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CWS/WP/200/62 WORKING PAPER

DEMYSTIFYING BLUE BOX SUPPORT TO AGRICULTURE

UNDER THE WTO: IMPLICATIONS FOR DEVELOPING

COUNTRIES

SEPTEMBER 2020

CENTRE FOR WTO STUDIES

INDIAN INSTITUTE OF FOREIGN TRADE

DELHI

Cite this paper as: Sharma, S. K., Dobhal, A., Agrawal, S., Das, A., (2020). Demystifying Blue Box Support to Agriculture

under the WTO: Implications for Developing Countries. Working Paper No. 62, CWS/WP/200/62. Centre for WTO

Studies, Delhi.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT .................................................................................................................................. 3

SECTION 1: INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................... 4

SECTION 2: METHODOLOGY ........................................................................................................ 5

SECTION 3: HISTORY OF BLUE BOX ............................................................................................ 7

SECTION 4: BLUE BOX MEASURES OF WTO MEMBERS .............................................................. 9

4.1 EUROPEAN UNION (EU) ................................................................................................................. 9

4.2 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (US).............................................................................................. 11

4.3 JAPAN ........................................................................................................................................... 11

4.4 NORWAY ...................................................................................................................................... 12

4.5 CHINA ........................................................................................................................................... 13

4.6 ICELAND ....................................................................................................................................... 13

SECTION 5: DECIPHERING THE ISSUES IN BLUE BOX ................................................................. 14

5.1 POLICY SPACE DUE TO BLUE BOX................................................................................................ 14

5.2 SIMULTANEOUS APPLICATION OF BLUE AND AMBER BOX FOR SAME PRODUCT ....................... 15

5.3 PRODUCTION-LIMITING CONDITION: STANDALONE OR NOT ...................................................... 15

5.4 ‘PRODUCTION-LIMITING’ OR ‘PRODUCTION REDUCING’ ............................................................ 16

5.5 UPDATING THE BASE PERIOD ....................................................................................................... 17

5.6 QUANTITY ELIGIBLE FOR BLUE BOX SUPPORT ............................................................................ 17

5.7 LEVEL OF IMPLEMENTATION: NATIONAL, REGIONAL, OR INDIVIDUAL FARM LEVEL .................. 18

5.8 TYPE OF SUPPORT MECHANISM .................................................................................................... 18

5.9 BLUE BOX MEASURES: TRANSITORY? ......................................................................................... 19

SECTION 6: TRACING BLUE BOX IN AGRICULTURE NEGOTIATIONS .......................................... 19

SECTION 7: SHRINKING POLICY SPACE FOR DEVELOPING MEMBERS AND BLUE BOX SUPPORT 22

SECTION 8: CONCLUSION .......................................................................................................... 24

REFERENCES ............................................................................................................................. 25

ABOUT THE AUTHORS .............................................................................................................. 30

ABOUT THE CENTRE ................................................................................................................. 31

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DEMYSTIFYING BLUE BOX SUPPORT TO AGRICULTURE UNDER THE WTO: IMPLICATIONS

FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES1

SACHIN KUMAR SHARMA, ADEET DOBHAL, SURABHI AGRAWAL, ABHIJIT DAS

ABSTRACT

Developing members at the WTO are faced with shrinking policy space to support their

agricultural sector owing to the restrictive provisions of the Amber Box. Contrastingly, most

developed members are able to provide high levels of product-specific support without

breaching their commitments, on account of their AMS entitlement. For some of these

members, the Blue Box plays a pivotal role in expanding the policy space with respect to

domestic support to agricultural products. Though a lot of scholarship has discussed and

examined Amber and Green boxes, the Blue Box remains relatively shrouded in mystery.

Testimony to this is the fact that although the Blue Box has found use amongst the developed

members, no developing Member, except for China in 2016, had ever used the Blue Box to

support their producers. Given the impasse in the Doha Round and limited flexibilities

available under Amber Box, this paper examines the feasibility and compatibility Blue Box

measures with the socio-economic situation of developing members. To this end, the provisions

of the Blue Box are demystified based on the Agreement on Agriculture and the practices of

members. Further, it traces the genesis of Blue Box and members position on this Box in the

agricultural negotiations. Findings of this paper bring to fore the various operational

flexibilities available in implementing Blue Box programmes to support agriculture.

Keywords: Domestic support, Blue Box, WTO, agriculture, developing countries, AoA,

product-specific support, policy space, subsidies, negotiations

1 Views are personal.

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SECTION 1: INTRODUCTION

Domestic support to agriculture has undoubtedly been the most sensitive and contentious issue

in the Doha Round negotiations. For a long time, developing members have demanded the

removal of the inequities and asymmetries existing in the Agreement on Agriculture (“AoA”).

Under the AoA, developing members are increasingly faced with shrinking policy space to

support their agricultural sector (Musselli 2016, Sharma 2016), which is often replete with

challenges such as poverty, price fluctuations, food security, inadequate infrastructure etc.

Despite these obstacles, this sector plays a vital role in achieving the United Nations’

Sustainable Development Goals (“SDGs”) of ‘eradication of poverty’ (Goal 1) and achieving

‘zero hunger’ and ‘doubling agricultural productivity’ (Goal 2). To support their producers, the

developing members implement various domestic support measures under the AoA. These

measures, especially the trade-distorting support such as Amber Box, have been increasingly

questioned at various sessions of the Committee on Agriculture (“CoA”), with dispute

proceedings also being initiated in some cases (WTO 2019a; WTO 2019b).

The asymmetry under the AoA is most clearly discerned in Aggregate Measurement of Support

(“AMS”) entitlements for some selected members. However, most developing members lack

this entitlement and therefore can only extend product-specific support up to 10 percent of the

value of production (“VoP”) of a product. The developed members, on the other hand, are not

bound by any such limit and have the additional flexibility to concentrate their entire AMS

entitlement in a few products (Sharma et al. 2019, WTO 2017). For instance, the US had

provided product-specific support as a percentage of the VoP to coffee (189 percent), banana

(64 percent) and sugar (64 percent) in 2017, which is exponentially higher than the applicable

limit of 10 percent for most of the developing members.

In contrast to the situation of developed members, several studies have found that developing

members are facing grave challenges in implementing product-specific support under the

Amber Box (Thou et al. 2019). China-Agricultural Producers and India-Sugar and Sugarcane

highlight the increasing challenges faced by developing members at the WTO. Further, Jordan,

Turkey, China etc. are facing a policy space deficit under Amber Box as reflected in their

notifications.

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In this context, it becomes pertinent to mention that trade-distorting product-specific support

can be provided only under Amber and Blue boxes. Given the restrictive provisions of the

Amber Box and impasse in the Doha Development Round, the only viable option to extend

product-specific support remaining is the Blue Box. Under this Box, WTO members can

provide support without limits provided they comply with the associated conditions. For a long

time, only a few developed members such as the EU, US, Japan, Iceland, and Norway have

used this Box to support their producers. It was thought that the provisions of Blue Box are

incompatible with the need of the developing members as they needed to stimulate production,

rather than limit it (UNCTAD 2003). Therefore, unsurprisingly, developing members have

rarely explored the provisions of Article 6.5 to support their producers. It was only in 2016 that

China introduced Blue Box measures for corn and in 2017 for cotton.

Given this background, it is pertinent to explore the compatibility of the provisions of the Blue

Box in light of the agricultural realities in developing members. Another critical issue that

merits examination is whether Blue Box provides flexibilities to these members in

implementing support programmes without breaching their commitments under the AoA.

Considering these issues, the main objective of the study is to examine the viability and

compatibility of Blue Box provisions with the prevailing socio-economic situation of

developing members in the context of shrinking policy space under the Amber Box. To this

end, the study analyses the provisions of Blue Box and evaluates the practices of members over

the years.

This paper is divided into eight sections. The second section explains the methodology. The

third section traces the history of the Blue Box and the fourth section details the Blue Box

policies that have been utilised by members over time. The fifth section attempts to explore the

various issues under Article 6.5 and the sixth section examines the negotiations on the Blue

Box. The seventh section explores the viability of Blue Box support for the developing

countries, whereas the eighth section concludes the paper.

SECTION 2: METHODOLOGY

The paper undertakes an examination of the provisions of the Blue Box and the practice of

WTO members. Through a review of literature, the study traces the genesis of Blue Box under

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the WTO. By examining the AoA, domestic support notifications and policy documents of

selected members, an attempt has been made to analyse the provisions of this Box to highlight

various outstanding issues under Article 6.5. The negotiating position of members over the

years on this Box has also been examined. Finally, drawing from the practices of members and

provisions of the AoA, this study assesses the operational viability of Blue Box measures for

developing members. Descriptive statistics have been used in relevant places to strengthen the

analysis.

Amongst the three pillars of AoA viz. domestic support, export competition and market access,

the first is undoubtedly the most contentious and sensitive facet of the Agreement for all

members. Articles 6 and 7 of Part IV of the AoA along with Annex 2 and 3, deal with the

provisions on domestic support. Based on the nature of the measure and its effect on production

and prices, domestic support can be classified as trade-distorting such as Amber Box; and non

or minimally trade-distorting support like Green Box. Further, the support is divided into

exempted support that includes ‘Green Box’, Article 6.2, ‘Blue Box’; and non-exempted

support under ‘Amber Box’.

‘Green Box’ measures such as general services, food aid, direct payments etc. are exempt from

reduction commitments as these are presumed to be either not trade-distorting or causing ‘at

most minimal trade distortion’ or ‘effect on production’. Available to all members, Green Box

measures are not subject to any financial limit. As a special and differential treatment provision,

under Article 6.2, developing members are allowed to provide investment subsidies generally

available to agriculture, and input subsidies generally available to low income or resource-poor

farmers without any financial ceilings.

An ‘Amber Box’ measure is not inclusively defined under Article 6.1 of the AoA, rather it

covers those measures that are not exempted like the Green Box, Blue Box and Article 6.2.

The Amber Box comprises product-specific support and non-product specific support. The

former includes market price support (“MPS”) or budgetary outlay and the support scheme is

implemented for specific products such as wheat and rice. The latter is available for agricultural

products in general, an example of this being input subsidy. All agricultural producers can

potentially benefit from non-product specific support. The de minimis limit is the minimum

permissible trade-distorting support a Member can provide under the Amber Box. This limit

for product-specific support is fixed at 5 and 10 percent of the value of production (“VoP”) for

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a concerned agricultural product, for developed and developing members respectively. In a

situation where the product-specific support or the non-product specific support is below the

set de minimis level, it is not subject to inclusion in the current AMS calculation.

It is noteworthy that many members did not provide Amber Box support above the de minimis

level during the base period 1986-88 and therefore, their flexibility to provide future Amber

Box support was capped at the applicable de minimis level (Sharma 2018). On the other hand,

some members had provided Amber Box support above the applicable de minimis level and

thus secured the AMS entitlement. In other words, these members have the privilege to provide

Amber Box support above their applicable de minimis. For instance, the bound AMS for EU

and US is capped at Euro 72 billion and US$ 19 billion respectively, whereas, for the majority

of developing members, this entitlement is zero.

Measures under Article 6.5 of the AoA, also called ‘Blue Box’ measures, are exempt from

reduction commitments, provided they fulfil the pre-requisites laid down in the Article. For

any domestic support to be termed as Blue Box, it has to be “direct payments made under

production limiting programme” with such payments being based on either “(i) fixed areas and

yields; or (ii) up to 85% or less base level of production; or (iii) fixed number of livestock”.

Unlike the Green Box, Blue Box measures are linked to production. Despite being trade-

distorting, these payments are exempt due to their production-limiting nature and are not

subject to financial limits. There is considerable ambiguity in the implementation of the

provisions on Blue Box as evidenced by the practice of members. These have been elaborated

in the subsequent sections.

SECTION 3: HISTORY OF BLUE BOX

The origin of Blue Box can be traced back to the agricultural policies of European Community

(“EC”) and the US, which were aimed at increasing agricultural production, ensuring

remunerative prices for producers, price stabilisation and achieving self-sufficiency (Garzon

2006). Some of the developed Contracting Parties of GATT, including the US and the EC,

adopted a plethora of trade-distorting support measures and policy instruments such as MPS

and export subsidies (SC 2015, WTO 1995b, WTO 1995c). Due to such measures, not only did

these members become self-sufficient, but also net exporters in many agricultural products

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(Arovuori & Yrjola 2015). The exports of surplus production took place at the expense of the

world market stability (Ackrill et al. 2008), undermining the interest of farmers across

developing countries. As a result of these measures, the producer support estimate (PSE) in

OECD members had reached an astounding $300 billion by 1990 (OECD 1991).

In the 1980s, massive support to agriculture by OECD members triggered a demand for the

comprehensive reform of the global agricultural system under the Uruguay Round, seeking to

establish international trade rules for the sector (Anderson et al. 1999). During this round, the

EC overhauled its agricultural policy under the Common Agriculture Policy (“CAP”) through

the ‘MacSharry reforms’ of 1992. These reforms made significant changes such as the

reduction in the guaranteed support prices on cereal and livestock products and introduced

direct payments to farmers (Garzon 2006).

On domestic support, the EC wanted to ensure that compensatory payment under the reformed

CAP (1992) be exempt from any reduction commitments at the Uruguay Round (Josling &

Swinbank, 2011). Compensatory payments were direct payments made to producers of certain

products such as cereals, dairy, beef etc. to stabilise their income and recompense them for the

reduction of price support and lowered import tariff (Garzon 2006). These payments had set-

aside conditions for cereals, under which some portion of land was required to be taken out of

production (EC 1993). Moreover, since the payments were linked to current production levels,

they did not satisfy the criteria of the “Green Box” subsidies under the Dunkel Draft (1991) of

the Uruguay Round. The EC feared that without a carve-out, its trade-distorting support would

exceed its bound AMS under the proposed discipline in agriculture negotiations. To avoid

being at the receiving end of additional reforms, EC renegotiated the Blair House Accord with

the US in 1993, resulting in a new Box creation, called the ‘Blue Box’ (Stewart 1999). It

exempted direct payments under production limiting programs such as compensatory payments

from reduction commitments under the proposed Amber Box (Murphy & Suppan 2005).

Other GATT members agreed to the inclusion of the Blue Box in the Final Agreement arising

from Uruguay Round negotiations because these payments were perceived as less trade-

distorting due to the attached production-limiting conditions (Hooda & Gulati 2007). The Blue

Box, thus, was a compromise between the EC and the US which allowed the EC to continue

compensatory payments under the 1992 CAP reforms, and the US to exempt deficiency

payments.

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SECTION 4: BLUE BOX MEASURES OF WTO MEMBERS

Since 1995, only few WTO members namely the EU (including the Slovak Republic and

Slovenia), US, Norway, Japan, Iceland and China have used Blue Box to support their farmers

(Table 1). This section provides an understanding of the Blue Box measures implemented by

the members and examines how the conditions under Article 6.5, including limiting of

production, have been implemented.

4.1 EUROPEAN UNION (EU)

Following the MacSharry Reforms of 1992, the EC sought to exempt compensatory payments

from the reduction commitments and was successfully able to introduce Blue Box provisions

in the AoA compatible with these payments (Josling & Swinbank, 2011). Since 1995, the EU

has been consistently providing Blue Box support for many products under various iterations

of the CAP. Currently, the EU implements Voluntary Coupled Support (“VCS”) as a Blue Box

programme covering 21 agricultural sectors such as beef, dairy products, sugar beet etc. under

CAP 2013 for the years 2015-20 (EC 2017). The support under VCS is granted as direct

payments based on fixed area and yield or a fixed number of animals in a targeted region or

sector. The eligible area and yield are fixed based on the reference period (2009-2013), and the

support rate is also estimated using this period. The actual payment per hectare/animal is

lowered if there is an increase in the eligible area/animals. This, along with strict financial

outlay for members, ensures that VCS is a production-limiting scheme (WTO 2019d &e). Thus,

it can be observed that direct payment under the VCS is based on predetermined variables,

rather than explicit conditions of acreage reduction.

Besides VCS, the EU also implements a Blue Box programme for cotton in Bulgaria, Greece,

Spain and Portugal on the fixed area and yield basis. The payment is made subject to Member

specific statutory bases set for area and yields (EU 2013). There is no explicit acreage reduction

condition attached to the programme. However, this payment is reduced if the production

exceeds the set base and the reduction in payment is in proportion to the increase in the base

area.

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Table 1: Trend in Blue Box support among the WTO members

China European Union Iceland Japan Norway USA Slovenia Slovak Republic

Year CNY millions Million Euro ISK millions ¥ millions NKR Millions US$ millions Million Euro SKK million

1995 0.0 20846 1455.1 0.0 7117 7030.0 0.0 42.51

1996 0.0 21521 0.0 0.0 7246 0.0 0.0 36.3

1997 0.0 20443 0.0 0.0 7375 0.0 0.0 43.7

1998 0.0 20504 0.0 50200 7880 0.0 0.0 0

1999 0.0 19792 0.0 92700 7674 0.0 0.0 0

2000 0.0 22223 0.0 92700 7669 0.0 24.6 69

2001 0.0 23726 0.0 91100 7330 0.0 31.1 129

2002 0.0 24727 0.0 86500 7531 0.0 53.7 530

2003 0.0 24782 0.0 68200 7360 0.0 46.4 1119.8

2004 0.0 27237 0.0 67800 7434 0.0 0.0 0.0

2005 0.0 13445 0.0 65300 3915 0.0 0.0 0.0

2006 0.0 5697 0.0 70100 3793 0.0 0.0 0.0

2007 0.0 5166 492.6 42400 3725 0.0 0.0 0.0

2008 0.0 5348 537.5 32400 3982 0.0 0.0 0.0

2009 0.0 5324 542.0 21800 4138 0.0 0.0 0.0

2010 0.0 3142 553.0 306800 4395 0.0 0.0 0.0

2011 0.0 2981 581.0 153300 4469 0.0 0.0 0.0

2012 0.0 2754 610.0 155200 4744 0.0 0.0 0.0

2013 0.0 2664 628.0 155900 4874 0.0 0.0 0.0

2014 0.0 2879 647.0 74700 5109 0.0 0.0 0.0

2015 0.0 4331 655.5 98700 5232 0.0 0.0 0.0

2016 39039 4641 669.9 70800 5238 0.0 0.0 0.0

2017 5508 0.0 0.0 0.0

Source: WTO domestic support notifications of selected members

Note: Slovenia and the Slovak Republic became the members of the European Union

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4.2 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (US)

The US has used the provisions of Article 6.5 only in 1995 for implementing deficiency

payments to certain products such as cereals, wheat, rice, sorghum etc. Based on up to 85

percent or less of base-level production, these direct payments were provided on the difference

between a set target price and the market price and only farmers who participated in an acreage

reduction program were eligible to receive these payments (US 2019). Under the 1996 Farm

Bill, these payments were replaced with Price Flexibility Contract (PFC) based on historical

areas and yields and were classified as decoupled income support under the Green Box.

Although the US has not utilised the Blue Box after 1995, it did try to make changes to the

Blue Box to make it compatible with its domestic counter-cyclical payments under Doha

Round negotiations (Murphy 2005, Ratna et al. 2011).

4.3 JAPAN

Japan started a Blue Box support programme for rice in 1998. Under this, direct payment

contingent on output was paid to the producers as a compensatory payment for loss of income

incurred when market prices fell in comparison with the three-year average prices of rice during

1995 to 1997 (WTO 2001, OECD 2000). It was replaced by another Blue Box programme

named ‘direct payment for rice’ in 2010, which was also based on less than 85% of the base

level of production (WTO 2014). Operationally, this programme comprises two components,

i.e. a fixed and variable component. The fixed component is calculated based on the historical

gap between the national average cost of production (2002-2008) and farm gate price (2006-

2008) (WTO 2014 a-b). On the other hand, the variable component is paid only in the year

when current farm gate price falls below a fixed threshold. This threshold has been determined

as the average farm gate price for 2006-2008 (WTO 2014c). It can thus be observed that the

programme has elements of price support as it shields farmers from losses due to price

fluctuations.

Under the programme, the government set the production-limiting conditions in terms of a

target level of rice production to avoid overproduction and stabilise the supply-demand and

price of rice. Japan has maintained that the payment was only made to farmers who “abided by

the target and limited production” (WTO 2019). However, no explicit acreage reduction

condition has been mentioned for this programme under Japan’s domestic support

notifications. This programme was phased out after payment to rice produced in 2017.

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4.4 NORWAY

Like the EU and Japan, Norway has been consistently using the provisions of Blue Box to

provide support for multiple products such as milk, meat, beef. Over the years, it has provided

Blue Box support under all the sub-headings of Article 6.5 viz. fixed areas and yields; or (ii)

up to 85% or less base level of production; or (iii) fixed number of livestock. Since 2014,

Norway has been implementing the ‘Quality Incentive Support Programme for Beef’. The

payments under this programme are direct and based on ‘85 per cent or less of the base level

of production’ during 2010-12 and are made on per kg basis of beef meeting the required

quality standards (WTO 2015). The base level of production was 59.4 million kg, and the

maximum quantity of beef eligible for support was 50.49 million kg. However, no production-

limiting feature requiring reduction of beef production can be discerned from Norway’s

domestic support notification for the programme.

In January 2019, Norway introduced a new Blue Box programme for milk, the “Support to

Small and Medium Size Dairy Farms” under which payments are made on ‘85 percent or less

of the base level of production’, with this base being set at levels during 2015-2017 (WTO

2019f). Under the scheme, a fixed amount per cow is paid to farms, increasing till the 23rd

cow. After the 23rd cow, the payments decrease on every additional cow till the 50th cow,

exceeding which no payments are made (WTO 2019c). However, the scheme is applicable to

farms that have more than six cows and not more than 50 cows, therefore establishing farm

limits for eligibility under the programme. The decrease in payments after the 23rd cow suggests

that incentives reduce, thereby limiting production. It is interesting to note that rather than

payments based on milk production during the base period, the programme provides payments

to eligible producers based on the number of milk cows.

Besides, Norway also implements structural income support to dairy farmers and regional

deficiency payments to milk and meat production (WTO 1999). It also provides headage

payments for bovine animals, pigs, goats, hens, horses, rabbits, and sheep (OECD 2016). These

payments are made per animal and are regressive, reducing with the increase in the number of

animals.

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4.5 CHINA

A Blue Box programme for corn called the “Corn producer subsidy” was initiated in 2016 for

two years on a fixed area and yield basis. The programme covered three provinces and one

region and had 2014 as the base year (WTO 2018). China undertook corn acreage reduction in

arid and cold areas and had capped the production that was eligible for support in furtherance

of the production-limiting condition of Article 6.5. Production over and above the prescribed

ceiling was ineligible for support under the Blue Box programme (Wei 2017).

For cotton, China started ‘deepening the target price policy reform of cotton’ for 2017-2019,

based on 85 percent or less of the base level of production during 2012-2014 (WTO 2018b).

However, the programme does not seem to have a mention of any explicit production-limiting

condition. The support is computed on the difference between the market price and the target

price for cotton. Interestingly, this programme bears resemblance in function to that of a price

deficiency payment while also meeting the conditions of Blue Box.

4.6 ICELAND

Iceland had first utilised the provisions of the Blue Box in 1995 to extend support to dairy and

sheep farmers based on up to 85 percent or less of the base level of production’ with the base

year being 1986-88. Direct payments were made under the programme to farmers for the

production under individually allocated quotas. The production above the yearly quota was

disciplined, however, the modalities for the same remain unclear (WTO 1995). It is also unclear

if the programme had production-limiting conditions in place. After 1995, Iceland discontinued

this Blue Box support and reclassified its support to sheep meat as decoupled payment under

Annex 2 (UNCTAD 2003). The Blue Box payments were restarted in 2006 for dairy and beef

based on a fixed number of heads (WTO 2016a). However, there are no domestic support

notifications for these new Blue Box programmes, therefore, details regarding base period,

production-limiting conditions remain unclear.

From the programmes of the members as mentioned above, it is observed that the production-

limiting condition has been implemented differently. Some members such as the US and China

had specific acreage reduction conditions for their Blue Box programmes, while others such as

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Norway and EU had regressive payments with an increase in production as a condition to limit

production.

SECTION 5: DECIPHERING THE ISSUES IN BLUE BOX

By examining Blue Box measures implemented by members over the years, and concerns

raised in the CoA, various outstanding issues related to this Box have been deciphered in this

section.

5.1 POLICY SPACE DUE TO BLUE BOX

Given the limited flexibility under the Amber Box, some members have utilised the provisions

of Article 6.5 to support their producers. In a scenario where the Blue Box would not have been

utilised, some members would have stood in breach of their domestic support commitments

under the AoA. For instance, the combined support under the Amber and Blue Box for Norway,

Iceland and Slovenia were higher than their respective AMS, and it was almost equal to its

bound AMS for EU (Table 2). Thus, the role of the Blue Box in expanding the policy space for

these members cannot be underestimated.

Table 2: Comparison of support under Amber and Blue Box with Bound AMS

Members Year Unit Bound

AMS

Current

AMS

Blue

Box

Total

Amber

and Blue

Percentage of

Total to

Bound AMS

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 = (5+6) 8 = (7/4*100)

EU 2000 Euro million 67159 43654 22223 65877 98

USA 1995 USD million 23083 6214 7030 13244 57

Japan 2010 Yen million 3972900 576900 306800 883700 22

Norway 2003 NRK million 11449 10831 7360 18190 159

Iceland 2016 ISK million 130 127 670 797 612

China 2016 CNY million 0 81357 39039 120396 Not Applicable

Slovak Republic 2000 SK million 10140 7885 69 7954 78

Slovenia 2002 Euro thousand 61846 13605 53690 67296 109

Source: Various WTO Domestic Support Notifications of selected members

Note: 1. The Slovak Republic and Slovenia are Member of EU since 2004.

2. Years are selected based on highest percentage value of total current and Blue Box support to the

Bound AMS.

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5.2 SIMULTANEOUS APPLICATION OF BLUE AND AMBER BOX FOR SAME PRODUCT

The provisions of the AoA do not restrict the members from providing support to the same

product under both Amber and Blue Box simultaneously. An analysis of practice reveals that

many members have used Amber Box along with the Blue Box for the same product for many

years. Table 3 shows that the EU, USA, Iceland, and Norway have given product-specific

support under both boxes for various years. This may have resulted in some products

benefitting greatly from dual support received under the boxes.

Table 3: Concurrent use of Amber and Blue Box for the same product.

Sr. No. Country Products Year (latest)

1 EU Sugar beet, Seeds, Dairy - milk and milk products,

Sheep and goat meat, Tobacco, Beef, Dairy, Sheep

and goat meat, Olive Oils, Fruit and vegetables

2016

2 USA Barley, Oats, Cotton, Rice, Corn, Wheat, Sorghum 1995

3 Iceland dairy and beef 2013 to 2016

4 Norway Milk and Beef 2016 and 2017

Source: Various WTO Domestic Support Notifications of selected members

5.3 PRODUCTION-LIMITING CONDITION: STANDALONE OR NOT

Under the Blue Box, direct payment for product-specific support must be made pursuant to a

‘production-limiting’ programme. However apart from this, the AoA provides no further

understanding as to what this condition entails, or what form the production-limiting

programme might take. It remains ambiguous if the condition to limit production is a

standalone requirement or whether it is implicitly covered under the sub-conditions of fixed

area and yield or, a base level of production or, a fixed number of heads, attached with Article

6.52. Some members such as China (for corn) and the US have had explicit production-limiting

conditions for Blue Box programmes in the form of acreage reduction (Wei 2017, US 2019).

In contrast, the EU initially had held the view that a programme complying with the attached

sub-conditions of Article 6.5 also automatically complies with the production-limiting criteria

(WTO 2009). By this reasoning, any member implementing a direct payment programme for

any product based on sub-conditions of Article 6.5, would comply with the production-limiting

2 Benitah M. (2019) observes that “to be included in the Blue Box direct payments must satisfy the following

limiting production criteria: (i) such payments are based on fixed area and yields; or (ii) such payments are made

on 85 per cent or less of the base level of production; or (iii) livestock payments are made on a fixed number of

head.”

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condition as well. Practises of members such as Norway and China for certain products also

bolster this interpretation. These members have been implementing Blue Box programmes for

beef and cotton respectively, which are only based on 85 per cent or less of the base level of

production, with no explicit production-limiting condition (WTO 2015; WTO 2018b). In sum,

the Blue Box practices of members seem to be diverse when it comes to the production-limiting

aspect.

5.4 ‘PRODUCTION-LIMITING’ OR ‘PRODUCTION REDUCING’

It has been a general assumption that a Blue Box measure is implemented to limit the surplus

production (UNCTAD 2003). However, under Article 6.5 members are not required to reduce

the area or production for a Blue Box measure, instead, only the payment must be on ‘limited’

production. The reduction in production is a stricter requirement than limiting production.

Moreover, production may be limited without actually being reduced, i.e. maintaining it at

consistent levels. Therefore, reduction in production does not seem to be a pre-requisite under

this Article, if it is restricted to base levels.

Table 4: Trend in production and area of soybeans in the European Union and France

Year

European Union France

Area harvested Production Yield Area harvested Production Yield

Hectare (Ha) Ton Ton/Ha Hectare (Ha) Ton Ton/Ha

2002 400023 1190786 2.98 74747 208533 2.79

2003 470736 967199 2.05 80747 147368 1.83

2004 421882 1181481 2.80 58594 147095 2.51

2005 465798 1308381 2.81 57385 142528 2.48

2006 548307 1385336 2.53 45263 122995 2.72

2007 389028 853787 2.19 32551 84603 2.60

2008 269429 758552 2.82 21771 63106 2.90

2009 346027 958028 2.77 43746 109842 2.51

2010 429119 1223610 2.85 50939 140059 2.75

2011 448626 1243208 2.77 41571 122521 2.95

2012 432073 962043 2.23 37367 103935 2.78

2013 468463 1224251 2.61 42999 110072 2.56

2014 575640 1859126 3.23 75789 227262 3.00

2015 884687 2363657 2.67 122529 336830 2.75

2016 827307 2473742 2.99 136370 338864 2.48

2017 891051 2667769 2.99 141000 412000 2.92

Source: Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) accessed on 24th October 2019

17

Contrary to the general perception, Blue Box measures may have a stimulating impact on

production (Josling et al. 1996). They do not ensure that actual area or production will reduce,

or even remain at the same level. For instance, under CAP 2013, the soybean production at the

EU level has seen an upward trend (Table 4). The sectoral support to soybean is covered under

protein crops and is applied by 16 EU members at the regional level. For France, both the area

harvested, and yield has seen exponential growth during the period of implementation of the

CAP, when compared to its set ceiling of 49,736 hectares and 2.75 of yield respectively (EU

2017). Thus, as is evident from the case of France, the production under a Blue Box programme

can increase rather than being limited.

Interestingly, in the Draft Modalities of 2006, it had been proposed that members using Blue

Box would need to demonstrate that the production of individual products under it had not

increased (WTO 2006). Although this proposed obligation failed to get consensus and was

subsequently dropped from the 2008 text, it would have helped to test whether the Blue Box

support was indeed less distorting than Amber Box (Das & Sharma 2011).

5.5 UPDATING THE BASE PERIOD

Article 6.5 does not impose any restriction on updating the base period for a Blue Box measure.

However, such updation of the base period during the tenure of a Blue Box programme may

not be permissible under Article 6.5. This is because updating base periods may serve as a

possible incentive for farmers to increase production for securing higher payments since these

payments would be linked to past performance. Updating base periods would also allow

members to increase the coverage and entitlement under the programme. However, it has been

observed that members have updated these periods by instituting new Blue Box measures,

replacing the old ones. For instance, Japan seems to have updated the base period to support

the rice farmers by implementing a new Blue Box programme ‘Direct payment to rice’, as

discerned from its WTO notifications (WTO 2001a; WTO 2014).

5.6 QUANTITY ELIGIBLE FOR BLUE BOX SUPPORT

Article 6.5 prescribes that payment for a covered product may be made based on either fixed

area and yield; or up to 85 percent of base-level production; or livestock payments on a fixed

number of head. However, a situation is possible wherein actual area or production, or livestock

exceeds the prescribed limit or base. What happens in such a situation is not envisaged by the

AoA. In a stricter interpretation, the excess quantity would most likely not be entitled to support

18

under a Blue Box programme, and only the quantity that was fixed would receive payments.

However, this interpretation of eligible quantity for Blue Box support may vary, as found in

practice by some members. It may happen that excess quantity remains eligible, but the

payment rate is reduced proportionally, as found dairy and milk payments of Norway (WTO

2019).

5.7 LEVEL OF IMPLEMENTATION: NATIONAL, REGIONAL, OR INDIVIDUAL FARM LEVEL

A Blue Box programme may be implemented at the national, regional or farm level since the

AoA does not set any criteria for the same. members have adopted different implementation

level according to their prevailing socio-economic situation. For instance, Norway has set

limits at national for its Blue Box programmes concerning dairy and beef. On the other hand,

China implemented at the regional level for its corn producers, whereas for cotton, it is on a

national level. To support its producers, Iceland had individually allocated quotas that applied

at the farm level (WTO 1995).

5.8 TYPE OF SUPPORT MECHANISM

The AoA is silent about the ‘type’ of support mechanism to be used under Article 6.5 except

that it must be a direct payment under a production-limiting programme. This opens the

possibility of members using mechanisms that are suited to their socio-economic

conditionalities. Members have been found to use various support mechanism for

implementing Blue Box measures. The EU has provided direct payment based on fixed area

and yield to support cover products under its ‘VCS’. Japan, USA, Norway, and China have

used support mechanism similar to price deficiency payments for supporting various products.

Table 5 shows the sub-criteria used by various members to provide Blue Box support.

Table 5: Classification of Blue Box measures of members under Article 6.5

Member

Article 6.5 criteria

(i) Fixed area and yields (ii) 85 percent or less base

level of production

(iii) Fixed number of

livestock

European Union ✓ ✓

United States ✓

Japan ✓

Norway ✓ ✓ ✓

China ✓ ✓

Iceland ✓ ✓

Source: Domestic Support Notifications (DS:1) of selected members

19

5.9 BLUE BOX MEASURES: TRANSITORY?

Blue Box measures have repeatedly been touted as transitory measures that facilitate a shift

from trade-distorting Amber Box subsidies and are necessary for reforming agriculture.

However, many members have made continued use of this Box to extend domestic support and

over the years, many new members have also joined this bandwagon. Table 6 gives a snapshot

of the use of the Blue Box by members over the years.

Table 6: Implementation of Blue Box measures by WTO members

Members Year

EU 1995-2016

USA 1995

Japan 1998-2016

Norway 1995-2017

Iceland 1995; 2006-2016

China 2016

Slovak Republic 1995-1997; 2000-2003

Slovenia 2000-2003

Source: Domestic support notifications of WTO members

Note: The Slovak Republic and Slovenia are members of the EU since 2004.

Unlike the restrictive provisions of the Amber Box, from provisions of Blue Box and the

practices of members, it is evident that Article 6.5 may provide a member with the much-

needed flexibilities to support their farmers, provided attached sub-conditions are satisfied.

SECTION 6: TRACING BLUE BOX IN AGRICULTURE NEGOTIATIONS

Since the Doha Round Declaration in 2001, many proposals have been submitted to discipline

the domestic support in general, and Blue Box in particular. However, given the divergent

views and interests of members, no consensus was achieved.

Opponents of the Blue Box claim that it gives unlimited policy space to provide trade-distorting

support to agriculture, resulting in an increase in production and shifting of support from

Amber to Blue Box. Thereby, it provided a window to evade reforms their domestic support

measure (Murphy and Suppan 2005). Further, it was also argued that Blue Box was a temporary

measure to shift support from Amber Box to Green Box, and that time had come to eliminate

20

or prescribe limits to this Box3. Cairns Group4 (2000, 2002), Canada5 (2000, 2002), Jordan6

(2001, 2002), Mexico7 (2001), India8 (2001, 2002), China9 (2002), US10 (2002), Philippines11

(2002), Dominican Republic12 (2002), Kyrgyz Republic13 (2002) called for either limiting,

reducing or eliminating Blue Box support in future agriculture negotiations in order to

discipline domestic support.

On the other hand, proponents argue that payments under this Box are less trade-distorting due

to production limiting conditions attached to Article 6.5. Norway14 (2001) demanded that Blue

Box should be maintained to address the non-trade concerns (NTC) such as rural development,

food security, environment etc. Other members such as the EC15 (2000, 2003), Japan16 (2000,

2002), Korea17 (2001) and Poland18 (2001) claimed that Blue Box is less trade-distorting than

Amber Box and indispensable in facilitating the shift from Amber to Green Box. On the issue

of Blue Box being a temporary measure, it was maintained that Article 6.5 was a permanent

provision of the AoA and nothing in the article suggested that it was temporary.

Based on various proposals and consultation with the members, the General Council adopted

a decision known as the ‘July Framework’ for establishing modalities in agriculture in 200419.

On Blue Box, the Framework provided for its capping, as well as, modification of its definition.

This Framework provided for the Overall Trade Distorting Support (OTDS) limit, which

covered the expenditure under the Bound Total AMS, Blue Box and the permitted de minimis.

Further, Blue Box was capped at 5 percent of member’s average total VoP during a historical

period. These proposed disciplines were further refined in the agricultural modalities under

which overall Blue Box expenditure was capped at 2.5 percent of the member’s average total

value of agricultural production during 1995-200020. The ‘July Framework’ also addressed the

3 See Chairman’s Report, Document No. JOB(02)/133

4 See Cairns Group Proposal, Document No. G/AG/NG/W/35 and JOB(02)/132

5 See Canada’s Proposal, Document No. G/AG/NG/W/92 and JOB(02)/131

6 See Jordan’s Proposal, Document No. G/AG/NG/W/140 and JOB(02)/178

7 See Mexico’s Proposal, Document No. G/AG/NG/W/138

8 See India’s Proposal, Document No. G/AG/NG/W/102 and JOB(02)/175

9 See Japan’s Proposal, Document No. JOB(02)/104

10 See US Proposal, Document No. JOB(02)/122

11 See Philippines Proposal, Document No. JOB(02)/111/Rev.1

12 See Proposal by the Dominican Republic and others, Document No. JOB(02)/174

13 See Proposal by Kyrgyz Republic, Document No. JOB(02)/179

14 See Norway’s Proposal, Document No. G/AG/NG/W/101

15 See the EC’s Proposal, Document No. G/AG/NG/W/90 and JOB(03)/12

16 See Japan’s Proposal, Document No. G/AG/NG/W/91 and JOB(02)/164

17 See Korea’s Proposal, Document No. G/AG/NG/W/98

18 See Poland’s Proposal, Document No. G/AG/NG/W/103

19 See General Council’s Decision, Document No. WT/L/579

20 See G-20’s Proposal, Document No. JOB(07)/71

21

issue of updating the base period or base production under the Blue Box by making these

payments contingent on fixed and unchanging variables. Further, these modalities introduced

product-specific Blue Box limits21.

Surprisingly, the Framework broadened the definition of Blue Box to accommodate the specific

interests of the US (Hart & Beghin 2015, Das & Sharma 2011) by making direct payments not

requiring production also eligible for Blue Box. Under the Farm Act 2002, the US had

introduced counter-cyclical payments (CCPs) to protect its farmers from price fluctuations and

categorised it as Green Box. However, the Appellate Body upholding the Panel’s finding in

US-Upland Cotton observed that CCPs did not satisfy the criteria of decoupled income support

under Annex 2 of the AoA, and thus were Amber Box support (WTO 2005). In the backdrop

of Doha negotiations on domestic support, especially on Amber Box, the US feared that it

would cross its AMS limit owing to CCP payments (Murphy and Suppan 2005) and sought a

carve-out to classify the CCP as Blue Box. However, since the CCPs did not require production

to receive the payments, they were incompatible with the provisions of Article 6.5 as they

existed. Actual production, unlike the Green Box, is a requisite for Blue Box payments (Josling

et al. 1996). This new and broadened definition of Article 6.5 under the Framework was against

the spirit of Doha Development Round (“DDR”), which sought to achieve a substantial

reduction in trade-distorting support.

The DDR witnessed a stalemate due to the divergent views of members on various elements of

the agriculture negotiations. Post the Bali Ministerial Conference in 2013, members submitted

various proposals on domestic support. Before the 11th Ministerial Conference in Buenos Aries

(2017), some proposals explicitly demanded the capping or elimination of Blue Box support.

ACP22 proposed the capping of Amber and Blue Box support at the de minimis level given

under Article 6.4 of the AoA. Similarly, in 2017, Brazil and others23, Argentina24, Mexico25,

Philippines26 and Russia27 demanded the capping or substantial reduction in Blue Box support.

On the other hand, proposals by G-1028, Japan29, India and China did not touch provisions of

Blue Box and called the members to focus on existing AMS entitlement and de minimis limit

21 See GC Decision, Document Nos. WTO TN/AG/W/4 and Revisions (1-4) 22 See ACP’s Proposal, Document No. JOB/AG/112

23 See Brazil’s Proposal, Document No. JOB/AG/99

24 See Argentina’s Proposal, Document No. JOB/AG/120

25 See Mexico’s Proposal, Document No. JOB/AG/124

26 See Philippines’ Proposal, Document No. JOB/AG/127

27 See Russia’s Proposal, Document No. JOB/AG/132

28 See G-10 Proposal, Document No. JOB/AG/103

29 See Japan’s Proposal, Document No. JOB/AG/104

22

as a starting point for negotiating new disciplines on domestic support. However, even after 19

years of negotiations since the Doha declaration, there remains a bleak chance to reach a

consensus in the near future. Owing to China’s recent Blue Box measures, there has been a

renewed debate regarding Article 6.5, as reflected from the questions raised in recent sessions

of the Committee on Agriculture (CoA). Interestingly, the EU, which had arguably been the

most vocal advocate and user of the Blue Box, recently expressed its intent to move from Blue

Box to Amber Box support citing red-tapism and corruption in payments as issues (WTO

2019g).

SECTION 7: SHRINKING POLICY SPACE FOR DEVELOPING MEMBERS AND BLUE

BOX SUPPORT

The substantive WTO rules, in general, are tilted in favour of the developed members against

the interest of developing members (Lamy 2006, Joseph 2011). The AoA was primarily

structured to accommodate the vested interests of the industrialised countries, ignoring the need

of developing members to promote and support their agriculture (Wolf 2005). The AMS

entitlement for most developed members remains a prime example of this bias.

In contrast, for developing members, the policy space to provide Amber Box support is

constrained by the de minimis limit. Further, many developing members provide product-

specific support in the form of MPS. Under the AoA, MPS is covered by Amber Box and is

calculated by multiplying the difference between the applied administered price (“AAP”) and

the fixed external reference price (“FERP”) with the eligible production. The FERP is based

on the export or import price of product concerned during the base period, i.e. 1986-88. Without

factoring inflation, the gap between AAP and FERP tends to increase over time, ultimately

resulting in exaggerated support levels, without capturing the realities of developing members.

Due to the outdated FERP and lack of AMS entitlement, the policy space for many developing

members has considerably shrunk.

The systemic issue of shrinking policy space faced by the developing members has become a

matter of grave concern. members such as China, India, Pakistan, and Indonesia etc. now face

a space crunch for implementing policies due to the restrictive provisions of the AoA (Sharma

2016; Thou et al. 2019). A review of domestic support notifications of members such as Jordan,

23

Turkey, China shows that they have also breached their respective AMS limit in some

notification years.

Given these constraints and impasse in agricultural negotiations, developing members may

explore Article 6.5 to support their agriculture sector. China’s use of Blue Box compliant

policies for corn and cotton is noteworthy as it is the first developing member to utilise this

Box to extend product-specific support. By tweaking the programmes for cotton and corn,

China has set an example for developing members to make use of this otherwise unutilised Box

which has long been used exclusively by the developed members.

Unlike the Amber Box, members can provide product-specific trade-distorting support under

Blue Box without any prescribed financial limits. However, members must be mindful that

agricultural subsidies are subject to the disciplines of the Agreement on Subsidies and

Countervailing Measures (ASCM). Further, the AoA does not restrict members from

simultaneously using Blue and Amber Box measures for the same product. Additionally,

members may provide product-specific support to its farmers based on either fixed area and

yield, or up to 85 percent of base production, or fixed head. Depending on the existing

agricultural situation, developing members have an array of options under which they may

initiate Blue Box measures. For instance, a developing member may implement an EU-like

policy based on fixed area and yield; or price deficiency payments based on output, similar to

those implemented by the US and Japan; or on a fixed head basis like Norway and EU. In

contrast to MPS, where a fixed base period must be maintained for the FERP, Article 6.5 does

not restrict members from updating their base periods. Further, Blue Box measures can be

implemented at the individual farm, regional or national levels. Given these flexibilities under

the Article, developing members may find it useful to frame Blue Box measures compatible

with their extant socio-economic conditions and requirements.

Traditionally, MPS measures find more acceptability amongst the developing members

because they do not require the significant financial commitment and administrative

capabilities that are otherwise involved in implementing price deficiency payments. However,

for the reasons detailed above, many developing members face policy space constraints under

the Amber Box on account of their MPS programmes. As one of the problems for farmers is

steep fluctuation in prices, support based on output might be more relevant for developing

members. Since there are no restrictions on the ‘type’ of programmes under Article 6.5,

developing members may implement MPS or deficiency payments by providing direct

24

payments based on up to 85 percent of base production. Till date, no member has initiated an

MPS-type Blue Box measure under the AoA. However, members such as China, Japan,

Norway and the USA have used Blue Box measures to provide price deficiency payments.

Some important points need to be considered while framing a Blue Box programme. Payments

under the MPS-type Blue Box measure must be ‘direct’ in nature. In case the government or

any of its agency makes payments to the producers, it may be classified as a ‘direct payment’.

Another challenge for developing members in implementing Blue Box measures is that they

should be under a ‘production-limiting programme’. Due to this condition, it was believed that

Blue Box would not be compatible with the policy objectives of developing members, which

are typically aimed at achieving self-sufficiency (UNCTAD 2003). However, as discussed in

Section 5, members have interpreted the production-limiting conditions differently. Some

members have explicit production-limiting conditions such as acreage reduction while some

simply base the measure on the conditions under Article 6.5 (a) (i-iii). Developing members

can benefit from the fact that Article 6.5 does not provide any guidance as to how the

production-limiting condition can be achieved and thus can adopt methods suitable to them.

Though the payment would be limited to fixed quantity, the actual production of a covered

product may increase. For instance, in case of payments made based on fixed area and yield, it

is practically impossible to keep the yield constant as it may vary with weather conditions,

fertiliser use, infrastructure facilities etc. Besides, as has been mentioned in Section 5, the

Article does not suggest a reduction in actual production, nonetheless, the payment should be

limited as per the conditions laid under the Article.

SECTION 8: CONCLUSION

Blue Box was the result of a compromise between the US and the EC during the Uruguay

Round of negotiations to create a carve-out from reduction commitments under the Amber

Box. For years, only the developed members have exclusively used the provisions of Article

6.5 to support their producers, and without this Box, some members such as Norway, Iceland

and the EU would have breached their AMS commitments. It was widely understood that the

measures under this Box are not compatible with the need of the developing members.

However, by examining the provisions of Article 6.5 and the practices of members, this study

bring to fore the issues and ambiguities in the Blue Box. It shows that members have interpreted

25

Blue Box provisions with a varying degree of pliancy, as per their needs. Given the operational

flexibilities under Article 6.5, as elucidated in this paper, developing members may initiate

Blue Box programmes to support their agriculture.

Under the Doha Round, several proposals were floated to discipline the Blue Box support.

Developing members have consistently demanded the limiting or elimination of expenditure

under Article 6.5. On the other hand, members such as EU, Norway, Japan, and the US have

defended this Box for various reasons, including non-trade concerns such as rural development.

However, as this paper finds, the negotiating position of some members on this Box has

changed over the years. China, which had initially called for the elimination of Blue Box, has

now implemented Blue Box programmes for corn and cotton. Contrastingly, the EU, which

was the major proponent and user of this Box, has expressed its inclination to move away from

Blue Box to Amber Box.

The absence of consensus under the Doha Round has left no option for developing members

but to utilise the existing flexibilities under the AoA to support their farmers. An analysis of

the Blue Box indicates the flexibilities available to developing members for framing a measure

according to their socio-economic conditions. Although no member has initiated MPS-type

payments under this Box, no restriction placed by the AoA preventing members from initiating

price support programmes, provided the payments are direct and conform to the production-

limiting conditions as laid down under Article 6.5. Developing members may explore this

otherwise unutilised Box to extend product-specific support to their producers. This will

provide developing members considerable policy space to implement their agricultural policies

without breaching their prescribed limits.

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WTO (2014c), Response by Japan to question raised by United States under the review process,

Ag-IMS ID 74039, https://agims.wto.org

29

WTO (2015), Domestic Support Notification of Norway DS:2, Document No.

G/AG/N/NOR/80

WTO (2016), Domestic Support Notification of China DS:1, Document No. G/AG/N/CHN/47

WTO (2016a), Domestic Support Notification of Iceland DS:1, Document No. G/AG/N/ISL/41

WTO (2017), Elimination of AMS to Reduce Distortions in Global Agricultural Trade,

Submission by China and India, Document No. JOB/AG/102

WTO (2018), Domestic Support Notification of China DS:2, Document No. G/AG/N/CHN/48

WTO (2018b), Domestic Support Notification of China DS:2, Document No.

G/AG/N/CHN/49

WTO (2019), Response by Japan to question raised by United States under the review process,

Ag-IMS ID 91180, https://agims.wto.org

WTO (2019a), China – Domestic Support for Agricultural Producers, Report of the Panel,

Document Number WT/DS511/R.

WTO (2019b), India- Measures Concerning Sugar and Sugarcane; DS 579, DS 580 and DS

581

WTO (2019c), Response by Norway to question raised by Canada under the review process,

Ag-IMS ID 91108, https://agims.wto.org

WTO (2019d), Response by the European Union to question raised by India under the review

process, Ag-IMS ID 92071, https://agims.wto.org

WTO (2019e), Response by the European Union to question raised by India under the review

process, Ag-IMS ID 91061, https://agims.wto.org

WTO (2019f) Domestic Support Notification of Norway DS:2, Document No.

G/AG/N/NOR/103

WTO (2019g), Response by the European Union to question raised by India during the review

process, Ag-IMSID 92071, https://agims.wto.org

30

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Dr. Sachin Kumar Sharma is working as Associate Professor at the Centre for WTO

Studies. He has more than 11 years of work experience with progressive

responsibilities as an economist and trade expert, both at multilateral and regional

levels. Dr. Sharma leads a dedicated team of lawyers and economists working on the

international trade issues with key focus on agriculture. Currently, his research focuses

on issues related to agricultural subsidies, food security, SDGs, FTAs and disputes,

among others. He has published many articles in peered reviewed journals and

authored/edited books on international trade and agriculture. Email:

sksharma@iift.edu

Adeet Dobhal is a Research Fellow at the Centre for WTO Studies, Indian Institute

of Foreign Trade, New Delhi. His work includes providing strategic legal inputs for

trade negotiations, international trade issues and WTO disputes. He can be contacted

at adeet@iift.edu.

Surabhi Agarwal was a former Research Fellow (Economics) at the Centre for WTO

Studies, Indian Institute of Foreign Trade, New Delhi working on international trade

issues. She has been pivotal in preparing India’s Domestic Support Notifications for

agriculture to the WTO. She can be contacted at surabhi.gipe@gmail.com

Abhijit Das, Professor and Head of the Centre for WTO Studies, is a trade policy

expert. He combines extensive experience of international trade negotiations with

formulating, implementing and managing trade-related capacity building projects.

Prior to joining the Centre, he worked in UNCTAD India Programme during 2005-10.

He also worked as a Director in the Trade Policy Division in Commerce Ministry

(2000-05) and contributed substantially in developing India’s negotiating position on

issues related to Antidumping, subsidies and disputes. He participated directly in

several multilateral and bilateral trade negotiations, including in the Anti-Dumping and

Subsidy negotiations under the Doha Round at the WTO and OECD Steel Subsidies

negotiations. Email: headwto@iift.edu.

31

ABOUT THE CENTRE

The Centre for WTO Studies was set up in the year 1999 to be a permanent repository of WTO

negotiations-related knowledge and documentation. Over the years, the Centre has conducted

a robust research programme with a series of papers in all spheres of interest at the WTO. It is

currently engaging itself in an exercise to back its research with an equally robust publication

programme. The Centre has also created a specialized e-repository of important WTO

documents, especially related to India, in its Trade Resource Centre. It has been regularly called

upon by the Government of India to undertake research and provide independent analytical

inputs to help it develop positions in its various trade negotiations, both at the WTO and other

forums such as Free and Preferential Trade Agreements and Comprehensive Economic

Cooperation Agreements. Additionally, the Centre has been actively interfacing with industry

and Government units as well as other stakeholders through its Outreach and Capacity Building

programmes by organizing seminars, workshops, subject specific meetings etc. The Centre thus

also acts as a platform for consensus building between stakeholders and policy makers.

Centre for WTO Studies, 5th to 8th Floor, NAFED House,

Siddhartha Enclave, Ashram Chowk, Ring Road, New Delhi - 110014

Phone Nos: 91- 011- 38325622, 38325624 http://wtocentre.iift.ac.in/

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