Democratic Transition and Democratic Transition and ConsolidationConsolidation

Kathryn Stoner-WeissKathryn Stoner-Weiss

July 27, 2012July 27, 2012

Structural or Precondition TheoriesStructural or Precondition Theories

Modernization (Lipset)Modernization (Lipset)* * Positive relationship between wealth and democracy: Why?Positive relationship between wealth and democracy: Why?* Literacy* Literacy* Urbanization* Urbanization* Demands of Greater Number of Owners* Demands of Greater Number of Owners

Middle Class (Marx, Barrington Moore)Middle Class (Marx, Barrington Moore)

**““No Bourgeois, no democracy.No Bourgeois, no democracy.”” (Moore) (Moore)

Equality (Aristotle)Equality (Aristotle)**Change in government does not have major distributional Change in government does not have major distributional consequencesconsequences* * ““oil curseoil curse””* oligarchy (big landowners) inhibits democracy* oligarchy (big landowners) inhibits democracy*Increasing capital mobility helps democracy (Boix)*Increasing capital mobility helps democracy (Boix)

Structural or Precondition TheoriesStructural or Precondition Theories(Cont.)(Cont.)

Culture Culture * * ““Civic CultureCivic Culture”” needed (Almond and Verba) needed (Almond and Verba)

* Some religions, cultures, traditions more conducive to * Some religions, cultures, traditions more conducive to democracy than others ???democracy than others ???

GeographyGeography* proximity to * proximity to ““WestWest””

Borders (Rustow)Borders (Rustow)* Must know who is in polity and who is not* Must know who is in polity and who is not* Ethnic Homogeneity* Ethnic Homogeneity

Structures Versus AgentsStructures Versus Agents

Preconditions vs. PrecipitantsPreconditions vs. Precipitants Environments vs. ActorsEnvironments vs. Actors Institutions vs. IndividualsInstitutions vs. Individuals

The The ““Third WaveThird Wave”” Paradigm Paradigm(Rustow, O(Rustow, O’’Donnell & Schmitter, Przeworski, Karl)Donnell & Schmitter, Przeworski, Karl)

• Actors = ElitesActors = Elites• Splits in Ancien Regime --Softliners versus HardlinersSplits in Ancien Regime --Softliners versus Hardliners• Moderates versus Radicals (in society)Moderates versus Radicals (in society)

• Key Ingredient for Successful Transition = PactsKey Ingredient for Successful Transition = Pacts

• ““Limit agenda of policy choiceLimit agenda of policy choice””• Share proportionally in the distribution of benefitsShare proportionally in the distribution of benefits• Restrict the participation of outsiders in decision-making.Restrict the participation of outsiders in decision-making.

* Equal Balance of Power between incumbents and challengers * Equal Balance of Power between incumbents and challengers

* Process Is Cooperative, Non-Zero Sum* Process Is Cooperative, Non-Zero Sum

* Strategic Interaction Creates Democracy (* Strategic Interaction Creates Democracy (““democracy without democratsdemocracy without democrats””))

Manezh Square, MoscowManezh Square, MoscowMarch 10, 1991March 10, 1991

The The ““Fourth WaveFourth Wave”” Paradigm Paradigm(Bunce, Fish, McFaul,)(Bunce, Fish, McFaul,)

Actors = Elites AND MassesActors = Elites AND Masses

Pacts Not a Key Ingredient for SuccessPacts Not a Key Ingredient for Success

Agenda of policy choice was not limitedAgenda of policy choice was not limited• Distribution of benefits NOT shared proportionallyDistribution of benefits NOT shared proportionally• Participation of outsiders in decision-making not limited to Participation of outsiders in decision-making not limited to

eliteselites• Mobilization not a threat to democratizationMobilization not a threat to democratization

Equal BOP not a Necessary Condition for SuccessEqual BOP not a Necessary Condition for Success

Process Is Non-Cooperative, Often Zero SumProcess Is Non-Cooperative, Often Zero Sum

You Get Democracy only with (Powerful) You Get Democracy only with (Powerful) ““DemocratsDemocrats””

DictatorshipsDictatorshipsPartialPartialDemocraciesDemocracies DemocraciesDemocracies

BOP in favor BOP in favor of of ChallengersChallengers

ArmeniaArmenia

Bosnia-Bosnia-HerzegovniaHerzegovnia

GeorgiaGeorgia

Croatia *Croatia *Czech RepublicCzech RepublicEstoniaEstoniaHungaryHungaryLatviaLatviaLithuaniaLithuaniaPolandPolandSlovakia*Slovakia*SloveniaSlovenia

BOP EqualBOP Equal TajikistanTajikistan MoldovaMoldova

RussiaRussia

UkraineUkraine

AlbaniaAlbania

AzerbaijanAzerbaijan

MacedoniaMacedonia

BulgariaBulgaria

MongoliaMongolia

BOP in favor BOP in favor of of IncumbentsIncumbents

BelarusBelarus

KazakhstanKazakhstan

TurkmenistanTurkmenistan

UzbekistanUzbekistan

FRY/SerbiaFRY/Serbia RomaniaRomania

Paths from Communism Paths from Communism (At point of transition – (At point of transition – not all of these regimes not all of these regimes consolidated)consolidated)

The Missing Variable in 3The Missing Variable in 3rdrd and 4 and 4thth Waves:Waves:

““The International SystemThe International System””• Bi-Polar SystemBi-Polar System

• Two Great PowersTwo Great Powers• Heterogeneity of Regimes/IdeologiesHeterogeneity of Regimes/Ideologies

• Unipolar SystemUnipolar System• One PoleOne Pole• One Regime Type/IdeologyOne Regime Type/Ideology

Multipolar (19Multipolar (19thth Century) Century)• Multiple Poles of PowerMultiple Poles of Power• Heterogeneity of Regimes/IdeologiesHeterogeneity of Regimes/Ideologies

Bipolarity/Cold War Constraints on Bipolarity/Cold War Constraints on ““Third WaveThird Wave””

* Agenda of Change Must Be Limited* Agenda of Change Must Be Limited• Evolutionary Change NecessaryEvolutionary Change Necessary• ““Anti-systemicAnti-systemic”” actors kept out of transition actors kept out of transition• Mobilization DangerousMobilization Dangerous• Violators Squelched by US and USSRViolators Squelched by US and USSR

Iran 1953Iran 1953 Hungary 1956 Hungary 1956 Czechoslovakia 1968Czechoslovakia 1968 Chile 1973Chile 1973 Poland, 1980-81 (even idea of self-limiting revolution Poland, 1980-81 (even idea of self-limiting revolution

did not work)did not work)

Unipolarity/Post-Cold War Lack of Unipolarity/Post-Cold War Lack of Constraints on Constraints on ““Fourth WaveFourth Wave””

• Agenda of Change Less LimitedAgenda of Change Less Limited Property rights and borders on the tableProperty rights and borders on the table

• Evolutionary Change Not NecessaryEvolutionary Change Not Necessary Czechoslovakia 1989Czechoslovakia 1989 Romania 1989Romania 1989 Philippines???Philippines???

• ““Anti-systemicAnti-systemic”” actors not as feared actors not as feared Liberals in Eastern EuropeLiberals in Eastern Europe Communists in South AfricaCommunists in South Africa HamasHamas

• Mobilization not as fearedMobilization not as feared Czechoslovakia 1989Czechoslovakia 1989 Serbia 2000Serbia 2000 Lebanon 2005Lebanon 2005 Egypt? (2011)Egypt? (2011)

Democratic Triggers?Democratic Triggers?

Defeat in WarDefeat in War

Decolonization/Collapse of EmpireDecolonization/Collapse of Empire

External OccupationExternal Occupation

Economic GrowthEconomic Growth

Economic Crisis Economic Crisis

Does Prior Regime Type Matter?Does Prior Regime Type Matter?Conventional Wisdom before 1989Conventional Wisdom before 1989

Authoritarian Regimes Can Authoritarian Regimes Can Democratize (Totalitarian cannot)Democratize (Totalitarian cannot)• Private Sector ExistsPrivate Sector Exists• ““ResurrectionResurrection”” of Civil Society of Civil Society• Restoring democratic institutionsRestoring democratic institutions

• Changing Changing ““regimeregime”” easier than changing easier than changing whole systemwhole system

Does Priori Regime Type Matter?Does Priori Regime Type Matter?(Cont.)(Cont.)

Totalitarian Regimes Cannot Totalitarian Regimes Cannot DemocratizeDemocratize• No Private SectorNo Private Sector• No Civil Society to No Civil Society to ““ResurrectResurrect”” • Stakes of Change Too HighStakes of Change Too High

Political and economic power intertwinedPolitical and economic power intertwined

Does Prior Regime Type Matter?Does Prior Regime Type Matter?The New Conventional Wisdom, (Geddes)The New Conventional Wisdom, (Geddes)

Military Juntas Easier to democratizeMilitary Juntas Easier to democratize• Soldiers go back to barracksSoldiers go back to barracks• Old institutions can be revivedOld institutions can be revived

““ReRe””democratization easierdemocratization easier Personalist RegimesPersonalist Regimes

• Small group relying on state for wealthSmall group relying on state for wealth• Who governs after death of dictator?Who governs after death of dictator?

Hegemonic Party SystemsHegemonic Party Systems• Have bigger Have bigger ““selectorateselectorate””• Can withstand crises better than generals, Can withstand crises better than generals,

personalist dictators: cooptionpersonalist dictators: cooption

Survivability Rates of Autocracies Survivability Rates of Autocracies (1946-1999)(1946-1999)

Military Regimes: 9 years Military Regimes: 9 years Personalist Regimes: 15 yearsPersonalist Regimes: 15 years Single-party regimes: 23 yearsSingle-party regimes: 23 years

TheocraciesTheocracies• Islamic Republic of Iran (27 years)Islamic Republic of Iran (27 years)• Taliban in Afghanistan (5 years)Taliban in Afghanistan (5 years)

Different Outcomes, Different Different Outcomes, Different TheoriesTheories

No One Path to Democracy No One Path to Democracy (Equifinality)(Equifinality)

No Single Theory of DemocratizationNo Single Theory of Democratization

Democratic Transitions Democratic Transitions vs.vs.

Democratic ConsolidationDemocratic Consolidation

The causes of democratic transition are not necessarilyThe causes of democratic transition are not necessarily

the same factors as the causes of democratic consolidationthe same factors as the causes of democratic consolidation

Factors Facilitating Democratic Factors Facilitating Democratic StabilityStability

Pacted Transitions (Schmitter & OPacted Transitions (Schmitter & O’’Donnell); elites work Donnell); elites work togethertogether

Non-Violent Transitions (Ackerman & Karatnycky)Non-Violent Transitions (Ackerman & Karatnycky) Levels of Wealth (Przeworski et al)Levels of Wealth (Przeworski et al) Income Equality (Boix)Income Equality (Boix) Institutional Choices: Parliamentary Democracy (Fish) Institutional Choices: Parliamentary Democracy (Fish)

(procedural legitimacy)(procedural legitimacy) Ethnic Homogeneity (but not a specific “culture”)Ethnic Homogeneity (but not a specific “culture”) Democratic Neighborhoods (Kopstein and Reilly)Democratic Neighborhoods (Kopstein and Reilly) Performance (political and economic) (Diamond)Performance (political and economic) (Diamond) Time (Huntington): Two turnover test?Time (Huntington): Two turnover test?

• What to do with old elites? “torturer problem” and What to do with old elites? “torturer problem” and “praetorian problem”“praetorian problem”

• Performance legitimacy (better than old regime?)Performance legitimacy (better than old regime?)

Wealth and Democratic StabilityWealth and Democratic Stability Per Capital IncomePer Capital Income

Less than $1000 =Less than $1000 =

$1,000-2,000 =$1,000-2,000 =

Over $4000 =Over $4000 =

(wealthiest subverted (wealthiest subverted democracy: Argentina, 1975, democracy: Argentina, 1975, $6,055)$6,055)

Life Expectancy of Life Expectancy of DemocracyDemocracy

8 Years8 Years

18 Years18 Years

ForeverForever

Income and Sustaining DemocracyIncome and Sustaining Democracy

““……there is no doubt that democracies are there is no doubt that democracies are more likely to be found in the more highly more likely to be found in the more highly developed countries. Yet the reason is not developed countries. Yet the reason is not that democracies are more likely to that democracies are more likely to emerge when countries develop under emerge when countries develop under authoritarianism, but that, however they authoritarianism, but that, however they do emerge, they are more likely to survive do emerge, they are more likely to survive in countries that are already developed.in countries that are already developed.”” (Przeworski, et al, 2000, p. 106)(Przeworski, et al, 2000, p. 106)

Why Is Wealth Good for Why Is Wealth Good for Democracy?Democracy?

Performance of Democracy?Performance of Democracy?

Education Levels Rise?Education Levels Rise?

Lowers the Intensity of Distributional Lowers the Intensity of Distributional Conflicts?Conflicts?

??????

New Democracies and Economic New Democracies and Economic PerformancePerformance

• Life expectancy of democracy with Life expectancy of democracy with decline in incomes: 19 yearsdecline in incomes: 19 years

• Life expectancy of democracy with rise Life expectancy of democracy with rise in incomes: 64 yearsin incomes: 64 years

Parliamentary vs. Presidential Parliamentary vs. Presidential SystemsSystems

Transitions to DictatorshipTransitions to Dictatorship1951-19901951-1990

39 Presidential Systems39 Presidential Systems

13 Parliamentary Systems13 Parliamentary Systems

2 Mixed Systems2 Mixed Systems

Expected Life of DemocraciesExpected Life of Democracies1950-19901950-1990

Parliamentary Systems: 73 YearsParliamentary Systems: 73 Years

Presidential Systems: 21 Years Presidential Systems: 21 Years

Democracy Results Democracy Results from Strugglefrom Struggle

Not an Engineering Not an Engineering ProblemProblem