deep historical roots - university of california, berkeleygroland/pubs/deephistoricalroots.pdfthe...
TRANSCRIPT
THEDEEPHISTORICALROOTSOFMODERNCULTURE:ACOMPARATIVEPERSPECTIVE.*
BasedonKeynotelectureat2ndWorldCongressinComparativeEconomics,June2017.
November12017GerardRoland,UCBerkeley,CEPRandNBER
Keywords:comparativeeconomics,comparativehistory,institutionsinancienttimes,culture,individualism,collectivismJELcodes:N00,P40,P50Abstract:Thispaperpresentsevidenceshowingthatsinceantiquitytherehavebeentwoopposedtypesofinstitutionalsystems:oneresemblingcentralplanningandpresentinancientChina,ancientEgypt,theIncaEmpireandotherterritorialstates,andanotheronewithstrongmarketinstitutions,protectionofpropertyrightspresentmostlyincity-statesnotjustintheMediterraneanbutthroughouttheworld.Evidenceispresentedthattheseinstitutionaldifferencesdatingbacktotheantiquity,andshapedbyspecialgeographicalconditions,canbeseentobeattherootofthetwoculturalsystemsintoday’sworld:individualismandcollectivism.Theseculturaldifferenceshaveeffectsoneconomicperformanceandinstitutionsintoday’sworld.
*IamverygratefultoLiDuan,YunhaoZhang,YueMaandespeciallyShaoyuLiuforexcellentresearchassistance.
1. Introduction
Inrecentyears,avibrantnewliteraturehasdevelopedontheeconomicsof
culture.Alargepartofthatliteratureexaminestheeffectsofculturalvaluesandbeliefsoneconomicoutcomes(growth,institutions,fertilitychoices,femalelaborforceparticipation,….)Itismorechallengingtounderstandtheoriginsofdifferentcultures.Alargepartoftheexistingliteratureaimsatunderstandingtheroleofparticularhistoricalvariablesonparticularculturaltraits.AgoodexampleistheresearchbyAlesinaetal.(2011)onhowdifferencesinsoiltypesledtothechoiceofuseoftheploughorthehoeinworkingthefields,andhowthisaffectedgenderrolesandculturalnormsrelatedtogender(otherexamplesarediscussedbelow).Tothisday,therehasnotbeensystematicanalysisoftheroleofhistoricalinstitutionalsystemsonbroadculturalsystems.Thisiswhatwetrytodointhispaper.
Forinstitutionalisteconomists,thereisoftenthepreconceptionthatpre-
industrialeconomicsystemswereroughlysimilar,orthattheirdifferenceswerenotthatmarked.Thereisinsteadastrongfocusoninstitutionaldifferencesinamorerecentpast,culminatingwiththecoexistenceofcapitalistandsocialisteconomicsystemsinthetwentiethcentury.However,ifwegobackinhistory,asearlyaswhatJaspers(1951)callstheaxialage(betweenthe8thand3rdcenturyBC),wewillfindthatthereexistedverydifferentinstitutionalsystemsamongearlystates.Thephilosophiesandreligionsthatemergedduringtheaxialagewereareflectionoftheexistinginstitutionsofthetimeandonecanarguethattheirdifferencesreflectedinstitutionaldifferencesacrossthemajorexistingcivilizations.Surprisinglyandinterestingly,thephilosophiesandreligionsoftheaxialage(ancientGreekphilosophy,Hinduism,Bhuddism,Zoroastranism,Confucianism,Judaism,etc…)nearlyallstillplayanimportantroleinthemodernworld.Theyarethemaininspirationbehindmodernculturesandculturaldifferencesobservedintoday’sworld.
Lookingateconomicsystemsintheancientworld,wefindthatsomesystems
(Egypt,China,PeruundertheIncasandothers)weremorelikecentrallyplannedeconomies.Therewasnoprivatepropertyofland(thelandbelongedtotheEmperororruler),agriculturalgoodsandcraftgoodswereallocatedbythegovernment.Marketswerehardlydevelopedandforeigntradewasunderthecontrolofgovernment.Forlackofabetterwording,Iwillcallthemstatistsystems.Othereconomies,likeancientMesopotamia,Athens,theAztecsinMexico,theChampa(coveringroughlytoday’sSouthVietnam)weremoreclearlymarketeconomieswithprivatepropertyoflandanddevelopedmarkets,bothdomesticallyandinternationnally.Iwillcallthemmarketsystems.Manyothersystemswereinbetweenbothofthesesystems,asdocumentedbelow.
Thesedifferenceshavebeennotedbefore.MaxWeber(1922)usedthetermofpatrimonialstatetocharacterizestateslikeAncientChinaandotherswheretheabsolutedominationofthefatherfigureinafamilyisprojectedontothestate.Privateandpublicpropertyareblendedinthepatrimonialstate.
Wittfogel(1957)theorizedaboutorientaldespotismandhypothesizedthat
theabsolutistruleinancientChinaandEgyptwasbasedonfactthattheabsolutistrulefacilitatedwhathecalledthehydraulicstatewherethestateorganizedlargescaleirrigationsystems,whichcreatedconditionsthatmadebureaucraticandgovernmentdespotisminevitable.
Polanyiandcoauthors(1954)documentedthelimitedroleofmarkets,where
privategoodswereexchanged,intheAntiquity.Trigger(2003)providesaveryinterestingclassificationofancientsocieties,
basedonarcheologicalevidence.Heemphasizesmostlythedifferencebetweenterritorialstatesandcity-statesbuthisclassificationisquitecomprehensiveandbasedonextensivescholarlyevidence.
Amongeconomists,GreifandTabellini(2017)analyzetherelative
importanceofclansinformationofcitiesinChinaandEurope.TheyfindthatinChinesehistory,thedevelopmentofcitieswasbasedonclansandclanorganization,whichhasplayedanextendedroleinChinesehistory.Incontrasts,citiesinWesternEuropedevelopedonthebasisofindividualcitizenship.Theytracethesedifferencestoculturaldifferences:generalizedmoralityinEuropeversuslimitedmoralitywithintheclaninChina.Theculturaldifferencestheyemphasizeareclosetothedifferencebetweenindividualismandcollectivismthatweputforwardinthisstudy.
BritishhistorianMacFarlane(1978)foundthatasearlyasthe13thcentury,
individualistculturewasmoreprevalentasontheEuropeancontinentandthathouseholdstendedtobemorenuclear,relyingmoreonthemarketineconomictransactionsthansocietieswherepeoplewereembeddedinlargerclans.
Maysharetal.(2017)emphasizetheroleoftransparencyinproduction.
Wheneveroutputcouldeasilybemeasured,peasantsworkeddirectlyforthestate,aswasthecaseinancientEgypt.Whenoutputwasinsteadlesstransparent,peasantshadpropertyrightsoverlandlikeinMesopotamia.
Inthispaper,Ipresentadatabasebasedonhistoricalandarcheological
researchtocharacterizethemajordifferencesbetweenstatistsystemsandmarketsystemsintheantiquity.Theevidencewepresentshowsclearlythatthesetwosystemsformdistinctinstitutionalclustersthatarecomparabletothedifferencebetweensocialismandcapitalisminthetwentiethcentury.Thesedifferentsystemsoperatedinmostlyruralsocietieswheremodernindustrialtechnologywaslargelyabsentandwherelaborandlandwerethemajorfactorsofproduction.
Whydothesedifferencesmattertoday?Whystudythedifferencebetweenstatistandmarketsystemsinthedistantpastexcepttosatisfyournaturalhistoricalcuriosity?Theargumentputforwardinthispaperisthattheseinstitutionaldifferencesfromthepastmatteralottounderstandtheworld’slongtermeconomicandsocietaltrajectories.Indeed,followingBisinandVerdier’s(2001,2017)canonicalanalysisofthedynamicsofculturaltransmission,andespeciallythejointdynamicsofinstitutionsandculture,wecanhypothesizethatparticularearlyinstitutionshaveaffectedculturalvaluesandbeliefs,whichhasinturnhelpedconsolidateboththeseinstitutionsandtheunderlyingculture.GiventheinertiaofculturepredictedfromtheBisin-Verdiermodel(seealsoRoland,2004),institutionsmayhaveaffectedculturalvaluesandbeliefsthatarestillpresentintoday’sworld.
Themainculturaldivideintheworldtoday,accordingtocross-cultural
psychology,istheonebetweenindividualismandcollectivism(seeHeine,2008;seealsothesurveyinGorodnichenkoandRoland,2012).Individualistcultureplacestheindividualatthecenter,valuesindividualrightsandfreedom,opportunityandindividualsuccess.Collectivistcultureseesinsteadtheindividualasembeddedinacommunity(tribe,clan),emphasizesconformity,adaptationandharmony.
Theseculturaldifferenceshaveimportanteffectsintoday’sworld.In
GorodnichenkoandRoland(2017),itisshownthatindividualistcultureprovidesaboosttoinnovationandlongrungrowth.Individualismalsoaffectsinstitutionalchange.InGorodnichenkoandRoland(2015),individualismleadstoearlieradoptionofdemocracythancollectivism,andthelattermayleadtostableautocracy.Thedegreeofverticalintegrationinmulti-nationalcompaniesisalsoseentodependonculturaldifferences,especiallybetweenindividualismandcollecvitism(seeKukharskyyetal.2016).Manyothervariablescanbearguedtobeaffectedbytheseculturaldifferences(seeGorodnichenkoandRoland,2012).
Whileeconomistshaveincreasinglyrecognizedtheimportanceofculture,
alongsideinstitutions,oneconomicoutcomes,thereisalsoalargeliteraturetryingtoexplaintheoriginofculturaldifferences.Thisisnotaneasytopicbecauseitisdifficulttodisentangletheeffectsofculturefromtheircauses,andfilteringoutthecausesofcultureisimportanttobetterunderstanditseffects.
PsychologistsKashimaandKashima(1998)remarkedthatculturalvalues
couldbetracedbacktolinguisticdifferences.Totheextentthatthestructureofalanguagereflectsculturalvaluesandbeliefs,onecananalyzelinguisticandgrammaticalstructurestodiscoverculturaldifferences.KashimaandKashimapointedoutanimportantdifference:whetherornotalanguageprohibitstodropthepersonalpronouninasentence.ThisisforexampleprohibitedinFrench,GermanandEnglish,butnotinItalianorSpanish.Theideaisthataprohibitionwouldindicateamoreindividualistcultureasitinsistsondifferentiatingindividualsbyaclearindicationofthepronounused(first,secondorthirdperson).Anotherdistinctioniswhetheralanguagehasornottwodifferentpronounsforthesecondperson(TuandVosinLatin)todifferentiatebetweenamoreinformalandamore
formalwayofaddressingaperson.Theexistenceoftwodistinctpronounsforthesecondpersonofthesingular(existinginFrenchandItalianbutnotinEnglishforexample)wouldindicateamorehierarchicandlessegalitarianculture.Similarly,theyalsosingleoutwhetherthereisasingleorseveralexpressionsforthefirstpronounofthesingular.Forexample,thereisonlyoneexpressioninEnglish(I),butseveralinotherlanguageslikeJapanese.Theideaisthatiftherearemultipleexpressions,languageemphasizesmorethesocialfunctionofthepersonwhereasifthereisonlyoneexpression,languageemphasizesmoretheindividuality.KashimaandKashima(1998)documentthestatisticalcorrelationbetweenthelinguisticmeasurestheyputforwardandmeasuresofculturesuchasHofstede’sindividualismscore.Someoftheirvariableshavebeenusedasinstrumentalvariablestoanalyzetheeffectofcultureoninstitutions(seee.g.Lichtetal.2003,Tabellini,2008).
Otherresearchershaveemphasizedtheroleofthedistributionofparticular
variantsofgenesindifferentcountriesinshapingculturalvalues.Forexample,ChiaoandBlizinsky(2009)andWayandLiebermann(2010)analyzedrespectivelytheroleofvariantsofgenes(calledallelesinlifesciences)thatleadmoreeasilytodepressionwhenfacedwithstressfulsituationsandtheroleofvariantsofgenesthatcreatemorepainfromsocialexclusion.Theseauthorsfoundthatahigherfrequencyofthosevariantsofgenesweremorepresentinsocietieswithcollectivistculture.Thebasicideaisthatthosesocietiesandcommunitieswithhighfrequencyofthoseallelesthatdevelopedculturalvaluesandsocialnormstoprotectindividualsfromstressfulsituationsandsocialexclusionwouldfarebetterthanthosethatdidnotdevelopsuchvaluesandnorms.
Asimilarlogicisfoundwiththehistoricalpresenceofparticularpathogens.
Fincheretal.(2008)andMurrayandSchaller(2010)findthatcountrieswheretherewasastrongpresenceofpathogensbeforethe20thcenturydevelopedmorecollectivistcultures.Again,theideaisthatinareaswithhighpresenceofpathogens,thosecommunitiesthatdevelopedmorecollectivistnorms,restrictingindividualbehaviorandshowingalessopenattitudetowardsforeignerswouldbemorelikelytosurvuvebetter.
Otherexplanationsfortheoriginofindividualismversuscollectivisminvolve
thehigherfrequencyofricecropsoverotherwheatcropssincericeismorelabor-intensiveandrequiresbettercoordination(Thalhelmetal.,2014)orahigherpresenceofirrigation(Buggle,2015),inthespiritofWittfogel(1957).Ontheotherhand,Knudsen(2017)findsthatahigherrelianceonfishingforone’slivelihoodinhistoryismoreassociatedtoindividualism.
Theseareallinterestingexplanations,andmostofthosevariablescanbe
usedasinstrumentalvariables.Nevertheless,itisrelativelyeasytoseethattheseexplanationsarepartialatbest.Giventheimportanteffectsofcultureoninstitutionsandeconomicperformance,onewouldgainfromcomingupwithamorecomprehensivehistoricalexplanationoftheemergenceofculturaldifferences.
Thisispreciselyourgoalinthispaper.Wehavegatheredanumberofvariablesthatcharacterizeinstitutionaldifferencesintheancientpastaswellasgeographicalvariablesthatmayexplaintheseearlyinstitutionaldifferences.
Insection2,weprovidesomenarrativesfromtheantiquitytoillustratethe
institutionaldifferenceswefocusonthatarecharacteristicofancientsocieties.Onthatbasis,wedevelopinsection3aclassificationofvariablesthatshouldmattertounderstandtheseinstitutionalclustersofthepast,theiroriginandwhytheymayhaveaffectedculturaldevelopment.Insection4,wedescribethedatabasewehavebeenbuildingtomeasurethosevariables.Insection5,wegivesomepreliminaryregressionresultsbasedonthisnewdataset.Section6concludes.
2. StatistversusMarketSystems:SomeNarrativesfromtheAntiquity.
ItisusefultostartwithanarrativecomparisonofancientEgyptandancientMesopotamiatoillustratetheinstitutionaldifferenceswehaveinmind.
EgyptwasaterritorialstatewiththePharaohhavingauthorityoverthe
extentofEgypt’sterritory.Theareaaroundthe800kmlongNilewasofexceptionalfertility.SeasonalfloodingdepositedmineralsonbothsidesoftheNile,makingtheearthveryfertileforgrainlikebarleyandwheat.WhatisimportantforourpurposeisthattheproductionconditionsalongthesidesoftheNileweregeographicallyrathersimilar,creatinghomogeneousconditionsofproductionontheproductivepartsoftheterritory.ThismeansthattherewerenogreatbenefitsintradinggrainfromoneregionoftheNilewithanotherregion.Becauseofthehomogeneityinconditionsofproduction,insteadthereweregreatadvantagesincoordinationandspecializationproducingsuchgreatmonumentsasthepyramids,butalsovariousspecializedcraftwork(Trigger,1993).InancientEgypt,resourceswereingeneralallocatedbythegovernment.Internalmarketswerelimitedandforeigntradewascarriedoutbythegovernment(Trigger,2003,p.351).Ordinarypeasantsdidnothaveprivatepropertyoverland.Theywereworkingthelandandthegovernmentinstructedthemhowmuchgraintodelivertothegovernment(Trigger,2003,p.320).NotealsothatwhileslaverywaswidespreadinEgyptlikeintheancientworld,slaveswereingeneralpropertyofthegovernment,notofprivatehouseholds.Ineffect,householdsdidnot,asarule,ownprivateslaves(Trigger2003,p.160).LawsthatwerecodifiedinEgyptweremainlyaboutregulatingattitudesandbehaviorofordinaryEgyptianstowardsthePharaohandtherulingelite(Trigger,2003,p.228-233).IncontrasttoMesopotamia,therewasnoformallegalcoderegulatingrelationsbetweencitizens,butprovincialofficialshadrightsoflifeanddeathovertheirsubjects,thereweredetailedregulationsdefiningpunishmentsincaseoftheftofstateproperty,evasionofcorvée,dutytowardsthegovernment,theftsfromtemples,royaltombrobberies,conspiraciesagainsttheking.Socialstratificationinsocietywasratherlow.Therewasrelativeequalitybetweenordinarycitizens.Theywerenotslavesbutweremostlyunfreeastheylackedanybasicrights.TheEgyptiangovernmentadministrationfunctioned
inarelativelymeritocraticway.Highlevelofficialsenjoyedhighprestigeandbecomingonewasthemostimportantaspirationamongordinarycitizens(Trigger,2003,p.627).
Onmostoftheseaspects,Mesopotamia,locatednottoofarfromEgyptalong
theTigrisandEuphratesriver,wascompletelydifferent.Mesopotamiawascomposedofcity-statesforalargepartofitshistorystartingfromtheSumeriancity-states.IncontrasttotheNilewhereconditionsofproductionwerequitesimilarandhomogenous,thereweremarkeddifferencesbetweenNorthernandSouthernMesopotamia.SouthernMesopotamiawasquiterichinagriculturalgoodsbuthadfewothernaturalresources.TheNorthinsteadhadlotsofstone,timber,bronzeandproducedluxurygoods.Becauseofthisgeographicalheterogeneityinconditionsofproduction,therewasalotoftradebetweencitiesofNorthernandSouthernMesopotamia(Finer,1997,p.106).TradeinsidecitieswaslessdevelopedasnotedinPolanyietal.(1954).PrivatemerchantshadanimportantroleinMesopotamiasincetradewasquitedevelopedandorganizedtoalargeextentbytheseprivatemerchants(Trigger,p.343).Craftworkwasalsomostlydonebyprivatecraftsmen(Trigger,p.364).MarketsforlandwerehighlydevelopedincontrasttoEgypt(Trigger,p.333)andmarketsforprivateslaveswerethriving(Trigger,p.158).AlsoincontrasttoEgypt,thelawcodifiedrelationsbetweencitizens,inparticularregardingconflictsoverprivateproperty.Oneofthebiggestaspirationsinsocietyforcitizenswastoendupbeinganowneroflargetractsofprivateland(Trigger,2003,p.333).
Ifwelookatotherancientcivilizations,wefindthatancientChinahadmany
similaritiestoancientEgypt.Fromwhatweknowevenabouttheearliestdynasties,theShangdynasty(1600-1046BCE)andtheZhoudynasty(1046-256BCE),thesesimilaritiesarealreadyquitestriking.ThesedynastiesdevelopedaroundtheYellowRiverand,likeinEgypt,conditionsofproductionwerequitehomogenous,mostlypropitiousforgrowingwheat(Keightley,2014).Thereisevidenceofstrongspecializationanddivisionoflaborincraftworkinimperialworkshops(Trigger2003,p.371-373).FarmersdidnothaveprivatepropertyoverlandasalllandbelongedformallytotheEmperor(Trigger,p.325-26).LawsweredesignedtoregulaterelationsbetweentheEmperorandhissubjects,specifyingpunishmentsassociatedtobreachofobligationsofsubjectstowardstheEmperor.WhenChinawasunifiedforthefirsttimewiththeFounderoftheQindynasty(221-206BC),thedoctrineof“legalism”statedthattheEmperorshouldusethetooloftheLawtoexercisehispowerovercitizens.TheLawisthusseenasaninstrumentofoppressiontofurthertheinterestsoftheruler.ThisisstillthecaseinmodernChina.MaoZedongwasanadmirerofthefounderoftheQindynasty,QinShiHuangDi,andwhenpresidentXiJinpingmentionstheRuleofLaw,hehastheChineselegalisttraditioninmind.LikeinEgypt,inancientChinatherewerenoprivateslaves,onlypublicslavesworkingfortheEmperor,forexampleintheconstructionoftheGreatWall.Prisonersofwarwereusuallykilledinsteadofbeingtakenasslaves.OnedifferencebetweenancientEgyptandChinaisthatclansplayedamuchlargerroleinChina.ClanswereregroupedincitiesandtheEmperor
managedrelationswithhissubjectsviatheheadsofclans(Finer,p.450;seealsoGreifandTabellini,2017).AnimportantinnovationofancientChinaistheestablishmentofpopulationregistriestocontrolthemovementofpopulations.IncontrasttomedievalEurope,peopleneededanofficialpermittoliveinaparticularplace.ThemodernHukouthusalreadyexistedalonglongtimebeforetheCommunistRegime,putativelysincetheXiadynastyandthelegendaryYutheGreatalready.Interestingly,theMongolstookovertheinstitutionofpopulationregistryfromtheChineseinotherterritoriesthattheycontrolled,inparticularinRussiawhenitwasunderTatarcontrol,andtheRussianstookitoverintheirturnafterthecollapseoftheMongolEmpireandtheEstablishmentoftheRussiantsaristregimeoutoftheGrandDuchyofMoscowandkeptitundercommunismasthefamouspropiska,whichhelpedlimitfreedomofmovementofSovietcitizens.
OtherancientcivilizationslookedmuchmorelikeMesopotamia.Thiswas
verymuchthecaseforAssyria(growingoutofNorthernMesopotamiatotheWest,ancientGreece(coveringmodernGreecebutalsoAsiaMinorandtheSeainbetween)orancientPhenicia(locatedroughlyintheterritoryoftoday’sLebanon).Thesecivilizationsallwereabletobenefithighlyfromtradeandhadquitedevelopedforeignaswellasdomestictrade.Theyalsohadstrongsocialstratificationwithononehandfreecitizensenjoyinghereditarystatus,citizenshipandpoliticalparticipationrights,andontheotherhandpeoplewithoutrightsandfreedom,suchasslaves,butalsointermediatecategories.AncientGreeceinparticularwasdifficulttoconquerbecauseofitsgeography,alternatingmountainousterrainswithproximitytothesea,bothimportantobstaclestoexternalconquest.Proximitytotheseamadealsotaxationdifficultasmerchantscouldsmugglegoodsviatheseaandevadecustoms.
Thesedifferencesinancientcivilizationscouldbeobservedondifferent
continents.Everywherewherestateshadformed,somecountrieshadinstitutionsclosertoEgyptandChina,whileothershadinstitutionsclosertoMesopotamiaandancientGreece.
TheIncaEmpireinPeruandtheAndesregionwasforexampleverymuch
likeEgyptandChina.Tradewasverylimitedandproductionwasorganizedbythestateinwhatwascalled“verticalarchipelagos”(Murra,1968).TheAztecEmpireinCentralMexicoandtheMayasinSouthernMexicowereinsteadmoreorganizedascity-stateswheretherewasalargerolefortradeandmarkets(Trigger,pp.114-16).
3. InstitutionalclustersintheAncientWorldandtheireffectsonmodernculture.
Thenarrativeoftheprevioussectiongiveusasenseofthekindofvariables
thatmaymatterindescribingancientsystemsaseitherstatistsystemsormarketsystems.
3.1. ClassifyinginstitutionsoftheAncientworld.
Thebasicforcesatplayleadingearlysocietiesintheancientworldtobeeither
statistormarketsystemscanbecharacterizedintermsoftwoofthemostimportant,arguablyeventhetwomostimportantprinciplesineconomics:thebenefitsfromtradeversusthebenefitsfromspecialization.ThetheoryofcomparativeadvantagecreatedbyRicardoexplainshowtradecanmakeeverybodybetteroff.OnedoesnotevenneedRicardo’sideaaboutspecializinginone’scomparativeadvantagetounderstandthebenefitsfromtrade.TheCoasetheoremalreadyexplainshowtrademakeseverybodybetteroff.ThetheoryofdivisionoflaborcreatedbyAdamSmithexplainshowtaskspecializationcanspectacularlyexpandproductivity.Thesetwoprinciples1)thebenefitsfromtrade,2)thebenefitsfromspecializationcandeliverthekeyinsightsforwhywecouldobservethetwosystemsintheantiquity:marketsystemsversusstatistsystems.
Thesetwoprincipleshaveusuallybeenputforwardinthecontextof
industrialization.Notehoweverthattheforceoftheseprinciplesisequallyvalidinsocietieswherecapitalandtechnologyarelessdeveloped.Indeed,benefitsfromtradeareuniversallyvalid,buttheybecomestrongerwhenthecostsfromtradearebroughtdownviareductionintransportcostsmadepossiblebytechnologicalprogress.Similarly,thebenefitsfromspecializationcanbereapedwithoutmachines.Allthatisneededisadivisionoflaborandtasks.Ofcourse,machineshelpincreasethebenefitsfromdivisionoflabor,buttheyarenotapreconditiontoitsbenefits.
Differentsocietiesfaceddifferentinitialconditions.Somewerefacing
heterogeneousconditionsofproductionintheirgeographicalsurroundings.Thiscreatedstrongpotentialbenefitsfromtrade,therebyencouragingtheformationofmarketsandaclassofmerchants,aswellasdemandforprotectionofprivatepropertyrights.Conversely,insocietieswhereconditionsofproductionweremorehomogeneousandwherepotentialbenefitsfromtradeweresmaller,itwaspossibleinsteadtoenjoylargerbenefitsfromspecializationanddivisionoflaborbyhavingalargernumberofpeopleparticipateinproductionsoastoestablishamuchfinerdivisionoflaborandspecializationoftasks.Inthosesocieties,strongstatesdevelopedexercisingcontroloverallofsociety,withthemeansavailabletothematthetime.
Othergeographicalvariablescouldaffectthebenefitsoftraderelativetothe
benefitsofspecialization.Afirstoneiseasinessoftransport.Lowercostsoftransportmadeitpossibletoengageintradeoverlargerdistances,makingitmorelikelytofindlargerbenefitsfromtrade.Geographicalclosenesstoahottradingzonewouldsimilarlyaffectthebenefitsfromtrade.
Geographymayalsohaveaffectedtheeasinessoftaxation,whichwould
favorthedevelopmentofthestate.Traderoutesoverlandmadeiteasiertopost
customsofficerstotaxmerchantstravelingfromoneplacetoanother.Maritimetraderoutesontheotherhandmadeitmoreeasytosmugglegoods,especiallyifcommoditiescouldbeloadedandunloadedatdifferentplacesalongthecoast.
Geographicalvariablesmayalsoaffecttheeasinesswithwhichaterritory
couldbeinvaded,whichwouldalsofavorthedevelopmentofaterritorialstate.Plainsarethemostvulnerable.Mountainousareasoffermoreprotection.
Thedifferenceinbenefitsoftraderelativetobenefitsofspecializationledto
acertainnumberofsharpinstitutionaldifferences.Thefirstrelatestopropertyrightsandthelaw.Statistsystemsdidnothaveprivatepropertyoralegalsystemtoprotectprivatepropertyrights.Twoareaswhereonecanseethistypicallyislandandslaves.Intheantiquity,landandslavelaborweretwoimportantfactorsofproduction;landbecauseoutputwasmostlycomposedofagriculturalproducts,andslavesbecausetheirlaborforcecouldcontributetoallsortsofproductsandservices.Instatistsystems,peasantswerenotowneroftheirland,whichbelongedtotheruler.SlaveswereputtoworkongovernmentprojectslikethepyramidsortheGreatWall,buttherewasnoprivatemarketwherehouseholdscouldbuyandsellslaves.
Legalsystemswouldbedifferentinstatistandmarketsystems.Inmarket
systems,theroleofthelawwouldbetoprotectprivatepropertyrightsandtherightsoffreemenandwomen.Inotherwords,thelawwouldprotectindividualsfromboththestateaswellasfromotherindividualsencroachingontheirrights.Instatistsystemsinstead,thelawisseenasaninstrumentusedbytherulertoensureobedienceofhissubjects.Thisis“rulebylaw”insteadof“ruleoflaw”.Inthiscase,thelawspecifiesthedutiesofsubjectstowardstheruleraswellasthepunishmentsassociatedtobreachoflaw.Thelawisthusmoreaninstrumentofoppressionthananinstrumentofprotection.Thebestexampleforthisisthe“legalist”doctrineinChinaintroducedbythefirstEmperorwhounifiedthecountryQinShiHuang,thefounderoftheQindynasty.
Differencesinpropertyrightsandlegalpropertyrightprotectionwould
translateintodifferencesindevelopmentofmarkets,bothdomesticandforeign.Marketsystemswouldhavedevelopedprivatemarkets.Privatemerchantswouldplayanimportantroleintrade,andtheirroleinsocietywouldbeimportant.Instatistsystems,domesticmarketswouldbelessdeveloped,foreigntradewouldbeconductedmostlyfortherulerorviagovernmentchannels.Privatemerchantswouldbemoremarginalizedinsociety.
Similarly,citieswouldplayamoreimportantroleinmarketsystems
comparedtostatistsystemssincemarketdevelopmentisassociatedtothedevelopmentofcities.Incontrast,instatistsystems,onewouldtendtoobservemorethedevelopmentofterritorialstatessinceastronggovernmentwouldbeabletocoordinateproductionoversufficientlylargeterritories.Statistterritorialstates
wouldthusalsobemorecentralizedwhilemarketsystemswouldhavemoredecentralizedformsofgovernment.
Statistsystemswouldtendtobelesstoleranttowardsforeignerswhereas
marketsystemswouldbemoretolerant.Indeed,ahighleveloftradeisassociatedwithhighlevelofethnicdiversityasmerchantstravelinandoutofcountries.Instead,statistsystemswouldbewaryoftoleratingtoomanyforeignersonitsterritoryasitislesseasytoexercisecontroloverforeignersthanoverlocalsubjects.
Similarly,weakclansystemswouldbemorefavorabletomarket
developmentwhereasstrongclansystemswouldbeassociatedwithnonmarketallocationofresourceswithintheclan.Whetherclanswerestrongorweakdependedmuchonexistingkinshipsystems.Manykinshipsystemsintheworldareunilineal,meaningthatsomeone’sdescendanceistracedthrougheitherthefather(patrilinealoragnaticsystem)orthroughthemother(matrilinealsystem).Unilinealorcognaticsystemsaremorefavorableforclandevelopmentassomebody’smembershipofaclaniseasilytraceabletomaleorfemaleancestors.Livinginlargeclansmeansallocationofresourceswithintheclan,thuswithoutusingmarkettransactions.OtherkinshipsystemslikethebilinealkinshipsystemthathasbeenprevalentinNorthernEuropethroughouthistoryforexamplemeanthatone’sancestorsshouldbetracedthroughbothone’sfatherandmother.Withbilinealsystems,thereisnomoreaclearcutmembershipofaparticularclan.Householdstendtobemorenuclearfamilieswithlessextensivetiestootherfamilymembers.Asaconsequence,membersofnuclearfamilieshavetomakemoreuseofthemarketbyexchanginggoodsandserviceswithpeopleoutsidetheirfamily.Bilinealkinshipsystemswouldthustendtobeassociatedwithstrongerdevelopmentofmarketsandpropertyrights,whereasunilinealkinshipsystemswouldbeassociatedwithstrongclansandasmallerdevelopmentofmarkets(ontheeffectsofkinship,seetherecentpaperbyEnke,2017).AswasthecaseinancientChinaforexampleintheShangdynasty,theEmperorwouldruleoverhisterritoryviarelationswithclanheads,whereclanswerelivinginurbanconcentrations.
Onewouldalsoexpecttoseestrongersocialstratificationinmarketsystems
comparedtostatistsystems.Indeed,thisisimpliedbythecombinationofprivatemarketsforslavesaswellaslawsprotectingpropertyrightsofcitizens.InAthensforexample,freecitizensenjoyedthemostrightsastheycouldholdpoliticalofficesandvote.Metics,residentaliens,werefreebutdidnothavepoliticalrights.Finally,slaveshadnorightsatall.ThecastesysteminIndiaorhereditaryaristocracyinfeudalEuropeisillustrationsofstrongsocialstratification.Socialstratificationtendedtobelowerinstatistsystemsasmostpeoplewereunfreeandsharedthislackoffreedominaratheregalitarianway.
3.2. Theeffectofancientinstitutionsonmodernculture.Wenowdiscusstheeffectsofstatistandmarketsystemsonculture.The
frameworkwithinwhichwearelookingatthisisverysimilartothecanonical
modelofBisinandVerdier(2014)aboutthejointdynamicofinstitutionsandculture.Weindeedasktowhatextentthedifferentinstitutionalsystemsoftheancientworldaffectedculturalvalueandbeliefs.Wemakeseveralargumentstothatextent.Giventhefactthatthesedifferentinstitutionalsystemsexistedforaverylongtime,culturalsystemshadthetimetoemergeinaconsistentway.Giventheinertiaofculture(seeinparticularRoland,2004),itisplausibletothinkthatculturaldifferencesintheworldtodayare,atleasttoapartialextent,thelegaciesoftheculturalsystemsthatformedintheancientworld.
Firstofall,socialstratificationmayhaveworkedasapowerfulforceforthe
emergenceofindividualistculture.Indeed,animportantcharacteristicofindividualistcultureissocialprestigerewardfromstandingout.Socialstratificationleadsthoseatthetopofthesocialhierarchy(freecitizensinAthens,BrahmincastemembersinIndia,DukesandCountsinfeudalEurope)tostandout.Sincetheeliteplaysanimportantroleinelaboratinganddiffusingculturalvalues,onecanunderstandhowsocialstratificationleadstovaluesglorifyingsuchstratification.
Atthesametime,privatepropertyisalsoafactorleadingtothedevelopment
ofindividualistvalues.Theextentofprivatepropertymaybeseenasdefiningsomebody’svalue.Thelargerthesizeofone’sproperty,themoreonestandsoutandthehigherone’ssocialstatus.
Onecanalsounderstandhowstatistsystemswouldhavefosteredcollectivist
values.Firstofall,insidelargeclans,somedivisionoftasksexistedbetweenmembersoftheclan.Fulfillingone’spositionandfittinginthelifeofthecollectivity,whateverone’sposition,wouldberewardedbysocialprestige.Asimilarlogiccanbeseentoapplyoutsidetheclanandinsocietyatlarge,inparticularforthosehavingapositioninthegovernmentadministration.BeingaloyalservantoftheEmperorandfulfillingone’sdutieswouldberewardedbypromotion,butalsobysocialprestige.
Theseargumentsmayseemsomewhatabstractbutacomparisonofsomeof
themainphilosophiesandreligionsthatemergedintheAncientworldcanmaketheseideasmoreconcrete.Confucianistphilosophyisagoodexampleofacollectivistphilosophy.IthasbeenarguedthatthesuccessofConfucianistphilosophyatthetimeoftheZhoudynastywasduetothefactthatitcodifiedexistingsocialnormsandculturalvalues.WithoutexplainingindetailConfucianistphilosophy,itisquitestrikingthatitinsistsonpeopleholdingtheirrankinsocietyandinfulfillingthedutiesoftheirrank.Thus,ayoungerbrotheristoshowrespecttoolderbrothers,asontohisfather,thelivingtotheirancestors,subjectstowardstheEmperor.Stabilityandorderrequirepeopleadheringtothenormofbehaviorassociatedtotheirrankinsidethefamilyandwithinsociety.Similarly,fatherswereobligedtotreattheirsonsfairly,andtheEmperorhadthedutyofbehavinginabenevolentwaytowardshissubjects,orelsehewouldrisklosingthe“MandateofHeaven”.Buddhistphilosophyalsohasstrongelementsofcollectivism.Buddhismdoesnotencourageindividualstostandout,butinsteadtolosetheirindividuality,
abstractfromtheirdesiresandmergewiththesurroundinguniverse.TheseEasternphilosophiesstandincontrastwithGreekphilosophyandJudeo-Christianreligion(andlaterIslam),thataremoreindividualist.Greekphilosophyencouragesindividualstoexcel,beitasasoldier,aphilosopher,apoliticianoramerchant,andconsiderscompetitionashealthymeanstoexcellence.ChristianreligionemphasizessalvationoftheindividualandtherelationbetweentheindividualandGod.TheseaspectsofChristianreligionwerereinforcedlaterwiththedifferentvariantsofProtestantism.
Ifourhypothesesarevalid,thenweshouldseeanempiricallinkbetween
variablescharacterizingstatistsystemsandcollectivismononehand,andvariablescharacterizingmarketsystemsandindividualismontheotherhand.Itisnotthefirsttimesuchhypotheseshavebeenformulated,butIamnotawareofasimilarhistoricaldatacollectionasinthispapertoinvestigatewhetherthesehypothesesholdwater.
4. AdatabaseonComparativeHistoricalInstitutions
Usingextensivehistoricalandarcheologicalsources,wecollecteddataon
thevariableslistedinTable1for97countries.Thecountrylistisnotexhaustive.WerestrictedourselvestothelistofcountriesforwhichwehaveHofstedeindividualism/collectivismscoressincetheprimaryaimofourresearchistounderstandhowancientinstitutionalsystemsstillaffectmodernculture,i.e.valuesandbeliefs.
Thisfirstdatacollectionisbaseduniquelyonthereadingofhistoricaland
archeologicalscholarlysourcesonthetopic.Needlesstosay,thisinvolvesahugeeffortinthecollectionofhistoricalinformation.Indoingthisdatacollection,wehadtomakeseveralchoices.
Afirstchoicewehadtomakewasontheexacttimeperiodtofocusonfor
eachcountryforthedatacollection.Thebasicchoicewemadewastochoosetheoldestperiodofearlycivilizationforwhichwehavehistoricalandarcheologicalsources.Thisusuallycoincideswithancientstateformation,butnotalways.1Sincethereisarelativeinvarianceininstitutionalcharacteristics,especiallyatthetimeoftheformationofancientcivilizations,wecanbeconfidenttomeasurevariablesthathadacertaindegreeofpersistence.Thereisofcoursenoabsolutetimeinvarianceonallvariables,butitisneverthelessquitestrongwhenweconsiderallvariablestogether.Thistimechoicewasrelativelystraightforwardinmostcases,astheseancientcivilizationsaffectedfuturehistoricaldevelopments.ThisisobviousforexampleinthecaseofChina,ancientRomeorancientGreece.ItisnotobviousatallforancientEgypt,thelongestlastingancientcivilization,thatwasnot1Forexample,thePhilippinesdidnotreallyhavestateformationbeforeSpanishcolonization.ThisisalsothecaseforsomeAfricantribes.
onlywipedouttwothousandyearsago,butthatdoesnotseemtohaveleftmanytracesincontemporaryEgypt.Onemightargueinthatcasethatlaterperiodsmightbemorerelevant.Itwould,inourview,howeverbearbitrarytodothingsthisway,andthiskindofdataselectionwouldbiasourdatacollectiontowardsfindingstrongpersistenceofearlyinstitutions.Wethinkitismoretransparenttolookasfaraspossibleinhistorytounderstandtheemergenceofparticularinstitutionalclustersandtheirhistoricalimpact.Ontheotherhand,insomecases,notonlyhaveancientcivilizationsdisappeared,buttheirancientpopulationswerereplacedbynewandcompletelydifferentpopulations.ThisisthecaseforexamplewithBritishcoloniesintheUnitedStates,Australia,CanadaandNewZealandwhereimmigrationandthequasi-eliminationofindigenouspopulationsbythenewmigrantsprofoundlytransformedthosecountries.Forthosecountries,wesimplyusedtheinstitutionaldatawehavefortheUKsincethisisthelargestoriginofthemigrants.Similarly,forSingapore,weusedthedatafromChina.Countrycompositionofmigrantsthusplayedanimportantroleinourchoiceoftimeperiodforacountry.Achoicethatispotentiallymorecontroversialisthechoiceofthepost-TatarDuchyofMuscowyforRussia.RussianhistoriographyalwaysemphasizesKievanRusasthecradleofRussiancivilization,butthishasbecomemoreandmorecontroversialovertime.WethinkourchoiceisreasonablesincetsaristRussiareallystartedtodeveloponlyaftertheeliminationoftheTataryoke,andourdatacollectionshowsthattheTatarsleftadeepinfluenceonRussia’sinstitutions.
Asecondissuehastodowiththeabsenceofoverlapbetweencurrent
countryboundariesandancientboundaries.Ifancientboundariesarelargerthanthecurrentones,thereisnoproblem.Theproblemariseswhenancientboundariesweresmallerthanthecurrentones.Thisismostlythecaseforsomebigcountries.ThemostobviouscaseisIndia.Here,wecollecteddataontheinstitutionsofthreeancientempires/kingdoms:theMauryanEmpire(322BCE-185BCE)thatcoveredmostlyNorthernIndiabutexpandedmosttotheSouthunderEmperorAshoka;theBengalKingdomthatstraddledcurrentBanglaDeshandcurrentWestBengalinIndia,aswellastheTamilkingdoms.Similarly,thecurrentterritoryofSouthVietnamwascoveredforaverylongtimebytheChampaEmpire(27BCE-1453CE),whileNorthVietnamwaspartofChinaformorethanthousandyears.
Athirdissuehastodowiththefactthatinsomecases,therehavebeen
multipleinfluences.Wetriedtoavoidasmuchaspossibletochoosemultipletimeperiodsinhistory,butinsomecasesitwasimpossibletodootherwise.ThemostobviouscaseisthatofLatinAmerica.Ononehand,importantancientcivilizationshaddevelopedthere,whichareimpossibletoignore:theIncaintheAndesregion,theAztecinCentralMexicoandtheMayaaroundtheYucatanpeninsula.Ontheotherhand,Spanishcolonizationlastedroughly500yearsandhadanenormousinfluenceonLatinAmerica.Insomecases,theinfluenceoftheSpanishwaspredominantastheyoccupiedterritoriesinhabitedbytribesthathadnotyetreachedstatehood,thatdiedoutorwereexterminatedtoalargeextent,andforwhichwehaveverylittleinformation.Againthepopulationcriterionplayedan
importantrolehere.ThePhilippinetribeshadnotyetreachedstatehoodbythetimeofSpanishcolonization,buttheautochtonouspopulationremainedverylarge,sowetooktheirinfluenceintoaccount.AchoicethatmayappearcontroversialisthatwedidnottakeintoaccountanycolonialinfluenceinAfrica,exceptforSouthAfricacolonizedbytheBoers.Indeed,thecolonialerainAfricahasbeenmuchshorter(roughly100years)thaninLatinAmericaandonecanarguethatcolonialpowersinAfricadidnotleaveanimprintasbigastheSpanish(orthePortuguese)leftinLatinAmerica.
TableA1intheappendixshowsthemappingbetweenmoderncountries
andancientfoundingcivilizations.Wescoredmostofthevariableswecollectedwithnumbersfrom1to10,
usingparticularcriteriaforourscoring.Thisisthecaseforthefollowingvariables:1)heterogeneityofproductionconditions,2)easinessoftransport,3)closenesstoahottradingzone,4)easinessoftaxation,5)easinessofconquest,6)natureofthelegalsystem(citizen-citizenorruler-subject),7)propertyrightsoverland,8)propertyrightsoverslaves,9)developmentoftradewithinthepolity,10),developmentofforeigntrade,11)theroleofmerchantsinsociety,12)theimportanceofcities,13)governmentdecentralization,14)tolerancetowardsforeigners,15)ethnicdiversity,16)extentofsocialstratification,17)strengthofclan.Thereissomewhatofacontinuuminthemeasurementofthosevariables,andwetriedtoscorecountryvariablesusingascaleof1to10toreflectthiscontinuity.Othervariableswerecodedasdummyvariables.Thisisthecaseforkinshipvariables(unilinealvsbilineal)aswellaswhethertheancientcountrieswerecity-statesorterritorialstates.Theappendixcontainsthescoringcriteriaused.Weareconstructingawebappendixthatcontainsnotonlythescoresbutalsothesupportinghistoricalevidence.Manyofthesevariablescanbebettermeasured,especiallythosedeterminedtoalargeextentbygeography.
Thedisadvantageofourmethodisthatwecanbeusedofarbitrarinessin
thescoring.Thisiswhywewanttomakethedataavailableinatransparentwaysoastocorrectpossiblemistakesofjudgment.
5. Preliminarydataanalysis
Westartbyshowingthecorrelationmatrixbetweenthevariableswe
collected.ThisisshowninTable2.Significantcorrelationsareindicatedinbold.Aswecansee,manyofthevariablesarestronglycorrelated,whichisnotsuprisinggivenourexpectationsofobservinginstitutionalclusters.
5.1.Institutionalclustersinancienttimes.Toputsomeorderinourdescriptiveanalysis,westartbylookingatthe
relationbetweenexogenousvariablesandinstitutionalvariables.InTables3and4,welookattheeffectofgeographicalvariablesontheintensityoftradeinancient
times.InTables5,6and7,welookatinstitutionalandsocialeffectsassociatedtohigherlevelsoftradeandinTable8,welookatlongtermeffectsofearlyinstitutionsonculture.
Table3looksattherelationbetweenheterogeneityofproduction
conditions,easeoftransportation,easinessoftaxationandclosenesstoahottradingzoneonintensityofdomestictrade,intensityofforeigntradeaswellasontheimportanceofmerchantsinsociety.NotethateasinessofconquestwasnotsignificantlycorrelatedwiththosevariablesandweomitteditintheTable.Thevariableshavetherightsignandaremostlysignificant,thoughheterogeneityofproductiondecisionsceasestobesignificantwhenweincludeclosenesstoatradingzone,arguablyduetomulticollinearitysincethetwovariablesarestronglycorrelated.
Table4looksattheimportanceofcitiesinancienttimesasafunctionofthe
samevariablesandtheresultsareroughlysimilar.Thistime,easinessofconquestappearssignificant.Citieswereindeednotonlyplacesoftrade,theywerealsosafehavensprotectingpeoplefromoutsideaggressors.
Table5looksatthedeterminantsoflegalsystems,i.e.whetherlegalsystems
were“citizentocitizen”protectingpropertyrights,orinstead“rulertosubject”regulatingthebehaviorofsubjectstowardstheirruler.Asonecansee,legalsystemsthatwere“citizentocitizen”wereassociatedtohigherintensityofdomesticandinternationaltradeaswellasimportanceofcitiesandmerchants.Itisalsoassociatedtoeaseoftransportation,which,asseeninTables3and4,affectedtheintensityoftrade.
Table6looksattheextentoftheinstitutionofprivateslavery.Wesee
similareffectsasinTable5.Privateslavemarketsweremorepresentinplaceswheretherewashighintensityofdomesticandinternationaltradeandwheremerchantsandcitiesplayedamoreimportantrole.Itisalsocorrelatedwithgeographicalvariablesaffectingtheintensityoftrade.
Figures1and2lookattherelationshipbetweensomevariablesthattake
onlytwovalues.InFigure1,wecanseethatclanstrengthwasstrongerinunilinealkinshipsystemsrelativetobilinealkinshipsystems.Thisisnotsurprisinggivenourdiscussionofkinshipsystems.InFigure2,weseethatpropertyrightsoflandweremoredevelopedinplaceswithbilinealkinshipsystems,whichalsocorrespondstoouranalysisabove.
Table7looksattheextentofsocialstratificationinancienttimes.Aswecan
see,itispositivelycorrelatedwiththeimportanceofmarketsforprivateslaves,withthelawbeing“citizentocitizen”,withtheimportanceofmerchantsandwithprivatelandownership.Itisnegativelyassociatedwithclanstrength.Thisisnotsurprisinggivenourabovediscussionthatmarketsystemstendtocreatemoresocialstratificationthanstatistsystems,wheremostpeoplearenotfree.
Fromthesedescriptiveregression,wegetaprettygoodpictureofstatist
versusmarketsystems.Statistsystemshadlowerintensityofdomesticandforeigntrade,citiesplayedlessofaroleandtheroleofmerchantswassmaller;legalsystemswerefocusedontherelationbetweenrulerandsubjectsratherthanrelationsbetweencitizens,theinstitutionofprivateslaverywaslesspresentandprivatelandownershipwaslessdeveloped;socialstratificationwasalsolessdeveloped.Ourempiricalanalysisalsoshowsthatstatistsystemsweremorelikelytoemergeundergeographicalconditionswhereconditionsofproductionweremorehomogeneous,transportwaslesseasybutconditionsoftaxationweremoreeasy.Theseresultsallcorrespondtoourtheoreticaldiscussionfromsection3.
5.2.Ancientinstitutionsandmoderncultures.Wenowexaminetowhatextenttheseancientinstitutionalsystemsmay
haveaffectedmodernculture,aswehypothesizedinsection3.Inparticular,welookattheextenttowhichmarketsystemstendedtodevelopamoreindividualisticculture,whereasstatistsystemsdevelopedamorecollectivistculture.
First,weseeinFigure3thatindividualismscoresarehigherinplacesthat
usedtobeorganizedascity-statesratherthanasterritorialstates.Indeed,individualistcultureisassociatedwiththecultureofcitizenship,whichhasdeeperrootsinsocietiesthatwereorganizedascity-states.Figure4showsthatindividualismscoresarehigherinsocietiesthathadbilinealcomparedtounilinealkinshipsystems.Indeed,thelatterhadstrongerclansystems,whichismoreconducivetocollectivistculture.
Table8looksattherelationbetweenacertainnumberofvariablesand
Hofstedeindividualismscores.Column1,showingapositiveandsignificantcorrelationbetweeneaseoftransportationinantiquityandindividualism,canbeinterpretedasareducedformregression.Indeed,easeoftransportationreducedthecostoftradeandencouragedformationoftrade,privatepropertyandlegalsystemsprotectingpropertyrights.Column2showsthatancientlegalsystemsemphasizingrelationsbetweencitizensarepositivelyandsignificantlyassociatedwithindividualismscores.Column3showsapositiveandsignificantpositiveassociationwithprivateslaveholdingandcolumn4showsapositiveandsignificanteffectofsocialstratification.Column5showsallthesethreevariablestobesignificantinajointregression.Thisconfirmsourviewthatancientmarketsystemsfosteredindividualistculturegivingsocialprestigetoindividualachievementwhereasstatistsystemsbredacollectivistcultureawardingsocialstatustoconformityandembeddedness.
6. Conclusions.
Wehaveputtogetheranewdatabaserelativetoinstitutionsinancient
history.Wefindthatsomesocietieswereorganizedasstatistsystemswithresourceallocationdonebythestate,underdevelopmentofpropertyrightsandlegalsystemsfocusingonenforcingthepoweroftheruler.Othersocietiesweremoremarketoriented,withabigrolefortrade,bothdomesticallyandinternationally.Thesesocietieshadlegalsystemsfocusingmoreonconflictsbetweencitizens,suchasconflictsoverproperty.
Itappearsthatgeographymayhaveplayedanimportantroleindetermining
whetherancientsocietiesbecamestatistormarketsystems.Oneimportantvariablerelatestoheterogeneityorhomogeneityofconditionsofproduction.Heterogeneitycreatedlargebenefitsfromtrade,whichmayhaveledtotheemergenceofmarketsystems,whereasgreaterhomogeneitymayhavegeneratedbenefitsfromdivisionoflaborandspecialization,whichmayhaveledtotheformationofstatistsystems.
Wehaveshownthatcountriesthatusedtoberuledbystatistsystemstend
todaytohaveamorecollectivistculture,whilecountrieswheremarketsystemsdevelopedinthepast,tendtohaveamoreindividualisticculture.
Thisresearchisonlyinitsbeginningandmanyquestionsareraisedrelative
tothedeeperreasonsbehindtheemergenceofthesetwodifferentsystemsintheantiquity.Forexample,howtoexplainwhycouldthebenefitsfromtradenotbereapedviacentralizedresourceallocation?
Thedatacollectionneedstobemuchimproved.Inparticular,manyofthe
geographicalvariablesusedtoexplaindifferentinstitutionscancertainlybebettermeasured.Giventhattheinstitutionaldatahavebeencollectedandscoredviaexistinghistoricalscholarship,onemaybeconcernedofpotentialbiasesindatacollection.Wewillputonlinenotonlyourscoresforparticularvariables,butalsoliteraturenotestojustifyparticularscores.
Finally,itisimportanttodisentanglerelationshipsbetweenmanyofthe
variablesintroducedhere.Wearewellawarethatthecurrentpaperdoesnotgobeyondbroadquantitativedescription.Nevertheless,giventhenoveltyofthedataandtheapproach,wethinkthisdescriptiveexerciseisanimportantfirststep.
REFERENCES
Bisin,A.andT.Verdier(2001)“TheEconomicsofCulturalTransmissionandtheDynamicsofPreferences,”JournalofEconomicTheory97,298-319.
Bisin,A.andT.Verdier(2017)“OntheJointEvolutionofCultureandInstitutions”
NBERworkingpaper.Buggle,J.(2015)“Irrigation,CollectivismandLongTermTechnological
Divergence”workingpaper,UniversityofLausanne.Chiao,J.Y.,andK.D.Blizinsky(2010)“Culture-genecoevolutionofindividualism-
collectivismandtheserotonintransportergene,”Proceedings-RoyalSociety.Biologicalsciences277(1681),529-537.
Enke,B.(2017)“KinshipSystems,CooperationandtheEvolutionofCulture”,
workingpaperHarvardUniversity.Fincher,C.L.,R.Thornhill,D.R.Murray,andM.Schaller(2008)“Pathogen
prevalencepredictshumancross-culturalvariabilityinindividualism/collectivism”Proceedings-RoyalSociety.Biologicalsciences275(1640),1279-1285.
Finer,S.(1997)TheHistoryofGovernmentfromtheAncientTimes,Oxford
UniversityPress,Oxford,UK.Gorodnichenko,Y.,B.KukharskyyandG.Roland(2015)“CultureandGlobal
Sourcing,”NBERWorkingPaperNo.21198Gorodnichenko,Y.andG.Roland(2012)“UnderstandingtheIndividualism-
CollectivismCleavageanditsEffects:LessonsfromCross-CulturalPsychology”inAoki,M.,T.KuranandG.Roland(ed.)InstitutionsandComparativeEconomicDevelopmentPalgraveLondon.
Gorodnichenko,Y.andG.Roland(2015)“Culture,InstitutionsandDemocratization,”
NBERWorkingPaperNo.Gorodnichenko,Y.andG.Roland(2017)“Culture,InstitutionsandtheWealthof
Nations,”ReviewofEconomicsandStatistics.Greif,A.andG.Tabellini(2017)“TheClanandtheCorporation:Sustaining
CooperationinChinaandEurope,”JournalofComparativeEconomic.Heine,S.J.(2007)Culturalpsychology.W.W.Norton&Company.
Jaspers(1951)TheOriginandGoalofHistoryRoutledge.Kashima,E.,andY.Kashima(1998).“Cultureandlanguage:Thecaseofcultural
dimensionsandpersonalpronounuse,”JournalofCross-CulturalPsychology29,461-486.
Keightley,D.N.“WhatdidmaketheChineseChinese?SomeGeographical
PerspectivesinTheseBonesShallRiseAgain:SelectedWritingsonEarlyChinaSUNYPress,NewYork,pp.75-86.
Licht,A.N.,C.GoldschmidtandS.H.Schwartz(2003)“CultureRules:The
FoundationsoftheRuleofLawandOtherNormsofGovernance,”JournalofComparativeEconomics35(4),659-688.
Mayshar,J.,O.MoavandZ.Neeman(2017)“Geography,Transparencyand
Institutions”AmericanPoliticalScienceReview111,622-636.Murra,JoseVictor(1968)“AnAymaraKingdomin1567”Ethnohistory15(2),p.
115-151.Murray,DamianR.,andMarkSchaller(2010)"HistoricalPrevalenceofInfectious
DiseasesWithin230GeopoliticalRegions:AToolforInvestigatingOriginsofCulture,"JournalofCross-CulturalPsychology41(1),99–108.
Polanyi,K.,C.MArenshergandH.M.Pearson(1954)TradeandMarketintheEarly
EmpiresFreePress,GlencoeIllinois.Roland,G.(2004)“UnderstandingInstitutionalChange:Fast-MovingandSlow-
MovingInstitutions,”StudiesinComparativeInternationalDevelopment38(4):109-131.
Tabellini,G.(2008)“PresidentialAddress:InstitutionsandCulture,”Journalof
EuropeanEconomicAssociationVol.6,255-294.Talhelm,T,X.Zhang,S.Oishi,C.Shimin,D.Duan,X.LanandS.Kitayama(2014)
“Large-ScalePsychologicalDifferencesWithinChinaExplainedbyRiceversusWheatAgriculture”Science344(6184):603-608.
Trigger,B(1993)EarlyCivilizations.AncientEgyptinContext.UniversityofCairo
Press,CairoEgypt.Trigger(2003)UnderstandingEarlyCivilizations,CambridgeUniversityPress
CambridgeUK.
Way,B.M.andM.D.Lieberman(2010)“Isthereageneticcontributiontoculturaldifferences?Collectivism,individualismandgeneticmarkersofsocialsensitivity,”SocialCognitive&AffectiveNeuroscience5(2-3),203-211.
Weber,M.(1922)EconomyandSocietyrepublishedin1978byUniversityof
CaliforniaPress.Wittfogel,KarlA.(1957)OrientalDespotism.AcomparisonofTotalPower.New
HavenYaleUniversityPress.
TABLES TABLE 1. Statist and Market Systems Compared.
market institutions statist institutions
Comparative advantage of trade heterogeneity of production conditions strong weak
easyness of transport strong weak closeness to hot trading zone strong weak Other geographical variables
easyness of taxation weak strong easyness of conquest weak strong strength of property rights
Legal system citizen-citizen Ruler-subject Land ownership Private and public Public Right to own slaves private and public public only Development of markets
internal markets strong weak, central allocation foreign trade private for the ruler role of merchants strong weak Importance of cities large weak Government and society
type of state city-state territorial state government decentralization strong weak tolerance to foreigners strong weak ethnic diversity strong weak social stratification strong weak strength of clan weak strong kinship bilineal unilineal
Table2.CORRELATIONMATRIX.
TABLE3:PotentialbenefitsofTradeandintensityofTradeinAncientTimes (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Domestic
tradeDomestictrade
Internationaltrade
Internationaltrade
Importancemerchants
Importancemerchants
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS Easeoftransportation 0.470*** 0.259** 0.284*** (0.106) (0.111) (0.105)Hetero.Tradeconditions 0.291** 0.032 0.413*** 0.216** 0.310*** 0.079 (0.134) (0.119) (0.116) (0.092) (0.110) (0.094)Closetotradinghotzone 0.259** 0.267** 0.308*** (0.121) (0.115) (0.106)Easinessoftaxation -0.406*** -0.251** -0.350*** -0.243** -0.476*** -0.352*** (0.135) (0.116) (0.116) (0.108) (0.102) (0.085) Observations 84 83 84 83 84 83R-squared 0.172 0.514 0.267 0.496 0.282 0.562Notes:Robuststandarderrorsinparentheses***p<0.01,**p<0.05,*p<0.1
Table4:ImportanceofcitiesinEarlyTimes. (1) (2) (3) (4)VARIABLES OLS OLS OLS OLS Easeoftransportation 0.239* 0.228* (0.123) (0.121)Heterogeneityoftradeconditions 0.535*** 0.293* 0.548*** 0.303* (0.122) (0.167) (0.118) (0.165)Closetoatradinghotzone 0.316* 0.298* (0.160) (0.160)Easinessoftaxation -0.056 0.058 (0.097) (0.082) Easinessofconquest 0.211* 0.056 (0.116) (0.103) Observations 83 82 83 82R-squared 0.164 0.340 0.191 0.340Notes:Robuststandarderrorsinparentheses***p<0.01,**p<0.05,*p<0.1
TABLE5:Institutionaleffects.Lawcitizentocitizen. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS Domestictrade 0.720*** 0.268 (0.076) (0.180) Internationaltrade 0.813*** 0.567*** (0.097) (0.213) Importanceofmerchants 0.749*** 0.228 (0.091) (0.226) Importanceofcities 0.260** -0.224** (0.124) (0.106) Easeoftransportation 0.548*** (0.145)Hetero.Tradeconditions 0.217 (0.167)Closetotradinghotzone 0.034 (0.159) Observations 95 95 95 86 86 83R-squared 0.408 0.386 0.330 0.051 0.479 0.272Notes:Robuststandarderrorsinparentheses***p<0.01,**p<0.05,*p<0.1
TABLE6:Institutionaleffects.Privateslaves (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS Domestictrade 0.792*** 0.308* (0.066) (0.178) Internationaltrade 0.943*** 0.510** (0.072) (0.208) Importanceofmerchants 0.904*** 0.216 (0.073) (0.199) Importanceofcities 0.477*** -0.005 (0.111) (0.101) Easeoftransportation 0.426*** (0.124)Hetero.Tradeconditions 0.206 (0.138)Closetotradinghotzone 0.402*** (0.134) Observations 96 96 96 87 87 84R-squared 0.468 0.504 0.467 0.168 0.568 0.460Notes:Robuststandarderrorsinparentheses***p<0.01,**p<0.05,*p<0.1
TABLE7.Socialstratificationinancienttimes. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS Privateslaves 0.167*** 0.133 (0.061) (0.091)Lawcitizentocitizen 0.138** 0.001 (0.064) (0.110)Importanceofmerchants 0.161** -0.066 (0.076) (0.124)Privatelandownership 0.156** 0.072 (0.061) (0.126)Clanstrength -0.127* -0.055 (0.069) (0.074) Observations 93 92 93 91 93 90R-squared 0.094 0.062 0.049 0.075 0.036 0.103Notes:Robuststandarderrorsinparentheses***p<0.01,**p<0.05,*p<0.1
TABLE8:Longruneffectsofearlyinstitutionsonindividualismscores (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) Easeoftransportation 4.028*** (0.583) Lawcitizentocitizen 4.185*** 3.021*** (0.487) (0.523)Privateslaves 3.629*** 1.304** (0.477) (0.544)Socialstratification 3.790*** 1.660* (1.076) (0.860) Observations 95 95 96 93 92R-squared 0.293 0.439 0.346 0.113 0.502Notes:Robuststandarderrorsinparentheses***p<0.01,**p<0.05,*p<0.1
FIGURESFigure1
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
bilineal unilineal
Kinshipsystemsandclanstrength
Figure2
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
bilineal unilineal
Kinshipsystemsandlandpropertyrights
Figure3
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
city-state territorialstate
EarlyStateTypeandaverageindividualismscores
Figure4
.
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
bilineal unilineal
Kinshipsystemsandaverageindvidualismscores
APPENDIX.
Table A1. Mapping between modern countries and ancient or founding civilizations Albania Illyria France Franks Angola Kongo, Mbundu, … ancient Rome Argentina Spanish colony Germany Ancient Germanic tribes Australia English colony Ghana Ashanti Austria ancient Germanic tribes Greece Ancient Greece Bangladesh Bengal Guatemala Spanish colony Belgium independent cities Honduras Spanish colony Bhutan Bhutan Hungary Hungary Brazil Portuguese colony Iceland Viking Bulgaria Blakanic Bulgaria India Mauryan Empire Burkina Faso Mossi kingdoms Tamil states Canada British colony Bengal Chile Inca Indonesia Indonesian Islands Spanish colony Iran Ancient Persia
China Ancient China (Shang and later) Iraq Mesopotamia
Colombia Inca Assyria spanish colony Ireland Celtic Ireland Costa Rica Spanish colony Israel ancient Israel
Croatia Ancient Rome + Eastern Adriatic coast Italy Ancient Rome
Czech Rep. Bohemia Jamaica Spanish colony Denmark Viking Japan Ancient Japan Dominican Rep. Spanish colony Kenya Swahili kingdoms
Ecuador Inca Korea Ancient Korea (Gokuryo, Baekje, Silla)
spanish colony Kuwait Mesopotamia Egypt Ancient Egypt Latvia Livonia El Salvador Spanish colony Lebanon Phenicia Estonia estonian tribes Libya Arabia Ethiopia Aksum Lithuania Grand Duchy of Lithuania Fiji Fiji Luxembourg Germanic tribes Finland Finnish tribes (continued below)
Table 2 (continuation) Malawi Maravi South Africa Boers Malaysia Malaysia + Sumatra Spain reconquista Castille Mexico Aztec Catalonia Maya Aragon Spanish colonizer Sri Lanka Sri Lanka Morocco Morocco Sweden Viking
Mozambique Tonga, Makua, Maravi and Karanga Switzerland Germanic tribes
Namibia German colony Syria Mesopotamia Nepal Nepal Assyria Netherlands Independent cities Taiwan China New Zealand English colony Tanzania Swahili kingdoms Nigeria Yoruba Thailand Dvaravati Norway Viking Trinidad and Tobago Spanish colony Pakistan Ghaznavid Turkey Seljuk/Ottoman Panama Spanish colony Assyria Peru Inca United Arab Emirates Arabia Spanish colony United Kingdom Saxons Philippines Spanish colony United States English colony pre-colonial Uruguay Spanish colony Poland Piast dynasty Venezuela Spanish colony Portugal reconquista Portugal Vietnam Champa
Romania Balkanic region Vietnam
North Vietnam/Southwest China/Tonkin
Russia Russia post-Tatar (Muscowy) Zambia Bemba Kingdom
Saudi Arabia Arabia Serbia Balkan Sierra Leone Tribes of Sierra Leone Singapore China Slovakia Hungary
Slovenia Ancient Rome + Balkan
SCORINGCRITERIA(DESCRIPTIONTOBECOMPLETED).
Heterogeneityofproductiondecisions.1-2:Veryhomogeneousgeographicalenvironment,oneoronlyafewkindsofresources.Typically,barrenlandduetoclimateorothergeographicalconstraints;alluvialplainonlyforgrainproduction;plantationeconomy3-4:Afewkindsofresources/products,somedifferencesofenvironmentacrossthegeographicalsurroundings.5-7:Somediversityofnotableresources,adifferentiatedenvironmentacrossthegeographicalsurroundingsandclosenesstoplaceswithdifferentresources.8-10:Verydiversegeographicalenvironment,manykindsofresources.Typically,vibrantinterregionaltradeofnaturalresources
Easynessoftransport1:noaccesstowatertransportation(lakes,riversorsea);landtransportationhastoovercomesignificantnaturalbarriers(jungles,swampsorhighmountains)typicallylackedbeastsofburdenandwheeledcarts2:lackednavigablerivers,landtransportationencounterssignificantnaturalbarriers(jungles,swamps,highmountains)3:lackedwatertransportation,landhassomenaturalbarriersthatblockcommunication4-5:lackedrivertransportation,butlandroutesarewell-maintainedanddonotencountermuchnaturalbarriers6:Moderaterivertransportation,landtransportationhassomebarriers(hills,trails,forests,deserts)7:Moderaterivertransportation,easylandtransportation.(well-maintainedroadsorplains)8:fairlyeasymaritimeand/orrivertransportation,difficultlandtransportation(e.p.jungles,mountains,bogs)9:easymaritimeand/orriverinetransportation,moderatedifficultyoflandtransportation(e.p.forests,deserts,hills,trails)10:easymaritimeand/orriverinetransportation;easylandtransportation(roadsystems;plains,etc)
LandOwnership1:noevidenceofprivateownershipinsociety,stateownershipdominates.2:noevidenceofprivateownershipinsociety,stateownership+communalorchiefownership3:noevidenceofprivateownershipinsociety,communalownershipdominates.4:someevidenceofprivateownership,whichcoexistedwithcommunal/familial/institutionalownership
5:mixed,limitedprivateownership6-7Privatelanddominates,cannotbetransferred;usufructrights;notinheritable,revertedtothestateafterdeath(iqta,Prazo)8:Privatelanddominates:ownedbyasingleperson;cannotbetransferred.Inheritablebuthadonlyusufructrights.9Privatelanddominates:ownedbyasingleperson;limitationsonlandtransactionorlittleevidenceoflandtransaction(example:landcanonlybetransferredwithintheclanorkindred);inheritable,anindividualcandisposethelandathisorherownwill.10:Privatelanddominates:ownedbyasingleperson;strongevidenceoflandtransferandtransaction.Canbeinherited,anindividualcandisposethelandathisorherownwill.
PrivateSlavery1:noslaves:serfdomandservants;mastersintegratedwarcaptivesintotheclan/adoption;2:noprivateslaves:uncommonforindividualstoholdslaves;typically,slaveswerewarcaptives;slaveswereheldbythechief/ruler/king/stateandworkedfortheruler;absenceofslavemarketandslavetrade;communalworkorcorveelaborreplacedslaveryinpublicworks3-4:privateslavesexisted,yetplayedaminorpartineconomiclife.Littleevidenceofslavemarketandslavetrade5-6:individualscanownslaves;existenceofslavemarketandslavetrade;slaverycoexistedwithserfdomandotherformsoflaborinsociety7-8slavesweretradedinmarketasproperty;individualscanownslaves;existenceofslavemarketandslavetrade;lawdefinedslavesasobjects;slaveryplayedanimportanteconomicroleinsociety9-10:Privateslavesslavesweretradedinmarketasproperty;verycommonforindividualstoownslaves;veryactiveslavemarketandslavetrade;lawdefinedslavesasobjects;slaveryplayedaveryimportanteconomicroleinsociety
RoleofMerchants1:Nomarket,reciprocityandredistribution2-3:taxationtodiscourageprivatetrade,stateagentscompetedwithprivatemerchants4-5:strictlyregulatedmarketwithprivatemerchants+statemonopoly6-7:strictlyregulatedmarketwithprivatemerchants8-9:governmenthadcertainlimitationsonprivatetrade10:Privatemerchantsinafreemarket
Governmentcentralization1:decentralized.Lackedaformofgovernment;societyisfragmentedintomanysmallandautonomousentities(bands/families/villages)2:Decentralized,lackacentralgovernment.manylocalauthoritiesareautonomousandthereisnotasinglecentralauthorityunifyingthem(tribes)3:mandala/largechiefdom/tribalconfederations.Thecentralauthorityhasweakoronlynominalsuzeraintyoverlocalauthority,localauthoritiesaredefactoindependentandautonomous4:suzerain-tributary/vassalrelationship(feudalism)5-6:powerissharedbetweenthecentralauthorityandlocalauthorities/institutions;thecentralgovernmenthaslimitedcontroloverlocalauthorities,someareas(cities/towns/state)haverightsofautonomy7-8:thecentralauthorityispowerfulandisabletoexertinfluenceandcontroloverlocalauthority,buttheeffectivenessislimitedbysomeotherfactors(ineffectivebureaucracy/religion/communicationetc.);localauthoritykeepscertainindependentrights9:highlycentralizedgovernment;thecentralgovernmenthaseffectiveeconomicandpoliticalcontrolovermostlocalgovernment(certainareashavelimitedautonomy/tributarystates/vassalstates)10:highlycentralizedgovernment;thecentralgovernmenthasaneffectivebureaucracy/toolstocontrollocalauthorityinalmostallaspectsSOCIALSTRATIFICATION1:societyisnotstratified(egalitarian).Statusisnothereditary.Typicallyseeninpre-statesorintribes,clansbasedonkinship2:Fewdistinguishablesocialstrataexistedinsociety.Statusisnothereditaryforthemostcasesandwidespreadmobilitybetweendifferentsocialstrata3:Societyhasafewsocialstrata.Statusisnotstrictlyhereditaryandmeritocracycouldprovidepossibilityofverticalmobility4:Societyhasafewsocialstrata.Somestrataarehereditarywhilethereismobilityintheothers.Example:Hereditaryfreemenandslaves.Lackedhereditaryaristocracywithinfreemen.theverticalmobilitywithinthegroupoffreemenispossibleandprevalent5:Societyhasmanysocialstrata.Somestrataarehereditarywhilethereismobilityintheothers.Example:Hereditaryfreemenandslaves.Weakhereditaryaristocracywithinfreemen.theverticalmobilitywithinthegroupoffreemenispossible6,7:Societyhasmanysocialstrata.Moststrataarehereditary;limitedverticalmobilitybetweenstrata.Example:hereditaryfreemenandslaves.Withinthefreemengroup,therewerethedistinctionsbetweenhereditaryaristocraticgroupsandcommoners/peasants/serfs8,9:Societyishighlystratified.Casteexistedinmostsocialclasses/groups.Anindividual’sstatusisalmoststrictlyhereditary.Limitedverticalmobilityamongdifferentstratainthehierarchy
10Societyishighlystratified.StrongCasteinalmostallclasses/groups.Anindividual’sstatusisstrictlyhereditary.Socialstatusisascribed;verylimitedverticalmobilityamongdifferentstratainthehierarchy(TOCOMPLETE)