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MTN – SA Quash Citation & Complaintv2018.07.24-000.00

of 30Respondent’s Special Appearance Motion to Quash Citation & Complaint.

No Notice. No Commercial Nexus.

CAUSE NO(s). ___________________ 1

THE STATE OF TEXAS, § In the JUSTICE OF THE PEACE COURT Plaintiff, § PRECINCT 4v. § AUSTIN, TEXAS,

§ TRAVIS COUNTY, Texas 2

Eddie Craig, §Respondent. §

§ Date: ____/____/________

RESPONDENT’S SPECIAL APPEARANCE MOTION TO QUASH UNLAWFUL CITATION & COMPLAINT.

TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF SAID COURT:

COMES NOW the Respondent, in pro per, in reshis/her Proper Private Capacity, as

Eddie Craig (“Respondent”), and disavows any COMMERCIAL/LEGAL/FEDERAL

CAPACITY or COMMERCIAL LIABILITY as “EDDIE CRAIG,” by which latter legal

capacity ress/he confirms reshis/her waiver of reshis/her objection to the debts of the United

States so that this court may both “see” reshim/her and “hear” reshim/her in this matter.

ASSERTION OF RIGHTS

Respondent (referring to both capacities, throughout) asserts all reshis/her unalienable

rights, privileges, and immunities at Natural Law, Common Law, and Maritime Law, and all

reshis/her respective commercial rights relevant to “this state.”

Respondent maintains that the nature of this appearance is special and not general as said

appearance is made only under threat, duress and coercion by Plaintiff.

1 Only cases have numbers. There being no charging instrument(s) filed, much less served, there is no case, here, by any number. Until STATE proves standing on the record this is a non-case, Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656, 668 (1975) (Blackmun, J., dissent); Deposit Guaranty Nat’l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. at 353 (Powell, J., and Stewart, J., dissent); Williams v. Vermont, 472 U.S. at 36 (dissent) (citing Austin), i.e., civil, until STATE proves standing. A common number associated with this matter is yet to be established to the knowledge of Respondent.2 The above style is mostly guess work, however, comfortably presumed are the Plaintiff and the County. The proper name and capacity of both the Plaintiff and the court are all still unknown. There has never been timely or proper service on Respondent of any charging instrument or anything at all identifying all parties and proper service information for same.




OBJECTION TO USE OF PRIVATE LAW

Respondent maintains that the nature of this appearance is special and not general as said

appearance is made only under threat, duress and coercion by Plaintiff.

Respondent objects to the use of unpublished cases. A cite to “WL” is a reference to

materials not publicly accessible. For such references even to begin to be meaningful, a full

copy of the opinion for each “WL” reference must be attached.

INTRODUCTION Respondent maintains that this is a special appearance for the express purpose of

challenging the court’s subject matter and in personam jurisdiction of Respondent in the instant

matter, to challenge the blatant denial of due process, and to quash the statutorily deficient and

invalid citation(s) and any related complaint(s) and charging instruments filed thereunder.

Respondent maintains that ress/he is NOT a trained legal professional, lawyer, or

attorney, and being denied assistance of counsel, is forced to proceed In Pro Per. The court

should and presumably does know that Respondent may NOT be held to the same standards of

pleadings and knowledge of the legal process as a legal professional shall be. Respondent is

being forced to navigate the legal waters against Respondent’s will and without benefit of legal

counsel, using rules and procedures both unfamiliar to Respondent and not of reshis/her own

making.

Respondent has both unalienable inherent rights and statutorily granted rights. The

Texas Const. enumerates only a select few of Respondent’s unalienable rights and does nothing

to affect or take away those rights not enumerated, nor could it and/or does it allow for any

department of Texas government, or its various officers and agencies, to do so. Similarly, the

Texas Code of Crim. Proc. specifically grants certain procedural rights, and the courts of this

STATE may not act in any manner or with the intended purpose of depriving Respondent of

those rights, or the procedures implemented by law to protect them:

“No one, under any circumstances, should be deprived of any right given him by

the laws of this state, and, if any provision of our [CCP] has been overlooked or




disregarded, if, in the remotest degree, it could have been hurtful or harmful to the person

on trial, the verdict should be set aside. He has a right to be tried in accordance with the

rules and form of law, and if this sort of trial is not accorded him he has the right to

complain, and to this complaint we will always give an attentive ear.” Parker v. State,

745 S.W.2d 934, 937 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, pet. Ref’d)

The procedural rules of the Texas Code of Crim. Proc. are as binding upon the courts as

any statutory provision enacted by the legislature:

“Procedural rules have the same force and effect as statutes. [T]hey should be

interpreted and construed under the rules applicable to legislative enactments.” Reese v.

State, 772 S.W.2d 288, 290 (Tex.App.—Waco 1989, pet. Ref’d).

The enumeration of certain rights within the provisions of the Bill of Rights in Article 1,

Texas Const., and the codification of those rights in the provisions of Arts. 1.04 through 1.27,

Texas Code of Crim. Proc. makes it axiomatic that “A court cannot enact a procedural rule

which conflicts with a constitutional provision.” Reese v. State, ibid.

However, this court has habitually and routinely ignored and/or refused to acknowledge

the existence of specific unalienable and statutorily granted rights belonging to every individual

appearing before it and, in the instant matter, Respondent.

Furthermore, this court has habitually and routinely ignored and/or refused to

acknowledge the existence of, and to act in compliance with, specific procedural requirements

that are binding upon the court as set forth by the Rules of Criminal Procedure and Reese v.

State, supra.

Respondent has made no knowing and willful waiver of these rights, whether voluntary

or otherwise. Thus, the court has knowingly, willingly, and intentionally acted to deprive

Respondent of the protected rights of a criminally accused individual in direct and willful

violation of constitutional prohibitions and specific statutory law.

Thus, Respondent argues that the court may not deny Respondent in either the

protections of an unalienable right or one specifically granted by statute. Nor may the court

ignore with impunity the plain language and intent of the law. If any magistrate or judge




knowingly and/or willingly declares the law of no effect in order to substitute and exert his or her

own private oligarchical opinion, power, and authority, s/he is guilty of sedition.

UNCONTESTED FACTS.

APPLICATION AND ENFORCEMENT OF THE TEXAS TRANSPORTATION CODE IS CONSTITUTIONALLY LIMITED TO A SINGLE SUBJECT MATTER.

It is an undisputed fact that the offense alleged against Respondent exists only within the

statutes enacted and codified within the Texas Transportation Code (“Transp. Code”), and has no

legal equivalent within any other Texas Code, including, but not limited to, the Texas Penal

Code.

It is an undisputed fact that the single subject requirement of Article 3, Sec. 35 of the

STATE OF TEXAS CONSTITUTION (“Texas Const.”) requires the Texas Legislature to

specifically limit the scope and application of any legislative Bill, and any and all statutes and

agency regulations promulgated thereunder, to a single specific subject matter.

It is an undisputed fact that all statutes within the Transp. Code must comply with the

legislative single subject matter requirement of Article 3, Sec. 35 of the Texas Const.

It is an undisputed fact that all court rulings upon statutes within the Transp. Code must

comply with and comport themselves within the confines of the single legislative subject matter

requirement of Article 3, Sec. 35 of the Texas Const. and the language of the statutes as written

and enacted. To do otherwise is an unlawful and prohibited act of legislating from the bench.

It is an undisputed fact that the Transp. Code is a recodified malum prohibitum regulatory

Code that is intended to regulate one single and specific subject matter, a subject matter that is

specifically “use” oriented in its contemplation and inception, i.e. the regulation of motorized

devices, and persons who are “driving/operating” those motorized devices, upon the highways

that are being “used” for the purpose of conducting business thereon for private profit or gain.




It is an undisputed fact that the Texas Government Code specifically identifies the

required method by which the courts may read and interpret the laws of the STATE OF TEXAS,

as well as how the Texas Legislature is required to write them.

Sec. 311.011. COMMON AND TECHNICAL USAGE OF WORDS.

(a) Words and phrases shall be read in context and construed according to the rules of grammar and common usage.

(b) Words and phrases that have acquired a technical or particular meaning, whether by legislative definition or otherwise, shall be construed accordingly.

Acts 1985, 69th Leg., ch. 479, Sec. 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1985.

Sec. 311.016. "MAY," "SHALL," "MUST," ETC. The following constructions apply unless the context in which the word or phrase appears necessarily requires a different construction or unless a different construction is expressly provided by statute:

(1) "May" creates discretionary authority or grants permission or a power.

(2) "Shall" imposes a duty.

(3) "Must" creates or recognizes a condition precedent.

(4) "Is entitled to" creates or recognizes a right .

(5) "May not" imposes a prohibition and is synonymous with "shall not."

(6) "Is not entitled to" negates a right.

(7) "Is not required to" negates a duty or condition precedent.

Added by Acts 1997, 75th Leg., ch. 220, Sec. 1, eff. May 23, 1997.

Sec. 311.021. INTENTION IN ENACTMENT OF STATUTES. In enacting a statute, it is presumed that:

(1) compliance with the constitutions of this state and the United States is intended;

(2) the entire statute is intended to be effective;

(3) a just and reasonable result is intended;

(4) a result feasible of execution is intended; and

(5) public interest is favored over any private interest.





Sec. 311.023. STATUTE CONSTRUCTION AIDS. In construing a statute, whether or not the statute is considered ambiguous on its face, a court may consider among other matters the:

(1) object sought to be attained;

(2) circumstances under which the statute was enacted;

(3) legislative history;

(4) common law or former statutory provisions, including laws on the same or similar subjects;

(5) consequences of a particular construction;

(6) administrative construction of the statute; and

(7) title (caption), preamble, and emergency provision.


Sec. 312.001. APPLICATION. This subchapter applies to the construction of all civil statutes.


Sec. 312.002. MEANING OF WORDS.

(a) Except as provided by Subsection (b), words shall be given their ordinary meaning.

(b) If a word is connected with and used with reference to a particular trade or subject matter or is used as a word of art , the word shall have the meaning given by experts in the particular trade, subject matter, or art.


Sec. 312.005. LEGISLATIVE INTENT. In interpreting a statute, a court shall diligently attempt to ascertain legislative intent and shall consider at all times the old law, the evil, and the remedy.


Sec. 312.006. LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION.

(a) The Revised Statutes are the law of this state and shall be liberally construed to achieve their purpose and to promote justice.

(b) The common law rule requiring strict construction of statutes in derogation of the common law does not apply to the Revised Statutes.





Pursuant to these sections, the Court may not create its own interpretation where “other

law” or “experts” have already defined a technical or particular meaning for that term or phrase

in relation to a particular trade, subject matter, art, or the term or phrase is being used as a word

of art.

It is an undisputed fact that the single subject matter that the Texas Legislature

specifically limited the Transp. Code’s scope of application and enforcement to is solely that of

persons and property engaging in and being “used” for the business profession or occupation of

“transportation” 3 as a “carrier,” “operator,” “driver,” or “chauffer” of a “commercial/ motor/

vehicle” for the purpose of generating private profit or gain.

It is an undisputed fact that “transportation” has been previously defined by “other law”

via the Supreme Court of the United States (“SCotUS”), in the case of ICC v. Brimson , 154 U.S.

447, 457-458, 14 S.Ct. 1125, 38 L.Ed. 1047:

“*457 … the term "transportation" includes all instrumentalities of

shipment or carriage.

*458 All charges made for services rendered or to be rendered in the

transportation of passengers or property, as above stated, or in connection

therewith, or for the receiving, delivering, storing, or handling of such property,

are required to be reasonable and just; and every unjust and unreasonable

charge for such service is prohibited and declared to be unlawful. § 1.

Any carrier subject to the provisions of the act, directly or indirectly, by

special rate, rebate, drawback, or other device, charging, demanding, collecting,

or receiving from any person or persons a greater or less compensation for

services rendered or to be rendered in the transportation of passengers or

property, than it charges, demands, collects, or receives for doing a like and

3 See attached certified copy of public record showing Page 1 of Senate Bill 971, as enacted by the 74 th Legislature in 1995, containing the mandatory Bill Title setting the constitutionally mandatory single subject of the entire legislation to that of “transportation.”

https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6342474828138333806&q=Interstate+Commerce+Commission+v.+Brimson+&hl=en&as_sdt=6,44





contemporaneous service in the transportation of a like kind of traffic under

substantially similar circumstances and conditions, is to be deemed guilty of

unjust discrimination, which the act expressly declares to be unlawful. § 2.”

This ruling has been cited over 1,400 times, and the meaning of “transportation” was

never once cited as encompassing not-commercial personal and private activity and use of the

highways by the general public for their own personal private business and pleasure using their

private automobiles or other forms of conveyances of the day.

“*598 That Congress was exercising its constitutional power to regulate

commerce among the several states, in the enactment of the Fair Labor

Standards Act of 1938, was recited in the declaration of policy in Section 2(b) of

the Act. Section 3(b) of the Act defined commerce as meaning "trade,

commerce, transportation, transmission, or communication among the

several States or from any State to any place outside thereof.” General

Tobacco & Grocery Co. v. Fleming , 125 F. 2d 596, Circuit Court of Appeals, 6th

Circuit (1942)

“The power to regulate commerce has no limitation other than those

prescribed in the Constitution. The power, however, does not carry with it the

right to destroy or impair those limitations and guarantees which are also

placed in the Constitution or in any of the amendments to that instrument .

Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States , 148 U.S. 312-336 ; Interstate

Commerce Commission v. Brimson , 154 U.S. 447-479. ” United States v. Joint

Traffic Assn. , 171 US 505 (1898) .

It is an undisputed fact that Black’s Law Dictionary 6th Edition summarizes these

precedent setting cases defining the common meaning of the term “transportation” to be:

Transportation. The movement of goods or persons from one place to

another, by a carrier . Interstate Commerce Com'n v. Brimson , 154 U.S. 447, 14

S.Ct. 1125, 38 L.Ed. 1047. (Emphasis added).














Criminal law. A species of punishment consisting in removing the

criminal from his own country to another (usually a penal colony), there to

remain in exile for a prescribed period. Fong Yue Ting v. U. S. , 149 U.S.

698, 13 S.Ct. 1016, 37 L.Ed. 905 (1893). See Deportation.

It is an undisputed fact that the offense(s) alleged is/are codified within the Transp. Code,

and have no specific equivalent offense within any other Texas Code, including, but not limited

to, the Penal Code.

It is an undisputed fact that, due to the aforesaid facts, and the requirements and

prohibitions mandated by the Texas Const. and state law, the alleged offense(s) is/are strictly

limited to the single subject matter confines of those “persons” actively engaging in, and self-

propelled devices and other property being used to engage in, the privileged and regulated

activity of “transportation,” and not to anything or anyone else.

RESPONDENT WAS UNLAWFULLY SEIZED AT HIS

LIBERTY, ARRESTED, AND SEARCHED, WITHOUT PROBABLE CAUSE.

It is an undisputed fact that, on or about March 20, 2018, Respondent was seized and

arrested without warrant 4 by Texas Department of Public Safety Trooper B. Williams #14128

of Region 6, District B, Area 07 (“Trooper Williams #14128”), for an alleged offense arising

solely under the Transp. Code.

It is an undisputed fact that Trooper Williams #14128 issued Respondent a legally

defective Citation that appears to be numbered as TX54T90UOKAY.

The Citation is legally defective in that, not only does it fail to fully conform to one or

more specific statutory requirements for citations as codified within the Transp. Code, it was

issued to Respondent without any articulable facts and evidence supporting the claim that

4 “Warrantless seizures are “per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment – subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.” United States v. Hill , 752 F.3d 1029, 1033 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting Katz v. United States , 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) ). One such exception comes from Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1 (1968).” United States v. Alvarado-Zarza, 782 F.3d 246, 249 (5th Cir. 2015) .

https://scholar.google.co.uk/scholar_case?case=10918934433583430800&q=U.S.+v.+Alvarado-Zarza&hl=en&as_sdt=2006

https://scholar.google.co.uk/scholar_case?case=17773604035873288886&q=Terry+v.+Ohio,+392+U.S.+1+(1968)&hl=en&as_sdt=2006

https://scholar.google.co.uk/scholar_case?case=17773604035873288886&q=Terry+v.+Ohio,+392+U.S.+1+(1968)&hl=en&as_sdt=2006

https://scholar.google.co.uk/scholar_case?case=9210492700696416594&q=Katz+v.+United+States,+389+U.S.+347,+357+(1967)&hl=en&as_sdt=2006

https://scholar.google.co.uk/scholar_case?case=11108042662333878504&q=United+States+v.+Hill,+752+F.3d+1029,+1033+(5th+Cir.+2014)&hl=en&as_sdt=2006

https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=10901042608626151307&q=Fong+Yue+Ting+v.+U.+S.,+149+U.S.+698,+13+S.Ct.+1016,+37+L.Ed.+905&hl=en&as_sdt=6,44

https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=10901042608626151307&q=Fong+Yue+Ting+v.+U.+S.,+149+U.S.+698,+13+S.Ct.+1016,+37+L.Ed.+905&hl=en&as_sdt=6,44




Respondent was engaged in “transportation” at the time of the alleged offense, and is facially

devoid of any allegation of same, thus, legally substantiating Respondent’s claim that Trooper

Williams #14128 lacked any and all articulable probable cause for the warrantless seizure and

arrest of Respondent for a “transportation” related offense.

It is an undisputed fact that, at the time of the unlawful and illegal arrest, Trooper

Williams #14128 would not provide any of the articulable facts offs/he was allegedly relying

upon to provide probable cause, which could only legally exist if Trooper Williams #14128 first

had reason to believe and did believe that Respondent was actively engaged in the regulated

subject matter activity of “transportation” so as to be subject to the Transp. Code, and thus

authorize a warrantless seizure and arrest of Respondent.

Respondent was unlawfully seized and accosted by Trooper Williams #14128 for an

alleged offense that specifically exists only within the statutory scheme of the Transp. Code,

which is a malum prohibitum regulatory code, not a penal code. Regulatory codes are applicable

only to a specific subject matter and class of legal persons and objects intended to be regulated

thereby. Neither Respondent nor reshis/her property has ever been a member or part of that class

of legal persons or objects, and Respondent was not engaged in the legal subject matter activity

of “transportation” as regulated thereby.

Trooper Williams #14128 did not have any articulable probable cause for the warrantless

seizure and arrest as Respondent was not otherwise actively engaged in causing harm to any

person, property, or thing in the officer’s presence or view, nor was there any visible indication

or evidence that alleged or proved Respondent to be actively engaged in “transportation” so as to

be subject to the regulatory scheme of the Transp. Code.

Trooper Williams #14128 did not have any articulable probable cause to believe that

Respondent was engaging in any commercial or “for hire” use of the highways for the purpose

of “transportation” that would serve to make Respondent subject to the commercial regulatory

provisions of the Transp. Code.




NEITHER THE CITATION NOR THE COMPLAINT PROPERLY ALLEGE AN OFFENSE UPON WHICH RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED UNDER TEXAS LAW.

It is an undisputed fact that the Citation issued by Trooper Williams #14128 does not

contain a sworn or even verified statement of facts.

It is an undisputed fact that the Citation issued by Trooper Williams #14128 is based

solely upon off[14128]his/her unsubstantiated legal conclusions and presumptions, themselves

fueled by nothing more substantial than Trooper Williams #14128 uneducated personal

understanding and opinion of the law.


allege the existence of all the necessary facts and elements of the alleged offense that are

required to be proven at trial.

It is an undisputed fact that proper, sufficient, and timely Notice of the facts and elements

of the alleged offense is a right of due process that the Citation issued by Trooper Williams

#14128 does not provide.


alleged that Respondent was actually engaged in “transportation” prior to the time it was issued

and at the time of the alleged offense.

It is an undisputed fact that the mere naked allegation of an offense, regardless of the

form in which the allegation is made, is not enough to establish probable cause or to invoke the

jurisdiction of the court. In the instant matter, both the Citation and the Criminal Complaint

represent nothing more than a naked allegation by some person who merely believes that an

offense has occurred, regardless of that person’s position or title as a public servant or a member

of the public in general. Furthermore, neither the Citation nor the Criminal Complaint contain

any allegation of the primary element required in a “transportation” related offense, that of the

Accused being actively engaged in some act of “transportation” at the time of the alleged

offense.




THE PRIMARY REQUIRED ELEMENT OF ALL TRANSP. CODE OFFENSES IS “TRANSPORTATION,” AND IT IS MISSING FROM THE CRIMINAL

COMPLAINT.

It is an undisputed fact that the Criminal Complaint is based solely upon Trooper

Williams #14128 unsubstantiated legal conclusions and presumptions fueled by

off[14128]his/her personal opinion, not by a proper statement of facts conjoined with a finding

of probable cause by a neutral and detached magistrate.

The Criminal Complaint fails to state all of the elements of the alleged offense that is

required to be asserted in a proper charging instrument, assuming that a proper charging

instrument takes the form of an Indictment or Information as mandatorily required by Art. 3, Sec.

12(b) of the Texas Constitution, and Arts. 2.04-05, 27.01, and Chapter 21 of the Texas Code of

Criminal Procedure.

Both Respondent’s right of due process and Texas law requires that all statutory elements

of an offense be alleged in a proper charging instrument and proven at trial pursuant Arts. 2.04-

05, 27.01, and Chapter 21 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, which specifically pertains

to Indictments and Informations. However, none of these Articles or Chapters say anything at all

about criminal complaints having any such requirement or being a valid charging instrument in

and of itself, as that concept is solely a baseless distorted fabrication of the law promulgated by

the Texas Courts. Chapter 21 states only that a signed, verified, and filed criminal complaint

must exist prior to the creation and filing of an Indictment or Information, while Art. 27.01 says

that the primary pleading of the STATE in a criminal matter is done by the filing of an

Indictment or Information.

Furthermore, Art. 3, Sec. 12(b) of the Texas Constitution states in no uncertain or

otherwise unclear terms that it is an Indictment and Information that invests a court with

jurisdiction of a cause, not a Criminal Complaint alone.

Finally, under Arts. 15.04-05 and 45.019(a) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, a

criminal complaint has no codified requirement to specifically state all of the necessary elements

of an offense that are required to be proven. Which means that a criminal complaint is not

actually required by Texas law to provide proper, sufficient and timely Notice of the alleged




offense to Respondent and others similarly situated, or to enumerate all of the elements required

to be proven at trial. This alone warrants invalidating the Criminal Complaint in the instant

matter in that it fails to perform sufficiently on its own in the same manner required of a proper

charging instrument.

Texas law provides no specific legal remedy to Respondent and others similarly situated

when faced with a complaint that fails to provide proper, sufficient and timely Notice by failing

to allege all of the necessary elements of an offense, because the statutes do not mandatorily

require a complaint to contain them in the first place.

THE CRIMINAL COMPLAINT VIOLATES THE RIGHT OF DUE PROCESS BY FAILING TO STATE THE MANDATORY ELEMENT OF

“TRANSPORTATION.”

The STATE OF TEXAS is violating Respondent’s right of due process by failing to

require the prosecution to both allege and prove that Respondent had a legal nexus with the

subject matter profession or occupation of “transportation,” and thus, with the regulatory

provisions of the Texas Transportation Code, which legal nexus is absolutely required for the

alleged offense to even legally exist, much less for such an offense to be committed by

Respondent.

It is legally impossible for the offense itself, much less any of its legal elements, to even

exist without evidence that Respondent was actively engaged in “transportation” at the time of

the alleged offense. The subject matter and any offense codified under that subject matter, are

constitutionally and legally inseparable. For lack of a better explanation, the legislative subject

matter and the codified offense have a symbiotic Parent-Child relationship. In this specific

instance, “transportation” is the Parent, and the alleged offense of “Driving While License

Invalid” is the Child. Legally speaking, the Child cannot and does not exist without the existence

of the Parent, i.e., using statutory math:

no valid legal nexus with an act of “transportation” =no valid legal nexus with the Texas Transportation Code = no valid subject matter application of the Texas Transportation Code =




no valid allegation of an offense governed by the Texas Transportation Code =

no valid legal standing for the STATE OF TEXAS to pursue allegation(s) of an offense governed by the Texas Transportation Code =no valid subject matter or in personam jurisdiction invested in the

State =no valid subject matter or in personam jurisdiction invested in the

Court =no valid subject matter or in personam jurisdiction of Respondent =

= NO JURISDICTION OF ANY KIND AND NO VALID LEGAL CASE.

Therefore, the only logical conclusion is that if Respondent, or others similarly situated,

have no legal subject matter nexus with “transportation,” then any alleged offense under the

Transp. Code cannot legally exist in relation to the not-commercial private actions of, or be

committed by, either Respondent or those other persons.

By failing to require the inclusion of “transportation” as the primary element of the

alleged offense(s), the STATE OF TEXAS is allowing prosecutor’s to deny Respondent, and

others similarly situated, with their due process right to:

(1) proper, sufficient, and timely Notice of all required elements of any alleged

offense codified under the subject matter of “transportation” within the Transp.

Code;

(2) full disclosure through discovery of exculpatory information and evidence relative

to the lack of evidence proving that Respondent was actively engaged in

“transportation” at the time of the alleged offense;

(3) full disclosure regarding the legal existence of an actual affirmative defense

against the allegation(s) and prosecution for same;




(4) a proper probable cause determination that would prove the subject matter

element of “transportation” does not exist in the instant matter and, thus is, in and

of itself, an affirmative defense against prosecution;

(5) properly prepare and conduct a vigorous defense against the allegation(s);

(6) a fair and impartial proceedings, up to and including, a trial.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, by failing to allege the existence of the primary subject matter

in relation to the offense, knowingly and willfully violates the single subject matter requirement

of Art. 3, Sec. 35 of the Texas Const. by trying to create the perception that the alleged offense is

a subject unto itself that is somehow separate and detached from the rest of the Transp. Code and

the single subject of “transportation” as set forth by the Texas Legislature.

It is morally, ethically, and legally reprehensible that the STATE OF TEXAS and its

actors believe they have the lawful authority to completely misrepresent the law and obtain false

convictions based solely upon equally fictitious facts and circumstances created in the

indoctrinated minds of intentionally mis/untrained and unqualified law enforcement personnel,

and then knowingly failing to allege and prove the primary element of such an offense so as to

allow these STATE OF TEXAS actors to more easily obtain knowingly false and malicious

convictions for their own profit and gain. These actions by the STATE OF TEXAS and its actors

constitutes nothing less than knowing and willful malicious prosecution, official oppression,

abuse of official capacity, fraud, and organized criminal activity, against unwary and uneducated

members of the general public.

Neither the STATE OF TEXAS nor the courts can arbitrarily separate the offense from

its governing legislative subject matter so as to allow the offense to stand apart as a separate

subject unto itself. Every single provision, prohibition, offense, and penalty codified within the

Transp. Code is entirely dependent upon the existence of “transportation” as its primary element.

Without the existence of that single subject matter element, the statutes would have to be ruled

unconstitutional on their face as having been enacted as multiple independent subjects within the

same legislative Bill.




The STATE OF TEXAS is allowing prosecutors to use unlawful backwards logic in their

effort to insinuate, and thus create the false presumption, that the Parent subject matter of

“transportation” exists and is applicable simply by falsely alleging that one of its ‘Child’ offenses

exists. This is not allowed under the right of due process. The controlling subject matter

absolutely must exist first in order for the ‘Child’ offense to even be relevant. The primary

element of an offense cannot be merely insinuated and presumed to be true by such mere

inferences to a ‘Child’ object codified within its scope, it must be clearly stated in the allegation

contained in the Criminal Complaint and in the body of a proper charging instrument, and then

proven to be true at trial on the merits.

However, the Criminal Complaint in the instant matter is devoid of any claim that the

subject matter element of “transportation” even existed at the time Trooper Williams #14128

unconstitutionally and unlawfully perpetrated the warrantless seizure and arrest of Respondent

without any articulable reasonable suspicion or probable cause to believe that Respondent was

engaged in “transportation.”

If the Criminal Complaint(s) are allowed to stand as valid despite the missing legal nexus

of Respondent with the primary subject matter element required to commit the alleged offense,

and there being no admissible evidence proving same, then The STATE OF TEXAS is

knowingly and willfully acting to perpetrate fraud upon the court and Respondent for the express

purpose of maliciously prosecuting Respondent while simultaneously denying reshim/her in the

free exercise and enjoyment of numerous state and federally protected due process rights.

THE CITATION ISSUED IS PATENTLY ILLEGAL UNDER TEXAS LAW.

Respondent argues that Citation TX54T90UOKAY (see front and back of citation

TX54T90UOKAY) is both statutorily and legally deficient under Texas law as both a valid

citation and as a sworn/verified statement upon which to base a criminal complaint and initiate a

criminal prosecution of Respondent. The citation does not comply with one or more requisites

of the statutory provisions discussed below.




Respondent further argues that Citation TX54T90UOKAY (see ATTACHEMENT A) is

both statutorily and legally deficient and may not serve as the basis for a criminal complaint as it

does not comply with the statutory requisites of Art. 14.06(b), Texas Code of Crim. Proc., to wit:

CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURETITLE 1. CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURECHAPTER 14. ARREST WITHOUT WARRANT

Art. 14.06. MUST TAKE OFFENDER BEFORE MAGISTRATE.…

(b) A peace officer who is charging a person, including a child, with committing an offense that is a Class C misdemeanor, other than an offense under Section 49.02, Penal Code, may, instead of taking the person before a magistrate, issue a citation to the person that contains written notice of the time and place the person must appear before a magistrate, the name and address of the person charged, the offense charged, and the following admonishment, in boldfaced or underlined type or in capital letters:

"If you are convicted of a misdemeanor offense involving violence where you are or were a spouse, intimate partner, parent, or guardian of the victim or are or were involved in another, similar relationship with the victim, it may be unlawful for you to possess or purchase a firearm, including a handgun or long gun, or ammunition, pursuant to federal law under 18 U.S.C. Section 922(g)(9) or Section 46.04(b), Texas Penal Code. If you have any questions whether these laws make it illegal for you to possess or purchase a firearm, you should consult an attorney."

(Emphasis Added)

Respondent further argues that Citation TX54T90UOKAY (see ATTACHEMENT A) is

both statutorily and legally deficient and may not serve as the basis for a criminal complaint as it

does not comply with the statutory requisites of Sec. 601.233(a), Texas Transp. Code, to wit:

TRANSPORTATION CODETITLE 7. VEHICLES AND TRAFFIC

SUBTITLE D. MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY RESPONSIBILITYCHAPTER 601. MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY RESPONSIBILITY ACT

SUBCHAPTER H. FAILURE TO MAINTAIN EVIDENCE OF FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY; SUSPENSION OF DRIVER'S LICENSE AND MOTOR

VEHICLE REGISTRATION




Sec. 601.233. NOTICE OF POTENTIAL SUSPENSION. (a) A citation for an offense under Section 601.191 issued as a result of Section 601.053 must include, in type larger than other type on the citation, except for the type of the statement required by Section 708.105, the following statement:

"A second or subsequent conviction of an offense under the Texas Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act will result in the suspension of your driver's license and motor vehicle registration unless you file and maintain evidence of financial responsibility with the Department of Public Safety for two years from the date of conviction. The department may waive the requirement to file evidence of financial responsibility if you file satisfactory evidence with the department showing that at the time this citation was issued, the vehicle was covered by a motor vehicle liability insurance policy or that you were otherwise exempt from the requirements to provide evidence of financial responsibility."

(Emphasis Added)

Respondent further argues that Citation TX54T90UOKAY (see ATTACHEMENTS A

& B) is both statutorily and legally deficient and may not serve as the basis for a criminal

complaint as it does not comply with the statutory requisites of Sec. 708.105(a), Texas Transp.

Code, to wit:

TRANSPORTATION CODETITLE 7. VEHICLES AND TRAFFIC

SUBTITLE I. ENFORCEMENT OF TRAFFIC LAWSCHAPTER 708. DRIVER RESPONSIBILITY PROGRAM

SUBCHAPTER C. SURCHARGES FOR CERTAIN CONVICTIONS AND LICENSE SUSPENSIONS

Sec. 708.105. NOTICE OF POTENTIAL SURCHARGE. (a) A citation issued for an offense under a traffic law of this state or a political subdivision of this state must include, in type larger than any other type on the citation, the following statement:

"A conviction of an offense under a traffic law of this state or a political subdivision of this state may result in the assessment on your driver's license of a surcharge under the Driver Responsibility Program."

(b) The warning required by Subsection (a) is in addition to any other warning required by law.




(Emphasis Added)

THE CITATION FAILS TO PROPERLY DIRECT RESPONDENT AS TO WHEN AND WHERE TO APPEAR IN VIOLATION OF TEXAS LAW.

Respondent further argues that the reverse side of Citation # TX54T90UOKAY (see

ATTACHEMENT B) contains an intentionally misleading statement of law and procedure in the

very first paragraph that reads “Within 21 calendar days from the date of the citation, you must

enter a plea with the court by choosing one of the options below.”

This statement, if taken at face value and believed to be true by an individual who is not

aware of the specific requirements of the Code of Criminal Procedure or their due process rights

under both the United States and Texas Constitutions, would lead that individual to believe that a

plea was legally required to be entered outside of the presence of a proper magistrate in open

court, which is completely untrue.

Furthermore, this statement, if taken at face value and believed by an individual who is

not aware of the specific requirements of the Code of Criminal Procedure or their due process

rights under both the United States and Texas Constitutions, would have the individual believe

that they have no right to receive proper, sufficient, and timely Notice of the Nature and Cause of

the Allegations, to a proper determination of Probable Cause by a neutral and detached

magistrate at an Examining Trial, or to be served with a copy of the criminal Complaint and the

statutorily required Information charging the individual with an offense.

The prosecution would be perpetrating fraud upon the court to try and argue that the

citation alone serves as proper sufficient and timely Notice by trying to misstate the purpose and

language of Art. 27.14(d) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

Respondent argues that pursuant one or more of the above cited provisions of Texas law,

Citation TX54T90UOKAY is not in compliance with the mandatory provisions Texas law ibid,

and is illegal on its face, and, therefore, may not serve as the basis for a criminal complaint in

any alleged “transportation” related offense under the Transp. Code as listed on the documents

face.




RESPONDENT’S ARREST BY OFFICER WAS WITHOUT PROBABLE CAUSE AND

VIOLATED RESPONDENT’S 4 TH AND 5 TH AMENDMENT RIGHTS.

Furthermore, Respondent claims and asserts knowing and willful violations of reshis/her

4th and 5th Amendment protected rights, in that any actions related to the false arrest and

imprisonment of Respondent by Trooper Williams #14128, which were perpetrated for the

express purpose of knowingly and willfully issuing an illegal citation, constituted criminal acts

by Trooper Williams #14128 by means of the unlawful warrantless seizure, arrest, and search of

Respondent without probable cause.

Neither a “peace” officer nor a “police” officer may act autonomously of law. Each is

bound by the laws relating to the duties and powers of their respective office. To violate those

provisions of law is to commit one or more criminal acts outside of the scope of the officer’s

duties and authority, and, therefore, deprives that officer of any official authority to act in the

first instance and any related forms and claims of immunity for those violations. Such is the case

here.

The citation issued by Trooper Williams #14128 is facially and patently illegal pursuant

one or more of the aforementioned provisions of Texas law, and, as such, any actions related to

the transportation stop initiated against Respondent for the purpose of knowingly and willfully

issuing an illegal citation are themselves patently illegal and fall under the provisions of the fruit

of the poisoned tree doctrine.

Furthermore, absent any articulable facts alleging that Respondent was actively engaged

in the regulable activity of “transportation” as governed by the “Transportation” Code, Trooper

Williams #14128 could not legally have probable cause to seize, arrest, or search Respondent

based upon a belief that Respondent committed an alleged offense that is codified therein solely

for the purpose of regulating that specific subject matter its related professional and occupational

activity, in which Respondent was not engaged.




OFFICER ACTED WITHOUT LAWFUL AUTHORITY.

TROOPER WILLIAMS #14128 LACK’S PROPERLY DELEGATED ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITY AS REQUIRED BY

TEXAS TRANSPORTATION AND ADMINISTRATIVE CODES.

Authority to enforce the provisions of the statutory enactment known as the Texas

"Transportation" Code is NOT simply inherent in the wearing of a peace officers badge. The

authority must be specifically delegated in accordance with Texas law.

In a more or less simplified method of logically "connecting the legal dots" so as to see

the whole picture, the KEY provisions for determining an officer’s authority to enforce the

Transp. Code BEGINS with Sec. 541.002(4) of the "Transportation" Code. This section makes

the entire point that enforcement of the Transp. Code is a delegated legal authority, not an

inherent legal authority based merely upon the wearing of a badge, which we then support by

using other statutory provisions. An officer’s Transp. Code enforcement authority is tied directly

to this statutory definition of "police officer" as that legal capacity and authority pertains to the

Transp. Code directly.

Sec. 541.002(4) reads:

"(4) "Police officer" means an officer AUTHORIZED to direct traffic or arrest persons who violate traffic regulations."

The thought process for making the assertion that Trooper Williams #14128 lacked any

and all lawful and legal authority to act as a “police officer” for purposes of “issuing citations

and making arrests” under the authority of the Transp. Code goes more or less like this:

(a) Under the Code, "police officer" has a local and specific legal definition that is

relevant to any and all enforcement authority under the entire Code.

(b) Part of the definition says that the "police officer" is one that has been "authorized" to

enforce via the issuance of citations and/or making arrests.




(c) Whereas every chapter of the Code that deals with enforcement and public safety uses

the term "police officer," or its legal contraction of "officer," it must be noted that

such usage is ALWAYS in conjunction with the term "department."

(d) The term "department" is ALWAYS defined LOCALLY within each of the specific

chapters.

(e) The definition of "department" within the specific chapters relative to this particular

type of citation enforcement, though each may be differently numbered, is ALWAYS

defined in approximately the same way:

Sec. 521.001. DEFINITIONS. (a) In this chapter:

…

(1-a) "Department" means the Department of Public Safety.

(f) Therefore, since the term "police/ officer" as referenced within these statutes is

ALWAYS defined in relation to the definition of "department," legal logic and

interpretation dictates that the ONLY "police officer" that is DIRECTLY

"authorized" by statute to enforce or arrest under the "Transportation" Code is one

that is a member of the "Department of Public Safety" (“DPS”) and NOT simply “any

peace officer" in general.

(g) If only "police/ officers" of the DPS are directly authorized to enforce these specific

provisions of the Transp. Code, then WHERE are the statutory provisions delegating

that same kind of enforcement authority to “any [other] peace officer" that is NOT a

member of the "department" to act as a "police/ officer" under the authority of the

"Transportation" Code?

(h) The ONLY place where specific statutory requirements exist actually

AUTHORIZING a local municipal or county "peace officer" to legally act as a

"police/ officer" in relation to "Transportation" Code, i.e., as an AGENT of the DPS

(which is the proper definition of "police officer" in this context), is found in the

Texas Administrative Code under Title 37, Part 1, Chapter 4, Subchapter B, Rules

§4.13 & §4.14.




(i) Lastly, the authority delegated to a local municipal or county law enforcement/peace

officer to enforce the Transp. Code as an authorized AGENT of the "department," i.e.

the DPS, is still STRICTLY LIMITED to only CERTAIN chapters of the Transp.

Code, one of which is Chapter 644 COMMERCIAL MOTOR VEHICLE

INSPECTIONS.

(j) In fact, the delegated enforcement authority of any local officer is specifically limited

to ONLY certain chapters of the Transp. Code relating specifically to

COMMERCIAL MOTOR VEHICLE INSPECTIONS and NOTHING else.

(k) Therefore, in order to protect Trooper Williams #14128 from criminal prosecution for

impersonating a duly authorized peace officer under the Transp. Code, the

prosecution must show ON THE RECORD that there is ANOTHER statutory scheme

that allegedly delegates the required enforcement authority to local law enforcement

officers that specifically supersedes the requirements set forth within Rules 4.13 and

4.14 of the Texas Administrative Code, and there simply ISN'T any.

Respondent has previously seen prosecutors INTENTIONALLY misquote the statutes to

the courts to imply that municipal and county officers are legally generally authorized to make a

"traffic" stop using the provisions stated in Art. 14.01(g)(1). The rebuttal to this baseless and

incorrect interpretation of the statute is the proper application of the rules of statutory

interpretation, i.e. the rule of LOCAL and SPECIFIC statutory provisions being controlling over

GENERAL provisions pursuant Sec. 311.026, Texas Government Code (“Gov. Code”).

Chapter 14 of the CCP is mostly comprised of GENERAL STATUTES within its

context. In contradistinction, EACH Chapter of the Transp. Code, and each chapter’s definitions

and use of terminology specifically defined within the Transp. Code, is LOCAL and SPECIFIC.

This local and specific defining and using of terminology is specifically controlling upon

everything that occurs under the authority of the Transp. Code, UNLESS the Transp. Code’s

local and specific provisions directly state that some other GENERAL statute is controlling upon

the interpretation and effect of these LOCAL statutes, and there is none to be found relevant to

the matter at hand.




Since the LOCAL and SPECIFIC provisions of the Transp. Code statutes as discussed

supra are wholly relevant to this matter, the LOCAL and SPECIFC provisions are controlling on

the issue of what state agency and what kind of “police/ officer” actually has original and

properly delegated enforcement authority under the Transp. Code, NOT Chapter 14 of the Code

of Criminal Procedure (“CCP”).

There is also the issue of certain limitations upon any officer’s warrantless arrest

authority.

Art. 14.01. OFFENSE WITHIN VIEW.

(a) A peace officer or any other person, may, without a warrant, arrest an offender when the offense is committed in his presence or within his view, if the offense is one classed as a felony or as an offense against the public peace.

(b) A peace officer may arrest an offender without a warrant for any offense committed in his presence or within his view.

Art. 14.02. WITHIN VIEW OF MAGISTRATE.

A peace officer may arrest, without warrant, when a felony or breach of the peace has been committed in the presence or within the view of a magistrate, and such magistrate verbally orders the arrest of the offender.

Notice the theme of "felony or breach of the peace" as the limiting factor upon the

legality of any warrantless arrest, which THEN appears to be completely countermanded by the

use of "any offense" in subsection (b) of Art. 14.01. However, we can also see that, even on the

direct order of a magistrate, an officer cannot validly arrest based solely upon the magistrate’s

expression of that order unless the offense the magistrate witnesses is a felony or breach of the

peace.

So, HOW is it possible to lawfully authorize an officer who literally knows little to

nothing, and could not care LESS, about what the actual and specific elements of any particular

criminal offense are, but which must exist in order to constitute an offense, so as to act entirely of

his or her own volition and discretion to make a legal determination of criminality? This question

continues to hold true EVEN when s/he sees the offense being perpetrated, as s/he could have

known and should have known that the offense does not constitute a felony or breach of the

peace.




If a magistrate’s authority to order an arrest is strictly limited to felonies and breaches of

the peace, then how is it even remotely reasonable for the legislature or the Texas Supreme Court

to determine that a presumably lesser educated “peace officer” is qualified and competent to

determine when any other type of offense is arrestable? Especially when that very same officer is

so professionally illiterate and incompetent in their personal and professional knowledge of the

actual “transportation” statutes of this state, that s/he will not only illegally seize a member of the

traveling public at their liberty under false pretenses and without jurisdictional authority, but s/he

will also willfully issue a citation that is in direct violation of no less than three different

mandatory provisions of those very same statutes?

However, an in-depth analysis of Art 14.01(g)(1) proves the fallacy of this premise when

it specifically FORBIDS the officer to make an arrest under the Transp. Code, which s/he could

not lawfully and legally do anyway unless the officer is SPECIFICALLY authorized and

certified in accordance with the local and specific controlling statutes granting that authorization,

which are found only in the Admin. Code under Title 37, Part 1, Chapter 4, Subchapter B, Rules

4.13 & 4.14. Otherwise, the officer is unlawfully acting "outside of the officer's jurisdiction" and

illegally impersonating an authorized “peace/ police/ officer” when s/he attempts to enforce any

provision of the Transp. Code.

Now, after reading Art. 14.01(g)(1), one MIGHT think that article DOES specifically

authorize ANY officer to perform an arrest. But that interpretation would also be incorrect, as we

MUST still go to the rules of statutory construction to understand the premise of the term "any,"

which, if properly read in pari materia with all the other statutes discussed supra, is still a

general declaration. And as a general declaration, the use of “any” within Art. 14.01(g)(1) can be

read ONLY in the following contextual manner:

"ANY peace officer who is properly CERTIFIED and AUTHORIZED according to the

provisions of Title 37, Part 1, Chapter 4, Subchapter B, Rules 4.13 and 4.14 of the

Texas Administrative Code, to act as a properly trained and certified agent of the DPS,

or who IS an active officer or employee of the DPS, for the purposes of issuing citations

or making arrests under the Transp. Code, MAY do so in accordance with the provisions




of THIS chapter (i.e. Chapter 14 CCP) ONLY if the officer has been properly qualified

and certified in accordance with the aforementioned Rules.”

Furthermore, Respondent argues that the term “police officer” has a special legal

meaning and application within the provisions of the Transp. Code via Sec. 541.002(4), a

meaning that encompasses the entirety of Subtitle C of that Code, as said term specifically

pertains to those to whom such enforcement authority has been properly delegated.

The term “police officer” is defined as an “officer authorized to direct

traffic or arrest persons who violate traffic regulations,” to wit:

TRANSPORTATION CODETITLE 7. VEHICLES AND TRAFFICSUBTITLE C. RULES OF THE ROAD

CHAPTER 541. DEFINITIONSSUBCHAPTER A. PERSONS AND GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITIES

Sec. 541.002. GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITIES.

In this subtitle:...(4) "Police officer" means an officer authorized to direct traffic or arrest persons who violate traffic regulations....

(Emphasis Added)

This definition would appear to indicate that enforcement authority over the provisions of

the Transp. Code is not automatically granted to every peace officer bearing a badge and/or gun,

but instead shows us that, such persons must be specifically authorized to act as “police officers”

by being explicitly granted enforcement authority over those provisions. Respondent can find

no statutory provisions within the Texas Transportation or Government Codes either describing

or setting forth the procedure(s) for this delegation of enforcement authority. However, there is a

method and manner addressing this delegation of enforcement authority specifically set forth in

the provisions of Rule §4.13 of Title 37, Part 1, Chapter 4, Subchapter B of the Texas

Administrative Code.

Pursuant Transp. Code Sec. 543.001, Respondent was placed in a warrantless custodial

arrest by the initiating of the alleged “traffic stop.”

http://info.sos.state.tx.us/pls/pub/readtac$ext.TacPage?sl=R&app=9&p_dir=&p_rloc=&p_tloc=&p_ploc=&pg=1&p_tac=&ti=37&pt=1&ch=4&rl=13




That this was in fact a custodial arrest is confirmed by the findings of the Texas Court of

Criminal Appeals in Azeez v. STAT,E 248 S.W.3d 182; 2008 Tex. Crim. App. wherein the court

stated:

“The seminal case construing the earliest incarnation of these Transportation Code

provisions clearly contemplated that a motorist who was detained along the roadside for a

speeding violation, and who agreed to sign a promise to appear in lieu of being taken

immediately before a magistrate, was nevertheless initially "arrested" and [**19] then

released from "custody" once he signed the citation. 30 Later cases established that such an

arrest does not amount to a "full custodial arrest," such that it would authorize the

arresting officer to conduct a search-incident-to-arrest without first obtaining a search

warrant. 31 But the Transportation [*191] Code scheme clearly regards it as some

form, degree, or gradation of "arrest," however fleeting.”

Since Respondent was not actively acting in the regulated legal capacity of a “carrier,”

“operator,” “driver,” or “chauffer” of a “commercial/ motor/ vehicle” while engaged/engaging in

any commercial acts constituting “transportation” as governed and regulated by the Transp.

Code, and since Respondent was subjected to this meritless warrantless arrest with out probable

cause to believe otherwise, the facts declare that Respondent was subjected to the criminal act of

false imprisonment by Trooper Williams #14128 and any other officers or troopers on-scene that

were actively involved in Respondent’s constitutionally unlawful detention and arrest.

ConclusionRespondent argues that the citation(s) is/are statutorily deficient, and, therefore, any

complaint(s) based upon said citation(s) is/are statutorily and facially invalid and are fatally

flawed, and Respondent challenges said citation(s) and any accompanying complaint(s) in

its/their entirety.

Respondent argues that Respondent’s warrantless arrest by Trooper Williams #14128

was initiated for the express purpose of knowingly and willfully issuing an illegal citation, and as

such, said arrest was both totally unlawful and illegal and a violation of the 4th and 5th

Amendment rights of Respondent, therefore, Respondent moves the court to take the




appropriate action(s) to issue a warrant of arrest for Trooper Williams #14128 for the

commission of felony and misdemeanor crimes against both Respondent and the general public.

Therefore, Respondent also argues that, as reshis/her arrest by Trooper Williams #14128

was unlawful and totally illegal, then, any evidence and/or statements obtained through or

subsequent the illegal arrest, search, and questioning of Respondent by Trooper Williams

#14128 at the time of the transportation stop is inadmissible and should be suppressed and

excluded.

RESPONDENT HEREBY MOVES THE COURT. Respondent moves the court to quash any and all complaints and charging instruments

filed in CAUSE NUMBER(S) J4-CR-18-002127 and based upon citation(s) TX54T90UOKAY

as being statutorily deficient and facially invalid, and, therefore, fatally flawed.

Further, Respondent also moves the court to levy civil and criminal sanctions against

whomever is the assistant city attorney and all others involved and/or responsible for this case, as

appropriate to each, for acts of prosecutorial misconduct, tampering with governmental records,

abuse of official capacity, official oppression, criminal conspiracy, aggravated perjury, and

denial of Respondent‘s protected rights and right of due process.

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Respondent requests that this motion be

granted.

Respectfully submitted,




VERIFICATION STATE OF TEXAS §

ss KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTSCOUNTY OF TRAVIS §

Before me, the undersigned Notary, personally appeared Eddie Craig, the Respondent in this matter, who satisfied me as to his identity, and who, upon administration of oath or affirmation by me, declared and deposed as follows:

I am Eddie Craig. I am at least 21 years of age, and I am competent to make this Motion to Dismiss. I have personal knowledge of these facts and attest under penalty of perjury the facts stated in this document are true and correct.

I assert all my unalienable rights, privileges and immunities at Natural Law, Common Law and Maritime Law, and all my respective commercial rights relevant to a place called “this state.”

The documents in the Appendix are true and correct copies of those documents, which copies I have kept in the regular course of this case.

Further, Respondent sayeth not.

/s/ Eddie CraigEddie Craig, Respondent and Respondent

Signed and sworn to before me on this the ________ day of

_______________________________ (month) 20______ (year)

for which witness my seal and signature.

Notary Signature: _____________________________________

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE By my signature below, I certify that on this the _______ day of ______________________, 20____,

I have no idea who should be served with a true and correct copy of this document, because there is no competent charging instrument, much less one showing a name or address for service of such documents on the Plaintiff by the Respondent. In other words, no one has made any Appearance on the Plaintiff’s behalf. Therefore, it is delivered by hand in open court to whoever shows up on the Plaintiff’s behalf. If that is no one, then there is nothing served as of this date. I do hereby object to the lack of disclosure and notice as to the identity and contact information of opposing counsel.

/s/ Eddie CraigEddie Craig, Respondent

Notary Stamp




CAUSE NO(s). ______________________ 5

THE STATE OF TEXAS, § In the JUSTICE OF THE PEACE COURTPlaintiff, § PRECINCT 4v. § Austin, Texas

§ County of Travis, TexasEddie Craig, §

Respondent. §§ Date: ____/____/________

ORDER

ON THIS the ________ day of ________________, 20_____, came on to be heard the foregoing RESPONDENT’S SPECIAL APPEARANCE, and after consideration of

{CHOOSE APPROPRIATE STATEMENT}

______ (A) the response, the Court hereby

______ (B) the response, and the evidence on file, the Court hereby

______ (C) the response, the evidence on file, and arguments of counsel, the Court hereby

______ (D) the response, and arguments of counsel, the Court hereby

______ (E) the response, and arguments of counsel, and after receiving evidence in open

court, the Court hereby

______ GRANTS / ______ DENIES, to which Defense excepted, the motion to quash the citation(s); and

______ GRANTS / ______ DENIES, to which Defense excepted, the motion to quash the complaint(s); and

______ GRANTS / ______ DENIES, to which Defense excepted, the motion to dismiss the cause(s)

with prejudice; and

______ GRANTS / ______ DENIES, to which Defense excepted, the motion to prepare and file

professional and criminal sanctions against all parties specified for that purpose.

COMMENTS: _______________________________________________________________________

____________________________________________________________________________________

____________________________________________________________________________________

SIGNED on ____________________, 20____ ____________________________________________PRESIDING JUDGE

5 See footnote 1 on page 1 of this document regarding the alleged cause number.

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