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PHIL DOWE

A DEFENSE OF BACKWARDS IN TIME CAUSATION MODELS INQUANTUM MECHANICS

ABSTRACT. This paper offers a defense of backwards in time causation models in quantum

mechanics. Particular attention is given to Cramer’s transactional account, which is shown

to have the threefold virtue of solving the Bell problem, explaining the complex conjugate

aspect of the quantum mechanical formalism, and explaining various quantum mysteries

such as Schrodinger’s cat. The question is therefore asked, why has this model not received

more attention from physicists and philosophers? One objection given by physicists in

assessing Cramer’s theory was that it is not testable. This paper seeks to answer this

concern by utilizing an argument that backwards causation models entail a fork theory of

causal direction. From the backwards causation model together with the fork theory one

can deduce empirical predictions. Finally, the objection that this strategy is questionable

because of its appeal to philosophy is deflected.

1. INTRODUCTION

The concept of backwards in time causation has actually had quite a high

profile in twentieth century physics. One has only to think of the interest

aroused in tachyons, particles which travel faster than the speed of light, the“Feynman electron”, Feynman’s bold conjecture that positrons are really

electrons travelling backwards in time, or the recent surge of interest in

time travel (see Earman 1995, 268). It is quite surprising, therefore, that

the backwards in time model of Bell phenomena, although it has a long

tradition,1 has received so little attention from theoretical physicists or

from any of the numerous popularisers of the wonders of modern physics.2

And this is all the more surprising when one considers the promise of this

model to solve all the deep mysteries of quantum mechanics (see Cramer

1988, section IV).

In this paper I want firstly (Section 2) to consider the backwards in

time causation model of Bell phenomena, and in particular to sketch the

transactional account due to Cramer, in order to highlight just why, fromthe point of view of physics, the theory deserves more attention than it

has received. In particular I will highlight three putative achievements of

the transactional account: its solution to the Bell problem, its explanation

Synthese 112: 233–246, 1997.

c

1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.



234 PHIL DOWE

Figure 1.

of the complex conjugate utilized in the central quantum mechanical for-

malism, and its solution to the various “quantum mysteries”, in particular,

Schrodinger’s cat.

Secondly, I want to utilise a recent argument (Dowe 1996) – which

shows that the only theory of causal direction compatible with the back-

wards causation model is the so-called “fork theory” – to answer a key

objection given by physicists responding to the transactional account.

Finally (Section 3), I wish to anticipate and answer a possible objection to

this ploy.

2. BACKWARDS CAUSATION IN QUANTUM MECHANICS

In its most abstract form, the backwards in time model (hereafter ‘Bit mod-

el’) provides a simple explanation of non-locality3 in quantum mechanics.

Suppose a system is separated from a sourceS

into two parts and spatially

separated, and measurementsM 1,

M 2 are performed on each part such

that no speed-of-light contact between the measurements is possible. The

nonlocality proofs in quantum mechanics seem to show that a choice of

measurement at M

1 can affect the result of the measurement at M

2. Bit

models propose that the choice of measurement atM 1 influences the earlier

state of the system S at the source, which in turn influences the result of

the measurement at M 2.

For example, consider the Freedman–Clauser experiment (Freedman

and Clauser 1972) where two correlated photons are emitted in an atom-

ic cascade of Calcium atoms. The linear polarization of the photons is

measured in various directions by means of rotatable polarizers P 1

, P 2

together with single photon detectors (see Figure 1). Local hidden variable

theories predict correlations which conflict with the predictions of quan-

tum mechanics for certain angles , . In the first successful experimental

test of Bell inequalities, Freedman and Clauser found that the results of

experiments match the quantum mechanical predictions rather than thelocal hidden variable predictions. Something about the local hidden vari-

able theories must be wrong, and one candidate is locality. If this is this

case, then we have a situation where the choice of measurement at M 1



A DEFENSE OF BACKWARDS IN TIME CAUSATION MODELS 235

influences the results of the measurement at M 2, and vice versa. The Bit

model proposes a scenario by which such non-local influence operates.

John Cramer’s transactional interpretation of quantum mechanics

(Cramer 1980; Cramer 1986; Cramer 1988) postulates a well defined mech-anism for such backwards in time influence. Cramer’s model makes use

of a generalised form of the Wheeler–Feynman absorber theory of elec-

trodynamics (Cramer 1980) which allows advanced-wave solutions of the

electromagnetic wave equation in addition to the normal retarded wave

solutions. Advanced waves are interpreted as propagating in the negative

time direction. In Cramer’s words,

When we stand in the dark and look at a star 100 light years away, not only have the retarded

light waves from the star been travelling for 100 years to reach our eyes, but the advanced

waves generated by the absorption process within our eyes have reached 100 years into the

past, completing the transaction that permitted the star to shine in our direction. (Cramer

1988, 229.)

Quantum events, then, are understood as “transactions” involving an

exchange of advanced and retarded waves. Suppose we have an emitter

E at (r1, t 1) and an absorber A at (r2, t 2). A transaction between the

emitter and absorber involves a number of components. The emitter sends

out a retarded “offer wave” F 1(r, t ) for t t 1. The absorber receives the

attenuated wave frontF 1 (r2,

t 2) causing the production of an advanced

“confirmation wave” G 2(r, t ) such that

G 2 r t F 1 r 2 t 2 g 2 r t

where g 2 is the unit advance wave, the complex conjugate of the retarded

wave:

g 2 r t t 2 F 1 r t t 1

The confirmation wave G 2(r, t propagates from the absorber to the emitter,

viz from (r2, t 2) to (r1, t 1). The wavefront G 2(r1, t 1) is proportional to

the initial amplitude of G 2(r,

t

), and thus toF 1(r2,

t 2), and also to the

amplitude of the time reversal of the retarded wave F

1 (r2, t 2), since it

travels through exactly the same attenuating media. Thus

G 2 r 1 t 1 j F 1 r 2 t 2 j

2

The arrival of the confirmation wave causes the emitter to send another

offer wave with initial amplitude proportional to G 2(r1, t 1), and the cycle

continues until the quantum boundary conditions are satisfied.



236 PHIL DOWE

In quantum mechanics the state function is said to contain all the

information there is about the system, but to calculate the probability of

any of the various possible outcomes of a measurement one must multiply

the function by its complex conjugate

. Thus Cramer finds that the fea-tures of the transactional interpretation are written into the very formalism

of quantum mechanics (Cramer 1986, 666), for the operation of com-

plex conjugation is essentially a time-reversal operation which transforms

retarded waves into advanced waves. This raises questions about why such

an interpretation of

has not been thought of before (see Cramer 1986,

666). As Cramer himself says,

What else, one might legitimately ask, could the ubiquitous

notations of the quantum

wave mechanics formalism possibly denote except that the time-reversed (or advanced)

counterparts of normal (or retarded)

wave functions are playing an important role in

a quantum event? What could an overlap integral combining

with

represent other

than the probability of a transaction through an exchange of advanced and retarded waves?

(Cramer 1988, 229)

As Garrett puts it, “Cramer’s idea improves the correspondence between

the physics and the mathematics” (Garrett 1990, 1505).

We turn then to the explanation of Bell phenomena. The explanation of

the Freedman–Clauser experiment is quite straightforward for the transac-

tional account. The source generates two offer waves F x , t and G x , t

constrained by conservation laws to be in the same state of polarisation.F

propagates to polarizerP 1, which filters out all but

F

the component of

F in the direction. F

propagates to the detector where it is absorbed,

causing a confirmation wave F

x , T ) to transmit unmodified back in time

to the source. A similar sequence occurs at the other arm, sending back a

confirmation waveG

x

,t

.

However, in general the summation of this total process will not satisfy

the boundary condition that the two photons are in the same state of

polarization (required by the law of conservation of momentum), since in

general the angles of polarization will not match. Further cycles will not

change this, so only the matching components of the confirmation waves

can be “projected” as a transaction. Thus the nature of the transaction

(which is the sum of the various offer and confirmation waves), which

determines the results of the measurements, is in part determined by the

choice of angle of measurements. This mechanism will produce nonlocal

correlations under the right conditions.

Finally, Cramer finds that the transactional account explains the variousmysteries of quantum physics, such as the EPR paradox, Schrodinger’s

cat, Wigner’s friend, Wheeler’s delayed choice, etc. Here we will focus on

Schrodinger’s cat. In this famous example a closed system, wherein a cat’s




life is dependent on the 50-50 chance of an atom decaying, is undisturbed

by measurement until one hour has passed. Schrodinger comments:

The

-function of the total system would yield an expression for all this in which, in equal

measure, the living and the dead cat are (pardon the expression) blended or smeared out.(translation from Fine 1986, 65)

According to the standard view, the statefunction of the total system is

a superposition of two states:F 1, where no decay occurs over the hour the

cat remains alive, and F 2, where a decay occurs and the cat dies:

1

p

2 F 1 1

p

2 F 2

The statefunction “collapses” when the measurement takes place, after

which it is definitely in on state or the other. But according to the trans-

actional account it is not true to say the statefunction collapses at the

time of measurement. What actually happens is that during the hour the

source sends out a continuous weak retarded offer wave. This is indeed a

superposition of both possible states. But the offer wave may or may not

be confirmed by an advanced confirmation wave from the counter to the

source. If it is, then the quantum transaction, involving the decay of the

atom, will go ahead and the system will be found in stateF 2, with the cat

dead. If there is no confirmation wave then the system will be found in

state F 1, with the cat alive. Thus the system itself is at no time in a ‘mixed’

state, and there is no time at which the statefunction collapses, yet the later

event is in part responsible for the definite state in which the system is

found; via backwards in time causation.

Thus we can see that the transactional account purports to provide

not only an explanation of Bell phenomena and non-locality, but also thevarious quantum mysteries, as well as puzzling features of the quantum

mechanical formalism itself. Given that this is so, one would expect the

theory to attract considerable interest. Yet this has not yet been the case.

Why? In the next section we shall examine one of the key responses of

those physicists who have responded.

3. TESTABILITY – THE PHYSICISTS’ OBJECTION

Of those physicists who do discuss the Bit model, many explicitly reject

it for well-known and essentially philosophical reasons (see the excellent

discussion in Price 1994). With Price, I do not think those reasons are veryconvincing, but here I want to focus on a different objection.

Shortly after the publication of Cramer’s (1986) paper, the Loyola

Conference determined to address the transactional account, and a number



238 PHIL DOWE

of the papers from that conference were published in the International

Journal of Theoretical Physics in 1988. A major focus of the criticism

raised there concernedthe testability of Cramer’s proposal. Cramer himself

had said that the testable consequences of the transactional account do notin any way differ from the experimental predictions of standard quantum

mechanics (Cramer 1986, 649, 663) although he appears to have changed

his mind by the Loyola Conference (Cramer 1988, section 7).

The feeling at the Loyola Conference appears to have been that since

there are no testable consequences of the transactional account perhaps

it therefore does not deserve too much attention. A particularly strong

version of this sentiment was expressed by Gornitz and von Weizsacker:

Since [the Copenhagen and transactional interpretations] refer to the same mathematical

structure with the same empirical use, [they] are no more than two different linguistic

expressions of one identical theory . As long as the two interpretations do not predict

different experimental results, there is no way of empirically deciding between them and

hence no way of empirically giving their difference another meaning than just as the use of

different languages for the same thing. (Gornitz and von Weizsacker 1988, 248–9)

Without pausing to analyze exactly what kind of positivism these authors

are appealing to here, it is clear that the view is at least that since the

transactional account is not testable vis a vis the Copenhagen account,

it probably should be passed over. This same attitude is articulated by

Groenewold:

In principle one could see as its base just the minimal skeptical [i.e. Copenhagen] interpre-

tation . In the transactional interpretation this hard core is displayed in soft conceptual

wrappings, which canneither be proved(defended) nor disproved (attacked) . [T]hisrep-

resentation might give soft interpreters a sense of deep comprehension. Hard no-nonsense

physicists, who do not enjoy that satisfaction and think they cannot even learn from it,

might just forget it and be content with the poor skeptical interpretation. (Groenewold

1987, 59–20)

In this paper I want to argue that this conclusion is too hasty. It is true

that the transactional account duplicates all the predictions of the quantum

mechanical formalism, e.g. those associated with the Bell inequalities.

But that does not mean that there is not a more subtle way of testing the

theory. Indeed such possibilities have since come to light. In his Loyola

paper (Cramer 1988, 235–6) Cramer says that although there is no direct

test, there may be ways to test the transactional account indirectly, and he

refers to work by Bennett as having promise in this regard (Bennett 1987a;

Bennett 1987b). A more recent attempt to provide indirect evidence is dueto Wolf (Wolf 1989a). In this paper I wish to present, in abstract form,

another avenue for indirect empirical testing. In the next section I will

summarize an argument given elsewhere (Dowe 1996) for a certain theory




of the direction of causation, which, together with the Bit model, entails

the possibility of a general strategy for uncovering empirical predictions.

(Note that even if that derivation were not sound, it would still serve to

show that the above position on the transactional account is much toohasty.)

4. HOW PHILOSOPHY CAN HELP SCIENCE

In this section I will summarize an argument presented in a recent paper

in Mind (Dowe 1996) which derives a theory of the direction of causation,

the fork asymmetry theory, from the supposition of backwards in time

causation. This, in turn, leads to a strategy for testing the Bit model. I will

also attempt to analyse the argument into its scientific and philosophical

parts.

The argument takes as a premise the Bit model as the correct interpre-tation of the Bell phenomena. So we suppose this model is true. Then, if

we think in terms of causal processes (see Salmon 1984; Salmon 1994 and

Dowe 1992b; Dowe 1995a) we can think of Bell experiments as involving,

amongst other things, a causal process going from the choice of measure-

ment on one arm, backwards in time to the source. It is essential that this

process has a direction opposite with respect to time to that of certain other

relevant processes. So it is necessary that there is an answer to the question,

what is it that constitutes the direction of a causal process? So, we need to

consider what answers there might be to this question.

The most common theory amongst philosophers of the direction of

causation is what I call the temporal theory (Dowe 1992a). The temporal

theory asserts that causes by definition, or by necessity, precede their

effects. That is, the direction of causation must be from the past to the

future. It is clear that if, as we are supposing, the Bit model is true, then

the temporal theory cannot be true. The Bit model clearly violates what

physicists call ‘causality’, the principle that causes precede their effects (at

least, it violates the microscopic version).

A second theory of the direction of causal processes which is quite

common amongst physicists is the subjective theory. According to this

theory the direction of causation is simply a product of the way we humans

see the world, it is not a feature of the objective world of physics (for

example, see Price 1992). But this is also ruled out by the Bit model,

since what is required here is an objective sense to the direction of causalprocesses.4 Backwards causation is claimed to be an objective feature of

the world which appears in the physical theory and, in the transactional

account, is represented by the complex conjugate of the wave function. 5



240 PHIL DOWE

It follows, then, that we need a physical account of the direction of

causal processes. A physical account will detail what it is, in the physical

world, that constitutes the direction of causation. Such an account will

concern things which in principle fall under the area of concern of physics.There are many rival physical theories. Some, such as the ‘transmission’

account of Aronson (1971) and the transference account of Salmon (1994)

simply fail in the end to offer anything distinguishable from the temporal

theory (for the proof of this see (Dowe 1995b, section 2.1) and (Dowe

1995a, 325–6) respectively). Other accounts, such as the Kaon Theory

once offered by the author (Dowe 1992a) fail for other reasons (see Dowe

1996, section 7).

However, there is one promising physical account, and that’s the fork

asymmetry theory. Causal forks are normally explicated in terms of statis-

tical correlations. In the language of Reichenbach, statistical correlations

are often ‘screened off’ by earlier common causes, but are never screened

off by later common effects (see Salmon 1984, chapter 6 and Dowe 1996,section 5). According to the fork asymmetry theory the direction of a causal

process is due to the direction of the causal fork in which it is involved.

Two versions need to be distinguished. The first, that defended by

contemporary philosophers such as Hausman and Papineau (Hausman

1984; Papineau 1993) says that the direction of a causal process is given

by the direction of the causal fork which it part constitutes. A second, due

to Reichenbach (1956), says that the direction of a causal process is given

by the direction of the net in which it is located, where the net is the web of

interconnected causal processes (see Dowe 1992a) and the direction of the

net is the direction of statistical forks within the net, which as it happens

in our universe, all point the same way. This second version must be ruledout in the present context, because what is required in the Bit model is

that processes which are part of the same net, e.g. two processes which in

part make up the two arms of a Bell arrangement, have different directions

(Dowe 1996, section 7).

However, the first version, which from hereon I will call the “fork

theory”, does not suffer this defect, and so emerges as the appropriate theory

of the direction of causation.6 If this is so, then we can deduce a surprising

consequence. Since the process linking the choice of measurement and

the source – in the case of the transactional account, the advanced wave

from the absorber to the transmitter – is a causal process whose direction

is backwards in time, then that process must in part constitute a causal fork

whose common cause occurs after its effects. That is, if the process really is

backwards in time, then the fork of which it is a part must also be backwards

in time. This follows from the fork theory. Then the absorber will be the




common cause and the transmitter will be one of the common effects.

However, we notice now that there must be another event correlated with

the action of the transmitter which forms the third event in the causal fork.

But there’s no reason why this correlation should have been noticed before,and it may well be something previously thought to be quite irrelevant.

So we have a general formula for testing the Bit model: find these events

which are predicted to be correlated with the decay of the source in Bell

experiments. To be more precise: it tests the conjunction of the Bit model

and the fork theory.

Obviously such a test has two possible outcomes: a positive or a negative

result, depending on whether the prediction turns out to be true. In the case

of a positive result we say the test confirms (by the standard Bayesian

understanding of confirmation) the conjunction of the fork theory and the

Bit model. In the case of a negative result we say that this shows that one

or other of the fork theory and the Bit model is false.

The above derivation can be divided into its philosophical and scientificparts, although at this stage I don’t wish to be committed to any particular

account of the natures of and differences between science and philosophy.

For it is clear that the Bit model is a scientific theory: it – least in the

transactional account – proposes a physical model of the mathematical

formalism of quantum mechanics. It is also clear that the fork theory of

the direction of causal processes is a philosophical theory. It provides an

analysis, in quite general terms, of the direction of causation. Further, the

proof of that theory is a philosophical proof. Finally, it is clear that the

prediction – that there should be some event correlated in a certain way

with the decay of the source in Bell experiments - is an empirical matter,

capable of being made more precise and being tested. A successful testwould constitute a scientific proof; or rather, strong scientific evidence.

Since it is the philosophical part of this argument which people are

likely to find most problematic, it is that feature to which we turn in the

final section.

5. AN OBJECTION ANTICIPATED

The above argument is an attempt to convince physicists and philosophers

alike to give Bit models the attention they deserve. It attempts to do this by

opening up a possible strategy for empirical testing. One objection might

be that the suggestion is just too abstract and it needs to be filled out beforethe viability of such an empirical test can be established. This point is

granted; what I want to say is even before that is done, the above argument

should alert us to this kind of possibility. Indeed, perhaps such an abstract



242 PHIL DOWE

outline is necessary before work can be done on the details of the physics.

Specific proposals first require an abstract vision. In any case, there’s no

reason to doubt that this objection can be answered by further work.

But that’s not the objection I want to focus on. The anticipated objectionto my argument to be addressed here concerns the philosophical nature of

the argument. (Perhaps it’s an objection that would be levelled by Groe-

newold’s “hard no-nonsense physicists”.) There are two parts to this objec-

tion. Firstly, it may be objected that the argument involves a philosophical

theory, the fork theory, which, being philosophical, cannot be proved. Fur-

ther, since philosophical theories have no empirical content, they cannot

lead to empirical predictions. Secondly, the argument for the fork theory is

a philosophical argument, which therefore is not incontrovertible. There-

fore the theory is not to be relied upon. (Why test for something which we

have no reason to expect will be there?)

In the remainder of this section I attempt to answer both parts of this

objection. Behind the first objection lies a familiar view of philosophyas conceptual analysis. Many philosophers of the twentieth century have

taken the task of philosophy to be just conceptual analysis. For example,

Peter Strawson writes,

the philosopher labours to produce a systematic account of the general conceptual structure

of which our daily practice shows us to have a tacit and unconscious mastery. (Strawson

1992, 7)

Associated with this view of philosophy is the belief that it is not the role of

philosophy to deal in synthetic a posteriori matters, which is the exclusive

task of science. Ducasse, for example, held this view: “No discovery in any

of the sciences has or ever can have any logical bearing upon the problems

of philosophy” (Ducasse 1969, 120).

However, in offering the fork theory, I did not have that project in mind.

There was no claim that the analysis captures any concept of everyday

use. Rather, what was in mind was something I call empirical analysis,

which is concerned with (in this case) causation as it is in the world rather

than with the concept that we have. This program has variously been

called “empirical metaphysics” (Armstrong), “ontological metaphysics”

(Aronson 1982), “speculative cosmology” (Jackson 1994), “physicalist

analysis” (Fair 1979, 233) and “factual analysis” (Mackie 1985, 178).

I do not deny that there is a place in philosophy for conceptual analysis,7

but what is offered above seems to fall pretty squarely under the descrip-

tion of empirical analysis. The proof of this seems to be evident in thevery argument itself: the fork theory is utilized in deriving an empirical

prediction – and the theory is essential to the derivation (both the Bit model

and the fork theory are essential for the derivation) – so the “conceptual




analysis” view of philosophy cannot apply to the argument and theory in

question here.

To make the point more explicit, I appeal to the notion of theoretical

definition as articulated by Ruth Millikan:It is traditional to contrast three kinds of definition: stipulative, descriptive, and theoret-

ical. Descriptive definitions are thought to describe marks that people actually attend to

when applying terms. Conceptual analysts take themselves to be attempting descriptive

definitions. Theoretical definitions do something else, exactly what is controversial, but the

phenomena itself – the existence of this kind of definition – is evident enough. A theoretical

definition is the sort the scientist gives you in saying that water is HOH, that gold is the

element with atomic number 79 or that consumption was, in reality, several varieties of

respiratory bacterium bacillus tuberculosis. (Millikan 1989, 290–1)

Millikan herself defends a “historical definition” of proper function, an

exercise which she takes to be an attempt at a theoretical definition rather

than conceptual analysis.

It is uncontroversial that theoretical definitions (in this sense) can anddo play a part in the derivation of empirical predictions from physical theo-

ries. For example, it’s agreed that Einstein’s theoretical definition equating

gravitational and inertial mass plays an important role in deriving empir-

ically testable predictions (such as the bending of light around the sun)

from general relativity.

This brings me to the answer to part two of the objection. The fork

theory is argued for by philosophical reasoning which takes the Bit model

as a premise. It is granted that philosophical reasoning is rarely if ever

incontrovertible. But that an argument is offered cannot count against the

theory. The fact is that very often in science theoretical definitions are

introduced without any argument; or with the justification that it is “fruit-

ful” since it leads to novel predictions. So, if someone has no patience

for the philosophical proof of the fork theory simply because it is a philo-

sophical proof, let her take the fork theory to be a theoretical definition of

an important aspect of the Bit model, and take the above derivation of an

empirical test as an indication of its potential fruitfulness.

In the light of these possibilities, it seems that the objection to my

argument concerning its philosophical nature is unfounded, and therefore

it ought not be a stumbling block to accepting the above argument as a way

to meet the argument that Bit models are untestable and therefore do not

warrant further attention.

NOTES

Note that the use of the term ‘causation’ is not intended to imply that the model is

deterministic (see Cramer 1986, 648, n. 3), nor that it violates the ‘causality condition’ that



244 PHIL DOWE

rules out spacelike connections.1 For example, (Costa de Beauregard 1977; Davidon 1976; Stapp 1975; Sutherland 1983;

Sutherland 1985) and (Cramer 1980; Cramer 1986; Cramer 1988).2 The only exception to this latter dearth that I am aware of is (Wolf 1989b).

3 For the purposes of this paper I will follow Cramer’s definition of locality: “that theseparated parts of the system described are assumed to remain correlated only so long as

they retain the possibility of speed-of-light contactand that when isolated from such contact

the separated parts can retain correlations only through ‘memory of previous contact’ ”

(Cramer 1988, 648).4 For a detailed argument for this claim see (Dowe 1996), which deals with arguments put

by Price (1992; 1993; 1994).5 Thus the subjectivist turn taken by Costa de Beauregard in recent years (e.g. Costa de

Beauregard 1992) seems quite unnecessary and if not ironic (since originally Costa de

Beauregard was developing the line pioneered by de Broglie, who was driven by strongly

realist intuitions). See (Dowe 1993a) and the reply in (Costa de Beauregard 1993).6 In the Mind paper (Dowe 1996, section 6) I consider a different flaw in this version, and

in response to that I propose a third version, a hybrid of the two versions mentioned above.

However, the differences between the first version given above and that third version arenot significant for the purposes of this paper. Note also that the fork theory here is a theory

of the direction of causation, not of causation itself. For my reasons for rejecting the latter

see (Dowe 1993b).7 Thus, although I approve of Millikan’s articulation of a philosophical task of giving a

“theoretical definition”, (see below) I do not agree with her dismissal of conceptual analysis

(Millikan 1989, 290). In this my views accord more closely with those expressed by Karen

Neander (1991).

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Department of PhilosophyUniversity of Tasmania

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