defence and security of india - dec 2011

DEFENCE and SECURITYof INDIA

DECEMBER 2011

DSIVOLUME 4 ISSUE 3 ` 250

DEFENCE POLICY

SIGNS OF STRAIN India's defence management cannot deal with nationaland international security challenges I C. UDAY BHASKAR

NUCLEAR

A YEAR OF COLD COMFORT 2011 brings few gains to India's quest for a nuclear energyprogramme I SIDDHARTH VARADARAJAN

CHALLENGES

AHEADTHE MILITARY'S AMBITIOUSPROGRAMME FORINDIGENOUS ARMOUREDVEHICLES MAY BE HAMPEREDBY BAD PLANNING ANDRISING COSTS I AJAI SHUKLA

DSI Cover_dec.qxp:cover-feb3.qxd 02/12/11 3:27 PM

216X276.indd 1216X276.indd 1 12/12/11 4:28 PM12/12/11 4:28 PM

DECEMBER 2011 DSI

1

LETTER FROM THE editor

India’s endorsement ofnuclear energy is significant inview of therecent disasterat theFukushima-Daiichi nuclearpower plant inJapan. Thenation may beon the path of acomprehensivecivil nuclearenergy programme but,as this yearshows, its questhas been besetwith manyobstacles.

Mannika ChopraEDITOR

Defence & Security of India

he year is winding up and that’s always an appropriate time to review whatshould have been and what should be. In the face of growing militaryassertion by China and the changing balance of power one would think itshould be boom time for India’s modernisation plans for the next decade.However, economic challenges and programme delays are resulting inreducing the competence of India’s defence programme. At the same time, thecapability differential between China and India is rising at an alarming rate.

This year, India allocated only 1.8 percent of its GDP to defence, though it is claimed that militaryexpenditure is up by 11.58 percent.

However, as DSI’s annual review of India’s defence management indicates, an effective defencepolicy is not merely about deterring China. It is about not losing the confidence to conduct one’sforeign policy unhindered from external and internal security challenges. It is also about cuttingdown on the military jargon and keeping to one’s commitments.

Keeping this focus in mind we celebrate Navy Day (December 4) and Army Day (January 15) in ourown way. In this year-end issue DSI shines a torch on the Army’s indigenous tank programme and theNavy’s plan to build warships. In a detailed, first-hand account,DSI delves into how delays in India’sarmoured vehicle programme will not only affect niche capability areas but put at risk a nation’sdefence preparedness. The Navy’s plans to increase its fleet strength is also facing potentialdifficulties. There is a need to revisit shipbuilding strategies which could mean more imports sincedomestic shipyards are unable to meet the needs of the Navy.

DSI also examines the Pakistan-China strategic axis and convergence of the mutual interests ofthese countries post-Abbottabad, especially in the area of nuclear cooperation. With the latest NATOair strike on Pakistan, there is bound to be a further strategic shift by Pakistan in China’s favour whichwill have regional implications.

India’s endorsement of nuclear energy is significant in view of the recent disaster at Fukushima-Daiichi nuclear power plant in Japan. The nation may be on the path of a comprehensive civil nuclearenergy programme but, as this year shows, its quest has been beset with many obstacles. As DSI pointsout, the doors of international cooperation in high technology areas are yet to open fully.

As usual we look forward to your suggestions and comments. Write to us at [email protected] you want to subscribe then drop us an email at [email protected] and our marketingteam will do the rest.

Letter from the Editor.qxd:contents-aug.qxd 02/12/11 3:59 PM Page 2

CO

NTE

NTS

COVER STORY 24

DRIVING FORCEThe Army’s ambitious tank inventory isdogged by unfulfilled contractual obligations,erratic ordering and rising costs. Today, alleyes are on the forthcoming trials of the ArjunMain Battle Tank as they will shape thedefence establishment’s future approachtowards indigenisation.

2 3

AFSPA 18

BOOTS ON THEGROUNDAdmist a growing debate, the militaryis strongly opposing changes in thebasic provisions of the Armed ForcesSpecial Powers Act.

NUCLEAR 12

A YEAR OFCOLDCOMFORT2011 has brought significant setbacksas also some small gains for India onthe nuclear front.

DEFENCE POLICY 06

SHOWING SIGNS OF STRAINAs the year draws to a close, it is clear that India’s national security challengeshave become more complex and its defence management policies remain miredin institutionalised statis.

NAVY 32

AT UNEASE More that six decades afterIndependence, there is only oneshipyard in India which can builddestroyers and frigates but at thesame time India has the potential to achieve a quantum jump inbuilding warships.

REGION 38

FRINGEBENEFITS Though Post-Abbotabad, the China-Pakistan equation has beencemented, it goes back to the 1980swhen China began helpingPakistan’s nuclear weapon’sprogramme.

DECEMBER 2011 DSI

Contents:contents-feb-R.qxd 02/12/11 3:30 PM Page 2


DECEMBER 2011 VOLUME 4, NUMBER 3

EDITOR-IN-CHIEFManeesha DubeEDITORMannika ChopraSENIOR SUB-EDITORUrmila MarakCREATIVE DIRECTORBipin KumarDESIGNVikas Verma (Sr. Visualiser),Ajay Kumar (Sr Designer), Sujit SinghSENIOR MANAGER INTERNATIONAL MARKETINGVishal Mehta (E-Mail: [email protected])DEPUTY MANAGER MARKETINGTarun Malviya (E-Mail: [email protected])SALES & MARKETING COORDINATORAtul Bali (E-Mail: [email protected])CIRCULATION & DISTRIBUTIONSunil GujralPRODUCTION & PRE-PRESSSunil Dubey, Ritesh Roy, Devender PandeyMTCPUBLISHINGLIMITED323, Udyog Vihar, Ph-IV, Gurgaon 122016Ph: +91 0124-4759500 Fax: +91 0124-4759550CHAIRMANJ. S. UberoiPRESIDENTXavier CollacoFINANCIAL CONTROLLERPuneet Nanda

GLOBAL SALES REPRESENTATIVESAustraliaCharlton D'Silva, Mass Media PublicitasTel: (61 2) 9252 3476Email: [email protected]/SpainStephane de Remusat, REM InternationalTel: (33) 5 3427 0130Email: [email protected]/Austria/Switzerland/Italy/UKSam Baird, Whitehill MediaTel: (44-1883) 715 697 Mobile: (44-7770) 237 646E-Mail: [email protected] Heiblum, Oreet - International MediaTel: (97 2) 3 570 6527Email: [email protected] Butova, NOVO-Media Ltd,Tel/Fax : (7 3832) 180 885 Mobile : (7 960) 783 6653Email :[email protected]/Benelux/South AfricaTony Kingham, KNM MediaTel: (44) 20 8144 5934 Mobile: (44) 7827 297 465E-Mail: [email protected] KoreaYoung Seoh Chinn, Jes Media Inc.Tel: (82-2) 481 3411/13E-Mail: [email protected] (East/South East)/CanadaMargie Brown, Margie Brown & Associates.Tel : (+1 540) 341 7581Email :[email protected] (West/South West)/BrazilDiane Obright, Blackrock Media Inc.Tel: +1 (858) 759 3557Email: [email protected] and Security of Indiais published and printed byXavier Collaco on behalf of MTC Publishing Limited. Published at 323, Udyog Vihar, Ph- IV, Gurgaon 122016 andprinted at Paras Offset Pvt Ltd, C176, Naraina Industrial Area,Phase I, New Delhi. Entire contents Copyright © 2008. Allrights reserved. Reproduction and translation in any languagein whole or in part without permission is prohibited. Requests for permission should be directed to MTCPublishing Limited. Opinions carried in the magazine arethose of the writers’ and do not necessarily reflect those of theeditors or publishers. While the editors do their utmost toverify information published they do not accept responsibilityfor its absolute accuracy.The publisher assumes no responsibility for the return ofunsolicited material or for material lost or damaged in transit. All correspondence should be addressed to MTC Publishing Limited.

SUBSCRIPTION INFORMATIONDefence and Security of Indiais obtained by subscription. For subscription enquiries, please contact:[email protected]

www.mediatransasia.in/defence.htmlhttp://www.defencesecurityindia.com

CONTRIBUTORS DECEMBER 2011 DSI

C. UDAYBHASKAR

G. PARTHASARATHY

GurmeetKanwal is director, Centrefor Land Warfare Studies,

New Delhi. He commandedan infantry brigade during

Operation Parakram on theLine of Control in 2001-03. A

soldier-scholar, he hasauthored several books

including Indian Army:Vision2020 and Nuclear Defence:

Shaping the Arsenal. He is awell-known columnist and

TV analyst on national security issues.

GURMEETKANWAL

Siddharth Varadarajan isthe editor of The Hindu and a

leading commentator onforeign policy and strategic

affairs. He has reportedextensively from Pakistan,

Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq,Nepal, Bangladesh, the

former Yugoslavia as well asKashmir and the North East.

He has edited a book on theGujarat riots, Gujarat: The

Making of a Tragedy in 2005.An economist, he has taught

at the New York Universitybefore returning to India towork as a journalist in 1995.

SIDDHARTHVARADARAJAN

AJAISHUKLA

Ajai Shukla works in boththe visual and the print

media. He is consultingeditor (strategic affairs) forBusiness Standard . He was

also consulting editor(strategic affairs)

for NDTV, a reputed newsbroadcaster in India, forwhich he has anchored

prime time news and specialprogrammes. He is currently

working on a book on Sino-Indian frontier policy.

G. Parthasarathy is aneminent diplomat and

columnist. Presently, he is avisiting professor at the

Centre for Policy Research,New Delhi. His areas of

interest are developments inIndia’s neighbourhood,

issues of economicintegration and national

security and terrorism. Hewrites prolifically for

newspapers and newsagencies in India and abroad

on foreign policy andnational security issues.

Commodore C. UdayBhaskar, currently Director,

National MaritimeFoundation, New Delhi,

retired from the Indian Navyin early 2007 after 37 years of

service. He is currentlyContributing Editor, South

Asia Monitor and a columnistfor Reuters. He has

contributed over 60 researcharticles to leading defence

publications and editedbooks on nuclear, maritime

and international securityrelated issues.

RAHUL BEDI

Rahul Bedi is the New Delhicorrespondent for Jane’sDefence Weekly, UK, and

contributes to it on a diverserange of security and

military related matters. He is also the India

correspondent for the Daily Telegraph, London,

and the Irish Times.

BHASHYAM KASTURI

Dr. Bhashyam Kasturiheads the research and

publications division at theNehru Memorial Museum

and Library, New Delhi.Starting out as a lecturer at

Delhi University, Dr. Kasturi subsequently

became a journalist andwas later associated with

the Selected Works ofJawaharlal Nehru. He has

authored a book on India’sintelligence service and on

Mahatma Gandhi andIndia’s Partition.

PREMVIR DAS

Premvir Das retired from the Indian Navy in 1998 as

Commander-in-Chief of theEastern Naval Command.

He has been closelyassociated with theformulation of naval

acquisition plans and theirimplementation. He hasserved on the ExecutiveCouncils of two leading

think tanks, the Institute ofDefence Studies and

Analyses and the UnitedService Institute.

Contributors-DEC-11.qxd:contributors-aug.qxd 02/12/11 3:33 PM Page 4

November 2011 is a particularlyappropriate time to review how effective India’s defencepolicy has been in managing

the complex national security (NS)challenges it has been dealing with sinceAugust 1947. The short assessment is thatthe existing higher defence managementpolicies are far from adequate, mired ininstitutional stasis though occasionallyanimated by individual brilliance. If indeedIndia has ‘managed’ its diverse nationalsecurity challenges – and also come up withsome extraordinary military successes such as the Bangladesh war of 1971 – it has been due to that distinctive Indian characteristic, jugaad or innovativeimprovisation, and the essential resilience ofthe Indian jawanand citizen.

Macro-defence and security policyformulation in India is a bleak domain thathas bedevilled successive Governments,going back to Prime Minister JawaharlalNehru right up to the NDA-UPAcontinuum. Extrapolating from WinstonChurchill’s observation of 1936, it may beaverred that, apropos national security, theIndian political apex has chosen to remain,“…in strange paradox, decided only to beundecided, resolved to be irresolute,adamant for drift, solid for fluidity, all-powerful to be impotent.”

Indeed, recent events over the last year,drawn from the wide spectrum nationalsecurity challenges, illustrate the tenaciousIndian penchant to retain the status quo andallow the policy drift to continue. Forinstance, the collective Indian publicmemory has little recall of the 1962 war withChina – and the current focus is simply onterrorism and its many tentacles.

Third AnniversaryThe third anniversary of the Mumbaiterrorist attack observed on November 26,points to one end of the NS spectrum, againsta backdrop of the Pakistani right wing party– the Jamat-ud-Dawa (JuD) spewing venomagainst India on the streets of Lahore.Coincidentally, just a day earlier onNovember 25, a cryptic announcement wasmade by the Ministry of External Affairs that the 15th Round of the India-China border talks between the two SpecialRepresentatives, scheduled for November28, had been postponed. Deemed to be‘unusual’, the last minute postponement wasattributed to scheduling problems. This maybe the preferred public posture by both Asiangiants – who are geographically contiguousbut politically distant – but reliable sources

07

DECEMBER 2011 DSI

06

POLICY

At a time when India’s national security challenges become more complex its defence policy contours remain inadequate

AFP

C. UDAYBHASKAR

SIGNS OFSTRAINSailors pull a rope from

INS Deepak to aircraftcarrier INS Viraat off

Mumbai’s coast

KEY POINTSn Macro-defence and security policyformulation in India has bedevilledsuccessive Governments.n The dissonance betweenpoliticians, bureaucracy and theIndian military, in the absence of clearpolicy outlines, is exacerbating aninadequate national security ethos. n India is a highly vulnerable militarypower with little indigenous inventorycapability.

AFP

OVERVIEW.qxp:INDO-PAK.qxd 02/12/11 3:33 PM Page 2

attribute this unusual step to the Indiandiscomfiture over the Chinese position onthe status of Jammu and Kashmir. Thecentrality of the Kashmir issue in the bilateralIndia-Pakistan relationship and the fact that Pakistan unilaterally ceded part of thedisputed J&K territory to China in 1963 haveonly compounded an already tangled issue.

India’s national security challenges may be interrogated at three discrete levels – the upper-end is the prevailingWeapons of Mass Destruction/cyber-spaceenvironment wherein India has joined aselect few by declaring itself as a de-factoState with Nuclear Weapons (SNW) and asatellite capable entity; the lower end is theMumbai syndrome – the terrorismchallenge stoked assiduously by thePakistani establishment. The middle-ground is occupied by traditionalchallenges including defence of territorialintegrity and national sovereignty.

The challenges that have been mountedagainst Indian security interests are almostco-terminus with the attainment ofIndependence in August 1947. In October ofthat year, a nascent free India was calledupon to ‘defend’ the State of Jammu andKashmir which was being threatened byPakistani troops and a horde of tribalirregulars – a pattern that was to berepeated in Kargil in 1999. The challengewas resolutely met – the Indian militaryimprovising with heroic professionalism –but the political handling of a perniciouschallenge to the idea of India was far fromastute and Mumbai of 2008 is amanifestation of a wound that festers.

Did India learn the appropriate lessonsand formulate the right national securitypolicies? The answer, alas, is in the negativeand consequently the 1962 war with Chinaover contested territoriality turned into anational humiliation, a trauma from whichPandit Nehru never recovered. China is thescar that abides and notwithstanding therapprochement that began in 1988 underPrime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, the last twodecades have seen the asymmetry betweenthe two neighbours grow in Beijing’s favour.

In the last two decades since the end ofthe Cold War, there has been a gradual re-appraisal of India’s holistic militarysecurity capabilities and the need to bolsterthis strand of national power – but theprogress has been halting due toinadequate macro-policy coordination.

Thus India exercised its long-held

nuclear option and acquired nuclearweapons in May 1998. Over a decade later,the texture of the Indian deterrent is uneven.

Two clear examples are self-explanatory. A nuclear weapon state mustacquire and exude both credibility andtransparency in its command and control ofthis apocalyptic capability in the pursuit ofdeterrence and stability. Although it isunderstood that the designation of analternate nuclear command authority ismandated by the 2003 Nuclear Doctrine,the Indian political apex has demurredfrom publicly making this known.

Consequently, to the detriment of itscredibility, the chain of control over thenuclear deterrent, should we come to losethe Prime Minister – who is in charge – in afirst strike, remains unknown to Indiansand adversaries alike. The Indian doctrineof No First-Use (NFU) calls for very high levels of operational readiness but ananomalous situation prevails.

Chains of ControlCurrently, the Indian nuclear deterrent isoperationally nurtured by the Commander-in-Chief, a Strategic Force Commander, a three-star officer and at the apex is theChairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee(COSC) – a rotational post held by thesenior-most service Chief. However, this is a very unsatisfactory macro-policyarrangement as Admiral Arun Prakash – aformer Naval Chief and Chairperson, COSC pointed out in an interview: “TheChairperson COSC happens to be a keyfunctionary in the nuclear command chain,and his role will assume further criticalitywith the induction of weapon systems likethe nuclear submarine INS Arihant (whichwill go on patrol with nuclear-tippedmissiles) and the Agni-V IntercontinentalBallistic Missile.”

Yet in its wisdom, since May 1998, theIndian political apex has neither found thetime nor the inclination to rectify the

DECEMBER 2011 DSI

anomalous situation that prevails, asregards a nuclear-capable nation that iswedded to NFU. Prakash further adds: “Alook at the tenures of eleven Chairpersons ofthe COSC, who held office between 2000and 2011, shows some startling statistics.Four of them served for less than sixmonths – one of them, for only 30 days; six served between 6 and 12 months; and only three served for over one year. No Chairperson has got to serve for two years. This clearly demonstrates the low importance the Government ofIndia accords this office. Even moreincongruous, for a nuclear weapon State,is [the tendency] to allocate this onerousresponsibility to a part-time incumbent ona rotational basis. ”

The poverty of effective policy reviewand re-formulation is even more starklyseen in the continuing Indian grapple withterrorism that has a State-sponsored,nuclear element embedded in it. For India,

this malignancy began in the summer of1990 in J&K; flared up in Mumbai in 1993and recurred episodically with the Kargilwar of May 1999; followed by the terroristattack on the Indian Parliament inDecember 2001 and peaked in the carnageof Mumbai in November 2008.

Reactive PoliciesRegrettably, the long-term policy response has been stubbornly reactive and short-lived. To its credit, the NDAGovernment, led by Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee, instituted theSubrahmanyam Commission whichrendered the most comprehensive reporton the Kargil failure in particular and thelarger issue of higher defence managementin general in early-2000. Valuable non-acrimonious recommendations were madeseeking a radical review of the existinghigher defence lattice – and in anunprecedented initiative, part of this KargilReview Committee report was placed in thepublic domain thanks to the perseverance ofthe late K. Subrahmanyam.

The NDA Government swiftly constituteda Group of Ministers to take forward therecommendations into the policy domain as

derived from four different Task Forcescomprising very eminent professionals. But intypical Indian tradition, the truly radicaldecisions that need political determinationand sagacity were postponed.

The re-structuring of existing stove-pipes between the main Ministries andintelligence agencies and the troubled civil-military interface was tinkered with but not boldly re-cast as was recommended.Consequently, the military remained outsidethe policy loop, internal security remainedthe turf of the Home Ministry and theappointment of an empowered Chief ofDefence Staff was kept on perpetual hold.The Indian political apex proved yet againthat they could cross a difficult chasm not intwo leaps (as in the nuclear decision) but eventhree – and remain suspended in mid-air.

What have been the deleterious effects ofsuch an inadequate national security policyapproach – and who has paid the price forthis fidelity to the status quo? The martyrsand injured veterans of the various warssince October 1947 and the growingnumber of victims of terrorism have paidin blood. At the national level, muchneeded tangible military capability hasbeen mortgaged to short-term institutionalinterests and both ineptitude and turpitudehave combined to denude comprehensivenational strength.

Consequently, for all the rhetoric aboutIndia’s imposing military profile – India isranked fourth in the Global Fire Powerhierarchy after the USA, Russia and China– the objective truth is far more modest.India is a highly vulnerable military powerwith little indigenous inventory capability.The Indian achievements in the missile,nuclear and space realms are indeed a case ofcommendable stoicism and perseverance inthe face of very adverse circumstances – butthe inability to design and cost-effectivelyproduce major platforms for the military iscause for embarrassment. For example, themuch hyped Indian Main Battle Tank, theArjun, was conceived in 1972 and finallyentered service only in March 2011 – andthat too in a hesitant manner.

The trajectory of the Advanced JetTrainer and the Light Combat Aircraft forthe Air Force are similarly depressing andthe onus for such dismal performance inthe field of indigenous defence productionis not with the scientists and their supportbase – but the apex that is charged with macro-policy formulation. Techno-

08

POLICY

Events over the last year, drawn from the

wide spectrum nationalsecurity challenge

illustrate the tenaciousIndian penchant to retainthe status quo and allow

the policy drift tocontinue. The collective

Indian public memory haslittle recall of the 1962

war with China – and thecurrent focus is on

terrorism and its manytentacles.

”

09

A soldier transportsheavy artillery

shells in the Drasssector, Kashmir

AFP


10

strategic and industrial audits are rarelydone in a constructive manner and India’smost expensive policy blunder must be thehasty closing down of the HDW submarineconstruction in the late 1980s line due topolitical considerations.

Similarly, the baby went out with thebathwater when M/s Bofors of Swedenwere blacklisted in a knee-jerk reaction in1986 and the Indian Army has not beenable to induct a new artillery piece since.

Is the Government of the day aware ofthe need for a policy review? Yes, but inan effete manner. The Rama RaoCommittee set up by UPA-I to review theDefence Research and DevelopmentOrganisation and the indigenous defencesector did a stellar job but the reportremains shrouded in secrecy and has notreceived the attention it deserves in thepublic domain or the appropriateparliamentary forum.

Is there a long-term policy for militaryacquisitions that will contribute to the goal of reasonable indigenous production in the future? Sagacious national securitymanagement would recommend such acourse of action – but whether it happens ismoot. In 2011, the much-awaited decision onthe Indian fighter aircraft reached laboriousclosure, with two European options being

short-listed. Given the burden of the Bofors-HDW scandals, the political apex opted to go for what is being termed as a decisionbased on ‘technical’ considerations alone.This may be a politically ‘safe’ decision

but its long-term sagacity and strategicrationale is elusive.

The institutional dissonance betweenthe civilian spectrum, represented by thepolitical class and the permanentbureaucracy, and the Indian military, inthe absence of a confident and reasonablyclear policy under-pinning is only serving tofurther exacerbate an inadequate nationalsecurity ethos. The unseemly fracas over the date of birth and tenure of theArmy Chief General V.K. Singh and thecontroversy generated over the AFSPA inJ&K are cases in point. Were theseomissions due to a policy void – or worse– deliberate policy choices?

Many of India’s capabilities, botheconomic and military are more notionaland perceived, than tangible and tested. At a time when India’s national security challenges are becoming morecomplex and contested, its policy contoursremain inadequate.

As an analyst, one would identifypolitical pusillanimity and domaindiffidence as the two areas that needimmediate and objective redress. Absentthis determination, the Churchill prognosismay have to be qualified: sadly,Independent India can neither govern itselfequitably nor defend itself effectively.

POLICY

A member of theNational Cadet Corpsparticipates in amarch past inSecunderabad

DECEMBER 2011 DSI

Consequently, for all therhetoric about India’s

imposing military profile– India is ranked fourth in

the Global Fire Powerhierarchy after the USA,Russia and China – the

objective truth is far moremodest. India is a highly

vulnerable military powerwith little indigenousinventory capability.

”A

FP


DEFENDER ® multi-hit body armor plates are the

leading commercial ceramic inserts developed

for use by global defense organizations. The

proven performance of DEFENDER® upgrade plate

technology provides lifesaving ballistic protection

for alliance warfi ghters around the world.

Our business is making the fi nest ballistic protection systems in the industry.

Our mission is saving lives.

www.ceradyne.com/products/defense

MAY TAN PVT. LTD., New Delhi, India | Telefax: 011-2649333 | Email: [email protected]

4266-CER_DSI_Body_fullpagebleed~f.indd 1 8/1/11 1:28 PM

When the Nuclear SuppliersGroup (NSG) agreed in 2008 to exempt Indiafrom its ban on nuclear

equipment and fuel sales to countries that do not permit international inspectionof all their nuclear facilities, no oneimagined this diplomatic triumph for New Delhi would translate easily andquickly into a reactor-led new dawn for thepower sector.

There were additional details thatneeded to be worked upon, such as the arrangements and procedures forreprocessing American spent fuel in India; the nature of India’s liability regimefor civil nuclear damage as well as enablingcooperation agreements with countries like Japan whose industry provides crucial components for US and Frenchnuclear vendors.

On some of these issues, especiallyreprocessing, progress was surprisinglysmooth with a formal document detailingthe manner in which India would treat thespent fuel produced by the U.S.-suppliedreactors inked within the period stipulatedby the 2008 US-India Civil NuclearCooperation Agreement. 2011 also broughtwith an unexpected bonus – Australia’sannouncement that it was willing toreverse its national ban on uranium sales to India.

Slow ProgressIn other areas, however, progress has beenslow. Negotiations with the Japanese on anuclear agreement have run aground andIndia's liability law is being unfairlyattacked by its potential partners. Worsestill, there has also been a setback for Indiawith the 46-nation NSG adopting newguidelines for the export of sensitivenuclear technology this June – includingenrichment and reprocessing (ENR)equipment and technology – that made thesale of these items conditional on therecipient State fulfilling a number of‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ conditions.

The first of these conditions, namelyNPT (Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty)membership and full-scope safeguards,were specifically designed to dilute the2008 waiver India received and were notneeded to ban ENR sales to any of the otherthree countries outside the NPT (Pakistan,Israel and North Korea) since the NSG’soriginal guidelines – with their catch-allNPT conditionality for the export of anykind of nuclear equipment – continue toapply to them.

Though Washington denies targetingNew Delhi and says it has been working torestrict the sale of ENR equipment andtechnology for many years now, the newguidelines' redundant reference to the NPT

13

DECEMBER 2011 DSI

12

NUCLEAR

This year brought significant setbacks and only small gains for India on thenuclear front


A YEAR OF COLD COMFORT

AFP

Police officers guardthe proposed site ofthe Nuclear PowerProject near Jaitapur,Maharashtra

KEY POINTSn Progress has been slow in India’squest to be recognised as a nuclear power. n Negotiations with Japan on anuclear agreement have beenstalled and India’s liability law isbeing unfairly attacked. n NSG’s 2008 decision to lift itsembargo on India was not some kindof unilateral concession. It was part ofa complex bargain involving reciprocalcommitments by both sides.

Nuclear Status.qxp:INDO-PAK.qxd 02/12/11 3:34 PM Page 2

When the Nuclear SuppliersGroup (NSG) agreed in 2008 to exempt Indiafrom its ban on nuclear

equipment and fuel sales to countries that do not permit international inspectionof all their nuclear facilities, no oneimagined this diplomatic triumph for New Delhi would translate easily andquickly into a reactor-led new dawn for thepower sector.

There were additional details thatneeded to be worked upon, such as the arrangements and procedures forreprocessing American spent fuel in India; the nature of India’s liability regimefor civil nuclear damage as well as enablingcooperation agreements with countries like Japan whose industry provides crucial components for US and Frenchnuclear vendors.

On some of these issues, especiallyreprocessing, progress was surprisinglysmooth with a formal document detailingthe manner in which India would treat thespent fuel produced by the U.S.-suppliedreactors inked within the period stipulatedby the 2008 US-India Civil NuclearCooperation Agreement. 2011 also broughtwith an unexpected bonus – Australia’sannouncement that it was willing toreverse its national ban on uranium sales to India.

Slow ProgressIn other areas, however, progress has beenslow. Negotiations with the Japanese on anuclear agreement have run aground andIndia's liability law is being unfairlyattacked by its potential partners. Worsestill, there has also been a setback for Indiawith the 46-nation NSG adopting newguidelines for the export of sensitivenuclear technology this June – includingenrichment and reprocessing (ENR)equipment and technology – that made thesale of these items conditional on therecipient State fulfilling a number of‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ conditions.

The first of these conditions, namelyNPT (Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty)membership and full-scope safeguards,were specifically designed to dilute the2008 waiver India received and were notneeded to ban ENR sales to any of the otherthree countries outside the NPT (Pakistan,Israel and North Korea) since the NSG’soriginal guidelines – with their catch-allNPT conditionality for the export of anykind of nuclear equipment – continue toapply to them.

Though Washington denies targetingNew Delhi and says it has been working torestrict the sale of ENR equipment andtechnology for many years now, the newguidelines' redundant reference to the NPT

13

DECEMBER 2011 DSI

12

NUCLEAR

This year brought significant setbacks and only small gains for India on thenuclear front


A YEAR OF COLD COMFORTA

FP

Police officers guardthe proposed site ofthe Nuclear PowerProject near Jaitapur,Maharashtra

KEY POINTSn Progress has been slow in India’squest to be recognised as a nuclear power. n Negotiations with Japan on anuclear agreement have beenstalled and India’s liability law isbeing unfairly attacked. n NSG’s 2008 decision to lift itsembargo on India was not some kindof unilateral concession. It was part ofa complex bargain involving reciprocalcommitments by both sides.


that the new guidelines would not“detract” from or “affect” the originalwaiver granted in September 2008.Stating that not every NSG member hasthe ability to transfer ENR items to othercountries, Mr. Krishna added: “We expectthat those that do and have committed todo so in bilateral agreements with India,will live up to their legal commitments.”He also held out a carrot – the hugeexpansion planned for India's civil nuclearindustry – and repeated once again in thatcontext that “we expect that ourinternational partners will fully honourtheir commitments in this regard.”

While the three big nuclear suppliershave all said the new guidelines do not“detract” from the grand bargain of 2008,South Block should not set much store bythese assurances. The fact is that therehas been a setback and a diplomatic effort

is needed to recover lost ground andensure that India is excluded from thepurview of the new ENR restrictionsimposed by the NSG.

The one supplier that has been the mostforthcoming so far is France. Indianofficials will have taken heart from FrenchForeign Minister Alain Juppe's publicarticulation in an interview in Delhi lastmonth that France did not consider itselfbound by the new guidelines when it came tonuclear commerce with India. The Minister

confirmed that notwithstanding the NSGrules, Paris remained free to sell ENR itemsand technology in a manner consistent withits national law and its bilateral agreement.French diplomatic sources also told this writer that the French delegation at the NSG meeting in June had entered a verbal reservation to the new ENRguidelines, questioning their applicabilityto India. The French intervention was notchallenged and was duly recorded in theminutes, sources said.

Of course, the challenge for India will beto hold the French to their word, as andwhen the requirement for cooperation inthe ENR field is required. Though Indiahas its own capabilities in these fields,there is no reason why it should not seek access to the best internationalcomponents and equipment for the newreprocessing plant it has committed tobuild. With both France and Russia, Indiamust make it clear that the multi-billiondollar contracts which are on the anvil forthe purchase of new reactors will alsodepend on Paris and Moscow's willingnessto follow through on their promises andcommitments on full civil nuclearcooperation. The US has not so farcommitted itself to sell ENR equipment toIndia. New Delhi can live with that. But notwith American efforts to block others fromcooperating with it.

The Liability ObstacleThe second challenge India must confrontis the reluctance of its nuclear partners –especially the US and the French, but alsothe Russians – to accept the sovereign rightof Parliament to frame a law on liability fordamages best suited to protecting the long-term interest of Indian citizens. Thoughliability was not raised as an issue by theAmerican side in the 2005 Indo-USstatement which paved the way for thenuclear deal, Washington extracted out ofNew Delhi in September 2008 acommitment to accede to the Convention onSupplementary Compensation for NuclearDamage (CSC). The CSC is an internationalconvention which seeks drastically to limitthe financial exposure of a nuclear exporterto damage claims by limiting liability andchanneling all liability arising out of anuclear accident exclusively onto theoperator of a nuclear facility. The CSC,which has yet to enter into force because therequired number of countries with a large

15

DECEMBER 2011 DSI

was introduced in order to fulfill anassurance that Condoleezza Rice, who wasUS Secretary of State at the time, gaveCapitol Hill in 2008. Some Congressmenfeared other nuclear suppliers would steal amarch on the United States by offering Indiatechnologies the US wouldn't. To allay theirconcerns, the US Administration said itwould ensure an NSG-level ban on sensitivenuclear technology exports to India. A draftwas circulated in November that year andfinally approved in June 2011.

The fact that India failed to prevent theadoption of the new guidelines despiteknowing they were in the pipeline for morethan two years suggests a certaincomplacency on the Manmohan SinghGovernment's part. We know from theWikiLeaks cables that the issue wasdutifully raised by Indian diplomats inmany of their meetings with US officials.But never was the proposed ENR banprojected by the Government as an attemptby Washington to unilaterally rewrite theterms of the nuclear bargain it had struckwith India.

When the story about the G-8 deciding toimplement such a ban in 2009 pending itsadoption by the full NSG, first broke, seniorIndian ministers took the view that this didnot matter. It was only when the NuclearSuppliers Group finally adopted the newguidelines this June that South Blockdecided to put on its punching gloves.

The fact is that the NSG's 2008 decisionto lift its embargo on India was not somekind of unilateral concession. It was partof a complex bargain involving reciprocalcommitments by both sides. If the suppliernations agreed to drop their insistence onthe NPT and full-scope safeguards andopen the door to full civil nuclearcooperation with India, India committeditself to fulfilling several onerous steps,including the difficult and costly separationof its civilian and military nuclearprogrammes, the placing of its civilianfacilities under International AtomicEnergy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, thesigning of an Additional Protocol, as wellas extending support to a number ofnonproliferation and disarmament-relatedinitiatives at the global level.

At a fundamental level, the logic of thisbargain hinged on two components. First,the NSG was making a judgment aboutIndia's status as a responsible countrywith advanced nuclear capabilities.

Second, the NSG and India were acting onthe basis of reciprocity.

The Liability ObstacleThough Indian officials made their anger known almost immediately in off-the-record briefings, External AffairsMinister S.M. Krishna finally provided theGovernment's formal response to the newNSG guidelines in a suo moto statement toParliament in August.

Noting the concerns that had been raised by MPs, he made the following “clarifications:” (1) The basis ofIndia's international civil nuclearcooperation remains the special exemptionfrom the NSG guidelines given onSeptember 6, 2008, “which containreciprocal commitments and actions byboth sides.” (2) That exemption accorded“a special status to India” and “was granted

knowing full well that India is not asignatory to the Nuclear Non-ProliferationTreaty.”Pursuant to the “clean” exemption,“NSG members had agreed to transfer alltechnologies which are consistent withtheir national law” including technologiesconnected with the nuclear fuel cycle.

Mr. Krishna said the only outstandingissue is the “full implementation” of theSeptember 2008 understanding. “This iswhat we expect and our major partners are committed to.” This understandingcontained commitments on both sides.“We expect all NSG members to honourtheir commitments as reflected in the 2008NSG Statement and our bilateralcooperation agreements.”

The Minister then noted the statementsmade by the U.S., France and Russiafollowing the NSG's June 2011 meeting inwhich each country tried to assure India

14

NUCLEAR

The fact that India failedto prevent the adoption

of the new guidelinesdespite knowing they

were in the pipeline formore than two years

suggests a certaincomplacency on the

part of the Manmohan Singh Government.

”A

FP

AFP

US President Barack Obamawith Prime MinisterManmohan Singh at theNuclear Security Summit,Washington, D.C.; (right)South Koreans protest againstthe nuclear accident at theFukushima Daiichi nuclearpower plant, Japan


that the new guidelines would not“detract” from or “affect” the originalwaiver granted in September 2008.Stating that not every NSG member hasthe ability to transfer ENR items to othercountries, Mr. Krishna added: “We expectthat those that do and have committed todo so in bilateral agreements with India,will live up to their legal commitments.”He also held out a carrot – the hugeexpansion planned for India's civil nuclearindustry – and repeated once again in thatcontext that “we expect that ourinternational partners will fully honourtheir commitments in this regard.”

While the three big nuclear suppliershave all said the new guidelines do not“detract” from the grand bargain of 2008,South Block should not set much store bythese assurances. The fact is that therehas been a setback and a diplomatic effort

is needed to recover lost ground andensure that India is excluded from thepurview of the new ENR restrictionsimposed by the NSG.

The one supplier that has been the mostforthcoming so far is France. Indianofficials will have taken heart from FrenchForeign Minister Alain Juppe's publicarticulation in an interview in Delhi lastmonth that France did not consider itselfbound by the new guidelines when it came tonuclear commerce with India. The Minister

confirmed that notwithstanding the NSGrules, Paris remained free to sell ENR itemsand technology in a manner consistent withits national law and its bilateral agreement.French diplomatic sources also told this writer that the French delegation at the NSG meeting in June had entered a verbal reservation to the new ENRguidelines, questioning their applicabilityto India. The French intervention was notchallenged and was duly recorded in theminutes, sources said.

Of course, the challenge for India will beto hold the French to their word, as andwhen the requirement for cooperation inthe ENR field is required. Though Indiahas its own capabilities in these fields,there is no reason why it should not seek access to the best internationalcomponents and equipment for the newreprocessing plant it has committed tobuild. With both France and Russia, Indiamust make it clear that the multi-billiondollar contracts which are on the anvil forthe purchase of new reactors will alsodepend on Paris and Moscow's willingnessto follow through on their promises andcommitments on full civil nuclearcooperation. The US has not so farcommitted itself to sell ENR equipment toIndia. New Delhi can live with that. But notwith American efforts to block others fromcooperating with it.

The Liability ObstacleThe second challenge India must confrontis the reluctance of its nuclear partners –especially the US and the French, but alsothe Russians – to accept the sovereign rightof Parliament to frame a law on liability fordamages best suited to protecting the long-term interest of Indian citizens. Thoughliability was not raised as an issue by theAmerican side in the 2005 Indo-USstatement which paved the way for thenuclear deal, Washington extracted out ofNew Delhi in September 2008 acommitment to accede to the Convention onSupplementary Compensation for NuclearDamage (CSC). The CSC is an internationalconvention which seeks drastically to limitthe financial exposure of a nuclear exporterto damage claims by limiting liability andchanneling all liability arising out of anuclear accident exclusively onto theoperator of a nuclear facility. The CSC,which has yet to enter into force because therequired number of countries with a large

15

DECEMBER 2011 DSI

was introduced in order to fulfill anassurance that Condoleezza Rice, who wasUS Secretary of State at the time, gaveCapitol Hill in 2008. Some Congressmenfeared other nuclear suppliers would steal amarch on the United States by offering Indiatechnologies the US wouldn't. To allay theirconcerns, the US Administration said itwould ensure an NSG-level ban on sensitivenuclear technology exports to India. A draftwas circulated in November that year andfinally approved in June 2011.

The fact that India failed to prevent theadoption of the new guidelines despiteknowing they were in the pipeline for morethan two years suggests a certaincomplacency on the Manmohan SinghGovernment's part. We know from theWikiLeaks cables that the issue wasdutifully raised by Indian diplomats inmany of their meetings with US officials.But never was the proposed ENR banprojected by the Government as an attemptby Washington to unilaterally rewrite theterms of the nuclear bargain it had struckwith India.

When the story about the G-8 deciding toimplement such a ban in 2009 pending itsadoption by the full NSG, first broke, seniorIndian ministers took the view that this didnot matter. It was only when the NuclearSuppliers Group finally adopted the newguidelines this June that South Blockdecided to put on its punching gloves.

The fact is that the NSG's 2008 decisionto lift its embargo on India was not somekind of unilateral concession. It was partof a complex bargain involving reciprocalcommitments by both sides. If the suppliernations agreed to drop their insistence onthe NPT and full-scope safeguards andopen the door to full civil nuclearcooperation with India, India committeditself to fulfilling several onerous steps,including the difficult and costly separationof its civilian and military nuclearprogrammes, the placing of its civilianfacilities under International AtomicEnergy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, thesigning of an Additional Protocol, as wellas extending support to a number ofnonproliferation and disarmament-relatedinitiatives at the global level.

At a fundamental level, the logic of thisbargain hinged on two components. First,the NSG was making a judgment aboutIndia's status as a responsible countrywith advanced nuclear capabilities.

Second, the NSG and India were acting onthe basis of reciprocity.

The Liability ObstacleThough Indian officials made their anger known almost immediately in off-the-record briefings, External AffairsMinister S.M. Krishna finally provided theGovernment's formal response to the newNSG guidelines in a suo moto statement toParliament in August.

Noting the concerns that had been raised by MPs, he made the following “clarifications:” (1) The basis ofIndia's international civil nuclearcooperation remains the special exemptionfrom the NSG guidelines given onSeptember 6, 2008, “which containreciprocal commitments and actions byboth sides.” (2) That exemption accorded“a special status to India” and “was granted

knowing full well that India is not asignatory to the Nuclear Non-ProliferationTreaty.”Pursuant to the “clean” exemption,“NSG members had agreed to transfer alltechnologies which are consistent withtheir national law” including technologiesconnected with the nuclear fuel cycle.

Mr. Krishna said the only outstandingissue is the “full implementation” of theSeptember 2008 understanding. “This iswhat we expect and our major partners are committed to.” This understandingcontained commitments on both sides.“We expect all NSG members to honourtheir commitments as reflected in the 2008NSG Statement and our bilateralcooperation agreements.”

The Minister then noted the statementsmade by the U.S., France and Russiafollowing the NSG's June 2011 meeting inwhich each country tried to assure India

14

NUCLEAR

The fact that India failedto prevent the adoption

of the new guidelinesdespite knowing they

were in the pipeline formore than two years

suggests a certaincomplacency on the

part of the Manmohan Singh Government.

”

AFP

AFP

US President Barack Obamawith Prime MinisterManmohan Singh at theNuclear Security Summit,Washington, D.C.; (right)South Koreans protest againstthe nuclear accident at theFukushima Daiichi nuclearpower plant, Japan


enough nuclear industry have yet to accede,specifies a model national law on nuclearliability that signatories should adopt as partof the accessing process.

The Indian law passed last year broadlymirrors this model but deviates from it intwo respects. It broadens the scope of theoperator’s right of recourse, allowing him tofile suit for recovery of money paid tovictims of an accident from the supplier ofthe reactor in the event that the accidentwas caused by defective equipment.

Secondly, it explicitly reiterates the rightof citizens affected by a nuclear incident to

take recourse to ordinary provisions ofIndian statute – in this case, the law oftorts – should they wish to do so.

American companies, backed stronglyby the Obama Administration, say theseprovisions of the Indian law will exposethem to “unlimited damages” in the eventof an accident and are seeking legalprotection as a precondition for sellingreactors to India. Given the legacy of theBhopal gas tragedy and now theFukushima-Daiichi nuclear disaster inJapan which caused billions of dollars of damage, the Manmohan Singh

Government is simply not in a position toaccommodate the US demand. Someattempt to provide comfort to foreigncompanies has been made in theimplementation Rules for the Liability Lawnotified by the Union Government inNovember 2011 but this is unlikely to satisfyWestinghouse and G.E. Ironically, thesepartial concessions are likely to bechallenged politically and legally. TheOpposition sees the new rules as ultra viresbecause they undermine the intent andprovisions of the parent Act.

At the time of going to press, the ObamaAdministration’s position was that it was still “studying” India’s liability rules tosee if the concerns of American companieshad been fully addressed. If it pronounceditself satisfied, the Opposition will see this asproof of the Act’s effective – and illegal –dilution by executive fiat, something thatis not permissible in the Indianconstitutional scheme of things. And ifWashington red flags the new rules, thatwould place a big question mark over anyAmerican reactor sales to India.

Diplomacy Abroad, and at HomeThe truth is that that would not be the onlyquestion mark. For 2011 also has broughtto the fore a new and unpredictable elementin the Indian nuclear equation: publicopinion. Until now, the Indian nuclearenergy programme has not attractedanything remotely resembling a sustainedpopular anti-nuclear movement. But therural population in and around Jaitapur,Maharashtra – the designated site for thereactor park where AREVA will build two,and possible four, massive EPRs – isvigorously opposing the impending arrivalof nuclear power in their backyard.

In Tamil Nadu, now, fisherfolk andvillagers in Tuticorin, Tirunelveli andKanyakumari districts have startedagitating against the Russian project atKudankulam, even though it has been in theworks for years and one of the VVER-1000reactors is nearing completion.

If reversing the NSG ban on ENR salesand convincing the US and others to livewith our liability law calls for deftdiplomacy on New Delhi’s part; reachingout immediately to those who havemisgivings about reactors being sited neartheir land is a challenge that the Manmohan Singh Government must embrace evenmore urgently.

DECEMBER 2011 DSI

16

NUCLEAR

AFP

Police personnel detainan activist during aprotest against thetabled Civil Liability forNuclear Damage Bill,New Delhi


216X276.indd 1216X276.indd 1 6/13/11 4:00:36 PM6/13/11 4:00:36 PM

Omar Abdullah, the Chief Ministerof Jammu and Kashmir (J&K),unilaterally announced inOctober, 2011 that the Armed

Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) wouldbe revoked from four districts of the State(Srinagar, Badgam, Jammu and Samba). Hebased his decision on an assessment that asthe security situation had improved in thesedistricts they could be handed over to thepolice forces. While denying that he wasplaying politics with national security, thefact is he ignored the Unified Command till hewas reminded that such a decision must be

arrived at only after obtaining a consensusfrom key stakeholders.

Recently, AFSPA has come in for somesharp criticism. Its provisions have beenreviewed at the highest levels for almostthree years and a decision by the CabinetCommittee on Security over its future isstill awaited. While the Ministry of Defence(MoD) and the Army HQ are said to beopposed to changes in the basic provisionsof the Act, the Ministry of Home Affairs isreported to have recommended a majoroverhaul of the Act to bring it in line withegalitarian human rights practices.

Commenting on the demands of somepolitical parties and human rights activists todilute the provisions of AFSPA, General V. K.Singh, the Chief of the Army Staff (COAS),said in 2010 that those who demand itsdilution, “probably do so for narrowpolitical gains.” More graphically, Lt GenB.S. Jaswal, former GOC-in-C, NorthernCommand, and the person responsible forall operations in J&K, has likened the Actto a holy book. “I would like to say that theprovisions of AFSPA are very pious to meand I think to the entire Indian Army. Wehave religious books, in which certainguidelines are given, but all the members ofthe religion do not follow it [thoseguidelines]. Does that imply that youremove the religious book?”

Clearly, the Army sees AFSPA as anenabling Act that gives it powers necessaryto conduct counter-insurgency operationsefficiently, without having to wait forcivilian magistrates to arrive on the scene of action. The Act also provides itspersonnel with Constitutional safeguardsagainst malicious, vindictive and frivolousprosecution. The Army considers itsprovisions mandatory for conductingactive counter-insurgency operations. If it is repealed or diluted, the Army’sleadership is of the view that theperformance of its battalions in counter-insurgency operations will be adverselyaffected and the terrorists or insurgentswill seize the initiative.

Insurgent groups establish theiroperating bases in areas in which thedeployment of security forces has thinnedout. Also, it takes a long period of time toestablish a counter-insurgency grid if itbecomes necessary. If the Army is removedfrom certain areas, it will be unable to protectits convoys such as those operating on theSrinagar-Kargil-Leh highway – from attack.

19

DECEMBER 2011 DSI

18

ARMED FORCES SPECIAL POWERS ACT

The military is stronglyopposing changes in thebasic provisions of theArmed Forces SpecialPowers Act

GURMEETKANWAL

BOOTSONTHE GROUND

A Central Reserve PoliceForce soldier, Srinagar

AFP

KEY POINTSn Political expedience should notcome in the way of militaryoperations.n The Army sees the AFSPA as anenabling Act that gives it powers toconduct counter-insurgencyoperations, without having to wait forcivilian magistratesn The Army should make itmandatory for its battalions to takepolice personnel and village eldersalong for operations.

AFSPA.qxp:INDO-PAK.qxd 02/12/11 3:36 PM Page 2

2120

DECEMBER 2011 DSI

Demands for RepealSome sections of civil society view AFSPA asa draconian piece of legislation, believing itthat violates fundamental rights granted bythe Constitution to all the citizens of thecountry. It has even been called “license tokill” by Syed Ali Shah Geelani, a hard-lineseparatist Kashmiri leader who, it isbelieved, is close to Pakistan’s Inter-ServiceIntelligence (ISI).

The Act has been opposed in India’snortheastern States as well. Even beforeManorma Devi, a member of the outlawedPeople’s Liberation Army, was allegedlyraped and murdered by soldiers from abattalion of the Assam Rifles in 2004 –allegations which were found to be false,activists in the Northeast was demandingrepeal of the Act. Irom Sharmila, a Manipuricivil rights activist, has been on a politicalfast unto death since November 2000 toforce the Government to repeal AFSPA fromManipur and other States in the North East.For eleven years she is being force-fedthrough the nose in a hospital in Imphal.

Explaining his position, Chief MinisterOmar Abdullah said: “The perception of theaverage resident of J&K is that the AFSPAis abused while there is a sense that it isindispensable for the security forces. Theneed is to address both views.” MehboobaMufti, President of the People’s DemocraticParty (PDP) has demanded immediaterevocation of the AFSPA and the withdrawalof the Army from J&K several times. In herview, the situation does not justify furtheroperations by the Army.

Various other Kashmiri leaders havealso made demands for the repeal of theAFSPA. These leaders forget that if the Act is lifted from some areas, politicalpressure to do so in other areas willinevitably follow. Also, the demands runcounter to the fact that infiltration hasincreased substantially in the summermonths of 2011; there is still a sense oftension in Kashmir Valley; and let’s notforget that the Army had to be called out toenforce a curfew after 15 Kashmiri youthhad died in a firing by the Central ReservePolice Force in 2010.

Contested ProvisionsThe Act was promulgated in 1958 in Assamand Manipur and in 1990 in Jammu andKashmir. The main criticism of the Act isdirected against the provisions of Section 4.Human rights activists object to the Act on

the grounds that its provisions give thesecurity forces unbridled powers to arrest,search, seize and even shoot to kill. Theyaccuse the security forces of havingdestroyed homes and entire villages merelyon the suspicion that insurgents were hidingthere. They also point out that Section 4empowers the armed forces to arrest citizenswithout warrant and keep them in custodyfor several days. They also object to Section 6,which protects the security forces personnelfrom prosecution except with the priorsanction of the Central Government. Criticssay this provision has on many occasions ledto even non-commissioned officers brazenlyopening fire on crowds without having tojustify their action.

The criticism is mostly ill-informed andbaseless. Critics forget that Section 5 of theAct mandates arrested civilians must behanded over to the nearest police station‘with the least possible delay’ along with areport of ‘circumstances occasioning thearrest’. Army HQ have laid down that allsuspects who are arrested will be handedover to civilian authorities within 24 hours.This instruction is strictly adhered to. Asfor firing on civilians, the internalinstructions of the Army state that fire may

be opened only in self-defence and that toowhen the source of terrorist or militant firecan be clearly identified. If soldiers wereallowed to fire indiscriminately, therewould have been hundreds of more civiliancasualties and thousands of refugees wouldhave deserted their home and hearth inKashmir over the last 22 years of unbridledmilitancy and terrorism.

A committee headed by Justice JeevanReddy was appointed in 2004 to review the provisions of the AFSPA. Though the committee found that the powersconferred under the Act are not absolute, itnevertheless concluded that the Act shouldbe repealed. However, it recommended thatessential provisions of the Act be insertedinto the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act(UAPA) of 1967. The Second AdministrativeReform Commission headed by VeerappaMoily, now the Union Law Minister, also recommended that the AFSPA shouldbe repealed and its essential provisionsshould be incorporated in the UAPA. If thiscourse of action is adopted, it would be aretrograde step that will substantially harmthe national cause.

Track RecordIn over 40 years of counter-insurgencyoperations in various parts of India, theimage of the Indian Army has not beentarnished with the equivalent of a My Laimassacre where an entire village was razedto the ground and most of its inhabitantswere tortured and killed in cold blood by anAmerican Lieutenant’s platoon that hadgone berserk in Vietnam.

The Indian Army has never had a prisonlike Guantanamo Bay or an interrogationfacility like Abu Gharaib. While there havebeen some individual excesses, committedby soldiers in the heat of the moment – andthese have been swiftly punished – theArmy as an organisation has maintained anexemplary record, in keeping with itsprofessional ethos and venerable traditions.

It is useful to remember that the IAfights with one hand tied behind its back.Its iron-fist-in-a-velvet-glove counter-insurgency doctrine emphasises the use ofminimum force, people friendly operationsand simultaneous development work towin hearts and minds. Unlike the scenesfrom Afghanistan and Pakistan’s NorthWest Frontier Province (NWFP) andFederally Administered Tribal Areas(FATA), seen on television screens almost

every day, heavy weapons like fighteraircraft and artillery are not used forcounter-insurgency operations in India.Even a rocket launcher can be fired onlywith the permission of a senior officer, whoinvariably assesses the situation personallybefore giving such permission.

Additionally, the Army follows a zerotolerance policy towards human rightsviolations. The Army’s determination tobring individual violators of human rightsto justice is without parallel. Since 1990,the security forces have been accused of1,511 cases of human rights abuse. All ofthese were thoroughly investigated,including by the National Human RightsCommission. 1,473 cases were found to becompletely false and had been possiblyinstigated by terrorist organisations.Where culpability was established, 104 soldiers, including 40 officers, havebeen punished in 35 cases so far.

Extraordinary situations require specialhandling. As the Army does not have anypolice powers under the Constitution, it is inthe national interest to give it specialpowers for operational purposes when it iscalled upon to undertake counter-insurgency operations. The promulgation ofthe AFSPA along with the Disturbed AreasAct is inescapable for providing legalprotection to Army personnel. Armypersonnel must be given immunity for anyact done in good faith.

However, such immunity cannot beabsolute, nor is it so under the presentAFSPA. The Central Government can andhas sanctioned prosecution where primafacie cases existed. Without these powers,commanding officers and young companycommanders are likely to follow a wait-and-watch approach rather than go afterterrorists and militants with zeal andenthusiasm and then risk prosecution.

On its part, the Army must make itmandatory for its battalions to take policepersonnel and village elders along foroperations which involve search of civilianhomes and the seizure of property. The practical problems encountered inensuring transparency in counter-insurgency operations must be overcomeby innovative measures. The Army must becompletely transparent in investigatinghuman rights allegations and bringingviolators to speedy justice, with exemplarypunishment being meted out where thecharges are proved.

ARMED FORCES SPECIAL POWERS ACT

Human rights activistsobject to the Act on the grounds that itsprovisions give the

security forces unbridledpowers to arrest, search, seize and even shoot to kill.

They accuse the securityforces of having

destroyed homes and entire villages

merely on the suspicionthat insurgents were

hiding there.

”Kashmiris look at adamaged house after agun battle betweensuspected militantsand Indian troops inMaloora, Srinagar

AFP

AFSPA.qxp:INDO-PAK.qxd 02/12/11 3:36 PM Page 4

Be-200

Rosoboronexport has supplied the firstbatch of Mi-17V-5 multirole utilityhelicopters to India as part of the

contract signed in 2008. The aircraft wereassembled at the Kazan helicopter factory.

The contract is another proof to the factthat the RW aircraft sector is emergingrapidly as a priority for the Russia’s defenseexporter. Indeed, helicopter sales arerising annually, with the latest modificationsof the Mi-17 family accounting for asignificant part of them.

In fact, Mi-17 has evolved to become asymbol of the Russian air industry. The never-ending demand for this aircraft is explained byits integrating most cutting edgetechnologies, combat proven in all militaryand peacekeeping operations in the secondhalf of the 20th century. The up-to-date helosare powered by new engines and featureinnovative avionics, while also inheriting thekey features of the family – outstandingreliability and maintainability. Placed amongthe best in its class, the chopper is equallyeffective in most adverse climates andterrains including sea, desert, mountains andjungles of Latin America, the Middle East,Africa and Asia.

Now the Mi-17V-5 helicopters are enteringthe Indian Armed Forces. One of the leaderson the emerging market of the Asia-Pacificregion, India has been Russia’s strategicpartner, including in defence sphere, eversince 1961 – for exactly fifty years – when the

first Mi-4 helicopter was shipped to thecountry. The trend that is traced back then,continues today: both nations attachparamount importance to this cooperation.

Nowadays it is exactly the area, where themost large-scale bilateral projects in aircraftmaking were launched recently.

The one most frequently mentioned isthe Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft, whichwas given go-ahead in December 2010,during Russian President DmitryMedvedev’s visit to India. Now both partiesare largely involved in the development of

the new generation fighter jet. Yet another promising project is the

Multirole Transport Aircraft to becommissioned for service with the AirForces of Russia and India. The plane is tobe employed both in military andcommercial roles.

The Su-30MKI offset deal with HAL is apositive example of technology transfercoupled with equipment sales. The fighters doa very good job, protecting India’s air borders,their upgrade in plans for the near future.

The scale of joint programs, technology

transfer and licenses for aircraft productionare the manifestation of a really strategiclevel of partnership between the two nations.JSC Rosoboronexport seeks to intensify thiscooperation, investing in future bilateraldeals and defense technologies.Simultaneously Rosoboronexport is offering

a long range of state-of-the-art aircraft. Verypositive shifts are in store in this sector, asthe Indian Armed Forces voiced a need formore advanced weapons.

For example, the Indian military paysattention to the Il-76/78 transport and tankerplanes, which have earned a good

reputation in the country. Rosoboronexporthas offered upgrades of these multiroleaircraft, including new avionics and moreeconomical PS-90A-76 engines that meetICAO noise and emission requirements. Asheer advantage of the plane is that it cantake off and land on unpaved airfields, not tomention that India has got a vastinfrastructure and a wealth of experience towork with them.

Indian specialists were fascinated by theBe-200 amphibian, which can be equippedwith present-day open architecturesurveillance and acquisition devices formaritime patrol, SAR, transport andmedevac roles. Be-200 is really a uniqueaircraft that proved outstandingly efficient infire fighting in service with Russia’sEmergencies Ministry.

Rosoboronexport is also offering up-to-date training aids and extensive upgradeprograms for earlier delivered helicopters,which are set to bring dramatic improvementsto their performance. Company’s specialistsreact promptly to meet the desires of theIndian clients, doing their utmost to expand atransparent, fruitful and mutually-beneficialcooperation.

Mi-17V-5

RUSSIA SHIPS FIRST MI-17V-5 HELOS TOSTRATEGIC PARTNER

IL-78-МK90

Su-30 MKI

IL-76

DSI Marketing Promotion

ROE7 new.qxd:contributors-aug.qxd 05/12/11 2:08 PM Page 2

If India has a capital for battle tanks, itis Avadi. So central is this Chennaisuburb to the country’s programmefor building an indigenous tank fleet

that local legend has it that Avadi is actuallyan acronym for Armoured Vehicles andAmmunition Depot of India.

The inference is probably apocryphal.But in a similar vein, the cantonment ofMhow, in Madhya Pradesh, which housesseveral of the Army’s major training centres,is purportedly an acronym for MilitaryHeadquarters of War. Either way, Avadi –home of the Central Vehicles Research &Development Establishment (CVRDE); theHeavy Vehicles Factory (HVF); and theEngine Factory – is India’s lone major hubfor tank production. This is where theVijayanta tank was built; then the T-72Ajeya; and now the T-90 Bhishma. Avadi isalso where the indigenous Arjun Main BattleTank (MBT) was designed and developed,and is now manufactured.

Getting permission to visit these closelyguarded establishments is not easy: theMinistry of Defence (MoD) took a monthto green signal a visit. At the massive HVF complex, a rigorous security checkprecedes any entry. This is after all the

flagship of the Ordnance Factory Board(OFB), a MoD-owned agglomeration of 39 factories sprawled across India whichhave the stated aim of manufacturing,‘State of the Art Battle Field Equipment(sic)’ for the military. Of the OFB’s totalturnover last year of `11,300 crore, HVFalone generated ̀ 2,500 crore.

HVF comes under the ArmouredVehicles Division, one of the OFB’s five constituent divisions. According to R.K. Jain, the Additional DG who heads theArmoured Vehicles Division: “The totalturnover of our division, which has some12,000 employees, was `3,500 crore lastyear. We are investing `3,000 crore toaugment our capacity; of this, theGovernment has already sanctioned `2,000 crore for the production of the T-90S, spares and overhaul. Another `1,000 crore will augment our capacity tobuild BMP-II infantry combat vehicles(ICVs) at the Ordnance Factory in Medak.”

Jain estimates that his division’sturnover is set to cross `10,000 crore perannum. This may be credible, given thatHVF will build India’s entire requirementsof tanks, while its sister factory at Medak is poised to get an Army order for1,800 BMP-II ICVs. HVF currently builds100 T-90S tanks per year, a capacity whichis to be expanded to 140 annually. HVF also builds 30-50 Arjun MBTs each year;some 50 T-72 variants like bridge layer tanks (BLTs) and trawls; and it overhauls120 T-72s annually. In all, HVF can deliversome 340-350 tanks each year.

Feeding off this capacity is the IndianArmy’s (IA) enormous MBT inventory,consisting of 59-60 tank regiments (abattalion-level force that brings 45 tanksinto combat). The rationale behind thismassive force of over 3,500 tanks is the feltneed for a credible conventional deterrentagainst Pakistan; this currently comprisesthree armoured divisions and another 9-10 independent armoured brigades. Thistank force is planned to be equipped, goinginto the 2020s with 1,657 T-90S tanks; 248 Arjuns; and almost 2,000 refurbishedT-72 tanks that most experts agree willhave long passed their sell-by dates. A

25

DECEMBER 2011 DSI

24

ARMOURED VEHICLES

The Army’s ambitious tank inventory is dogged byunfulfilled obligations, erratic ordering and rising costs

AJAI SHUKLA

T-90S assemblyline Avadi,Chennai

DRIVINGFORCE

AJA

I SH

UK

LA

KEY POINTSn The rationale behind this massiveforce of over 3,500 tanks is the feltneed for a credible conventionaldeterrent against Pakistan.n The Heavy Vehicles Factory,Avadi, can build India’s entirerequirements of tanks with thepotential to deliver some 340-350tanks each year. n Erratic indenting by the Army mayresult in the shutting down ofproduction lines.

Tanks.qxp:INDO-PAK.qxd 02/12/11 3:37 PM Page 2

If India has a capital for battle tanks, itis Avadi. So central is this Chennaisuburb to the country’s programmefor building an indigenous tank fleet

that local legend has it that Avadi is actuallyan acronym for Armoured Vehicles andAmmunition Depot of India.

The inference is probably apocryphal.But in a similar vein, the cantonment ofMhow, in Madhya Pradesh, which housesseveral of the Army’s major training centres,is purportedly an acronym for MilitaryHeadquarters of War. Either way, Avadi –home of the Central Vehicles Research &Development Establishment (CVRDE); theHeavy Vehicles Factory (HVF); and theEngine Factory – is India’s lone major hubfor tank production. This is where theVijayanta tank was built; then the T-72Ajeya; and now the T-90 Bhishma. Avadi isalso where the indigenous Arjun Main BattleTank (MBT) was designed and developed,and is now manufactured.

Getting permission to visit these closelyguarded establishments is not easy: theMinistry of Defence (MoD) took a monthto green signal a visit. At the massive HVF complex, a rigorous security checkprecedes any entry. This is after all the

flagship of the Ordnance Factory Board(OFB), a MoD-owned agglomeration of 39 factories sprawled across India whichhave the stated aim of manufacturing,‘State of the Art Battle Field Equipment(sic)’ for the military. Of the OFB’s totalturnover last year of `11,300 crore, HVFalone generated ̀ 2,500 crore.

HVF comes under the ArmouredVehicles Division, one of the OFB’s five constituent divisions. According to R.K. Jain, the Additional DG who heads theArmoured Vehicles Division: “The totalturnover of our division, which has some12,000 employees, was `3,500 crore lastyear. We are investing `3,000 crore toaugment our capacity; of this, theGovernment has already sanctioned `2,000 crore for the production of the T-90S, spares and overhaul. Another `1,000 crore will augment our capacity tobuild BMP-II infantry combat vehicles(ICVs) at the Ordnance Factory in Medak.”

Jain estimates that his division’sturnover is set to cross `10,000 crore perannum. This may be credible, given thatHVF will build India’s entire requirementsof tanks, while its sister factory at Medak is poised to get an Army order for1,800 BMP-II ICVs. HVF currently builds100 T-90S tanks per year, a capacity whichis to be expanded to 140 annually. HVF also builds 30-50 Arjun MBTs each year;some 50 T-72 variants like bridge layer tanks (BLTs) and trawls; and it overhauls120 T-72s annually. In all, HVF can deliversome 340-350 tanks each year.

Feeding off this capacity is the IndianArmy’s (IA) enormous MBT inventory,consisting of 59-60 tank regiments (abattalion-level force that brings 45 tanksinto combat). The rationale behind thismassive force of over 3,500 tanks is the feltneed for a credible conventional deterrentagainst Pakistan; this currently comprisesthree armoured divisions and another 9-10 independent armoured brigades. Thistank force is planned to be equipped, goinginto the 2020s with 1,657 T-90S tanks; 248 Arjuns; and almost 2,000 refurbishedT-72 tanks that most experts agree willhave long passed their sell-by dates. A

25

DECEMBER 2011 DSI

24

ARMOURED VEHICLES

The Army’s ambitious tank inventory is dogged byunfulfilled obligations, erratic ordering and rising costs

AJAI SHUKLA

T-90S assemblyline Avadi,Chennai

DRIVINGFORCEA

JAI S

HU

KLA

KEY POINTSn The rationale behind this massiveforce of over 3,500 tanks is the feltneed for a credible conventionaldeterrent against Pakistan.n The Heavy Vehicles Factory,Avadi, can build India’s entirerequirements of tanks with thepotential to deliver some 340-350tanks each year. n Erratic indenting by the Army mayresult in the shutting down ofproduction lines.


greater acceptance of the Arjun Mark-II,and the successful development of theArmy’s planned Future Main Battle Tank(FMBT) will considerably reduce thedependence on the obsolescent T-72s.

Erratic IndentingGiven this appetite for manufacturingtanks, HVF’s assembly lines ought to bebuzzing with optimism. Instead, there isuncertainty and frustration. Of the 1,000T-90S tanks that the Army plans to buildin HVF — and for which it has, in fact,already paid Russia licence fees — HVF hasonly received an order for 300 tanks. Withhalf that number already delivered — 24tanks in 2009-10; 51 in 2010-11; 25 so farthis year; and an annual production whichis likely to hit 100 next year — theremaining tanks will need to be deliveredby mid-2013. Just as the production linewill be hitting its stride, say OFB officials,the absence of more orders from the Armywill force the line to shut down completely.Given the 30-month lead-time that HVFsays it needs for ordering and obtaining thesub-assemblies and components that gointo each T-90S the lack of further ordersfrom the Army means that, in mid-2013,the production of the T-90S tanks willgrind to a halt.

“We are in touch with Army HQ and theMoD for the follow-on orders of the T-90S tanks. The lead-time for positioning of materials and components is about 30 months. [This covers] ordering, gettingthe material, manufacturing and assemblyand delivery. We are progressing the casewith the Vice-Chief of Army Staff and haverequested the MoD to pursue the matter.If we don’t have continuity in production,skilled manpower gets distributed to otherworks. And to reassemble them creates itsown set of problems,” details Jain.

Such situations, where ill-consideredindenting by the three Services causesproduction breaks, are common acrossIndia’s defence industrial complex,including its defence shipyards and public sector behemoths like HindustanAeronautics Ltd and Bharat ElectronicsLtd. Erratic indenting hinders the smoothplanning of production cycles, economicutilisation of skilled manpower and theprovision of lead times needed for out-sourcing materials and assembliesfrom external vendors. The military’sproclivity for placing piecemeal orders

also blocks potential economies of scale,something that India’s vast armed forcesare actually better placed to exploit thanmost other countries.

This is evident from the T-90S’ rising cost.The T-90S tanks that came ready built fromRussia cost ̀ 11 crore each; and the knockeddown tanks from Russia that were assembledin Avadi cost ̀ 12 crore each, the Minister ofState for Defence, Rao Inderjit Singh,informed the Lok Sabha on November 30,2006. But the tanks that are built in Avadinow cost `18.1 crore, according to the OFB.Asked how much this price could be whittleddown through timely bulk orders from theArmy, HVF officials estimate a potential costsaving of 25-30 percent.

Spurning this opportunity forces theArmy to pay `3,800 crore extra for the 700 more T-90S tanks that HVF willeventually build. The indent for thoseshould have been placed on OFB in early-2011, that is 30 months before the currentproduction run ends in mid-2013. But theArmy is holding back, insisting that it needsto be satisfied that the T-90S tanks alreadybuilt are free of production glitches.

“The Army wants indigenous T-90S tobe observed and user confidence built up[before placing a fresh indent]. So far, the users have run only the first batch of 24 tanks, delivered in 2009-10, to the

extent where they can properly evaluatetheir performance. The 51 tanks that wedelivered in 2010-11 have yet to beadequately exploited,” points out Jain.Asked why a supplementary indent formore T-90S tanks had not yet been placedon HVF, the MoD did not respond.

Russian Game-PlanIt was in the late 1990s, that the proposedpurchase of the T-90S tanks – billed as ahigh-tech battle-winner for an affordableprice – was touted as a model of growingRussia-India partnership. With Russiaproviding full transfer of technology (ToT),HVF was to capitalise on its experience ofbuilding the T-72M1 which was then themainstay of the Army’s strike formations.Today, that expectation seems grimlyironic, perhaps even a sign of Indiannaiveté in the face of Russian duplicity.

The T-90S contract, signed on January15, 2001, for `3,625 crore, committedRussia to supply 310 tanks to the IndianArmy and to licence the building of another

DECEMBER 2011 DSI

1,000 in HVF Avadi. The 310 T-90S tanksthat were built by the Russian facility,UralVagonZavod, began to flow in quickly:124 in fully built condition; 86 in semi-knocked down kits (SKD); and 100 incompletely knocked down kits (CKD). But the transfer of technology and the supply of assemblies for building the 1,000 tanks in India quickly hit aRussian stonewall.

First, Russia took one-and-a half years totransfer the ToT documents that were theessential first steps towards building the T-90S in India. When those tonnes ofdocuments finally arrived, they were inRussian; translating them into English tookanother one-and-a-half years.

Worse was to follow. HVF officialsdiscovered that Russia had withheld keydetails of the T-90S technology withoutvalid reason. The documents for crucialcomponents – including the tank’s maingun and a key frontal section of the turretarmour – were not provided. When askedfor those technologies to be transferred in

accordance with the contract, Russianofficials blandly responded that they weresecret. To this day, Russia has nottransferred full technology for building theT-90S in India. It should be added that theEmbassy of Russia in New Delhi hasignored an email asking for theircomments on this issue.

When asked how the T-90S was beingbuilt without these technologies, M.S.N.Rao, General Manager of HVF Avadiadmits: “Eventually we developed the tank gun indigenously in Central OrdnanceDepot, Kanpur, and the turret armourcomponent in CVRDE, Avadi. This is still a sticking point between India andRussia,” said Rao.

Clearly, this remains a serious irritantbetween New Delhi and Moscow, evidenteven in the careful language of MoD pressreleases. On October 5, 2011, the day afterDefence Minister A.K. Antony met hisRussian counterpart, A.E. Serdyukov inMoscow as a part of the apex Indo-RussianInter-Governmental Commission on

Military-Technical Cooperation (IRIGC-MTC), the MoD release noted that “ShriAntony drew the attention of the Russianside to the vexing issue of delayed exportclearances for vital repair equipment foralready contracted weapons systems. Thishas been affecting supplies of defenceequipment and spares.”

For Indian officers in Avadi, this was notjust a political hot potato but also a matterthat was holding up their flagshipproduction line. By the end of 2007,Russia’s refusal to provide the contractedtechnologies, and also key aggregates(components and sub-systems) that theHVF needs for building T-90S tanks inAvadi, has blocked indigenous productionfor almost seven years.

The Russian game-plan was evidentlyto leave India with no choice but to ordermore fully built T-90S tanks from theUralVagonZavod plant which was lyingidle because the Russian military wasplacing no orders. And India dulycapitulated, ordering 347 more T-90Stanks from UralVagonZavod in November2007 for ̀ 4,900 crore. Of these, 124 were to be fully built, while 223 would come insemi-knocked down condition. An IAofficer who expressed his frustration to his Russian counterparts recalls thetaunting Russian response: “Starting T-72 production took you ten years. Howcan you imagine that you will produce the T-90 in just six or seven years?” It maybe recalled, that this was also the period when Russia demanded an extraUSD 1.5 billion from India for refitting theaircraft carrier, Admiral Gorshkov, nowINS Vikramaditya.

Immediately after India purchased theadditional 347 T-90S tanks, Russia begansupplying the components needed forbuilding the T-90S in HVF. Jain recallswryly how the logjam was broken: “In 2006,when the Defence Minister went to Russia,he took up the issue. Then help startedflowing in and we could start the productionof T-90S in 2008.”

Apart from having to deal with Russia’s blockage of key technologies andaggregates, the Army received anothershock. It discovered to its horror, in themidst of Operation Parakram, the near-war face-off with Pakistan in 2002, that thenewly inducted T-90S fleet was not battle-worthy. The Thales-Optronika thermalimaging (TI) night sights supplied with the

26 27

ARMOURED VEHICLES

The Heavy VehiclesFactory currently builds 100 T-90S

tanks per year, with that capacity planned

to be expanded to 140annually. HVF also

builds 30-50 Arjun MBTs each year; some 50T-72 variants like bridge

layer tanks and trawls;and it overhauls 120

T-72s annually.

” Improved ArjunMark-I beingreadied fortrials, Avadi

AJA

I SH

UK

LA


2928

DECEMBER 2011 DSI

HVF T-90S — essential for firing tankweapons accurately at night — quicklystopped functioning in the blistering hotdesert summers in which Indian tankregiments routinely exercise and fight. Foryears, while the Army consideredalternatives, the indigenous building of T-90S tanks went onto the backburner; onlyin November 2004, almost four years afterthe T-90S contract, did the Army indentfor 300 tanks to be built by HVF.

To this day, the problem of the Thales-Optronika night sight remains a bugbear.By the time the second contract was signedfor 347 T-90S tanks, refinements to theelectronics did improve the night sight’stolerance to high temperatures.

Most tank soldiers find the idea of air-conditioning galling. They believe that atank must fight ‘opened up’, with thecommander half-outside his turret toremain oriented to the battlefield. But HVFofficials believe airconditioning can beeffective even if the turret remains open.“Even if we manage to reduce thetemperature by ten degrees, theperformance of the electronics will begreatly improved,” says Sudhakar K., JointGeneral Manager, General Assembly.

Equally worrisome were problems withthe barrel-fired Invar missile, a weaponthat was considered a clinching factor inbuying the T-90S in the first place. Andindeed with India poised for war withPakistan the Invar missiles received fromRussia were found to be unusable. Theywere quietly sent back to Russia.

Continuing FiascoEven more alarmingly, the Armydiscovered that the T-90S’ sights were not calibrated for firing Indian made tank ammunition which was noticed to befalling well short of the targets. Even as apanicked MoD appealed to the DefenceResearch and Development Organisation(DRDO) and other research institutions to re-orient the T-90S’ fire controlcomputer to Indian ammunition tankrounds were hastily shipped in from Russiaat great cost.

The fiasco continues; more than a decade later, India has eventually builtjust 150 T-90S tanks. But Moscow seemsunconcerned about any damage to its statusas India’s premier arms supplier. TheRussian arms’ industry no longer has thebreadth to beat off competition from the

US, France, Israel, UK and also indigenousadvances in multiple areas that were onceits exclusive stamping ground.

Moscow might well have reconciled tothe conclusion that the T-90S will be thelast tank that India buys from Russia. Theemergence of the Arjun as a serious heavyMain Battle Tank has already begunshutting out the Russians from the desertborder and the successful development ofthe FMBT programme will fully establishIndia as a country that no longer needs toimport tanks.

That the IA has some distance to cover insupporting this aim becomes evident froma visit to the Arjun assembly line in Avadi.Housed in a giant prefabricated structure inone corner of the HVF, this was set up in 2000 when the Army indented for 124 Arjuns. Now, with a second indenthaving been approved by the MoD’s apexDefence Acquisition Council for 124 Arjun Mark-II tanks, the capacity of the Arjunline is being expanded from 30 tanks peryear to 50 tanks.

The `100 crore that the MoD hasallocated for this upgrade will be split twoways: Ordnance Factory Medak, in AndhraPradesh, where the Arjun’s hulls andturrets are built, will get ` 65 crore; whileHVF Avadi, where the tank is finallyassembled, will get ̀ 35 crore.

Presently, though, there is little activityon the Arjun line. Of the 124 tanks that theArmy ordered, 110 have already beendelivered and the remaining 14 almostcompleted. Starting from July 2008, whenthe Army finally cleared the Arjun Mark-Ifor induction, the production line workedfeverishly to equip two tank regiments withthe Arjun: 43 Armoured Regiment in 2009and the 75 Armoured Regiment in 2010.But once the last 14 tanks are delivered, theproduction line will fall silent. The managerof the Arjun production line says his skilledworkers will be farmed out elsewhere.

“We can send our workers to HVF’sother lines. But what can we do about thedislocation of our sub-contractors, many of them small enterprises around

Chennai, who supply thousands of Arjuncomponents like fuel pipes and bearings.They will seek other work because theyknow they will get no orders until an indentis placed for the Arjun Mark-II. And, whenwe need them again, they might not beavailable,” says Ashutosh Kumar, WorksManager at HVF.

A year from now is the earliest that theArmy will indent for the Arjun Mark-II.And that will only happen if the CentralVehicles R&D Organisation, the DRDOlaboratory that has developed the Arjun,can satisfy the Directorate-General ofMechanised Forces (DGMF) in crucialtrials next summer that the new, improvedArjun is ready for operational service.

S.Sundaresh, DRDO’s Chief Controllerfor Armament and Combat Engineering(CC ACE), explains that the Army and theDRDO have agreed upon 18 major and 70minor improvements that will upgrade theArjun Mark-I to the Mark-II level. CVRDE iscurrently upgrading two Arjuns; if thesepass Army trials that are planned for

January and June 2012, the HVF will get anindent for 124 Arjun Mark-II tanks. But fornow the production line will lie idle.

“Our worry now is: what will the Arjunline do? We are asking the DGMF to placethe indent now so that the procurement oflong lead items can begin. For example, thesteel factory at Rourkela takes 12-18 monthsto deliver the steel plates for tanks. Placingthe indent now will allow that fabrication tostart and the steel plates and structures willbe received in 2013. Even if the indent isplaced today, there will be a one-year lull inproduction,” says Sundaresh.

“We will deliver the first Arjun Mark-IIabout 30 months after the specificationsare finalised and a go-ahead given. Weneed 30 months to order and deliver,” saysJain. But Army and CVRDE officers aresceptical; they see a 30-month time line asunreasonably ambitious.

At the CVRDE’s Arjun facility, a hive of activity, work on the Arjun is on. Two key leaders of the Arjun Project, V. Balamurugan and G.K. Kumaravel,show how two modified Mark-1 Arjuns, one of which underwent gruelling Army trials over summer to evaluate the 45 modifications that were alreadycompleted. The biggest success duringthese trials was to demonstrate that the

modified Arjun, which will weigh at least65-66 tonnes, is as mobile as the Arjun Mark-I, which is three tonnes lighter.

“Thanks to a major modification in thetransmission system, the Arjun remains asmobile as it was. We ran it for 1,300km,loading dead weight until it was 65.5 tonnes.The tank’s performance, acceleration,torque, working temperature and fuelconsumption was actually better than in theArjun Mark-I,” claims Balamurugan.

ModificationsWhile this modification increased thebattlefield mobility of the Arjun, the trade-off has been in maximum speed. The ArjunMark-II can do a maximum of 60 kmph,compared with the 70 kmph top speed ofthe Arjun Mark-I. The Army has acceptedthis lower speed, since tanks seldom go attop speed in the cross-country conditions ofthe battlefield.

Another major modification is a newhydro-pneumatic suspension for theheavier Arjun Mark-II. Capable ofhandling a 70-tonne load, this incorporatesthe latest technologies to overcomeoccasional problems that the Arjun Mark-Ihas observed over the last two decades:grease leakage, track shedding. TheCVRDE chief, Dr P. Sivakumar, an award-winning specialist in suspension systems,has masterminded the brand newsuspension.

The new version of the Arjun will alsofeature an all-new TI night sight for thetank commander, replacing the day-only sight that featured in earlier Arjuns.This would allow the Arjun to function in ‘hunter-killer’ mode – the commanderas ‘hunter;’ and the gunner as ‘killer’ —both by day and night. In this, thecommander scans the battlefield throughhis TI sight; spotting a target, heelectronically allocates it to the gunner tofire at and destroy, while he gets back tohunting for more enemy targets.

“The new commander’s sight is asaccurate and detailed as the gunner’s sight.It allows the commander to fire at thetarget if he wants, but we recommend thatthe gunner engage the target since heusually has better firing skills than thecommander. But if the gunner isincapacitated, the commander can fire aswell,” says Sundaresh.

The Arjun Mark-II is also fitted with adriver’s night vision device based on ‘un-

ARMOURED VEHICLES

Everyone in HVF andCVRDE has a simple

suggestion for the Armyon how to reduce the costof the Arjun: increase the

size of the order. For anArmy with more than3,500 tanks, many of

them obsolete T-72s thatare crying out for

replacement, an order forjust 124 Arjun Mark-IIs

seems pitifully low.

”

A soldier sits on a T-55tank as he participatesin an exercise at KunwarBet in the Rann ofKutch, Ahmedabad

AFP


air defence gun and explosive reactivearmour with most; the cost rises further.Meanwhile, the value of the rupee isdown… a Euro is ̀ 70 today.

“Half the price of the Arjun goes on justthree imported systems: the power pack,which we buy from Renk in Germany; thegunner’s main sight from OIP Systems,Belgium; and the gun control equipment fromBosch, Germany,” explains Kumar at HVF.

Everyone in HVF and CVRDE has asimple suggestion for the Army on how toreduce the cost of the Arjun: increase the size of the order. For an Army with morethan 3,500 tanks, many of them obsolete sT-72s that are crying out for replacement, anorder for just 124 Arjun Mark-IIs seemspitifully low.

“The numbers make a big difference topricing. All the Arjun’s major aggregates

are outsourced, and if the Army’s indent is limited to 124 tanks, the vendors chargehigher prices. Besides, the amortisation of jigs, tools and equipment is reduced overa larger order. HVF and CVRDE have been jointly requesting the Army toconfirm an order of at least 250 Arjun Mark-IIs so that we can negotiate from astronger position,” says Jain.

“If you are talking just 124 tanks, there isa problem. Bring an order for 500 tanks. We will go for ToT for the foreignparts. The cost of labour in Germany is the highest in the world. We will build 70 percent cheaper in India. If webuy the power pack of the Arjun for ` 7.5crore today; I will produce it in India for just `5 crore,” an impassioned Sivakumar claims.

But the problem is that the Army

has little stakes in reducing costs. Seniorofficers do not rule out the ordering of more Arjuns but they are content to place the orders piecemeal. Thatnotwithstanding, the DRDO is optimisticabout the tank that they have nurturedthrough the most difficult of developmentprocesses. “Once we demonstrate themissile firing capability in January, and theother improvements next summer, weexpect the Army to increase the numbersby another 124 more to 256 before theproduction commences,” says Sundaresh.

It is an expectation that comes with amassive goal. Today, all eyes are on theforthcoming trials because as India’sdefence establishment knows, theperformance of the Arjun Mark-II will becrucial in shaping the Army’s futureapproach towards indigenisation.

cooled thermal imaging,’ which allows thedriver to see 300-500 metres even on apitch-dark night. This is far better than theMark-I, in which the driver’s ‘imageintensifier’ required some ambient light. A DRDO laboratory, InstrumentR&D Establishment, Dehradun, has alsodeveloped the new driver’s sight.

“We have also developed an ‘ammunitioncontainerisation system’. If the tank is hit,and the on-board ammunition ignites, it willexplode outwards saving the crew. Ametallic box with ‘blow-off panels’ directsthe explosion outwards,” says Kumaravel.

“These four major modifications – thecommander’s night sight; the driver’s nightvision device, ammunition containerisation;and the mobility performance at 65 tonnes –have been tried out successfully in summer,”says Sundaresh with satisfaction.

Due for trials in January is another newcapability: missile firing through the ArjunMark-II’s main gun. While the firing ofIsraeli LAHAT missiles was demonstrated,the sighting and firing systems needintegration into the gunner’s main sight by itsvendors, OIP Sensor Systems (Belgium) andSAGEM (France). “We plan to fire 18LAHAT missile during the January trialsand evaluate the hit probability of themissile. The LAHAT’s manufacturer, IsraeliAircraft Industries, claims a hit probability of90 percent,” says Sundaresh.

Make or Break Trials These new systems and capabilities, whichaim to make the Arjun Mark-II a world-class tank will be evaluated during make-or-break trials next summer. Only a singlecrucial system will come in later, perhapsnext October: a laser warning countermeasure system. This senses the laser of anincoming missile, which means that themissile is just 10-15 seconds away.Automatically, the system launches smokegrenades, which creates a smokescreenaround one’s own tank blinding theincoming missile.

The development of the Arjun Mark- II isclosely tracked by the Arjun CoreCommittee, which meets every month inChennai. CVRDE says that, if proof isneeded of the Army’s new acceptance of theArjun, it is can be seen by the smoothnesswith which the committee operates.Chaired by the CVRDE director andattended by brigadier-level representativesfrom every concerned Army branch – the

directorates of mechanised forces; weapons& equipment (DGWE); electrical andmechanical engineers (DGEME); qualityassurance (DGQA); and also agencies likeHVF – this committee monitors every stepof the development process. In the event ofa developmental roadblock, the committeeimmediately, and consultatively, arrives atan alternative.

The head of the Arjun Core Committee,Dr P. Sivakumar, believes that this newcooperation will be key to the Arjun’ssuccess: “For years, one of the reasons forthe Arjun’s slow development was thatstakeholders were not cooperating. I don’twant to comment on whether it was theDRDO’s fault or the Army’s. But today weare all working in unison.”

However, an emerging problem in theArjun programme could be the prohibitivecost of the Arjun Mark-II. On August 29,Defence Minister A.K. Antony announcedin Parliament: “The likely estimated costof each MBT Arjun Mark-II with allmajor/minor improvements will beapproximately ̀ 37 crore.”

This is twice the Arjun Mark-I’s price of `18 crore and within touching distance ofthe M1 Abrams, the US-manufacturedMBT that is regarded as the global

benchmark. The cost of the M1 Abrams –going by the July notification to the USCongress of the sale of 125 Abrams to Egyptfor USD 1.3 billion — is USD 10.4 million, or` 52 crore, per tank.

Both HVF and CVRDE say that theArmy has no problem with such a highcost; it has asked for high technology and iswilling to pay the price. The Mark-II, theysay, is technologically far superior to theMark-I; and that advantage comes withfinancial implications.

“In the Arjun Mark-1 we had acommander’s panoramic sight, which theDRDO built and we paid for in rupees. Butthe Mark-II’s commander’s TI sight hasmany new features and costs twice asmuch. You want to fire a missile — thatcapability costs. The new transmissioncosts. You [the Army] wants an advanced

DECEMBER 2011 DSI

3130

ARMOURED VEHICLES

The emergence of the Arjun Mark-II as

a serious heavy MainBattle Tank has already

begun shutting out the Russians from

the desert border; andthe successful

development of theFuture Main Battle Tank

programme will fullyestablish India as a

country that no longerneeds to import tanks.

”

Indian armouredvehicles take partin a ceremonialparade in Kolkata

AFP


33

DECEMBER 2011 DSI

32

NAVY

PREMVIR DAS

Sailors on board IndianNavy’s aircraft carrier

INS Viraat offMumbai’s coast

AT UNEASE Navies build ships; they do notbuy them goes the weather-beaten naval axiom attributedto a famous English admiral of

yester-years. Independent India’s Navylearnt this lesson quickly. While a second-hand aircraft carrier and 19 major surfacewarships had to be purchased from theUnited Kingdom soon after Independence,plans to build major surface warships inthe country had begun to crystallise veryearly and took root in 1968 when the keel of the INS Nilgiri was laid at MazagonDocks Ltd (MDL), a shipyard acquired by

the Ministry of Defence (MoD) as aDefence Public Sector Undertaking(DPSU). This first modern Indian-builtwarship was commissioned in 1972.

Since then, 14 frigates/destroyers built atthis yard have been commissioned into theNavy and four more are in various stages ofconstruction. With their delivery, whichshould be completed by 2020, MDL will havebuilt 18 major surface warships since 1972.

The first ship was built entirely withdesign and equipment purchased from theUnited Kingdom. In the next three ships,several British sensors were replaced with

AFP

More that six decades after Independence, there is only one shipyard in Indiawhich can build destroyers and frigates but India has the potential to achievea quantum jump in building warships

KEY POINTSn The Navy must have at least 25destroyers/frigates and 20submarines by 2020.n Recently, orders for a few low profile ships have been given to some private sectorcompanies. n The first nuclear submarine, INSArihant, was launched last year butgiven the complexities that areinvolved, may not be deliveredbefore 2014.

Warships.qxp:INDO-PAK.qxd 02/12/11 3:41 PM Page 2

Engineers (GRSE), another DPSU, and hasplaced orders for three ships. Until then,this yard has been building relativelysimple vessels required for hydrographicsurvey and assorted small craft andconstruction of complex warships likefrigates. This is expected to be a slow andlearning process which would yielddividends later.

The first of the three ships, the INSBrahmaputra, could be delivered only inthe late 1990s with the other two comingin some years later. Once again, chaos in the USSR was partly responsible for

the delay; also contributing for lowproduction was the stressful industrialclimate in Kolkata and slow growth of skillsin the DPSU. This notwithstanding, it was agood stepping stone but the Navy, unhappywith the time delays, was shortsighted and committed a serious blunder bydiscontinuing frigate production at GRSE.

Current StatusThe net result is that more that six decadesafter Independence, MDL is the onlyshipyard in India which can build destroyersand frigates, about one every 18 months orso, and imports have had to be made toprevent force level from dwindling.

On the positive side there has been thegrowing competence of the naval designbureau. Every one of the ships, starting with the INS Godavari, has been entirelydesigned by this group. In addition tofrigates and destroyers, smaller ships, mostnotably, corvettes of about 1500 tonnes havebeen designed and a dozen of them, mostbuilt at GRSE are now operational. A largereplenishment tanker and some amphibiousships have also been built there apart from acontinuing line of hydrographic ships. All ofthem have been designed in-house.

Recognising the need for yet anotherfacility where lower profile platforms, like offshore patrol vessels for the Navy and the Coast Guard could be built, theMinistry of Defence acquired the GoaShipyard Ltd (GSL). This facility has nowdelivered over a dozen of the larger vesselsand several smaller ones and has even builtsome of the small fast missile vessels thatthe Navy needed.

More recently, the MoD has acquired afourth DPSU, the Hindustan Shipyard Ltd.(HSL) at Vishakhapatnam, primarily forconstruction of submarines. These facilitieshave created a good base for indigenouswarship construction.

The indigenous building of submarineswas, correctly, delayed until sufficientexpertise was built up in construction of surface warships. In 1983, a contract was signed for the purchase of two boats of German design (HDW) followed by building two at MDL with equipmentpackages supplied by the parent company.Submarines are required to operate at greatdepths and safety standards are far morestringent. Enhanced construction skills areneeded and MDL-trained a sizeable team ofworkers in Germany. The two locally built

Dutch equivalents, their interfacing withthe retained items being undertaken by thefledgling Indian naval design team. In thefifth and sixth vessels, changes to the hulldesign itself were made by this group whichenhanced capabilities considerably. Thedesign bureau, having gained in confidence,went to the next stage of designing an entireship using equipment and systems fromdiverse sources, no easy task. This resultedin the much larger and operationallycapable Godavari-class frigates which werebuilt by MDL between 1983 and 1987. Thenthings took a turn for the worse.

With the collapse of the USSR in 1990and the resultant chaos, supply of weaponand sensor systems from that source wasdisrupted; financial resources also becamea serious constraint. In the event, the nextship from MDL, the destroyer, INS Delhi,could be delivered only in 1997. Two more ofthis type came thereafter in five years andboasted capabilities much above theirpredecessors. Since then, two Shivalik-classfrigates have been commissioned and athird followed by three ships of a projecttermed 15A (Delhi-class follow-on) are inthe pipeline.

Ground RealityThe useful life of a frigate/destroyer isaround 25 years. So, if the starting strengthis 25, all would need to be phased out inthis period and an equal number built toreplace them with no addition to the forcelevel. This means that MDL will have todeliver a ship every year which it has beenunable to do.

Faced with this ground reality, five shipshave been purchased from the USSR in the1980s and, at the same time, the Navy hasdecided to start a second frigate productionline at the Garden Reach Shipbuilders and

DECEMBER 2011 DSI

34 35

NAVY

AFP

AFP

Naval tankersINS Aditya andINS Gomti off theGoa coast; (right)INS Shivalik

Despite having purchased 8 ships in thelast 40 years and having

built another 17, the Navy still has only 21 major surface

warships, about the sameas it deployed in 1971.On the basis of orders

presently underexecution, the strength ofmajor surface warships is

unlikely to exceed 20 in2020. As for submarines,

it will be a miracle if theforce level crosses 14 a

decade hence.

”


3736

DECEMBER 2011 DSI

submarines were delivered by the mid-1990s. It was envisaged that the line would becontinued with increased indigenous designand equipment content but a spate ofallegations of bribes having been paid led to termination of dealings with HDW in1987. Consequently, several MDL workers,trained at great cost, migrated elsewhere.

It took nearly two decades before freshnegotiations for the French Scorpene classboats could be concluded and a projectinvolving construction of six submarines ofthis design and equipment package is nowin motion at MDL. It is expected that thefirst boat will be commissioned in 2013-14and the remaining five may take anothereight years.

Fresh PurchasesRecognising the seriously dwindlingsubmarine force levels following the self-inflicted HDW fiasco, the MoD is nowcontemplating fresh purchase of twovessels followed by building of five more inIndia, possibly at HSL. Finalisation of thisproject is nowhere in sight.

As highlighted, sustaining a force levelis no easy matter as ships get phased out continuously. This is why despitehaving purchased eight ships in the last 40 years and built another 17, the Navy stillhas only 21 major surface warships, aboutthe same as it deployed in 1971. On thebasis of orders presently under execution,the strength of major surface warships is unlikely to exceed 20 in 2020.

As for submarines, it will be a miracle ifthe force level crosses 14 a decade hence,much less than the 20 that wereoperational fifteen years ago. While everyeffort must be made to improveproductivity and to modernise facilities inthe DPSUs, it is abundantly clear that otherIndian entities must be inducted into thewarship construction business.

Given the emerging security scenario,the Indian Navy must have at least 25destroyers/frigates and 20 submarines by2020 and a larger number of both by 2025.Since this is clearly well beyond thecapabilities of DPSUs, we must eitherimport or expand building capacities, infact, both. In recent months, orders for afew low profile ships have been given tosome private sector companies and this is astep in the right direction.

Major warships, jammed with weaponsand sensors are complex platforms, and

chosen private sector yards must be allowedto enter into collaboration with suitableforeign manufacturers to gain the requiredexpertise. Transparency in going about thisenhancement is critical as allegations andcounter-allegations of illegal transactionsby competing interests can only act to thedetriment of the objective. Nothing is moreillustrative of this ever present danger thanrecent reports that acceptance of a privateshipyard as its subsidiary by MDL has gotthe MoD to freeze that action and to reviewthe matter afresh.

There are three to four privateshipbuilders who have the potential to meetthe Navy’s needs if they are nurtured and

they should be treated on par with theDPSUs rather than inducted throughapparent subterfuge.

Mention needs to be made of twoambitious projects involving the building of an aircraft carrier and nuclearsubmarines. Construction of the aircraftcarrier, sanctioned ten years ago, is beingundertaken at a public sector shipyard inKochi and facing many teething problems;it may take another three to four yearsbefore this ship becomes operational.

The first nuclear submarine, INSArihant, was launched last year but giventhe complexities that are involved inmaking the reactor operational and

proving its other components, may not bedelivered before 2014.

The MoD has been farsighted inauthorising the building of two more ofthese boats and L&T, a major privatesector company, has been associated inbuilding their hulls. This same sagacityhas to be shown by ordering a follow-onaircraft carrier even now. Such ships takeseveral years to build and long termdecisions are essential.

Unsatisfactory PositionSome issues relevant in the immediate timeframe need to be noted. As highlightedearlier, based on existing force levels, orders

under execution and wastages, the Navywill, at best, be able to deploy an ocean-going fleet of 2 aircraft carriers, 2 nuclearsubmarines, 20 frigates/destroyers and 14conventional submarines in 2020. There areplans to build seven frigates under license,four in MDL and three in GRSE but there isno possibility of their being delivered in thenext nine years. The collaborating firm hasstill to be finalised, MDL has its hands fullwith orders already in hand and GRSE will take time to get ready for the complexitiesof the task.

However, with maritime securitybecoming more worrisome, the MoD mustseriously consider buying at least 2 ships,preferable 3 outright and concurrentlybuild the rest in the country so that aminimum of 25 major surface warshipsare available in our inventory by 2020.

As far as conventional submarines areconcerned, the present position is veryunsatisfactory as the numbers operable in2020 are going to be well below those thatthe Navy could deploy in the 1990s. Thereare plans to build six such boats indigenouslyunder license but prudent decision makerswill know that even with the best intentions,this will not happen in the 2020 time-frame.Outright purchase of three submarines andconcurrent production of the remaining, at HSL, is needed. Our objective should be to have three production lines for

frigates/destroyers in place so that thedesired force levels can be put in place by2025. With the MDL already engaged in thatactivity and GRSE earmarked to do thesame, the need for a third shipyard, in theprivate sector, deserves serious attention.Collaboration with a foreign shipyard willbe easier and the facility will becomefunctional sooner.

As far as submarines are concerned,two production lines at MDL and HSL should suffice for the moment.Increasing use should be made of theseveral private yards in the country forlower profile ships. The construction ofaircraft carriers is best kept at the KochiPSU but expertise already created at L&Tfor hulls of nuclear submarines can beexploited for larger amphibious andreplenishment ships.

All this may sound logical but not soeasily done. The MoD, or rather itsDepartment of Defence Production, longused to monopoly of naval shipbuilding isresistant to the ingress of private sectorcompanies in its sphere of activity. Strongleadership is required to counter thisopposition. Another difficulty is thereluctance to import ships on theargument that it will hinder self-reliance.While indigenisation is, no doubt,desirable it should be viewed objectivelywhile matching deliverables withoperational needs.

In some cases, judicious ‘buy-and-make’ decisions can, actually, expedite theobjective of self-reliance as transfer oftechnology reduces the learning processand facilitates progressive improvementof the product.

Finally, availability of human resourceswith the Navy can also be a constraint.Each and every project of ship building,whichever the shipyard, requires thebuyer-the Navy-to monitor constructionactivity on a continuous basis and tointervene and get corrections made asnecessary. The work is multi-disciplinaryand people of the required experience andnumbers are not easy to find.

To the credit of the Navy it has played astellar role in getting indigenous warshipproduction to the level that it has reached. Aplatform has been reached which, ifsuitably exploited, can result in a quantumjump in warship building in the yearsahead. We have come a long way but thereare still many miles to go.

NAVY

Given the emergingsecurity scenario, the

Navy must have at least25 destroyers/frigatesand 20 submarines by

2020 and a larger numberof both by 2025. Since

this is clearly well beyondthe capabilities of DPSUs,we must either import or

expand buildingcapacities, in fact, both.

”

Warship INS Chennaibefore its launch atthe Mazgaon Dock,Mumbai

AFP


G.PARTHASARTHY

The epicentre of Pakistan’s nuclearand missile development is nowlocated in the triangle connectingthree towns in Central Punjab –

Chashma, Fatehjang and Khushab. This isalso the area into which China’s entireassistance to Pakistan for the development of nuclear power, nuclear weapons andballistic and cruise missiles is funneled.Additionally, Chinese supplied nuclearpower plants are located in Chashma.

While Dr A.Q. Khan is often describedas the father of Pakistan’s nuclear weaponsand missile programmes, the real leader inits missile and nuclear weaponsdevelopment is a scientist by the name ofDr Samar Mubarak Mand, who supervisedthe Chagai nuclear tests in May 1998.While. Khan’s main claim to fame, apartfrom his notoriety in proliferation ofnuclear weapons designs and knowhow,was his purloining of nuclear enrichmentknowhow from the Netherlands, theserious work on warheads and missiles wasunder Mand’s supervision.

Dr Samar Mubarak Mand has been thehead of Pakistan’s National DevelopmentComplex (NDC) since its inception in 1990.The NDC is designated as an aerospaceagency and has played a crucial role in the development of the solid-fuelledShaheen-1 (range 750km) and Shaheen-2(range 2,500km) Ballistic Missiles. The Shaheen-1 is a clone of the Chinese DF 15/M-9 missile, while the Shaheen-2appears to be a variant of the Chinese DF-21. The entire missile programme,including the Babur (range 500km) andRa’ad (range 250-300km), both subsoniccruise missiles, has been codenamed the Integrated Missile Research andDevelopment Programme (IMRDR). Theintegration of warheads with missiles is also reported to be an important functionof the NDC. The development of cruisemissiles comes in the wake of India’sdetermination to develop strong androbust anti-missile defences after the 1998nuclear weapons tests.

Active AssistanceRecognising that Pakistan required lighter plutonium warheads for theminiaturisation and fitment on missiles of Chinese origin, China provided activeassistance to Pakistan in the development ofplutonium reactors and reprocessingplants. Plutonium weapons are lighter,

39

DECEMBER 2011 DSI

38

REGION

Though post-Abbotabadthe China-Pakistanequation has beencemented, it goes backto the 1980s when Chinabegan helpingPakistan’s nuclearweapon’s programme

AFP

Pakistan’s Prime Minister YusufRaza Gilani (right) and China'sPremier Wen Jiabao inspect aguard of honour at the Great Hallof the People in Beijing

FRINGE BENEFITS

KEY POINTSn There is evidence that China hasbeen supplying Pakistan with arange of nuclear weapons designs.n The US has remained silenteven though China has beenproviding unsafeguarded plutoniumreactors and reprocessing plants to Pakistann China has shown remarkableinsensitivity to Indian concernsabout the activities of Pakistan-based millitant groups.

china-pakistan.qxp:INDO-PAK.qxd 02/12/11 3:43 PM Page 2

DECEMBER 2011 DSI

from the Pakistani nuclear programme,there is no Pakistani nuclear programme”.There is evidence, including hints fromPrime Minister Zulfikar Ali’s Bhutto’sprison memoirs, that suggests that Chinaformally agreed to help Pakistan to developnuclear weapons when Bhutto, then PrimeMinister, visited China in 1976.

It is now acknowledged that by 1983China supplied Pakistan with enoughenriched for around two weapons and thedesigns for a 25 kiloton bomb. Chinesesupport for the Pakistan programme isbelieved to have included a quid pro quo inthe form of Pakistan providing China thedesigns of centrifuge enrichment plants.China’s assistance to Pakistan continuedeven after it acceded to the NPT. WhenPakistan’s enrichment programme faced

problems in 1995, China supplied Pakistan5,000 ring magnets. It was around thistime that China’s assistance to Pakistan todevelop plutonium-based nuclear weaponsprogramme picked up momentum.

There is evidence to establish that Chinahas supplied Pakistan with a range ofnuclear weapons designs, commencing inthe early 1980s. While the nuclear weaponsdesigns supplied by Khan to Libya were of aChinese warhead tested in the 1960s, thenuclear warheads tested by Pakistan in1998 were of a more modern design. Whilesome work for the development ofPakistan’s plutonium nuclear warheadsmay be carried out at Mubarak Mand’sNational Development Complex, the nexusbetween this complex and China’s nuclearestablishments has been so close that India

40

REGION

and have a higher explosive yield thanweapons based on enriched uranium, and they form the mainstay of Pakistan’snuclear weapons programme, since itsinception in the 1970s. Plutonium weaponscan also be fitted on Pakistan’s cruisemissiles. They have a higher yield of 50 to 100 kilotons and can develop eventhermonuclear capabilities.

China’s assistance for Pakistan’s effortsto build plutonium weapons capabilitiescommenced in the 1990s. Pakistan todayhas one operational plutonium reactor inKhushab, whose capacity is estimated to bebetween 40-50 MW. The construction oftwo other plutonium reactors, estimated tohave similar capacity and which wereinspected by Prime Minister Gilani inFebruary 2010, is believed to be nearing

completion. The plutonium reprocessingfacilities are located or under constructionin Khushab and Chashma.

Pakistan’s plutonium reactors can eachproduce an estimated 22 kilograms ofweapons-grade plutonium annually. It isestimated that once the three reactors are fully operational, Pakistan will have the capacity to produce ten high-yieldplutonium weapons annually. It is notsurprising that most analysts regardPakistan’s programme as the fastestgrowing nuclear weapons programme inthe world.

Interestingly, while China has providedthe unsafeguarded plutonium reactors andreprocessing plants over the past twodecades to Pakistan, the Americans, whogo ballistic on alleged proliferation by

countries like Iran, have remainednoticeably silent on China’s actions whichconstitute gross violations of itscommitments under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Missile Technology Control Regime(MTCR). Under US law, China should havebeen subject to stringent sanctions forthese actions. But, being a PermanentMember of the UN Security Council, with anuclear weapons programme sanctified bythe NPT, it has been left untouched.

Extensive DocumentationChina’s assistance to Pakistan’s nuclearprogramme is extensively documented.Recently, the Director of the WisconsinProject of Arms Control Gary Milhollincommented: “If you subtract China’s help

41

Recognising that Pakistan required lighter plutoniumwarheads for the

miniaturisation andfitment on missiles

of Chinese origin, Chinahas provided active

assistance to Pakistan.

”

(Left) Former Pakistani PrimeMinister Shaukat Aziz andChairperson of China AtomicEnergy Authority Sun Qin (right)inaugurate a nuclear power projectat Chashma; Pakistan’s Shaheen-2missile being test fired from anundisclosed location

AFPAFP


has to be prepared for the fact that Pakistanis on the way to developing boosted fission and even thermonuclear warheads, with Chinese assistance. Having violatedits commitments under the NPT, China is now hardly likely to hold back inenhancing the lethality of Pakistan’sPlutonium-based weapons.

Post-Abbotobad EquationIs China likely to be more restrained in its nuclear collaboration with Pakistanafter the Abbotabad raid that killed Osamabin Laden? These weapons could, after all,fall into the hands of jihadi non-Stateactors, or even into the hands of extremistelements linked to the Taliban or Al Qaeda,which have, supported Uighur separatists in China’s Xinjiang Region for a long time.A Chinese official accompanying theXinjiang Governor was recently asked ifthe involvement of extremists trainedalong the Pakistan-Afghanistan border hadcaused any strains, or misgivings in thePakistan-China relationship. The Chineseofficial made it clear that the relationshipwas strong enough to withstand the impactof such events.

During the recent Istanbul Conferenceon Afghanistan, China joined Pakistanasking for a complete withdrawal of USforces from Afghanistan after 2014.Moreover, China kept its links with theTaliban open even during the period ofTaliban rule. It has also kept in touch withthe members of the Inter-ServicesIntelligence (ISI)-backed Hizb e Islami, led by Pashtun warlord GulbuddinHekmatyar. It is not without significancethat while India’s experts involved ineconomic development projects and itsdiplomatic and consular premises havebeen attacked by the Taliban inAfghanistan, the Chinese have remainedimmune to such attacks.

China has also shown remarkableinsensitivity to Indian concerns about theactivities of Pakistan-based India-centricterrorist groups like the Lashkar e Taiba(LeT) and the Jaish e Mohammed. For overthree years, China blocked efforts in theUN Security Council to get the Jamat udDawa (the parent organisation of the LeT) declared as an internationalterrorist organisation. It relented only afterAmerican nationals were also killed duringthe 26/11 Mumbai terrorist outrage.

The former Director-General of the

ISI, Lt. General Javed Ashraf Qazi,acknowledged publicly in March 2004 that the Jaish e Mohammed, led byMaulana Masood Azhar, had carried outthe December 2001 attack on India’sParliament. But, prodded by the ISI, the Chinese even today continue to block efforts by the UN Security Council to declare the Jaish e Mohamed aninternational terrorist organisation. Thiswould suggest that even after theAbbotabad raid, the Chinese remain verysensitive to and supportive of the strategiesof the ISI, to ‘bleed’ India.

There has also been no let up in China’ssupport to Pakistan, through supplies ofweapons and equipment for Pakistan’sarmed forces. The supply to and efforts forassembly in Pakistan, of JF-17 fighterscontinues. The same is the case withregard to the supply of frigates forPakistan’s Navy. There is also a distinctpossibility of China supplying J-10 fightersdesigned by the Israelis, to Pakistan,together with reports that Pakistan’s fleet ofAWACs being augmented with Chinaproviding AWACs aircraft to its ‘allweather friend’ Pakistan.

Additionally, the Chinese involvementin the construction of roads in the Gilgit-Baltistan region of Jammu andKashmir continues unabated. A largeportion of these construction activitiesclose to the Line of Control is carried out by members of the China’s People’sLiberation Army (PLA), evoking justifiableIndian concerns. There is also reasonedspeculation in India that the freneticactivity of constructing tunnels by China

4342

DECEMBER 2011 DSI

in the mountainous Gilgit-BaluchistanRegion may well include the constructionof nuclear weapons silos, which can be located in manner that they areimmune to missile and air strikes. This isan option, which is becoming increasinglyimportant for Pakistan, as the control ofthe Pakistan State over large parts of thePakhtunkhwa and Baluchistan provinces isprogressively becoming more and morefragile and tenuous.

There was some speculation thatChina’s refusal to bail out Pakistaneconomically by direct foreign exchangesupport and the provision of untied soft loans may be indicative of waningChinese support for an economicallydysfunctional ’all weather-friend’. This isnot entirely correct.

China rarely, if ever, provides non-project assistance. And, its projectassistance is invariably tied to the supply

of Chinese machinery and equipment andthe provision of Chinese experts andconstruction crews. Moreover, like the USand the IMF, the Chinese appear to haveconcluded that direct foreign exchangesupport would be meaningless, untilPakistan sets its economic house in order.

India will have to be prepared for the fact that Pakistan will remain the key player in the Chinese policy of‘containment,’ directed at it.

REGION

The supply to and efforts for assembly in Pakistan of JF-17fighters continues.

There is also a distinctpossibility of China

supplying J-10 fighters, designed by

the Israelis, to Pakistan,together with reports

that Pakistan’s fleetbeing augmented

with China providingAWACs aircraft to its ‘all-weather friend’

Pakistan.

”

AFP

Chinese J-10 fighterjets at the Yangcun AirForce base, Beijing


has to be prepared for the fact that Pakistanis on the way to developing boosted fission and even thermonuclear warheads, with Chinese assistance. Having violatedits commitments under the NPT, China is now hardly likely to hold back inenhancing the lethality of Pakistan’sPlutonium-based weapons.

Post-Abbotobad EquationIs China likely to be more restrained in its nuclear collaboration with Pakistanafter the Abbotabad raid that killed Osamabin Laden? These weapons could, after all,fall into the hands of jihadi non-Stateactors, or even into the hands of extremistelements linked to the Taliban or Al Qaeda,which have, supported Uighur separatists in China’s Xinjiang Region for a long time.A Chinese official accompanying theXinjiang Governor was recently asked ifthe involvement of extremists trainedalong the Pakistan-Afghanistan border hadcaused any strains, or misgivings in thePakistan-China relationship. The Chineseofficial made it clear that the relationshipwas strong enough to withstand the impactof such events.

During the recent Istanbul Conferenceon Afghanistan, China joined Pakistanasking for a complete withdrawal of USforces from Afghanistan after 2014.Moreover, China kept its links with theTaliban open even during the period ofTaliban rule. It has also kept in touch withthe members of the Inter-ServicesIntelligence (ISI)-backed Hizb e Islami, led by Pashtun warlord GulbuddinHekmatyar. It is not without significancethat while India’s experts involved ineconomic development projects and itsdiplomatic and consular premises havebeen attacked by the Taliban inAfghanistan, the Chinese have remainedimmune to such attacks.

China has also shown remarkableinsensitivity to Indian concerns about theactivities of Pakistan-based India-centricterrorist groups like the Lashkar e Taiba(LeT) and the Jaish e Mohammed. For overthree years, China blocked efforts in theUN Security Council to get the Jamat udDawa (the parent organisation of the LeT) declared as an internationalterrorist organisation. It relented only afterAmerican nationals were also killed duringthe 26/11 Mumbai terrorist outrage.

The former Director-General of the

ISI, Lt. General Javed Ashraf Qazi,acknowledged publicly in March 2004 that the Jaish e Mohammed, led byMaulana Masood Azhar, had carried outthe December 2001 attack on India’sParliament. But, prodded by the ISI, the Chinese even today continue to block efforts by the UN Security Council to declare the Jaish e Mohamed aninternational terrorist organisation. Thiswould suggest that even after theAbbotabad raid, the Chinese remain verysensitive to and supportive of the strategiesof the ISI, to ‘bleed’ India.

There has also been no let up in China’ssupport to Pakistan, through supplies ofweapons and equipment for Pakistan’sarmed forces. The supply to and efforts forassembly in Pakistan, of JF-17 fighterscontinues. The same is the case withregard to the supply of frigates forPakistan’s Navy. There is also a distinctpossibility of China supplying J-10 fightersdesigned by the Israelis, to Pakistan,together with reports that Pakistan’s fleet ofAWACs being augmented with Chinaproviding AWACs aircraft to its ‘allweather friend’ Pakistan.

Additionally, the Chinese involvementin the construction of roads in the Gilgit-Baltistan region of Jammu andKashmir continues unabated. A largeportion of these construction activitiesclose to the Line of Control is carried out by members of the China’s People’sLiberation Army (PLA), evoking justifiableIndian concerns. There is also reasonedspeculation in India that the freneticactivity of constructing tunnels by China

4342

DECEMBER 2011 DSI

in the mountainous Gilgit-BaluchistanRegion may well include the constructionof nuclear weapons silos, which can be located in manner that they areimmune to missile and air strikes. This isan option, which is becoming increasinglyimportant for Pakistan, as the control ofthe Pakistan State over large parts of thePakhtunkhwa and Baluchistan provinces isprogressively becoming more and morefragile and tenuous.

There was some speculation thatChina’s refusal to bail out Pakistaneconomically by direct foreign exchangesupport and the provision of untied soft loans may be indicative of waningChinese support for an economicallydysfunctional ’all weather-friend’. This isnot entirely correct.

China rarely, if ever, provides non-project assistance. And, its projectassistance is invariably tied to the supply

of Chinese machinery and equipment andthe provision of Chinese experts andconstruction crews. Moreover, like the USand the IMF, the Chinese appear to haveconcluded that direct foreign exchangesupport would be meaningless, untilPakistan sets its economic house in order.

India will have to be prepared for the fact that Pakistan will remain the key player in the Chinese policy of‘containment,’ directed at it.

REGION

The supply to and efforts for assembly in Pakistan of JF-17fighters continues.

There is also a distinctpossibility of China

supplying J-10 fighters, designed by

the Israelis, to Pakistan,together with reports

that Pakistan’s fleetbeing augmented

with China providingAWACs aircraft to its ‘all-weather friend’

Pakistan.

”A

FP

Chinese J-10 fighterjets at the Yangcun AirForce base, Beijing


The bomb blast at the Delhi HighCourt on September 7, 2011 took atoll of 15 lives and three monthslater there does not appear to be

any concrete information of who wasresponsible and how the attack took place.The name being floated around byintelligence agencies is that of the IndianMujahideen (IM), a militant organisationwhich has been held responsible for manysimilar blasts in the past. As the year drawsto a close perhaps this an appropriate timeto outline the intents and origins of thislittle-known terror group

Two groups claimed responsibility for the Delhi High Court bomb blasts.Initially, the Harkat-ul-Jihadi Islami(HuJI) claimed ‘credit’, followed soon bythe Indian Mujahideen. For the country’sintelligence establishment the IM seems to be the more obvious perpetrator as on May 25 this year, a similar, though low-intensity, blast took place in the service

lane leading to the Delhi High Court –reportedly the handiwork of the IM.

The device that exploded in earlySeptember was in all probability a remotecontrolled Improvised Explosive Device(IED) with shrapnel packed around theexplosive for maximum effect. IEDs withshrapnel are military weapons usednormally in insurgency-prone areas likeJammu and Kashmir. According to theSouth Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP)

terrorists in Kashmir this year are layinggreater emphasis on IEDs and grenadeattacks in order to avoid direct contact withsecurity forces and consequent loss of theirown cadres. In fact, the website hasrecorded 36 such explosions in 2010 asagainst 13 in 2009.

E-mails sent before the blasts suggeststhat it was the Indian Mujahideen whocarried out the September operation.

Typically, in terror strikes carried out bythe IM, e-mail messages are sent out to themedia prior to the attacks, describing thegroup’s views on issues such as the Babrimosque demolition, the Mumbai riots andthe communal violence in Gujarat. IM citesthese incidents as reasons for their Islamicjihad. The IM’s email-manifestos alwaysshed light on its objectives: The group callsfor spreading Islam in India and waging

jihad against the infidels (non-Muslims),and establishing “God’s Government”according to Quranic tenets.

It was way back in November 2007 thatthe IM came into the open for the first timewhen simultaneous bomb blasts targettedlawyers in the court premises of three cities of Uttar Pradesh – Varanasi,Faizabad (Ayodhya) and Lucknow. The IMdescribed the attacks as “Islamic raids” andjustified them as revenge against lawyerswho had allegedly assaulted a couple ofJaish-e-Muhammad terrorist suspects. The IM also claimed that the lawyers hadrefused to take cases involving otheralleged terrorists, including suspectedHuJI leader and Phulpur-based Islamiccleric, Muhammad Waliullah, apparentlythe mastermind of the March 2006Sankatmochan Temple blasts in Varanasi.Given this background, it would not besurprising if the Delhi attacks were actuallylinked to the death sentence awarded toAfzal Guru involved in the 2001 December,Parliament attack case.

Origins of the GroupWhat and who are the IM? According to Wikipedia the word mujahideen means mujahid in Arabic. Nominative plural,mujahideen, translates to ‘strugglers’ or ‘people doing jihad’ – Muslims whostruggle in the path of God. The additionof the word, Indian, merely indicates thatthis group has its origins on Indian soil andoperates there. With this, terroristsperhaps want to try and de-link the sourceof attacks from Pakistan making IM anindigenous entity. So even though it is wellknown that groups like the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) are funding and providingweaponry to the IM, the blame shifts to a‘local’ factor when an attack takes place.

There are many theories about theorigins of the IM. One traces its lineage tothe Islamic Security Force-IndianMujahideen (ISF-IM) 2000-2001 inAssam. ISF-IM claimed to have carried outthe bomb attack in Guwahati in 2008. Thisorganisation is supposed have been formedin Lower Assam’s Bodo-dominated areas‘to counter’ the Bodo Liberation Tigers(BLT) and National Democratic Front ofBodoland militants in 2000. It is mostlikely that this force was created by theHuJI in Bangladesh with the help of theDirectorate-General of Field Intelligence

45

DECEMBER 2011 DSI

44

INTELLIGENCE

BHASHYAMKASTURI

THE

INSIDESTORYKnown for its multiple, coordinated bombingstargetting civilians, the Indian Mujahideen is thenew face of terror in India

A roadside vendorsells newspapers aday after a terroristattack in the DelhiHigh Court

AFPKEY POINTS

n One theory traces the Indian Mujahideen’s (IM) lineage tothe Islamic Security Force-IndianMujahideen while another says its anoffshoot of the banned StudentsIslamic Movement of India. n Though IM recruits tend to be lowerand middle-class Muslims it also hasIT professionals as its cadres.n The IM has clearly endorsed thegoals of Osama bin Laden and the alQaeda and its linkages to Pakistan.

IM.qxp:INDO-PAK.qxd 02/12/11 3:44 PM Page 2

(DGFI) and Pakistan’s Inter-ServicesIntelligence (ISI).

In addition, it has been reported that the cadres of the Muslim Liberation Front ofAssam (MULFA) and Muslim LiberationTigers of Assam (MULTA) moved to the IM, indicating that the IM is emergingas the nerve centre of a pan-India terrorist network with the capacity to carryout attacks anywhere on Indian soil.

If that is the case then how did the ISF-IM transform itself into the IM? The nameIndian Mujahideen was reportedlyconceived at a terrorist conclave attendedby top leaders of the LeT and HuJI inPakistan-Occupied Kashmir in early May2008. That was Pakistan’s ISI’s way offashioning an Indian identity for the IM sothat its transnational linkages could behidden behind the façade.

This leads us to a second theory

about the origins of the IM. It is also saidto be an offshoot of the banned StudentsIslamic Movement of India (SIMI). Thisorganisation was founded in 1977 and itwas banned in 2001 by the CentralGovernment. It was around then SIMIwitnessed internal tensions between itsradical and moderate factions, creating aninternal crisis which came to a headfollowing the post-Godhra riots in Gujarat.

The radical wing of SIMI was led by Safdar Nagori. He oversaw the ISI’soperation in India and the LeT-supportedfounding of IM by Amir Reza Khan, RiyazShahbandri and Abdul Subhan Qureshi(akaTauqeer). Indeed, SATP considers IMto be a SIMI-front group, while others saythat the IM is actually SIMI’s militant wing,but now a separate splinter group, foundedin part by former SIMI members.

However, another source states that the

credit of founding the IM goes to SadiqIsrar Sheikh of Azamgarh – a former SIMI member and an electronics engineerby profession.

Another theory is that the Asif RezaCommando Force (ARCF), created withthe help of HuJI in 2001, converted itselfinto the IM in 2002 after the death of AsifReza Khan, one of its founders. ARCFwas a small Sunni militant group that wasonly active in late-2001 and early-2002.The organisation was created in theMalda District of West Bengal sometimein the third week of December 2001. InOctober 2001, while the group was stillbeing formed, Asif Reza Khan was killedby Indian security forces whileattempting to escape prison thus givingthe group its name.

Reportedly, some HuJI leaders crossedover into Malda from Bangladesh inDecember 2001 to meet certain maulvis(priests) and cadres of the proscribedSIMI to create an affiliate of the HuJI. TheHuJI is also reported to have lent some ofits experienced cadres to the ARCF. It is possible that at this stage it wasdecided to form the ISF-IM as an Indianoffshoot of HuJI. There is however noconfirmation of this.

The ARCF had three primary leaders:Aftab Ansari and two brothers, Asif andAmir Reza Khan. After Aftab Ansari wasarrested by the police, Amir Reza Khan isthought to have contacted Pakistani outfitsand sought to reinvent the organisation.He was approached by the LeT to organiseattacks in India. Amir Reza Khan is alsoreported to have met Riyaz Bhatkal, aliasRoshan Khan, who is alleged to be one ofthe co-founders of the IM.

If the IM was indeed founded by formermembers of SIMI, like Subhan Qureshi, the group’s leaders are likely to have been influenced by the thoughts ofmodernist Islamic revivalist, MaulanaSayyid Abu’l-A’la Mawdudi, as well.Inspired by the ideology for Islamic revivalmovements launched by the Darul UloomDeoband and Maulana Maudoodi, thefounder of Jamaat-e-Islami, SIMI stands forradical change in the socio-politicalcharacter of Muslims in India, supports the jihadi interpretation of Islamicscriptures and has assisted various Islamistterrorist groups to destabilise the country.

But the fact is that Deobandism is amovement of the Ulema and that

DECEMBER 2011 DSI

46

INTELLIGENCE

Kashmir Universitystudents protest againstthe death sentence ofMohammad Afzal Guru

AFP


ORDER FORMYes, I would like to subscribe DEFENCE and SECURITY of INDIA for** :

NATIONAL PRICE No. of Issues Annual Cover Price (Rs.) You Pay (Rs.) Discounts2 Years 12 3,000 1,500 50%1 Year 6 1,500 800 46%

INTERNATIONAL PRICE1 Year 6 US$ 40 International price (Inc. Airmail Postage)

Please deliver to the following address:Name :............................................................................................................... Position / Rank :..................................................................Organization / Unit :.......................................................................................................................................................................................Address:.........................................................................................................................................................................................................City :............................................................. Pin :......................................................... Country :..................................................................Tel :........................................ Fax :........................................ Mobile :...................................... Email :.........................................................

Mode of Payment :Cheque / DD no:................................................................. For Rs./US$............................................. (In favour of “ MTC Publishing Limited” )Please charge Rs./US$.................. to my :Card Number :.................................................Card Expiry Date :......................Date :.......................... Signature:.......................................

You can also offer subscription opportunities to your friends / colleaguesName :................................................................ Job Title :................................................ Contact Number:.................................................To subscribe sent this form to : MTC Publishing Limited (a subsidiary of Media Transasia Group)323, Udyog Vihar, Phase-IV, Gurgaon, Haryana 122016, India. Tel: + 91 124 4759 616/617, Fax : +91 124 4759 550 Email: [email protected]

Condition apply* *MTC will take 4-6 weeks to start the subscription. All disputes are subject to competent courts in the jurisdiction of Delhi court only. MTC is not responsible for any postal delay.

DSIDEFENCE and SECURITY

of INDIA Special

Subscription

Offer

n India’s only magazine on nationalsecurity, strategic affairs & policy matters.

n Focuses on defence & security issues through insightful & analytical articles on defence policy, procurement, terrorism, insurgency & border management

n High quality strategic affairs magazine with South Asian perspective covering region’s linkages with China, Indian Ocean region, near Middle East & South Central Asia.

n Reaches to decision makers in Armed & Para-Military Forces, policy makers in Govt., strategic analysts, security agencies, domestic & international defence manufacturers who are lookingat India as a potential market.

n For more details about the magazine refer to our website: www.mediatransasia.in/defence.htmlwww.defencesecurityindia.com

DEFENCE and SECURITYof INDIAFEBRUARY 2010 DSIVOLUME 2 ISSUE 4 Rs 250

MODERNISATIONTHE CHALLENGE TO CHANGEThe armed forces need cost effective solutions to enhance

their combat edge I AIR CHIEF MARSHAL FALI H. MAJOR

SECURITY

NEEDED: PERSPECTIVE PLANNING Twelve years down, the office of the NSA is still a

work in progress I SIDDARTH VARADARAJAN

POLICING THE SEAS Despite attacks by terrorists from the

sea, the focus on maritime security

remains inadequate I C. UDAY BHASKAR

COVER STORYCAMOUFLAGED MANOEUVRESThe countries may playdown their strategic andmilitary links but today Israelis India’s second largestarms’ supplier I RAHUL BEDI

b3.qxd 08/02/10 3:47 PM Page 1


AUGUST 2011


INDIA-UK DEFENCE RELATIONS

REACHING OUT India has become an irresistible strategic partner for

the United Kindgdom I Ajai Shukla

REGION

GROWING APART With the elimination of Osama Bin Laden, tensions in

US-Pakistan relations are growing I G. Parathasarathy

CAN INDIA EVER STOP A TERROR ATTACK?MAJOR CHANGES

ARE URGENTLYNEEDED IN THE

NATION’SINTELLIGENCE

APPARATUS BUT

NOTHING WILL EVER

DSI Cover final 4.8.qxp:cover-feb3.qxd 05/08/11 12:21 PM Page 1


DECEMBER 2011


DEFENCE POLICY

SIGNS OF STRAIN India's defence management cannot deal with nationaland international security challenges I C. UDAY BHASKAR

NUCLEAR

A YEAR OF COLD COMFORT 2011 brings few gains to India's quest for a nuclear energyprogramme I SIDDHARTH VARADARAJAN

CHALLENGES

AHEADTHE MILITARY'S AMBITIOUSPROGRAMME FORINDIGENOUS ARMOUREDVEHICLES MAY BE HAMPEREDBY BAD PLANNING ANDRISING COSTS I AJAI SHUKLA


OCTOBER 2011


REGION

OFFICERS AND BUSINESSMEN

Many South Asian militaries are in business –

from hotels to bakeries to golf courses I Rahul Bedi

AVIATION

BROKEN WINGS

High peacetime attrition due to accidents continues

to be a matter of great concern for the IAF I V.K. Bhatia

CHANGES

IN THEAIR? MAY BE IT IS TIME TO INSTITUTE AN OVERARCHING AEROSPACE

TECHNOLOGY COMMISSION NOW THAT THE SECTOR IS ON THE CUSP OF

FAR REACHING CHANGES I AJAI SHUKLA

DSI Cover final_NEW.qxp_2nd time.qxp:cover-feb3.qxd 29/09/11 1:49 PM Page 1

SAVE UP TO50%Subscribe Now

Subscription-Dec-2011:cover-feb3.qxd 12/12/11 1:44 PM Page 1

should place it in conflict with Mawdudi’santi-clericalism, proposes Christine Fair in her seminal work on the SIMI and IM, suggesting that the IMascribes to a more generic form ofIslamism that accommodates these twocompeting ideologies.

There are many plausible reasons forformer SIMI members forming the IM.First, could be their personal experiencesduring the Gujarat riot of 2002. The otherreason could be the abundant availabilityof funds for such activities through anunderground network of terror financiers.Young men, especially from Uttar Pradesh,are known tobe tempted by these activitiesbecause of the money.

Pursuing terror activities does notrequire high education or even knowledgeof the English language, yet the monetarybenefit can be tremendous. In fact, most of the arrested IM cadres have been badly versed in English yet fluent in Hindi or Urdu.

There is yet another theory about IM.According to one researcher based in theUS, the credit of founding the IM goes toMohammed Sadiq Israr Sheikh ofAzamgarh. A former SIMI member and anelectronics engineer by profession, Sheikhhas been identified as the co-founder andleader of the IM. Sheikh is alleged to havecontacts with the LeT in Pakistan throughhis brother-in-law, Mujahid Salim. Theanti-terrorism squad of the Maharashtrapolice has been interrogating Sheikh for hisrole in the July 2006 serial train blasts inMumbai. Sheikh has described how thegroup planted seven pressure cookers filledwith explosives on the train before gettingoff well before the blasts took place.Sheikh’s confession also indicates the IM’shand in the March 2006 attack on theSankat Mochan Temple in Varanasi.

Pan-Indian NetworkClearly, the IM has an all-India spread.The arrest of IM cadres from differentlocations demonstrates the geographicalspread of a terror network that now spansthe length and breadth of India – possiblyeven extending into neighboring countries.

One aspect of the growth of IM in India isits southern link. Recent media reportssuggest the recruitment of people fromKerala for undertaking terrorist activitiesin Kashmir.

And it is well known that SIMI has a

very strong base in Kerala. According toSATP, SIMI operates under 12 coverorganisations in Kerala. So it is possiblethat the IM has a base in that State withlinks to Pakistan and Dubai.

Mentioned earlier, Riyaz Bhatkal (akaIsmail Shahbandri), is reportedly thecommander of IM’s southern region.According to police sources, Iqbal

Bhatkal, Riyaz’s brother, holds a seniorposition in the IM hierarchy. RiyazBhatkal was previously involved inorganised crime in Mumbai when he waspart of the infamous Fazlu Rehman gang.Interrogation of arrested IM membershas revealed that Bhatkal was a key LeToperative located in south India who hadplanned the Hyderabad, Bengaluru,Ahmedabad and New Delhi serial blasts.Abdul Subhan Qureshi, still on the run, isreportedly the IM’s second-in-commandfor the southern region.

Though IM recruits tend to be lower and middle-class Muslims who aredisaffected by Hindu nationalism, as wellas those offended by Western values andpolytheism, IM also claims leaders andcadres from this professional backgrounds,especially from the IT sector. SIMI and theIM have long-standing ties to globalIslamist organisations, including LeT andHuJI and the mafia, as well as Pakistaniintelligence agencies and other criminaland militant organisations beyond India.

A greater connection, given the origins ofthe IM as the Islamic Security Force-IM inAssam, is the active links that it has withinsurgent groups in the Northeast and itmight even have training camps there.Consider the fact that when the USGovernment designated the IM as a foreignterrorist organisation in September 2011 itwas described as: the “Indian Mujahedeen,also known as the Indian Mujahidin, alsoknown as Islamic Security Force-IndianMujahideen (ISF-IM).”

If the argument holds that IM is themilitant wing of SIMI, as the latter is abanned organisation, the question is whatstops SIMI from carrying out terroristactivities it wants to? Evidence does suggestthat the ISF-IM is a creation of thePakistan-ISI created jihadi network andsomewhere along the way, SIMI was taggedalong to make it look more ‘domestic.’

So what of the future? Terrorist bombblasts in shopping malls, courts, markets orsome other places? A mail allegedly sent bythe IM soon after the Delhi High Court blastclaiming that it would target shopping mallsnext was perhaps a red herring. But forsecurity forces nothing can be ruled out.Clearly, Indian intelligence agencies haveto prepare themselves for a new level ofalert as far as new non-State actors areconcerned. It will involve some element ofrisk-taking and some focussed tasking.

48

In November 2007, the IMcame into the open for

the first time whensimultaneous bomb

blasts targetted lawyersin the court premises of

three Uttar Pradesh cities– Varanasi, Faizabad

(Ayodhya) and Lucknow.The IM described the

attacks as ‘Islamic raids.’

”

DECEMBER 2011 DSIINTELLIGENCE

SIMI activistsprotest against US

imperialism, Mumbai

AFP


216X276.indd 1216X276.indd 1 9/21/11 5:16:23 PM9/21/11 5:16:23 PM

Modernising the ForceThe Indian Air Force (IAF) has embarked on anambitious procurement drive, estimated at over astaggering USD 50 billion over the next 15 years, tobecome a strategic force capable of extended, out-of-area operations to protect national interests.

Outlining the force’s imminent modernisation,dependent entirely on imports, Air Chief Marshal(ACM) Norman Anil K. Browne recently said this expansion included acquiring 126 MediumMulti-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA), likely toincrease to 220, and around 214 Fifth GenerationFighter Aircraft (FGFA), expected to go up toaround 250 or even 300 and 22 attack and 15 Heavy Lift helicopters.

The IAF wants MMRCA inductions to begin by2015-16 and the FGFA, developed jointly by Russiaand India, a year or so later. Both fighter types willaugment the IAF’s depleting fighter squadronsdown to around 31 from 39.5 a decade ago as its Soviet and Russian platforms have reachedcollective obsolescence and need replacing. ACM Browne has said that he wants the IAF to permanently maintain a holding force of 34 front-line fighter squadrons to meet emergingchallenges in the neighbourhood, a euphemismfor nuclear rivals Pakistan and China.

Additionally, the IAF is acquiring 75 PilatusPC-7s, selected from amongst seven competingmodels in ‘fly away’ condition, and licence-buildan additional 106 in a deal estimated at over USD 1 billion, 20 more BAE Systems’ Hawk Mk.

132 jet trainers for its Surya Kiran AerobaticsTeam, six additional C-130Js specially configuredfor use by India’s Special Forces and ten BoeingC-17 Globemaster III Heavy Lift Transport Aircraftfor USD 4.1 billion.

Consequently, by 2016, the IAF will operate 106 Hawk 132s: Twenty-four of them wereprocured in ‘fly away’ condition seven years agoand the remaining are to be built by HindustanAeronautics Limited in Bengaluru.

The PC-7s, on the other hand, will replace thefleet of 180-200 locally-constructed HindustanPiston Trainer (HPT)-32 initial trainers inductedinto IAF service in the mid-1980s and grounded inJuly 2009 following a series of fatal accidents inwhich 23 pilots died.

As of late September, the IAF has beguntaking delivery of the first lot of 80 Russian Mi-17V-5 weaponised helicopters acquired inDecember 2008 for USD 1.345 billion that will be completed by 2013-14. Alongside, advancednegotiations are on to acquire an additional 59 Mi-17V-5s that, like the ones previously handed over,will have a 6km operational ceiling for deploymenton special heli-borne operations, transportationof troops and materiel, search and rescuemissions, casualty evacuation and possibly evenanti-insurgent operations.

Replacing obsolete air defence capability andhigh-altitude radar and upgrading long, disusedadvanced landing grounds along the inhospitableChinese frontier to enable the IAF to deploy

50

RAHUL BEDI Chief of Air Staff Norman Anil KumarBrowne inspects a guard of honour duringAir Force Day parade, Ghaziabad

defe

nceb

uzz

an

u

pd

at

e

on

d

ef

en

ce

c

om

me

rc

ia

l

ne

ws

AFP

DEFENCE BUZZ DECEMBER 2011 DSI

Defence.qxd:DSI Defence Talk-May09.qxd 02/12/11 3:45 PM Page 2

216X276.indd 1216X276.indd 1 02/12/11 4:49 PM02/12/11 4:49 PM

Su-30MKI fighters, C-130Js and C-17transporters in response to a steadymilitary buildup by the People’s LiberationArmy (PLA) in Tibet also include the IAF’smodernisation plans.

Let the Bidding BeginBy the time this column appears theMinistry of Defence (MoD) will be closer to deciding which of the two Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) –Eurofighter’s Typhoon or Dassault’s Rafale– it will procure in support of the Indian AirForce’s requirement for 126 fighters.

The rival bids by the two Europeanvendors were opened at the MoDheadquarters in South Block on November4, in the presence of their representativesby the Contract Negotiation Committee(CNC): considering the complexity of theprocurement the winner will only beannounced early next year, the MoD has said.

Though the MoD has declined toelaborate on the bid amounts, officialsources have indicated that the pricedifference between the two fighters was‘competitive’. They have also hinted that ‘political and strategic calculations’can influence the eventual choice, anassessment borne out by the flurry of high profile visits by senior European and French diplomats, politicians andmilitary personnel.

Industry sources also point out that the estimated USD 11 billion deal for 126 MMRCA can double to around USD 20billion taking into account mountinginflation, decline in the value of the Indianrupee and ‘benchmarking’ the respectivefighters' cost by the MoD against theirglobal market sale price. The MMRCAnumbers too can rise to 200 or even 220fighters, appreciably pushing up theeventual contract value.

The CNC, comprising senior MoDofficials and the financial adviser to theIAF, will evaluate the MMRCA bids on theirlife-cycle cost based on 40 years or 6,000hours of squadron service before thelowest bidder, designated L1, is selected.

It will also appraise the biddocumentation running into thousands ofpages to determine the basic cost of theplatform, on-board weaponry, transfer oftechnology for local licensed manufacture,warranty and offset proposals – mandatedat 50 percent of the eventual contract

value, up from the usual 30 percent in all materiel purchases over ` 300 crore.

Technician and pilot training, establishingHindustan Aeronautics Limited’s (HAL)manufacturing facilities at Bengaluru, spares and initial operating costs will also be taken into consideration whilstdetermining the winning fighter model.

The MoD has shortlisted the Rafale and Typhoon in April from six vendorsfollowing trials by the IAF that evaluated allaircraft on 643 technical aspects in desert,coastal and high-altitude conditionsacross the country. Assorted weaponryand other advanced systems have beenevaluated in the respective vendors'countries and the trials were completed ina record 12 months.

Prompted largely by the IAF, the MoDhas managed to fast forward procedures inselecting the MMRCA in a record fouryears after the tender was issued in August2007 some six years after the ministryissued the Request for Information (RfI) forthe fighters.

It is worth recalling that it took the MoDnearly two decades of negotiation toacquire 66 Hawk 132 trainers for the IAF in2004 but the IAF, eager to begin MMRCAinductions by 2015-16 to keep pace withfleet modernisation by Pakistan and China,is optimistic over the outcome.

Eighteen MMRCA are to be delivered in ‘fly away’ condition within 36 months of the deal being signed and the remaining 108 built by HAL through majortechnology transfers.

A New LowClearly, indigenously developed Indian AirForce (IAF) platforms are not doing well.The long-postponed Tejas Light CombatAircraft (LCA) programme is sufferingfrom yet another setback with its initialoperational clearance (IOC), grantedprovisionally in January 2011, beingpostponed to late 2012.

“There was a primary IOC for the LCA inJanuary 2011 and we were supposed to getthe final IOC 12 months later. As we see,there is a delay of almost a year,” Air ChiefMarshal N.A.K. Browne admitted ahead ofthe Indian Air Force’s 79th anniversary inOctober, but declined to elaborate. Thedelayed IOC will, in turn, reschedule theLCA’s final operational clearance expectedearlier by 2012 after which two squadronsof 40 aircraft were to be inducted at theIAF’s Sulur base in Tamil Nadu.

Delays in securing Tejas’ IOC hasfurther meant that the LCA’s induction willonly begin around 2014 – three decadesafter the LCA programme was launched–and be completed two-three years laterprovided, no further hitches occurred.Overall, the IAF plans on raising seven LCAsquadrons or 140 aircraft.

Official sources say that the IOCpostponement has been due to the ‘haste’ exhibited by the state-runAeronautical Developmental Agency(ADA) in Bengaluru responsible fordeveloping the LCA in ‘managing’ theprimary IOC in January 2011 ostensibly toblunt mounting criticism over delays. Ofthe 3,000 ‘test points’ or operational and

DEFENCE BUZZ

52

EurofighterTyphoon

DECEMBER 2011 DSI

AFP


54

technical parametres which the LCA wasrequired to fulfill for the IOC, like itsweaponisation, radar functioning andagility, only around 1,200 have so far beenaccomplished. The remaining ones are stillbeing worked on.

A special technical committee too wasconstituted to make recommendationstowards reducing the LCA’s excess weightwhich was limiting its maneuverability and weapons load, something thatremains largely unresolved with littlescope for modification.

Experts, however, caution that the LCA’s weight issue will impact adversely on the LCA when its General Electric F404-GE-IN20 after-burner engine isreplaced with the heavier General ElectricGE F414 power pack after the first 40fighters are series produced by Hindustan Aeronautics Limited.

The IAF has opted for the GeneralElectric GE F414 power pack with a 90-100kilonewton (KN) thrust compared to the 80-85 KN thrust provided by the GE F404-IN20engine that has compromised Tejas’weapons load and angle of attack.

The follow-on 100-105 LCA Mk-IIs,including twin-seat trainer models andnaval variants for carrier-based operations,after the first 40 for the IAF will be poweredby the GE F414 engine-selected over rivalEurojet’s EJ200 power pack. But its fitmentwill require re-engineering and that canlead to to more delays.

IAF officers are also concerned over the high import dependency of around

50 percent of the LCA’s components – otherthan its power pack – like the Israeli EL/M-2025 mutli-mode radar, range of weaponryand avionics systems even as the MoDrepeats the mantra of self-sufficiency indeveloping indigenous military equipment.

Calling the Big GunsThe constantly postponed modernisationof the Indian Army’s artillery assets has once again triggered the proposal tolocally build Field Howitzer FH77/B155mm/39 calibre towed howitzers. TheArmy acquired 410 of this artillery in 1987accompanied by the technology to locallybuild them, but never did.

The State-run Ordnance Factory Board(OFB), to which Sweden’s AB Bofors, laterSWS Defense AB Bofors, transferred the

FH77/B blueprints and other technicaldetails never undertook their manufactureas the howitzer deal was mired in acorruption scandal allegedly involvingsenior politicians, military and defenceofficials. The Bofors corruption case,which led to Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’sCongress Party administration being votedout of office in 1989, still awaits legalclosure even though many of the accusedin the case had died.

Plagued by repeated setbacks over thepast decade in acquiring new howitzers,an anxious Army has recently approachedthe Ministry of Defence (MoD) with aproposal to get the OFB to beginconstructing the FH77/B howitzers at itsVehicles Factory unit in Jabalpur. It wantsthe OFB to build six prototypes – twoFH77/B 155mm/39 cal guns, two similarmodels but with upgraded on-boardcomputers and two upgraded 155mm/45cal howitzers within 24 months.

The OFB, on its part, maintains that itsJabalpur unit is capable of making theFH77/Bs having earlier built 105mm fieldguns and more recently, in collaborationwith Soltam of Israel, has upgraded 180 Soviet-era M-46 130mm guns to155mm/39 cal. But industry and militarysources have cautioned that the FH77/Bproposal could well be ‘jeopardised’ by ‘theprevailing political sensitivity’ over thelingering Bofors issue as well as by theongoing arbitration over India’s unpaiddues to the artillery manufacturer.

Earlier attempts in 2009 to upgrade theFH77/Bs to 155mm/45 calibre were abandonedprimarily due to the ‘over ambitious’qualitative requirements (QRs) drawn up by


Air Force personnel workon LCA Tejas atYelhanka Air Forcestation, Bengaluru

AFP

AFP

Soldiers climb up amountain in Kargilto proceed towardsthe Line of Control


2012

11 - 15 JUNE 2012 / PARISwww.eurosatory.com

I N T E R N A T I O N A L E X H I B I T I O N

LANDDEFENCE & SECURITY

The most comprehensive answerAn opportunity to meet all actors

of the Security-Defence Continuum

Under the patronage of Presided over by

the artillery directorate for the retrofit. The howitzer upgrade which by raising

its calibre will enhance range will alsoinclude replacing the gun barrel, breechblock, strengtheni the under carriage andfit it with a modern sighting systemallowing it to fire heavier ordnance toregister greater damage at extendeddistances. The Army has doggedly declinedto either revise or modify the QRs eventhough many in the artillery directorateconceded that they are unrealistic.

A similar RfP in 2006 that requiredcompeting vendors like BAE Systems that now owns Bofors AB – theFH77/B howitzers’ original equipmentmanufacturer (OEM) – private defencecontractors Tatas of Mumbai and the OFB to develop an upgraded prototypehowitzer within a year, lapsed unfulfilled.BAE Systems, despite being the OEM,reportedly politely declined to respond tothe Army’s ‘QR overreach.” And thoughTatas, despite its lack of technicalexpertise in building howitzers, was theonly one to respond to the tender, declaringthat it planned on executing the upgrade bycollaborating with the OFB nothing cameof the project and it was abandoned.

Under its interminably delayed FieldArtillery Rationalisation Plan, the Armyproposes to configure its artillery profilearound a mix of some 3,600 howitzers for its220 artillery regiments estimated at betweenUSD 10-12 billion. The majority of these willbe 155mm/52 cal howitzers in addition to theupgraded FH77/B 155mm/45 cal guns and180 130mm Russian M-46 field gunsretrofitted to 155mm/39 cal. But repeatedinconclusive trials since 2001 by competinghowitzer vendors and issuing, cancelling andre-issuing of tenders by the MoD hasseriously imperiled all artillery procurements

Even the acquisition of 145 BAESystems M777 155mm/39 calibre howitzerswith SELEX Laser Inertial PointingSystems for around USD 647 million via theUS’ Foreign Military Sales programme thatwas cleared by the MoD last year has runinto domestic legal problems furtherpostponing their procurement.

The M777s are to arm two newMountain Divisions presently under raisingfor deployment along India’s disputedNortheast frontier with China. Theirdelayed procurement will adversely impactoperational effectiveness in the region at atime when the People’s Liberation Army

(PLA) is improving its logistics capabilityto amass military assets across thedisputed Line of Actual Control in theautonomous Tibetan region.

So critical is the Army’s artillery profilethat in 2009 it even considered acquiringadditional Soviet-designed 130mm M-46field guns, developed in the 1950s, fromsurplus stocks lying with the former SovietRepublics to augment its severely depletedfire power. India was the largest exportcustomer for the M-46 guns with anestimated 800 purchased late-1960onwards and successfully employed in the1971 war with Pakistan.

Artillery officers say that under the‘most optimistic scenario’ it will takebetween six and nine years to beginexecuting the Army’s artillery requirementtill which time it will remain largelydependent on the FH77/B Bofors guns,many of which had been cannibalised tokeep the rest operational.

Coming Up ShortThe Ministry of Defence and the Army arebeset by inordinate delays in procuringvaried materiel like sniper rifles, 9mm sub-machine guns and 125mm ordnance for T-72M1 Main Battle Tanks via the specialFast Track Procurement (FTP) route.

The deadline under the FTP to finalisethe import of 900-1,000 sniper rifles for theSpecial Forces (SF) ended last Decemberwith Finland’s bolt-action SAKO TRG-22/24, Israel Weapon Industries (IWIs)semi-automatic Galil 7.62x54mm snipermodel and Sig Sauer of USA’s SSG 3000bolt-action, magazine-fed rifle, vying forthe USD 10-12 million contract.

Comparative trials were conducted latelast year in the respective countries by an Indian Army team led by a two-star officer and additional orders wereanticipated to augment India’s anti-insurgency operations led not only by the Army but also the Paramilitaries. Sig Sauer, however, under a specialdispensation, carried out firing trials at theInfantry School in Mhow in April.

Alongside, the purchase of 1,200-1,3009mm submachine guns (SMG) for selectGhatak infantry commando platoons and1.3 million rounds of ammunition initiatedtwo years ago also under FTP procedures,too awaits closure.

Switzerland’s Brugger & Thomet, IWI andGermany’s Heklar and Koch are vying forthe contract, estimated at around `20 crore;trials for this fire power were conductedmonths ago in all three countries.

The MoD also recently initiatedemergency measures to import some 66,000

125 mm armour piercing fin-stabiliseddiscarding sabot (APFSDS) rounds fromRussia for its T-72M1 Main Battle Tanks ongrounds of ‘operational necessity’.

This followed the recent intimation bythe Army that its war wastage reserves of125mm rounds for its T-72M1s that form thebackbone of its 60-odd armour regimentshad fallen below ‘critical levels’.

MoD sources have said the emergencyprocurement, reportedly at ‘inflatedprices,’ also obliged it to waive the offsetobligation of 30 percent mandated for allIndian military purchases over `300 crore inviolation of successive editions of theDefence Procurement Procedures.

56


Sniper rifle 7.62 mmbeing checked at DefenceExpo, New Delhi

AFP


1181DefenceSi276x216raptorJan.indd 1 11/16/11 4:45 PM

216X276.indd 1216X276.indd 1 02/12/11 4:47 PM02/12/11 4:47 PM

defence and security of india - dec 2011

Documents

programme delays

indias quest

indias modernisation

nuclear energyprogramme

pakistanchina strategic

internal security challenges

economic challenges

area of nuclear cooperation