democracy and the chain of command: a new governance of africa's security sector

8/7/2019 Democracy and the Chain of Command: A New Governance of Africa's Security Sector

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Serious political crises in Niger, Honduras, Turkey,

Bangladesh, Guinea, Madagascar, Thailand, and Mau-

ritania in recent years illustrate the continuing inu-

ence o security orces on the political trajectories o

countries around the world. Examples o such instabil-

ity are particularly recurrent in Arica. When Arica’s

political crises turn into coups, armed insurrections, ortragic conrontations, the deense and security orces

(DSF) are invariably key players. For many years, such

military actions were justifed as an established right o

state sovereignty over domestic issues. Oten, they were

even recognized as such on the international level.

This chaotic state o aairs is no longer accept-

able. Much o Arica is now frmly committed to ur-

thering the standards o democracy and human rights

AfricA Security Brief

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that have advanced over the past two decades. None-

theless, the path toward democracy, stability, and de-

velopment is long and has many blind alleys. I Arica

is to stay on this path, its deense and security orces

must resolutely ulfll the role assigned to them by the

nations they serve with dedicated and consistent ad-

herence to constitutional rule and a republican ethos.How can the deense and security orces be re-

ashioned to support democracy? Ultimately, this is

dependent on deep respect or the rule o law by all

stakeholders, whether civilian or military, governmen-

tal or nongovernmental. The caliber o command and

leadership exercised by a country’s senior ofcers, ac-

cordingly, will determine the DSF ability to eectively

support democratic governance. To this end, deense



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and security sector leaders should ocus on fve priority

reorms to orge a new military governance in Arica.

reform no. 1 : eStAbliSh nAtionAl,

threAtS-bASed dSf

Some Arican deense and security orces con-

tinue to operate without any constituent document

that clearly sets orth their missions and defnes their

rules o deployment. This perpetuates many problems

and causes great conusion in defning their purposes,

their confgurations, and the resources and the tasks

assigned to them.

In the feld, this oten results in orces that are

insuiciently organized and poorly equipped with

lopsided troop numbers that are difcult to manage

and control. Roles and responsibilities o the mili-

tary and police in some instances are unclear and

overlap, leading to inadequate budgetary support and

improper and counterproductive deployments.

To remedy these structural and organizational

weaknesses, it is incumbent on the senior chain o

command to:

◆ deine a clear and pertinent interservices

national security strategy

◆ establish suitable doctrines or the use o orce

◆ adopt rational organizational structures

◆ establish and maintain appropriate human

and materiel resource management practices.

Well-conceived national security plans are signs

o military proessionalism and enable proactive, ex-

ible, and rapid responses to threats. Ghana, Senegal,

Sierra Leone, and Burkina Faso, among others, have

made noteworthy progress toward developing such

comprehensive plans.

A coherent national security strategy provides a

systematic basis to restructure a nation’s deense and

security orces. This is a top priority given that orce

structures or many Arican countries are misaligned

with today’s threats. A rational deense structure pro-

vides commanders and oversight authorities the abil-

ity to better balance the missions to be ulflled with

available resources. It also osters a more outcomes-

based means to create budgets, recruit, train, procure

assets, maintain equipment, and reliably track troop

compensation. As a result, even in a context o lim-

ited budget resources, overall efciency and readiness

can improve. Additionally, these tools help prevent

embezzlement and corruption, a requent aiction

within Arican DSF. For example, public submission

o the deense budget to parliament was reinstituted

in Zambia in the 1990s and has continuously led to

adjustments that produce new eiciencies, reveal

poor management, and rectiy the misallocation o

unds within the DSF.

Restructuring deense and security orces must in-

volve key societal stakeholders. This approach under-

scores that DSF are rom and or the broader society—

not distinct rom it. Sierra Leone, which continues to

consolidate reorms made during a multiyear compre-

hensive DSF restructuring, provides a model o pro-

ductive consultative deense review. Citizens’ groups,

civilian agencies, and senior ofcers collaborated to de-

sign new policies that streamlined the DSF command

structure, elevated training and personnel priorities,

and enhanced accountability and transparency.

reform no. 2 : build inStitutionS of

ProfeSSionAl dSf

Order, discipline, know-how, and rigorous stan-

dards have always been the mainstays o eective de-

ense and security orces. Scenes o mutiny, looting,

and violence by troops in ragged atigues—all too

amiliar in Arica—are the antithesis o a proessional

DSF. Reorms that enhance ethics, improve training,

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and provide adequate means to support the well-being

o troops will institute and sustain proessionalism.

The oundation o a proessional deense and

security orce is relected by basic ethical values

typically ormalized in an oicial code o conduct

meant to guide the thoughts and actions o troops.

Such values include loyalty to the nation and to the

armed orces, a sense o duty, seless service, and in-

tegrity. While some security orces in Arica wholly

lack codes o ethics, others in countries such as Mali,

Senegal, Ghana, Zambia, Tanzania, and Malawi have

made great strides to inculcate these norms into their

day-to-day operations. A code o conduct, however,

is only valuable in so ar as it is known and respected.

As successul eorts in Mali have shown, such codes

must be instilled in new recruits as well as seasoned

ofcers and modeled by commanders i they are to

be absorbed.

Ethical values must also be reinorced by a

senior command that scrupulously rewards troops

on merit and perormance and strictly prohibits a-

voritism and arbitrary decisionmaking. Moreover,

leadership by example, absent all demagoguery, is

a undamental quality o a disciplined and ethical

DSF. Senior ofcers must know how to listen and

advocate or their troops, exercise authority airly,

and emphasize proessional development. Further-

more, the willingness to embrace ideas rom the out-

side cultivates innovation and improvement across

the chain o command.

Proessionalism within the DSF is sustained

through ongoing high-level training. This must be

the underlying principle governing any organization

that seeks to operate eectively. Proessional skills are

acquired through objective selection o participants,

meaningul instruction delivered by experienced o-

fcers, and by the proper use o human and fnancial

resources. Many Arican states, however, lack thesta colleges and other acilities that oster technical

specialization and advanced strategic comprehension.

To this end, properly targeted and dynamic military

cooperation must be developed not only between

developed and developing countries, but also among

the latter.

Given the general security environment in Ari-

ca, training programs that ocus on peace operations,

responsible crowd and riot control, rules o engage-

ment, soldiers’ compliance with the rule o law, and

inormation and communication technologies are

critical priorities. Such training enhances DSF capa-

bilities and integrates democratic norms. Programs

must also moderate ofcers’ and soldiers’ perceptions

o “enemies” to more humane notions o “adverse

parties,” particularly during the low-intensity opera-

tions common in peacekeeping and those inrequent

domestic police operations that require DSF support.

Troops who assess threats dispassionately and ratio-

nally will operate more eectively.

Special attention must be paid to the social

aspects o the military. A social services network

is needed to ensure a dignifed reentry into society,

retirement, and management o amily aairs. Simi-

larly, every eort must be made to establish insurance

policies to support amilies in the event o a serious

injury or death o a member o the DSF. The aim is

to meet basic material needs, thus acilitating compo-

sure, readiness to serve, and decreased susceptibility

to corruption and the risk o manipulation.

During the 1980s, the Senegalese armed orces

established a health-care system unded by military

personnel on a monthly basis. Accountable manage-

ment led to the addition o a social welare provision,

loans or property acquisition, and other services. In

2007, the armed orces o Burkina Faso established a

similar system through a modest government subsidy

coupled with monthly private contributions. The sys-

tem has worked to the great satisaction o person-

nel—boosting morale and pride.

reform no. 3 : inSPire reSPect for

rePublicAn vAlueS

Endowed by the constitution with the capac-

ity to employ orce, deense and security orces must

transcend partisanship and represent the ideals o national unity and patriotism. In short, they must

relect an exemplary republican spirit. In a demo-

cratic orm o government, this means respecting

citizen rights and reedoms during periods o elec-

tions, strikes, protests, and other orms o democratic

expression. Unortunately, the demonstration o re-

publican values among deense and security orces in

Arica remains rare.

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To achieve that spirit, the actions o the senior

DSF command should ocus in particular on three

main goals.

First, adhere to a legal ramework grounded in the

primacy o the nation’s democratically elected political

authority over the deense and security orces. This

basic requirement must be reinorced by the nonpo-

liticization o the armed orces and by their neutrality

as an institution. Among Arica’s armed orces, only

those o Tanzania, Botswana, Malawi, Senegal, Mau-

ritius, and a handul o others have never orchestrated

or involved themselves in military coups. I Arica’s

emerging democratic militaries wish to be widely re-

spected as proessional, this must become the norm.

Second, ensure that the nation’s deense and

security orces are a genuinely national orce and

a melting pot containing all o the country’s eth-

nic and social components. Such an approach will

help build a sense o national identity, generate a

deep-rooted pride in the armed orces, and inspire

an attitude o sacrifce and readiness to deend the

interests o the nation. Recruitment in Burkina Faso

is nationwide and nondiscriminatory. Selection is

based on a rule o proportionality. Recruitment tar-

gets are determined by the size o the population

living in a given area relative to the total number

to be recruited at the national level. As a result, the

DSF better reects the nation’s diversity.

Third, the conduct o security orces must be exem-

plary at all times, in all venues, under all circumstances,

and solidly grounded in international humanitarian law.

Violence, racketeering, and other types o harassment

o the local populace must be eliminated i security

orces are to earn the trust and respect o citizens. To

oster such conduct, the senior chain o command must

empower and ully sta Ofces o Inspectors General

within the DSF to deter, investigate, and punish abuses.

Similarly, senior ofcers must work closely with parlia-mentary committees responsible or oversight as well as

auditors and judicial authorities.

reform no. 4 : imProve

civ il-mil itAry relAtionS

Despite eorts rom both sides, relations between

civil and military ofcials in Arica continue to be

typiied by mutual distrust, deep prejudicial eel-

ings, and taboos based primarily on ignorance and

lack o communication. Indeed, there are relatively

ew domestic venues where civilian and military o-

fcials regularly convene. When Arican civilians and

members o the military meet at international events,

a wide gul in perceptions is oten apparent despite

their complementary skills.

Forums where civilians and the military can

reely and confdentially meet and explore common

interests and establish a culture o dialogue are need-

ed. Such orums not only provide opportunities to

establish relationships but also oer space to discuss

integrated approaches to national security and devel-

op shared understandings o roles and responsibilities.

In times o crisis, the relationships built through such

orums contribute invaluably to fnding consensus-

based and durable solutions.

Experiments in bringing senior-level civilians and

military ofcers together or strategic planning sessions

in Nigeria, South Arica, and Egypt have been con-

structive. Additionally, the well-respected Southern

Arica Deence and Security Management Network

has proven an exceptional initiative or promoting

transparency, ostering confdence and cooperation

between civilian and military ofcials, and contribut-

ing to shits in policy and thinking. Originally devel-

oped in South Arica, the network o 10 universities

and research institutes across the Southern Arican

Development Community subregion is an independent

nongovernmental body unded in part by international

donors. It provides police, military, and civilian secu-

rity proessionals with joint specialized and accredited

training, as well as support to governments in deense

policy analysis and ormulation. Similar initiatives

should be adopted by other Arican countries and

subregions. As an initial step, the creation o proes-

sional exchange programs between senior ofcers and

civilian counterparts would build trust and ensure thatthe actions undertaken on each side are coordinated,

complementary, and mutually understood.

The culture o secrecy that pervades many o A-

rica’s armed orces (or example, some do not even pub-

licize their national security plans) is another obstacle

to constructive civil-military relations. An appropri-

ate communications strategy that provides the public

and media an understanding o lie in the barracks is

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essential—as a matter o principle and practical beneft.

A public that knows and understands a DSF and its

purpose will more reely support it. Such a DSF, in turn,

will beneft rom timely inormation-sharing, thereby

enabling it to more eectively ulfll its protection mis-

sion. Due to the dramatic expansion o communication

technologies in Arica, the rapid transmission o rumor

and suspicions can quickly escalate into crises and com-

plicate DSF missions, as it did in Kenya’s 2007 postelec-

tion violence, the 2010 ood riots in Mozambique, and

recurring communal conict in Nigeria. A proactive

strategy to share inormation—oten by leveraging such

technology—can combat conusion and rumor and pre-

vent or stabilize conict.

reform no. 5 : m it i gAte the

comPlexity of nonmi litAry fActorS

Any progress toward improved governance

within the DSF will also depend on complex issues

involving actors beyond the security sector.

As a popular saying puts it so well, “the fsh rots

rom the head down.” I the armed orces are subsidiary

to civilian political authority, then adherence to re-

publican values within the deense and security orces

will depend to a great extent on the quality o civilian

political leaders. Unortunately, sectarianism and indi-

vidual sel-interest have requently taken precedence

over the interests o the nation. In order to hang on to

power or to seize victory in raudulent or lost elections,

some Arican leaders are even prepared to violate the

constitution and to imperil the country.

Such machinations oten involve attempts to ma-

nipulate or command military and paramilitary units.

Moves designed to oment discontent or even uprisings

are typically started by spreading rumors and alse inor-

mation, sometimes cleverly fltered by vested elements

within the media. On occasion, some well-o, power-

hungry politicians will even deploy private militia inpursuit o their ambitions. Such irregular orces and

armed gangs have played a predominant role in recent

or current conicts in the Democratic Republic o the

Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Burundi, Zimbabwe, Sudan,

Liberia, Uganda, and Somalia. Elsewhere, weak insti-

tutional checks and balances leave DSF vulnerable to

politicization. For instance, the role o the legislature in

approving deployments, nominations, and other deci-

sions taken by the civilian commander in chie is oten

unclear even in Arica’s most stable states.

The recurrent and crucial role o private security

providers also requires attention. Mercenaries motivated

by money are, at times, entrusted with critical deense

and security responsibilities. This tends to privatize and

trivialize the deense and security o the nation. Com-

pounding matters is the persistent intervention by cer-

tain major powers that, on occasion, exacerbate internal

conicts or strategic, economic, or other motives.

Models o good governance that can counter-

act these complex nonmilitary actors are available,

however. In particular, the United Nations, Ari-

can Union, and Arica’s increasingly vital Regional

Economic Communities have established legal in-

struments or strengthening democracy, peace, and

good governance. For example:

◆ The Arican Union’s Arican Charter on

Democracy, Elections, and Governance

◆ The New Partnership or Arica’s Develop-

ment’s Arican Peer Review Mechanism

(APRM), adopted by the Arican Union

◆ The Economic Community o West Arican

States’ Protocol on Democracy and Good

Governance.

Rather than allow commitments to democratic

standards, basic human rights, and good governance to

remain optional considerations, these and similar agree-

ments seek to make their observance obligatory. Disre-gard o such principles has contributed to weak state

legitimacy, institutional sclerosis, and other shortcom-

ings that requently cause and drive crises in Arica. In

other words, adherence to democratic processes—and

the legitimacy this engenders—has a direct impact on

peace and conict, and thereore on the DSF.

When signatories violate the Charter or Protocol,

regional bodies and their members are obligated to take

“a pblc that knws andndstands a DSF and ts pps

wll l sppt t”



irm and consistent steps to halt and reverse urther

extra-constitutionalism and destabilization. With par-

ticular relevance to the senior command, such actions

by regional bodies help strengthen the buer that sepa-

rates politics and deense and security. Civilian leaders

who respect these charters earn the trust not only o

the people but also o military ofcers and their stas.

When that buer is breached, senior ofcers conront

a troubling dilemma: respect the principle o civilian

authority or uphold the standards o democracy. As a

result, the state and entire chain o command is let

compromised and the trajectory o the nation uncertain.

The Arican Peer Review Mechanism merits

special mention regarding reorming Arica’s DSF.

Through the APRM, Arican states evaluate their

eorts to advance democratic governance, including

whether states have eective policies, institutions,

and processes in place to prevent and manage intra-

and interstate conlict. To enhance accountability

and share best practices, this sel-assessment is com-

plemented by a separate evaluation conducted by a

multinational team o Arican experts. All 12 o the

completed APRM assessments have identifed specifc

vulnerabilities to conict and recommended how the

DSF can improve diversity, human rights training,

due process, and other inefciencies. In other words,

the APRM provides the senior chain o command a

constructive process to measure perormance, identiy

areas or improvement, and receive recommendations

and innovations rom Arican counterparts. The DSF

should vigorously cooperate with and contribute to

the APRM process.

Complementing the aims o these Arican instru-

ments, the Millennium Challenge Corporation (an

agency o the U.S. Government) is an initiative that

rewards good governance with greater development in-

vestment. This initiative merits replication within the

security cooperation realm in Arica. Security coopera-

tion and assistance that avors partners with a track

record o principled and eective perormance can in-

centivize responsible governance within the DSF while

discouraging the exploitation o deense and security

orces or political ends and personal interest.

concluSion

The degree to which democracy is consolidat-

ed in Arica is contingent on deense and security

orces that are well structured, proessional, based on

republican values, and subordinate to civilian politi-

cal authority. Across the continent, then, all societal

and governmental leaders, including top military of-

cials, must acknowledge the need to reverse outdated

mindsets that stymie necessary reorms and adjust-

ments. Additionally, international partners must

work to consistently encourage good governance and

unequivocally denounce the intererence o deense

and security orces in politics, politicians who seek to

skirt constitutional checks and balances, and the use

o armed militias and mercenaries as an instrument o

contestation and conquest. Sustained support to com-

mitted reormers as they seek to implement sound,

consensus-based plans is equally critical.

With professional defense and security forces

fully dedicated to these reforms, Africa will be able

to sustain the momentum now under way and steadily

expand the number of countries on the continent re-

spectful of democracy and human rights.

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AfricA center for StrAtegic StudieS

p://www.aa.

AfricA center for

StrAtegic StudieS

Director: Ambassador William

M. Bellamy (Ret.)

National Deense University

300 Fith Avenue, Building 21Fort Lesley J. McNair

Washington, DC 20319-5066

Phone: + 1 202-685-7300

Web site: www.aricacenter.org

AfricA center

regionAl office

in dAkAr

Regional Manager:

Elisabeth Feleke

Phone: 221 33 869 61 00

Email: [email protected]

AfricA center

regionAl office

in AddiS AbAbARegional Manager:

Brad Anderson

Phone: 251 11 517 4000


AfricA Security briefS

Editor: Joseph Siegle, Ph.D.

Phone: + 1 202-685-6808


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democracy and the chain of command: a new governance of africa's security sector

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