand the reasons for that thinning.

13 The Centre for the Observation and Modelling ofEarthquakes and Tectonics has used data from ESA's ERSsatellites to map small surface displacements acrossfault lines under the Earth's surface that cannot beobtained from seismology.


appe

ndix

thre

e


ESA's SOHO mission.

38

appe

ndix

four


Glossary of termsAppendix 4

ARTES

ASTOS

ATS

Beagle 2

BNSC Headquarters

BNSC Partnership

CCLRC

Centres of Excellence

DEFRA

DfT

Downstream space activities

EO

ESA

EU

EUMETSAT

Framework Programme

Advanced Research in Telecommunications Satellites (an ESA programme)

Association of Specialist Technical Organisations in Space

Applications Technology Support. A DTI Space programme designed to support the development of critical enabling technologies

British-built Mars lander launched on the Mars Express in Summer 2003. Due toland on Mars during Christmas 2003

British National Space Centre Headquarters. The central co-ordinating body forthe Partnership, hosted by the Department of Trade and Industry

British National Space Centre Partnership. The virtual organisation embracingthe ten members of the Partnership

Council for the Central Laboratory of the Research Councils

Collaborative centres that bring together specialists from different fields toinvestigate a particular scientific area

Department for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs

Department for Transport

Those elements of the space sector which are responsible for the exploitation ofspace infrastructure e.g. satellite communication and earth observation services

Earth Observation. The study of the Earth's atmosphere and surface from spaceby means of remote sensing techniques

European Space Agency. The co-operative organisation which provides spaceactivities on behalf of its 15 member states

European Union

European Meteorological Satellite Organisation. An inter-governmentalorganisation whose objective is to establish, maintain and exploit Europeansystems of operational meteorological satellites

The European Union's main instrument for research funding in Europe

REPORT TITLE HERE

39

appe

ndix

four


Galileo

GERB

GLONASS

GMES

GPS

Herschel

HIRDLS

ISO

JASON2

Juste Retour

Living Planet

Mars Express

MOD

MOSAIC

MSG1

European Union and ESA global satellite navigation system, providing a highlyaccurate, guaranteed global positioning service under civilian control

The Geostationary Earth Radiation Budget Instrument. This will enable experts tostudy the Earth's radiation budget and its potential influence on the climate

Global Navigation Satellite System. The Russian equivalent of GPS and Galileo

Global Monitoring for Environment and Security. A joint EC and ESA initiativethat seeks to make better use of Europe's existing and planned capabilities andinfrastructures and to develop mechanisms for improved collection anddistribution of environmental and security information

US operated Global Positioning System

ESA space telescope analysing how stars and galaxies are born

High Resolution Dynamics Limb Sounder. An instrument designed to improve ourunderstanding of the chemistry and dynamics of the troposphere and stratosphere

Infrared Space Observatory. An international collaboration seeking to look atissues including the origin of planets and the chemistry of the universe

A joint mission between Europe and the United States to study ocean surfaceroughness. An optional EUMETSAT programme

The process by which ESA member states receive contracts for work equivalentin value (after taking account of the technological value of the work) to thatwhich they have contributed to the Agency's budget

ESA's new programme for Earth Observation, using smaller satellites on shorter,cheaper, more focussed missions

ESA's mission to Mars, carrying the Beagle 2 Mars lander

Ministry of Defence

Micro Satellite Applications in Collaboration. A DTI Space programme designedto encourage the United Kingdom's small satellite capability

Meteosat Second Generation

40

appe

ndix

four


NASA

NERC

New Observing Techniques

OST

PPARC

Planck

ROAME Statement

S@TCOM

SME's

SOHO

SWOT

Upstream activities

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Natural Environment Research Council

A NERC programme aimed at encouraging the development of novel EarthObservation instrumentation and techniques

Office of Science and Technology

Particle Physics and Astronomy Research Council

ESA mission to study how the Universe came to be and how it will evolve

Rationale, Objectives, Appraisal, Monitoring and Evaluation Statement. These areproduced as an appraisal and planning tool for most DTI initiatives at their outset

DTI Space satellite telecommunications programme which aims to help UnitedKingdom companies exploit opportunities in the satellite communications and navigation industry

Small and medium-sized enterprises

Solar and Heliospheric Observatory. A joint ESA/NASA mission which isstudying the surface, atmosphere and internal structure of the Sun

Strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats

Those areas of the space sector that deal with the development and constructionof space infrastructure. For example, space and ground segment suppliers andprimes, research and consultancy

department of trade & industry the united kingdom's civil ... · united kingdom's...

Documents