The Democratic Movement in Korea

Introduction

South Korea’s journey to democracy was one long struggle since it had a long history of

centralized authority and autocratic rule under the Korean monarchy till 1910, which was

followed by a thirty-five-year Japanese Occupation and finally by another more than twenty-five

years of military rule in South Korea after the Second World War. The drive towards democracy

however began much earlier when South Korea’s first president Syngman Rhee (1948-60) after

coming to office in 1948 “wanted to build South Korea’s democracy from scratch”1, by creating

the necessary government structure, bureaucracy and political institutions congenial to

democracy. However since he had little experience in administration and with the approach of

the Korean War, Rhee became engrossed in his own political struggles for survival and thus

governed more like a monarch of the past, rigging elections, whimsically dismissing competent

government officials who displeased him and brought an end to the voice of people by stifling

the press. Thus little effort was made to develop the institutions and procedures of democracy

and although the end of Rhee’s office was followed by the Democratic Party coming to power,

the nation was still decades away from establishing democracy.

The delay to democracy in the early years was primarily because during and after the Korean

War, communism from the North was seen as a constant threat and therefore a staunch leader in

form of a dictator was given much credence. Also the South Korean social system being rooted

in Confucianism, created a hierarchical political and social structure that made obedience to the

leader mandatory.2 However all this started to change from the mid-60s as people set aside their

docile temperament and voiced out their opinion in the workings of the state, reaching a climax

in 1979-80 and finally transitioning to democracy in 1987.

1 Uk Heo and Terence Roehrig. South Korea since 1980. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 13.2 Heo and Roehrig, 5.

Park Chung-hee (1961-1979)

President Park, originally a Major-General, came to power through military coup with a bid to

end the corruption that was rife among the politicians, and even pledged to return to the barracks

with his military men, when the political and economic house was put back in order. Not only

that Park also managed to hoodwink the people by stating that the ‘“military revolution” was

necessary to establish a “true, free democracy in Korea-certainly not for the establishment of a

new dictatorship and totalitarianism.”’3 Although Park imposed some restrictions on the press,

intellectuals and opposition politicians in the early 60s, they were still able to criticize the

government and hold organizations. Thus in 1965 when the government normalized its

relationship with Japan which had for so long occupied the nation and sent combat troops to

South Vietnam at US bidding, the general mass, particularly the students were not happy with

these proceedings. Thus there were numerous student demonstrations against these which the

government kept a check on without leading to any casualties. 4 However when Park was re-

elected for the third time, he tightened his control over the country by proclaiming national

emergency and forcing the National Assembly to grant him complete power to control, regulate

and mobilize the people, economy and press.

It is important to note that South Korea’s economy rapidly grew under the Park regime.

Government programs to modernize and industrialize Korea gained momentum and

industrialization fueled urbanization as South Korea transformed its agrarian based economy into

one concentrated in export goods. The high rate of domestic migration during this time

corresponded to the growth of urban centers and their populations. However, contrary to the

argument that economic development and democratization are positively correlated, the political

system in Korea became increasingly autocratic with the growth of the national economy.5 This

was further exacerbated with the drafting of a new constitution called Yusin or Revitalization

Constitution. Though Park had organized and headed the Democratic Republican Party in 1963

to mobilize mass support behind his military regime, by 1962 he had discarded the party through

3 Heo and Roehrig, 21.4 Andrea Matles Savada and William Shaw, eds., South Korea- A Country Study (Washington D.C.: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, 1992), 39.5 Gi-Wook Shin et al. “South Korea’s Democracy Movement (1970-1993): Stanford Korea Democracy Project Report” December 2007, < http://fsi.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/KDP_Report_(final)-1.pdf> (28 April 2015).

enacting of the constitution6. Thus as part of the Yusin system, Park shut down all colleges and

universities and enforced strict censorship of the media, while dissolving the National Assembly

and banning all political parties. Not only that this new “constitution” concentrated political

power in the executive branch and all future presidents were to be appointed by the National

Council for Unification which was headed by Park. Presidential tenure for single terms was also

extended to six years and limit on the number of terms was lifted. Park had the additional power

to appoint one third of the National Assembly, effectively ensuring his strong hold over the

legislation. Most importantly, the Yushin Constitution allowed the president to declare special ad

hoc “Emergency Decrees”, whereby he could pass a quick law anytime which would remain

unchallenged and this allowed Park the flexibility to amend national law as he deemed fit. In

short, the Yushin Constitution in all practicality “transformed the presidency into a legal

dictatorship”7

In retaliation, the students and intellectuals conducted a national campaign to revise the Yusin

Constitution in the fall of 1973. As the student campaign gained momentum, the president issued

his first emergency decree, outlawing all such campaigns. This was followed by successive

emergency measures, imposing further restrictions on other aspects of the society and later the

harshest emergency decree was issued in May 1975 which made it a crime to even criticize the

constitution. The student demonstration was unable to achieve fruition in its protest not just

because of Park’s harsh suppression but primarily because the movement itself was loosely

organized and espoused diverse ideologies and programmes. For instance, while one section

confined their agenda to the curbing of the Yusin constitution, others demanded a complete

reorganization of politics, national security and the entire economic system and yet one another

group demanded social justice and a spiritual renewal of the state.8 Important personalities from

the university faculties and the Christian Church emerged from this movement but apart from the

persecution and repression it faced from the Korean government, there was little in common

between them.

This lack of unity is also seen in the parliamentary opposition towards the Yushin system which

was only intermittently effective because the opposition was divided into major factions and was

6 Savada and Shaw, 53.7 David Adesnik and Sunhyuk Kim. “If At First You Don’t Succeed: The Puzzle of South Korea’s Democratic Transition,” 2008, < http://www.pomed.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/12/adesnik-kim-submitted090915.pdf> (28 April 2015).8 Adrian Buzo, The Making of Modern Korea (London: Routledge, 2007), 124.

also disunited in terms of the tactics to be employed. Although the main opposition New

Democratic Party (NDP) wanted to confront the government on fundamental issues of

democracy and human rights, when the leadership was replaced by a more Yushin-compliant

person, all attempts to confront the government were halted until original leadership was restored

in 1979. Apart from the fluctuation in resistance, it is important to note that the major challenge

to Yushin came from a relatively small group of activists, rather than the population at large. One

reason for this is the rapid economic growth which secured the public support. Also the situation

of South Vietnam, which by the 1970s was entirely dependent on the US for its survival as a

separate nation, particularly alarmed Republic of Korea (ROK) which had empathized with the

South Vietnamese as the anti-communist half of a divided nation and it was content with how

Park ensured the national security, even at the expense of a dictatorial regime. Thus politically,

the ever-expanding middle class (as a result of industrialization) offered little opposition to the

government as it accepted authoritarianism in exchange for material wealth, law and order and

effective national security.9

Since much of Park’s mandate depended on sustained economic growth, when the ROK

economy experienced a sharp decline in 1979, pressures began to mount on the regime. With the

rapid rise of inflation and stagnant wages, Park addressed these issues by adopting economic

measures which paradoxically created a recession producing a succession of bankruptcies and

thus increasing unemployment.10 The turning point in Park’s regime grew out of a labour dispute

known as the YH Incident where textile workers began a sit-in protest at their factory, the YH

Trading Company, over large-scale layoffs. Park government sent the police force to break off

the demonstrations, severely beating the protestors resulting in the death of one and arrests of

many more. This was the beginning of the social unrest which was to culminate in more decisive

uprisings of 1979-80.

Also the opposition despite suffering from internal dissension was growing stronger in its

criticism against the government in 1979, following the New Democratic Party’s winning a

plurality in the late 1978 general elections for National Assembly. The new leader of the NDP ,

Kim Young Sam began his challenge against the government from June 1979, announcing his

decision to meet the North Korean leader to discuss matters of unification and even delivered a

scathing criticism of the government. Not only that he also argued how the government had

9 Buzo, 131.10 Savada and Shaw, 45.

stifled people right to freedom in the name of constitution, stating that the suppression of human

rights had become an international disgrace. Not only that he also voiced out that people should

be permitted to elect their own president through direct elections, and not through electoral

college, and that they should be allowed to live without fear.11 Kim’s revolutionary ideas were

seen as a threat to the Park regime and the government immediately retaliated by ousting him

from the National Assembly. This sparked outrage among the mass, leading to further unrest and

by October 1979, the conditions were ripe for a transition to democracy as labor unions launched

a wave of strikes and demonstrations and Churches also lent their support to the movement. Thus

the workers, students and clergymen were all united and joined the parliamentary opposition to

give them the strength and support they needed.12

As the chaos intensified, it became clear to Park and his advisors that something decisive must

be done before the protests spiraled out of control. Park’s advisors disagreed how to respond

with some suggesting to compromise with their democratic demands while others advocating

violent crushing of the protests to which Park assented. The Park regime was brought to an end

on October 26, 1979 when the head of Korean CIA shot down the president.

Transitional Government

With the assassination of Park, although it appeared that Korea was marching its way to

democracy, the journey was extended for a further eight years. The country experienced a

transitory breeze of democracy as the Prime Minister under Park, Choi Kyu-ha was elected

president in December 1979 and stated in his inaugural speech that a new constitution supported

by the majority of the people would be adopted within a year and also promised the nation of a

free and fair general election to be held afterwards. Although Choe did not stay long in power to

bring about these changes he freed several hundred protestors from Park’s regime and also

abolished the Emergency Measure Number Nine, whereby the criticizing of the constitution was

considered a crime.

In spite of all this, Choi was mainly a figurehead and had little control over the military.

Lieutenant General Chun Doo Hwan was appointed the head of the Defense Security Command 11 Ibid, 42.12 David Adesnik and Sunhyuk Kim. “If At First You Don’t Succeed: The Puzzle of South Korea’s Democratic Transition,” 2008, < http://www.pomed.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/12/adesnik-kim-submitted090915.pdf> (28 April 2015).

(DSC) which was the most powerful of South Korea’s military intelligence agencies. Also since

the DSC was responsible in dealing with coups and revolts, Chun was given the task to

investigate Park’s assassination. Under the pretext of this investigation, Chun managed to uproot

the Park era power elite in order to remove impediments from his future rule. Not only that, he

also used the rife in the military to assert his control in the army by December 1979.13 Chun’s

next move to advance his control over the government was in April 1980 when he asked

President Choi to let him take command over the Korean CIA(KCIA). Taking this position was

illegal for Chun unless he resigned from the military which he refused to do and Choi having no

political base was unable to refuse Chun, who had the military at his disposal. Nevertheless the

trend towards democratization continued with the reopening of universities in March 1980. Once

again the students began to voice out issues such as government restrictions on campus

autonomy, the retention of Yushin Constitution, delays in moving towards an open,

representative government and many more. They also demanded broader socio-economic

demands which was restricted by the Yushin system and soon these demonstrations moved off

campus and towards downtown Seoul where protestors met on an almost daily basis leading to

increasingly massive and violent demonstrations.14

On the other hand, Chun’s ambitions signaled that he was determined to gain entire control over

the ROK government which resulted in the flaring up of widespread protests since the people in

the wake of democracy did not want it to be disrupted by a military takeover. Thus in early May

1980 there was an added issue to the student protest that Chun be removed immediately from

government and on May 14, there was a massive demonstration of tens of thousands protestors,

consisting mainly of students and workers that took place in Seoul.15 Also the leader of the NDP

took part in this movement along with journalists and religious leaders, anticipating ‘a revived

opposition movement, a “Seoul Spring,” but Chun could not let this challenge to his authority

stand.’16 Thus from May 17, Chun’s master plan began to surface as he declared martial law and

re-imposed the Yushin-era prohibition on political gatherings, publications, broadcasts, closing

down all colleges and universities and banning all criticisms of past and current presidents. Part

13 Savada and Shaw, 52.14 Buzo, 145.15 Savada and Shaw, 5416 Heo and Roehrig, 30.

of Chun’s plan was not only to quell demonstrations but to destroy the power bases of all

existing political figures and groups. Thus apart from the shutting down the National Assembly

and the headquarters of most political parties, he also arrested student leaders and arrested chief

opposition leaders, completely banning all political activity17. The military leaders were of the

opinion that the harsh response of the army was justified in saving the country from escalating

chaos or disorder.

The Kwangju Uprising

Although the military measures quieted most of the protests in Korea, demonstrated continued in

Kwangju, the southwest portion of the Korean peninsula and the political home of Kim Dae-

jung, who was arrested by Chun’s military. Also for years, Kwangju was the base of opposition

to the Park regime and was consequently punished by withholding economic investment. Thus

for the Kwangju people, this nascent democratic movement was not only seen as a means for

political rights and freedom, but also seen as a chance to share in the country’s growing

economic prosperity.18 Hence the Kwangju uprising was not easily crushed, despite Chun’s

adopting a hard-line policy. On May 18, when Chun sent special forces to stop the unrest, the

protestors were badly beaten by the soldiers, resulting in many deaths. Thus on May 19, student

demonstrations escalated into violent confrontations with the military troops, and though ROK

army paratroopers were sent to restore order, using all the ferocity they could muster ‘the

protests turned into full fledged insurrection’19 as the civilians retaliated by seizing control of the

city and forcing the troops to withdraw.

However Chun realized that if he were to consolidate his coup, he could not give himself in to

the Kwangju Incident and thus after several days of deliberations and attempted negotiations, on

May 27, 1980 he sent twenty thousand troops from elite units in the army to a city of only

600,000 people. The poorly armed group of students and citizens were no match for the best

troops in the ROK army and thus the city was taken with brutal force. This event came to be

known as the “Kwangju Massacre” and is often likened to China’s Tiananmen Square because of

the magnitude of its impact. It is estimated that the number of civilians was at least several

17 Heo and Roehrig, 31.18 Ibid.19 Buzo, 145.

hundred and remained a considerable source of bitterness for the Koreans, making it impossible

for Chun to establish any sort of legitimacy to his rule. The Kwangju Incident is important in

shaping further revolts in the 80s since it served ‘as a powerful symbol of popular resistance to

military –backed authoritarian government’20Although the Kwangju Incident appears on the

surface a failure to launch democracy, it paved the way for later movements in the 1980s that

eventually brought democracy to South Korea as will be later discussed.

Chun Doo-Hwan (1980-1987)

After the revolts and protest subsided, Chun proceeded to consolidate authoritarian power and in

August 1980 he was elected to a seven-year term as president. Chun just like President Park

announced the drafting of a constitution that would give rise to a democratic Korea and at the

same time also provided ‘the constitutional basis for the reimposition of military-backed

authoritarianism.’21 However by 1982, Chun had turned back the forces of democratization and

established a regime firmly based on Yushin system and had thus achieved a secure grip on

power.

However in spite of considerable developments in economy and diplomacy, Chun could never

secure public trust and support, and was regarded by the mass as a usurper of power who had

deprived Korea of its rights to restore democracy. The Kwangju Incident which lingered in the

minds of the people further disqualified his rule. In an attempt to enhance his legitimacy without

reducing his power, Chun held the legislative elections in the National Assembly where the

opposition parties won more vote than the government party, clearly indicating that the people

wanted a change22. Realizing that his electoral tactic was a failure, Chun knew that the opposition

would demand free and fair election with the end of his term in 1987 and thus wanted to install

Roh Tae-woo a friend and an army general in the ROK army, as his successor. However this

could only be achieved if the 1980 constitution was in effect. After having won the legislative

elections, the opposition launched a campaign to revise the constitution in February 1986 and

though initially Chun did not give in, later after extensive protests and rioting he compromised

20 Buzo, 145.21 Ibid, 146.22 David Adesnik and Sunhyuk Kim. “If At First You Don’t Succeed: The Puzzle of South Korea’s Democratic Transition,” 2008, < http://www.pomed.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/12/adesnik-kim-submitted090915.pdf> (28 April 2015).

by forming a special committee in the National Assembly to propose a set of constitutional

revisions. With these proceedings, the streets remained relatively calm as the people anticipated

a transition to democracy with the amendments of the constitution. As talks went on about

constitutional reform, on April 13, 1987, Chun surprised the nation by announcing to suspend all

talk until a new government was established at the end of his term. This declaration marked the

beginning of the democratic movement as the public responded with universal outrage. To make

matters even worse, Chun even announced that he would appoint General Roh as the candidate

for his Democratic Justice Party (DJP). Thus Chun had not only ended the political reforms but

also ensured that another military man would take over the government.23

Unlike previous times when students was the driving force behind the movement, this time the

opposition exploded. Although the opposition leaders advocated non-violent protests against the

regime the crowds, led by students attacked the police with fists, blunt objects and gasoline.

Initially the public was indifferent to this confrontation between the student demonstrators and

the government, but the daily chaos in the streets and the never-ending smell of teargas aroused

their anger. Also the news of the torture and death of a student by the police further moved the

people24 and by the spring of 1987, protests intensified as the common people joined the

movement along with a diverse combination of beliefs including Marxism, nationalism,

Catholicism and many more. Although the protest and riots resulted in few fatalities on both

side, the police was becoming rapidly exhausted whereas the students’ number and energy

seemed inexhaustible.25 Furthermore the government suffered major damage to its credibility

when brutal interrogation methods used against the student leaders were revealed.

Amidst all this on 10 June, when DJP ratified the nomination of Roh Tae-woo as its presidential

candidate, the opposition called out a street demonstration and it proved to be a success as it

combined with the ongoing student protests to produce successive days of street violence which

was unprecedented during Chun’s presidential term.26

23 Heo and Roehrig, 37.24 Savada and Shaw, 63.25 David Adesnik and Sunhyuk Kim. “If At First You Don’t Succeed: The Puzzle of South Korea’s Democratic Transition,” 2008, < http://www.pomed.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/12/adesnik-kim-submitted090915.pdf> (28 April 2015).

26 Buzo, 149.

As the unrest escalated, Chun was faced with the same dilemma Park Chung-hee faced in the

1979 demonstration. Although Chun still had the option of mobilizing the armed forces, this

approach carried the risk of extreme violence, and since his rule was already maligned with the

Kwangju Uprising, Chun did not want to exacerbate it any further. As the riots entered into their

third week, Roh Tae-woo made the first official move from the government by announcing that

he was willing to adopt the opposition’s demands. This he outlined in an eight-point plan,

maintaining that the constitution should not only be expeditiously amended, but a direct

presidential election must be held under a new Constitution. The democratic overtone of his plan

is clearly seen as he stated that a presidential election system is vital at this juncture in order to

overcome social confusion and achieve national reconciliation since people are the masters of the

country and their will should be placed above everything else.27

Roh’s announcement was a turning point in South Korean history as it not only curbed the

protests and demonstrations but also led Chun, the mastermind of the ‘Kwangju Massacre’ to

adopt a soft policy. Thus a few days later, Chun reversed his position and allowed the

constitution revision committee to continue its work. Roh was quick to realize that the growing

opposition along with the people would be a tough match for the government and therefore

decided to break free from its stance to save his own political future. Also Roh perceived that

although the opposition were united in their effort to drive out the military government and

establish democracy, the two strong leaders in the opposition were also rivals and hence there

was a good chance that they would split the vote, allowing Roh to triumph in the end. The vote

results thus turned out as Roh anticipated, with him winning the election.

Reasons behind the success of the 1987 Democratic Movement

The Activists

A main reason for the success of the 1987 movement is the increased unity of the protest

movement. The four main constituents of the movement – students, labor unions, churches and

the parliamentary opposition – were the same during both transitions and these constituents

27 Heo and Roehrig, 37.

sought to establish umbrella organizations or chaeya, that would effectively coordinate the

strategy and resources of the movement. In 1987, however, the chaeya achieved a much greater

degree of efficiency and solidarity because they learned from the mistakes of the failed transition

in 1979-1980.28 A big factor contributing to these protests were the number of participants which

reached a zenith in 1974 during the Yushin period with about one million participants and the

number did not differ significantly in the 1979-80 revolt. However in 1987, it reached a

staggering over 6 million participants as several new groups, including average citizen and

middle class participated in the democracy movement.29 Although students and labor were

important groups in the late 1970s and their general tendency was to use disruptive tactics such

as demonstrations, sit-ins, and strikes, Christians also remained a dominant majority and as their

religion promoted peace and nonviolence, they seldom resorted to violent tactics such as

demonstrations and this contributed to the high number of non-disruptive tactics.

However, in the 1980s students and labor groups became stronger while Christians took a back

seat. The decline of Christian and journalist participation in the 1980s was complemented by the

increasing participation of General Activists and ordinary citizens in protest events towards the

end of the 1980s. General activists began to emerge in the mid 1980s, finally becoming the most

active protest group in the democratic period, followed by ordinary citizens. Students held

numerous demonstrations on campus or in the streets, and workers used sit-ins during their

strikes. The position of the labour movement which had been weakened by the extreme

authoritarianism since the 1960s started to change during the 80s as continued industrial growth

led to the development of a strong labour union movement. These Korean workers, in their

demand for obtaining improved salaries and better working conditions, attracted substantial

support from the chaeya which struggled for human rights and democratization.30 This

development might signify the increasing radicalization of the democracy movement from the

1970s to the 1980s. As the political context changed with the coming of power by Chun Doo

Hwan, dissidents realized they had to use more extreme measures in the 1980s compared to the

28 David Adesnik and Sunhyuk Kim. “If At First You Don’t Succeed: The Puzzle of South Korea’s Democratic Transition,” 2008, < http://www.pomed.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/12/adesnik-kim-submitted090915.pdf> (28 April 2015).29 Gi-Wook Shin et al. “South Korea’s Democracy Movement (1970-1993): Stanford Korea Democracy Project Report,” Stanford University, December 2007, < http://fsi.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/KDP_Report_(final)-1.pdf> (27 April 2015).30 Kenneth M. Wells, ed., South Korea’s Minjung Movement (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 1995), 46.

1970s. The growing increase of general activists and citizens indicates the professionalization

and institutionalization of activist identity.31

Government’s treatment of the activists also had a major impact on the protests. For instance

after the Kwangju Massacre in May1980 when students clashed with the police, leading to civil

strife Chun Doo Hwan executed a strict policy of repressing any dissenting voices that would

challenge his rise to power and as a result all protest dwindled from 1980- 1984. However from

1984 onwards Chun Doo Hwan relaxed his repressive policies since the General Elections was

drawing close and the government became confident of their control over the society, having

achieved economic growth and political stability. As the Chun regime continuously suffered

from a lack of legitimacy, it was imperative for them to demonstrate how democratic their

regime was to the voters and the international audience. Therefore, in the spring of 1984 some

political prisoners were freed and the professors and students who had been fired and expelled

were allowed to go back to their schools. The general atmosphere at college campuses became

much freer and it was also conducive for a flourishing of political activism as the government’s

relaxing of political control was an opportunity for students to reorganize and to prepare for

further action. It is noteworthy that when Chun announced his decision to hold presidential

elections under the old constitution, it was the students and not the opposition who organized

massive demonstrations, articulating the sentiments of the public who wanted a freely contested

presidential election.32 South Korea’s teachers have often been marginalized in this democratic

movement, but they played a major role in establishing a degree of autonomy from the state and

also played a crucial part in disseminating democratic values and promoting greater popular

participation in the government. These teachers even formed associations and so effective they

were in circulating ideas that even after the liberalization of the military regime in 1987, the

government continued to ban all teachers unions other than the government-controlled one.33

Government and the US Involvement

31Ibid.32 Chang Kyung-Sup, ed., South Korea in Transition (New York: Routledge, 2014), 25.33 Ibid, 26.

There were many factors, both domestic and international, that led President Chun to acquiesce

in to the democratic demands of the people. One of the main reasons was the very nature of the

protest itself. While during the days of President Park Chung Hee, it was mainly composed of

students, increasingly the demonstrations started to attract a broader cross-section of ROK

society, especially the members of the affluent middle-class and hence the drive towards

democracy was ever stronger. For the government, crushing these protests was far more difficult

when the participants included businessmen, housewives and others from the middleclass.34

Change of demography is also a significant factor in the success of the 1987 movement. While in

1961 a military-backed government superimposed itself over a tiny urban elite in a largely urban

country, by the mid-1980s industrialization, economic growth and growing international contact

led to the explosive growth of the middle class. As the proportion of the white-collar workers

increased, Chun’s slogans which echoed that of the Park era such as the necessity to have a strict,

authoritarian government to prevent attacks from the North, failed to convince them of Chun’s

legitimacy.

The businessmen bore its very own grudge against the government since as the economy grew

larger and more complex, close government monitoring of business activities was becoming an

increasing burden. ROK businessmen became increasingly convinced that they would flourish

under civilian government because of the liberalization process with the end of the strict controls

of Park-Chun regime.35 With the business class fuming against the government, even the military

was anticipating a change towards democracy and it was no longer cohesive in defending the

existing military government from the challenge. While during the Park regime, the military was

at his disposal which functioned at his bidding, by 1987 the military was gradually accepting the

fact that their time of political domination was coming to an end. This was particularly seen in

their attitude towards the protestors since there were clear indications that the military was

“unhappy with the prospect of taking yet again a direct role in politics, a role that would

undoubtedly have led to severe domestic and international pressure”36 Thus while Chun was

hardly repentant, many officers were ashamed of the military for killing hundreds of the civilians

they were supposed to protect as the younger officers in the ROK military made known to Chun 34 Heo and Roehrig, 39.35 Buzo, 151.36 James Cotton, “From Authoritarianism to Democracy in South Korea,” in Korea Under Roh Tae-woo (Canberra: ANU Printery, 1993), 33.

and Roh their adamant opposition to the use of lethal force against the protesters. It is believed

that the sum of all these pressures led to the swift collapse of military authoritarianism.

Apart from domestic politics, regime change in South Korea reflected the influence of America.

Since the founding of the ROK, South Korean actors have exerted the greatest influence on the

government transitions but American decisions, expressed in terms of both actions and acts of

omission, have made certain outcomes that had both positive and negative effects on the

democratic movement. From the founding of the ROK through the 1970s, the US government

displayed an uneven interest in South Korean democracy. The priority of the US was stability

and thus it tended to favor democratization when it advanced the cause of stability. Thus after

the outbreak of the Korean War, although Syngman Rhee’s Rhee’s government became

progressively less democratic, the US government made little effort to restrain Rhee

authoritarian tendencies, being preoccupied with the threat from the North. However when this

very government rigged the 1960 elections and protesters poured into the streets, the US helped

ease Rhee out of office, paving the way for a democratic transition. 37

Up until the 1980s, the U.S. was viewed very positively by most Koreans as they upheld the

popular image of the U.S. as that of a savior who saved South Korea from Japanese colonial

occupation and communist aggression. Thus when US President Gerald Ford visited Korea in

November 1974 dissident groups hoped that the president of the “free world” would advice Park

Chung Hee’s government to stop repressing the democracy movement, but the US President

maintained a neutral position. This same hope was pinned on the visit by U.S. President Jimmy

Carter in 1979 but by this time the dissident groups realized that the government could be using

the U.S. President’s visit as a strategy to legitimate the dictatorial regime instead. Although the

Carter administration welcomed the democratic movement of 1979 and lent its support to the

interim government, the administration did not ensure the transition’s success.38One reason for

37 David Adesnik and Sunhyuk Kim. “If At First You Don’t Succeed: The Puzzle of South Korea’s Democratic Transition,” 2008, < http://www.pomed.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/12/adesnik-kim-submitted090915.pdf> (28 April 2015).

38 Gi-Wook Shin et al. “South Korea’s Democracy Movement (1970-1993): Stanford Korea Democracy Project Report,” Stanford University, December 2007, < http://fsi.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/KDP_Report_(final)-1.pdf> (27 April 2015).

this is the turbulence of the US-ROK relationship in 1977 and 1978. The mutual antagonism of

Jimmy Carter and Park Chung Hee resulted in a low point in US-ROK relations. As a candidate

for president, Carter spoke in favor of a phased withdrawal of US forces from Korea. Yet during

his first months in the White House, Carter surprised the ROK by announcing a schedule for the

withdrawal of all US combat forces within 4-5 years. The humiliation for Park was considerable,

even though Carter ultimately abandoned his plans in response to congressional opposition.

Carter also antagonized the Park regime by describing its human rights violations as

“repugnant.” 39In addition, the crisis in US-Iranian relations made the US administration

extremely averse to any course of action that risked further instability. This crisis started in

1979, at a time when South Korea was about to experience a democratic movement, through

Khomeini’s revolution against the Shah, with whom the US had good relations. With the Shah

monarchy being overthrown, Iran not only developed an Anti-American sentiment but the

American embassy was also seized by student radicals and American diplomats taken as

hostages.40 Thus US feared that if Washington were to push too hard, an anti-US government

similar to Iran could come to power in Seoul it would jeopardize US security interests and the

ROK-U.S. alliance. Thus it was very supportive of the Chun regime and developed friendly

relations with the administration.41

The public however did not take this well and there were even allegations that the US were

involved in the Kwangju Massacre. This caused serious suspicion about the true intentions of the

U.S. towards South Korea and the atmosphere was rife with Anti-American sentiment. Dissident

intellectuals and prodemocracy activists began to criticize the U.S. role in the Korean peninsula

in the 1980s and viewed the U.S. international policies as imperialist. They thus believed

national liberation from U.S. imperialism was indispensible for genuine democratization. Anti-

Americanism was expressed directly in protest activities as well as intellectual debates. The fact

that all four main U.S. Information Centers in Korea were attacked during democracy

movements in the 1980s illustrates that anti-Americanism became one of the important sources

of prodemocracy activism. The issues raised by the protestors varied from demanding clear

explanation about the alleged U.S. involvement in the Kwangju massacre to criticizing its

39 Ibid. 40 Shaul Bakhash. “The U.S. and Iran in Historical Perspective,” Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI), September 2009, < http://www.fpri.org/articles/2009/09/us-and-iran-historical-perspective> (7 May 2015).41 Heo and Roehrig, 33.

imperialist aggression regarding the Korean economy, especially the rice market.42 This placed

Washington in a difficult position since though it was unhappy with Chun’s actions, it could not

antagonize the diplomatic relations with him. Also it was reluctant to impose economic sanctions

for fear of making an already bad ROK economy worse. However it might be noted that

Washington was responsible passively for Chun’s military coup in 1980. When Chun was

appointed the head of Korean CIA and demonstrations exploded across the country, the U.S.

policymakers were of the opinion that the ROK military could bring law and order, before

moving towards political liberalization. Thus the U.S. ambassador to Korea, William Gleysteen

assured South Korean officials that the United States would not oppose any risk taken by the

government to restore law and order, even if it involves reinforcing the police with the army.

However the U.S. officials did not intend to support any form of extreme violence and on several

occasions asked Chun and his military officials to refrain from it, but Chun took the message of

the ambassador as a tacit approval, and started to crack down on protests throughout the

country.43

The Reagan administration was the high point in the US-ROK relations. Initially, the Reagan

administration rejected democracy promotion in principle, preferring to focus on the solidarity of

anti-Communist governments, both authoritarian and democratic. This developed a relationship

of trust and confidence between him and Chun Doo Hwan. Yet over time, the administration

came to favor democratic transitions even at the expense of strongly anti-Communist

dictatorships. Thus during Reagan’s visit to South Korea in November 1983, he withheld direct

criticism of the military regime, but firmly insisted that democracy was the goal towards which

South Korea should strive in spite of the threats from the North. Reagan’s polite and friendly

manner softened the prodemocracy message given to Chun, which was well-received by him. In

fact Chun even told Reagan that the ROK’s turbulent postwar history had led “the people [to]

believe that a change of presidents is only possible through violence. This is a very dangerous

way of thinking … My term is scheduled to end in 1988 and it will.”44 Though a protégée of Park

42 Gi-Wook Shin et al. “South Korea’s Democracy Movement (1970-1993): Stanford Korea Democracy Project Report,” Stanford University, December 2007, < http://fsi.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/KDP_Report_(final)-1.pdf> (27 April 2015).43 Heo and Roehrig, 33. 44 David Adesnik and Sunhyuk Kim. “If At First You Don’t Succeed: The Puzzle of South Korea’s Democratic Transition,” 2008, < http://www.pomed.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/12/adesnik-kim-submitted090915.pdf> (28 April 2015).

Chung-hee, for Chun the end did not justify the means, especially after the Kwangju Massacre

and thus he was preparing to step down after the end of his term. However the people were not

only looking forward to the end of Chun’s term but the end of military government as whole,

hence the widespread protest and revolts following the nomination of Roh Tae-woo, a major

General in the army. The U.S. however supported the Chun regime towards the very end as the

U.S. Ambassador James Lilly attended the electoral convention of DJP in June 1987 where Roh

was nominated and the former even assured both Chun and Roh of America’s friendship.

However Washington was quite unprepared for the public outburst to this nomination and thus it

quickly reverted its position as Reagan’s letter to Chun asked him to advocate “Dialogue,

compromise, and negotiation [which] are effective ways to solve problems and maintain national

unity.”45 Only after a couple of hours of receiving the letter, Chun decided not to declare martial

law. Reagan’s word carried considerable weight precisely because Reagan had embraced Chun

without hesitation during the early and uncertain days of his regime.

Apart from all these factors, Chang Kyung-Sup in South Korea in Transition suggests South

Korea’s “education fever played a key role in the development of a society based on a sense of

citizenship and active citizen involvement in public affairs.”46 They very curriculum of the South

Korean education system reinforced liberal democratic values and concepts such as citizenship

and participatory democracy were taken directly from American textbooks. Korean textbooks

also gave long accounts that traced the rise of democracy and freedom from Ancient Athens and

the Magna Carta to Abraham Lincoln’s speeches on emancipation. Thus an increasingly

educated public identified with the West in their quest for democratic rights. By the 1980s as

most Koreans identified themselves as middle-class, there was an increasing growth of literate

working-class and the spread of egalitarian ideals. Not only that every year, thousands of South

Koreans sought education in the USA and the government ministries, school systems, media, etc

were staffed with large numbers of America-educated South Koreans. All these developments

led to the educational transformation of South Korea and according to Chang this educational

development prepared the way for democratization through encouragement of a dynamic,

pluralist society of active politically engaged citizens.

45 Don Oberdorfer and Robert Carlin. The Two Koreas (New York: Basic Books, 2014), 168.46 Kyung-Sup, 30.

Among authors who have scrutinized the South Korean transition, the most widely cited

explanation for Chun’s restraint in the June Uprising is that if the violence escalated, the

International Olympic Committee might have called off the 1988 Summer Games or awarded

them to another host.47 The entire South Korea was looking forward to hosting this event to

showcase the economic progress of the country and for Chun, the game symbolized the success

of his effort to transform South Korea into a modern republic. Thus with the international media

focused on South Korea, Chun did not want to jeopardize the reputation of the country, hence his

decision to acquiesce, since there was already discussion within the International Olympic

Committee of cancelling or moving the games from South Korea because of potential unrest.48

Conclusion

Thus the June Democratic Movement was an all-encompassing movement which not only had its

representative of the entire South Korean population, but the atmosphere itself was one which

was conducive to the flourishing of the movement, because of the above-mentioned factors. The

personality of President Chun is also an important factor here, since unlike Park Chung-hee he

did not pursue power relentlessly, but instead like a true diplomat took into consideration the

advice and the situation at hand. Ironically, therefore President Chun found himself acting as a

proponent of democracy in a country where all sectors were demanding the establishment of

democratic rights. For the people, however, the movement was not just a mere transition to a

democratic state but it was one which earned them their emancipation and independence at the

cost of thousands of lives.

47 David Adesnik and Sunhyuk Kim. “If At First You Don’t Succeed: The Puzzle of South Korea’s Democratic Transition,” 2008, < http://www.pomed.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/12/adesnik-kim-submitted090915.pdf> (28 April 2015).

48 Heo and Roehrig, 38.

References

Adesnik, David and Sunhyuk Kim. “If At First You Don’t Succeed: The Puzzle of South Korea’s Democratic Transition.” 2008. < http://www.pomed.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/12/adesnik-kim-submitted090915.pdf> (28 April 2015).

Bakhash, Shaul. “The U.S. and Iran in Historical Perspective.” Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI). September 2009. < http://www.fpri.org/articles/2009/09/us-and-iran-historical-perspective> (7 May 2015).

Buzo, Adrian. The Making of Modern Korea. London: Routledge, 2007.

Cotton, James. “From Authoritarianism to Democracy in South Korea,” In Korea Under Roh Tae-woo. Canberra: ANU Printery, 1993.

Heo, Uk and Terence Roehrig. South Korea since 1980. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.

Kyung-Sup, Chang. ed. South Korea in Transition. New York: Routledge, 2014.

Oberdorfer, Don and Robert Carlin. The Two Koreas. New York: Basic Books, 2014.

Savada, A. M., and William Shaw, eds. South Korea- A Country Study. Washington D.C.: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, 1992.

Shin, Gi-Wook, Paul Y. Chang, Jung-eun Lee and Sookyung Kim. “South Korea’s Democracy Movement (1970-1993): Stanford Korea Democracy Project Report.” December 2007. <http://fsi.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/KDP_Report_(final)-1.pdf> (28 April 2015).

Wells, Kenneth M.,ed. South Korea’s Minjung Movement. Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 1995.