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DemystifyingtheNation:TheCommunistConceptofEthno-Nationin1920s–1930sKorea

VladimirTikhonov,UniversityofOslo

Tikhonov,Vladimir.2018.“DemystifyingtheNation:TheCommunistConceptofEthno-Nationin1920s–1930sKorea.”Cross-Currents:EastAsianHistoryandCultureReview(e-journal)28:69–92.https://cross-currents.berkeley.edu/e-journal/issue-28/tikhonov.

Abstract

Introduced to Korea around 1900, the modern idea of the ethno-nation (minjok)developedintooneofthemostimportantintellectualandpoliticalconceptscirculatingin the countryby theearly1920s. From thenationalists’ viewpoint, theethno-nation,seen as an unchanging and homogenous entity, was the primary site for individuals’belonging.Thenationalcollectivitywasaprerequisite for individuals’existence.Whilenationalistshadbeencelebratingaprimeval,immutableandratherahistorical“Korean-ness”sincethelastprecolonialdecade(the1900s),theMarxists—stronglyinfluencedbyOtto Bauer’s and Joseph Stalin’s understandings of nation as a product of capitalistmodernity—started to question the nationalistic approach to Korean identity as amatter of principle by the late 1920s and early 1930s. There was no full agreementamong themon how to understand the history of the Korean ethno-nation. SomeofthembelievedthattheKoreanethniccoredatedbacktotheageoftheThreeKingdoms(the first century BC to AD 668). Others put heavier emphasis on the role of proto-capitalismandmarkets in themoderndevelopmentofnationalconsciousness, tracingthisdevelopment to the seventeenthoreighteenth centuries. This article summarizesthesedebates—betweennationalistsandMarxists,andalsowithintheMarxistmilieu—andlinksthemtoMarxistintellectualdevelopmentselsewhere.Theauthorarguesthatthe “proto-constructivist” approach articulated by some colonial-ageMarxistswas animportantcounterweighttothenationalistnativismofthe1920sand1930sand,intheend, made a significant—and still largely unappreciated—contribution to thedevelopmentofscholarshiponKorea’shistoryandculture.

Keywords:ethno-nation,nationalism,communism,socialism,Comintern,Korea,PaekNam’un,HongKimun

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Ethno-NationinPrecolonialKorea

Thisarticledealswiththedebatessurroundingthedefinitionofminjok(ethno-nation)incolonialKorea (1910–1945).1 Themainprotagonists in thedebateswere,ononeside,Marxists(someofthemrelatedtotheundergroundcommunistmovement)and,ontheother side, more conventional nationalists. It is noteworthy that the former wereattempting to articulate an understanding of nation that can be termed “proto-constructivist.”2 The latter, as I attempt to make clear in this article, were furtherdevelopingtheminjokdiscoursesofthelastprecolonialdecade(1900–1909),towhichasetofqualitiesascribedtotheethno-nation(“nationalcharacter”)wascentral.Forthenationalists—in contrast to the Marxists and their emphasis on the dialectics ofproduction force development and class struggle—“nation” constituted thefundamental,primevalessenceofKorea’stime-honoredhistory.Atthesametime,theviewofnationasanextended familial lineageboundwithblood ties, common to theprecolonialnationalists,wasmuchlesspronouncedincolonialKorea:nationalistsinthe1920sand1930sweremoresophisticatedintheirattemptstounderstandtheminjokasaproductofprimarilyhistoricalandculturaldevelopments.TheContinuousImportanceofEthno-Nation

Minjok is,without doubt, one of the central concepts of Koreanmodernity. For bothKoreas, North and South, the concept is of crucial ideological importance today.WhereasSouthKoreaofficiallyadoptedmulticulturalismasstatedoctrineatthestartofthe firstdecadeof the twenty-first century—itsyoungergenerationbeing increasinglyinclinedtoidentifySouthKoreannationalityaspolitical(ratherthanethnic)belongingtotheSouthKoreanstate(Campbell2016)—minjokstillservesasthemaininstrumentofstrengtheningsocioculturalcohesion,aswellastheideologicalgroundforSouthKorea’sclaim to eventual unification with North Korea.3 In the case of North Korea, thediscursivestatusofminjokappearstobesignificantlyhigher.Muchlessintegratedintothecapitalistworldsystemandinfluencedbytheinternationalmigrationtrendsoflatecapitalismtoan incomparably lesserdegree,NorthKoreabasesmuchof its legitimacyon itsclaimto theroleofguardianofKoreanethno-culturalvaluesagainst imperialistpredations(Shin2006,89–93).

Concurrently,minjokiscruciallyimportanttotherelationshipbetweenthetwoKorean states and the worldwide Korean diasporas currently totaling approximatelysevenmillionpeople,or10percentoftheKoreanpeninsula’spopulation,accordingtoSouth Korea’s statistical authorities (Kukka chip’yo ch’egye 2016). The relationshipbetweenthesediasporasandthetwoKoreasarecomplicatedandpotentiallyconflict-ridden. In South Korea’s case, Chinese Koreans (chaoxianzu, ethnic Korean citizens ofthePeople’sRepublicofChina)orKoreans fromthe formerSovietUnion (1922–1991,

1ThisarticleincorporatessomerevisedmaterialfromTikhonov(2017a).2Ontheconstructivistapproachinnationalismstudies,seeBrown(2000,4–30).3OnthenationalismofSouthKorea’syoungergenerations,seeLee(2006).

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popularly known as Koryŏ Saram), for example, may justifiably resent being placedbelowKoreanAmericans in the official and unofficial hierarchies of South Korean life(SeolandSkrentny2009,151–153).Still,minjokprovidesaspecialgroundforrelationsbetweenthemandtheSouthKoreanstateandsociety,whichnon-ethnicKoreanforeignworkers lack (Lee 2010, 185–233). By law, overseas ethnic Koreans are allowedpreferential treatment inthemattersofstayingandworking inSouthKorea(SeolandSkrentny2009).Allinall,althoughtheglobalizingtrendsofthelatecapitalistagehavereducedtoacertaindegreethesignificanceofethnonationalcohesion, itstill remainsimportantforthemajorityofpeopleself-identifyingasKoreans,insideandoutsidetheKoreanpeninsula.Ethno-NationinKorea:TheBeginnings

It is noteworthy, however, how relatively recent the concept ofminjok is, and howhistoricallyquickwasitsascendancetoacentralpositioninKorea’snascentsystemofmoderndiscursivecoordinatesduringtheearlytwentiethcentury.AsresearchbySouthKoreanscholarKwŏnPodŭrae (2007)demonstrates, theMeiji Japanesewordminzoku(K.minjok,Ch.minzu)4firstenteredtheKoreanlanguagein1898,whenChangHoik(?–1904),thenaKoreanstudentinJapan,mentionedtheterminanarticleonSpenseriansocietal competition in a journal published by Tokyo-based Korean students. InsideKorea proper, the first known usage occurred in 1900 in a letter to the editor ofHwangsŏngsinmun(Capitalgazette),amouthpieceofreformistConfucians.Theletterusedminjok as a translationof “race” and discussed the vicissitudes in the history of“Whiteminjok,”or“Easternminjok.”5

Minjok first appears in Hwangsŏng sinmun articles in 1903, in an articledescribing the pro-war views of a prominent Japanese businessman, ViscountShibusawa Eiichi.6 As noted in Kwŏn (2007, 48–55), already in 1905–1906, KoreanperiodicalsroutinelyusedthewordminjokasareferencetobothKoreansasahistoricalethnonational group and Koreans as a political nation—that is, the subjects of theKoreanEmpire(1897–1910).Ethno-nationasaconceptwasbeingquicklyentrenchedina country threatened with foreign colonization (and ultimately annexed by Japan in1910): the concept was to provide the sort of cohesion that the weakened KoreanEmpire,aJapaneseprotectoratesince1905,couldnolongerbuildamongitssubjects.

From 1905 to 1910,minjok had several important connotations in its Koreanusage.Ontheonehand,itwasunderstoodasanextendedlineageofsorts,shapedbythe supposed four thousand years of history since the times of Korea’s legendaryprogenitor, Tan’gun (believed tohave come topower in2333BC;PaekT. 2001). In a

4OnthegenealogyofminzokuintheMeijiJapanesediscourse,seeDoak(1996,81–82).5“ReasonsfortheWesternEncroachmentsintheEast”(“Sŏsetongjŏmŭikiin”),January12,1900inHwangsŏngsinmun(1984,3:26).6“Baron(sic)Shibusawa’sPro-WarStance”(“Sapt’aeknamjakŭichujŏnnon”),November7,1903,inHwangsŏngsinmun(1984,8:642).

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country where the dominant stratum of yangban scholar-officials was still patrilinealandsomeofthemlivedtogetherinthevillagesoftheirancestralclans(Deuchler1992,129–179),theunderstandingofethno-nationasonegiantpan-nationallineageofferedgreatpotential.AfamouseditorialpublishedonJuly30,1908,intheradicallynationalistandvociferouslyanti-JapaneseTaehanmaeilsinbo (Koreadailynews)dealingwiththedifferences between “ethno-nation” (minjok) and “political nation” (kungmin), madethispotentialclear.Ethno-nationwasunderstoodtobeconstitutedbyhomogeneityofbloodlineage(hyŏlt’ong),territory,history,religion,andlanguage.However,todevelopinto a political nation, the ethno-nation needed, in addition, the unity of “spirit”(chŏngsin),especiallyinrelationshipwiththeouterworld,aswellastheconsciousnessof common interests and ability to take coordinated political action. An ethno-nationfailingtodevelopitselfintoapoliticalnationwasseenashavinglittlechanceofsurvivalinmodernity’sDarwinianjungles.7AMarch12,1908,editorialinHwangsŏngsinmunonthesubjectofthe“basicimprovement”oftheKoreanethno-nationproclaimedthattheKoreanethno-nation, “descendantsofTan’gun,”was regardedasoriginallypossessingthequalitiesofloyaltyandhumanenessseenaswoefullylackinginthepresent.Thus,itsmeritsweretobeimprovedinthedirectionofdevelopingthespiritofethnicsolidarity,industriousness,andpublic-mindedness.8

On theotherhand,minjok could alsomean simply the “people” as anethno-politicalsubject.Importantly,asapoliticalcategory,itwasbroaderthankungmin,asitalso included women and adolescents, who were so far not supposed to claim fullmembershipinthenationasapoliticalconstruction.Theywere,however,alsoexhortedto be aware of their role as the country’s preservers and excel in competition withforeigners,soastoguaranteeKorea’ssurvivalintheageofDarwinianstruggles.9Whilean essentialized cultural and historical category built upon a fusion of the importedconceptofethnonationalvolk10andtheindigenousfocusondescentgroupsasthebasicunits of a society,minjokwas simultaneously denoting citizenship and civic duties, asbeing a part of historical Korean nation was supposed to imply certain publicobligations.Thissortofambiguitycontinuedtoaccompanytheusagesofminjokinthecolonialperiod,whichstartedin1910withKorea’sannexationbyJapan.

7“TheDifferencebetweenEthno-NationandPoliticalNation”(“Minjokkwakungminŭikubyŏl”),editorial,inTaehanmaeilsinbo(2001,4:4491).OnthepopularityofsocialDarwinisminearlytwentieth-centuryKorea,seeTikhonov(2010).8“BasicImprovement”(“Kŭnbonjŏkkaeryang”),editorial,inHwangsŏngsinmun(1984,16:408)9“PreservingtheNation”(“Pogungnon”),editorial,May6,1907,inHwangsŏngsinmun(1984,15:18).10OnthegenealogyofthisconceptinthecontextofGermannationalism,seeVick(2003).

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Ethno-NationandColonialNationalism

EthnicityasaLegalandDiscursiveCategory

Under Japanese colonial rule, Korean ethnicity became a legal category. Korea wasclassifiedasgaichi(outlyingterritory);ethnicKoreansweregaichiresidentsrequiredbythe 1915 law on civil-status registration (Chōsen minsekihō) to enter the gaichihousehold register.By contrast,ethnic Japanese, including these living inKorea,wereenrolled in the Japanesecivil-status register (according to the1899NationalityLawofJapan).EthnicKoreansandethnic Japaneseweresubjectedto thetwodivergent legalsystems. The formerwere governedbothby common Japanese lawsand the colonialGovernor-General’s decrees, which were in many cases applied to Koreans only; thelatter enjoyed at least some protections allowed by the 1889 Meiji Constitution.Koreans were severely disadvantaged under the colonial discrimination regime; theycouldnoteventraveltoJapan,thecolonialmetropole,withoutaspecialpermit(Chen1984;M.Kim2012,181–189).

As “ethnic Korean” was synonymous with “colonized” and “discriminatedagainst,”minjok couldnotbutbecomea termforanticolonial subversion, for theLeftand Right alike. It was the central ideological code for March First, the large-scaleindependencemovementthatbeganinKoreaonMarch1,1919—whenWilsonian“self-determination” was demanded by demonstrators in the name of the Korean ethno-nation (Pak C. 2010, 91–93). Ironically enough, it was the system of colonialdiscriminationthatmademinjok,arelativelynoveltermintheKoreanvocabulary,intoaword of daily usage,withmillions of demonstrators proclaimingminjok rights on thestreetsduringthedaysoftheMarchFirstMovement(Chŏng,Yi,andYi1989).

Deprivedofcivilrightsandputunderastrictcensorshipregime(Han2016),thecolonial-era nationalist intellectuals were adding further details to the essentializedimages of minjok’s past and its current status, the blueprints for which, as I havementioned,werefoundinthelastprecolonialdecade.Nationaliststypicallysawminjokasanextendedfamily-like,age-old,andveryhomogenous(orhomogenized)entity,withitsown“consciousness,” “spirit,” “character,”and“special features.”However, in linewith the general tendency toward an analytical approach to reality— inspired by thesocial sciences and strongly influenced, inter alia, by the surge in popularity of leftistdiscourses in the 1920s—the new views ofminjok placed stronger emphasis on itshistoricity rather than on its pseudofamilial qualities. A good example of such adefinition is a programmatic editorial in Tong-a ilbo (East Asian daily), “DiscussingKorea’s Ethnonational Movement at the Beginning of the WorldwideReformation,”whichdefinedminjokasa“productofhistory”butinthesametimeasan“ever-flowing, continuous totality [chŏnch’e].”11 Even if it was history that formedminjok, the time of its historical existence—assumed to amount to four thousandyears—was supposed to be long enough to make it almost a transhistorical, eternal

11“SegyekaejoŭipyŏkturŭltanghaeyaChosŏnŭiminjokundongŭlnonhanora,”Tong-ailbo,April6,1920.

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entity. In addition to being a community of common fate, minjok was also acombinationof special features (suchas“national character”) thatwere todefine theattributesofeachindividual’sexistence.“Homogeneity,”Blood,andSpirit

Nationalist ideologists regarded not only individuals, but nation-states, too, as beingdefined by their ethnic composition, and Tong-a ilbo’s 1920 editorial assumed that a“homogeneous nation” (tan’il minjok) in each and every nation-state was to be thestandard of modern international society. However, it is noteworthy that“homogeneity”herereferredtothecommoncharacterandculturegroundedinsharedhistorical experiences, rather than the assumption of an identical bloodline. Theeditorial made a point of saying that “infusions of Chinese or Japanese blood” intoKorean veins did not matter, as the totality and actuality of minjok was primarilyanchoredinitshistoricityandcommunalconsciousness(Tong-ailbo1977,1:27–28).12Inaword,minjok was the overarching, totalizing entity creating the possibility for bothindividualexistenceandstatehoodandpossessinghistoricallyrootedcharacteristicsofitsown,but itwasprimarilybasedonnurture(sharedfateandhistoricalexperiences)ratherthannature(“blood”).

Intherelativelyliberalclimateofthe1920s,Tong-ailbowasdefinitelyfocusingmoreon“spirit”ratherthan“blood.”Sixyearslater,inaneditorialon“TheGreatnessofSpiritualStrength,”13thenewspaperdefiantlypronouncedthataslongasthespiritofaweaker,conqueredminjok isalive,theconquestisonlytemporal.Asdemonstratedbythepro-independenceralliesinSeoulonJune10,1926—ontheoccasionofthefuneralofindependentKorea’slastemperor,Sunjong(r.1907–1910)—Korea’sminjokretaineditsspiritualstrength.Theneweditorial impliedthatKorea’s“individuality,dignity,andself-reliance” were all intact.14 In this and other nationalistic narratives,minjok wastypically described as an individual-like collectivity, almost as a single person—with astrongly individual set of characteristics—in plural. Indeed, much of the earlynationalistic scholarship on Korea’s history and culture was devoted to attempts toproduce a coherent description of timeless Korean-ness as a combination of nationalmores,habits,beliefs,andtraits.KoreansandTheir“NationalCharacter”

Designedtocounter JapaneseOrientalist (mis)representationsofKoreansandKorean-ness,earlynationalisticdescriptionsofKoreanminjokwereoftenstronglyself-affirming,definingitasasetofuniversalhumanvirtues—inadditiontocertainspecial,historicallydefinedqualities.Typically,AnHwak(1884–1946),awell-knownnationalisthistorian,ina 1922 work on Korean literary history, The History of Korean Literature (Chosŏn

12“SegyekaejoŭipyŏkturŭltanghaeyaChosŏn,”1920.13“Chŏngsinnyŏkŭiwidaesŏng,”Tong-ailbo,June11,1926.14“Chŏngsinnyŏkŭiwidaesŏng,”1926.

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munhaksa), defined Koreans as collective-oriented, polite and respectful, simple andwarm-hearted, peace-loving, optimistic, and able to combine down-to-earthpragmatismwith goodConfucian virtues of humaneness and righteousness (An 1994,146–185).TheinfusionsofHanChinese,Mohe(K.Malgal),orXianbei(K.Sŏnbi)bloodinthe Korean “bloodline” did not really matter, as long as all Koreans were united inworshipping Tan’gun, their forefather “equal to bright and fair Heaven in the Koreanthinking.” In other words, as long as beliefs and “national character” worked toconsolidate theminjok, its heterogeneousdescentwouldhave little impact (An1994,146–185).

It is important to remember that the “national character” as seen by thenationalist intellectuals was both a given and a variable. National character wasregarded as a reality that one could observe and assess; at the same time, Koreannationalismasamovementwassupposedto improve it inthedesirabledirection.Forexample, An Ch’angho (1878–1938), one of the most respected nationalist leaders,publishedin1926anexhortatoryappealtoKoreanstudentyouth.15YoungereducatedKoreans,representingthenation’shopefulfuture,wereaskedtodevelopthequalitiesthatAnCh’anghowantedtoseeallKoreansdeveloping—namely,aself-sacrificialspiritof public commitment and cooperative skills. In An Ch’angho’s thinking, Koreansdefinitelywere lacking inthesequalities,but thesituationcouldbe improvedthroughconsciouscollectiveefforts.Yetanother importantexhortation to thestudentswas tonottreatlesseducatedcompatriotscontemptuously,andtonotfocustoomuchontheshortcomings of the Korean national character. The character could be, after all,improved under the guidance of the new, nationalist elite, and a merciful attitudetowardcompatriots’shortcomingswouldalsotranslateintostrongerhatredtowardthecolonialistenemy(An[1926]1973,74–78).

“NationalHomogeneity”andtheHeterogeneityofKoreanNationalism

As researchers have noticed before, the belief in the cultural and “spiritual”homogeneityoftheKoreanminjoktookshapeincolonialKoreaevenwithoutamytho-historyofKoreans’“homogeneousdescent”beingproperlyarticulatedandpopularized.Historicalandculturalhomogeneitywasmorethanenoughforthepurpose(Han2007).Oncertainoccasionsthe“unitarydescentline”fromTan’gunstraighttothepresentdaywassolemnlymentioned.Forexample,as themouthpieceof theShanghaiProvisionalGovernment (the exile government, organized by Korean nationalist emigrants inShanghai in 1919), Tongnip sinmun (The independent) reported that Yi Tongnyŏng(1869–1940),thenMinisteroftheInteriorintheprovisionalgovernment,mentionedinhis speech onNovember 24, 1919, on the occasion of Tan’gun birthday celebrations,thatallKoreansbelongedtoTan’gun’sbloodlineage(hyŏlt’ong).Thatmadethem“onebloodlineage-basedethno-nation”(hanhyŏlt’ongŭiminjok)obligedtoaideachother,

15AnCh’anghowasalsoconsideredoneofthemostmoderatenationalistleaders,duetohiswillingnesstomakeallianceswiththeLeft,ifnecessary(YiM.2002,264–292).

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asbefitsbloodrelativesinalargefamily.16However,asRichardKimpersuasivelyarguesinhisvolumeoncolonialKorea’sdiasporicnationalism,itwastheprincipleofterritorialnational sovereignty, coupled with the belief in self-determination and popularsovereignty—ratherthanthe“bloodlineage”-relatedideas—thatformedthebackboneof the overseas Koreans’ nonsocialist nationalism in the 1910s through the 1930s (R.Kim 2011, 4–14). As Pak Ch’ansŭng concludes in his study, cultural and historicalhomogeneitytookprecedenceoverspeculationsabouta“unitaryKoreanbloodlineage”in the Korean nationalist discourse of the 1920s and 1930s. Some nationalists, bothinside and outside Korea, sometimes mentioned the assumed singular bloodline.However, in most cases it was understood as a complementary element in therelationshiptothehomogeneityofthebeliefs,spirit,andvirtues.Collectivelybelievingin Tan’gun’s role as the nation’s forefather was clearly more important than thebloodlineofTan’gunperse(PakC.2010,103–106).

One necessary caveat is that nationalist views on the issue of “nationalbloodline” were as ideologically and politically diverse as the nationalist milieusthemselves. In theory, the positions on radical land reform or the feasibility of goingfurther towarda Soviet-type society after thehoped-fornational liberation separatedthesocialistandnonsocialistnationalistcampsonagenerallevel.Inpractice,thelinesbetween them often blurred, and diverse groups and opinions coexisted inside eachcamp.17Thisdiversityisvisible,forexample,intheanswersgivenbyvariousnationalistintellectuals to a question concerning the appropriateness of interracial marriages,asked in September 1931 by the editors of a popular monthly, Samch’ŏlli (Threethousand li). All the intelligentsia luminaries who answered the questionmade cleartheiroppositiontoeconomicallyorpoliticallymotivatedmarriages“with foreignracesinside Korea” (obviously referring to the intermarriages with Japanese, politicallyencouragedbytheJapaneseimperialauthorities).18Otherthanthatsetofanswers,theopinionsweredivided.HanYong’un(1879–1944),aself-proclaimed“Buddhistsocialist”andnoncommunistanduncompromisingnationalistwho,however,sharedmanysocialconcernsof the leftists,made itclearthathumanity’sprogresswasachievedpreciselythrough “blood contact” between different nations and that, in his opinion, it wasinternationalismthatconstitutedthedominanttrendofthecurrentage(TikhonovandMiller 2008, 1–30). By contrast, Hwang Aesidŏk (Esther Hwang, 1892–1971), anAmerican-educated female Christian and concomitantly nationalist activist, definedKoreansaspossessorsof “superiorqualities”andconcluded that theirmarriageswithnon-Koreans had little chance of success due to differences in customs and“ethnonationalsentiments”(Kimetal.1931).WhilebothHanandHwangusedminjok—

16“TaehwangjoSŏngt’ankŭpKŏn’gukKiwŏnchŏlCh’ukhasik,”Tongnipsinmun,November27,1919.17SeePakC.(2007,281–308)andRobinson(1988)onvarioustendenciesinsidecolonial-eranationalism.18OnthepoliciesconcerningKorean-Japanesemarriagesinthecolonialera,seeTikhonov(2015,151–183).

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ratherthan,forexample,socialclass—astheprimarycategoryofanalysis,theydifferedconsiderablyintheirviewsonthedegreetowhichminjokmembers’intimacywiththeoutsiderswaspermissible.

Tosummarize,whereastheJapanesecolonialadministrationlegallydefinedthecategory of “ethnic Korean-ness” by systematically according different juridicaltreatmenttoKoreansandJapaneseontheKoreanpeninsula,Koreannationalistsofthecolonial era, building further on the conceptual developments of the last precolonialdecade, were attempting to challenge the colonizers’ power to define and fill thecategoryofKorean-nesswithmeaningsoftheirown.ThehistoricallyconstitutedKoreanethno-nation(minjok),astheyimaginedit,wassimultaneouslyunited,transcendentinrelationshiptothemyriadofdifferencesinsidetheKoreanethno-community,andatthesametimeparticularandseparatevis-à-vis therestof theworld.AllKoreans, just likeoneperson,possessedaspecialsetoftraits,virtues,andcharacteristics,andallhadtoregard theirnationalcommitmentasprimaryandall-consuming. Itwas this totalizing,ahistoricalwayofimaginingthenation—withcompletedisregardtoboththerealitiesofclassdifferentiationandthe international relatednessofdifferentclasses,groups,andinterests—thattheKoreanMarxistsofthe1920sand1930sattemptedtodeconstruct.Communism,Marxism,andEthno-NationinKorea

MarxismandEthnonationalIssues

Marxism took its shape after the democratic and national revolutions of 1848 and,naturallyenough,hadtoengagefromtheverybeginningwiththeissuesofnationandnationalism. In the beginning, Marxist understanding of the dialectic of nationalidentities and movements was rather instrumental (Glenn 1997). Such Marxismfounders as Friedrich Engels (1820–1895) viewed nationalisms (Polish or, say,Hungarian)alliedwiththerisingtideofbourgeoisliberalisminthestruggleagainsttheoutdatedautocraticgovernmentsas“progressive”(MarxandEngels1975–2005,8:227,20:152–161).Moregenerally,inPolandandelsewhere,independentnationalstatehoodwas regarded as an important prerequisite for internationalist working-classcooperation—hencetheattentiontothe“Polishquestion”(MarxandEngels1953,116–120). The point about the essentiality of support for national(ist) demands forindependence—naturally,onlyaslongassuchademand,voicedagainstanoppressivemultiethnicempire, is “progressive”—was furtherdevelopedbyVladimirLenin (1870–1924). He famously foregrounded the right to national self-determination as afundamental democratic principle, although it was clearly always expected that the“proletarian and peasantmasses” ofmostminorities in Russia, or any other countryoptingoutof thecapitalistsystemwouldeventually“voluntarilychoose”toalignwiththenewborn“socialistmotherland”(Lenin1973,22:143–156).Still,Lenin’sadvocacyofnationalself-determinationinprinciplewasoneofthemajorreasonsthathisversionofMarxismattractedsomanyindependence-orientedintellectualsincolonizedKorea.

Yet another commonality shared by Lenin, Engels, and other Marxisttheoreticians in their views on nations and nationalisms was the basic “proto-

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constructivist” position. Nations—Hungarian, Polish, orwhat Lenin termed “advancedcapitalist nations ofWestern Europe and the United States of America” (Lenin 1973,22:148–153)—were seen as products of economic and political history, mostsignificantly as the results of the history of capitalist development inside theframeworksofabsolutiststatesandthehistoryofliberal(“bourgeois”)revolutions.Inaclassic Marxist statement on the problems of nation, Die Sozialdemokratie und dieNationalitätenfrage (1907), Otto Bauer (1881–1938), a famed Austrian Marxisttheoretician, recognized the premodern roots of modern nations in the tribal“communities of nature” and medieval “communities of culture”; however, as heemphasized, itwas the capitalist developmentof transportation, industry, commerce,postalsystems,andpressthatproducedthenations inthemodernsenseoftheword(Bauer[1907]2000,62–63).

Bauer preferred to solve ethnic issues with national-cultural autonomy forminorities,whichwouldbothalleviateethnicdiscriminationandpreventthebreakupoflargemultiethnic states byoffering theminorities a practical alternative to secession.Theimplementationofthissolutionwas,interestinglyenough,attemptedintheshort-lived Far Eastern Republic (1920–1922) vis-à-vis the Korean, Jewish, and Ukrainianpopulaces (Sablin 2017). Some sort of local Korean autonomy existed in the RussianMaritime Province even after the demise of the Far Eastern Republic—annexed byBolshevikRussiain1922—butby1926,non-Bolshevik,pan-Russianethnicorganizationof Koreans was disestablished and further Korean immigration to the Soviet Russiabanned (Sablin and Kuchinsky 2017). Koreans were defined as a foreign populationwhose national aspirations were to be fulfilled by the liberation of its historicalhomelandviatheLeninistrouteofcombinednationalandsocialstruggle,ratherthanasa“Sovietnationality”tobeaccommodatedthroughautonomyonSovietterritory.

Lenin,thefatheroftheSovietUnion’sethnicpolicies,wasmoreapractitionerthanatheoreticianofMarxism.AlthoughhedidnotnecessarilyshareBauer’spracticalprogram(hewasemphaticallyagainstBauer’sappeal forestablishingnational-culturalautonomyforminorities),hedidshareBauer’sunderstandingofthehistoricalrootsofmodernnationsandnationalism.“Awakeningofnationallifeandnationalmovements,thestruggleagainstallnationaloppression,andthecreationofnationalstates”were,inLenin’s view, important traits of historical capitalism’s early history. Wherevercapitalismwas still underdeveloped, the formationofmodernnationswas stuntedaswell (Lenin 1973, 20:17–51). In fact, Bauer’s—and Lenin’s—accounts of the origins ofmodern nations contain in their nuclei all the essential theses of contemporaryconstructivisttheoreticiansofnationsandnationalisms,includingthecentralityof“printcapitalism” (Anderson 1991) and standardized high culture, popularized through theeducationalsystemandmedia(Gellner1983).

By contrast, French philosopher and historian Ernest Renan, in his influential1882 speech, emphasized modern European nations’ presumed roots in post-RomanGermanicbarbariankingdoms,aswellas“commonwill”andcommunalconsciousnessas the cornerstones of nationhood (Renan 1882). Such an approach had more in

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commonwith the views of the Korean nationalists of the 1920s and 1930s discussedearlier. Bauer’s belief in the existence of “national character”—which he, however,consideredahighlyvariableproductofhistoricalconditions([1907]2000,20–22)—wasalsonotentirelydifferentfromthespeculationsofthelikesofAnHwakontheKoreannationalpsyche, thedifferencebeingBauer’s emphasison thedecisive importanceofmodern, rather than ancient, history. However, Bolshevik thinkers who exertedespecially strong influence on the Korean Marxists of the 1920s and 1930s—forexample,JosephStalin(1878–1953)inhiswell-known1913pamphletMarxismandtheNational Question—made it clear that different classes and groups of which nationsconsist are hardly in a position to share the same “character,” the use of commonlanguage notwithstanding. It was the communality of (capitalist-age) economic liferather than mystical “character” that defined the commonality of modern nation’smembers(Stalin[1913]1975).KoreanMarxism:DefiningNation,Nationalism,and“NationalAnti-ImperialistRevolution”

ThebasicsofKoreanMarxists’understandingofethno-nationdidnotessentiallydifferfromthattypicalofMarxistselsewhere,althoughcolonialKorea’speculiaritieswerealsoto be taken into consideration. As a Marxist thinker, famed Korean philosopher andpopular writer Sin Namch’ŏl (1903–1958) defined it, ethno-nation was a historicallyformedhumancollective,unitedbyitssharedlanguage,territory,andeconomiclife,aswell as the “spiritual communality” produced by the experience of cultural unity (Sin1948, 80).19 Sin obviously agreedwith his non-Marxist contemporaries on the ethno-nation’s historicity, aswell as the (historically conditioned) existence of some sort of“spiritual communality”among fellownationals.Hedidnot,however, regardnationalexistence as a precondition for the individual life, and showed little interest inspeculationsontheethnonational traits,character,orvirtuesofKoreansthatweresopopular in the nationalist milieus. He was even less interested in the ethno-nation’ssupposed common descent, which he did not even mention in his definition of theethno-nation(Sin1935).

Indeed,inthemid-1930s,SinNamch’ŏlwasathoroughMarxistuniversalistwhowasskepticalnotonlyabout the theoriesofessentializednationalpeculiaritybutalsoabout the reified, ahistorical dichotomy of East versus West. He acknowledged thedifferencebetweenthe“West’shuman-centeredness”andthe“Eastern”attachmenttotheideasofnon-action(Ch.wuwei;K.muwi)orcosmicinterconnectedness,buttendedtoascribe thisdifference to thedisparityof theeconomicbasis in the capitalistWestandpre-capitalist East, exactly in linewithMarxistorthodoxy (Sin1934). Sinwasalsoseriously troubled by the rise of nativist nostalgia for the ethnonational past in post-1933 fascist Germany and Japan’s rapidly expanding ultra-nationalist and pan-Asian

19Sin’sdefinitionappearsinamonographpublishedafterthedecolonizationbutisbasedonhiscolonial-eraworks;seeYiP.(2015).

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circles, and saw a certain connection between Korean nationalists’ essentialist andnativistleaningsandtheturntowardnationalistextremismelsewhere(Sin1935).

However, given Korea’s sociopolitical situation in the 1930s, simply definingethno-nation in an orthodox Marxist way and subsequently denouncing nationalistattempts to absolutize or essentialize it would not be sufficient. After all, with theexplicit blessing of the Comintern (Communist International, 1919–1943), KoreanCommunists—whoseunderstandingof thepolitical situation and the sequenceof thetasks strongly influenced nonpartyMarxists aswell—designated the first stage of thecomingrevolutionas“nationalandanti-imperialist.”AsKoreanCommunisttheoreticianHan Wigŏn (1896–1937) formulated it in his programmatic article, “On the PresentTasksoftheWorking-ClassVanguard”—firstpublishedin1929inKyegŭpt’ujaeng(Classstruggle),aChina-basedCommunistmagazinemainlytargetingpartymembersandtheirfellow travelers)—such a revolution had to be conducted by a proletarian-ledcollaborative front (hyŏptong chŏnsŏn) of different classes and groups with anti-imperialist potential on the ethnonational (minjok) basis. Whereas a broader front,includingthenonproletarian“masses”previously influencedbythenationalist leaders,was seen as needed, Han viewed the political stance of right-wing nationalistbourgeoisie as increasingly reactionary (Han [1929] 1987), a view that was broadlysharedbytheComintern’sownKoreancadres.AtypicalcasewasLiKang(pseudonymfor YangMyŏng, 1902–?), a Beijing University graduate who stayed inMoscow afterarriving as a political immigrant in 1931. Affiliated with the Comintern’s CommunistUniversityof theToilersof theEast (KUTV,1921–1938), LidescribedKorean“nationalreformism” in Russian in a lengthy analytical article in a small-circulation Cominternjournal, Materialy po Natsional’no-kolonial’nym problemam (Materials on national-colonial problems) as a reactionary force driven by unscientific beliefs in Koreans’uniquenessanddisregardingclassissues(Li[1933]2007).

Generally, the Comintern’s approach to the diverse nationalisms of the non-European world was just as instrumental as early Marxists’ views on ethnonationalissues; explicitly anticolonial nationalisms were seen as potential allies, albeittemporarily (MateraandKent2017,164),whereas those too tightlyconnected to thegreat powers, implicated in colonial enterprises, or seeking territorial expansionwerecondemned as reactionary. For example, the Comintern and its affiliated PalestinianCommunist Partydefined Zionismas “imperialism’smilitaryunit” destined tooppressthe(legitimate/revolutionary)nationalismofthe“Arabmasses”onbehalfofBritishandother colonizers (Programmnye Dokumenty Kommunisticheskijh Partiy Vostoka 1934,294).TheChineseNationalistParty,theGuomindangwas(relatively)“progressive”untilits anticommunist turn in 1927, after which its nationalism was, naturally enough,redefined as reactionary (Mamaeva 1999). Although Comintern militants inside andoutsideKoreaviewed themore radicalwingsofKoreannationalismaspotentialalliesuntilthelate1920sorearly1930s,thisviewchangedundertheinfluenceoftheGreatDepression. Since the late 1920s, the Comintern espoused a (not fully substantiated)belief in impending revolutionary explosions all over the world and of growing

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rapprochement between certainmoderate nationalist groupings inside Korea and thecolonialauthorities.Bytheearly1930s,KoreannationalismwasregardedinCominterncirclesasoneoftheobstaclesonthewaytothesupposedlyloomingrevolutioninKorea(Tikhonov2017b).MarxistCriticismsandNationalistReactions

Suchhardeningattitudestowardpoliticalnationalism inKoreawere largelyechoedbyMarxist intellectuals inside Korea dealing with the issues of nation, nationalism, andnationalcultureor“nationalstudies”(kukhak),whichcameinvogueintheearly1930swith the growing depoliticization of Korea’smoremainstream nationalists. The latterpreferredtodealwiththediscursivechallengesrepresentedbytheJapanesecolonialistdeprecationofKorea’snational culture rather than thepolitical challengesof colonialdomination(PaekS.2008).Infact,contrarytoHanWigŏn’sorLiKang’sviewofKoreannationalismasanexclusivelyreactionaryforce,thenationalists—especiallythosebasedatChosŏnilbo(Koreandaily),whereanumberofCommunistsusedtoworkinthe1920sas well—began giving serious consideration to socialist viewpoints. Indeed, aconsiderable amount of intellectual interchange between socialist and nonsocialistintelligentsiawastakingplace,especiallyonminjok-relatedissues.

AnChaehong (1891–1965), a long-termeditor-in-chief ofChosŏn ilbo, agreed,for example, that class movement might indeed be needed. However, he alsomaintained that the progress of the class struggle is first and foremost nationallyimportant, since itwould influence the situation of the nation as awhole in the end(cited inPaekS.2008,110). Judging from the columnshepublished inChosŏn ilbo inJanuary1936,healsoappearstohavebelievedthatKorea’s“backward”culturewouldbenefit fromthe influencesof“internationalvanguardculture” (most likely,hemeantsocialistculture).Atthesametime,heappealedtorespectforKorea’sparticularity,inaculturalsensebutalsointheevolutionarymeaningoftheword.Nationalism,avestigeof the nineteenth-century past for established European nation-states, might be stillneeded in colonial Korea.20 By 1936, socialist ideas had changed Korea’s intellectuallandscapetothedegreethatevennationalistthinkersfeltobligedtopayhomagetotheideasofclassstruggleandinternationalsolidarity.

Still, nationalists’ predilection toward foregrounding Koreans’ supposedethnonational homogeneity and particularity—rather than socioeconomic factors ofnational life—and their uncritical attitudes toward ancient mythology would not gounchallenged by the Marxists, with their universalist worldview and “scientificmethodology.”Thetoneoftheircriticismwasnotverydifferentfromtheridiculewithwhich Li Kang cited An Chaehong’s musings on the supposed specificity of Koreans’“philosophical and utopia-loving national character” in his lengthy Russian article (Li

20AnChaehongpublishedthesecolumnsunderthegeneraltitle“Kukcheyŏndaesŏngesŏponmunhwat’ŭksukwajŏngnon”(Ontheculturalparticularityprocessseenfromtheinternationalsolidarityviewpoint);theyappearinAn(1981,558–560,564).

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[1933] 2007). In a 1935 article on ethnic groups (chongjok) and nations (minjok), AnChaehongdescribedKoreans—differentlyfromsuchcompositenationsastheJapaneseorBritish,which formedthroughassimilationandconquest—asasinglenaturalgroupmade by centuries of common life under the same (relatively isolated) naturalconditions and collectively possessing “virgin-like self-pride and emotional spirit of[collective]advance”(reprintedinAn1981,546–547).Atthesametime,Marxistsweremaintaining that nations in the modern sense of the word were formed under theconditions of capitalist development. “National spirit” was among the terms theystudiously avoided (Cho 2015, 77–79). A prominent Communist activist, Yi Yŏsŏng(1901–?) made the point clearly in his article on the national question serialized inChosŏnilboinNovember1929:thetransitionfromfeudalismtocapitalismhadbroughtethno-nationsintomodernexistence(citedinCho2015,78).

Some Marxists, true to the spirit of dialectics, were eager to allow certainexceptionality totheKoreancase,givenKorea’s longandrelativelycontinuoushistoryas a single, centralized statewith a relatively homogeneous ruling-class culture.HongKimun(1903–1992),ayoungCommunistintellectualwhowastobecomeoneofNorthKorea’smostcelebratedexpertsonKoreantraditionalcultureafterthe1945liberation(Kang 2004), mentioned in his influential 1934 article on Korean literature (originallypublished inChosŏn ilbo) that Koreans had already formed their ethno-nation at thetime of the Three Kingdoms, in the first century BC to AD 668 (Hong [1934] 2015).Although“nation”hereseemstosignifyapremodernethnicgroupratherthananationinthemodernsense(Cho2015,80), it isalsoclearthatHongconsideredtheKoreans’casetobedifferentfromthatof,say,Italians,whoenteredtheprocessofethnonationalformationonlyduring“Dante’stimes”(thatis,theendoftheMiddleAges).

AcademicStudiesofKoreanEthnogenesisandKoreanTradition

Interestingly,contrarytothepositionoflinguisticnationalists,21HongKimunconsideredKorean literature in classical Chinese a part of Korean literary history, too. The onlycaveatwasthatitwastheliteratureoftheyangbanscholar-officialclass.FromHong’sviewpoint,itwasthenationalidentityofthewriterratherthanthelinguisticmediumofwriting thatwas todefine literature’sbelonging (Hong [1934]2015).When itcametoissuesoftheformationofethnonationalidentityinitsmoremodernmeaning,however,theMarxistswere,expectedly,moreon theuniversalist thanexceptionalist side.PaekNam’un (1894–1979), a prominentMarxist historian who also went on to occupy animportantpoliticalpositioninNorthKorea(Petrov2006),suggestedthatthetraditionof“nationalstudies”(kukhak)—aformofself-knowledgethat impliessomedevelopmentofnational self-awareness—began in theageofChosŏnkingSukchong (r.1674–1720)

21AfamousexampleisYiKwangsu,who,inhisJanuary1929articleforthepopularmonthlySinsaeng(Newbirth)definedKoreanliteratureaseverythingwritteninKoreanandthusexplicitlyexcludedthevastcorpusofclassicalChineseworksfromtheKoreanliterarytradition(YiK.[1929]2015).

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andwasspearheadedbythePracticalLearning (Sirhak)school thatwas lessboundbyneo-Confuciandogmatism.Likeelsewhere,ittookplaceinKoreaintheageofthe“crisisoffeudalismandemergenceofmerchantcapital”(PaekN.1934b).

Indealingwiththemostancientpastofproto-Korea,PaekNam’unattemptedto maintain rigorous distinctions between “race” (injong), “ethnic group” (chongjok),and “ethno-nation” (minjok). Proto-Korean ethnic groups, according to Paek, wereraciallyrelatedtotheSushentribesmentionedintheChineseclassics,andtheYilou—supposedly“themostbackward”descendantsofSushendescribed inChinesesourcesonearlyKorea(PaekN.[1933]1989,95).Thedirectancestorsofproto-Koreanswere,inPaek’s view, the Puyŏ people, who built the eponymous kingdom in what isnortheasternChinatodayinthesecondandfirstcenturiesBC.However,thePuyŏendedupsplittingintoseveraltribal(pujok)orethnicgroupsintheprocessoftheirexpansiononto the Korean peninsula, and these groups grew increasingly different from eachother(PaekN.[1933]1989,145).ThesamefatebefellthepeopleoftheThreeHaninthesouthernpartsofKorea(firsttothirdcenturiesAD),whowereoriginallyinterrelatedbut split into three major tribal alliances in the process of territorial expansion andsocioeconomicdevelopment.Then,withthefirststatescomingintobeing,theystartedtoslowlymovetowardtheformationofethno-nation(PaekN.[1933]1989,129).Paekwas scathingly critical about the nationalist attempts to lump a number of ancientKoreanrulerstogetheras“mutuallyrelated”heirstoTan’gun’sstateand“membersoftheclanof supposedSundescendants.”Such idiosyncratic interpretationsofpasthadnothingtodowithwhatPaekregardedas“theonlyscientificmethodofresearch”(PaekN. [1933] 1989, 145). Aswe can see, Paek strove to give a balanced account ofbothhomogeneityandheterogeneityinvolvedintheprocessoftheKoreanethnogenesis.Hisefforts contrast with the nationalists’ much stronger emphasis on the allegedhomogeneityoftheKoreans.

Asaprofessionalhistorian,PaekNam’unattemptedtomakeacleardistinctionbetween an “ethnic group” (chongjok) and “ethno-nation” (minjok). However, someMarxistpolemistswhowerenothistoriansbytradealsosometimesdescribedancientproto-Koreans as an “ethno-nation”—at the same timemaintaining a distinction thattheywere “primitive” (wŏnsi) rather than “modern” nations. Still, the thrust to apply“the only scientific method of research” and discover the general, universal logic ofKorea’sethnohistorywascommontoallMarxistswithoutexception.Agoodexampleisa 1935 polemic by Kim Myŏngsik (1891–1943), one of the pioneers of the KoreansocialistmovementandagraduateofWasedaUniversity’sdepartmentofpoliticsandeconomy.22 From the beginning, Kim proclaims himself to be a Marxist evolutionist,believinginthegradualsophisticationofsocietiesandculturesastheyprogressforwardfrom “primitive life” to slave-owning or feudal “stages” in their development. YetanotherstartingpointforKimwastheanthropologyofFranzBoas(1858–1942),withitsexplicithistoricism, cultural relativism,and repudiationof racismand thedoctrinesof

22KimTongjŏn(2008)providesabriefbiographyofKimMyŏngsik.

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ethnonational exclusivity. Boas was hardly aMarxist (Bloch 1983, 126–128), but Kimclearly deemed important Boasian anthropology’s broad, international view with itsemphasisonthecommonalitiesfoundindifferentcultures.

Arguing against thenationalist penchant for glorifying the “Tan’gun age,” KimMyŏngsik maintained that the primitive communities of the Korean peninsula andneighboringManchuriasimplycouldnotpossesstheculturalsplendorascribedtothemby the nationalist authors: sophistication came later, in the “feudal period,”with thedevelopmentofConfucianismandBuddhism,whichnationalistsoftenusedtodenigrateas“foreign”totheoriginal“Koreanspirit.”KimMyŏngsiksawthenationalistpaeansto“Tan’gun’s spirit” as a nonsensical attempt to “equate national soulwith barbarism.”Moreover,heascertained that therewashardlyanythingspecifically “national” in thesupposedlytypicaltraitsoftheKoreanminjokattheprimitivestageofitsdevelopment.Nationalists—typified by An Hwak in connection with his speculations on Koreans’“national character,” as mentioned earlier—were ascribing to the primitive “Koreannation” such qualities as optimism, democratic cooperation, and high religiosity.However,asKimMyŏngsiksaw it,mostpeoplesof theworlddemonstratedabroadlysimilar set of characteristic traits during their gradual transition from egalitariancommunal life to the early class societies. “National character” was an artificial, far-fetched construction, but the same could be said about the very idea of unchanging,eternal,self-containednation(KimM.1935,56–58).

AccordingtoKimMyŏngsik,theKoreanethno-nationofhisdaywasbasicallyaproduct of a long history of Confucian transformation of the society and culturalimpulsesfromoutside,Chinainparticular.Allnations,Koreansincluded,wereproductsof long-term historical processes rather than static entities preserving their “spirits”since primitive times. Both Japanese and Koreans were composite, heterogeneousnations combining the bloodlines of at least several different peoples—interestingly,KimreferredtotheresearchofthefamedJapaneseanthropologistToriiRyūzō(1870–1953)whenhearguedthispoint—butsoweremostnationsoftheworld.DisputingtheHitlerianemphasisonthe“purebloodoftheGermannation,”KimMyŏngsikmentionedthe presence of Slavic and other heterogeneous elements in the process of Germanethnogenesis but claimed that the Jews, Hitler’smain target,were no “pure-bloodednation” either (Kim M. 1935, 52–55). In short, Kim Myŏngsik attempted to radicallydemythologizetheKoreannationalpast, refusingtoprivilegetheKoreanethno-nationandviewingitshistoryajustoneexampleoftheuniversalprocessofnationformation.For Kim Myŏngsik, ethnic Korean culture (minjok munhwa) definitely existed andunquestionably mattered greatly; but still, it was to be researched objectively, withwhatKimconceivedofasthegenerallawsofhistoricaldevelopmentinmind.“Proto-Constructivism”andtheTeleologyofLiberation

In a nutshell, Marxists saw nationalist views on issues related to the Korean ethno-nationasdevoidof thescientificmethodologicalapproachandthesortof liberationalperspectivethat,intheiropinion,onlyauniversalistviewofhumanhistoryasaprocess

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teleologically leading to human—and national—liberation could bring. Talk of“homogeneous”Koreansandtheir“nationaltraits”supposedlynurturedbymillenniaofhistory had weak foundation and led nowhere. Kim Kijŏn (1894–1948), a prominentnationalistand ideologistofan indigenousKoreannewreligion,Ch’ŏndogyo,regardedthestoryofTan’gunandhissupposedlybenevolentruleoverKorea’sfirststate,AncientChosŏn, as proof of such special ethical Korean qualities as love of justice andkindheartedness(KimK.1925).Bycontrast,suchMarxistresearchersasPaekNam’unorliteraryscholarandSinologistKimT’aejun(1905–1949)interpretedtheTan’gunmythashistoricalevidenceof theprocessofprimitivecommunities’dissolutionandaspartofthe legitimizing ideology of early Korea’s nascent ruling classes (Paek S. 2008). Bothancient mythology and the history of traditional Korea as a whole took form anddeveloped according to the general laws of the world history, according to HongKimun’s summary of the Marxist historical method. The driving forces of thisdevelopmentweretheprogressofsociety’sproductiveforcesandtheclassstruggleoftheexploited,ratherthanthe“nationalspirit”(Hong1935;Chŏng2012).

However, the nonexistence of the “national spirit” did not imply thatCommunists failed to recognize thehistoricalexistenceof theKoreanethno-nationorwere reluctant togivemembersof theethno-nationapromiseofhope in the future.Quite to the contrary, the teleology of Marxist historical theory was essentially theteleologyofethnonationalliberationintheeyesofthecolonial-eraradicalintellectuals.Afterall,asPaekNam’unwroteinareviewofanarticlebyafellowMarxist(andlaterafellow member of the North Korean academia), Kim Kwangjin (1902–1986), on theChosŏndynasty’s (1392–1910)monetaryeconomy, theonly special featureofKoreanhistorywasthefactthatitsnormalcapitalistdevelopmentwaspreventedbyimperialistintrusions(PaekN.1934a).ButaslongasKoreanCommunistswereabletojointheepichistorical battle against both capitalism and its inevitable outgrowth, imperialism—which, as Korean Communists asserted, enslaved three-fourths of humanity, Koreansincluded—theirvictoryinthestruggleforbothethnonationalandsocial liberationwasassured.Afterall, asemphasized in the “Declarationof theKoreanCommunistParty”(firstpublishedintheShanghai-basedCommunistjournalPulkkot[Flame]),theydidnotfight Japanese imperialism on their own, but were a local unit of the world socialistrevolution(YŏksaPip’yŏng[1926]1992).Conclusion

TheintellectualworldofcolonialKoreawasanarenaoffiercediscursivebattlesoverthedefinitions of everything related to Korean-ness—and the concept of ethno-nation(minjok)wasafocusofheatedideologicalcontention.AftertheconceptenteredKoreaattheverybeginningofthetwentiethcentury,thenationalistinterpretationofitshiftedfrom the precolonial vision of a nationwide descent group united in worshipping itstitular patriarch, Tan’gun, to amystical image of a “national totality” as a historicallyconditioned homogeneous community bound not only by common traditions andlegacies,but alsoby its supposedly sharednational character. “Homogeneity”didnot

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necessarily imply a unitary descent line, and the admixture of non-Korean blood inKorean veins was accepted, albeit somewhat reluctantly. However, it did imply thepossibilityof,forexample,rejectingtheplaceoftraditionalliteratureinclassicalChineseinthehistoryofKoreanliterature:afterall,thehomogeneityoftheethno-nationhadtostartwithlinguisticuniformity.Italsoimpliedthesubsumingofgroup—includingclass—interests into what the nationalists were to define as the sacred interests of theunchanging, age-old ethno-nation with its roots in mysterious antiquity. Given theprivilegedbackgroundsand rather conservativepoliticsof thenationalist leaders, it ishardly surprising that Marxist critics regarded the nationalist views on the ethno-nation’ssupremeimportanceasself-interested.

In addition, Marxists viewed their opponents’ attempts to define the Koreanethno-nationintermsofparticularity,uniqueness,andunitary,homogeneouscharacterasdangerouslyahistorical,implyingdisinteresttowardorignoranceoftheuniversalitiesof historical development. In amodern sense of theword, nationswere products ofcapitalistdevelopment(althoughsomeMarxistsallowedthattheKoreanethno-nationcouldactuallypredatecapitalism,duetotheearlyemergenceofcentralizedstatehoodinpremodernKorea)and the lociofall thecontradictions inherent to capitalism, firstand foremost, class contradictions. Trying to demystify the absolutized notion of theethno-nation typical of the nationalistic literature, Marxists emphasized the sharedworldwidecommonalitiesofhistoricaldevelopmentsin“primitive”times,aswellastheroleofoutsideimpulsesinthelongprocessofKoreanidentityformation.Incontrasttothenationalistaccentuationoftheuniquenessof“Tan’gundescendants,”theMarxistswere attempting to develop a “proto-constructivist” view of Korean ethnonationalhistorythatwouldqualifyasscientific.Koreanminjokanditshistoryweretobeseenasjust one case of certifying the truthfulness ofwhatwas assumed to be the universallogic of historical development. Victorious struggle against capitalist imperialism forbothnationalandclassliberationwasanimportantpartofthislogic.

Whereastheuniversalityoftheworld-revolutionaryprocessalsogavehopefortheKoreannation’sescapefromacolonialpredicament,theexaggeratedparticularismof thenationalists indeed resembled thenativismof Japanese imperialist ideology, asthe brilliant Marxist philosopher Pak Ch’iu (1909–1949) mentioned in an articlepublishedjustafterthe1945liberation(Pak[1946]2010).Inyetanotherarticlewrittenin the same year and specially dealingwith “fascization of extremenationalism,” Pakdefined fascism as an attempt to conceal and suppress the very existence of classantagonismsby substituting “class”with “nation” and to create an indefinite state ofemergencywhile relyingonviolenceandnational sentiments.Manyof thesenationalsentimentscouldbeillogical,orindeedevenpre-logical,butthatnolongermatteredinthe framework of extreme nationalism’s ideology of “blood and soil.” In Pak’s view,descent intoadictatorshipbasedon thecommunalityofnationalisticemotionswasaserious threat toKorea’s future, as “backward” countriesgenerally tended to fall intothetrapofnationalisticandauthoritarianpolitics (reprinted inKimY.2011,332–350).Given the prominence of both authoritarian politics and ethnic nationalism in both

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Koreas,NorthandSouth,intheirpostliberationhistory(PakCh’ansŭng2010,232–256),itmaybesaidthatPak’schillingwarningindeedhitthemark.

At a time when civic nationalism is gradually replacing the ethno-nationalistmode of societal cohesion in South Korea, the colonial-era Marxist attempts todeconstruct ethno-nationalist notions are worth revisiting. Such a rereading maycontributetocreatingapost-ethno-nationalistcivicsociety.Ratherthanbaskinginthegloryof thecapitalistsuccessesof the increasinglypolyethnicSouthKoreanstate, thissocietywouldbe committed to emancipatory visions akin to thoseonce espousedbytheMarxistsofthe1920sand1930s.

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AbouttheAuthor

Vladimir Tikhonov is Professor in the Department of Culture Studies and Oriental Languages(IKOS)attheUniversityofOslo.Theauthorwouldliketoexpresshisdeepgratitudetothetwoanonymousreviewerswhosethoughtfulandconstructivecommentsandcriticismscontributedgreatlytoimprovingthisarticle.Heisalsogratefultotheeditorsforalltheinvaluableassistancetheyprovidedintheprocessofpreparingthisarticleforpublication.