REPORT OF THEDEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD

TASK FORCE

ON

DEEP ATTACK WEAPONS MIX STUDY(DAWMS)

January 1997

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense forAcquisition and Technology

Washington, D.C. 20301-3140

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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE3140 DEFENSE PENTAGON

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3140

DEFENSE SCIENCEBOARD

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (ACQUISITION &TECHNOLOGY)

SUBJECT: Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on theDeep Attack Weapons Mix Study (Phase I)

Attached is the report of the Defense Science Board TaskForce on the Deep Attack Weapons Mix Study (DAWMS) (Phase I) . TheTask Force was charged to provide an independence assessment ofthe analytical tools and models employed in the DAWMS effort.

The significant issue illuminated by the Task Force is thegreat challenge in realistically modeling large-scale jointmilitary operations against opposing forces; and then drawingacquisition conclusions from the results. A number of factorscontribute to this difficulty, including:

"* models require an adequate sample of "ground truth" data forverification and validation, and with recent militaryoperations employing new technology, weapons, and tactics witheach new engagement such stationary data is not available;

"* the models must represent not only the physical relationshipsconstraining combat, but also the vagaries of human behaviorand command decision making;

"* the models must encompass not only realistic situations, e.g.involving underground facilities, WMD, information warfare andso on, but also an adequate variety of situations, and thereis typically extreme sensitivity to initial conditions leadingto radically different outcomes;

"* making acquisition choices based on the results of the modelsdepends, in part, on realistic projections of future costs notonly for the elements included in the models but also relatedsupport costs, alternative uses for the elements, and so on;

"* making acquisition choices based on the results of the modelsdepends on our value structure for alternative outcomes,including political and social considerations involvingdeterrence, loss of life, collateral damage, and so on.

In sum, while the DAWMS effort is being conducted with thebest available methods, our confidence in the modeling resultsmust be limited, and our conclusions and acquisition plans mustbe shaped by military experience and common sense. It isimportant for the Department to move forward with the developmentof greatly improved approaches for modeling such large-scaleoperations. Only by such an advance will it be possible toevaluate the capabilities of various force-structure options aswell as the impact of new tactics and weapon systems.

Craig FieldsChairm

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE3140 DEFENSE PENTAGON

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3140

DEFENSE SCIENCEBOARD

MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD

SUBJECT: Final Report of the Defense Science Board TaskForce on the Deep Attacks Weapons Mix Study

Attached is the final report of the Defense ScienceBoard Task Force on the Deep Attack Weapons Mix Study

(DAWMS). The Task Force was charged to provide anindependent assessment of the analytical tools and modelsemployed in the DAWMS effort.

The significant issue that the Task Force discovered intheir review of DAWMS methodology is the great difficulty inrealistically modeling large-scale joint military operationsagainst opposing forces. As a result, the Task Forcebelieves that it is important for the Department to moveforward with the development of greatly improved approachesfor modeling such large-scale operations. Only by such anadvance will it be possible to evaluate the capabilities ofvarious force-structure options as well as the impact of newtactics and weapon systems.

Walter E. Morrow, Jr.Chairman

REPORT OF THEDEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE

ON

DEEP ATTACK WEAPONS MIX STUDY

(DAWMS)

1 January 1997

Office Of the Under Secretary of Defense for

Acquisition and Technology

Washington, D. C. 20301-3140

This report is a product of the Defense Science Board (DSB). The DSBis a Federal Advisory Committee established to provide independentadvice to the Secretary of Defense. Statements, opinions, conclusionsand recommendations in this report do not necessarily represent theofficial position of the Department of Defense.

OVERVIEW OF TASK FORCE REPORT

- BACKGROUND

* TASK FORCE MEMBERSHIP, TASKING, MEETING/BRIEFINGS

* REVIEW OF DAWMS METHODOLOGY- ASSUMPTIONS

* SCENARIOS* LOGISTICS* PLATFORM CHARACTERISTICS

* WEAPON PERFORMANCE

- MODELS- COSTING APPROACH

* OBSERVATIONS

* SUGGESTIONS

* EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The report of the Task Force is partitioned into separate sectionsdealing with the origins and character of the DAWMS study, thecomposition and tasking of the Task Force, a review of the threecomponents of the DAWMS study (namely input assumptions, structureand approach of the models used, and the approach to costing of forceoptions).

The report finishes by making some observations on each of themethodology components listed above as well as making somesuggestions on how to improve the process of evaluating differentmilitary force structures.

BACKGROUND

DOD IS CURRENTLY CONDUCTING A STUDY OF DEEP ATTACK WEAPON ANDPLATFORM ALTERNATIVES

* THE STUDY IS A FOLLOW-ON TO THE CONGRESSIONALLY-DIRECTED HEAVYBOMBER STUDY COMPLETED IN MAY 1995.

PART I OF DAWMS IS TO IDENTIFY THE APPROPRIATE MIX OF DEEP ATTACKWEAPONS FOR 1998, 2006, AND 2014, GIVEN THE CURRENT FORCESTRUCTURE

PART I1 IS TO EXAMINE FORCE STRUCTURE TRADEOFFS GIVEN ADVANCESIN THE QUANTITY AND QUALITY OF DEEP ATTACK MUNITIONS

IN ADDITION, THE IMPORTANCE OF ALTERNATIVE MISSIONS FOR DEEPATTACK FORCES ARE TO BE EXAMINED

PART I IS SCHEDULED FOR COMPLETION IN THE FALL OF THIS YEAR. PARTI1 IS TO BE COMPLETED EARLY IN 1997.

D4AWVaW1•.• "4t2

As a part of the Congressional debate on the possibility of further B-2production in 1994, a heavy bomber study was mandated by Congress. Thisstudy was completed in May 1995. It concluded that U.S. deep conventionalstrike capabilities could best be served by expenditures on precision weaponsrather than further purchase of B-2 bombers.

As a result, a study of the optimum mix of weapons to be procured wasundertaken late in 1995 by OSD. The actual study was undertaken by J-8 inthe Joint Staff.

During further Congressional debates on the issue of further acquisition of B-2s in the Spring of 1996, the Administration agreed to initiate a study of theoptimum mix of deep strike platforms including current and B-2 bombers,tactical air, naval air, long-range missiles (land- and sea-based), andhelicopters.

This latter study was appended to the DAWMS weapons study as a secondphase also to be carried out by J-8.

Completion of the first, or weapons, phase was to be by September 1996 andthe second, or platform, phase by the end of winter 1996/97.

As part of the agreement with Congress, the Department agreed to have theDefense Science Board (DSB) review the methodology employed in theDAWMS study.

TASK FORCE OBJECTIVES

PROVIDE AN INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT OF THE ANALYTICTOOLS AND MODELS USED IN THE DAWMS EFFORT FOR:

- COMPARISONS OF DEEP ATTACK WEAPONS ALTERNATIVES(PART I OF DAWMS - NOW UNDER WAY)

- COMPARISON OF DEEP ATTACK PLATFORM ALTERNATIVES(PART II OF DAWMS - TO START IN THE SUMMER '96)

A Terms-of-Reference for the DSB Task Force was prepared by theDOD Director of Program Analysis and Evaluation with the concurrenceof the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology. Acopy is attached as Appendix 1.

The DSB Task Force is charged with an independent assessment ofthe analytic tools and models used by the DAWMS study. The TaskForce is to examine the analysis developed in Part 1 (Deep StrikeWeapons Optimization) and prior to Part 2 (Deep Strike Force StructureTradeoff), to examine the soundness of the analytic approach proposedfor that effort.

The Task Force will be sponsored by the Under Secretary of Defense(Acquisition and Technology) with Professor W. E. Morrow asChairman.

The final report is to be delivered in the Fall of 1996.

DSB DAWMS TASK FORCE MEMBERSHIP

CHAIR: PROF. WALTER E. MORROW, JR., DSB

MEMBERS: GEN MICHAEL P. CARNS, USAF (RET)

DR. JOHN D. CHRISTIE, SENIOR FELLOW, LMI

ADM LEON A. EDNEY, USN (RET)

MGEN RAY FRANKLIN, USMC (RET)MR. ROBERT J. MURRAY, PRESIDENT, CNAMR. MICHAEL D. RICH, EXEC. V.P., RAND

GEN JOHN W. VESSEY, JR., USA (RET)

EXEC. SECRETARY: DR. J. MICHAEL GILMORE, OSD/PA&E

DSB SECRETARIAT: LTC 'T' VANHORN, USA

REVIEWER: HON HAROLD BROWN, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC &INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

Under the direction of the Under Secretary, the Task Force wasorganized to have membership consisting of retired senior flag officersfrom each of the Services to include the Marines. In addition,membership included senior civilian analysts associated with theServices.

Dr. J. Michael Gilmore from OSD/PA&E served as Executive Secretary.

MEETING SCHEDULE

JULY 18 WASHINGTON, D.C.(PENTAGON)BRIEFINGS ON PART I METHODOLOGYDISCUSSIONS

AUGUST 13 & 14 NEWPORT BEACH, CA(BECKMAN CENTER)BRIEFINGS ON PART II PLANSDISCUSSIONS

SEPTEMBER 4 WASHINGTON, D.C.(PENTAGON)

INTERIM REPORT PREPARATION

SEPTEMBER 24 WASHINGTON, D.C.(PENTAGON)INTERIM BRIEFING TO UNDER SEC. KAMINSKI,

AND MR. LYNN, DIRECTOR PA&E

OCTOBER 8 WASHINGTON, D.C.(PENTAGON)BRIEFINGS ON PART1 RESULTS, PART 2 PLANS

An initial meeting was held 18 July 1996 in the Pentagon to review theHeavy Bomber Study and Part 1 of the DAWMS study. This was

followed by a two-day meeting, 13-14 August 1996, at the Academy ofScience/Engineering Beckman Center at Newport Beach, CA. At thismeeting results from Part 1 were reviewed, additions of low-observables and surveillance models were reviewed, as well as plansfor Part 2. Finally, comments on DAWMS from each of the Servicesincluding the Marines were heard.

On 4 September 1996 the Task Force met to prepare its report.

An Interim briefing was given on 24 September 1996 to UnderSecretary Paul Kaminski and Director of Program Analysis &Evaluation, Bill Lynn. Further briefings were given to the Task Force on8 October 1996 concerning results of Part 1 of DAWMS as well asplans for the future.

BRIEFINGS TO DAWMS METHODOLOGYDSB TASK FORCE

7/18 REVIEW OF THE DOD HEAW BOMBER STUDY DR. KOLEZAR, IDACOMPARISON OF OTHER BOMBER STUDIES MR BEXFIELD, IDADAWMS PART I METHODOLOGY CAPT MILLER, ETAL, J8DAWMS PART I ANALYSIS TOOLS COL GEORGE, J8

TACWAR DR. KOLEZAR, IDAWORRM

8/13 STEALTH UPDATE COL CEDEL, ASDTACWAR INPUT DAWMS COL GEORGE, JCS (J-8)WORRM CALIBRATION AND MODEL DETAILS COL GEORGE, JCS (J-8)C41SR IMPLEMENTATION DR. KOLEZAR, IDAPART 2 METHODOLOGY DR. GILMORE, ODP&EPART 2 COSTS COL DURHAM, ODPA&E

8/14 NAW COMMENTS CAPT NOONAN, OPNAV N88ARMY COMMENTS COL FLORIS, ODCSOPSAIR FORCE COMMENTS COL O'BRIEN, AF/XO-DAGMARINE CORPS COMMENTS LTCOL GOULD, HO MCDISCUSSION DR. BROWN, DSB REVIEWER

9/4 PREPARATION OF THE REPORT DSB TASK FORCE

10/8 PART 1 RESULTS COLGEORGEC41SR IMPLEMENTATIONS COL CEDELSERVICE CONCERNS KEN WATMANJWARS LTC PROSSER DAWMS-DSB-TF-RPT-06

The Task Force was briefed on 18 July 1996 on the predecessor HeavyBomber Studies as well as the DAWMS Part 1 (weapons optimization)methodology/models by the J-8 DAWMS leadership as well as by IDAstaff members who were assisting them.

On 13 August 1996 additional briefings to the Task Force were held on(1) augmentations to the TACWAR model, (2) stealth issues andsurveillance C41SR) modules. In addition, the Part 2 methodology(deep-strike platforms analysis) was described along with preliminaryinformation on force costing approaches.

On 14 August 1996 comments on the DAWMS study were heard fromthe Navy, Army, Air Force, and the Marines. Finally, on 14 August1996, Dr. Harold Brown joined the Task Force as a DSB reviewer togive some suggestions on the Task Force review.

The 4 September meeting was devoted to preparation of the report.

The 8 October briefings were arranged at the suggestion of Dr.Kaminski and Mr. Lynn in order to hear about preliminary results of Part1 as well as plans for future DAWMS activities.

DAWMS ASSUMPTIONS

- SCENARIOS-2 MRC(s) STAGGERED IN TIME

- VARIOUS WARNING TIMES- SOUTHWEST AND NORTHWEST ASIA USED AS SPECIFIC SETTINGS- 1998,2006,2014 TIME EPOCHS

(MANY SA-10s IN 2014 SOUTHWEST ASIA THREAT)CHEMICAL WARFARE ATTACKS AS EXCURSIONS

* CURRENT AND PROGRAMMED U.S. FORCE STRUCTURE IN PART 1(WEAPONS OPTIMIZATION)

* LOGISTICS BASED ON CURRENT AND PROGRAMMED SEA/AIRCAPABILITIES

U.S. FORCE STRUCTURE DECREMENT AS EXCURSIONS IN PART 2

* ADDITIONAL WEAPONS AS EXCURSIONS IN PART 2

* B-2 FORCE ADDITIONS AS EXCURSIONS IN PART 2

The basic setting of the DAWMS study is that of a two regional (SWA,NEA) contingency crisis such as was used in the Bottom-Up Review.No other settings were examined either of smaller contingencies or oflarger scale conflicts. A variety of fairly short warning times (5 to 10days as well as a zero warning excursion) were planned to beexamined.

Time epochs of 1998, 2006, and 2014 will be examined. To date, Part1 results center on 2006 epoch while plans for Part 2 cover 2006 and2014. Chemical attacks are treated as excursions.

Significant SA-10 defenses in SWA postulated by DIA have drawnconsiderable comment from DAWMS participants. In addition, the useof extensive underground shelters by NEA reserve forces has drawncomment.

The U.S. forcestructure using in Part 1 is that current and programmed.The logistics (ability to deliver forces to theater) is based on current andplanned air/sea lift.

In Part 2, modifications downward in force structure (described in laterviewgraph), as well as upward levels of B-2 forces, are employedtogether with several levels of weapon inventories.

DAWMS METHODOLOGYPART 1

WEAPONS MIX OPTIMIZATION(UNDER J-8)

LOGISTICS FLOW WEAPONS IN STOCK &(PLATFORMS, WEAPONS) WEAPONS BUDGET

TARGET SETAIRCRAFT SORTIE RATES, OlMU

FORCE • CAPACITIES WEAPONSSTRUCTURE TACWAR WORRM MIX

NUMBERS. SORTIE I MIXRATES. WEAPON I

CAPABILITY I TARGETS KILLED(PART 1 ASSUMES TARGETSILED

CURRENT/ BLUE AIR AA-RITIONPROGRAMMED) I

2 SCENARIOS(SWA & NWA ONLY)

MODIFIED

GROUND FORCE - LANCHESTER UNEAR PROGRAMMINGMODELING EQUATIONS OPTIMIZER

PISTON-LIKE DETERMINESMANEUVER OPTIMIUM WEAPONS MIX

CLASSIC AIRAIR POWER -* CAMPAIGN

MODELING AGAINST DEEP

TARGETS

Basically the same computer/mathematical models are used in bothDAWMS Part 1 and Part 2 with different force structure inputs. Twoseparate models are used together. The first and by far the oldestmodel is TACWAR.

This model has been in existence for a number of years and models alarge-scale conflict by means of two-sided modified-Lanchesterequations (simplified form given on next viewgraph) for the groundcampaign and has had added to it an air campaign in which air attacksare mounted on a defined set of ground targets as limited by numbersof aircraft, sortie rates, and weapon quantities and capabilities.

TACWAR outputs in terms of aircraft attrition, and target kills by groundsystems are sent to WORRM. This model is a one-sided linearprogram optimizer of a classical form to determine the optimum mix ofweapons in order to maximize target kills. WORRM is usedinteractively with TACWAR in that its output, in the form of targetskilled, is fed back to TACWAR to produce a two-sided air/ground war.

DAWMS MODELS

- TACWAR- DEVELOPED OVER 15 YEARS

- TWO-SIDED LANCHESTER GROUND-WAR MODEL COMBINED WITH DEEP AIRWAR

- GROUND-WAR MODEL USES MODIFIED LANCHESTER EQUATIONS TO CAUSEFEBA MOVEMENT AND FORCE LOSSES IN EACH OF A SERIES OF PARALLELPISTON-LIKE SECTORSBASIC EQUATIONS:

dR -- dB dB = -rR

dt dt

- MANUAL INTERVENTION AND JUDGEMENT IS USED TO INTRODUCEADDITIONAL MANEUVER AS NECESSARY

- THE ORDER OF THREE WEEKS PER RUN IS CURRENTLY REQUIREDALTHOUGH THE COMPUTER TIME IS ONLY A FEW HOURS

The TACWAR model employs a modified form of Lanchester equationswhich are shown above. These equations model the losses of twoengaged forces as proportional to the size of the opposing forcemultiplied by an effectiveness factor. They result in an exponentialdecay in the two force levels with time. No maneuver is inherent in theoriginal formulation. In the case of TACWAR, movement in the FEBA isintroduced when sufficient differences in force levels exist.

Since ground maneuver in TACWAR is limited to a piston-like motion inadjacent columns normal to the FEBA, manual intervention byexperienced military is employed to resolve problems and to introducemore complex maneuvers but not including flanking or encirclement.The average run times of TACWAR are of the order of several hours,but, in reality, extend to as much as three weeks because of the manualinterventions and their adjudication.

MODELSI TACWARI

CONTROLI -AIR: SORTIE RATES, APPORTIONMENT TO MISSIONS,

. -AND ALLOCATION TO REGIONS OF THE BATTLEFIELDAND SUB-ALLOCATION TO TARGET TYPES

-GROUND: UNIT MOVEMENT ORDERS AND OBJECTIVES

,AIR/40 AIRCRAFT TYPES, 50 MUNITION TYPES

--TIME-PHASED FLOW TO BASES

-AVAILABLE AIRCRAFT ALLOCATED TO 12 MISSIONS IN' 'AIR-TO-AIR, AIR-TO-GROUND, AND SEAD MISSION AREAS

".. " \ t -AIRCRAFT ATTRITION DUE TO AIR-TO-AIR ENGAGEMENTS,FIXED & UNIT AIR DEFENSES, AND KILLED ON THE GROUND

• /4 ........... .... • * GROUND

0: -12 GENERIC PLATFORM TYPES

"-UNITS CHARACTERIZED BY WIDTH, DEPTH, MOVEMENT, etc.

-WEAPON CHARACTERISTICS CAPTURED BY ENGAGEMENTRATES, ALLOCATIONS TO TARGETS, AND PKs AS FUNCTIONOF POSTURE

- FEBA MOVEMENT AND ATTRITION BASED ON FORCE RATIO

283584-2

The piston-like action of TACWAR is shown in the viewgraph. In eachcolumn (piston) a separate Lanchester equation is evaluated for each12 hours of battle. As the result of this computation, the balance ofresidual force levels is determined. A decision is then made to declarea stalemate, or, if the force ratios are sufficiently large, movement of theFEBA is declared. If one piston movement is far ahead of its neighbors,manual intervention is required to rebalance the front.

In the air, many types of aircraft and weapons are modeled fromvarious bases to targets banded by range. Depending on the weaponcapabilities, ground targets/enemy air are killed or not, and aircraft arelost both to enemy action as well as to normal operations.

10

DAWMS MODELS (Cont'd)

- WORRM

- A ONE-SIDED LINEAR PROGRAM OPTIMIZER WHICH TAKES INPUTS FROMTACWAR IN THE FORM OF AIR-TARGET REQUIREMENTS, GROUND KILLS OFAIR TARGETS, SORTIE RATES, GROUND-TARGET KILLS PER SORTIE

- USES STANDARD LINEAR PROGRAM OPTIMIZER "CPLEX"

- OPTIMIZES WITH MULTIPLE CONSTRAINTS AND BOUNDS ON WEAPONPROCUREMENT COSTS AND CURRENT INVENTORY

- PRODUCES A LIST OF NUMBERS OF WEAPONS OF EACH TYPE TO MAXIMIZETHE QUANTITY OF TARGETS KILLED WEIGHTED BY TARGET VALUE

- IT OPERATES WITH NO INTERVENTION AND TAKES SEVERAL HOURS PERRUN

The WORRM model carries out a one-sided optimization of weaponmix, and, in the process, delivers back to TACWAR targets that it hasbeen able to kill for use in the two-sided conflict modeled by TACWAR.

It employs a widely used software package, CPLEX, to determine theoptimum mix of different types of air-to-ground weapons to maximizethe sum of target kills weighted by value. A number of constraints andtabular inputs are used in the optimization including one on totalweapon expenditures. Others relate to aircraft sortie rates/ load outs,range of platforms and weapons, probability of kill, etc.

It operates without intervention and requires several hours per run.

11

DAWMS METHODOLOGYPART 2A

PLATFORM OPTIMIZATION(UNDER J-8)

PART 2A ----------------------------------------

TARGET KILLS, BLUEPLATFORM OPTIONS: AIR ATTRITION

BASE CASE (6x3 + 6x3 OUTPUTS WITH

REDUCTIONS I TACWAR WORRM ASSOCIATED COSTS)6 OPTIONS EACHEVALUATED FOR: 20-YEAR COSTS

3 WEAPON OPTION03 INCLUDING OPERATIONS,AND, I A MAINTENANCE,3 B-2 OPIIONS MODERNIZATION (NO

2 SCENARIOS BASE COSTS, NODEPRECIATION)

3 WEAPON FUNDINGOPTIONS

(CURRENT, +1 00%, UNLIMITED)

In Part 2A of the DAWMS study the ability of various deep strike forcestructures are to be examined for effectiveness and cost. TheTACWAR - WORRM configuration previously described is planned tobe used for these studies. The same scenarios as in Part 1 are to beused with the same logistics limitations. However, in Part 2A, variationson the force structure upwards and downwards together with largevariations in weapons inventories are to be investigated. Starting withthe Base case used in Part 1, a total of 6 decremented deep-strikeforces are to be examined with three variations of weapons inventories.Thus, a total of 6x3 or 18 cases will be modeled, with costs calculatedfor each case together with outputs of deep strike targets killed. It is notclear whether outcomes of the ground campaigns will be also available.In addition to these cases, additional runs will be made with variousadditions to the B-2 bomber force.

The next viewgraph will show the various cases to be examined.

12

PART 2 FORCE STRUCTURE OPTIONS (FSOs)

I. BASE CASES II. REDUCTIONS CASES

BOMBERS 1126-1.

BUR FORCES SEA-BASED TACAIR 1 CVICVW

-WITH AND WITHOUT OPTIMUM MUNITIONS FROM LAND-BASED TACAIR A -EFROM DAWMS 1

-WITH AND WITHOUT UNFUNDED CONVENTIONAL HELICOPTERS 10% FORCE 20% FORCEBOMBER UPGRADES

SURFACE-SURFACEMISSILES/ARSENAL SHIP (DETERMINED USWG DAWNS I RESULTS)INVENTORIES

III. MUNUMlOONSIII. MUNITIONS OPTIMUM. OPTIMUM, OPTIMUM. IV. B-2 TRADEOFF

TRADEOFF CURIENT CURRENT CURRENT ANALYSIS +20 B-25' 40 B-2s* +60 B-2s*ANALYSIS BUDGET BUY BUDGET BUY BUDGET BUY

BOMBER REDUCTIONS X X X BOMBERS

SEA-BASED TACAJR X X X SEA-BASED TACAIR 2 CVMWIREDUCTIONS+

LAND-BASED TACAIR " 27FWE.LAND-BASED TACAIR X X X HELICOPTERS _ WA NAREDUCTIONS

SURFACE-SURFACEHELOCOPTER X X X MISSILES/ARSENAL SHIP N/A N/A N/AREDUCTIONS INVENTORIES

SURFACE-SURFACE N/A N/A N/AMISSILES/ARSENAL 'A- -fbISHIP INVENTORIES

The various force level decrements and B-2 augmentations are shownby shading in the viewgraph above. Six different decrements of deepstrike forces have been chosen for analysis. Three levels of weaponinventories are to be used with each force option thus resulting in 18different options to be evaluated and costed.

In addition, two levels of B-2 augmentations are to be evaluated witheach of the six force decrements equipped with nominal weapon levels.This will result in an additional twelve outputs.

The Task Force believes that this set of force options is reasonable andappropriate for the Part 2 DAWMS effort.

13

DAWMS METHODOLOGY

PART 2BMISSION ASSESSMENTS

(UNDER SERVICES)

- EXAMINATION OF OTHER MISSIONS FOR DEEP-STRIKE FORCES

- STUDY ASSIGNMENTS- THEATER AIR OPERATIONS AIR FORCE (RAND)

(CAS, AIR DEFENSE, SURV., ETC.)- NAVAL WARFARE DoN (CNA)

(SEA CONTROL, FLEET DEFENSE, ASW, ETC.)

- CLOSE COMBAT ARMY (TRADOC)

- PRESENCE (OVERSEAS) DoN(CNA)

- NUCLEAR DETERRENCE OSD

- MULTIPLE MEASURES OF MERITTO BE CONSIDERED, BUT NOT YET ESTABLISHED

The Services have noted that the deep strike forces being decrementedin Part 2A have other important roles than deep strike. As a result, inPart 2B of DAWMS, the Services are to examine the impact of forcedecrements on other missions such as those shown above. Eachmission area has been assigned to an appropriate Service and they arefree to use whatever models they think appropriate to make theassessment. As yet, there have not been any measures of meritestablished for these studies.

14

[DAWMS COSTING OF FORCE STRUCTURE OPTI[ONS

- DAWMS FORCE OPTION COSTS INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING PRICEDOVER 20 YEARS

- OPERATIONS INCLUDING PERSONNEL, FUEL/CONSUMABLES,MAINTENANCE

- BASE SUPPORT

- TRAINING OF REPLACEMENT AIRCREWS- BASE CLOSURES- 20 YEARS OF MODERNIZATION

- COSTS NOT INCLUDED:DEPRECIATION COSTS OF FORCE PLATFORMS

- DEPRECIATION COSTS OF BASESCARRIER TASK FORCE SUPPORT SHIPS (NAVY)

- AIR FORCE SUPPORT AIRCRAFT (AWACS, EW, SURVEILLANCE, ETC)- SHIPS FOR SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILES

DAWMS-DSB-TF-RPT-15

Current plans are to evaluate force structure options by calculating the20-year costs of each force option to include operational and direct-support costs as indicated above. A 20-year modernization cost hasbeen included as a surrogate for force depreciation.

A number of other costs have not been included. These include theactual depreciation (wearout) costs of the force options. Thedepreciation costs of the CONUS and overseas air bases have also notbeen included. In addition, the costs of secondary support systemshave not been included. In some cases, these systems are necessary.for air platforms to penetrate successfully. In other cases, they areuniversally needed for surveillance and acquisition of targets.

Finally, the costs are fully attributed to the deep-strike mission, whereasthe forces considered may have other significant other missions.

15

INITIAL RESULTS AND FUTURE PLANS

(8 OCT 96 BRIEFINGS)

" DAWMS PART 1 (WEAPON OPTIMIZATION) IS NOW OPERATINGSATISFACTORILY. INITIAL RESULTS INDICATE THE NEED TOREFINE CERTAIN CONSTRAINTS IN WORRM TO AVOIDANALAMOUS RESULTS

" PLANS WERE PRESENTED FOR RUNNING ADDmONAL CASESWITH VARYING ASSUMPTIONS AND AN ADDITIONAL SCENARIOINVOLVING AN MRC WITH NO IN SITO U.S. FORCES AT THE TIMEHOSTILITIES ARE INITIATED

" ACCESS TO BOTH AIR FORCE AND NAVY SAR DATA IS INPROCESS

Part 1 Results: On the first topic COL George reported that Part 1 results hadbeen obtained for the year 2006 West first/East later case. Some of the weaponallocations resulting from this run had raised questions, and, as a result, some ofthe constraints in WORRM were being reviewed. COL George also reported onthe efforts to get the IDA and PA&E TACWAR models to produce the same resultsfor the same input conditions. It now appears that there will be an attempt toanalyze many of the cases suggested by the Task Force including an MRCscenario in which no U.S. forces or prepositioned equipments are present at thebeginning of hostilities. This is going to take considerable time to accomplish. It ispossible that the Part 1 effort could easily take to the end of the year and perhapsbeyond. It also seems clear that Part 2 analysis (Platforms) will take well into thenext year to accomplish.

Access to SAR Information: A memo-of-understanding has been signed which willresult in a significant number of analysts being given clearances into SAR datafrom both the Air Force and the Navy. About 30 on 125 requests have beengranted to date as well as the clearance of space at IDA.

Update of the Efforts to Improve Modeling of C41SRh Considerable progress wasreported of better modeling of C41SR in TACWAR and WORRM. The currentmodeling incorporates the effects of varying capability to detect, classify, andidentify targets. It appears, however, that the complete modeling of BDA,particularly its timeliness, is yet to be achieved.

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INITIAL RESULTS AND FUTURE PLANS(8 OCT 96 BRIEFINGS)

CONTINUED

"A REVIEW OF SERVICE CONCERNS INDICATED THAT MOSTISSUES HAD BEEN SETTLED. A FEW TOPICS WERE STILL OFCONCERN:- MODELING OF ATACMS AND THE ARSENAL SHIP- AIR SORTIE RATES DURING THE 2ND PHASE OF THE CAMPAIGN

" SEVERAL-YEAR PROGRAM TO DEVELOP AN ADVANCEDLARGE-SCALE COMBAT MODEL HAS BEEN INITIATED AS AREPLACEMENT FOR TACWAR

Status of Services's Concerns: Ken Watman reported on the current status ofServices's concerns about the TACWAR modeling. He reported that many of theearlier concerns of the Services had been met. There were still some items ofconcern however:

Army is still concerned about the adequateness of modeling the ATACMSsurface-to-surface missile.

Air Force: is concerned about the drop in kill rates during the 2nd phase ofthe conflict.

Navy is also concerned about the modeling of the arsenal ship and itseffectiveness.

Marines: apparently still did not have any concerns.

Plans for the Development of JWARS: Lt. Col. Prosser reports on longer-termplans to develop a new modeling capability called the Joint Warfare System. Hesaid that this effort had been under way for about one year and that it wasmotivated by the Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, during a briefing of arecent mobility study, when he raised questions about the quality of and degreeof new technology (e.g., intelligence processing, smart weapons, etc.) included inthe combat models being used to evaluate forces and generate movementrequirements. The JWARS effort is in the definition/contracting phase at thistime.

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INTRODUCTORY OBSERVATIONS

MILITARY FORCES SHOULD BE DESIGNED TO HANDLE A RANGE OFTHREATS TO NATIONAL SECURITY WITH SUFFICIENT ROBUSTNESS TORESPOND TO UNPREDICTED EVENTS AS WELL AS THOSE PREDICTED

MODELING OF FUTURE MILITARY ENGAGEMENTS SHOULDREALISTICALLY REPRESENT MODERN COMBAT TACTICS

ANALYTIC MODELS CAN SHOW HOW OUTCOMES VARY WITH CHANGESIN CIRCUMSTANCES AND DETAILS

BUT THERE IS A GREAT DEAL OF UNCERTAINTY ABOUT THECIRCUMSTANCES AND DETAILS OF FUTURE CONFLICTS

The fundamental thought of the first point is that military forces shouldnot be point designed to be optimum for one or two very specificscenarios such as those identified in the Bottom Up Review of a fewyears ago. Rather they should be designed for a spectrum of possiblescenarios including those which now seem unlikely as for instance therise of a peer competitor. This is important because of the rather longtime it takes for build and train armed forces - some ten to twenty years.

Modern combat jnvolves maneuver tactics including encirclement, deeppenetration, deep attack stand-off fires as well as non-linear warfare.Analytic models that could represent these tactics would be useful, butcurrently do not exist.

Analytic models can indicate how the outcome of a conflict might varywith changes in the input assumptions and scenario. They are lesslikely to be able to give absolute answers about the precise level ofmilitary forces needed for a particular challenge to national security.

Finally, it should be obvious, from even a brief study of history, that it isnext to impossible to predict even the major parameters of possiblefuture conflicts to say nothing of the details.

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OBSERVATIONS ON ASSUMPTIONS ANDSCENARIOS

* UNCERTAINTIES REQUIRE EXPLORATION OVER WIDE VARIATIONS INALL IMPORTANT INPUTS /ASSUMPTIONS

* DAWMS PART I (WEAPONS OPTIMIZATION) EXAMINES A LIMITED SETOF SCENARIOS (LOCATIONS, THREAT, ETC.) AND VARIATIONS INASSUMPTIONS (WARNING TIMES, C41SR, STEALTH, ETC.)

* PLANS FOR DAWMS PART 2 (PLATFORM ALTERNATIVES) SHOW ANAWARENESS OF THESE LIMITATIONS BY INCLUSION OF SEPARATEOVERALL ASSESSMENTS OF MULTI-MISSION CAPABLE PLATFORMS,BUT THE OVERALL PART II APPROACH STILL DOES NOT OVERCOMETHESE LIMITATIONS

* TO ADEQUATELY TEST THE ROBUSTNESS OF THE U.S. DEEP ATTACKCAPABILITIES, IT WILL BE NECESSARY TO EXAMINE:

- A BROADER SET OF PLAUSIBLE POLITICAL - MILITARY SCENARIOS- A WIDE RANGE OF VARIATIONS, IN KEY PARAMETERS (C41SR, STEALTH,

WARNING TIME, LOGISTICS FLOW, COSTS, ETC.) FOR EACH SCENARIO- USE OF ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES / MODELS DAWMS-DSB-TF-RPT-19

Because of uncertainties concerning possible future conflicts, it is necessaryto test analytic models of such conflicts over a wide range of inputs andassumptions in order to understand the dependence of outcomes on thoseinputs.

The DAWMS Part 1 Study (weapon optimization), examined only a limited setof scenarios namely two - South West Asia and North East Asia. In addition,there has been time to examine only a few variations in assumptions such asdifferent warning times, different C41SR capabilities, and as yet no detailedinformation on stealth.

The plans for the DAWMS Part 2 Study show concern over these Part 1limitations in that additional variations are planned as well as the inclusion ofmission assessments which will examine the importance of other roles for thevarious deep strike forces. However, the overall DAWMS Part 2 approach isjudged to be limited in its approach. For instance, it does not plan toinvestigate other scenarios which are more likely in 2006 and especially in the2014 time period.

Therefore, the Task Force believes that to understand the effectiveness ofvarious deep attack force options or combinations thereof, it will important toexamine a much broader set of international security scenarios. For each ofthose situations, a wide range of basic assumptions concerning keyparameters such as (C41SR, warning time, logistics flow, etc) will have to beexamined. In addition, it will be important to examine in some analytic detail,the multiple roles that deep strike forces can play in the outcomes.

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OBSERVATIONS ON MODELS

THE TACWAR/ WORRM MODEL IS VERY UMITED IN ITS REPRESENTATION OF MODERNMANEUVER WARFARE

THE CURRENT IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TACWAR / WORRM MODEL BY THE DAWMS TEAMREQUIRES MANUAL INTERVENTIONS THAT RESULT IN UP TO 3 WEEKS PER SET UP AND RUNAND THUS SIGNIFICANTLY LIMITS THE NUMBER OF PARAMETER VARIATIONS THAT CAN BEEXAMINED.

THESE LIMITATIONS ARE MARGINALLY ACCEPTABLE FOR DAWMS PART I (WEAPON MIXOPTIMIZATION) RESULTS THAT APPLY OVER THE FYDP WHICH ASSUMES CURRENT FORCESTRUCTURE

THE TACWAR / WORRMS MODELING APPROACH IS EVEN LESS APPROPRIATE FOR PART 2A(PLATFORM MIX TRADEOFFS) BECAUSE THE SET UP AND RUN TIMES AS BEING IMPLEMENTEDWILL NOT PERMIT SUFFICIENT EXPLORATION OF PARAMETER VARIATIONS AS WELL AS AWIDE SPECTRUM OF SCENARIOS.

FOR PART 2B (MULTI-MISSION ANALYSIS) THE MODELS AVAILABLE TO THE SERVICES ARE NOTLIKELY TO PROVIDE COMPARABLE JOINT WARFIGHTING VALUES FOR MULTIMISSIONPLATFORM ASSETS. THE METHOD OF INTEGRATING RESULTS FROM THESE MODELS BYDAWMS IS NOT YET EVIDENT.

WE KNOW OF NO SINGLE MODEL THAT CAN ASSESS THE RELATIVE VALUE OF MULTIMISSIONWEAPON SYSTEMS. MULTIPLE MODELS WITH COMPARABLE MEASURES OF PERFORMANCETOGETHER WITH PROFESSIONAL MILITARY JUDGEMENT ARE NEEDED FOR THIS TASK.

The Lanchester equation-based TACWAR model does not represent modernmaneuver warfare tactics such as encirclement, rapid deep penetration, deception, ornon linear warfare.

Because of the necessity for extensive manual intervention, the currentimplementation of the combination TACWAR-WORRM models used for the DAWMSeffort requires as much as three weeks per run. In the time available for the DAWMSstudy, relatively few variations of the critical parameters can be explored.

For DAWMS Part 1 (weapon mix optimization) this is marginally acceptable exceptthat the deep strike platforms chosen is limited to current forces plus those planned inthe FYDP. This raises significant questions concerning the 2006 and 2014 yearestimates.

For DAWMS Part 2A (deep strike platform trade-offs), the TACWAR-WORRM modelmay be even less appropriate since the limitation on the number of parametervariations will be even more restricted because of the desire to test a significantnumber of variations in deep strike platform combinations which have been notedearlier to be at least 18 in number. In addition, the DAWMS model is judged to beseriously deficient in modeling maneuver as well as the impact of the use of WORRMon airfields and support areas.

For the multiple mission Part 2B portion of the DAWMS effort, multiple models will beused by the Services involved. The compatibility between these models is not evidentnor is it evident that a method of integrating their results is available.

Finally, it should be noted that the members of the DSB Task Force know of noexisting model which can access the relative value of multimission weapon systemsover a range of conflicts.

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OBSERVATIONS ON COSTING

IN DAWMS PART 1, A RANGE OF COST ESTIMATES SHOULD BE USEDFOR PRE-PRODUCTION WEAPONS TO TEST FOR SENSITIVITY OFRESULTS TO VARIATIONS IN ACTUAL COSTS FROM ESTIMATED COSTS.EVEN FOR WEAPONS IN PRODUCTION, POSSIBLE COST VARIATIONSDUE TO CHANGES IN THE NUMBERS PURCHASED SHOULD BEINVESTIGATED.

ALSO IN DAWMS PART 1, THE IMPORTANCE OF WEAPONS PLATFORMATTRITION ON PREFERRED WEAPONS MIXES SHOULD BE EVALUATEDIF THE VALUES OF PLATFORMS LOST THROUGH ATTRITION VARYSIGNIFICANTLY WITH DIFFERENT MIXES OF WEAPONS

IN DAWMS PART 2A, THE WEAPON PLATFORM COSTS NEED TO BECONSISTENT AND COMPARABLE. A RANGE OF COSTS NEED TO BECONSIDERED WHERE THERE IS COST UNCERTAINTY SUCH AS FORWEAPON PLATFORMS YET TO BE PRODUCED.

OAMMs&WMPT.2i

In DAWMS Part 1, reasonably accurate costs are available for theweapons in production although variations due to production ratechanges and total numbers need investigation. Where production hasyet to be undertaken, some caution needs to be taken in usingestimates, since these often turn out to optimistic. Therefore a range ofcost estimates needs to be used for these weapons to see if theweapons mix estimates are significantly changed should the costs ofthe advanced weapons turn out to higher than estimated.

If weapons platform attrition values turn out to vary significantly fordifferent Part 1 runs (i.e., the differences in value of platforms lost arenot small compared to the assumed values for total weapons budgets),then some evaluations (possible offline) of the importance of platformattrition or desired weapons mixes should be performed.

It should be evident that even if the models in DAWMS were able togive accurate outcomes over a range of scenarios and inputassumptions, the results of the study will not be meaningful unlessaccurate and comparable costs can be generated for all of the variouscombinations of deep strike platforms. This means that a great deal ofattention needs to be paid to insure that the costs of the variousweapon platforms considered are comparable in all aspects such assupport costs, wearout or modernization costs, as well as operationscosts.

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OBSERVATIONS ON INITIAL RESULTSAND MODIFICATIONS IN PLANS FOR DAWMS

"THE INITIAL RESULTS FROM DAWMS PART 1 (WEAPONOPTIMIZATION ) INDICATES SUCCESSFUL OPERATION OF THEMODEL. FUTURE RESULTS WILL BE MUCH MORE MEANINGFUL IFWIDE EXCURSIONS IN ASSUMPTIONS SUCH AS WARNING TIME, IN-THEATER FORCE LEVELS, C41SR L.E OF STEALTH AIRCRAFT, ANDUSE OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION ARE ANALYZED ASCURRENTLY PLANNED

" THE EFFORT TO MAKE AVAILABLE SAR DATA IS UNDER WAY ANDSHOULD PROVE HELPFUL IN ASSESSING THE VALUE OF STEALTH

" LONGER-TERM PLANS TO DEVELOP A NEW LARGE-SCALE COMBATMODEL (JWARS) ARE VERY ENCOURAGING AND OFFER THEPOTENTIAL OF OVERCOMING LIMITATIONS IN TACWAR, BUT THENEW MODEL WILL NOT BE AVAILABLE FOR THE DAWMS

The initial Part 1 DAWMS results involving the end-to-end operation ofthe TACWAR/WORRM model verify the end-to-end operation of themodel. After some adjustments in the WORRM constraints, it shouldbe possible to run a number of variations in assumptions. The TaskForce is very encouraged that a much more extensive set ofassumptions are to be run than originally planned. Efforts are underway to bring on-line IDA and PA&E TACWAR computers in order toincrease capacity to run different cases.

However, even with additional capacity, it is not likely that Part 1 runscan be completed short of the end of 1996, or perhaps, even the earlymonths of 1997. It seems clear that Part 2 runs, involving platformtrade-offs, will take a number of additional months.

The availability of SAR data should make possible a number ofmeaningful runs to test the value of stealth.

The Task Force is very encouraged by the longer-term plans to developJWARS, an advanced warfare modeling capability which should becapable of overcoming many of the shortcomings of TACWAR.However, it will not be developed in time for use in the DAWMS.

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GENERAL CONSIDERATIONSI

THE FUTURE IS UNCERTAIN. IN THE TIME FRAME OF DAWMS (1998, 2006, 2014)NEW COMBINATIONS OF POTENTIAL ENEMIES AS WELL AS ALLIES CAN OCCUR.IN ADDITION, A PEER COMPETITOR COULD ARISE BY 2014

THE USE OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION, INFORMATION WARFARE ANDOTHER ASYMMETRICAL FORMS OF WARFARE COULD ARISE IN THE DAWMS TIMEFRAME

THESE UNCERTAINTIES NEED TO BE INVESTIGATED BY A BROADER SPECTRUMOF ANALYSIS THAN IS BEING UNDERTAKEN IN DAWMS

BECAUSE OF THESE UNCERTAINTIES, MILITARY FORCE OPTIONS SHOULD BEEVALUATED NOT ONLY FOR THEIR WARFIGHTING CAPABILITY, BUT ALSO FORTWO QUALITIES NOT IN THE CURRENT ANALYSIS

DO THEY INCREASE OUR ABILITY TO SHAPE THE FUTURE INTERNATIONAL SECURITYENVIRONMENT?

DO THEY PROVIDE HEDGES AGAINST UNCERTAINTIES SUCH AS THE LOCATION ANDPOSSIBLE FORM OF FUTURE AGGRESSION?

DAWMS ANALYTIC APPROACH DOES NOT INCLUDE THESE BROADEREVALUATIONS

Finally, there are a few general considerations that the Department of Defenseleadership needs to address.

It should be noted first and obviously, that the future is uncertain. By theyears 2006 and especially 2014 the U.S. could very well face newcombination of enemies as well as new allies. It is entirely possible that a newpeer competitor could arise by 2014 which could challenge the U.S. withasymmetrical forms of warfare.

By that time, threats against the U.S. mainland in the form of weapons ofmass destruction, information warfare, and challenges to our sources ofenergy, raw material supplies, as well as markets, could emerge.

This broader spectrum of possibilities, not currently being examined inDAWMS, needs to be examined.

In view of the unpredictability of these major threats, future military forceoptions need to be examined for two basic qualities:

Do these hypothesized future forces increase the ability of theU.S. to shape the future international security environment bydiscouraging potential challengers from armed aggression?

Do these future forces provide hedges against uncertaintiessuch as the location and possible form of future aggressionagainst the U. S. or its allies?

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SUGGESTIONS

DO NOT DEPEND ON THE INITIAL PLANS FOR DAWMS PART 2 TOPROVIDE REALISTIC INSIGHTS IN MAKING DEEP ATTACK FORCESTRUCTURE JUDGMENTS UNLESS, AS CURRENTLY PLANNED, THESTUDY IS REFOCUSED TO:

- CONSIDER ADDITIONAL SCENARIOS SUCH AS:* AN MRC IN A LOCATION HAVING NO IN THEATER SUPPORT (I.E. PRE POSITIONED

EQUIPMENT, TAC AIR, LARGE AIRFIELDS, PORTS ETC.)

* PEER COMPETITORS, ONE LOCATED CLOSE TO THE SEA AND THE OTHER FAR FROMTHE SEA

- EVALUATE FOR EACH SCENARIO THE IMPACT OF DIFFERENT DEGREES OFDEGRADED C41SR, SIEALTH, WARNING TIME, AND OTHER CRITICALPARAMETERS

- MAKE AVAILABLE TO DAWMS SPECIAL ACCESS INFORMATION- PROVIDE A NUMBER OF MONTHS OF ADDITIONAL TIME TO COMPLETE THE

SUGGESTED CHANGES TO PART 2- PRODUCE COMPLETE WRITTEN INTERIM AND FINAL REPORTS OF DAWMS

RESULTS VS ANNOTATED VIEWGRAPHS OF RESULTS

The Task Force suggests that the initial plans for DAWMS Part 2 study is not likely to providedefinitive answers on the best mix of future deep strike forces unless the study is refocused toovercome the limitations of the initial plans for DAWMS Part 2. The Task Force suggests areorientation of the DAWMS Study to incorporate the following modifications:

- In order to provide and greatly improve INSIGHTS, the Task Force believes thatadditional scenarios need to be evaluated such as: an MRC in a location whichprovides very limited in-theater support in the form of prepositioned equipment,tactical airfields, large ports, etc., as well as two peer competitor scenarios, one ofwhich is located close to the sea and the other of which is located well inland.

Combat ability of future deep strike forces needs to be evaluated in all of thesevarious scenarios under a variety of conditions such as a degraded C41SR capability,decreased warning times, and various degrees of stealth.Make available detailed data on the stealth performance of deep attack platformsand weapons. It is important that the Deputy Secretary of Defense directthat this data be made available to the DAWMS study.Allocate additional time beyond that currently planned for DAWMS since one to threeweeks is required for each TACWAR/WORRM run. Part 2 will need to investigatea number of additional runs involving additional scenarios and assumptions outlinedabove. Under these circumstances, it is unlikely that DAWMS Part 2 can becompleted by the end of Winter early in 1997. A number of months of additional timeis likely to be needed.

DAWMS should record its results in the form of a series of carefully documentedwritten reports, both interim and final, for both Part 1 results as well as Part 2 results.It is believed that such reports will provide a much clearer and less ambiguous pictureof the DAWMS results than a series of viewgraph reports.

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SUGGESTrO'JS (CONT'D)

FOR THE LONGER TERM, SUPPORT THE DEVELOPMENT OF ANIMPROVED APPROACH FOR RAPID EVALUATION OF BROAD MILITARYFORCE STRUCTURE ISSUES. THE ONGOING JWARS PROGRAM MAYOFFER SUCH AN APPROACH.

The Task Force encourages the efforts of the Department to developinnovative concepts for rapid modeling and evaluation of broad militaryforce structure issues. In particular, the Task Force supports thevigorous development by the Department of the recently initiatedJWARS modeling program.

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