decree of the president of the republic of indonesiasetia itu harus , jujur itu wadjib, sopan santun...
TRANSCRIPT
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DECREE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA DOCTRINE OF STRUGGLE FOR THE EXECUTER OF THE PEOPLE ASSETS
NO: 013 / PPTAPRI / SKR / III / 50 (Quoted from the original letter )
DOCTRINE OF STRUGGLE, TRI-SANDHY " GAJAH KENCANA" ( The Three Principle of Elephant Power )
" GAJAH KENCANA" is the ARMY / TASK FORCES or the SECRET ARMY working on the basis of high awareness and VOLUNTARY, defend and uphold the rule of empire, unconditionally And His organization is blind / dissolved, REAL but NOT REAL, NOT REAL but REAL So there is no one who knows the nest, between members-not even know each other. They consist of: farmers, fishermen, merchant, village officials, etc.- which average a very high knowledge in the field of martial arts or science martial arts. Not knowing each other because they sometimes met in battle, but after removing the secret movement, they know and understand that they are friends in arms and one the way of life. They never met each other, but they are very Converge: In the Thought Awareness, Self Awareness, and Consciousness psychics. And they are: Mutual Respect, Mutual Respect, Mutual forgiveness, love each other, love each other, and help each other. However, they will not open their secrets to their own. Gajah Kencana team is scattered across the Majapahit Empire District, to Madagascar and Sri Lanka , Leadership of Gajah Kencana Forces are: Ki Ageng LEMBOESORA or often referred to as the WOENGKOEK, (Grand Master Hunchback). Who went to the Indonesian appoint the members of Team individually and one by one until it reaches the number 9999 (Nine Thousand, Nine Hundred, Ninety Nine) members of the forces. These forces, which move under the laws of Allegiance appreciated by the Ideological and Characteristic. So that the members will not violate practical. Thus the better they kill themselves than violate his oath. And the most precious members of Laskar Gajah Kencana can not be bribed, although at the time / time is very difficult.
3 Based on THE OATH OF GAJAH KENCANA FORCES , THE DOCTRINE of STRUGGLES I
do and I'm very confident that this LETTER HOLDER able to implement this doctrine. The whole number of the Act are as follows:
Knight Thus the Law of the Act, but not everything I use to DOCTRINE, such that only two types of the laws that I use.
TRI-SANDHI GAJAH KENCANA (The Three Principle of Gajah Kencana )
1. Honor the Saints not less wits in the face of adversity. Pull yourself together in the face
of danger. Tell the truth really is. Suppose that one actually. Man is Perfect. Rich and poor is a measure of Birth. We respect other people with life size. Therefore do not ridicule, insult and injure that can injure the liver. Looks glory. Let not your hearts reflect the crease in your face. Then, think and act clearly. That honor Gajah Kencana.
2. Knight True Patriot personality Gajah Kencana is plenary. High true human personality. Life is to be useful for: Family, Nation, State and Homeland. It must be true, it must be honest, courtesy in acting, socially friendly, without being overbearing Help yourself, love of neighbor. Responsible for the duties and obligations. Smiling sweet in sorrow, always calm in love. Save the talk, Energy, Wealth. Served without asking.
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3. Gajah Kencana, Unite and Work, Knight Robust personality, discipline, able fused. The
steps will not deviate from the fence life. Personality makes the assessment Knight of Religious always, will never be forgotten. Panca Dharma (Five Principle) always animates in modesty, decency, accuracy is a key attribute. Knight character, discipline, Never retreat, Abstinence despair became his trademark. Honorable life is more important than life betrayal;
PRESIDENT OF THE HIGHEST COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF THE ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA, MR. SOEKARNO
Notes : DOCTRINE OF STRUGGLE FOR THE EXECUTER OF THE PEOPLE ASSETS
NO: 013 / PPTAPRI / SKR / III / 50 without stamps / stamp. Both its written on paper Red and White in two languages, English and Indonesian, red in the paper is translucent
(Decree of the President is one of the letters to equipment Property Settlement People who are out of the country)
"GAJAH KENCANA" is ARMY / LASKAR PENDEM or SECRET ARMY is UN SECURITY COUNCIL OF SECRET
based on
UNITED NATIONS NUMBER APPROVAL: 81,704 MISA
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SURAT KEPUTUSAN PRESIDEN REPUBLIK INDONESIA
DOKTRIN PERJUANGAN PENYELESAI AMANAH HARTA KEKAYAAN RAKYAT NO:013/PPTAPRI/SKR/III/50
( dikutip dari surat aslinya dan ejaan bahasanya disesuaikan E.Y.D)
DOKTRIN PERJUANGAN, TRI-SANDHY " GAJAH KENCANA"
" GAJAH KENCANA" adalah TENTARA/LASKAR PENDEM atau TENTARA RAHASIA yang
bekerja atas dasar KESADARAN yang TINGGI dan SUKARELA, mempertahankan dan Menegakkan Kedaulatan Kerajaan Majapahit, tanpa pamrih Dan Organisasinya adalah tersamar, ADA tetapi TIADA, Jadi tak ada masyarakat satupun yang mengetahui sarangnya, diantara anggotanya-pun tidak saling mengenal. Mereka terdiri dari para : Petani, Nelayan, Saudagar, Pegawai Desa, dll- yang rata-rata berilmu sangat tinggi dalam bidang Beladiri maupun ilmu Tata Kelahi. Dikarenakan tak saling mengetahui mereka kadang-kadang bertemu dalam pertempuran, namun setelah mengeluarkan sandhi gerak, baru mereka mengetahuinya dan mengerti bahwa mereka adalah teman seperjuangan dan sepenanggungan. Mereka tidak pernah bertemu satu dengan yang lainya, namun mereka sangat Menyatu : Dalam menggunakan Kesadaran Pikir, Kesadaran Rasa, dan Kesadaran Raga. Dan mereka : Saling Menghormati, Saling Menghargai, Saling memaafkan, Saling mengasihi, Saling mencintai, dan Saling membantu. Namun demikian mereka tak akan membuka Rahasia masing-masing pribadi mereka. Pasukan Gagjah Kentjana ini tersebar di seluruh pelosok Daerah Kerajaan Madjapahit, sampai ke Madagaskar dan Srilangka Guru Besar Pasukan Gajah Kentjana ini adalah : KI AGENG LEMBOESORA atau sering disebut juga EYANG WOENGKOEK, ( Eyang Bongkok). Yang telah pergi ke seluruh NUSANTARA melantik para Anggota Pasukan secara perorangan dan satu persatu sehingga mencapai jumlah 9999 ( Sembilan Ribu, Sembilan Ratus, Sembilan Puluh Sembilan ) orang anggota PASUKAN GAJAH KENCANA.
PASUKAN GAJAH KENCANA ini, bergerak berdasarkan hukum yang dihayati dengan Sumpah Setia yang Ideologis, dan Characteristic. Sehingga para anggota praktis tidak akan melanggar. Maka dari itu lebih baik mereka Bunuh dirinya sendiri dari pada Melanggar Sumpahnya. Dan yang paling mulia, Anggota LASKAR GAJAH KENCANA ini tidak dapat DISUAP, kendatipun pada masa / waktu yang sangat sulit sekalipun.
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Dengan berdasarkan SUMPAH LASKAR GAJAH KENCANA inilah DOKTRIN PERJUANGAN ini aku buat dan aku sangat yakin bahwa PEMEGANG SURAT ini mampu untuk melaksanakan Doktrin ini. Adapun Seluruh jumlah Undang-Undang itu adalah sebagai berikut :
17 WEWALERING BHAWONO artinya 17 Hukum Alam
8 WEWALERING PENANDITO artinya 8 Hukum Pendeta
45 WEWALERING SINATRIO artinya 45 Hukum Satria. Demikianlah mengenai Hukum Undang-Undang tersebut, namun tidak semuanja aku gunakan untuk DOKTRIN, diantaranya itu hanya dua jenis Undang-Undang saja yang aku gunakan. Diantaranya ialah : 1. TRI SANDHI PASUKAN GAJAH KENCANA. Dalam hal ini terdiri dari :
Kehormatan itu suci
Kesatria Teguh dan Berekepribadian
Bersatu, Berpikiran, dan Bekerja 2. TRI SANDHI PASUKAN GAJAH KENCANA. Dalam hal ini terdiri dari :
Tri Adhi Prasetia
Panca Sila Dharma
Panca Kordha Dharma
Limolas Dharma Pasamo Demikianlah yang saya gunakan untuk DOKTRIN ini, dan selanjutnya susunannya sebagai berikut di bawah ini :
TRI-SANDHI GAJAH KENCANA
1. KEHORMATAN ITU SUCI
1. Gajah Kencana, penjaga kehormatan 2. Janganlah Kurang akalmu dalam menghadapi suasana yang gemilang / kesukaran 3. Tenangkan dirimu dalam menghadapi lawan/kawan marabahaya. 4. Katakanlah Benar yang sesungguhnya 5. Katakanlah Salah yang sesungguhnya 6. Sabdha Pandita Ratu 7. Jangan sekali, Engkau berbuat baik. 8. Baik Sekali, Engkau berbuat jahat.(maksudnya berbuat jahat untuk
kebaikan)misalnya lihat cerita Nabi Musa yang belajar dengan Nabi Khaidir. 9. Manusia itu tertcipta dalam keadaan Sempurna, tanpa dengan cacat lahir. 10. Kaya atau Miskin itu ukuran lahir. 11. Kita Harus menghargai orang lain. dengan uluran bathin. 12. Oleh karenanya, janganlah : Mengejek, Menghina, dan Mencaci-Maki yang akan
dapat melukai hati kawan/lawan. 13. Tampakanlah Kemuliaanmu dihadapan semua makhluk di bumi persada ini. 14. Janganlah mencerminkan isi hatimu yang kusut di mukamu. 15. Berpikir, Berkata, dan Berbuatlah dengan Penuh Kebaikan serta bersahaja dan
jernih yang sangat Penuh Kejujuran. 16. Demikianlah itulah Kode Kehormatan Laskar Gajah Kencana.
TRI-SANDHI GADJAH KENTJANA 2. KESATRIA TEGUH DAN KEPRIBADIAN
1. GAJAH KENCANA adalah Patriot Paripurna. 2. Wujud Manusia sejati berkepribadian tinggi. 3. Hidup itu harus berguna bagi: Alam Semesta, Toehan Yang Maha Esa, Keluarga,
Nusa Bangsa dan Negara, serta Seluruh Makhluk di Bumi Persada ini. 4. Setia itu harus , Jujur itu wadjib, Sopan Santun dalam bertindak, Ramah Tamah
dalam Pergaulan, Menolong tanpa bersombong diri, karena diatas langit masih ada langit yang lebih tinggi lagi.
5. Kasih sayang terhadap sesama makhluk hidup. 6. BerTanggung Jawab dan Tanggung Rugi terhadap semua Tugas dan Kewajiban. 7. Tersenyum Manis di waktu Duka, dan Selalu Tenang dalam waktu suka. 8. Hemat dalam : Bicara, Tenaga, dan Harta Benda, seta jauhkan perbuatan tamak. 9. Berjasa tanpa minta Nama, Berguna tanpa perlu di Puja. 10. Demikian itulah Kode Kesatria Laskar GAJAH KENCANA Majapahit.
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11. Bekerja dengan sepenuh hati dan Sepenanggungan, Berani, BerTanggung Jawab, Lemah Lembut.
PRESIDEN PANGLIMA TERTINGGI ANGKATAN PERANG REPUBLIK INDONESIA,
MR. SOEKARNO
Nb :
KEPRES : DOKTRIN PERJUANGAN PENYELESAI AMANAH HARTA KEKAYAAN RAKYAT, NO:013/PPTAPRI/SKR/III/50 tanpa perangko/materai. Keduanja ditulis pada kertas Merah Putih dalam dua bahasa, Inggris dan Indonesia, warna merah dalam kertas tersebut adalah tembus
(Keputusan Presiden ini adalah salah satu perlengkapan surat-surat untuk Penyelesaian Harta Rakyat yang berada di luar negeri tersebut )
" GADJAH KENTJANA" adalah TENTARA/LASKAR PENDEM atau TENTARA RAHASIA
adalah UN SECURITY COUNCIL OF SECRET
berdasarkan UNITED NATIONS APPROVAL NO: MISA 81704
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United Nations
SECURITYCOUNCIL
Nations Unies
CONSEILDE SECURITE
REPORT
BY THE
CONSULAR CCMMISSION AT BATAVIA
TO TEE
SECURITY COUNTIL
UNRESTRICTED
S/58622 October 1947
ORIGINAL: ENGLISH
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Note: The Report of the Consular Commission has been issuedwithout editorial revision and will appear in itsfinal form in the Official Records of the SecurityCouncil.
/1. In pursuance
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8/586Page i
1. In :;Jursuance ·-;f the resolution of the Security Council of
August 25, 1947) ~ ~ e uLdersi[ned Consuls General of career in Batavia of the
nations reIJresented. on the Security Council formed themselves on
September 1, 1947) into a Ccwnission for the purIJose of reporting on the
observance of the "Cease Fire" order in Java and Sumatra and on conditions
prevailing in areas under military occupation or frcm which armed forces now
in occuIJation may be ",ithdra"lIl by agreement bet,lOen the parties.
2. He have the honour to transmit our report herewith.
; .... We should like to record our appreciation of the work of our Secretary)
Mr. Glenn Abbey) and of our Press Relations Officer, Mr. Colin MacLaren.
Since we had no special"clerical staff at our disposal we should like
especially to record our appreciation of the work of the stenographers and
typists attached to the Consulates General who have done the clerical work of
the Commission in addition to their own.
4. Aircraft for the use of the Commission were kindly prOVided by the
Governments of Australia) China, the United Kingdom and the United States.
5. We regret that olving to translation difficulties in Batavia, Ive are
unable to furnish this report in French as well as in English.
. :. ..'.:.', ~ .
-Etienne Raux
Consul General of France)
/
WaIter A. Foote )Consul General of the United states
Paul VanderstichelenConsul General of Belgium
Charles EatonConsul General of Australia
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Batavia. October 14. 1947.
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JOINI' REPORT
OF TEE
SECURITY COUNCIL CONSULAR COMlvlISSION
BATAVIA
October 14, 1947
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/TPJ3LE OF CONTEl'lrS
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
CHAPrER I
Introduct"ion • .'. . • '. '. . '. • '0 •• • • .'. • · . . . . . . . . 1
CHAPTER n,
Definition of "Cease Fire" Order
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4
5
6
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. . . .
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General
The Van Mook Line
Republican interpretation of lICease Fire"
Dutch interpretation of' lICease Fire" .
Indonesian allegationB against the Dutch • • • • • • • • • • • • • 9
(1) Dutch reconnaissance · • • • • • • • • • • · • · • •(2) Sorties into Republican-hald·districts • • · • • · • · •(3) Deliberate attacks · • · • · • · • • • • • · • • • · • •(4 ) Naval blockade • • • · • • • • • • • • • • • • • · • • ·(5) Atl'ocities • • • • • 0 • • • • • • • • • • • • · • · • ·(-6 ), Ar.son and plundering • • • · • • • · · • • • • • • • • •
999999
Dutch allegations against the Indonesians. • • • • · . • • · . . . 10
(1)(2 )(3)(4)(5)(6)
Attacks on Dutch posts • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •Terrorisation of villagers • • • • • ! • • • • • • • • •
Atrocities • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •Mining of roads and sabotage • • • • • • • • • • • • • •Compulsory moving of the population and kidnapping • • •Firing at ships •••••••••• • • • • • • • • • •
101010101010
Organization of forces • • • • • • • • • • .. . • • • • • • • • • • 11
Dutch • • • • • •Indonesian. • • •
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1111
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• •
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• • •• • • •
(a)(b)
Propaganda • •
Possibility 01' enforcing the "Cease Fire" order • • • • • • • • • 12
CHAPrER III
Section A • • • • • .'. • • , I. • • • • • • • • • I • • • • • • 13
I. General conditions of the population •••••••• • • 13
VTar suffering • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •II.
(a)(b)
In Republican-held territory••In Dutch-occupied territory • •
• • I • • •
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1313
14
(a) In Ropublican-held territory • • • • • • • • • ., 14(b) In Dutch-occupied territory. • • • • • • • • • •• 15
IIII. Situat1cn
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8/586Page iv
TABLE OF CONTENrS(Continued)
IIl. Situation of forej,g:ners . . . , . . . • • • • • • • • •
Page
15
(a) In Republican-held territory • • • • • • • • • • • •• 15(b) In Dutch-occupiod territory • • • • . • • • • • • •• 15
. (a) In Republican-held territory ••• • • • • ••(b) In Dutch-held territory ••••••••••.••••
Economic condition of the population in different areas
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Section B
I.
Section C
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16
1617
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I.
Il.
Civil administration, dismissals, c h ~ g e s of policy,non-co-opera.tion,· et cetera • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Scorchecl earth policy aa. planned and carried out •• • • •
CIIAPrER'IV '
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18
Stu:mnary ••.••••••••• • .. • • • • • • • • • • • 0" • 20
APPENDIX I - Report on Visit to DJocjakarta and East Java Area byMasrs. Eaton and Raux • • • • • • • • • • • • •••• 2J.
APPENDIX 11 '. Report on Visit to East Java by Mr. C. Eaton,Australian Consul-Ger.eral and Mr. E. T. Lambert,D ~ p u t y Brltlsh Cchsul-Gen0ral, Batdvia • • • • • 29
,
APPErIDIX III ' - Report of Mr. Tsiang Chia-tung, Consul-General of, China, and Mr. Vanderstichelen, Consul-General of
Belgium" Otl their Tripe to Buitonzors, Tji'badak,, . Soekaboemi, and TasilriDalaya • . .'. . • • • • • • •• 37
;-' ,.'
APPElIDIX IV - Visit to Djocjaltarta by Mr. F. M. Shepherd andHr. C. A. Liverigood ••••••••.•••••.•• 43
APPENDIX V' - Re:port 'on Visit t·o Sumatra by Consuls-General Raux(France), Eaton (Australia), and Lambert (Britain).Soptember 16th - 21st 1947 • • • • • • • • . • • •• 45
APPEtIDIX VI - Report of the Vil3it to Bandoeng, Java, ofWelter A. Foot€:; American Consul-General, accompaniedby Major ~. Mackin, United states Marine Corps ••• 60
APpnmIX VII - Report 'cn the Conference held betwoen the ConsularC o ~ i s s i c n :presided by M. Raux, Consul-Genoral ofFrance, assisted by Messrs. V a n d c r s t i c h e l ~ n ,
. ~onsul~Genoral o~ Belgium, Eaton, H.B.M. AustralianCcnsul-Gencrcl, Shepherd, H.B.M. Consul-General,Livengood, Amor1can Consul~Gdnoral and Lambert,H.B.M. Deputy Consul-Goneral, and the IndonesianDelogation hoad8d by Dr. Sjar1fuddin, Prime Ministerand Minister for Dctence, assistod by Dr. Setiadjit,Vice Prime !1inistor and the C h i e ~ s of Staff of theRepublican Army, et Jogjakarta, 26th S0ptember 1947. 63
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TABLE OF JONTENTS(Continued)
Page
APPENDIX VIII - Roport of conference between Nethorlands EastIndies G o v e r ~ ~ e n t officials and ConsularCommission on september 29, 1947 at Batavia . o 0 • 87
APPENDIX IX _ Declaration of the Lt. Governor GeneruJ. • • • • • • 134
APPENDIX X _ Officiu.l Announcemont of tho Republic of Indonesia. 138
~ffiP OF JAVA - Issued as document S/586/Add.l
MAP OF SUMATRA • Issued as document S/586/Addo2
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/CHAPTER I
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CHAPTER I
Introduction
l'mEREAS, the Security COill1cil on August 25, 1947, in the resolution on
the Indonesian question requested
"the goverrr:::..;nt me::nDers of the Council' \'Thb have career consular
r e p r e : J p . t : ~ a t i 'reo i:1 :Eatavif'. to :1. '.~H"t:>:"..tct t}:em to prepa:!.·e jointl~r
for the izrL'OX'!llation aj,~\: ~,u:l.{, '?:ce of ' ~ h e SeGm:i'0Y Ccuncil reports
on the si:'ue.-:iorJ in th::: ?'·'i";",;l~,c of ::IrJ.-::r:c:Jia fo110":1":7'3 the
resC'luticn of the COU.:1:: ,t]. f'(; ..... ':,he fi'!:'ot of' t,VS·.lE:t 1)',7:. such reports
f.or'::;ls nmr in occupation rns.;; be y:ithdrmm b.'r agreemen-: betveen the
Ilarties".
AN'!) K~:il':rJ::ll.s, havin~ received in::itr....~ction:J fl'om om' respective
Governments, '..re:
Charles Eatqn, Consul G f ~ ~ J r e l of Australia
P. V ~ , n r l o r s t i c h e l e l 1 ; , CO:1u1J.l General of Belgium
Tsiang Chia-tunS f Cr-nsul General of China
Eticm;e R:-.U::, Consul General of Fre.nce
Fl'ancis M. Shepherd, Consul General' of the United Kingdom
Walter A. Foote, Consul General of the united States
duly constituted ourselves the Security Council Consular Commission to give
e f f e c ~ to the resolutions of the Security Council. Charles L i v ~ n g o o d , Consul
General of the United States, and T. Lambert, Deputy Consul G e n e ~ a l of the
United Kingdom, participated in the work of the Commission.
At the first meeting, it 'iras unanimously agreed that eech of the po1'Ters
represented should be requested to furnish military officers to observe any
possible violations of the cease-fire order; to investigate, where possible,
allegations of violations of t4e cease-fire orders; and to gather any other
data that might be of value to the Commission and to the Security Council.
In c o m ~ l i e n c e 'idth this r,equest, the followinG observers were attached to
the Commiss·ion:
Australia 4, BelGitun 2, ~ h i n a 4, France 3, United Kingdom 4 and the
United Stateo 8, Iu addition, the resident B r i t ~ s h M i l i t ~ ! Liaison
O:t:ficer and tl1'e American l'faval Aide \'Tere attached to the Conmiasion,
1>1r. Glenn A. Abbey, consul of ccreel' of the United States lTes appointed
SecretarJ end 1>1r. C. F. ,MacLeren, Information Officer of the British
Consulate General lTCS appointed Press Rela'bions Offioer.
/During the
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S/586Page 2
During the period September 3 to September 27 inclusive, members of the
Consular Commission were constantly on visits to the various areas in both
Dutch and Republican held ts::" 'tories, the following tours being made:
Areas Members Dates Report
Djoc.1akarta Consul General September ApwendixEaton 3 - '( I III
Consul GeneralRamc
East Java Consul General September AppendixEaton 9 - 13 "IIII
Consul GeneralLambert
Tasikmala.1a Consul General September ApNendixand Tsiang 10 - 14 IIIII
' .. ;.~: ;:....: ..Soekaboemi Cons.ul General
areas Vanderstiohelen
D.1ocjakarta Consul General Soptember AppendixShepherd 17 ~ 19 lIrvll
Consul GeneralLivengood
Sume.tra Consul General September AppendixEaton 16 - 21 "V"
Consul GeneralRamc
Consul GeneralLambert
1", i.1doens Consul General September A p ~ e n d 1 xFoote 26 - 27 VI"
. Djocjakarta All members of, September Appendixthe Commission 26 M 27 IIVII"with the exception
...... :.; of Consul GeneralTsianp, and ConsulGeneral Foote
The visit of the members of the Commission to Djocjakarta
on September 26-27, ~res for the purpose Gf obtaining the views of the
Prime Minister and the Cabinet of the Republic. On September 29, the
Commission received the views of Netherlands East Indies authorities
who had been selected therefor by the Lieutenant Governor General for
a similar purpose. (Append ix 11VIII" ) •
The Milita~1 Obse~vers of'Australi~, Belgiun, China, Francs, the
United Kingdom and the United States made tours- of inspection in all
of the principal areas of Java and Sumatra.
The Commission received every courtesy and assistance from both
Netherlands and Rep~blicen authorities in executing its task.
/CHAPTER IT
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S/586Page 3
Definition of IIC-ease Fire ll Order
';,"
The C o ~ i s s i o n .ms faced 'at the ourset of its work' with the
consideration that the qt;estion whether the IIcease fire" order ia observed
or not dependa on the definition of "cease fire".
2. The recommendation of the Security Council dated August 4th calls upon
the parties:
(a) to cee.se hostilities forthi'7ith.
(b) to settle their disputes by arbitl.'ation or other
:geaceful means.
3. The resolution of the Security Council dated AUGust '25th IIrequests the
Goverru::J.ents· members of the Security Council '7ho lJs,ve career Consular .
rel)l'esente t i ves in Batavia to instruct the!" J\ ~ "al'e j o i l 1 t l ~ · •••• reports
to coverihe ' O b E l e l ~ V a n c e of the II cee.s e fire" or"J.p 11
4. The COIllIUisBion are informed that there ~ ~ , .:fference in m i l i t a ~ r
'",' '.<.;.", ".:
practice between the siGnificanoe of th" o.u " : ~ e a s e fire" and -che order
'''cease hostHities ll• They understand t' '; tf. ''''',6 fire ll only entails 'the
. ,
stopping' of milital""J advarces ape. cess!:' .,do actual f:l,ring. "nease'
"liostilities" on the other hand appears to entail the cessation of all' "rar-like
operatiou9} inclUding the uoe of all military weapons; naval blockale; air
reconnaissance; hostile propacanda, and movements of troops into territory
occupied by the other side. "Cease hostilities ll accordingly has-a
considerably wider sicniI'icance than ."cease fire".
5. E;;-ce?t 'lI7here otherwise stated, the e.:x'Pression "cease fire" is used
throughout this report for co;).veni "lnce O'l:'y.
6. It l ' ! l E ! . ~ r be here noted t ~ l e . t the follc\ling statement VIas made by
Lieutenant Governor-General Dr. v : ~ Mook in a radio speech on A u g ~ s t 3rd:
"The Goverr..I:lent can only declare, at this jtmcture, that a
cessation of hostilities should i n c l u d ~ , in its opinion, a cessation
oJ:' dc,:.olition, of acts of vio:'e11('e D.gainst m3mbofll"sund Grov,s of
the population in Republican territ:n,';j, and of hostile propaGanda,
"'licll has latel:- even incited to mass-murder".
The follovring statene:l.t was contained in Paragraph 6 of the cOIJUUunication
made by the Repul:l .... ca.. F-.cime ~lin'ister to the S t " c u r i t ~ r Counon on AUGust 4th:
"T:'le Gc. vE:r!'..:::J..~nt of the Republic of Inc.'.mesir·. ,.ish to emphasize that
a Dutch or1er t o ~ e a s e hostilities should :Lr.perc.:':ivel;y imply the
cessation of all kinds of actions; botll bJ the :L.utch mi.litary and civil
authorities, directed aGainst the Inclcnesian population."
7. Neither side :lovrever, had erq real beli6f t.hat the order "rould be
carried out by the other. The "cease fire'" order iss'.'ed by the Netherlands
Eaot Indies Government H i ~ h Command included the following:
/"X·Tot expected
. ~ . '
•• I• .' • ill t •
• '. '•• ' ·0: '. ~ ' . , ".., ... ; .• ': ~ " . , I • l '. I' M. . ~ .' r
: ' '.. . ' . : . ~.' . ". ".
8/<=;,86Puge 4
... ;. .....
"Not expected that Jocja w:;.ll :fulfil the laid down cono.itions
to C680e hostil~tios, propaganda, destruction, inciting of population
and troops and dispersed fighting organizations".
The Rep'.lblican Government for their part, in P,-,ragraph 5 of the statement
sent to the Security Council by the Prime Minister, said:
"The Government of the Republic of Indonesia wish to express their
Grave concern that, as the experience gained during the past two years
bas learned, unless tile execution of. the cessation of hostilities be
fully and continuousl;y controlled by a third neutral party there is no
Guarantee at all that a t1cease fire" order will not be violated b ~ r the
Dutch forces one-sidedlj-".
8. There wae thus an unfortunate lack of confidence on both sides that the
order would be properly carried out.
9. Both sides admit that a lIceaee fire" order should normalJ.y be followed
by contact between the t ~ T O parties in order to arrange details for the
satisfactory observance of the order. No attempt was made by e i ~ h e r to make
such contact, largely, if not entirely, because of this lack of confidenoe.
10. The general military situation resultIng from the initiation ~ f
~ P o l i c e Action by t h ~ Dutch forces on July 20th has already been described
as follows in the preliminar;y report made by the Commission 011 September 22nd.
lIAdvances by Netherlands troops between July 20th and August 4th
were in the nature of spearheads and some fiehting occurred. ~ 1 h i l e
the main bodiee of Republic and troops in most areas retreated,
considerable numbers of Republican troops remained between the
spearheads in some areas and guerillas remained in all aread. The
Indonesian scorched earth policy and other disturbances, including
looting and lleavy loss of life e s p ~ c i a 1 1 y of Chinese, were intensified
between and behind the spearheads during and after the Dutch advance" .
It ,.,as to this situation that the "ceal::le fire" order was to be applied.
Republlcan Inte:;,_pretat:.on of "Cease Fire"
11. The order given by the President of the Republic in his radio speech
on August 4th is quoted as follows:
"I order all armed forces of the Indonesian Republic ano,
Ind.ones lan pe,pIe in general 'Tho are fight ine; s idc by side 'I-;i th the
Armed Forces, from this moment on, to stand fast at your respective
places and. cease hostilities".
12. Hh11e this order may be regarded as complete i,n itself, we have found
that YerJ little attempt has been made by the Rep'lblican Army Headquarters
to issue e:xact and deta iled orders to all ranks of the Republican Army
and it has been found that the interpretation of "cease fire" have varied
slightly with individual millturJ commanders.
/13. The general
, ... .. ,- . . .' ....." -- '
" , "~ ','. . " , , , . ",'. ,.',,: • J. , •• _ ; ...... ' I ". ..
5/586Page 5
13. The general interpretation on the Republican side is:
I Do not fire u n l e ~ 6 tired upon, 'and do not initiate any'
, .. ' offensive action,'
II Consolidate the present defensee.
III Continue'patrols o u t 8 ~ e the foremost defended localities for
the p u r p o e ~ ot md11tary intellieence.
rl Repel v i ~ o r o u e l y anY attack by the Dutch.
14.' At the same t1rite, in at:leest' two dlvi',.liona a policy has been adopted
which allows harassing attacQ on Dutch concentretions believed ready, to
advance, This is considered by the Divisional Conmlandenr in question to be
a ju~1fiable precaution. Reconnai.eance patrols into Dutch held territorJ
have a.1.ao be~n considered. j\.lstit'1eble.
15. Owing to the late arrival ~ the Security Council 'e l1esolution, the
radio speech delivered by President ~ o at midnight 4/5tk AugU8t 1947
'Was, in effect, the ol'dei:' given by * as Supreme ~ O D I D M d e r of the RepUblican
Armed' Forces to cease hostilities,
16. The first o f f i c ~ e 1 action t h r O ~ ~ channels ~ I a clarifying eignal
sent out at 15.25 hours local time on. 5th August 1947 by 'the CQDIMn4er.·1n
Chief to' ~ serVice can1llle.=lCi.ers inc1uding'the C ~ d e r ot 5umatre COlII!l!!lnd,
end ita purport ie that '\:hi1st offerulive action llhould ceaQe,' aft act1",'
defense should be maintained. '1'i10 message was sent aut via wireless: and
telephone, and appears to have op-en duly acknowledged'b1 the recipients.
'l'hey in their turn, :f'O'lw...-,.:;:r.'~l 'hta .,:1.131181 cWIn to unit level. .At unit level,
mil1'ta:"y observers have J:'epc,r-tl;ld that forward "entries were fully acqua'1nted
-Vith ardent 1'orbiddine offer-a i ',re ~ct ion and. that written ordere tar patrol
leader& expressly forbaie the use of force except in s e l f - d e f e ~ e . Whilst
the ordere 1eflued from !lrrJr'J Iiead,q,uerters to oeaae, hostilities were dou'btleeB
~ e 1 v e d . in central Java and in areaa wb!;re communications were .'!&ilable
BIJd. cootl"fJl poesible, there 1e little l1k&lihood that anything but the
Preaidantts radio speech reached the g u e r i ~ l a bands within the Duteh
controlled areas and the ~ b 1 1 c a n ForcefJ cut off by the Dutch advance.
Dutch Inte[Vtation of "Cease Fire"
17. T'h~ Dutch order for the c.aee Fire contained the following relevant
.sentences:
"Netherlands G o v ~ ordered finish operations eoaneet under
pressure resolut1Q1l S e c ~ t y Council. Therefore all o i ~ r a t i o n e must be
c e ~ e d August 4th repeat ~ t h ~ 4 . o o hours whereby it must be clear-this
means operations which: aim gain!;,' new :repeat new territory. To safeguard
'population, bur troops aDd obJects within repeat within now occupied
t e r r i t ~ ope1"6tiona continue without interruption. Admini,.strative
Geographical de,C".r1ption or territory roelv held by Netherle.nde forces
will be issued 100000st, )lo repeat no actions allowed outside now
I"\,..,...,,,,-..,il +.,...--i+_ ..... il ..,),,4_+ .. 11 118. li'r.'cm
. ... ", • • ,~' ~ p •• -. • • • •
11 ~ •• •• • • '. .," • ~ _ • I • ': •
8/586Page 6
.'.. \
",' ," ','
le. From officia.l statements made to tho Commission it is clear that the
Dutch army's interpre.tation of the "cease fire" order is based on the
principle that it is p o ~ s i b l e to dominate and control an area, vithout
necessarily o c c u p ~ ' i n c the 'Thole of it.
19. When the order to cease operations was received., all the strategic points. ~
which had been the first objectives of the 'police action had been occupied..
The Commander-in-Chicf accordingly reported to· the Lieutenant Governor-General
that the area dominated by those strategic points 'WaS under his oontrol.
20. The D'ltch Army vie'" is, therefore, that the location or movement of any
Republican forces within this area is a breach of the "cease fire" order and
that the Dutch forces are at l i b e r t ~ . r to take any measures to disperse, capturr
or d e s t l ~ Y such forces. A l t h o u ~ h it was fully realised by the Dutcll that,
in their very rapid advance, they kept to main roads and by-passed many
Republican formations, which remained in their original locations, they did
not consider that this affected their control over the whole area.
Accordingly they considered. that the Republicans by remaining in their
positions, patrolling in their neighborhood and attempting to s u ~ p l y them
were contravening the terms of the order •
. ;".' ,: : 21. The Dutch "cease fire" order was acIUlowled.Ged by all formations and
units before 23.59 hours on August 4th. Dutch troops operate in general in
small detachments which are established at points suitable for,giving
confidence to populations, t ~ e protection of property and e a s ~ of commtmication.
\. 22. Continuous patrols and clearine sweeps are carried out throughout the
area, designed to aafeguard lines of communication and to disperse or capture
any concentrations of Republicans. One of the major tasks is the constant
work of engineers in renoving mines and reparinG demolitions. M o v e ~ e n t of,
" larger bodies is impeded by the destruction of bridGes but t h e s ~ are being. ~ . I ' ;'
repaired rapidly.
23. In most areas the army is recruiting and training considerable civil
. 'police forces. These are ccreened and then Given three weeks primary training.
",'They are then armed ~rith rifles and ~ r o r k under Dutch officers and N.C.O's.
They are gradually relieving the a ~ ' of m ~ ~ y routine patrol duties and those
seen at work appeared to be ei'ficj.ent.
24. Ifnere possible, the Dut;h are endeavoring to assist in the formation
of a "Home Guc.rd" for the protection of factories' and estates. A special. . ',-
corps of Chinese has' been enlisted for the protection of their c o m m u n i t i ~ s
and properties. These will free still further troops. . i ,
T~e Van Mock Line
25. A declara.t ion made bj' the Lieutenant Governor-General on August 29th
contained the follOlrinc passage'c: (Appendix IX)
j"In accord" ,
S/51:36Page 7
"In accord ,.,ith the principles upon ....rhich the action was founded
the Netherlands Indies Government's intention "IaS that the several
Republican officials end official orGanizations would continue their
tasks in this territory subject to her general responsibility.
Since however the present Republican Government at Djocjakarta, even
after the Netherlands Government decided to cease hostilities persev6l'ed
in f o r b i d ~ i n 8 its officials under v ~ r i o u s threats to fulfil this task and
' ~ ' m o r e o v e r incited o}?enly as ,·rell as otherwise to continue regular acts of
violence, the Netherlands Indies Government declares:
A. that no authorit~r of the present Government of the Republic of
Indonesia can be any lODGer recognized in the above-mentioned
territories;
B. that c o u s e q u e n t ~ : · the inhabitants of these territories
are relieved. of their duty to obey tr.e said Government and
that e v e r ~ ~ o d y is forbidden to follow up the orders of
that Government;"
This was preceded by a statement'of the boundaries of the. territory in Java
and Sumatra within which the Netherlands East. Indie8 Government considered it
had taken over direct responsibility on August 4th. The boundaries of these
territories are known as the van Mook Line.
'26. The Republican Government countered with a statement on September 1st
which contained the following passage:. (Appendix X)
liThe Republican Govermr.ent states cateGPrically that the Dutch
contention that their troops have finally and completely occupied
certain areas in the de facto territory of the Republic is in strict
v a r i a . ~ c e with the truth, and Given a wilfully v ~ o n g impression of the
extent and nature of the Dutch' }?enetration of those areas of Java)
Sumatra and Madura. The Republican Government assert that up till
this moment Dutch troops lmve only succeeded in occupyinG a number
of to....nlS and the main roads connecting them as' well as several isolated
localities. If there is an;)' Question of civil and military authority,
this ,·rill onl;)r operate in these afore-mentioned tOims, and alonG the
military lines of conanunication which the D u t c ~ have to maintain.
Those areas which l'ie outoide and beyond thene tmms and lines of
cOmIDtUlication are not in any vlay under Dutch authority, out are in
fact f u l l ~ / controlled. ',W the established administration of the
Re}?ublican Goverrunent, ,.,hich the peo}?le in the 8.reas reCOGnize as the only
l a , r r ~ l authority,
Based on the foreGoinc, the Republican Government states
catecorically that it cannot and will not a c c e ~ t the one-sided
/interpretation
. ' ,......, ." . ., u· .'''. . .. • .
. . '- ..., '.' .. , . '. . '
8/586Page 8
.... :
., .... ,.'.... :,....:.' ..
interpretation by the Dutch of these so-called "occupied areas" and
"demarcation lines".
26(u) It may be noted that the area contained by the Van Mook Line a c t ~ a l l y
e:{tendeccln many districts be;yond the line of advanced posts' reached on. .August 4tn, with the object of brincing those districts under administrative,
economic and stratecic control. The Republicans strongly disputed the riGht
of the Dutch to establish this line.
27. As set out above, the speed of the Dutch advance and their deep, narrOvT
thrusts into Republican territory left IllEinj' Re!'ublican formations "in the
air". These remained in their original locations and were by-passed by
the Dutch. BeillG'still intact, they were, of course, still able to
o ~ r a t e as military units •
28. The SUbsequent "fannine-out" b;:r the DutQh forces and their establ;i.sbment
of small posts in areas which they had not previously occupied, but which
they claimed to control, was considered. by the Republicans to be a breach of
the "cease fire" a G r e ~ m e n t . They therefore c o n s i d e r e ( ~ themselves justified
'. in sniping poats and. takinG offensive' action against movements or
'concentrations of Dutch troops. In addition, they also made every effort
to impede the Dutch supply mechanism by mining roads, destroying,bridGes
and r a i l ~ ' 1 a Y lines.
29 •. Similarly, as the Dutch considered the areas in question to be ~ n d e r
their control, the presence of Republican troops we, in their view,
unjustified. They therefore took offensive action to disperse those forces
and as a consequence, engagements between the two forces occurred
c o n t i n u o u s J ~ . The actual declaration of the Van Mook Line on August 29th 191}7
had little effect from the Dutch point of view beyond announcing to the worl
what their policy and intentions were. The Army hud been working on t~is
basis since August 4th.
From the other standpoint, the Republican Coramand learned for the
first time that IJ".any of their formations were, so to say, "out of bounds".
30. It will be realized that while the Dutch have restored, a measure of
Im'T and ord.er in many pal'ts of the Dutch controlled area, those very
actiVities have themselves been the cause of frequent outbreaks. The
establishment of a small post is an invitiation to snipers and in some
cases provokes more determined attacks from larGer bodies of troops 01'
em1gs who feel confident of success. M o r e o v e ~ , the constant Ilecessity of
maintaining those poets by road is a temptation to ambush which is difficult
to resist.
31. There is no doubt that the continuance of hostile action is due to the
decision of the Dutch authorities to impose militar~' and adminIstrutive
control over the area defined by the Van Mock Line, to the refusal of the
/Republican
. '-, .. ", . . \ ~
'. (It" ~ . . • , , •
.. :.. • , '. • 1\. •
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Page 9
Re~u~)lico.n Quthoritieo -:'0 recognize their risht to cio so ar..c. to the contir:ued.
actions of irrespons::'ble o:o.ncis.
Indonesian All.ec;aticns At1ainst the Dutch.
3 ~ : . !Trom {\It,-;ust 5th 1947 to S e : 9 ~ e : 1 1 b c r ccth l ( ) L ~ 7 thoce ell:Ji3e.t':'ons have
numbered 811.
33. Their nature ranges from Dutch recor,naissance to d e l i b ~ r : : : . t 3 full scale
atta0ks on Rspublic:LJ. he.J.d vilJ.G;-;es. Classifications 01' alleged breaches
a ~ p e a r as follows:
(I) Dutch R e c ~ a i 8 ~ , vThich has c c n s ~ s t c d ef patX'o2.s - !llalbl~r
u1thin the nVan l-iock Linen, and recon.:lD.issc,nee f l i C h ~ 8 ~ · ! i ~ , h
military a e r o ~ l a n e s .
(II) Sorti,eJ in-!-o Re~)t11::1:'..can-~leld cii~ :ricts. Neny inst:.:...:ces a.re Q,ltoted"
where Dutch forces of ap9J:'ozirr.ately one p l a ~ o o n s t r ~ n G t h have
2.pproached and. at t n c : ~ e d (};. villaGe a..'ld "T1 thdravm a f t e : . ~ i:1flict inG
casualties. These t o o 1 ~ placo within the Va::1 Mook L:.nG.
(ITI) Deliberate a"';tacks by 1.1:9 to two compan;y otrength, someti:!1es
supported by aircraft and usually supported c ~ r a r t i l 1 e ~ J , mortars,
and armored fightinc vehicles. 'These attaCkS, it is claimed,
are for territorial sain. In most instances t h e ~ e actions have
taken pJace inside the IIVan ~look Line".
(IV) N 3 . ~ l o c k a d e
(V) Atrocities. These, it is alleGed have included the indiscriminate
killinG of civilians of all ages and. both sexes, ti113 rava,zing of
women and mutilation of the dead. Such atrocities are claimed
: .....
.;: .- ... :;.;;
to llave been p e r } ) e t . ; ~ 9 . t S ' 1 bo'tll by D ~ t c ~ ~ a:.rl DU':iCh GO;'/j).ltal tro0tJ.:l.
Photocraphs hase been el'ppEeC'. of alleGed mutilations of t:1e d.ead
but have been discounted because it is poscible that r.:an;jT of the
injuries may have been caused b2- fair fiGhtinG, e.nd alse because
it is not possible to decide by 'Thom s~1Ch atrocitie3 wsre perpe"trated.
(v"T) Arson ancl P l u n d . c r j n ~ . H a n ~ r a l l e ~ a t i c n s hO.ve teen made that Dutch
troops have plt.'ndered and cor:nnitted a:::'Gon in the are-as wnere tlH':'Y
have been c a r : : : ' ~ ' i n G out police action. It is ~ m l J o s l 3 i b l e -':0 determine
'ihether these crir.:es have been };lerforn::ed by ~ r ( j o r s under Dutch
cormnand, 'by 1rresIonsible croups of Indoneoi::ms, or by ~ : : e
,!?rosecution o ~ the nelJublican IIsccrched earth r : : o l i c ~ " I I .
34. F':::'om the point 0:: vievr of tile Dutch military r.owr.:and the actions l':'sted
under (I), (II) and (ITI) above would not be brea.::he3 0:' the ")f;B.Se r ' l r e ' ~
order, since the force:J Vlould feel themselves fully jt.stified ::'r. Lakir.g actior
to protect themsel'IAs and the population and to clear the arec.a in question
from trooJs or irreGular bands who they ccnsider haven; r i s ~ t to'Le chere.
/35. The Dvtch
. . . . ,.- ..... - . ".' . '. . . .' .' . ,', : :'.' . .'. -- . -. ". ' ...
8/,:86Pne;e 10
35. T;le Dl'tc:1 agse:o:t that there has been no-;;'hillg in the nature o:z' a Na';al
Blo:;};:ade e:-:crJpt i.n certain vm.:y reiJt~icted arCD-G for the scle :J:.lr1!)se of
p l ' e v e n t : ; ' ~ : 3 the smt:g;;lil1g of ar:ns. For some mont~ls l}ast ti:erc ht.ve been 'Ter;::
lc.rB8 e:\1'10rts eO::;Jcc:'ally fron Sumatra} ef produce l1lD-inl;)' f:!:-cI:: Dutch ar..d
: ' ;. - .: .. ~ .. ;. - -:;. ~ ::......
.;. <'.':;
.... ;..'.
•
fOl'ej.gn-m-med estG.,:;es. In orc.ler to control thi.3 trade) muc:l. of ,·,hich ~ l a s
helQ to be illeGal and to be damaging both to the Dutch and foreign
interests invol'red and to the general econODY of the cour..tr;;:, the D u t ~ h
instituted a o.'lste~ of l1a"/al contrcl ,-:hich p8!·mitted. tl:e export of native
produce but not that of Dutch and. foraign-mmed. estates. 1'[ith the
exception of the wee-surcs tal;:en aga:nst 2.!"illS 8DlIGSlinC, the centrol measures
no., in force appnar to be the sar:le as tho:::e ado:pteJ. befere the ini t i a ~ i o n of
police action•
36. As regards Republican allecations that DutGh wnrships ha\'e v:'olated
Republican territorial ,·raters, the Dutch Naval aU1ihoritier; CQ:m:.:'c.er that any
de facto l'Gcognition of the R€lIlUbl1c would not sxtGnd to recogl.i'Gion of
territorial wat'3rs .on the Republican coast, so long as tile Republic :"ad no
de facto control over those waters.
f.lltch .A.Uege;!;!ons Asainst t ~ d o ~ ~ ~ ~
37. Dutch allegations of ir..f'ringements of the "c6Sge f1r0" order by the
Republicans uU1.':bar 1792 between August 5 and September 26, 1947.
(I; Attacks on Dutch posts within the controlled area) inclvdin3
sniping.
(rI) T e r r o ~ i s a t i o n of villaGers, murder and a r o o ~ in the Dame area •
To this class should be added looting and r o b b e ~ J .
(III) Atrocities.
(IY) Mining of roads a.'1d sabotaGe •
(V) COlllpulsory moving of the population and lcidnapping.
( ~ I I ) Firing at ships.
To the foregoing should be added the cnmpaign of vilificat:on and
incitement to m ~ d e r £'ram the Republican radio. 1:1 tIle Dutch View,
this is a transGression of the "cease fire" agreemF.'nt for which the
RepUblican Govel'I'l.1lent CW",,"1ot evade their responsib ilities.
38. As reGards (r); (IV) and ( V I ) ~ since the Republican G o v e r p ~ e n t has
:refused to recognize the Van Mook Line or the claim of the Dutch to control
the a r r ; : ~ ~ . d t h i n it, the Indonesians c o n s i C l . : : ~ themselves fully justif:'ed in
purSUing defense action in areas which they controlled before
October 14th, 1946 even if those areas are on the Dutch side of the
Van Moo~ Line. T h ~ y do not aclalowledge the riGht of the Dutch to
unllindereduae of Lines of C o m m ~ ' 1 i c a t i o n between their bases and f o ~ m r d
poets, or of lateral con:munj.cations.
/39. As regarda
· ' • 0 .. \. ...,. ~ , : '
'. . .'. ~
s/SP.6?eGe 11
::-..
39. As rsgarc.s (II) '::;,ld (III) CO!lSj,".6ra'ble doct'mentation ac-com:r:anied 1Jy
ph'Jtc'0~e,ph8 has beer:. :9l"oduced b~r both sides to shmT that atrocities h::l.'Te
been corr..:nitted by the other, 'b'ut it is 1l:J.poosible in the ti:ne avaihble to
d e t e r m ~ n e by whom s~ch crimes were committed.
40. Consi..derabJ.e damage has beon dene by Dutch troops to Indonesian vil1a.ces
and property both by shell fire directed at the Indonesian forces and tn the
clearing of fields of fire and b l o ~ n n g up of ~ ~ r l i k e stores. In one case, at
least, the Dutch f'h'et gave ivarnine to viJ.:agers that a mine store 1-TOuld be
blmm up a.nd the vi2.1oGe was eve.cHe.ted, 'but nOl"r::allJr it is considered
UIl.'1eCessary to wan" villac;ers that they :::.re in a danger area since they
evacuate of their own accord on the approach of troops. On the Il:dones.i.an
side, considerable damage to viJlages and property has occurred as a result
of sabotaGe and the scorched e[4'th polic:{ and also in attempts to disrupt
the D ~ G c h administration.
(a) DlJ'TCH
41. Organlzat1on and discipline o ~ ~ ~ Q P S on the Dutch side are good.
Troops are well equipped; their discipline appears excellent, their system
of communication is Good and it is reasonable to say that orders are rapidly
t ~ J S m i t t e d and promptly carried out.
(b) nlDOl'ffiSIAU
42. As regards Republican reGular forces the organization seems reasonably
sound although it is hampered by lack of e q u i p m e n t ~ The organization at'
General Headquarters appeared ~ o o r but conditions are better in lower
formations. Discipline of the troo];:-8 seems GOod and orders are promptly
carried out, but, few troops have complete uniform and their appearance
6uegeets more a guerilla force than an army. Communications appear fairly'
effective but by no means ah-a:r"s certain. Good use ie made of radio
broadcast but this has the serious drawback that it 1a not possible to receive
acknowledgements e..nd there is uncertainty aa to whether orders r..ave been
received.
43. It viaS noticeable that at General Headquarters there was full lmowledge
of and control over forces in C o n t r ~ l . J a v c but centrol of forcos in S ~ a t r a
and in the d.isputed territory viaS by no means complete. In many instances,
the GeneraJ. Staff was unable to say vThere certain formations were and in
several instances Give the wrong locations for Divisional Headquarters. This
is no d.oubt due partly to the poor communications and to the very poor maps
in uae.
4 ! ~ . During the early stUGe6 of the Police Action and for some time after
there vTaS <bnsiderable activity by Banes of extremist youths who had for the
Imost part
. . . ~. " . .. \.'" ...... • • .• • , \ t" • ,', ;. • ".\ .' '.. '.1' _ . ~
8/526Page 12
most part been tainted by Japanese propaganda and. training. They f.ormed
themselves into bands with nnmee like " ~ I M A U LIER" (Wild Tigers),
and "NAGA TERBANGlI (Flying Serpents), and did not appear to acknowledge
any central authority·. These bands hdve now been officially absorbed into
the Republican Army. Some of them have been dispersed by the Dutch forces,
and the Republican authorities claim that the remainder are being brought
under control. A good deal of irresponsible banditry is still taking place
in areas brought under Dutch control and it is iopossible to tell how much
of this is perpetrated spontaneously by independent bands end how ~uch
is due to incitement from Republican leaders. The Republican authorities
themselves point out that although there are organized bodies of troops
lrithin the Van r,took Line, it is impossible to control activities which ma~'
partake of' the nature of a lIres istance movement". Such disturbances are
h o ~ e v e r now decreasinG.
45. Propaganda
Since the inauBuration of Police Action there had been a good deal of
propaganda from both sides, same of it inflammatory, especially from certain
Indonesian leaders. There are signs that this is moderating somewhat, but
much could be done to reduce bitterness by a modification in tone.
46. Possibility of EnforcinG the "Cease Fire" Order
It is clear from an examination of the existins situation and of the
differing interpretations of the meaning of "cease fire" that cessation
of casualties and complete observance of the order could not be expected on
an~ after August 4th. In view of this fact and of the Sreat difficulty in
securing a satisfactory investigation of past incidents, the ~ o m f f i i s s i o n did
not consider that ~ ~ good purpose would be served by a detailed discussion
in this report of alleGed violations.
4'7. Although this. does not come strictly ,V'ith2.n their terms of reference
the Commission h a ~ e kept in mind the d e s i r a b i l i t ~ of finding some means for
securing a better observance of the order and a reduction of casualties, They
have coru:d.dered practical measures but have not been able to devise any
method of achievi!'.g ~ h i s object in the immediate future.
/CHAPI'ER HI
• . •. ~ .. ~.. . . . , . ~ ~,- ...1"
- • ~ _ , f 0
• I • '
S/5C6Pese 13
CH.\FThR HI
S J ~ C T I O N A.
I • .QE.~~~ls~-:~1£.~~Lt)1.2...12.C2."2~~
(f1 ) Ir. ~ ~ : , ~ z . ' : : : · ~ 1 . k ~ r . i . + - ~ : : ' D : . : .
1. 'I'here is -,.;HI10'..lC nny dot.lbt an e : l t h t . ~ s i r : \ 8 t l c r.3ticna1ist ± \ : I ~ l i : : g CHile-ne; tile
e d u c a ~ e d pert of t ~ e population and t ~ i s is evident) not only i ~ the t C ~ i J 5 but
in the coun:L::::r aree.s. f. t t::e car':') t~.:ne the feeling n}?psars 1,;0 1.:e o:.::e!ll~r
ant1-D1.ltc~, but tilia fef'ling J v11en pl'01ec., if; not !:lse-inst :j!le a v:;r::",~') :::;'u:~cl.lm!ln
but against the ret',U--:1 of Iicolcllialir:m". I-(; Js ~ 1 . a o 01)-<10U8 ~hat tt.e feBling
against t!1e Dutch he.8 ~en intenz:tfied sin:::e the c · : : ; ~ e r . c S ! ! l S r L t , ol tbe Police
Action. It 8h01.<.1c. be ~ t e d . th:::.t J"hroughout the count.cl j rl1_i.:e l:.'J od.uca tea.
classes are 'by far the ~ 0 3 t im':uential poli'fjically 31:..0. ot~le!",",;i36, they cre
e s t i ~ a t e d to f o r ~ :lot ~ ~ r a t l ~ n five per c e ~ t of the populaticr.. It 18
difficult to estiL15.·te the extent to ....r1.ich nationalist feelbg has penetmted
to the ll'.asses) who are mainly ag:::'icu1.turaI J but eviclt:>l1ce shv~r8 't:.&.t, 'thoy are
not in geners.l 'Doli tically minc.ad.
2. It is k . ~ o . m that people ,mo voice opinions 86ainst the Republic and those
who are 6 u s p ~ c t e d rrS sy--.uj;la thisinl3 with the Dutch maet idtil st:dct ::les,su""'os,
ust~lly in ~ r . e f o r m . o ~ t m p r i 8 Q P ~ e n t l without trials, for long periods.
3. The eWrl.nist:'ation of the population is oUbrard.ly good ar-.d Ilhcre possible
n o ~ . a l s e ~ v 1 c e s such es ~ f f i t e r , li@lt, road end rail transport are in operation,
c ~ l 1 e f l y with i"c;:mer Dutch material. ConSiderable attention is being :;:,:a.id to
general ~ , r e l f a : ' e j schools and hospitals 8re run reasol18bly efficiently ",ith
"rhat s u p p l i ~ j U::'S available. Cultivation of crops and gor-eraI livelihood are
proceeding C':':\ a baA:!.s com];atibIe ....d th e m c r g e n c ~ r conditions.
4. In tile. T'::iUo "Teas viflited, enough foed is available for the r: o:Yt1:!.ation
but t h ~ ! ' e i 8 a Si-~ ~·i.::US shortaeo of <.:lothing, whilst in the SU.'1:':l t r ~ areas, the
food p o a : · , ; t i . c ~ - . J c : . : l t h m ~ ; : , : ! l sdIJ, s'.lfficient, is r..ot 30 gOO(},. It is provable that
the food ::.:lC ..:~.Uc· .. "':~.l~c·t,1ri,-,:;u.:;e i:'. the i ' . 1 ' ~ u r e :)n a;::J("l~t o~ lack of trnnspor
5. F e e . ~ : i . s t; (0:' .~ .;.t;;' i ':.~"':. '1~~ ";'.0 r:':1. ':, :.'t (;10::'L af r1 ;:;{ ±'i. "/... ;':;: mj::' ~ ....p.ry acti·.,i ty
,·rhlch t h 9 ~ r : : - . : . ' ~ J , ' : 2 ' ~ : n . : l , ~ ~ ~ l " , ~ " ) f . : . d ~ 0 : ' ~ l : ; ".,:::'1.' L..a::'~jr'uci'J.,'n m~d 100i..·:.lG'
6. The : J I ; " : ~ ' l t (;f '0:10 1=0Ili:.)::. ~i'.)~l i3 fed IT:: ;,1'1 nOlJo.1t r . . . : : : - . ' ~ b l i c c n e:lti-Dutch
pro-pag:'1r.de c . ~ : ' . i . ::!'''.':_" is '-.: '\.0 er c.1:y :'~t,ch pt~::icitJ hlrlt.i.ng at Zurt::(-}!' military
action F.l.f:?.:'l"!6t t:"" ht.~.· l'::~.
(,. "U.
C o . , . . . ~ ~ t . i o n "''':a~ -41-' 1'V"l '.. , .:.. ..... "'·"'(1 t·.;! ''''''';a Clou....,·r'ay" Ean r1I'" A n.o. ' ~ _ ' . , : - l ~ , p." :a_ . .l. ... ~ .... ·t.e "' .. \'IL1 e.r...., .... \.w•• ",;.:r ... ,......... ~ , ....... .,.,·"01
lile<'\an) ....rL:.ch were ell'euc.y und.or Dutch ecimidstl':l tior. before tte Polic,',} Action
.rill n o J ~ be dealt '..T1 th in this repol·t. Indeed the t'..;".intcnnT:ce of le·..... and
O ~ Q e r 13 a ~ B u r e ~ a u ~ econ:mic acti7ity h a ~ bee:l r e s u ~ e ~ therGin.
/8. Ne outw.lrd
I • 4 • • , I '" • , ' • I. - • ~..'.. •
, .' .. .
8/5e6PIlGe 14
8. :Ne OUt"W':l"-'d. coercion on the pt:'.rt of the Dutch ago.Llst the nor-J1."l :!:8acefnl
Indonesian Il0]?a2.D.t.ion ,·18.S noted, but it is Imown tll.;:.-t c;. fEm In:'..:-::-.2.sian official::'
,'Tho a.ct agdinst the D'.ltc:1 in I ' u · ~ 0 h - h e J . d territorYl l : : ~ v e ' b ~ e n pl<1(,Gd unCle::.'
arr98t. I : r . d c : ; e s i e . ~ s , arld Juh'.Jre !O.r8 l:~L!'.y 0:' theLr" I:articuJor2.y o t ~ 2 i d e the
occupied to\m a!tlC1S j who ara te.lting an act:!. 'le :0::l.rt ::'n tbr:: ::::8,?ub:':'can Gv.erilla
warfare, are deaH ',d th militarily by the Dutch in their restontion of law and
order.
9. Afuninisti:e;!:ion is cO:1t.roJ.leQ l1y tr.~e N.E. I. a u'tnor::' ti;,;s t and, in r . - ~ 1 . n y cases:
is a3si3ted by f 0 1 ~ e r Republican officials, n e ~ ~ l y all of whom are acceptinG
Dutch 1'3;yment or ad. Vc1.nCFJS ( ...·ee pU'agI'f.'\.pl1 39).
10. In r . . e , . , l ~ r occL'.pied te:r.::itories) eXc8pt for 3 fe"!' 31'E;I.:;,8: til.'j :::.,c'.(l:.lcsian
population has no": the r'..r:J:neanou:::- of h a p p i l ~ 6 s s as in -che Re;;JU'l:11i.-.::.::.n are!;.s ':T:1id.
may be due to fea:::' of both terrorist bands c.nd Dutch mo vec:"mts.. ':her's is a
gene:ral fear of W08, t viill happen 1.,hen R-3publican autoorit:,/ f . : . s ~ \ : ' n n-p,pears 1 as
many rr.ay be considered to ha'"e cOnopanted 101ith the Dutch iri. csr:'""j"irrg out their
ordine.ry !Ilt'lans of 11velihocd instead of retreati:'1g to Bopublicl3n tel'ri t o r ~ ' , an
opportUo.'"lity which r,MU eXi3ts vdth Dutch approvaL Hhen iauily life is te.kon
into account, 'che Indonesians are in a difficult position.
11. In Dutch and foreign. estate-areas, fihere c o ~ i d a r a b l e progress has been
made in a sno:,'t time 1n.th· rehabilitation work, and w}lere there iD d.efinite
enthusiasm bebo1een the Dutch and. the I n d o n e s i e . : r ~ s , "vforkers are coming back to
the estates. Hcwever» there is. still great feur of E e p u b l i c a ~ g u e r i ~ l a bands
who not only operate against estate buildings and factories, but against the
personnel and here again for th9 time being) it is difficult for ~ I " and order
to be rraintained by the Dutch Forces. So:r.e estates, "d..tn Dutch approval, have
their ovm ar~ed sect~ity Gt~rds.
12. In a fawar8as) Ilarticularly in Stmatra .. sellaratist n : . o n r e e n ~ s have
dtarted. n1ey h o ~ e to be a u t o n o = ~ u 8 in the near f u t l ~ e and s o ~ e wish to be
federated with a Central Indonesian Covernment.
II. } ' [ r : . U ~ ~ n g .
Renublir:;'m ter:'itory.------.._----...__ .__...---
13. Except in areas where complete surprise on the part ef the Dutch during
the police action achieved immediate results ~ - r i thout Ol'Fcr: i tion, t:""e Indonesiar
and foreign population Guffered concidera1Jly both on accounb of military actior
and the cchcrched earth polic:r • Vzny civilians in t o < m ~ h i p 3 an1 villqeec
Here ki:'led.
14. 1he scorched earch policy applied by the Repub:icans has resulted,
a r ~ r t from the ~ e s t ~ c t i o n of c o ~ u : n i c a t i 0 n s etc., in entire tOimships being
d e ~ t r c y e d , thus c r e ~ t i n c a great numoer of h c ~ e l e s s refUGees. This applies
to both Indonecis.:.ls and foreic;r.erc eGpeciaHy Chinese.
/(b) D u t . ~ h · · h ' : l J . d ·i;p.r:': tcrv .------_._.. _-~~
, • , • '. -,.. '1'''' "~.'·"n. • -.' (, J), •• -, -, ' ,. , , " • e' • ,.
~ . ... . '.
8/586Page 15
;....
:.;-:.
0.'> .; •....
(b) ~ c h . h e l d terri-l;or;r.
15. The GUffering in the present Dutch-held territory during the action has
been described in the previous paragraphs but since the cease fire order ~ m s
given, on account of Republican troops, guerillas etc. still remaining in the
area and the fact that the Dutch are continuing police action for maintelmnce
of law and order, considerable sUffering still ccntinues but is decreasing.
16. Except for defined points held by the Dutch in thi s area, Republican
troops and guerilla bands are active throurhout the areaz not only against the
D\ltch forces but against the Indonesian population who may be c o · o p ~ r a t i n B or
working with the Dutch. A state of fear of roprisa13 is very evident. In thic
reopect, Chinese population suffered the most since they are often suspected of
being pro-Dutch.
17. Under these conditions a return to n O ~ D l life is not possible except in
tmmships or l'lreas under definite poliCE) control.
III. ~ i tm t i o n . . . . . £ ~ e i c n e r s .
(a) RepUblican' terri tor:.
18. A large number of the Chinese pOIlulation in many areas sUfi'ered both bafon
and since the police action. The Chinese ~ r e r e mostly a ~Iealthy class compared
to Indonesians and on the i ~ p l e m e n t a t i o n of the scorChed earth policy they
were the victims of looting and terrorism. They sUffered'severely from many
kinds of a t ~ c c 1 t i e 8 at the hands of Indonesjan soldiery and ci~iliuns.* In
some cases, they were accused of being spies of the Dutch but the Commission
has no evidence to this effect and it ls considered that their suffering ,ms
£enerally on account of their haVing the best p o s s ~ s G i o n s at the time uhen the
scorched earth policy WES commenced.
19. Since the cease fire order many Chineee '.rho ~lere forc:l;bly evacuated to
the Republican territory are now being placed in refugee camps and are in
General looked after by their O,nl community.
~). Other foreisners most1:1 British Indians and Arabs elso suffered but their
position is analogous to thet of the rest of the population under the disturbcc
condition2 in the territory where they re3ide. The ~p,at majority of the
Europeans had prevlou2ly baen eV8cuutei.
("0) D'.<tch-held teXT!torY •
~l. Since the cease fire 0rder Chinese in outlying area8 ere still beinG
s\wjected to t e r r o r i ~ m by ~ e ) ~ b l i c a n gunGc. This is on account ef their
e.lleced cc-operation ~ ' 1 t h the Dutch and of the fact that.LDeny of them are
cnrry1.ng en their fermer bllcines'3 and wQrkine on Dutch esta tea. Ther3 1s
still a larf8 ntumber ef Chir.ese 'rho had been forced to leave their ordinary
placee of residence and are being held by the Re;:ublican troopo or £uerillas
/ in ieola ced
* See rep~rt sUbmitted to the Secruity Cotmcil by the Ghinese~ ll'\'mTllln1 t.v.
• ,', ",'. ' I - .. ' " • .... ,'" , • '.
, ': . 'I' t'6' (j .".. ,,'. '\ ',.. '.
8/586}'lace 16
/:1. Many
. ,;.,,'
;.; ,',
J
in isoleted places \o!Hhin the Dutch ereaf', and it i3 };:no,;n that Dutch troops
are gr.:: dually freeing these people in thei:::' mOPIJing up opera ticns. Both the
:naGi'!e and the foreign, espec1Ill1'.' Chinese, population are lJnderfed end
ill-treated 'l1hile in the hands of these bands.
6? Because of the inadequate pretection that, at the present t i D ~ , c ~ n be
[i tTen 'by the Dutch, the Chinese population have started to form their o ~ m
G e c t ~ i t y corps with arms loaned to-them by the Dutch. This is causing
friction \o!ith the guerillc.s and che lawless 'element of the population'whoG8
h ~ i n o b j e ~ t i8 to loot and murder irrespective of race or creed.
'--3. Although the Dutch police actien "TaS launched ~ l i th the a vO'l-Ted purpoce of
restorin3 law and order, this purpose has hm-lever,so far not been completely
a c h i e v e d ~
''24. It is reliably reported that since the police action more than 1,000
Chinese, including women anc.l ·:hildren, have been murdered, over lO,OOD are
still missing and nearly 100,000 ha ye beon rendered homeles,s and dr;stitute out
of a total Chinese poptUution of approximately 600,000 in the affected areac
of Je va and Sumatra •
~5. The position regarding other foreigners, mostly British-Indians and
Arabs, is as'desLribed for Republican territory.
SECTION B
·I.' Economic condition of the population in different areas.
(a) ~ 1 1 c a n - h e l d t e r r i t o ~ ' ,
26'. Except for manpower reCj,uired for the ,Tar effort, cultivation and
h ~ r v e s t i n g of crops for food production are proceeding smoothly but not to
the same extent as before the police action. As a result in most areas food
appears to be suffici~nt. Cr09s are only being g r o ~ m for local c o ~ s u m p t i o n .
27. For clothing, some primitive spinninG mills are in operation, but r a ~ f
ll'.aterial is lacking and the quantity of cloth produced, chiefly from kapok,
is lindted. The clothing position is acute particularly in Java.
~ 8 . Republican ~ u r r e n c y is in circulation in Java and both Japanese
occupation and Republican currency in Sumatra. Possession and uoe of Dutch
currenc:T are not permitted.
29. Production of non-essential requirements is ~ t a standstill and general
trade is 6mll. In Ja ve mo:renient of goods and imports and exports are not
generally possible on account of shortage of transport and Dutch naval
control measures, b ~ ~ t · in Surr:.e tra trade with l-alaya in substantial quanti tics..of Goods is still beine carried on. Native produce is shipped, ~ l i t h Dutch
pernuseioIl, chiefly for exchange of tezt::'les. ::;muccling also goes on.
30. There is little u n e m p l 0 ~ ' l l e n t and, except in front line areas, no
distress ~ m s seen apart from overcrowding due to the movement of the
population from disturbed 2rees. It is r e l i ~ b l y reported, however, t r ~ t
the"C'e is economic distres8 in e. fe" other areas.
" ~"" . •.••.. ,' ",' . - . ,~.',' ••.••, 'l!JI' " ~" .. " , •.••
... • • .',' ; ~ '.. I • J'. - - • •
. .,: • ,1, ... • 'f • ." : ,.
S/'y36?aCl3 17
31. I,len] responsible Republican officials, with whom Members of the
Commi8si-:m spoke, st'1ted that they would ,;relcome the co-operation of Dutch
or other forei@1ers in the future e c o ~ o m y of the Republic., provided they
themselves reamin responsible for policy.
(b) ~ q h - h e l d territory.
32. This area includ.es most of the export producing estates and plants ,Thich
recieved considera'ble daruage before and during the Police Action and in fact
ere still subjected to ~ l e r i l l a actions on the part of Republicans. In the
food preducing areas, considerable damage has b e e I ~ caused to irrigat,ion vTOrk3
by Republican action. This, in some instances, caused considerable damage to
crops. Repair work was undertaken at the earliest possible time.
~ 3 . Exce9t in the rnatn townB, R e ~ u b l i c a n Guerillas and troops are still
act.i ve in many areas. It is ~ h e r e f o r e not poscible for normsl economic
condi tiens to exist until law' a.nd order return. On account of destruction
of property, housing conditions of tlle population are often poor,
34. The Police Action brouGht under Dutch control the Dain rice and other
food producing areas of Java, and the Dutch are in the process of restoring. .
the normal food situation by means of the transport at their disposal. \Vhile
the price of rice is still far b e ~ ' o l 1 d the pre'Har level, it has been
considerably reduced since the police actioll. Prices of o t h e ~ food products
have not fallen appreciably.
35. Republican and Japanese money is not ur.ed but \-Then 'Republican money ie
exchanGed the rate is appro:';ima tely 20 RepLlblican rupiahs to one N.E.r.
guilder,
36. Con:::iderable effort is nmT being rn.ade on the part of the Dutch to
rehabilitate plants, factories and e:3tates, and the economic life of the
}?opulation wi.ll 1mpro Tre in tUrect ratio to this 'IJ'Ork. Production and
exportrtion of rubber, petroleum producto, palm oil cnd sugar have ~ o r n m e n c e d
and o t h e ~ crops, I n c l u d i n ~ tobacco, are expected to be available for export
in the near future.
SECTIon C.
I. Cl.vU r-tc1mtnistration. d;.i smis ca10 , chanpes of tJoliG;'I, nen-
co-operation, etc.
37. Afte::.· thE" 21st of July "Then the N.B. I. auteori ties c c c ' ~ p i e d 'rariou8
areas c ; . ~ l r i n e the police action, they endea voureo. to secure the voluntary
co-operation of the iI"'l18.b1tants and the IndQIle3ia!'l cfficials end without
a doubt a seriouc attempt has been made to encournge Indonezian officials
to carry on t:le administr:3.tion, but only t'nderDutch control and 'on
condi tien that all ordorf.l a nU. cuD".Dlunica tion3 from the Rer,l1.:bli can Headc:uarters
at Djoc,je be ignored. If th-a Indonesian officials could not see their \-Tay
Ito carry
( ~ , - ~ . - .
. . ~ ." ..: .' "'.' .... '., ..;: ' .',. , '. . ' .. ' '.". .
,:',-','. '., ,,' .,' "-'" ' '., " ',., ,,'" ' ',;;.", .. . . .
s /')(~6
PaL's le
, ....;:,.. ".;.;.
: - ~ ... .
to carr:' on under t:J.ese Dutch instruction.:;, they 'fere edv:sed to gi're up
their Ci'9Pointmentc and, in a wajority of caE8s, if they fished they could, ,
8vacue.te to the present Republican-held t8rritory.
3 ~ . On the othe:'" h~nd, t~le RelJublican Government broadcast instructions
cc.llinl; upon :'\11 Ir.donccianc 'i,r:,thin the D u t c h - o c ~ u p i e d arl'Jas not to
co-o'!?erq te in Bny Hay. Republican officials '"ere therefvre placed in an, .
extreme1~' IHfficult position. Some who considered "they co\)lcl best render
a3sistance to the general population by remaining at their posts did so,
while others r e ~ u s e d , particulerly after the b r o a d c ~ s t , instructions from
Djocja.
39. The!:e officinls ranEe from mayors and regents to officials filling
minor p o ~ t s . A feH Indonesian official::; \o1ho' ha ve been placed in appointment
are anti-Republican and pro-Dutch. Practically RIl the officials spoken to
stated that they were Nationalist at heart and wanted a free and
independent'Indonesia ancl to be able to fly their Olm flag. Some stated
they had no fear for their acti'ona '..hen R ( ~ 1 ? u b l 1 c a n authorities return even, ,
althou€h they did realise they were working in co·operation with the Dutch
against the incltructions from the Republican Government'. They steted the t
it was their honest opinion that thet are taking the correct action for the
General good of the Indonesians in Dutch·held territo!"J. Many former
Republican officials are ~ · r i l l i n g to co-operate ~ - r i th the Dutch but are afraid
to do so through fear of J ~ t e r reprisals.
40. The N.E.I. authorities have established a civil administrative
orgdnizetion in the newly cccupied ereas, arld the officials thereof and the
;ilitary co-operate in restoring law and order and resuming n O l ~ l
administrati ve services.
41. The Indonesian officieli.l ·"ho vacated their posts have, in most caecs,
been replaced by Indonesiaw' 'iri.llinc to co-operate ':f1th the Dutch. In a
fe\or cases, however, posi tlC'nG are still vacant.
42. A fe~'r offic:'als, ~ T h o in 'Gome instances co-opera ted ~ " i t h the Dutch
from t h ~ first, have been replaced on account of their active support of
the Republic or lla 're vohmtarily Hithdrawn afte!' the Republican I s
broadcast instructions.
43. In all the n e ~ . , areas occupi,ed by the Dutch, there is no direct official
comm'.Uli:la tion wi th Republican Headq,uarters, and messagee and inst.ructions
from Republican EE)ad:luerters are contained in ordh1l1ry radio broadcasts.
II. Scorched earth u o l i c y ~ s plflnped-8nd carried out.
44. 'The Republ:'can Governrnent have previousl:.' ate.ted that "In case of Dutch
cggression", Q, scorched earth policy Hould be ono of the main forms of
resi:.:. tance. High Republican a'..lthorities such as the Prer:idont, Vice
President and the Prime £·1in::'ster p~blicly declared that the Dutch army
/.should.'be
• ....... r.', ~ ~ , { •
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8/5'36?ac,G 19
r.hould be acccmpanied 1y f i ~ G · b r i g a d e s if it enters R e ~ u b l i c a n territories.
It is kr.0"m t r ~ t e l e b o r ~ t c planE were made for carrying out the scorched
earth policy, ~ o / ' h j ch not only included ob,1e.::ts of mili tary i m ~ o r t a n c e such
es r a i l , ~ y s , roads, bridges and public utilities, but also private
IJro-,erties belonging to Indouesians and foreigners.
45. Frcm enquiries md.e at ceveral places, the scorched earth plans seem
to he,ve been ",arked out bJT both the civil and m i l i t D r ~ T authoritieo and 'ierc
e.cti.1ally ini tia'ted ~ · r e l l 'before the police action.
1 ~ 6 . Factories, installations and buildinGs in the Republican territory,
where it is anticipa tee.. that further Dutch military action may take place,
are prepared at the present time for demolition.
47. On the advanc3 of the Dutch t r o o ~ s on end cinee the 21st July, the
scorched earth policy seems 'to have been carried. out in an haphazard rranner.
In many areas objects of roE tary importance '\-rere left alone, such as the
se'reral long brid[es connectine \'Jest Java with Central Java, 0'11:; there ~ ' l a S
large G r ~ l e looting and destruction which included foreien properties, the
Chinese often oeine the main tal'eat. It is interestinG to nete that in
same areas in West Java, Dutch properties and public utilities '\-rore actually
left unharmed, while focdRtuffs '..,ere destroyed.
48. Due to the q u t c k ' a d ~ c e of the Dutch t r o o ~ s , some cities are left
undamaged, such as C h e ~ i b o n , Banjoewanel, Tegal, !ahat, etc,
49. The scorched earth policy .ms carried out more ruthlessly as regards
private properties in Central and Eest J a ~ ~ and.Sumatra during the police
action. HO,\-Tever, since the cease fire, guerillas are continuing this
!Ipolicyll against mili t a r ~ t objectives ',rith greater effecti ,reness.
50. The scorched 8:!.rth policy TNaS accompaniad bJ vranton destruction 'by
irresponsible bands. ITory little consideration appears to have oeen gi '.'en
to the ,relfare of the na ti ve and foreign population, no definite plans for
their prior removal and care aftel"1·rards were made, I'lnd as many large
industrial plants have been included in the destruction, the economic
position of the r ~ t i 7 e and foreign population remaining in those areas, is
d 1 f f i ~ u l t .
/CHAPTER IV
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PaGe 20
CHAPTER IV"
Su:.-"';',?,ry
I. Cease Fire OrQers were dUly given b ~ t there was no confidence by
Dutch or L l i o n e s i ~ s tr.::tt tLe othe:: '::idc H o t . ~ l d carry them o'.:.t J and no
e.tte1Jl].Jt ~-r:1S l!!:.ide ay e : i t . ' . ~ e r side to -::o.:r.s to ,a:'l as:.'sement.with the other
about m . e ~ , - s of 3:.,.-1:"13 e.:'fect to tbe o ; r ~ ' . J : : .
11. Hhile the ~ ~ : r - " . l b l i c a n G O V ~ J l . . ' ~ r c , . e . i 1 t o ! ' ( h ~ . r e d t h ~ i r troops to remain in
their positions a ~ i to cease hostilities tte NeE.I. G o v ~ r n m e n t c a n 9 ~ d e r e d
i t incum~1e:.t 00 tl:em to :?roceed. ~ ' l i til th? :cesto'L'T;!, ~ion of law' and order
\-ii kill the 3.imi ta of tJ:.e lir,',;c l.::ti6.. iol':::-' '0y 't;~!'llo
111. '1:'he n~.0id Du..~ -;h tLCdCl7.ce ~Y-l'e,<J ::e~ CO:l<;~, ;Lr~:-:' ,',"-J~,e ROFlbli-::cn forces J
which reLkJ.:..1ed ir'~ their posi tiw"ls in d C C C T u . e . : . ~ ~ e " ~ I i t;h the R e : : : : i . ~ 1 ; l i c a n Ceasl9
Fire Order, while they I"ere subject to mo,?pi',:lg l'll operc.tions by troops
under Dutch c ~ . Q in accordance wivh· the D u t c ~ i n t e r p ~ e t a t i c n of the
order. The Republica."l ' : ; . o v e r r ~ a n t c.in cted their force::; to ciGfenc tli.cJlSelves
and to oppose movementa ~"i thjr.. Dutc);j, ;:~:!.d territory. 'i'he different
interprete.tions of the C e a s ~ Fire Or l<lr by each sj de th"lS made it impossible
for t ~ e order to be oboerved.
IV. Apart from actiorls involving regular forces, a considerable amount of
banditry, including murder, arson ~ l d looting, is still b ~ l ~ g carried on
by irregular b ~ ~ d s .
V. Tr.e population suffered consi1erably even before the police action
from ba."ldi try and the scorched eCt:::'th rvl.iq. T ~ i s was inter,8ified during
and after the police action o The Ch~ne~erTera a special tai'i;?ct.,
VI. Adlr.ir..:!.8tratio:! ar:,d .:ultiva,tio:l .:lre y : r ~ ) c e e " L : ! . z : g ur::l-s:;:o el!l'''~, ..,;ency
c o n c . i ' ~ i o : J , E l : i ~ b ( j 1 j ~ ' ) . I m t c ~ a::ld 3;;:;;:1...'0 Ll0X.~ i,e'i.rl t·"!.' : : . ~ . to:7, I : ' ~ ~ t e former
.<.•.
ther e is C 01',S ic.er:;:,blF.' f'ear ai.' bar.\d.i try ir. the : , ~ P '··r ~:'J:1A a:.:c. ~\G:i.')'~·.b:'l can
re:p:cisals i ~ l t h ~ f,...t·..:rEl, In ti:.e latter there <:':i.',:) T\":!.l,. .:~.'r·-' ..l'l 8ho.ctf..ges
owing to the c e s 1 : k 1 . ~ i . : J / 1 of nOYI:'3.1 import and eX'_' )"C':; t · r < , f . : , ~ . 10. Republican
areas the food. si t':atl0i.1 in IT.ost districts is good at i.:r,::,e5er.:.t but may
deteriorat'3 in e. fei-[ mO:1.'.jts I t:i:ne,
per cent of ths : L 1 C : ? U : ~ . : . t . ' , ( ) r . e..:.'5 :i?r';,-::tlcc.:;'ly all ...::.tictJ.r'1,).:i.-l>' ,-",/1 se3k
some f0rm of ir.,lc.:;:e:lc"·:l':3 al··~'.:'·<.'3~"" ';:r)'c nsce3es.rily s · ~ · / ; J ; : : ' · , . l ~ the present
Repu·ol1.c. Ther':;):'s li t-:le hat,::3d oi - ' : . ~ j e l"Jutch as 1 i . ~ d i 7 I , d u . . : . l s , and their
assistance in r u n n i n ~ the country ~ , s recognized as essential.
/APPEND1X I
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?aGe 21
1','E.2ENDIX I
RE?OI:T c~r Vrs::rl1 ':'0 DT()CJ·AIU..F.TA AI;D Z:'£I£ JA':A;P.B:l BY ~\'lf;~S:13 \I B A ' l \ : j ~ ' ; kID R . q U ~ r :
Ssrrte;.:"cr :1rn._....--_ ..__.-1. G e ~ 3 r n . l--_ .._-
He arrived. Djoejakarta at 1000 hours ana. ~'7ere ree·~. DJ va::.':ous Indonesian
Authorities :'ncludl:'.3 the S.D.tnn of D;joc.js.lml'·te.. ':nen we prccaedf3d :0 't;le
home of :or. S~,J1C~mO w:lere ,'re viere }?X'osen"Ved to the Fresi·:L'3u ~ ane. t::le
Prime Hinister.
2. A f t ~ r an o f f i c i ~ l I m l c ~ e c ~ p a ~ t y a t ~ 3 n d e d by ~ l l mSBbero ef t ~ e cabinet;
with the P.M. and hia ativisers.
3. Military'S:tt~tion___.. _I.!-.-. .__
: ; ,
After general discussions we l'eClUeGtec. the Goverr,n:er::t to Sr..O"7 us a ,
map giving the present ILilitarJ poa1 ~ : ! . o n . He 1"cre sho'NIl a ::-,,':l.}? '"):11 ~J~Ji(;h vTae
marked the pOfJiMons of the Dutch and Indonesia!. ' b c ~ o r e ';;l10 ZO'th July, the
posttions as, at 4th Augt\st a.nd tne posItions today. Also s . h c ~ m WG:l.'e the
lines of demarcation of Dutch and R e p t ~ b l i c a n te:r'ritory as recently C4"1."1Ounced
by the Dutch authorities and i:lte!,?J::'eted by the Incloneoians but wllich are
not accepteble by the .Indonesians. A copy of tIlls m a ~ is to be mado
available for the inf9rmation of the Consular Mission. ( E n c l o s t ~ 6 IAt)
4. After this ";Te asked the p.r.l. inreln.ticn to tile ef binet and T.R. I. ,
who is responclble for mHitar.y opcl'ations. He stated that ~ e end his
Cabinet are r ! J 8 : . ; ~ 1 n c i c 2 . . p for all o p e r a t ~ o I l S directet'!. b ~ ' t::16 mili';;ary
authorities a:;:.l '!:h':1 i; " ~ ; · . i 3 cc·d!'oJ is fully e7-f;rci38r.••
5. WG aIoo ' ~ j . - . : · ; L l 1 ! ' e d c.8 to ~ h c ; use by t:10 Ind.'j:le siens of Britieh Indian,
Japanese and Gel'"j:E.n pt;l'sclmel. He iTere inf01med that; u.e;3ertern· fl'om
the B r H , i 6 ~ ' l II\fl;i?;). . ~ l ' l n y ';T::Jre at }!l'ecent concent:rated in Djocjal:arta for
return to Inlia ~ f ~ e r consulix.ticn with the Indian Government but, owinS to
the present blockad.e, no shi)?6 have been avalla"ule for t l · e ~ i ) p c r t a ! i i c n . vTe
,,;ere also informed that some Indians 1'1ho li7ed thel'e "Jefore the war [:re still
in the T.R.I. forces in St1ILEl.tl'a. An X'8gards ~ · e . j J l 1 n G G e it ~ { a s stated that
no officers ~ ' 1 e r e employed but up to ~ O O.R. ts Y . . r ~ l ' e still e!:lp1oJ'ed by the
T.R. I. as instructors. No Gel"'!"'..D.nS ";Tere bei:i8 err.:plr,);;,'od but sC:Je were interned.
Our 1</'1sh to viGit them ¥TD.::! reo.dl1;;.- accepted.
6. He ";!ere infol'IJ:ed that the approxiv.ate casue.lt;; r:-.te ;'lir.ce the
IIcease.fire" ";TaS 150 Indor,esianG vel' 'woell: of 1-Th1..:::11 mU:lber 80 ~ c r cent "7e1'e
civilians killed by e.:=otillery Cl' mortar fire. ~ r : : 0 Y e x p e . : : ~ J.:;he ];Jrr;:Jent r~.te
to continue or ev::m increase. Their e s t i ~ t e of the Dutch caa:mltio3 1,r:J.£l
20 killed per week.
/7. Enqui::ies
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s./'ji36Page 22
7. E n q ' . t i l ' ~ . e s were IrL.de cOIlce:l:r..i'15 :'utch ?O,I';.::3 cnd. ',-re 1vcr3 informed that
onJ.;r u feu ',1'0::'"6 l:eJ.d, tirO of \ ~ ' h c ; J : : l .,8:::'3 at : : ? : : : ' e ' ! ( ~ " ' : t at D,Jocj<.l.Y:al'ta hos])i tel.
P./31'eel:1..'"'nt to visit t:10se I : r : i S J r ~ . : : r 8 was reacJ.ly /3i";en also,
e. Infol'll1.'1.tlon iras re1ue8ted cC1::::sJ"Gir.;; (j0~llr,j.catjor~s in ':n3 '.c.R.I.
He 1'181'9 ir.for:::ad. t::(-:!.t t:here ~ " 3 . 3 CE:neral re.dio cC:.J:,;:unic3.t::':>n -Det~Tetm
DjocJal:arta end. all ccmrnend.s er-d that each COr.rrn£lilU. also had. radio 0:::'
telepllone c : > : : r ~ u r . i c a t i o n t·:) £ . l ~ . : L , j : ~ o . i - t E . n t d.lsposi t ~ ono. vie i'~ere alao inforJ.":ed
tho.t eyen a f ~ j e r D . ~ t c ~ militt:rJ al"!c. po~.ice ac~"ion S,3 :per CC:lt of the To.R. I
i·ras still an organicer.l. Dod.y. He ve:'G c.dv ieecl tba t all mC:::J.Jf3rs of :;he T.F.. I.
had some i t(-)1:1 of m . ~ l i t u r ~ - C : . J t l l ~ . : : c in thil'ij ::'llGY cot~ld DB recognised
: .', ...
."",' '.;..:.
.;'..... .;-. ~ : ; . ; .: .
OS 801di81'8 i.Jut ~_ t 'li{as a d.L:'ficuJ.t posi ti':-ll ""ring 1.0 the lack of c ~ o t h .
It 1'iaS also otat8d t ~ a t m'l'i:18 to the COIDI)lex mi2.itDry positioTIS that there
were "francs tir31.;.:cs :l on t·::-e Inc:onesian EJiG.e.
9. He asked if fm"ther Ifltch :rn.::;.:'i ~2ry ac"':;icn cou.:! Cl. 'be re,i8-:ed 1 1 ~ d "iiere
t,old "no", but that more intensive gU2ril1a f i g h t l ~ ~ - T O u l d O " C l . : " ~ .
10. The main question ..re.,'3 then aa!:ed regarding the Il cea::.e ..nre" order
and its compliance. The I n d o ~ e a i a n s stated qUite op'lDly that the T.R.I.
and Republican Civil authoriti'3s 1'iere still ftmctio::1ing lrithin the Dutch
defined area of respons:!bilit Jr , and that they in no w ~ ~ y r ~ c o g n i s e d the lines
of demarcation 01' responsibility as promulgated by the Dutch.
11. It sse:ns obviotts that lUtny Indonesians are l'rl thin the so-ca.lled Dutch
sphere and it is a d L 1 1 t ' ~ e d by the Ir.c.oncsians that any D t ~ t c h peroonnel moving
vithin this area a.re I.l.ttacked by Indonesian doldier8. T:1G Dutch, of course,
only occup:y certain pl)ints within the lines of ci.errlll'cati:·n and as the Republic
still regard the are cl , apal't from the area occupied by th) L'1.1tch on
4th August, as their tel'ri tor;) !:linor' guerilla acti-rities ls c c n t i ! ~ u o u s
1'rhers"'Jer Dutc~ mo'rerwnt occurs outs:'de tncir main occulded poi..:':'s.
12. It was further stntecl that Dr. Van MOOK had g:Lven ir:st:ucti(1)a that
although after the "cease-fire" orrler Dutch 'croo];s were to Gtan·l fast, they
,.,ere to mop-up atlj- ];lockets of resistance cnd this calJ.ed for·,;h the reply by
an Ind.onesian General t h D : ~ all Dt:-tch mOVing l'li t ~ l i n th:'s area '-Tere to l)e
attacxed.
1J. It is OUl' cons~'lered. opinion theft in v i ) ~ · r of the p r C 8 ( l ! ~ t situation
rel2a1"a.ing the IJut0h de:rr..-::rcatic:'1 l::.:les and the p.cesGut p c s l t i ~ n s cf both
Dutch and Indonesian trc.0:f s , the If cease-fire lf o r d . e : ~ cc.nnot be o1se.cved and
that i:lcid.ents and cuerHJo. fiGhtir-G ..rill be continued. ar:d prcbably increase.
111-. l:rssont ('(8T'.'31'el ·[)l)s.l.tion- -------1';e haye ascer·ca.!.nctl. that the effects of the Dutch "olvclmde together 'l-rith
the earlier J a p o n e ~ e occuraticn co.ve resulted i::1 the discontinuance of
contact between the Indon6sinn Republic and the outside world. e x c e ~ t by
/1'ao.io
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S/586Page 23
radio b r o a d c a s t 3 ~ d , t h e r e ~ o r e , there are no exports, no imports, no
movements of f o o ~ frcm one district to another, no or~inar~ mail or teleGraph
facilities; ~ l i t h the outside world. The ~ormal requirements of life such as
medical supplies, literature, transport, fertilisers, and textiles are not
available.. It is a fact that clothing for Javanese is particulal':'ly short
and many are w'ithout any apIJarel. It is also a fact that. at. the present.
time there is a sufficient, but only j ~ s t sufficient, sUPIJly of food without
movements of food, but. should the rrain crops fail this year a di~ficult
IJosition would 090Ul'.
15. General morale of civilians s c e m ~ to be quite high but general c o n d i t i o ~ s
of both the civil and military p O ' p u l ~ t i o n 1s rather pitiful. The feeling
towards the Dutch ~y ~t least all Indonesian officials with whom we came in
contact is one of hatred.
September 4th and 5th
. ..'; ~ -.. :
General
16. We left Djocjakarta at 0700 hours by special train travelling via
SUBEKARTA1 TOELOEN, GAGOEHG and BLITAR to SUMBER-BUTGENG.
17. At SUMBEB-BUTEUG ue visited the Administrative H e a ~ q u a . r t e r s of the
Indonesian 7th Division ~ . 1 o r General MIESTOPO) ~"ho.they said had 20,000
troops in MALANG and BECUK! areas. It ie of interest to note that both
the Administrative Headquarters, D i v i s i o ~ 1 ' H e a d q u a r t e r 6 , a n d the.whole
organisation of the division is within the Dutch area as defined by
Dr. van MOOK in his radio speech of 29th August. SUHBER-BUTGENG is the
present terminus of the railway.
18. From SUMBER-BUl'GEHG we IJroceed.ed to TAIJ..ANAGUNG 2 lan. from KEPANroE,
the Headquarters of the Divis.ion, then to TEUBEN the Indonesian Civil
Headquarters of the district an1 then to DAMPIT. ~lis lattsr journey was
made by car and at a IJIace PANGOLNGREDJO we saw trucks with Chinese refugees
from KREBET. We were infor.n~d by the Chinese that there were some 4,500
Chinese refU8ees from this IJlace who had been 'I-rorkinc chiefly in the sugar
and taIJioca fac-torias but because of the looting by the 'l'.R. I. and Indonesian
villaGers at Krebet they were forced to leave and seek new homes and work.
The Indonesian officers ,'ith us said that the statement was correct and that
during the firs:t 2 days after the cOILmencement of the "police action,"
considerable looting hed taken IJlace and t h ~ t it was not confined to the
Chinese IJopulation. \1e were informed that after the first surprise attacks
by the Dutch, the Indonesian civil udministration broke down and was not
restored till sometime afbenlards ~ . , h e n all lootinc waG stoIJped and that now
the Indonesians were accepting the resIJonsibility of evacuatiru3 the Chinese
from t h ~ area to camIJs.
/19. At TEURElT
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8/586Fage 24
19. At TEUREN we visited the military hospital. It was stated that 350, ,
civilian and 150 military patients had passed through the hospital since the
"cease-fire" order. There were several l-Tounded 'Datients both civilian and. - . - -
military at p r e ~ e n t in the hospital•.A hoopital at BLITAR also had 150 war
casualties but many of the casualties were women and children.
20. YTe stayed the night at B L I T . ~ and left at 0800 hours the n e j ~ t morning
by car for SARANGAN. This place W ~ i c h before the i'Tar ~'1as a week-end hill
resort has a community of 67 German eX-int~rnees. The Germans are employed
at the hotal, as teachers at the school and as physical ctuture instructors.
They seemed qUite happy but are 1'Tondering about their ·futtU'e. They are at
present being paid by th,e Indonesian authorities. We ascertained that
amongst this community there were no German officers and no milital~
instruction was being given. All the Germans were in Indonesia before the
i'Tar except one who was 1'Torking in J ~ : p a n and was brought to Java in 1942 by
the Japanese to act as an 1 ~ t e r p r e t e r .
21. At BLASON we visited organisations which housed and cared for 200 orphans, .
who had lost their parents by military action and also a hom~ and school for
war widows and other ~ a m e n .
22. We returned to BLITAR at 1700 hOurs, entrained and . r e t ~ e d to
Djocjakarta at 200 hours.
23. An IndOnesian Government report on the general refugee position is ,
enclosed h e r ~ i t h •. (Enclosure WD').
General Impressions
(a) lUli tar)"
~ 4 . The T.R.I. is a very liqhtly organised force Without many .trained, .
leaders. The troops are in Il'.any c ~ s e s young boys, untrained some ~'Ti thout
weapons and v ~ r y few with even a proper unifor.m. Thes0 are supposed to be
"reGular" soltl.iers and apart froM. these troops there are "irreGulars" who may
have some portion of a unifor.m such as a cap e.nd shoes. These "irregulars"
are organised in some manner and are controlled by the a l ~ :
25. The military situation is pitiful and although t h e r ~ are thousands of
Indonesiens Within the Dutch area it is obvious t h ~ t no organised resistance
is shown to Dutch troops and that the Indonesians form themselves into patrol
and raiding parties to inflict casuelties on the D u ~ c h whenever the opportunity
presents. There 'was no sign of c:.ny 1'TeapOI1S except small-arms.
26. In talks 1'Ti th l:lilitary officers they agreed thet Lmder the present
conditions it was ~~possible to say w h o ; ~ i r e d first" but they all aGreed that
they fired on any Thttch movements as they in no way recognised the line of
d e o a r c a t 1 o ~ . a s defined by Dr. var. MOOK and even do not know the exact
delimination of that line.
/27. At the present
fJ' " ' .'
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e/58.6Face 25
27. At the prosont tU1.0 thoy he:To no s o r - . , i ~ G a b l o £i:!.:0':l'Di't. Tl:o Genior
officor ~ i l : : ) 9.cCCDll'QIliod us ~ an Air Oommcdero, he.s no t; flci-ffi a:.:y otho:::'
machi:.::.o o:::=cpt f1 "t:;.~a:i..!'.or", or~:.i he infor.:.cd us t::e.t the Indonusia!'ls did
not ha70 ono f Q l ~ y q ~ a l i f i c d ~ a l ' ,ilot.
28. 1';0 i~O~"O shc.r:;r':l 'buildingG and. r.:otor Ca::'S Gaid. t;) ~ w . ' ! ' ( ) "j)·.;:on dos'tro.Y.:;d by
Dut=h attackors, but the d,8ll1C\€;o i-7a13 in fact· t ~ o roanlt of J a ~ ? , m o s o sabote.go
£'.t the o:ncl 0:' 'the ·,·lar. Thoro -;.r3.9 no o " . i . ' i o n ~ ; o of t:he 11 scor'~hod oart:r. lI policy.
29" E.xCJp'C f::;r t 110 :first 2 days aIL')r tt1.C 001.J:l),ol1GCmOl'::0 o-=: tho I l ' p o l ~ f ; o
actionll, casue.l·~iea have c O . 1 " ~ i n v . e d a'G 'L.:l0 UC'..i..e..: rC'.te (io o. 150,.200 per
'\olee1\:) •
','-:-,) 'U'~OT"""·~",, ,'",~, " .:.'n., .L-, I J._..., ~ .,.,,;,; ~ ..._...._.._ ~- ---
","
30. The country tl"e."rj"or'sod 'VJ'<lZ c.;~trcmcJ...v fer"C~.lc: Cl:.'1d tho c : . ~ o p s of rico,
sugar, tobacco, S1·rect rate.toos..ote" i·roro ntill being cu],tiva-:,cd in tho
usual 'T:le.,yo Of tho many Otigar f a c t o ~ : - i o s in "i:h", d:!.~:r:;l·:!.:::;t. '...!,t'.r Co'J.e or t"'lO
i'lore being ',lcrked, owlng to tho dos'truC'cion or ro:rao\"nJ. of p:La::"J by t ~ b
Japanese.
31. T'.110 railrol:'.d. ~ o J ' e . f : l in gooe. CC!J.,7.i·i:,ion cm.':' the train 8oz-vic:os 0i'ficiont.
32. It '\ores notod that the Ind.ones:l.an Ch"U admi:n:ist2'atiol1 tras s"bill
funct:J.onL"1g u.nder the Indonos:i.all authoritiea ~ i i e the D-.c. van MOOK
dcmar~aticn ~ine3
(.:;:) ~2lJ:~.Q:1..§J.tua.ti~
33. All o l f ~ c o ~ s w ~ o ~ wo met, both civil cnd military, hato tho Dutch.
He ~'7oro il1.formod that since the "police a c · ~ i r . m r r this hatrod h ~ 1 S 'become
bitter, and. there is no spirit ciJ'i·ion.Jjj of conci2ic.tion iT:!. th the D L ~ t c h 0
Tho;,;" realiso J . ; ~ n t from a milit<:(~j' point of viow thoy CG.!"..llo't idJ.j!'J.s+'and
the Dutch although thGY s~ thoy will carry on tneir p r 0 6 ~ n t rcsistance
until they o ~ t a i n in 8cmo way their p o l i t ~ c a \ dosires. T . h ~ i ! ' f a ~ t h in the
,roblcm "Joing settled by U.NoO o is simple and cntiro. !J1al.1,Y high rar.k1ng
officers and civilian officials havo o : ~ p r c s s e d to us the ids:h for a
peaceful sottlement and thoir confidonco in the U.N"O. Tl".cy ob"Vlous:!.y
Wallt poaco but at the prosont time they arc not ~ r 0 ~ a r G d to coopvrato with
tho Dutch in 0I'.y uay.
34. Lttrir.g the il1':.ole journoy our .isit had o'!?·,iou.sly 0e:::n ed.vort,:::wd '
although at C:Jhort nc':;ice and all alor.g the route mar.;'! lJo:.:sons h:-ld. gatllOrcd
in gro1.1.po ani £1.11 d:1lJl,laycd a spontaneous (3r0otine; e i t : l ~ r 1:1y S:101.J.'GiI1.g or
w a v i r ~ o It was obyioUG that this was not orgunised o ~ c c p t at s o ~ o rail'\oToaY
stationo.
3 5 ~ Tho pop1.1.la~ion soc~cd ha~py, wo)JL fod b u ~ snor+- of clothingn
/S£TJ.lE?2.9P 6th
•
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Page 26
~ £ ! ? t C t 1 1 : 2 : __2tl1 ql£.1"th
36. On SatnrdQ.;J" 6th SOTrbom1)or:·;o v::sitcoi the : r j o ~ . ~ a Ci"/il Eos:;ital c Tho
hospital 1'T£:8 ~vell kopt n:rd c::f:'cion-l:.ly opor' ..tnd o T"noro 1'TC1'e t~-ro i'Tar'ls of
mili ta!'y pat.ients (iY01.mcloQ) ar.d in a special i'Tard were t ~ . ; o ].':1..i.t::.l-:. soj.diors
prisoners. Hctal1:od to tile two s o l , ~ i o r £ ! i ~ :vr:J.:,c,to and. YC:::'O Cl.s':m:::,od that
t h c ~ r treatmcnt from thc IndonosiCL.'"lf3 1vas vcry satisfactory 0 Thoir ne-mcs
and p a r t i ~ u J . 2 ! ' S were ta}.:cn to cO::!;'Jll.micate to the vu.tch D ; L 1 : ~ n ' J : : : ' : ' ~ : : ' o s .
37. Enq,uirios were then :!JJlc.e at P.0p·,"."olicB.."l J.l. Q" roc;r:rQ..il:2 ..T2.pa~-:'\Jso who i-TCre
or arc being, cmplo;;oi by the Ropubl:i.cu--:s. ';'1.., ~~ould. net get D.ny dofinite
i!'.i'onna ~ i o n as rega:c<is this and one ..Taprmese '·11.lO 'was sijatod to b0 omploj-od
on clero:l1ng ~ ( . ' . h i n e 3 "..r3.8 inte::;'710i'fedo 0:1 aC'col~lt of lor..guuge o.::'f.f::'CL1.lties
the b.tervicl<T ~ / T a s n e e a " t i 1 r o ~ The author:lti08 sta:;cd that :i.n ....-io.; of the
:',' .
numbor of Je.;anese desertoJ:'s in J:=.vo. it vas C l ~ j . te p : i . " o ~ a 1 } l o a mt.n'bor were
operativ.g \dth h"'.:."cg...uar Re:pu:l:r~al.1 t::;O~I'.3 ·Jut r.ot as a.':l C r S t 1 . . . L ' . ~ e c . 'bedy.
3 8 ~ At 1130 hm.lrs 'vo again had. a tlisouf3Gion wBh t;lO :Preo::'.c:.:J!j·;'; u-'1.d Promior
of the Rcpull,lic. Some of the cOllchlsicns 1'Te i1~.d red-che':' · ~ · i c . . : : . · O diflcussod and
agreod uith 'by tho P r ~ J . m o Mi:lic;ter and P : : . " e m i o : : , , ~
39. In the afternocn we were asked. to !'eoeive a ~ d talk to Ropresentatives
of S.O.PoS o!. W ~ ~ e n and youth o r g a r d s a t i o ~ s ~ (Enclosures QCi). ~ ~ i s we
did and lette:L's submitted horo,.fi -;,;11 were hand.ed to us for all ::,-o:aibe:::s of the
mission.. At tho timo of t:ho talks ·,.;ith the representatives I a thl'ee
kilometre l o r ~ p r o ~ e s e i o n , carryivg a n t i ~ D t t t ~ h b u . ~ n o r s and sloenns for
ireodom for Indonesia passed by cur q u a r t e ~ s ~
40. On the morning of Sundo,y ::;210 7th Sep'Gomber s "",e visited a RC:'lle..n Cu:tholic
and Protestant churches at Djocja'i::-9j,·ta ~rher'o it vras notcrl t ; ' ~ : l t there ,vas
freedom ef roligion. At thc R ! . O ~ Ohurcb., Ma.ss ~-ras -aeing cor,1.'..w'!;cd. ·oy a
Dt'ltch priost~
41. At 0830 hourn w'c lcft Dje,":lja by aoroplane for re'burn to Eata.".ia.
42. A repor'c ,11 th I:Q.pS on tho milita.:."y situatIon by the Ropubllce.n
Govol'!'.lIlent ""T1th allege.tions acains"b the Du:!;oh has b L . e ~ h a n ~ 1 0 d . to us and is
8ubmittcd h e r o ~ ' T i the (lmnex tB f).,
C o n c l u s i ( ' ' ' ~ 1 s RlCad:ed on ~ ; " j sit_---.......--- -
43. (A) R~l:l·9~.cq~
(a) The RepU~lican Govcr:Blcnt in no ~ ' T a y •..ii~_l ag.roe to DC?:::' ~neccgni8o
the dCI!lD.Y.'catio:'l line dofined by DJ:'. VC.Il N'JOK in hi:J speech on 29th
AUG1.w"t la:3"'-, as a di':rision of rooponsi"bEi t.y 'bot~lCCn. tho Dutch and
Indonesians fa ..... n::ain:~en~co of lai-T u:.-:.d. ordor.
(b) That as a ~~e::').y to If.c. var. MOCKrs s'tt.lte..mcnt of' 29+-=1 k~!Z1).ot, that
t:'lO Dutch '1-11:1 dica=m and i - r i n d ~ 1 . t p all armod oreanications vi';;1";in their
( j ~ m cons:l.dered a1:'oa of rOupons::uility, the Republican G o v c r r ~ ) r . c l l t havo/ordered
~ . t' •
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"", ..' .;,'.
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3/586Pare 27
c r d " l ~ ' : : d . that on,Y movement o ~ : r ; l . r G ~ h t ~ ..oopo f:::-cn. stand fast ,?ositior.B at
(c) : ~ d o n ~ s i m 1 offiGials 80 far met arc i n t o ~ 8 o l y tittor ~ ~ a ~ ~ 5 t the
Dutch l I p o l i ~ : e action ll and thoi:' J : l r O ~ l O n t a.tt:!. tudo iri f:X"1.."..tj,co.lly
(d) Tho Ikpu1:.:iosn Goyorr;mcnt J.8 plo.cir.g cct::plotu rolio.."1:c on U , i ' ~ ~ O .
for t ~ 1 e s o l u . t : ~ o n of t::oir j,)l"o':JlcIa.S o
( 0 ) Bv o::"y~.,hC''..·8 th01"0 l'TO:::'O e ig~ of 0. 8tro!"'.{3 ne.tio!la:;.~3t I:'l<no:n:on:;; tho
L"1d.cnoeian f:.I.ag f10V7 from a::n'Jot v"('0l'y }·.o'..~Ge c:J.r..d c:r.ioe of uMurdoka"
(f.L'ooG.cm) grooted us ";Tho:'oycr "iTO iiO·.;.t. HC',hero 1TaB th0~o a-::.y sign of
tho ccr.;:,w.l1ist f}ag and. o~:ly on od.d o'::eqior.f1 Llicl l'TO Ou:30:CYC t110
c o m m u r ~ G t s ~ u t c .
44. (:0) MiJ~~?-rZ
(0.) In comparico;i.1 l'lith tho ~ t , . : h !cilito:,:y o:r:S<1.11iEla1ilcn a~:;i. Jqu.:!.lJIllont
tho Rcp':iolican a r ~ in t:10 aroa visitod is rJoth hopo::'u':;o ~~ll pitifuJ.
in orgcu1isation, t ~ a i n i l 1 g and o ~ u i p ~ e n t .
(·0) Re::?u'bl~can tl'OO!'S both rog'.lla.r and. in'c8,.u.ar anu. somo E~ Q~ s aro
within tho D.ltch m'sa of rOElponslb:i.:ity as clcfincd by Dr. van MOCK.
(c) Organised resista.nco to Dutch troo!, IllUvomonts is net possible and
only g t . l c r l 1 ~ . a and frMc th'our aci{io!JEJ can snd will tako place.
(d) Considering previous paragraphs thore 1s no poss1bllity of the
cease firo o r ~ o r boing o;sorvod in the aroa visitod in East Java.
(c) Censidurll1B previous paraG!'aphs it is qu1te 1mpossfblo in our
opinion in East Java to asoortain ~ 1 1 : . 0 firos firs"b in the non··o-:'servcnco
ot the cease fire order and moreovor it ~ T o u l d be a 1;a51;0 of tblo to
attempt to do so.
1 ~ 5 . ((j ) ~0.!E:1
(a) The pr0sent 90sit1on of the Ropublican Governmont is that they
are cut off' from all comr.nunicatio11S ....,ith the outsido 'Ifc""ld o;';:Jc:Dt for
Radio Broadcauts mld ae~~r:i~e arrivals at D j o c j ~ a r t a by Dutch
permission. Thero is not ut prosent ar.y HIT or tulophoT4o cOm::Jur...ications
with Batavia.
(b) In tho 8Xoa visited civil a ( ~ l d n i s t r a t i c n , o r B ~ 1 i s ~ t ~ o n of public
utilities such as r ~ i l w a y s ~ n d hospitals and c g r i ~ ' i l t i ~ a l c ~ l ~ i v u t i o n
a!':90ar to Dv nern:u:, as fm4 as o g , ~ i ' p m o n t EQlmis.
(c) Thore is a e!lortog0 of' nuterlal0, c l u t h i r ~ ~ ~ d mcdico.l supplios
but not of food.
(d) I : " : l P : > : i . 4 · ~ O i'r'':ill the outside vrorld are iLl.po3:::i"ulo"
( e) 'Ibe morale of the poeple appoa1:"o high, they l·Te:i.comod the cousnla.r
miooion by 'Wllv1r.(3 ino.i"Tic.uo.:ly und so::!oti.ccs collectivc'.y aJ.Ol'lg tho
routo. There 'VToro several c:x:a;llp10s of the Ropu'bJ.icL4"1 Gc·vorI"..4llcnt
intereot and accompliohmcnto in oociaJ. ~ ' 1 O l f o . r : . .
I(f) Freedom
, .' .. .'.. ..;. '.
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8/586Page 28
(f) Freedom of roliBic:l is pormi'ctod..
•___(...3_~d. ) 3:. Ra~,=,~~ . _
Co.t:'.Gul Goneral of - ( j h o R 0 P ~ l b l 1 c of Franco,
DO!lu'iiy GI)!1sul Gwnoi:'ul. of 'Ghe
Cc.. ~momj'oa·::'"i1 of A u s ' G r a : ~ , a ..
•
'., ... .. ' .' ~ ~ '" . . . . ~ .. ~ I, . ~" , . .
~ • , • • I I
3/586Pa,3e 29
APPE:t.;DU: II
Re"?0l"t <l.':"~ \·~.;~it to : ~ ~ 8 t ~ i ~ : L ' , r a by M:t'< C. I ! ' ~ 0 I l . z .A._u9trs::":'C'..n--_._-.-._----_._---------- .
C0!:2.:?':tl-Ge.~~~~.l!r • .F~_ Tu ~~m'Jer ~ _£ED2l!:tT.
3::i t:i.oh Co"UsuI-Gen.eral, Bata"via---... _---=..;...;;;.;:.~..;.;;,;,~;;;.
3e;;terr:~er 9~h - 13tb, 1947-._-_.__-._------I. DESCRIPTIOn QiP TOUR
We took off f ~ o m Batavia at 9 o'clock on Tc,eedoy norni~G 3~~tomber 9th
an-C'.. landed chol't1'J- before v.oon at S o · < U ' e : ; ) ~ y a . We called cri!
Major General de Bruine, General Officer Co;:r.rna:J,ding lVetherla..1G.e; "A" Division,
who kindly arra..'1ged. for us to ha...·e a Joint interviel1 with Mr. van der PJ09.S,
the "Reccmba" ( ' } o v e ' " C l " ' . m e ~ l t Commissioner for Civil Affairs) for East Java,
and himae:f the same afternoon. At this interview p l ~ 8 were discussed and
dl'awn up for a three-day toul' of East Java and for contacts wi th numerous
Dutch s-"'ld Indonesia."'ls wham we were to mE':et on, the way.
2. The first d a ~ ' , September 10th, was spent on a v~he lvlodjokerto
and M9.1ang areas. He left Sourabaya at 6:30 a.m. ~ , l ' .;u_ " oil four
jeeps and accompanied by Colonel van del' Meulen, t' o f . ~ ' 0 ~ ~ n d i n B
"X" Brigade. After a brief halt at the sluice B a t e ~ .., I J,jrentas river
we drove to ModjOkerto for discussions with the Dutch Resident and various
local officials ~ T h o had assembled at the house of' the Republican Regent to
meet us. We then proceeded to Watoedakom, a Dutch frontier outpost, where
we had a talk with the officel' in charge. OUr nex~ stop was at M!llang,
which we approaphed via Porons, Lawang and Singcsal'i. The bridge over the
PorongBiver was captured intact by the Dutch last January; elsewhere the
bridges a l o n ~ this routd have for the most part been b l o ~ r . n up by R e p u b l ~ c a n
forces and are nml in process of being repaired.
3. At Malang we lunched With the Dutch Resident and some officers of the
local g a r r ~ s o n , after which an opportunity ~ T a s given to us to meet and
t a ~ ~ l i t h a numbe~ of Indonesian officials, including the Republican Resident
and representatives of the Chinese, Arab and British Indian communities.
4. During our return journey to Sourabaya we received a report tlmt a
jeep containing three Dutch soldiers had been fired upon shortly after
passing Singosari at a spot scme 100 yards from the roadside. We continued
our Journey and on arrival at the part of the road indicated, more firing
occurred, bullets riccchetted off the trees and we sought cover for. a tew
minutes in a ditch beside the road. No one was hurt; we saw no sign of
the attackers ~ n d the rest of our Journey that evening p r o v e ~ uneventful.
5. We le:t Sourabaya again early on Thursday, September'IJ.th, and drove
in a Jeep convoy via Pasoerocan to Probolinggo. Here we were met by
Lt. Colonel VM1 GIJN, Chief of Staff to Colonel Rcelhofs, cCIlll:lBIlding the
Dutch lIarine Br16adc. Af ter ta.lks vTith Dutch an(l Indonesian officia.ls
land an
~ . ,,' .' . ~. ".'" ., . ~ '.. " .,.. - ~ ..
8/586Face 30
and un intervieiT ~ ...ith 80me Re::9ur.:.iGf'.n P,O .vls ,'le r:roceedecl to Kltllnh, the
Letjes on the · ( r a ~ · . Colenel Roelhofs invited us to It:.."lch and W-3 h::>.d an
i n t f . ) r ~ " t i n g tallc a.f'ter'.·re.r-u-s with one of his int<?lligence officer'3. 'I'::I1..lrsd.ay
night "').8 spewt at leo:':l.ad.jang rrhen "e vere a ~ c o t J ! ! l o d a ted in the house of the
Dutch Resid.er-t.
6. Dt.lring the ni6ht ~ ' T e ,oTf)re diotul'oed by a fe~j bursts of roechir:10 gun fire
from a neighbou:::'in,s defance post. Cn enq,'.l:'r;y the .i.:ext lllOrning ve were
informed. that the f i r i l ~ he.d been ~ o n e by th5 l o c ~ l Chinese who had been
ala-rmed by some LlOvement, The Dutch have armed the Chinese in aome parts
of East Java to enable them to protect their mm property against "raro:pokkers"
. (maraudo;:,u) and to help in protActing the large nunbers of Chinese refugeea
who were 3reatly in fear of reprisals or other f c ~ of assault. Discussing
this with a representative of the ChinesD community at Djember we were told
that the Chinese were glad. to have this o p p o r t u r ~ 1 t y to protect themselves,
but in most cases the arms and eIDmIDlition distributed to them were i n a d e ~ u a t e .
7. We left Leomadjang at 6:30 ~,m. on Friday, September 12th, and drove'
to Sitoebondo for lurLch stopping at Djatiroto, where we inspected the large
sugar mill and hospital, and at Djember, where -ile Illet and hed talkS with the
local Dutch and Indonesian officials. Shortly after lunch we passed
Pasirpoetih, the s:pot on the north coast wher.' the Dutch marines landed at
the beGinning of the Police Action. The rest _ ~ our return j o ~ r n e y to
Sourabaya proved uneventful and was accomplished along the old rrPostweg ll,
built by General Daendels in 1811, which runs t l ~ o u g h Besoeki, and.
Probolinggo. In the evening we ,.,ere entertained by the Dutch civil and
military authorities to a cocktail party, followed by d i r ~ e r at the
Simpang Club.
8. We retumed to Bata'via by air on Saturday m o r D . ~ B , 3eptember 13th.
Our tour has necessarily been IDldertaken rather hurriedly and we were given
lit'tle time to abs0rb all the impressicns gained. vie covered in all some
500 miles, startiI1{3 each day soon after daybreak and trill: dUng for the most
part by ,jeep in a thickly dust-enshrouded convoy_ Whore1far we stopped we
had contacts vrith the local officials, i"loth 1)utc:h and Indones:!.an, fu'"ld often
with t:.le latter alone. No attem:pt WhaT,ElVer 'ffB. •.I made to conceal anything
from '..1.3 or to obstruct our task - on thfJ ':':Jntrary, every facility was placed
at our di3posal. It would be appreciated if a neFlOage of t h a n l ~ s crmld be
conveyed. to l,:ajor General de Bruine and I·jr. van der Plas for all the
assiotance, courtesy and Icindness extended. to us on our tour.
/11 • OB3ERVl~ICE
.• • a '.', . '..:;." .,: ..• ',.... ", .,'. '. • ;" :, " ,-.: .' , '. : .,.. ' ~ . ' , ' •. '.:. . .• ' ' '. .,
8/586Page 31
II. OBSERVANCE OF THE "CEASE FIRE" ORDER
9. In their declaration dated August 29th 1947 the Netherlands 'East Indies
Government cleZined the areas in Java, Sumatra and Madura over 1'1hich they
r ~ d assluued direct responsibility for maintaining law and order arter the
termination of the Dutch polico action of August 4th. At the 8 a m ~ time
the vaTious R e ~ u b l i c a n officials and official organisations W1tlrln these
area,3 ~ ' 1 e r e called u:pon to continue their funct:l.ons i!l co-operation with the
Dutch, subject to the latter's general responsibility.
10. This definition has not been accepted by the RepUblican Government,
who contend that the areas in question have been arbitrarily deIrarcated and
are not in alJcordance 11ith the situation prevailing at the time of the "cease
fire" order. It Is claimed tha.t outside the few' large towns captured by the
Dutah and alonS their lines of communication the Repub'ican civil and
military authority is still being maintained. Consequently the inhabitants
of these areas are being encouraged, to resist the Dutch attempts to secure
their' cQ-operation and to attack and harry any Dutch forces which advance
beyond the positions they were holding at the time of the "cease fire" order.
11. The Dutch in East J a v ~ are thus faced with the task of Winning over the
support of the native population and, at the same time, of giVing them an
adequate measure of protection against reprisals and other subversive
activities on the part of RepUblican forces and irregular bands over whom,
rightly or 1'rrongly, they claim that the RepUblican Government no longer
exercises any e f f e c ~ i v e control. The Dutch aim therefore at completing
their "oopp,ing up" operations as soon as possible and at preventing further
infiltrations of Republican forces through their demarcation ~ i n e s .
12. It is our cons+dered opinion that under such conditions and until some
satisfactory agreement has been reached in regard to the demarcation lines
it will be virtually impossible for the "cease. fire tI orders to be observed
by either sid.e. There is no actual fighting in progress on any laree scale,
but sniping, ambushes, :patrol clashes :?ono.. other incidents are constantly
occurring and it is of little c o n s e ~ u e n c e to discover who fired the first
shot. Seen in this light the tasle OI"' our mlitary observers should be
comparativel,y simple antl , it is therefore probable that early confirootion
of the v i e ~ . , s expressed 'IoTill be available ~ r o m Military experts.
IH. CONDITIONS P&""YAILING IN AREl-l.S UNDER MILITARY OCCUPATION
(a) i·ill1tar.'!
13. In general the military situation in East Java may be described as
having s h e ~ m conside:r-able improvement in the north and east and to b ~ w e
undergone little or no change in the south and south west. The Sourabaya
area is nO·'1 completely plcified and z:10 incidents have occurred in it fol:'
/some time.
.,: ." ',<", :". '" , '. .'. . :... ,.... :.:-, '., .. :... . ....>. "',"": ." ". . ' ,
S/586
some tima. The same applies to the BanJoewangi area and to areas alone
the north cv:J.st, such ao that, between 1'robo11n1350 and Kraksaa.n, where
disarmament is proceed.ing peacefully and the inhabitants are sheH'ins a
dispositi0n to c o - o ~ e r a t 6 . Further to the east along the coast El few cases- .were brou8ht to O t ~ ~ o t i c e of terrorisation by bands of irreGulars o p e r a t i ~ 3
from centres of resistance in the m O l l i ~ t a i n s . The victims were for the most
r:art Chinese who were 'alJeged to have co-operated ~ , ? , i t h the Dutch or who had
made t~emaelves unpopular by their money-changli18 practices. A few
Christians, both Javanese,and ~ ~ d u r e s e , are also reported to have s l ~ f e r e d
at the hands of IIIslamitic bands".
14. Unlike the north coast the i'lodJokerto area has a more stabilised front.
When visiting the Dutch outpost at i-la1'0edalcom ''le r:assed a bridge a few
h u n d r ~ d yards. behind the lines whi?h had been blown up by RepUblican forces
after the "cease fire ll order had been .Given.. The Officer in charge of this
post told us that. t,he RepUblican forces opposite attaclced from time to time
w ~ t h mer.tar and ma.chine gun fire and that D u ~ c h lJ8.trols were sent out to
deal "lith them. There \-Tere also c a ~ e s of , ~ e laying, telegraph l.l1res ~ 1 th
hand g r ~ a d e s attached stretched across the road, and other booby traps, but
c a s u a l t i e ~ were few and no fighting ever occurred on a major scale.
15. In ~ h ~ Malang s e ~ t o r .we.were told that there had been several recent
cases of kidnapping. We interrogated the mother and friend of one of the
victiIDa, but failed to extract an;y coherent story from them. Neither of
them had actually witnessed the event and the only evidence they could adduce
was that the abduction had been o.ccompained by a considerable amount of
noise. There is no doubt, however, that a 800el deal of infiltration"
terrorisation and looting is still going on in this area. rtJB.la11S itself Ms
been b.ad1y d.a.nJa.ged. ~~ny of, :,:l.ts best houses and buildings have been either
blown up, set on fire or stripped bare of their contents by thJ retreating
Republican forces, leaving a very depressing picture of this once flourishing
centre of a richly productive agricultural region.
16. The area to the south of ~ ~ l a n g . a n d the lOW-lying stretch of coast
towarde Loemadjang and beyond present the greatest problem from the military
point of vie"T. Bands of RepuQlican f o r ~ e s and irregulars operating from s
guerilla stronJhold n\)ar Toerep are constantly inflltratine through the
Dutch 11nes and harr,ring the c'ountryside, preventing food from reaching the
towns, organisinG a m : ) U ~ h e s , booby traps, etc., a..."1d. snip:,ng at - ~ . . l t c h p a t r o l s
returninc to their base. During our tour a' Dutch Lil.nrt"cl11ant ""as shot and'
killed 1.'1. this "Tay While uxiving in his jeep. ..he tutch intelliGence
officer at Klakah, the headq,uurte'rs of the I,Brine b...'igade 1 abO-led ua a ma.p
on vThieh vere located all the Rer-u'blican reoistancB (;()y.H,re3 8.t p"esent
/lmown to the
5/586Fage 33
known to the Dutch. ' The most dangerous' area, he said, lay between Valang
and the reGion to the'south of Loemadjang ~ h i l e the remainder of these
centres stretched out like a long finger along the coast, with a few isolated
OIleS more inland tmro:rdsthe north and north east. He explained that the
'T.N.r. and the "Badans" (Islam:1.tic ba.'1ds organised. by: the MasJoemi) were
oDerating independently of each other, but it was difficult to distinguish
them as very few of +,he men wore uniform or any insignia to show to Which
uni t they ·oelonged. Orders were be1n8 received. for the moat part by
DjocJakarta r ~ d i o and also by messengers from RepUblican WiT receiving
centres. "'i1..ile 7,h9 milital'Y organisation and tactics of these RepUblican
forces had recently Sh01:n improvement there '..,ere signs that they were losing
the s u p p o ~ t of the l1ative r-opulation. He attributed this largely to the
failure of an atteo:flt cy the Masjoem:1. to rally the MUslim inhabitants of
East Java in a "Holy \'i':ll'" ag':l. ~nst the j)utch. This had occurred some time
towards the end of Augt1.st anj,bince then the Republicfo influence with the
native population hac. been d.;lc1dedly on the wane.
(b) Po:':!. t:!.cal- - ~ ... -~--
17. The main pro1Jlem which the Dutch ha.ve to fa.ce in the political field is
how to secure the voluntary c o ~ o p e r a t i o n of the inhabitants. In all' the
places where we l~d direct contact with Indonesian officials we found that
the degree of co-operation varied in direct proportion to themaasure of
security Which the Dutch' '-Tere able to give. The' ''Famong Pradja" (Indonesian
Civil SerVice) and the ''Polisi Negara" (General ReIlublican Police force)
have been retained by the Dutch and a:1"e functioning well in the areas that
have been pacified. The Republican political parties r ~ v e also been allowed
to continue and the Dutch have found that their existence farilitates the
task of administration since they help to ensure a better balance between
the traditionally conservative outlook of the old feudal chiefs and the more
progressive tendencies of the younger and more politically-minded seneration
of Indonesians. Each town has its o ~ m "Badan Penlak:' lan Rak,jet" or local
representative body, elected by ali the political parties, and leaflets
e x p l a i n i r ~ the elementary principles of democratic government have been
prepared ~ ~ d are being d i a t r i b u t e ~ in the towns and villages.
18. In our conversation with Indonesian officials we' asked a number of set
9.uestions. Here they sa.tisfied with existing ccnditions1 IIad these
conditions b ~ e n bet-r:.er or i'1OrSe before the Dutch Police Action'? Hhat were
their relations with the local DUtch authorities and how did they feel
towards the RepUblican Government" in Djocja1 The answer was invariably that
they we7e not happy with the eXisting State of affairs and they did not feel
at home. They were RepUblicans first and foremoJt and would like to see the
IDutch go just
• " •• , • ~ .. • - • • • I'll • •• \
'. ... ' . ..' .. ' .' . \
s/~je6
Pace 34
I... - . , ...
• I. V ,..", • • •. , . .• 11 • • ..
D u t ~ ~ 30 just as soon as a proper Republican police force could be formDd
'\Tith enough men and etlUipllent to talce over the dut.Les of ruaintaining ImT and
order. Control fl"otl Djocja had been, and would be 'luits ade'luate r;rovidecl
the Lutch forcas w i t h d r ~ w ~ Above all, they would liko to hnv? theil" Crln flac
and their own currency. They were not in the least afraid to GO to D ~ o c j a ,
if an opportunity were given them. In fa.et they would like to do so in order
to explain their difficulties. On August 6th the Republican Government had
issued instructions to all its o f f i c ~ a l s in the occupied areas not to
co-operate With the Dutch. Those had been obeyod by some, notably at
Bondowoso, where they had all been relieved of th0ir posts by the Dutch. In
other :9laces, however, the instructions '\'1ere beinG ignored. At Modjokerto
for example, nearly all responsible Indonesia.ns \'1ere no~'T co-operating
Wholeheartedly '\'1ith the Dutch. Huch depended on the personality and conduct
of the officials concerned. Their position wa3, of course, extremely difficult
and the moral cOltflict to Which they were beinc subjected had to be respected.
They were technically servants of the Republic, but were nevertheless
forbidden by the Dutch to communicate direct with Djoc,ja. He were informed
that although the Indonesian officials had been forbidden to communicate With
Djocja, they were able to do so in practice by means of a special line which
had been left open 1'0:::- them through ModJokerto and Djombang. Communication
by telephone has also been permitted from time to tlllle. Moreover, they were
being paid by the N.E.I. Government in Nica guilders and not with Republican
money. Some, who could afford to do so, had refused to accept any salary;
others were being paid in ~ d v a n c e at the rate of one half of t l ~ i r salary
plus ten Nica gUilders a month, as a loan on behalf of the Republican
Government. The Dutch R e s i d e ~ t at Modjokerto told us that, on the Whole,
this syotem was wor!ting well, but unfortunately insufficient materials
(textiles etc) were being suppliod to absorb the extra Nica guilders thus
being put into circulation. In the more remote Kampongs (Villages) the
people were less wil1L1g to accept Dutc4 money for fear of reprisals. No
official rate of exchQn(Je has yet ·ceen fixed in East Java for the Nieu.
gUilder and the Republican rupee.
19. From the impressions ''le Gained from our tovu.· and from the numerous
contact::! we made with Dutch and Indonesian officials on the ',Tay vTe have
reached the conclusion that three essGXltial conditions must 1e observed if
the Dutch are to succeed in gaining the full confidence and co-operation of
the Indonesian pop'.l.lation of East Java, They must in the first case be given
some iefini te assurance that the day of their freedom and independence is not
far off. Early peroission to fly the R e ~ u b l i c a n flag over their offices and
public buildings would be an encouraging step in this direction. S e c o n ~ l y ,
/the Dutch must give
S!')b6
P ~ L ; e 35
the Dutch must gIve 9,11 assurance that. the.. economic :t'Qsition which Ind?nesians
ha're acquired in the lifa of the couIltry, during the last few years will be
res:pected and. that there wl1lbe·no discrimination against them in the
economic field. Thil'dly, there m u ~ t be security at' life and property against
reprisals. This, ~ " e thinlc, can best be done by training and equiPIJing as
soon as IJossible an Indonesian police force to assume resIJonsibility for Imf
and order. l\Il experiment on these lines is, we understand, already being
made with considerable success i ~ Nadura, Where the Dutch Recomba (Governmen.t
Commissioner for Civil Affairs) for East Java has recently concluded. an
agreement with t h ~ Republican Resident.
(c) ~ ~ . _
20. E c a n o m 1 c a l ~ · , East Java is shevring siGns of recovery. Though a number
of factories have peen destroyed milling has in most places started again,r '" ,-.
tl~ rice IJroducin3'area around SidoardJo which suffered so severely at the
beginning of this year by the opening of the sluice gates across the Brantas
and Poreng rivers, has now been reclaimed and replanted with fresh crops;
food is comparatively plentifUl and conmnUlications are improving with the
gradual :P9.cU'lcatlon of the country. The large sugar mill at DJatiroto, Which
before the War employed over 23,000 peoIJle, is expected to be operating again
early next year. Many of its emIJloyees, who bolted when the first Dutch
trooIJs arrived, have since returned and 800 of them have already bean
re-employed. The hospital there is also worldne well under Indonesian
management. The paper factory at LetJes, Which before the war employed
300 peopla and had an output of.' 400 tons a lIlOnth, will be started again
within six months. The RepuJlican forces attempted to destroy it, but Dutch
marines arrived in time to put out the fire and save the factory from any
major damage. The sugar experimental station at Pasoeroean is ~ t i l l standing,
but its library l'.as been completely gutted by fire. Extensive damage has
been done at 1!.a.lang ar.d other smller IJlt1.ces which we visited. Bridges are
in process of being repaired and communications generally are imprOVing.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
21. ( ~ ) a 3 ~ S O Fire Order e It Is obvious that neither the Dutch nor the
I n d o u ~ 3 : a n forces cun observe the cease fire order in View of the
i n s t : t ' L ~ ~ T , i r . : . r ..;J ~'hi:::h they a!"o ac ting under.
22. (b) ~ t i l i t a r y . The military situation is confused OWing to tbo fact
that Re!iUblican forces are occupying, and are ac:tiYely engaged in carrying
on mil1tar;y activit0S ~ i t h i n , the area.s claimed by the Dutch as nrn" under
their res:POnslbility for the m9.1nten8nce of lay, and order. The scorched
earth policy adopted by the Indonesians has boen applied extensively and
has resulted in very groat da.."1Elge to property, nCrm':ll services tmd
communicu.tions.
/23. (c) Political
~ ~, ,~ , ,.~ ,.. " .' . : " ,,' ~ . .., " .' .. '. , '.' ,':' " , ,~:"
S/5r36Pase 36
23. (0) Political. 'A serious attempt i ~ being mado.by the Dutch in
the areas which they have occupied to encourage Indonesian officials to
carry on the administration, but only under Dutch control and Without
communication from Republican h e a d ~ u a r t e r s at Djocja. T h ~ administration
is being conducted by these officials as well as possible in the
circumatances, but without enthusiasm.
24. (d) E c o n o m ~ c . Food 1s a d o ~ u a t e , but there is a great shortage
of textiles, and druBS and medieines for Indonesian hospitals.
(signed) C. Eaton
Australian Consul-General
( signed) E. LambertDeputy nr1tish Consul-General
•
BA'I'AVIA
September l 4 t h ~ 1947•
/ APPENDIx: III
. . . ", .' . '. ... . , \. . . ',. .;, .\
S/586Page 31
.APPErrorl III
R e ~ o r t of M r ~ Tsiang Chia-tuns. Consul Generel of C h i r ~ ,
£nd Mr. V ~ d e r s t i c h e l e n , Consul General of B e l G i ~ ,
on Their Trips to B U 1 ~ e n z o r 6 , T j i ~ a d a k ,
Soekaboemi, and Tasikmalaya
I. Buttenzorg
We left B a ~ a v 1 a on September 10, 1941, at 9:00 a.m. and proceeded to
B u i t e ~ z o r g by. car. There",e visited the headquarters of the 1st Brigade
of the 7th December Div.is'ion I;lnd were met by Colonel Thompson ~ d officers
of his staff.
We were t o l ~ that, in the very extensive area in which the Brigade
operates,. mopping up of the remnants of Indonesian troops ('l'.N.Ie, Laskjar,
Hizbullah, etc.) was proceeding very fast and would be completed within the
next t"!'o or three months. Most oif the Republican troops, consisting chiefly
of irregulun, are trying ~ o get through the demarcation line (aa d ~ f i n e d
by Dr. van Mook) to Bantam, where la,e Indonesian forces appear to be
concentrated at t ~ e m o m e n ~ .
At BUitenzorg conditions are o n c ~ more nor.ma1 - practically no Dutch
troops are· stationed in the town i tseJ.f, o r d ~ r being maintained by a small
civil police made up of Indonesians. A Javanese mayor directs. municipal
affairs.
:.,'"
II. TJibadok
At Tjibadak we :qud an interview with the controller, Mr. Hamm, whose
district comprises about l25,OOu inhabitants. The population is co-operating
in the work of a d m i n i e t r a t i v ~ and economic rehabilitation, but remains
anxious on account of the exactions of some two hundred terrorists' who still
operate in the. district; among these, a. few Japanese my still be found. The
inhabitants demand ar,rna 00 as to be able to protect the Villages f r ~ the
nightly incursions of these terrorists.
We were present at the weekly meeting of all h e ~ d s of Villages in the
distr1c.t, num.bering a.bout forty. ThiA reunion ",as prbsided over by the
Hedc.na and 4 Assistant Wedanas. He ~ere given the opportunity to question
. these people, no Dutchman, either military' or civilian, being present.
The outcople of this ' n q t l i ~ r ,shows that the only desire of the population
is ,to be allowed to work in lleace and safety, ~ . , i t h o u t feel' of pillage or
violence. To the e n q , u i ~ J as to "hat they usually do .,hen terrorists come
to their village, they replied that they were afraid to report to the Dutch
authority.
YTe Here informed that in certain villages u g~Edj percontage of the
rnele population had been deported. by Jepunese as Romushas and never returnedb
IAs a. result
,', , • ' :, ' " " ,,' , ' ~ I, " .,.', . '~",. ~ ." ,': ",' .' ,.. ' ..
8/536Page 38
::;.: : :.: ·
.... ; ..
As a result of this draining of slave workers, and on account of the high
death rate caused by malaria under Japane,se occupation, conditions are
difficult O.n a certain kampong onl; one "heaithi inan s·urvived) •. '•• I • •
The Chinese representatives of the Chinese community at Tjlbadak
reported as follows:
"Beginning from 2300 hours on the 21st of July, 1947, the
Indonesians started to set fire to Qhinese shops and houses,
destroying in total 38 buildings, including 3 godowns. The
'destruction in places around'Tjibadak was also intensive, involving
houses, shops, c o d o ~ m s , and factories, very fe"1, however, of My
military importance. When the Indonesians started their incendiary
"Tork, they told the people to stay inside the houses, but we managed
to'escape through the back d o o r s ~ That's'how we were lucky to be
alive nm'T.
"The Dlitch arrived at 1400..1500 hours on the 22nd of JUly.
Since then some Indonesians still tried to infiltrate and loot
and bum.
"For two years lU1der the Republican GOvernment, the Republican
troopa exacted whatevel they wanted from the Chinese population.
The Chinese Association (Chung Hua TSlU1g Hui) had to arrange with
the Republican troops and other organis9,tions for 'Thole scale'
"offerings" in order to avoid individual extortion."
In contrast with the p e a c ~ f u l and calm attitude of the population in
the regions under Dutch control since the end of 1946, it is striking to note
the timorous and frightened bearing of the people in those regions but
recently brOUght back to Dutch administration.
EverJWhere we have been able to observe destruction, devoid of any
m:l.litary purpose, perpetrated et random by RepUblican forces, regular and
irregular, before their retreat. We have seen rubber, tapioca, tea factories
and rice mills entirely burnt do.m, and we have been assured that even a
Dessa-school was Wiped out. Numerous plantations have been destroyed, either
the trees .Tere cut dmm or else the bark .TOS peeled off at the foot.
Ill. Soekaboemi
He left Tjibadak at 1500 hours and arrived at Soelcaboemi at 1600 hours.
There we met the Dutch military cOIllIlllJ.nder, Overate van LeomT, the Assistant
Resident, Wempe, and the Indonesian Regent, Reden Hilman DJaJadiningrat, a f t e ~
which we saw the representatives of the Chinese community who gave the
follol1inc report:
"At about 07: 00 houro on the 21st of July, 1947, the .Indonesian
troops and policemen Guarded all the street corners 'and prevented all
Indoneoiane from entering the to\m. Three representatives of the Chinese
/Association
· ...; , " . . . \ ,#'., ; , .', I ' ..' • > '" • ',..... • ',. .. :" • '\ '
~ . . -
s/5e6PeGe 39
... :- ;..
Association (Tsur:g ITui) uere sent to the mHitary corumandel' of the
Republican army to request him not to destroy C h i ~ e s o p l ~ p o r t y . The
Chief of Staff received them and gave them the assurance that the
RepUblican alny would protect life and property of all foreiGll residents
in Soekaboemi. About 09:00 hours, however, they started the
destructions, beginning with the post ..of'fice and, later on, most of the
Chinese buildings. Both the Indonesian police and troops il1th about 10
or more Japanese took part in this destruction work. They first drove
all inhabitants out of their houses and then set f'ire by using benzine
and bombs. LootinG went on at the same time. This destruction continued
until 19:00 hours of the same day ilhen the Indonesians fled on the
approach uf the Dutch troops "'Ilho entered Soekaboemi at 20: 00 hours •
Some buildings were saved from beinG destroyed by briberJ'. Fortunately
no life was lost and the Chinese "l'lere n,ob forced to evacuate.
"Conditions in and around Soekaboemi after the Dutch occupation is
still unsafe. The Chinese are much worried because of the ~ c t i v i t i e s of
terrorist·s even in the immediate environa of the "tmm. There are frequenl
infiltrations into the city itself. The Indonesians threatened them by
spreading rumours that if the Republican army come back they will kill al:
Chinese, so the Chinese request that their safety must b ~ first guarantee(
before the Dutch troops withdraw.
"Tllere are now nearl.y 1800 Chinese refugees in Soekaboemi, 300 of
i-Them are from surrounding areas. Their chief difficulty is nO"l'l shortage
of rice. The rice allO"l'lo.nCe from the Dutch Red Cross is only one ounce
per person per day.
"Before the Indonesians started to d ~ s t r o y , all Chinese ovmers of
goods such as tea and l ~ b b e r were made to register such with the
I ~ d o n e s i a n Government. The authorities then marked all the places where
these goods wel"e stored to facilitate "':heir destruction '·lork."
"'ITe drove around 80ekaboemi and Sl?W the damage done there. Besides some
public bUildings, Chinese properties in Soekaboemi destroyed. number 296
shops, 5 textil0 mills, 7 rice -mills and 25 godo"l'n1s. liTe also visited
Tjipanengah, about 4 kilometers outside Soelmboemi, '.There tl rice mill and a
",eavi~lg factory were o\.l.mt dO'dn in broad dayliGht on the 9th of September, the
day befo:ce vFe arrived •. The Indones:lans on this occc,sion looted the houee of,
Hrs. 'r2.n Tek Lie and ldlled her and her 80n-1.n·13.'·T.
As to the administratior., cccording to statements 01' the Indonesian
Regent, Raden Djajadin"inGrat anc'!. the repres.:mtative of' the Recomba, things
vTen t aa f .::>llO'i's :
IOn July 24, 1947
I:,
-, . . ., ' . . - .' ~" . '~':.' .' (),- - .' " "
On JU1~r 24, 1947, the civil administration, set up by the Dntch for
the Regency of Soekaboemi and consisting of represente.tives of the
Recomba, the Departments of Social Affairs (also in charge of the Red
Cross), Economic Affairs, Finances, Transpol't, Irrigation, etc., arrived
in Soekaboemi.
In the afternoon of the same day, the Representative of the Recomba
(the Assistant Resident, Hempe) conta.cted the Republican town
administration, and the following monling, the Republican Regency
AdD.inistration. '
After a few' preperatory discussions, during w'hic11 the ,-11sh of the
Netherlands Government was exposed strongly in view to create, as soon
as possiole, a proper Indonesian administration in these 1 ~ c i o n 8 , withi",
the scope of the Linggerdjati Agreement, all ex-Republican officials.declared themselves prepared to enter into tempora17 government service
for the sake of the country and people, until such time as the new form
of Government and its heads were chosen by the people.
Thus the continuance of all vital functions, such as irrigation,
veterinary service, agrictutural i n f o ~ t i o n , fisheries, municipal works
sanitary services and educational work could be guaranteed, while the
~ T o r 1 C of co-operative reconstruction could begin.
After the 4th of Agust (cease fire order) many 01' these Indonesian
officials went back on their "TOrd and immediately ~ of:, '.>"lcame apparent
that all 'l-lho collaborated with the Dutch w'ere thl'e:" :,:ep:;;i to be
murdered by isolated elements of the T.N.I:
The kidnapping on August 6 of Soekaboemi's Indonecian mayor, Raden•
Soeria lloedaye (later rescued near Njailindoeng by Thltch troops),
tosether with the prohibition of the Republican Minister of Home Affairs
to collaborate in any WJ.y 'l-Tith the Dtuch, made the reality of this
death menace so cleer that all of t h e ~ immediately stopped working once
more, leavins the population to shift for itself.
vlhile measures 'IoTere being taken to continue the "\-1Or1: of
:=.dministro.tion "T1th nm-1 Indonesian officials, or without them if need
be, the Dutch succeeded, on the 9th of August, in getting them all back
to ~ T O r k by formall,Y cOJ:lI!lj;) 11ding them to do so.
It ';ias necessary to proceed in this mamler so as to release these
men from any responsibility towards the Republic, whose detrimental
attitude to'lorards the cour.tr<J end the population ",as disapproved by
most of them.
Up to this day, "1i th veJ:'J fe~T exceptiono, the wOl"1c is still being
calried on by them. The Indor.esi::.n recent further said that the
Republicans ',Tere not in e position to protect the various groups of the
/poplllation
, .' . .' .' ..... ~
• - '. a'- " • • sI : • _ .~ • \" .t.I ,
8/:-e6Pago 41
population, lThether Chinese, Europeans, Arab s or Indones ians against
exactions comuitted by their troops, irregular or r e G ~ l a r . Because of
the e:-:actior..s 1TJ1de by the extre.llists, the opinion of the mass of the
people is:;·.ll''Iling a g : ~ _ i n s t the Repu':>lic. Further, political ar,ite.tions
that were verJ active u n ~ 8 r tee nepublican regime have now entirely
ceased.,
\'le left Soekaboemi at 1 4 ~ s o hours via r:l:j::'andojoer. On the i'Thole
trip from Bata-via to Soeb.'.'bo0Dli and. back, Tt10 see in many places repair
work being carried out on the roai and we obsel~e practically no
military l!lo'/O!1erlt.
.......... ;.:
IV v ~£ ..;~':_~~
~~ left Batavia at 08:00 hour3 on the 12th of 33ptember, 1947, for
Bandoeng by plane and arrived thel'e at 08:30 hours 0 He TtTere received by the
representative of the n e c o w ~ a of ; ~ 3 ~ Java, Mr. Mors:!._~c and the Resident of
Bandoeng, Mr. van ~ e r Earst. 1ie arranged. to pay a flying visit to
Tasikmalaya in a 6:pec~.n.: plane provid.ed. by the :::>utch authorities and return
again to ~ a n d o e n g in the afternoon to visit surrounding areas. We had. to
fly to Tas1kmalaya because the road betlTeen Bandceng and Tasilcna1aya TtTas
not safe.
We left B ~ ~ d o e n g at 09;00 hours and arrived in Tasikmalaya at 09:30
hours where we were received by the, controller and the representative of the
military commander. At 09:45 hours t.J.'. Tsiang went to meet the
representatives of the Chinese community in Tasilonalaya while Mr.
Vanderstichelen remained to talk with the officers and. some Luxembourg
citizen? The foJ-lQlling is the report of the Chinese represen.j.atives:
It Cond.itions had allmys been difficult in Tasikma.laya during the
Republican regime, under which we were not alloi-Ted to use the Chinese
language for correspondence. Indonesian troops took houses and goods
from us ~ T h e n e v e r and vlherever ·they_ 11Wltod. Af'ter ~ h e ast of July I
1947, TtTe were af~aid every day that hostilities i'Tould come to our part,
but nothing happened. At 16:00 hours on the 3rd of August, the
Republican militarJ authorities ordered us to concontrate in 6 houses.
Ho looting took p l ~ c e then. At 01:00 hours in the night, the Republican
t r o o ~ s started destruction of, first, governmont properties, and, t h e n ~
Chinese shops and houoes. Immediately our re)resentatives requested the
R e ~ u b l i c c . i . 1 euthori ties not to burn the vhole lot and. they agreed to
ellot a smnll erea as a security zone. Most houses and shops outside
this zone 11ere first looted and then burnt. He i·rere not a110TtTed to save
anything on threat of beinG shot on the spot. AltOGether 225 Chinese
bUildinGo, including Chinese schools, were burnt, but the houses in the
securi ty zone iTere left alone. Some other buildinGS TtTere also spared
/throul3h
~.' i' '. .. ' • • • • • •
. ._ I.. I
~,.. '" • • If • •
8/526Faga u2
........ ;.. : ; .
throuGh bribe17. For the safety of the security zone, the ChineGe
Association paid over altoGether R.60,oOo.
"Fire continued until the arrival of the Dutch troops on the
9th of August. There 'I'las no resistance and the Indonesians fled. into
the mountains. All the food. S'::C':"3d. 1.:1. the Chinese shops "iere destroyed
by fire and so Tasih:Jr1.nle.?8. is in Great short:l(;c of food supplies. The
Indonesians do not CODe to the city to sell food and so we are
absolutely dependent on t81p from outside.
"Every day ,thers aro in:f'il'Cl"ations into the city by Indonesians and
they loot and b1t!'n whenever t h e ~ r have a c~e..'1ce. !v1e.ny Chinese in pl:::.ces
outside Tasikma1aya are s t ~ l l ~ L s s ~ n g a ~ d have not been found. The road
bet'l'Teen Tasikmalaya and Bandoeng is under constant fire of the
Rept.lb11can troops and only ~ n i ' t o . r y c c m Y o ~ r s can 1)(;1.33 through."
He toured the to\offi and sa'\oT that "Tl th few' exceptions the '\oThole European
Q.uarter ,.,as also burnt dO'\om. 1;..'hi1e ':re , ..er!) in th':l city, tlTO houses ,.,ere
destroyed. Accord.ing to the Dutch cc:mnauder of Tasikmalaya, it may take him
three to six months to clear up his areas of extrem"lsts. No Indonesian Tilas
seen anY1'There 0 Fields are left unattended although rich crops of paddy· are
waiting to be harvested, the population being prevented from coming back by
the Indonesian troops in surrounding areas. •
. He returned to Bandoeng by air as ,re ,Tere advised by the military
not to r i s k u s i ~ G the road. We al~'ived at Bandoeng at about 14:00 hour3
and started almost immediately for Penggalengan by car. We visited
Penggalengan and Tjhride.j and returned to Bandoeng at 18:30 hours. In
Penggalengan we saw the remains of a laree tea and Q.uinine factory. We saw
very felT people working in the fields and most of the houses we passed '\o;e:::-e
closed~
He fle'\o7 back to Batavia. the follol'Ting morning end a.rrived at Kemajoran
at 09:45 hours.
. Batavia, September 14th, 1947.
Vander Stlchelen
Consul General of Belgium
Ts ial~g Chia..Tung
Consul General of China
/ APPErmrx. IV
\ "' eo " •• • • :;.... .... '.. ' .. .. '
'. ,
",'
\,. ,.
S/586Pc.gc 43
Visit to D j o c J a k a ~ a by Mr. F. M. SheEherd
and Mr. C. A. L1 vengood
ioJ'e arrived at D ~ o c : ' j a k a r t a aerodrome at 10.4'5 hours on the morning of
September 17th and were met by the Vice-Premier, Dr. Setydjit, and various
other Republican officials.
2. In the course of t ~ e morDtng we were received by the President and the
Prime Minister at the Palace. In view of the despatch of Military Observers
to disturbed areas we thought it best to confine that ~ a r t of our activities
in Djocjakarta which had. reference to the Consular Commission, to the ~ u e s t i o n
of conditions prevailing 'vi t h i ~ the area controlled. by the Republic. HaVing
intimated this desire to the Prime Minister an interview was arranged for the
afterno..-n which ,,;.;as attended by no less than thirteen members of the Cabinet.
We ,,;-rere invited to put aI'.y ~uestlons we ";vished to the meeting.
3. i-le had already ascE::rtained that in the Republican view the "cease :fire"
meant that troops should not only atop shooting but should remain where
they were. This applied, of course, to both Dutch and Indonesian troops
and it f o l l ~ w e d that if the Dutch troops were to approach Indonesian
positions with hostile intent the Indonesians would be called upon to defend
themselves. This was in fact the position. Although Indonesian troops were
situated at points behind the "Van Mook" demarcation line (this was not
recognized, by the Republic) th8 RepUbliC recognized that the Dutch were
entitled to the free use of the roads forming lines of communication with
their defencG posts" ahrays provided that the lstter were those held on
the date of the "oease fire" order. The R'Jpublic did not considel' that it
was Cl practicable pr':lposi tion to ett.;mpt to define e dofinite demarcation
line in view of the coni'ust3d situnticn of Dutch and Indonesian Units.
4. W8 raised the ~ u e s t i o n of the Civil administration within the area
taken oyer. by th0 Dutch as a result of th': Police Action or in disputed
areas c.s El result of tho formulation of the "Van Mo;)k" line. It hod been
s t ~ t c d by the Republic that the Dltch w e r ~ d ~ s t r o y i n g Republican civil
a d m i n i s t r ~ t i o n with ~ view to thG eventual d ~ s t r u c t i o n of th0 Republic
i t::wlf'. The m..... ~ ting confirmed thst tlwir view ';lCS that RtJpubliccn civil
inst:!. tutions w(;rQ b.jing l i ~ u i d E l t 0 d a.nd tbt in c o n s : J ~ u c n c ' .... I:1don8sian civil
officials hed been instructGd not t.) co-operat0 wl th thl:; Dutch. Wc
suggvstcd that pOGsicly some bittGrncso might be e ~ m i n a t c d if it wcro
possible to come to F'ome arra..'1gement w:th the !X,tc'h for the l'1'Orking of the
clvil administration within the disputed areas. Th:; ~Jinisters appeared to
think that this mibht not be impnssi ble but th8Y p'Jinted out c€rtc:dn
/difficulties ,ofitt
,.: : .
............., "
•
dlfficnlties Hith reBard to the security of tenure and payment of salaries,.~ ...to);· ,y ~lls() pointed out that ?epublican official sh,"'uld be entitled to fly
the c.,c gublicon flug end that i.t: s,hould be open to schools fu'l.d other
insti tutions to sing the R e p ~ b l i c a : n , ~ a t i o n a l Anthem.
5. ThC' only other point in connection ~ ' T i t h the "cease fire" that Has
taken up on this 0ccus10n'wan that of the scorchfd earth policy. It was, . . ,
p~)inted. out to the: Ir.donesians that the result of this policy \l'Ould be more
11armful to the Republic itself than to an;;rbody else. The l>Unisters were
not pre!JarGd entirely to deny t ~ l i s but said that they were determined that
rather than all."'T the Dutch forces t.:- advance on Djccjakarta they would be
preparp.d to carry out the scorched earth policy since they regarded the
principle of freedom as more i~p'0rtant than any economic loss which
mi3ht result from the destructLm I)f planta.tions. One of the Ministers
p o i ~ l t e d out that it would be qui ta possible for the population of Java tc
live more or less as they were acoustomed to in the past w ~ t h o u t the
participation of the Foreign estates in the national economy. In this
connection it ',TaB found that in a sugar estate we visited on the following. .day wood. was piled in the administration building ready for destruction by
. . .
firo ,.,hile it was allvged that preparations had been made for dynamiting
the foctory. Our impression wos that the administration had, in fact, .
reached the point where it wes determined to carry out the scorched earth
policy if an attack on Djocjakarta was launched., .
6. The Mini.sters complained about their isolation from the rest of the, ,
world; the Dutch NDval blockade; the lack of imports caused thereby,.....
especially textiles and tyres mid tn~ difficulty of carrying un an efficient
economy ',Then they "Tere not able ·to export the ra,,, materials which they had
in store.
7. It is relevant in connection with conditions in and around the
RepUblican capital that a certafn om()unt of what might be described as
" ~ v a r fever" ~ , ! e , s in evidence, it was clear that determination to secure.a free
rGpublic end e n t h u G i a s ~ for the creation of a Government which might be
described as really Indonesian is cer.tered at D j ~ c j a k a r t 8 . It is also
clear that this enthusiasm is being carefully fostered end that any
concessiJns by the RepUblic' '''ill have to be mode with great care with
this condition in mind.
8. F~r the r8st we were a b l ~ to confinn the observatisns made in the
report made by Messrs. Eat,m and Faux on September 7th, Si"' far GS they
applied to the Situation at Djocjakorto.(Signed) Charles A. tivengood
American C o ~ l - Q e n a r a l
( ~ : a . g n e d )..L...M. _§.ill3:..;;p:.:::h~e.:..rd:::-. _
British C o n s u l ~ e n e r a lBNrAVIA.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - ~
.; . .; .
8/586Fc.C0 45
A:?P:2!EIX V
Renort. on VLGi t to SVJDS12:.a 1)1 Gcn.r.iulo-Oane:,'o,l RaLtx (Fl."ance);------------- -- -- .' -------E"'tc'" (1\·,,';"a1';a) "':1'1 T"illJ1Je"'"- (~l';'''''~n)....:::;-'_..~.-:~:.:.:--=-~ .. ~~..:...:::.. -'-~-=--:-
7+': -n'.o"""y~:,:.::.:::..:.:...
LGe.vil1€ Ef,TA'tIA ea:dy on Tuesday mer.!i.ir1[i, Se:9~e!1J.ber 16tn s e.::d travelling
in a ~.A.A.F. Dakota aircraft, ~ " , e covered ~ h e f o l l m T i r ~ 3 iti.?:8rer:r=
S e ' [ l t e r r ~ : ) , 3 l ' 0 ' C ~ - ~o .?A:I.:S1Jl9ANG. 7isit to ;3 ,r' .111. Oil F.efi!lery at IJIA.DJOE and
lunch '\'iith t!.ttl ~ , i l l . : ; , . c . g i : : ; g Director. T ~ · . } ' l w '\'11:::1. the local D " l t C ~ l and
Inc1cnesian officia:"s ir. t ~ 2 e evening, aJ..3o l1ith rOIlresentati'lGs of the
Chinose and Briti8h ~ ~ d i n n c o m r . ~ ~ ~ t i o s .
S e l ' l t e ~ J l b ~ ~ _ 1 7 t h - '20 ?AD.'JYiG. Iilfletir:3 "rith Dt..tch Civil Military £l.uthv:i:'ities
in ~ h o To'l":.! ITa1l on aj;'ri"lal. After 1'.-'nch visited the local r:u::.-ke·:; J textile
f a c t o ~ J a!ld l:ospi'bal, then fu:oove to the Cr:)J.;)f'nc Factory at DlDARONG" 14 lans·.
from, J?_\DJ~rr3-. In t!.'.e eV'e:n.lnc tc.lko with Ini.1.onosic..."'l I·1ayQX' cnd Chinese and
British Indian representati'l6o.
September 18th - To EUKrl' T:NGO! (FORT DE K;:lrJIC). Intervie1'1 a"t 11 a.m.. with
Dr. Mohammed IIA'IJrA, Vic:e~President of the Indonesian Republic, follb"'ed by
talks with Chinese and British Indian representatives and by avlsit to
the local hospital, also to a secondary girls r school. Before luncli
witnessed a mass demonstration from the Vico.PresidentVs house and received
a message of welcome from members of the National Committee. In the
afternoon visited the local marke'c and drcveto PADilliG PANDJ,A!'IG to see the
Adat Rouse and School of . ~ t s . The t'Iofo British Military Observers who
accompanied us visited part of the Republican front near SOLOK.
Se'[lterober 19th - To MEDAN. Talks on e.rrival ,·rlth D U t C ~ 1 ClvU and £.1.1li tar~l
authorit.ies. After lunoh viai'ced the hospital at BINDJEI and TMJDJONG
MOHA.VTA (SENEHBAB: r-t..IJ). On return talks vli th Indanesian officials, some
of "lhom 'fere co-operating 'I'lith the Dutch and others lrho had refused to' do
so. The Milito.ry Observers visited the front at BRAST.AGI.
September 20th - To·SINGAPORE.
S?ptember 21st - Returned to BATAVIA arrivir~ shortly before noon.
~ b n n g
P')litical
1. The Dutch Reoid.ent of PAI.EI1BANG, Dr. HIJ:NM!\LEN, informed U3 that on
July 21st when the police action began the Republicen Vice-Governor of
Sumatra, Dr. ISA , and seme 6,000 of' his collElagues "rere im'Hed to co-operate
in maintaining lml and order under Dutch suporvis'ir.m. They agreed to do
60 on a temporary basis pending instructions from the Republican Government.
/Tne a ~ n i s t r a t i o n
.:', ....
.:: '.:'.'
8/586PO-ge 46
The ad""; nistration continued to l T o : c : ~ smoothly in this me.!lner ~;i th only -:'
fe~'; caGes of int.ir:idu·tiol'l and oostructiion from. ?epuoli~cn agents t:.."ltil
A~lGu::rt :::1.8-(; '.;hun Dr. SJAI",IFt,1J:iD:;'1J, t~1e Republican Premier, l:::-oadcast
instruetions to a.E R5publi .Jan offi·:;1.als to C'3':.8e co-operation i';ith the
Dutch. A ~ o u t ti.;o-thir-ds of the offj.cials, incluriing D:c. ISA, obeyed these
instructio!1s at o::lce, bu'h many hr-we since rest:.!r.od their
duties unde..~ Di.rtwh conJ,jro.l., 'l'b.ey have done so for the :;'QllOi·r1.:15
rop..'=!ona ~
(a) c e ~ a u s e they had no other means of livelihoJd;
(b) because they ~ · ; e r e attracted by tlle Dutch rationing sr;b.eme
for food, c l o t h i ; . ~ , etc.;
(c) because i ~ ' ~ e r e s t was bsing a..'oused in a new movoment ~ong
the naJ;;ive ir..b.at:!.tn.nts (see paragraph 36 be1m·; ) •
2. The Resident added tllat Dr. IS..'\. had meani.,hile been placed under house
arrest. 'l"he Dut0;1. had deteoted hi.Jl ~:l tb.e act of sending financial
assistance (65,000 Japanese roepias = ~.E.I. f3,250) to R 9 p u b l i ~ a n troops
who i'Tere i'Tithout money and food. ~ { ~ sought an interview' with Dr. I8A and
heard his case. lie confirmed the R e e i d e : 4 l t ~ s account of what had 1s.ppened
since July 21st and explained that before Dr. 8JARIFUDDI1r's broadcast he
had aimed at,being an lIintcrnedierylt between the Dutch and his mm people.
lie added that the Dutch had introduced a law to enforce work and that some
of those who refused to obey had been interned. A few had been deported to
T.ANJ)JO:NG KAPMfG in the LAL\lPONGS. They had been taken to the frontier and
left to walk the remaining distance. He admitted that he himself had been
t 1 7 i ~ ~ to assist the T.R.I., who were operating on the boundary near
PRABOEMOELI and were short of rice and money. His colleague, the Minister
of Islam Affaire, was also under house arrest but they were both being well
treated and were permitted to have a radio receiving set.
Military
3. A fuller report on the ~ l i l i t a r y situation in the various parts of
8 v ~ a t r a which we visited has been prepared by the two British Military
Observers, who accomp~lied us on our tour, and ferms an appendiX to this
report.
Economic
4. The Oil Refineries at PLADJOE and SOENGEI GERONG lie to the eaot of
P A ~ , f i h ~ « } on the riGht barue of the MOE8I River und crude oil is piped to
them. from fields to the west and north which nair lie within Dutch occupied
territory. The PLAWOE Refiner'J (B. P. M. - BATAA.FSc:IIi!: PETROLEUM ;'IAAT8CILA..PPIJ),
which we Visited, resumed operations on October IGt 1946 with about one-third
of its pro-war plant and is expected to be restored to its full ccpacity
/by the end of
S/586PaGe 47
by the end of tho yC'ar. It is ! l O ~ ' 1 producing mo Gor gasoline ~ ( e : : : ' o s a ~ 1 e ,
fuel oil c.nd ci.iesel oil; 8.V'iatiou spi!-it ~ ' l i ~ 1 also be produced ~ . ; i thin a
fe"l months. Since the };lolice action crulle oil !::tas :"een · o r O l : 0 . 2 ~ from the
oil field.s at FHABOTIlliQEL! i.rhicn, to(!:etJ19:: ~ l i th t . ~ e oil frOl:!. t·;:;"-=: r i£1 Dorneo,
has reEeved tIle ::eceasit;,{ of c::l",'i::.g oil · t ; ! ' ' 3 . . : l S p o ~ a d b ~ ' t e . d : ~ r ::-ro!1l -:he
Hidd1e East. Tae Dutch had feared. extensiV'e damage ~'1ou1ci. be d O ~ 1 e to the
oilfields, bt:.t •..."~en their kco];,s a..-::':!.vei on , 1 ~ J ' 21:3t t~~y found. tr.0:':l
comparat.iY61:i' intac·t. '1";\'0 da':7S le:;;er, t ~ c ~ ~ e Y e r , foi4' s ~ . ; ~ " J . l ~ l s l } . s 'i'6re sst
on fire by Republican irrogulars op€lX'2.tir.lf,; ::.r.D.l1 PE:IDOE~; these w,:)1'e soon
extinguj ~ h e d . Some sabot.'l.ge was also a t . " : ; ' 7 ~ · : . i e ' i at, the T ; ' : ~ . r . 1 ! : ; ' :.Jr.-I.;' oilfields
near F P . A B C ~ ~ C : r : ; L I ani ~ ; j , e :a.P .~. rc·.rer p l : : : ~ r t the:..''=J ',ia3 st;':·~.:=;r6J.;:· ':2':~1.tSe·i by
the Japanese b e f o ~ e t h e i ~ s ~ ~ L d e r .
5. At the p r e s e n ~ time there are ~ o eeriou3 labour troublas. T ~ e oilfields
are ~ v e l l gumoded at"-d. some 7,000 IndollSS:!.::.:n 12.D0m;erS ha.ve. ~e6:::' Z'3~employed.
Absenteeism has deolined f r o ~ . 5 to 1-1/2 per c a n ~ . n a a r ~ y a:: ~ ~ e higher
operatiz'l.g pel'so:mel hO"1e gone over ·co the B e p ~ b l ! . c ; une:::oe· :J,o~'e cttractive
awards and p o s 1 t i o ~ are being offered, and in order to fill tne gap the
Company have been obliged to send for some skilled personnel from Holland.
6. The Coal Mines e.t BtJKJ:!I' ASEM have suffered no d.aln.e£e except for the
destruction of same valuable transformers. Work on them. has been resumed
and some 3,coo Indonesif'..n labourers have been re-elD1?loJ'ed. The present
output is 750 tons a day against a pre-war output of 3,000 tons. Transport
is difficult and the ra11raod to MOEARA ENL~ has to be constantly guarded
against sabotage ~ l d cttacks by guerilla bands.
7· Food now has to be imported into ? A L & ~ A l T G . Before the police action,
rice was being tmport3d from SINGAPORE in exchange for nctive rubber. These
imports have now ceased and as some of the best rice-crm1ing areas 1io
outside the Dutch porlueter the food situation at the r e o n ~ n t is not v e ~ J
favourable. The clothing ~ s i t l o n ls, however, better tbQn in Java. The
Dutch blockade d.id not touch t ~ ' l e export of r ~ b b e r I since 95 per c.3nt of it
was native produce and not from E t ~ o p e a n e s t a ~ e s . T118 e7.po~t of ruuber
was prohiblted dm-ing the first n:cmil fclloili:l{3 the police a c ~ i o n , but it
has now boen restmed. The fo~ ~~~Je~ pla~tati~)~s wit~i~ the Dutch occupied
area have suffered little or no ~se, ~d before J ~ l y 21st t h e ~ 0 were
some 3,500 to:'.3 of rubber stoc}:s in Cbi110se hp..,ndc. Thoso stoc:~s are gradually
b e i r ~ e x p o ~ ~ 1 , together ~ ; i t ~ other small quantities ef rubber from the
interior, ~ ~ d t e x t i l e s are being ~ p o r t e d in e y . c h ~ ~ e e . The pcIn oil estates
in the area hayt3 been severely daI:Jaged. Roads are in a very poer condition
but a regular train s e ~ v i c e has been resto:ced 'beti'lcen PALEMB1\1IG cnd
itlQEARA ENDt, with branch lines to URt\T und BATOE RWJA.
:.
_._._--------------------------~
8/586Page 48
Political
8. TIle :!)u'tch Besic..ent, Dr. L.B. van STRAEIT, i!"..fr~.r.8d us t:....:.t since the
police action there have been no d1sturbancf. J ·"'itb.~,: L ~:J.e nc~r r,;;:~iffiBkr.
The Rept1blica~ iv!aJTor, Dl". EAIITM; and some local officie,lsKore arr8EJ'ted.
on July 21st, detained a fmv days and la.ter sent tl I FOR'r DE !~CCIC The
Republican police force, consio'tir.g of 75 men, Hert' disaJ.'ILled and taken into
custody. T ~ t r t e e n of them. have since been screened. a ~ d are ~ ~ 1 serving
'l'Tith the Dutch police, i·,hile t ) h l ~ remain:ier h : ' 1 . ~ r e beeI allow-si to p.!'oceed.· to
FORT DE '{OCIL Some left vohu:;tarily, but othe::'s hev.' done eo 11:1der
intimid.ation, their families and relatives b e ~ . n G in ,:' ,El int",:':'m.'. On
August 6th 1947 a gathering was held at the Residen:t t , house a."1d was
attended by all the 3epublican officials, teacl1ers, de. ctors, etc. 1 i'Tho ~ad
remained behind. They ,Tere told that the Dutch had no :!rr:e:r'ji-::::,. of
restoring the old colonial syctem and i'Tanted only to [;;1:e the- L::':JCGadjati
Ae;reement eo fair chance • At this mee"Cing the Repti.').l:'c;::',r.. Mayor, Dr. El\ICIH,
was elected to replace Dr. AZJZ KF..AN, the fomer Republic. ~ n mayor, who
had been ambushed and } ~ i l l e d while vislting the front in c;. ::lIIrpany wi'bh "t1-TO
Dutch officers shortly before the police action began. We- interviewed
Dl'. HA.ra:M but 1t was difficult to obtain any coherent story from. him' or. to
gauge where his s y m p a t h ~ e s really lay. Re declared'himself tJ be a staunch
Republican at heart, but he is clearly c o - o p e ~ a t i n g w-ith the l·:tch and
a d m i t ~ e d that he has been threatened with k ~ ~ ~ p p i n g . Hitherto. he has
received no salary f r o ~ the N,E.I. Goyernment. He told us that ~ ~ o s e
Indonesians who are co-operair..g i·T:!. t~ the Dutch and vho had. famil:'es in the
interior were Oiol±ng subjected to tl"...l'eats and other fOrD1£ of h 1 t i n ~ ~ d a t i o n
suoh: as posters found on trees thro::1.tenin3 them 'l'Tith va::oious porLolties
when the Dutchwithdrai'T.
9. Before the police action beBe.n 0. movement, hloiln as the PI!il:lSATGEfl.N
OEMOEM (United CommtL'l'J.i ~y), had been startod comprising about 400 men:bers,
the majority being ex-Government officials ivho had been pensioned off. The
declared aim of this movement is general i'Telfare 1 to distl'ibute clothing,
etc. Politically it is considered insignificc.nt and has raceived vel"'J
little support from the people, ar.d lacks any promir.ent leaders.
10. The Republicc.n nei'T::jpaper TJfIJI'lA PADANJ. iTaS suppressed ~ - f . ; 1 ..9:::l. the police
action begd1\., but the Dutch have since alloioTed resumpUon of p ~ " . J l i c a t i o n on
condition that it does not indulge in a r ~ anti-Dutch propagar.1a and adopts
a more r e s p e c t f ~ ~ tone.
11. The Resident concluded his tall': idth .an account of the m1sfortune:3
/ ~ " ~ i c h had
,"".' .':.
8/586Page 49
"'hich he: i befallen the inhabi t S . ~ l t s of NIAS Island, many of " , 1 ~ o m 11vs on
the mai:cland and have throughout remained loyal to the Dutch. These
people are for the most part C ~ r i s t i a n s and have been severely ill-treatod
bllt:l by t:'e Japa;:lsse and by the R e p 1 - ~ ~ ) l i c a n s .
12. 'l'lle ~ 3 . ' : i ' · n 6 factory' of Mesal's. van HOTJl:EN S'I'EFFJ..N and Co. has beQll
stl':il;,ped by the Re!lublicans a..."1.d the Japanese, of 70 per cen.t of its
mac;1:: nery] but is now "Torkil".g again with 29 machb,es, t u r n ~ . ; ; . g out a coarse
un1-;'ed c~'.")bh at the rate of 10,000 ;rards per mo'.'.th. 'E"le pre-'iy-ar o u t ~ u t
ef tlds fe.::JLcry, 'Working rd.':;ht c..nci day -..ras 80,000 metres a J11~n:~h. Labm:1r
is s u f f : i c : : ' n : : : l " ~ ; bu.t skilled la:)o)ur re::ne.ins 1nRel'u.bl1can territ0ry. Dj es
are lacking and there is a shortage of coal, the mines at 8 A . i ; " . P . H L O E ; ) ~ 0 being
still in RepUblican hands and raw spinning thread s U ~ D : i e s ~ e difficult
to obtain.
13. The Policlinic and civilian hospital at P A D f ~ J G , which we visi~ed, are
in the c h ~ 3 e of a Dutch Medical Officer assisted by one Indonesian .loctor.
The hospital can at present accommodate only 70 p a t i e . ~ ~ : " s , but this number
-is aoon to be i ~ ~ r e a s e d to 120 with the a c ~ u i s i t i o n of an adjacent building
and must cope with the present population of 60,000 souls.· There is no
X ~ t a y a!,paratus and medical supplies, beds, blar..kets, etc., are in great
demu.'"ld. Most of the patients we saw had recently come from the i:J.ii6rior
and were surfex-ing from maLT'lutrition. We were told by the Resident that
some excellent work is being done in this area by mobile hospital teams
~ l h i c h work day alld night in the "kampongsll and bring in the most serious
cases to the hospital.
l l ~ . TEE NETBERIANDS TIIDIE..S PORTLAND C'.EMENr CO. at rNDAF.ONG, 14 kms. from
PAD1\NG, ~Tas until recen+.l,y used as a T.R.I. Headquarters, and has suffered
a considerable amount of damage by Allied and Dutch bombing. It is
expected that the plant will be operating again within four months using
one I'otary kiln with an Ol.l.tput of 200 tons of cement a d~. The pre-war
output ,"ith the use of' 4 kilns was 750 tons a day and of its ·kind ~ T a S the
second most important factory in the Far East. Indonesian skilled labour
is slowly r e t u r r i i n g ~ Some 200 employees are already engaged in
reconstruction work and little difficulty is anticipa.ted in securing an
additional 400 personnel which will ~ , e up more than half of the p r ~ · ~ r . a r
complement.
15. We visited the local market and found it crowded and comparatively
lIe11 stocked. The Dutch authorities have succeeded in keeping down prices
by placing a ban on the transaction of business by agents outside the
tovm. The Chinese have thus been restrained and the peasants are forced
Ita sell thoir
," >: "
8/586Page 50
to sell their produce within the town itself so that food i3 mcde av~ilcblG
and textiles, salt kerosene,' e'tc'.· can be rationed out at comparatively
cheap rates.
16. The schools have been reopened, but there is a great shortage of
matr;;:t'1c.ls and lack of teachers.
l'r. The present stO}K of rice ls expected to last about five or six months.
All the best r i c e ~ g r o w i r ~ areas are situated just outside the 'Dutch
occuuled area and rice is now being imported from Java at the rate of
190 tons a month au against 130 tons a month before the police action began.
Copra, coffee and rubber plantations are outside the Dutch controlled area
and trade conditions a ~ e therefore very poor.
Bukit Tinggi (Fort De Kock)
PolItical
18. On arrival at BUKIT TmGGI we called on Dr. Mohammed HATrA, Vice
President of the IndoneAian Republic, and had an inter-dew w1 th him. l.c.sti!l8
one e..nd a half hours. Dr. HATrA told us that he had left JOOJA on June 7th
intending to stay for about one month in Sumatra. He 'had brought with. , .
hi~ plans for the demobilization of part of the Republican Army, and for
the reconstruction of cotlllIllUlications and Industt'les in general. At that." . , .time the people were showing a readiness to co-operate with the Dutch.
There had been little opposition in Sumatra to the Linggadjati Agreement
largely owing to the fact that the NASJOEMI, one of the two' principal
parties opposed to it, had no influential leaders in Sumatra, while the
other party, t1le PARTAI NASIOl'IAL INDONESIA (P.N. I.) was under the influence
of Dr. GANI and Dr. IBA, both of whom favoured the Agreement. Goods l/are
b o i r ~ brought into the country from Singapore, and native rubber was Ueing
exported in exchange. TIle police action on July 21st had taken the
Republican At.my ay surprise and the local population had reacted to it
vigorously in self-defence.
19. The Dutch authorities vera compelling the Republican officials, who
·ema.ined behind in the Dutch occupied territories, to '''ork for them. The
majority had refused to do so, and at P ~ ~ T A N G S ~ ~ A R a general exodus
hud taken place. Some of the o f f i ~ i a l 6 hud been instructed by the
R ~ ? u b l i c a n Government to remain at their posts in order to help the
Indonesian popUlation. ~ l one occasion some 400 Indonesian refueees hed
been attacked at TIGA RAS to the weGt of 3IA!fl'AR by a BD.n8 of "rampok:lmrs"
knmm as HARIMAU LIAR (VTild Tigoro) operating under the orders of a
Japanese officer, Captain nrOUE. At LOEMBANG DJOELOE near PRAPAT on tho
shores of Lake TOBA 208 members of this Bang were substantially captured
by the RepUblican A ~ and are a,.,aiting their trial and sentence.
/20. Plnns for
S/586Page 51
20. Plans for th13 crushing of these elements have be0n dra"m up by the
Republican Government ~ut cannot ce put at praser-t into execution on
account of t ~ e general military s i t u a t i ~ n .
21. The Oo~~nist Pa:4 ty existod b r r ~ ~ ~ i n l y in name; i+' 1s based on
Central G o v e ~ . ~ e ~ t .
MilitaEI
22. In r e p ~ y to a questioIl r 8 s a : : ( l : ' ~ 1 : 3 ~ ; . : 1 e Re1;'uJ lican "scorched. earth"
policy Dr. li(-i.TJl.A said. ' ~ : 1 a t : ! . : - . : : d a · ' . . ~ c . ; ( . i u r ~ s 1'.(,1..i '!)een issued. by hi s Government
to "destray aUJ:iihing a:ld e v e r y t l ~ i : J g 1,:'c:t m.tghJ.j bs of OCO:lomic or military
benefit to ' ~ : ' l 9 D..l.tch:;. Ee ad:r.:.tted t·:>:..:!.'b in p::oactJlce this p o l i , ~ y tended to
get out of h a ~ d J a ~ d ~ h ~ t in certain s e o ~ o r ~ of tha f ~ o n t it had
unfortu..-mtely been in1ie::-preiJed as a di~ect encoiZ.1 ugement to loot. '::118
hospital at S::./\.1';';:'....2, fer instia:'l:;e, had been ra7.ed to 'Ghe ground by the
local inha"Ji'ban't;s a..'1d. :!.ts cor:.tents looted.,23. ~ o f i t . J J . regard to 'br..a I1cease fire" order Dr. l L ' d " J : ~ said that the
Republica:.1 Government does not recognise the SO-CE'J.led VA.., HOOK L:rnE nor
the right 't"!lic:h the Du{.ch have clam.ed to continue II'.oppi:ng-uj operations.
This claim is regarded as a violation in itself &1d a direct incitement
to further host11it1eso Dr. TIA~A complaL'1ed that tte frontier post at
LOMBOK ALONG 1~as occupied by the D ~ t . c h after the cease fire order had been
given. 'l'he Republican arm;y hael been ordered to Ustand fast" on AUe,""Ust 4th,
but also to "defend its positions". Ho be2ieved that tteDutch WS"i:13
contemplating a res~tion of hostilities. Their police action had been
a ve~J 8l'eat mistake. ~ f u c h ill-feeling hud been e p ~ e n d e r e d by it and
co-operation vTas now ~ch more difficult. Direct negotiat10ns wi'C,h the
Dutch were nQ lor~er possible. He could not accept the Dutch claim that
the problem in I ~ d o n e s i a was an internal one. It had already been proved
othert'rise.
Economic
24. Dr. H A ~ A i l l f c . : : i ~ 9 d us that the coal mines at SA}TJ\ELOEr-lTO were being
exploited, the present outpuc being at the rate of 300 tons a day. This
1Ta8 sufficie~b to : : - ~ ~ tbe local electric plant, textile a.'1d paper factories
and the reJ.lway. Food 1'188 plentiful, but machinerJ and means of transport
were urgently required. Ho said that 5,000 tons of padi were ready for
lIll!1l()diate shipment from lv!EDIA1300, north of PADANG, and that it would be
possible for s ~ : l a r quantities to be made available after c ~ c h harvest.
Largo quantities of cattle and buffaloes were also a"reiting an opportunity
for export. He asked us to bring this to the notice 01' Lord KILLEA..TW,
H.B.M. Special Commissioner for S o ~ t h East Asia, Singapore in the hope that
Isome arrangement
,,~ .. .;.'-,' ,;. ".. . .
•. '.' >.' ,« ;
8/586Pe.se 52
some arrangement might ba made for resuming the rice agreement w i J ~ h the
Goverr..I!'..ent of India. .£I.t the p:ces.;rnt ~ : t : r ~ e , ci.,":ing to the D',ttch blockade,
a.ll exports of l'ubJer p q'"t'Lnine 2 ti::n1:'er anti ratta..""l f1:'O:::J. 8u.'.J.1a~'t':l' s west
coast had. bet::l7l discontinue,::'. Dl'. E.!'...r-t;f.... GaLl. that ,:hen a sa\jisfuctol'"J
solution had JlleIl fOt:.lld f.Jl' t:'lC Il:::'8 S 0:':,':; diffi.;ult:l.es" Jt:;he Republican
Govermen!.i btencled to baild f Q . ~ ' ~ m : i e s in mar.y parts of tile country and'
to draw up a ~ranSlr.igrution scho;::e :'01" Je.vO""'1ese families, similar to tb-at
1'Thich hed proved so s : 1 c c e 3 s f ~ 1 1 1:lefo'l.,,)I;h0 im:.". The Rep'liblican Gover:unent
1'iaS anxious +,0 e~1.Co:.u"ai30 f.)reig:l e r ~ t c , : ! : , r i 3 e , b 1 . 4 ~ la'bour e m p l o ~ n n e n t
conditions would huve to he B:::'eo.tly ullpro7ed. 'I'here would be no
discr.imination 0 o ~ ~ e e n c o ~ ~ ~ r i 3 s . S l ~ ~ t r a was rich in resources.
Dutch could rur.....!'(i'!1 t , ; h : - o ~ g ' : 1 the is7.az;,d fro:J: o::;e e!7"d to th2 c-";,:-.t'r. if they
vTished. bu'c they woul:l never be ~ b l e t,) h::J:"u. it G1Zl?:.ins'[j t}:e ~ ~ . : , ~ . : . ; : tide of
independence. T:':\e l';ro"ole:n. 1-TaS mainly ps;ychologic,]. 1\."1,';, '~::e ~;::·;.~.~l had set
about it in the v r . ~ O D e way. If a peaceful 6 e t t l e ~ e n t c o ~ l d be ~ e a c h e d the
economic benef!ts 1'Tould soon folIO'·,.
Social- , , ~ -
25. The local hospital at' BtJKIT Tn1G~r is well leept ~ . : l d efficiently run
although there 1s a serious shortage of medical supplies. It can aocommodate
200 patients. We also visited a secondary girls 7 school and, later in the
afternoon, were talcen to see the SJhool of Arts at PADAl'TG PMIDjANG. .T'.ae
former was a t t e ~ d e d by some 4co pupils, all of whom. appeared to be happy,
' h e a l ~ h y and well turned out. Tllere is, however, an acute shortage of
qualified teachers and '!Jooks) IllElterials, etc. ere sadly lacking.
26. Before and afte:." an official l u n c h e c n ~ to which '\oTe "ere invited by the
Vice-President, we witnessed a mass demnnstration by several thousand
people representing Youth Groups, Tr3de Unions, etc. who marched past the
resid.ence bearing bmmers '\oTi1.1h the foJ.lmling slogcms: "Once Free, forever
Free", "Away 1'11th the Dutch forces". In the midst of these proceedings
we were joined by Dr. llATTA, who received ~ ~ imu.enae ovation. A ~~~~~~U
(inhabitants of t . h ~ P ! - ~ A N G Eighlcnds) himself, he has achieved great
populari';y in his mm home te,m and duriI'l8 the course of our tour '\oTe saw
c:nr>le evidence of the extent ·co which his authori"" is being respected in
various ports of the countr'J. He is aseisted at BlJKIT TmOOI by two State
C o ~ u i s s i o n e r s , who are directly respou8ible to the R e p u b l i c a ~ Government
u.t JCGJA.
Hed.c.:.n
Political
27. The Republican Mayor, Dr. HohaJ:!lled JOESOEF, ~'Ii th vThom v,e had an internet.,.
resigned on September 1st when culled upon by t ~ , e Dutch 'co break off his
/relati'ons
. ~. .
S/586Fage 53
relations with the Republic. Five of his ten colleagues followed his
example, but the other five and the lower grade personnel all remained at
their posts. Dr. JOESOEF declared ':,ha'c he bore no grudge against them for
this because they had to 'ofork to earn a living. Dr.· SOEP-CSO, the
Indones1an fmnnicipal doctor, has remained at his hospital Without accepting
any salary f".t'om the Dutch official. The ex-Ropublican Mayors of BmDJEI
,and TEBBING TINGGI a~d the former Secreta17 of the Republican Resident at
SWlTAR are actively co-operating With the Dutch. Dr. JOESOEF said that
the police action had come as a complete s u r ~ r i s e to the Indonesians in
MEDAN and that not much resistance ~ a d ueen offered. There were mass arrests
and some 400 Republican officials el'S still undergoing detention at
BELAvlAN.
Military
28. The Dutch declare that they have now occupied the whole of Sumatre.'s
East Coast Residency, and thflt no ~ v a n c e 8 . have been made in <this sector
since Ausust 4th. The largo towns, suth as SWll1'AR, were taken by surprise,
and bridges etc. were thus saved from destruotion. A number of RepUblican
bands are still aotive inside this el'ea, burning estate property, houses,..
villages, eto. as well as looting and terrorising any persons who are
Buspected of oollaborating with the Dutch. Some of these bands belong to
the RARIMAU LIAR (seo pc.ragraph ;19 above) and inolude several Japanese•.
29. It is expectod that tt'TO or three months ll111 elapue before law :;md;;
order oan be fully restored in tnis area. '!'he inhabitanto of several
villages have asked for arms to defend themselves asainot looting gangs •.
The Dutch have agreed to this and some 500 Home Guards havo boen arned and
eqUipped in this way as Police unit9 to take over the duties of statio
dofence 'behind the Dutch lines. ThoGe Home Guards are noW being organised
by the' acparatist movement known as DAERA !STDIEHA SUMATRA 'rIMOR under the
ler.dership of Dr. MAriSOER. This undel'ground movement began d u r i n . ~ the
Japanose oooupation and now' has sub-committees in var:l.ous parts of tho
territory (Gee paragraph 39 below)." .
30. About fifty out of the 250 estates Within the Dutch· occupied area have
been totally o ~ p a r t i a l l y destroyed and this process is being ruthlessly
carried on 'Under resistanco orders from JOGJA. All Indonosians who co-operate
with the Dutch ere branded as enemieo of the Republic und i n t i ~ d a t i o n ,
kidnapping end other incidents of th:l.s kind are oontinually.taking place, ,.
but the Dutch hope that by means of the villago Home Guards the co-operative
Indonosians' will Doon be able to look after t h e m s e l v e s ~ .
31. The Northern front has boon compc.ratively quiet. This ~ m s u n e x p e c t e d
by thoDutch sincl} the ATJDTESE are knCi'm to be very fanatical. The
!Ropublican
. .
-- - - - - - - - - - - _ . _ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~
•S/586Page 54
Republican army in ATJEH is believed to be better organised than its
counter-parts elsewhere.
Economic and Social
32. Since .. the cease fire order the Dutch have been su,ccessful in opening
up a lurl3e part of the country. Roads have been repaired and daily train
services to TMIDJONG BALE! and BINDJEI are again running so that estates
can be brought back into production. Planters have returned and are w o r ~ i n g
together with Indonesian guards of 20/30 men formed ~ o n s s t their estate
personnel. An area covering more than 60 estates has now been reoccupied
1.."1. this way. The food situation has improved since the police action, and
the price of rice haG fallen from N.E.I. r6. - to f2. - a litre. Rice 1s,
hO\'1ever, still being imported from Java at the rate of 1,000 tons a month.
It may.be possible to discontinue this when rice is h a r v e s t ~ 4 ; f r o m former
tooMeo ·areas. The ,p1'OOuc1'1on of tobacco has been resumed and about
30,000 labo1;11"ers are now re-employe(~ on the tobacco estates.
33. The oilfields ~ t P.ABGKALAN BRANDAN, 20 kma. from. the Dutch line, we:re
fired by RepUblican ~ o r c e s and the 111000 Chinese residents in th1s area
have "Deen .evacuat6\'\ by the Republicans to Iilngsa in ATJEB:. Plana have been
made to destroy oil and. rubber installations outside thE;l Dutch held
territo:ry .if ~ fUrther advances ~ e mde :py the Dutch. ~ r .',
34. The clothing situation is bettel" than in ~ other parts of the l s 1 ~
owing to the fact that large quantities of rubber and oil were smuggled
to Singapore in excha.n6e for textiles and arms. Ships are still being
irrbercepted b e t w e ~ n Sumatra and S i ~ g a p o r e but the produce of native estates
is exempt from. seizure •
35. Schools have been re-opened in ~ l the main t o ~ m 6 and Indonesian
teachers have :returned but in insufficient numbers. One hospital vioitod
at BIIIDJEI ,ms in an appalling eondition beiTJg understaffed, filthy and
Without any. reasonable ~ o o d a:rransement.
Separatist Movements
36. In Sumatru1 a number of so-called Separatist Movements have beAn
started. In PALENBAlTG ""e L"1.terviewed four of the RADENS (representatives of
the old Sultans) who are sponsoring a local movement wh:l.ch they intend
ultimately to cover the whole of South Sumatra. They declared that the
moveJIt:Jnt was not beine aimed specifica.lly against the Bepubl1c as had 'been
tho case. with the PASUI'!pflIlj' Movement in vlost Java. Its purpose was to Y!;.lko
South SUl!lL1tro, which they considered has fllways been an econolll1c unit, into
a self-governillg state oz. the basis of Article 4 of the Linggadjati
Agreement. 48 out of the 51 village headsmen 1n the PALEMBAl'TG Q.z'ea were in
f a ' l ~ of the movement Which, we were informed, hed the support of at least
/80 per cent of
8/'586PaGs 55
Ba l'er cent of the local pOPl.?-lation.. The : E A D E N S . ~ ~ p r e . s 8 { ) d ·£lllt;!.pathy for
the present Republican leaders and decl,ared that they w o ~ l d . ....be prepared to
co-operate with the .Re"Ju'bHca ' u n d ~ r a diff~.~ent, 80VerIlIll.ent" They m'e... - . . .obviously pro-Dutch end the Dutch are in f a v ~ u ~ q ~ the movement.
37. Dr. rSA, With \';'hom VG discussed ~ > " . : J 'r.1..·,stion:, stated. that· the. !"aaS8 of the
people ''''ere d i s i n ' ~ 6 ' : ' a s t , " d n n d a ~ p - t h e ':io t " ) ' ~ · : f 3 . : . : : i s . tho Hovement. A few, ~ h Q
i'lere followers of ~ ' ~ e R4.:JEioI group, hael talW"l an f : ( r ~ A r e s ' r , in it, but this
~ · 1 C . S la:rgoly for fi.(l:J.r"cial r e a S O ~ 1 8 . Tl:e Du ·:t:h Resident a"; PAL'E?·!PA:HG
confirr:.od t:':t:;.e at~i:;" ,•.,..le, an.d eef.cd that tn,e mass of the ' J e o p ~ .."l ~ . , e r e n.ot
p o l i t i \ ~ u l l y ;t::.:!rJ.ed.,; t;~ey asked only t::-> be lE:'f'c alo'J~ an,'. ~0 l=.-.-e i::. : 2 e £ l . c o ~ .
They had s : l o : ~ n 1i t ' : ~ l e response to the Republtc l s p.'";:;J;lc..r,.r..··.. !.G:L1. 01: !:.ld·.i:;endence
after the.' J·o;pa..'1ese collapse, and many 0f those .1::'0 had eV £;:it1.:a2.:; joilled
the R e p ~ b J . . ; t c c..:1.d so because t.hey had collaborated vith the J a ~ ~ a ' ~ e e e Md uere
afraid of bei'."1g brought to book by tee 'Cutch. T:.lp.ra is;, b . o " l e ' - ~ I ' ; " a very.
distinot feeling of regio':'al UIlity ~ O : " ' 1 ~ some neti-res of l J [ I . L i 1 I : ~ - ; : i . . : T : : : ; ' , who
tend to rega't"d all other' peoples of' In.;!.cnesiaas I I f o r e ~ , g n e r s " . D ~ . HATrA
and D r . ~ r £ (Vice-Premier of tho Republic of Indonesia) still retain much.
influence in P A m 1 3 . ~ r G .
38. · ~ t PADANG we found that a m'J:Y'ement Imolm as the PEBSA'l'OEAJ.'IJ OEMOEM
(see p ~ a g r : ; l . ~ h 9 above) has been founded by ~ " 1 K A B A U S J most of whom
escaped from FORi' D1:: KOCK "11th t-he 01)jl~ct of. helping the poor' a l ~ d ' distributing
clothing. '1':.1e Movement 'is also reportod to 'be advclcating some fo:rni of local
autonomy at P A D P 1 ~ .
39. We ',.,ere i n f o ~ ! ! l e d that the most influential end best ol"gcn:i.. ~ed of the
Separai'.ist Moyem-J.::.-:iS was tile DABHA IST:}·1EUA STJMA':':"!'A TIHJ'\ (SpC''-.;al District
of EastSU1liD.tra) cdj :,1EDJ,....~; w'hich grov out of an ' ' ' . . l ; ~ : ' e r g r o ' ~ ~ . l J t1,".' ",l!'ent duriI1f3
the Japanese occupation. Its leaders had formed a con:mi.ttee for. the East,
Coast I and are act!vel37 cppcsin:.3 the Repu'IJ:'1c, ref1lsing to l e ~ Republican
officials take o v e ; ~ cont:r-ol of : l c : : . m i n i s t ' t " a t ~ o n and. o\'l3an~ si:'.g l)"cjY,e Gucrds
to assume the p o l i ~ e duties in e ~ c h Villace. They aim ~ ~ an a ~ 7 . o n o m o u s
state for Surnatra's.£ast voast within a Federal orcanisation for the island
as a i·Thole.
40. We found it difficult to assess the strength and importance of these
various movements. ~ l e B e ~ u b l i c c n s claim that they are ~ n s p i r e d by the Dutch
D.S a IDCt::ns of underr..J.nine Republican influence. The. Dut~h, on the- other· "
h~d, deny that the:,- hc.ve iSh-en the m o v c ~ n t s 3.."ly officio.1 e n c o u r a : g ~ m o n ~ or,
support, and declare that the7 uro'a spontanoous d e v e l o ~ m e n t ar±sing ont of
diosatisfact·ion with t h ~ BepubUcqn ragi!llO. There ''I'Tould app'e~~',t:o be SOIlW,
truth in this contentilm. In IIlUI1Y p'8.rts of' the country the Republio has;':·,·
tended to disregcrd the- old ,ADA'l" authority. The nc.Mve r',llers ,in the
/NEGERIS
~ • ~" • .' D • .~. * .'~. • >r' • " _
J • ,. I I
. :- ;
8/5.96Page 56
I,ffiGERIS (Sub-districts) and the village chiefs, who have long enjo7ed a
re~utution aa interpreters of the ADAT or local custom, are 'now being
replaced by younger and more politically minded men mostly Javanese and
Min~igknbaus nominated by the Republican political parties, who know or
care little about the old feudal life and customs of the people over whose
fortunes they are sent to preside. The l'lEGERI interests have thus been
taken out of the hands of old . ~ A T authorities and entrusted to Republican
officials.
Chinese
41. We had interviews with Chinese Consuls end other Chinese representatives
ut the various places ,fe visited and asked for their opinions on the
situation in their respective localities. In each case the answer was much
the same. There had been little suffering in the t O ~ n l S occupied by the
Dutch, but e l 6 ~ w h e r e , especially in frontier areas, where the lives and
properties of the people could not be properly safe-guarded, the Chinese
had been SUbjected to all manner of atrocities and misfortunes at the hands
of terrorist Sangs. Within the RepUblican area conditions appear to have
been somewhat better. ~ 1 e Chairman of the Chinese Association at BUKIT .
TIt'GGIinformed us that the Chinese community there, numbering about 18,000
and consisting largely of small retailers, shoemakers,. carpenters, etc. had
suffered very 11ttle and had lost no property or houses. In the small
villages, however, trading conditions were bad, and the Chinese there had been
"digging into th0ir capital". In the East Coast of SUIIliltra the Dutch have
armed the C ~ J ~ , : , " " ' 1 e ~ ) £ . : . . ~ th:eir mm aelf"'Ii::'Otection. A Chinese Security Corps
has now bee~! : '...:~. :.~'.l i.ll 6 or 7 places Ell'med with rifles and sten suns. It
appears t h e . ~ i:'lL'.': 2.:C'e &';Hl 1:"1 '~his area a number of Chinese belonging to
the former ClnL'les8 i{ationaHst ArrJj(f who were brought over by the Japanese
and used as instructors.
42. Conclusions
A. PaHtical
The spirit of Independence 1s strOllg tlu'oughout Sumatra and i'ncludes
aspirations for r e g i o n ~ autonomy which has resulted in a number of
separatist movementa. These movements are not co-ordinated but they do not
exclude the possibility of a subsequent union within the frame-work of an
Indonesian Federal S ~ t e .
B. Military
1fo reaffirm O ~ opinion expressed in previous reports that the cease
fire order cannot be properly o b s e ~ e d by either side under existing
conditions. The boundaries known as the VAN MOOK LINE are not aooepted by
the Indonesians, who feel that they are under no obligation to do so. The
/Republ1cnn
~ . JJ- f .. • I, ..', r _. .... ... : '! • \ .... ". • .. '.., _
.. " .... ' ~ , /' ~ . ~ ~ , - .. -. ''', ' . '. ..' - . ~ . ''''.. .'
• - •• j • • • , • .... <11
8/586PaGe 57
Republican Government's 3 . t t i ~ u d e touard this has been clearly set forth in
its st[l.tement of Septelhber 1st. He believe that no elfecti-.,re means of
reducing casualties can be f o ~ ~ Without both parties being b r o u g ~ ~ together
again fcr discuscing a renedy for the existing military si t ....13..~i-:;n. The
demarcr:.tion lines m u s ~ be redrmm and agr'3ect u}?cn by both si.des.
C. ~ . ? l } o ~ c
A strong effort in being wede to rehabilitate estate a r ~ a s on the East
Coast of Sumatra but until SOU0 agreement ' b o ~ , r e e n the Dut.ch 2nd the f.epublic
has been reached great difficultie S ,.,ill contl.:-:ue.
W 0 1 ~ on oil r e f i r ~ r i e s has already te6n resumed in the ? _ ~ c _ ~ r G a r e ~ .
Trade in general IJarticularly from the Axport anGle is stil.l I:hamstrunc"
on accottnt of the b l c ~ ~ ~ m1d General instability of the C 0 1 ~ t r y .
. ....
.-. '.:..: .'
/APPErJDIX
. t... I" '. • '" ~ ' . ' w / ~ •
. ~\ .
8/::;86Page 58
Genero.l
1. The situation in SW.ATRA differs from that in JAVA in that all activit;;
is confined '::0 three definite a.."eas,. pALErvlEfmG, PAIJP1TG alld l , f 2 ~ I . In each
case the DUrc:.:r troops are occ';pyir.C a fai~",l;:r larr38 ::;"n'i:Ui3't3r about 1.;hich
Be:l;lublican forces are o : p e ~ a tir..<3. The l::.L-.i ts oi'· these perimeters lrere defined
by Dr. V - . ~ l 11100k on .l\,·.;t[;ust 29th and D'l.,":::'C!3: forces consider the::l3elvas at libex't;r
to o:l;lerata as they wish within them. ~ n o Republican f O ~ G e s do n ~ t
aclmm'l1edge this s o ~ c 3 . l l c d Van l\'iool( Line .and regard. al".:Y Dutch movement fl'O:W
the positions which they occup:!.ed on 4th August 19h7 as a brea.ch of the
ltCease Fire lt order. Brief accounts of the milital'y c o n d i t i o ~ s in each area
are given below.
P a l e m b a ~ Area
2. In this area, military o:l;lerations by the DOTC3: teok the form of an
expansion of the former perimeter by the establisrJllent of small posts as far
as LORBOEK LA!·iTJANG in the NORTH, LAEAT in the WEST and BATOE RADJA in the
SOUTH. Since 4th August 1947, there has been no expansion of the perimeter
but patrols have been carried out in the area of S ~ t J O E to deal With the
concentrations and snipers. ~ A e DUTCH report that in the B l f A I ~ A S d ~
coalfield area the railway near T A ] ~ O N G ENIM is subject to continual sabotage
and severe.l actiens he'-ve taken place as a result. They als::> report that
Republicans attacked KJ.JOE AGOENG on 12th August 1947, as a res~lt of which
several CTIJJillSE were killeQ. As in other areas; D U T C ~ main o : l ; l e r a ~ l o n s have
been along roads with the reslut that many Republican formations have been
by-passBd. and are etill operating in the c o u r . t ~ y inside the Van Mook Line.
P $ , f . 9 . r " f L ~
3. DUTCH military operations up to 4th August 1S'47 consi:~tec.. of movement
along main roads to expand their fOlcmer perimeter. The points reached by
4th August 1947 were:
TYro miles nORTH of LOE:aOElC ALOE~rQ, 18 I:'.iles SOUTE! of PADPJTG in
the direction of R . I \ ] ~ A H and 12 miles EAST in the direction of SaLOl:.
PatrfJls operate from trucks in all direc Gions but pal''tic',119.rly in
the ;DR'I'H :l;lart of the area. Most e . c t : ! . o r ~ G fouGht have b e ~ n as a result
ef clashes b e ~ T e 8 n th88e patrols and P . e p u ~ l i c a n forces in tee area of
LES:EOEX ALOE~:G and in the hills about BALIM3TI,YQ.
Fort re Keck----
4. Republican forces in ~ h i s area consist of one Div:'sion, "Thic~l is not
fully err.ed, but efforts by five factories are beinc made to r 8 i l l e ~ y this.
/Tbe CO:mr'..ander
• r> • ~ ~.' - • • " -- •• • • • •
- .
The Ccr:..r::ar:d.er in this arca stated th::.t no Bepubl:.cc.n fcrces had. entered
Dl,TCR cont:"vl2.e~. ter:::-:'-tm"y since !.;.'t",h .h.1.1Gust cut t l ~ o . t J:n::::Ci?: forc\:'s TI8vinG
from ]?lace to pla.ce i·rere vigcrouslj e.M.&url:o ..l as t:le Vs.r. Hook Li:ue wo.s not
r e v o G ~ 1 i s e d . E'3 re:i.'used to Give i n . f o : ' . . " ' : : ' . 9 . t : . ( ; ~ as to 't1:le ;L:>c:::.ticn ef his troops.
A full list of a11'2::;8. tious a[ainat the :ClT'reI i·ms ?,l'er1.l~:::eC: .. t~:53e var~r from
air l:ecormaissc.::1ce to a combinod land.ing operation at P:illTIvliUr.
5. mn.'CTI ::lHi"car;: 0:geration3 up to l:th . , ~ ' I G 1 . . ' . 3 t 19!.;.7 c::::}!ar..d.sd. the c:dCina.l
perimeter in this .area 'GO the Hr:e ' I ' ; " ; : ; ~ C F , G I ' J . : . : r . . ~ .. PWO:}J::NG - ·?:::,;~.'l'.ANG
SIAI'lTJ\R 4 TArrDJC~~'-:": E.'\IAI.
..;.;..:..... , ....
: ....
..... ...
except pat'rols ar.d small bodias tu dez.l 1'Tith R';;IJlfblican c o n ~ e n t : i . " 2 tions •
There are many 'bodies of BE:lYI.'.blico.."1 troo11S "Tithin the area w'ho are constantly
s ~ p i : n g vehicles, blocking a.:.'"ld mining roadi3 and. terrorisizlG tl:e :[Jol)ulation.
Damage in'the S J ~ A R area, particularly to BRITISH property: is sevare.
There have been. several caSatS of' kicL"1E'.ppingJ n;·~e.bly at B:?fI.BTf,CrI in t!:e
centre 'of the U't.;'TOH Dattalion the:L'e, "Then four persons were fnrcibly
abducted on 19th September 1947. DUTCH forces were JIloYing to liberate some
500 CHINESE wno had been k i d r ~ p p e d from P . R ~ ~ ~ and who were being held some
five miles S O U ~ of that place.
~ ~ ~ i ( \ n
6. It is not within the scope of a military report to say, which is the
correct interpretation of' the "Cease Fire ll order1 but it i"s cl':1ar the.t the
two sides understand it differently. Each resists Violently actions vrhich
the other 'bakes in 8,ccordance wHh its mm inter:9reto.tion. In such.
circum.stanc.:es, there can be no true observance of a "Cease Fire" order and
it can be s a i ~ in y o ~ c 1 u s i o n that conditions in Sul1ATPA at present are not
those "Thich would eXist ~ v e r e the order being enfol:ced •
~ne above is a s~ary of the reports of the British Military O b s e ~ r e r s
in SUMATP.A, compiled by the :Bl"itish Hilitary Liaiscn Cff'icer at i3A'llAVIJ\.
/Sicncd/ D. L. R~ys Lt. Col.
Hilitary Liaison Officer
3/586Pat3e 60
APPENDIX VI
REPORT OF 'mE VISIT TO
BANDOEOO, JAVA, OF HALTER A. FOOTE, AHERICAN CO!'iSUL GENERAL,
ACCOMPANIED BY MAJOR J. MACKIN, UNITED ST.ATES MARINE CORPS
The purpose of the visit was to observe general conditions in the very
impo:ctant area connectinG Batc.via and Bandoeng -- the area know as the
heart of West Java.
T".ne visit 'Ahlch began at 7:00 a.m. OD 26 September 1947, ~ 1 a 6 made by
automobile and the route travelled was Batavia-Buitenzorg-Poentjak Pass and
then to Bandoeng.
It should be stated and emphasized that the journey from Batavia to
Bandoens, a distance of about 180 kilometers, was made through towns, small
villages, rugged mountain areas and throueh agricultural countryside and
that we were traVelling by ordinary pussenger automobile and completely
unescorted. The return journey was made in the same manner.
The area between Bataviu and Buitenzorg has returned to pre-war
conditions. Fear has disappeared :from i.ihe natives and the road is usually
full of farmers carrying their fruits, vegetables and other commodities to
the markets of Batavia and Bui tenzorg.
From Buitenzorg to the PoentJak Pass, an area once noted for its
beauty and which contained hundreds of European homes built either for
recreation or for retirement purpooes, is n o ~ r barren of European homes,.
•. ; ." '. , ....•. , , ~ - < . ; . .
except for burned out skeletons of once beautiful bungalows. In this area,
however, the natives, having lost their fear of reprisals by Republican
forces, are docile, friendly, polite, helpful and busily engaged in
reconstructing their own homes as well as roads, bridges, etc., for the
common good,
From the Poentjak Pass to Bandoeng the same conditions existed. The
area is full of bu...""l1ed out ~ 4 ' l : ' ' ' l c k s of forme!' European schools, churc;:hes,
hospitQls, homes, factories, etc., which show the senseless or wanton
destruction of property by either the Republican forces or by private or
irresponsible gangs which ere now claimed by the Republican leaders as part
of the I n d o ' ~ e f ' : : ' : " ~ ~ "Trtir:mCll Army. In this a:,:,ea, hOi-rever, ref'c'l';truction is
progre.';S:':;I"; r:_::... ·S..;.:.. llt)Zens of road b U l l i : : ~ : G W'Jci. :cep~I~.:·:J,:; ·:_,':,,9 · ~ ; e r e
passed c:.nci. t~lC: h:r.G"r",r~Y3 are even now in exctlllent condl ~ i v r . J ' I ; , J ' l ~ C : E ' S ~ r e r e.being repaired ever;;''1'lhere; shops were being rebuiltj homes ,·{ere ~l:'ising from
the ashes; crops of rice and other foodstuffs were beinG harvested; the,
natives were .rell dressed and signs of hunger ,·rere not 3een. It should be
emphasiz.ed that in this entire area, now under Netherlands Indles Government
/control, only six
• • ~ • .... _ ., h • • ' • _ •• _ • • ...
. . .
0. ' .".., : ~ • ..... ,- ,...I, I." ~ .'. ~ : ,"~, I _I.. ",.,':. . \ . ' .. ~ . -'" . . .
8/586}-age 61
control, only six unifonned and armed men i-rer!'l seen. They i'1ere all nati yes
and. ~e:mbers of the Veld'Politie (Field Police).
, < ',' ,'.',',
, '
The condition of much of' the European residential section of Bandoens
attests to the terror that reigned while the city i - ~ S being looted and- .
burned. by the retreating Republican forces. Ba!)doer.s, hOHever, is rapidly
beinG rebuilt. Homes, factories, schools, churches, etc., are arising from
the i'Trecks -- and the i-1Orkb being done cheerfully and gladly by the natives.
nle city is clean and rapidly returning to its p r e - ~ ~ condition.
Visits "rere made around Bandoenl3 to the fruit, veGetable and flower
marlwts. At every point there was b.ughter tmd cheerful ba.'1tering and
bargaining. Not a sign of hatred wo seen. On the o ~ e .. hand, there was
every sign of thankfulness that they could again go about their daily affairs
in freedom and without molestation.
Major Mackin and I Here visited by several i m ~ o r t a n t Indonesians ~ m o s e
names'must not be mentioned herein for their Oim physical safety. 'These
men i-rere of ~ i o u s ages and ranke. in life. Some uere wise old men and others" .
i-Tere keen minded young men. Some were Soendanese and others were Ja7aDese
i'1ho'had'recently deserted from the Republican cause and had"come o ~ e r to 'the
Netherlands side. The gist of their remarks were as follows:
1. All are nationaJ.ists at h e ~ t , but the in'tel1igentones faver the, . .
United states of Indonesia instead of the Republic of Java and Sumatra.. ,-
2. GovernmentaJ. organization in the Republic is practically, ,
non-existent. There is little likelihood of any i ~ p r o v e m ? n t therein
under the present Republican leadership. Graft ia said to be rampant
aJ::onC aJ.l classes of R'3publican officie..la.
3. The Socndaneae movement is a fact and should not be discounted.
Hatred of Javanese customs and habits is too old and too deeply rooted
to be eliminated quickly. Only a long period of education can
a c c o ~ ~ l i s h the task.
I ~ . A well kno,m leader of the Arabs of Java, Hho has long been an
ardent supporter of the Republic of DjocJakarta and has been liVing in
Republican held areas since the beGinninG of the present troubles,
said, "Sir, there in no :·lerdelca (Freedom) there!". Another ardent
BUPJ.:orter of the Republic, an Indian, said 1'Tith'great bitterness: "1-Te
hav'J no money, i-Te have no Government, i,re have no transportation, vTe have
nothing that i-Te can soe and feel -- 1.,e have only 1 I ~ : e r d e k a ! " .
5. Several important L'"Jdoneoians, foJrmer1y follm'Tcrs of Soekarno and
Gupporters of the Republic, said that S c e k ~ r n o had ceased to be the
real leader of the R e p u b l ~ c . Others said that tho Republican'army, as
Hell as cang leader::!, arc too often autocrati c and idthout patriotism
/merelY
S/586Page 62
:: ;. ::.;
..........
merely con:mandeerinc; "That they uant cll1d punish the o,mers if they
complain of the confiscation.
6. An iID1JOrtant criticism ilas voiced by several men vrho said that they
cot1J.d not understa,.T)d why the IJress of the i,!orld, the intelligent and
educated people of all cotlIltries and the Governments of many countries
had blindly supported the idea ,of the Republic of Java and Sumatra and
had paid no attention iThatever to the more important idea of The
United states o ~ Indonesia. They felt that it i ~ S time for thinking
people to thrOi'T over the iO.ea of sUP1Jorting a small republic controlled
by a small clique of greedy men and give their support to patriotic
Indonesians i.,ho desire.. to see a sovereicn United states of Indonesia.
Hithout exception these m e ~ said they iranted the help and guidance
of tho Dutch in the f o ~ a t i o n of the United states of Indonesia as
provided for in the Linggadjati Agreement.
7. A number of former Republican officials of various ranks, including
civil administrators and chiefs of police, have recently deserted the
Republic and are nOrT co-operating with the Dutch. All these men
expressed fear of dr'astic retaliation if the Netherlands forces should, .
be withdrawn. Without exception, they said that the masses of t h ~
p e o p ~ e were ruled by fear of punishment even for such small acts as
accepting medicines or clothing from the Dutch. They all agreed that if
that fear can be removed from the minds of the people: there will be more
co-operation ~ v l t h the Dutch and general reconstruction of the country
as a ~lhole •
(Signed)
1'Jalter A. Foote
American Consul General
J. M a c : ~ ~ . i :
Major U. S. rv:iJ.:':i:.?) ,:; ~:..'~:,.::J ,
Observer./ APPEND::={ VII
• : If'. . . ' ~ ' .. - " .' ~ • ." .- ~ .' - ~
8/586Pase 63
Deport cn tl:e Conference Eclc' between t ~ : e Ccnsulo.r
CoIllIlliSDicn ::?residec:.. bJ ~i. Rc.u.x, Consul-General of
~ ' r Q n c e I ccsisted by Me':'srn. Vono.erotichelen, C,:nsul
Generc.l 0; 3el,-ium, Eo.tcn, H.B.N. Austrc.lia.."'l Consul
G ~ n e r a l , Shepherd, H.B.M. Consul-General, Liven,occ',
..1.meriC8n Consul-Genernl and. Lrunbert, H .B·.r.1. Deputy
Consul-General, and the 1n0)nes1an D e l e ~ a t i o n HeaLed
by Dr. Sjari::'udc.in, Prime i-linister 8n(1 !vlin1ster for
::::efence, r".ssisted by Dr. Setia.djit, Vice Prime l:linister
ant the Chiefs of Staff of the Renublican Army, at
Jogjakarta, 26th September, 1947.
COl~':J:i 80ion:
e'en you define "cease fire" or the :Clcasures to be taken to Give e;'feGt to
it - in ~ e n e r a l t e ~ s ?
Dr. Sjnriiuddin:
He have stated before an order that the President and the Ccmmander
in-Chief Gave. Our President said to Give order to all armed forces
of the Ino.onesian forces and I n c ~ o n e s i a n ;people in ceneral "from this
moment stand fast at your respective places and cease hostilities".
Commission:-Cease hostilities is more than cease fire.
Dr. ~ 3 ,j :'.r:Lfuddin:
It io necess8r'J to ask what our conception of the "cease fire" is.
In '.:,enera1 it is com;prisinG t ~ · r o points, the "stanc fast" o r d ~ r ann
the "cease fire" o:;:'der, In ceneral there must be El I'ceese hostilities"
orcer, I mean. The United Nations cablec..ram meant tc uo uease
hostilities.
COrJJli ~!8ion:
Hj'J.at instructions ~ v e r e civen to implement your cecision rei:arcl':nc t.he
~ l · 6 . e r from the nilitary standpoj nt?
Dr. ;;.'urifuddin:
Cr. the :,th A u ~ . u s t the Commanler-::'n-('hieJ.' i s s u e c ~ order tc nIl our
1'or''::cs to romain at their pests, th0." ~'Tere not allcwec' to lep-vo
their !llaces.
Cornr.li csion:
A:..'ter the " ~ e e . s e fire" orc.er ar.c 1I(;oooe hostilities" was civen wculu
:;OU Cl' your mili t ~ r y ociviscrs e x ~ e c t to c·.:me to Bcme direct ar!'cncer:ent
'\-Ti th the troC'ps on the other 6:1.:':e7
.~.. ".-"" ' ~ : \ ~". . -; ~ ","' ,.' .. - ". "'.- ~ .., "'. .. - • '0 ' "" ..
-
~~r:fudcin:
He tLouE,ct t~at the " ~ e a s e fire" orcl.er would be prelir.linarJ' to
tru.::e talks.
CC1~1Dli fJ G i cn.:\--viere an;! advances made to you from the Dutch s1l:'.e as to -'the best
way to o b ~ e r v e the "cease fire" or "cease hostilities"?
fr. S j a r i ! ~ :
T ~ e r e have never been any talks about it.
9crIDli:3 ('1 i on:
Were there any acLvances to the Dutch from the Indonesians?
Dr. Sjarifuddin:
None.
Comroi ssicn";
.< .:..•
Were there any advances from either side?
Dr. Sjarifuddin:
!{o, not from cur side.
9°nunission:
Do you consider that the other ~ i d e has adopted a similar definition?
D r ~ Sjarifudd1n:
I do nottbink the Dutch have the. same idea as we.
Commission:
Do JOu think that breaches of "cease fire" may be due to ~ . i f f e r e n c e of
j.ntel':Pretation'l
Dr. Sjarifuddin:
ylhen Dr. van Mook declared he would issue "cease fire" he said his
troops were allowed to carrJ on mop~ine-u:p operations. We could not
agree 'because we think that you cannot issue a "cease fire" crder
vi thout a "stDnd-faot" order. Hhen Dr. van Hook stated. that he had
dra'in a demarcation lino for the whole of Java that was a meas'~e taken
by Dr. VDn Hook whicb mcc.e if ver:;" cunfusing for us, in ract, I think
IllUde it impossiblo to observe the "cease ±'ire" order. By stating that
line he cave his t r o o ~ 3 within thooe botmdories 0 freo hana to move
a~~ wit~in which there would be conflict. We could not accept that,
of courne.
Comul.ssicn:
Houl~;. it not be true that ur.dor U I " ~ · line ther0 woule be conflict as to
a.uth0rity7
Dr. Sjarifuddin:
I clo not think so, Sir. I:Z' our troops ore on this side of tho line onc
t!:c1rs arc on the othe:!:' side the "cease fire B order could be observed,
but not while our troopo a",o behind these lines. It would be ~ossible
othcrwioo.
!Commission:
• • • , • ... ~ ~ tI" I >, ..
.. I ~.. , • .
8/586Page 0)
COCX1.ission:
C..n ;rou tell us m:ytl1inG more definite them thet. Did h8 pUSG the era.er
on to you?
~ r . Sjurifuddin:
Dr. vcn Nook 6.olivered 0. speech on AUGust 2nd in whl.::h he said. t l ~ a t
tl:ere 1vould be given o r t ~ e r s to his trocps to cease hostilities. It
1'TC S <1r.I1ouni.l e ci. b:/ rudj.0 • ( Dr. S j arifud din turne Cl. to Mr. l·lcr3Illi s :
He scid it when? I tbinl~ on tbe first Cl" necone. of AUi-ust because
1le have the te:(t of the speech. Setiadjit: Second, OI' August).
Commission:
The Republican Government complained thnt they d i ~ not receive throuD1
the ;)utch GOV01"r..ment the Uni tee:!. Nations request to "cense i'ire" until
one 0 I clock P.UE,ust It·th. Is that COl"roct?
Dr. S j a r i f u d d ~ n :
Correct.
COnmllssion:
Did. it m.cke any difference that the" ceC'.so fire" order vlas not received
until one o'clock on the 4th August?
Dr. Sjarifuddin:
Yes. Dr. von Mook iseuec. his ,order on the 4th AUGust 1'1hile we hael only
one dny - not even one day, we received the order one 0' clock in the
morning. He had only one day to issue the crders over the 1'Thole of
Inc1.onesia.
Co:mmissicn:
Hhat Lcncral mili-cory measures vT0re tE:ken to Give effect to the
"c€Jase fire" order?
Dr. Sjariruddin:
I think the firGt thing to do is to issue a "stund fast" ore.er and
th€Jn decide upon the demarcation line. v l ~ must talk abuut it firet.
I thir..k the Dutch trooIJo within our bcro.er ohoulo. 1'11thdrmr to these
~ e ~ ~ r c a t i o n lines ~ n d our troops return to thoso territcries. In. -.tl:o.t 1'Tcy I tl:irl<.: it '\-TcuB. be peasible to maintain e.nd -:bserve the
"coo.oe fire".
Corn.issi:.::n:
\;01.1.10. 1 t be :pr:lCtico.l to do this?
Dr. S,jcrH'uddin:
Not et this time vli th the existinG van Mock line.
CoI!ll!li 0 s:'on:
In Y O t ~ opinion would it be pro.cticnl to define a line ccreeable to
both sid.es at thifJ s t o : ~ c ?
lIt only
8/580Eo.e;e 66
~.s ,jc.r:'fu<.ldin:
It o n l ~ r dc]?ends "Thieh line it is. Of courso, it is not only a mill tar,Y
question, it is also a ]?olitical question. I thir~ that as
m a t t e : : . . ~ s now stand "re cannot reach a solution. He cannot. haye talks
no", \o1ith the Dutch while this van Mook line exists because as we
stated before we Ct~ln0t accept the van Mook line, which wao Qeci~eQ
from one side only. If the van Hook line exist::: ,.,a will 50 on in
these areas'.
Commi seion:
.': ~ . ; '.' - .
...:.,';: ..
Hm., \-TQuld you determine a line in the place of the van Nook line?
On ,-,hat basis?
Dr. Sjarifuddin:
Ol cou!'ce we ClJIlIlot decide by ourselves. He must talk about it •
Commission:
Posts at suitable places (these may have been moved sliGhtly owinu to
short notice of stand-still).
Dr. Sjarifuddin:
In Hest Java the Dutch have moved more than 100 kilometers since the
4th AUGUst. We have sent a statement to the Security Council. In
Middle Java 80 kilomcters and E ~ s ~ Java 50.kolometers, as is shown
on the map •••••Sector Salatiea, Tasikmnlaja, Garoet, Pamekanan, Garoet
and Tasikmalaja are verJr impcrtant centres. These are places that the
Dutch occupied after the fourth of f t u ~ u s t .
Commission:
Lines or Communication.
Dr. S~arifUdcin:
The~e are no lines of communication within our territory.
CommiGsion:
i-lould you acree thut the Dutch have the richt under the "cease fire"
of unhinr:.ered communication betimen their bases and their forward. posts?
:Or. S jari:L~uq,c:l}~:
Yes if ·they have occu]?ied the strcnL,holc1s along t ~ ~ o s e lines, not if
they m c ~ ~ l y advance 100 kilometers and they have troops only in those
pests at the end of those 100 Ifilorn.eters. He cannet cive them 8uthoritJ
in trcse places.
ComIni ssL::'.:
S u r : : , , ' ) ~ : ' n L on Au£;tl.st 4th the Dutch hud advanced to c.ertain places uno.
aceo::':::':;'.1£; to the "cease fire" orc.er they wore ccmpelled to stone' still?
/If they
• " • ~. .. • - ... • 1 t .J ' , 'I(y
• '.' •. , ." - ~ . I." • " I .': • .:. • • • ._.. • ':.' •••• ";'.'. ~ : . ' > "
8/586Page 61
Dr. G:'[:rifu(lci.in~
If they had occupieci. the intervening territory. You COllnot keep a
co1'ri(lor between two places. He .~annot reco[,nise tllGir C:.uthorHy
over those ureas between pcsts. The areas b€lti'1een these places erc
o t : L ~ . l uncal' our centrol. Of' course i-le e:m have talks with the Dutch
ab0ut their communications. If that is L e s i d e ~ b e ~ w e e n us they can
have freedom of transport tWice a da:/ or four times a day under ::,ur
authority.
Commisoion:
Hculd you agree that sup!,osinE-, the Dutcb had two posts in the fCri-wrc'
area on AUGust 4th that they hac any riGht to free access between the
two posts ••• accorclinr, to the "ceo.se £'ire"?
Dr. Gjarifuddin:
That only depends if they are in reality occupying those areas. Hhat
they have (l.one in most p.lDees is tl:at they advanceci. with tanks and
a r ~ o u r e c i . cars in only small numbers and occupied those placas but
they did not occupy the area be.t,-reen those places.
Commission:• I .
Then you consider tlJat lines of communication may be' attacked. by
Indonesian troops without·, violating the If cease fire'" orC' er?
Dr. S j a r i f u ~ d i n :
That is our point.
COI!IDlission:
Hot~ld you aGree that the Dutch are entitlec) to resist·:!.f' they are
attacked?
Dr. Sjerifuddin:
Yes, in the same way we re~iDt.
Commisr3ion:
.0' • ':-, }Trom a military point of view (10 J ou consiC.er the Dutch tc have enouGh
troo!,s to occupy all the areas?
Dr. G.jcrifudclin:
No, not enou[h troops but Dr. ven Mock by Gtnting those new d e ~ ~ c o t i o n
lines hO:3 nOy1 concentrated tr<.lcps for instonce in 'Host Java, beccuce
'..Jr- the bounc.arie IJ we. arc not miP11osccl. to be f'i::..htine. Tr.erefore, it
is not nccessur:,;r to have mt:n,y troops there.
Commissi:-u:
!'!avlll bloclmc..o (hO"1 diffol'inC frot: !Jrocod.ure before) •
Dr. S .iari £'tto.C'..in :
Havel b l o c ~ : E l , l e is the so.me as before •. I only think it is rr.ore strinc;er.t
n0'\01. He CUI'.not mIlort medicines, textiles and so on. (Setiadj1t:
complete blcc1:ac.e). Com!,letc 1 J l c l ~ k c r l e .
CCImudon:
Thero is no ~ i f f e r e n c e now? INo.
8/586Page 68
I'~o •
Commission:
Is it the case that products that do not come from f o r e i ~ n estates are
~ e r Y . i t t e d to be exported throuch the blockade?
Net only that Sir, because we have expcrtec r.ice to India but
ue cannot take this out b;:,' importi11£; textiles to Ino.onesia. He
cc.r..not use it because the Dutch claim that part of that money be1ol1gs
te the Dutch Government.
Commission:
I understand that during the peried of March 1946 there have been
:<:. exported from Java and Sl..lIIlatra 290 million Singapc'l're dol1ar1'J,
mainly from Sumatra.
My understandinG is naval b10ckacle ,,'as put o ~ partly 'co prevent
the export of Goods which might belong 'to foreirr,n concerns, but that
Goods and produce of Indonesian estates were beinG permitted to pas8
through the blockade. Is that still t ~ e case?
Dr. S j a r i f u d ~ ;
Partly so but we have sugar factories here that are o'iIled by Indonesian
concerns and part of these stocks have been taken b,Y the 1)utch. For
instance factorjes around Djocja and Soerakarta are owned by the
Indonesians.
CoIllnl. ssfen:-'tTas that particular question ever taken up '\-lith the Dutch?
q. S .1arifuddin:
We talked about it alreadY and before the 20th July we reached an
oQreement about this.
Commission:
And after that?
Dr. ;:3 .~,'lrifuddin:
It's war.
CCI".Jnission:
Is there any practicable me(·no of import. ancl export 't'Tithin the areCt of
which Djocja is the centre?
Dr. Sjarifuddin:
Yes, three days aco a ship left Pctjitun.
Connni se:' '::>n:
It ran the blockade?
/Yeo,
• • .. ". • • • \.. • • I
\ ' rJ" .""'. ." ~ , , .. •
8/586Pagec9
Dr. Sjurifuddin:
,', .
. ~. '" :.; -:;.':
Yes, it's still possible.
Co:rnmission:
In list of allegations of infrinGements of "cease fire" I think I
remember seeine a number of occasions on which Dutch warships came
within the three mile limit without doing anythinc in particular.
Do you attach any importance to that?
Dr. S,iarifuddin:
Yes, this is still war. There is no peace anc every time a ship comes
there people in the inland may feel that they '\07i11 try to land troops
there. I do not thilUc it is necessary for Dutch to enter these waters
if they have no plans.
Commi ssion:I
I refer to this letter of van Mook to the Government of the Republic
en July 20th••• the blockade situation at Medan.
Dr. S,jarifuddin::
It was a food blockade in that area.
Connnission:
I think you are Going to •••that you cave orders to stop this before
21st July•.
Dr. Sjarifuddin:
Yes.
Commission:
Orcers for the latter were given by you?
Dr. Sjarifuddir:
\-Ie cave orders and l.,e wrote to the Dutch that we have given this order,
but then at that stage the situation in MeQan was very tense between
the demarcation lines•
CornmiGsion:
Police action (July 20th).
Dr. S,jarifuddin:
\'Ie never considered the militar'J action taken by the Dutch as police
action. I do net think it is a common thill5 that police action is taken
by usinc planes, by strafing, by using landing craft which they did in
Eazt Java in several places. landed troops, heavy artillery, tariks,
bombers and fichters.
CoI!llJ1ission:
In radio speech of van Mook on July 21st he said the military measures
which they have to undertake are police measures, not directed against
the Indonesian people or against Indonesian liberty or only aGainst
/those
8/586Page 70
those powers cnd troups "7hich in reality obstruct the l:i.beration of the
c01:.ntry. Did van Mook ever specify to th'e Republic whe.t theso Groups
',Tere or in "That way that they might be acting?
Dr. S,jari'::udd.in:
I do not think that those &,TOUPS exist. He conoider that the groupG
mentioned. by van Hook are not .existingin the Republic.
CommiGsion:
Is it not to be presluned. that police action would. only be taken aGainst
u n o r g ~ ~ 1 s e d and a n t i ~ s o c i a l alements?
D.,., S j""" ,,:.; i-l •• • I ~::.!; .•'~:..!. ......-E.
Yes,' ·Jf course, but Dr. van Mock, I ·think, foreets that the ,resistance
he me-!j was not from groups but from the Ro,public as an orGanisation.
ColIlI:li ssi()n~
I su~?ose the excuse for a police'action would be the non-existence of
o r d i n a ~ ~ l y peaceful conditions in the country or region concerned. Hero
thex'e sufficiently peacefUl conttl.tions in those areas?
He clz,},1.Jl that law and order was maintained here and "re dono't object ~ o
h a v i ~ an international commission here to look for themselves. In fact,
we proposed it before but the Dutch did not agree.
CoIllI!li saion:
Can you give us any indication of whut group van Mook referred to?
I t!:irll{: he thouGht about what he calls Extremist 0 •
COI!mli ssi()n~
Anti. not the Republican urrn,y?
I do :.1': c; think so because the Republican army was' recognised "Then the
Allied forceo were here. I, as Minister of Defence have sicned t'70
e G r e e ~ e n t s with ~ l e British forces here and the Indonesian RepUblic has
und.erte!.I:.:Jn t1'TO tasks - the evacuation of internees and evacuation of
JananeS3 forces. Our a ~ r was recognised as an'organisation and not as..1'1il0, troops or banda. .
Commission:
Are there any irregular troops?
Dr. S . i a r i f ~ ( l d . i n :
I thinl~ there arc croups o ~ e r a t i n e now in Dutch-held territ9ry • of courso
"Te do not control tho se croups. It may be a r::iti zens movement.
ComIni ssion:
~ o you recognise bands of those who are operatinc•••
INo.
8/586Page 71
Dr. Sjarifuddin: '
No. We cannot specify. 1'le do not recognise those ~ x : 81.'.matra as pnrts
ef the Republican amy. I just received a cable from Dr. Hatta.
(Hr. lcmbert discussed SOtle of the damage in'
Sumatra which he noticed on his last tour).
Br. Sjarifuddin:
Our t ~ o p s are ~ n s t r u c t e d to eliminate those bands.
2,oImlJ.i ss:'on:
lies any marked pro/;ress been made?
Dr. S j e.rifuddin:
There is a report that they 'Here driven to the north.
CommissioE:
A Great deal has been said about looting and damaGe. In a state of
ai"fairs like this that there would be extremists who are without control.. ,
Would you say that during this year substantial proBres8 has been made
in briDGinG these bands under control?
Dr. S j a r ~ f u d d i n :
More thenproE;ress, becauSEl the · t ~ t h Groups who are f 1 g h t ~ G bere are
now' in the National arm.Y. We iSlU6'd a decree at the end of May that
all lads over a certain age must be tclcen OVer.
Commission:
Are you f a i r ~ · well satisfied with tbe General discipline of the
Republican forces?
EE.:..§ .jnrif'~:
Yes..:- .....: .....
.: ' ~ " ~ . ,". .: . ~ . : .<- :
Commission:
If fucilities were given y,,)U to give orders to all those in Dutch
territory 1 they ,wu1d follow your orders?
Dr. S.:j 'J.1':l. fuddin:
I do not think so, because it is n a t t ~ a l that there should be a
resist~~ce IDOvenent •••not before the political issue has been decided.
COI::missicn:
Air a ~ t i o n . (Illustrations from a1lecations by other sice).
Dr. S j a : ' i ~ ~ :
D u r i n ( ~ thu fichtinG the Dutch made use of bombers and fiGhters; they
bombed several ~ l u c e s and strafoo. daily; also civilian trains, too.
The:r still used. aircrai't ci'ter August 4th; they dropped paratroops in
the neichbourhood of Tasihrealaya.
C01Jil!'J.ssion:
1Ie ~ e f 0 r to Question 3 (r.) concerninc security measures.
/Do you
S/526Pa5e 72
Dr. SJarifttdd,in:
<.;;::: :-....
.',',.' .. , .
~o you mean security measures that should be taken i ~ , o c c u p i e d . t e ~ r i t o r y
or in the interior?
Conm:dssion: .
In the interior, of course.
Dr. Sjarifuddin:
In the interior there are no special security measures to be take?, I
think. Fore,iGn properties and communications ••• I do not understancl
w}:at is 'meant.
Commission:
Text should be "communities".
Dr. Sjarifuddin:
In the territory which io still under our control, I think normal
situation still prevails. We have taken some'measures concerninG Chinese.
He ordered the Chinese to be br.ought back to the places and to punish
those 'Hho are robbing, but incidents occurred in parts were fighting
occurred between Indonesians and Chinese.
Commission:
Were any special m e a ~ e s taken after AU5ust 4th to make sure ~ h a t the
, popUlation was not molested especially ,Chinese against whom it was allegec
a number of attacks were made by bandits?
Dr. SjarifuddiE:
He have taken a lot of measures to safeguard the lives and properties
especially the lives of Chinese encountered on the border areas, e.g.
areas around Keboemen. Police have arrested 117 people who robbed the
people around Poerwoedadi. They have also arrested a lot of people in
the Malang area. He are still investigating all these affairs. He
h~ve some organisations but we are still investigating these affairs.
He suspect that they are sent by the Dutch to make tt:ouble. We are
still investiGating.
Commissicn:
1fere measures taken to safeguard the liv.es and property of Chinese?
Dr. 3jcrifuddin:
BeZore the outbreak of the 'attack we had already taken measures but it
did not prove to be sufficient because the provocative actions are very
sreat. The Chinese Consul-General asked us to create a Security Corps
but this was rejected because \7e do not think it riGht that one port of
the population has its own police force. We created a system for
:protectint the to'\>r.n. The tmm is divided into parts and each part L.• s
El head man of tuenty houses end Chinese and Indonesians are members of
that :preservation corps.
!Comission:
• .:. •• i : • '.-. , . . . '. '" ' ~..... _ ~ ,.' ~ .' • ~ _' .. ~ . . . ~ ~ _. '. ~ ~ '. ~ . . ._.... ~ . _
8/586Page 73
C:,!:rrol.iasion:
Hew im~ortant do you consider the attacks on the Chinese? Were they
in [reat or small numbers?
Dr. Sjerifuddin:
1'Then Dutch attacks began in those areas, looting o c c u r r e ~ , especially
of the Chinese.
Comr.ission:
Were there any troubles before July 20th?
Dr. Sjarifuddin:
Just minor troubles bafore the 20th JulY.' Relations between the
Chinese and the Indonesians were weak.
Conllni saion:
Question c o n c ~ r n i n g Indians and Arabs.
Dr. Sjarifuddin:
Not correct. These'allegations may be correct for East Sumatra where
there is u larGe Indian cOnmllUl1ty.
Commission:
As result of "scorched earth" llolicy, were many foreign properties
destroyed?
Dr. Sjarifuddin:
Yes, forei6n properties, not only Dutch.
Commission:
Was 'che destruction extensive?
Dr. Sjm-ifuddin:
I think mostly Dutch p r o p e l ~ Y .
Commission:
vIas there any special reason for the looting of the Chinese?
~ j a r i : f u d d i n :
No special reason but just because the Chinese are rich. Of course
looting did not only occur against Chinese, but against our own people,
too, but most Chinese are rich. They are mostly shopkeepers.
Commission:
Have you any complaints against the Chinese?
Dr. S~arifuddin:
V70 arrested some Chinese who are spies and did fifth c o l ~ work. But
OIl the other sid.e it is know that the Dutch e:rmy is using Chinese
individuals in the Dutch troops. They are Netherlands subjects but are
stHl Chinese in our eyes. The Dutch are arming the Chinese; they
have created the Pau An Tui. They are considered to be on the Dutch
si~e by the troops and that is creating much trouble. The Chinese are
s D . ~ ' i n G that they ore defending their properties but i'Te ere saying that t h e ~
ere on the Dutch side.
8/58cPage 74
. ~. .• .; .. '';,<
Ccmission:
R0t'erred to question 3(h) concerning Civil A d m i n i s t ~ l 3 : t i , o n .
Dr. SjQrifuddin:
\'[09 have instructed our 'Peo'Ple not to follow the Dutch ,and not to
cc-o'Perate because after 4th August they have forced our' 'Peo'Ple to..' .
liquidate the Re'Publican Civil Service. We consider this a hostile act
because they want to dissolve our organisation.
Commission:
How many civil administration officials are working with the Dutch?
Dr. 8jarifuddin:
V e ~ J tew. I donlt think it.is ~ or 7 per ~ e n t ~
Commission:
Will action be taken against these 'People when these areas c o ~ e once
more under your control?
Dr. Sjarifuddin:
Yes, and rightly so.
Commission:
Question.re payment.
Dr. Sjarifudd1n:
If ~ . , e can send the tllOney we can pay them from here.
Commission:
So you agree to them carrying on the work?
Dr. S,j:lrifuddin:
Generally speaking, no; but if they can do something for our population
then, of course, they can work.
Commission:
Is it realised that they are working under Dutch control?
Dr. 8jarifulidin:
There are instances that the Dutch allow our people to be paid by the
Republican Government, for example, the Central Hospital. at Batavia
ls still run by Republican,doctors and paid by us.
Commission:
Question re principles of van Mookis speeches of July 21st, August 29th
and August 30th - i.e. that the Dutch wanted to remove the present
R e p u b l i ~ a n Government, but not to destroy the Ropublic.
Dr. S j a r : ! . : : ' u . d d i : ~ ' l :
I do;) not think this is a question of the principles laid down by
Dr. van Mook but this question is important f o ~ us but if the Civil
Sorvice is going on it is a question whether it ia a Civil Service of
the Republic or of the Dutch. They have come to new territories by
/their military
8/586Page 75
their :n1litary action. We do not think we can order our people to
c o - o p c r a t ~ with the Dutch.
Comnission:
The point to be decided then is whether the Civil Service on the other
side of the van Mook" Hne is the service of the Republic or the
Netherlands East Indies Government?
Dr. SjarifUddin:
Yes.
Commission:
Is it a fact that many former Republican civil servants are carrying
on their ~ l o r k with the Dutch and that they realise they are Republicans
and thp.ir work is· for the good of the Indonesian people and, aa I said,
r e ~ s e payment? What 1s your general attitude?
Dr. Sjarifuddin:
They must refuse p ~ e n t fram. the Dutch Government t and if we can
send money we pay it from here.
Commission:
But if you cannot eend money?
Dr. Sjarifuddin:
Then the trouble begins.
Commission:
I presume they must get money to live?
Dr. Sjarifuddin:-Ue send them money. llhy can't an agreement be reached with the Dutch
tliut we send money?
Comm:i.ssion:
:' ..
. .Is it not very hard on the Civil Service if they wish to benefit the
population without regard to politics?
])-1'. S jarifuddin:
I think it is much harder for them not to be loyal to the RepUblic.
Commission:
They are at heart good Republicans? And some of them are expecting. .'.
J ~ help while they are carrying out their jobs because they are
accepting money so that they can live, and I understand that that
money is in the nature of an advance and not a straiBht-out payment.
In this case do you still object to them carrying on?
Dr. Sjarifuddin:
H'e ha',e ordered them not to receive money from the Dutch.
COI:J:lUS sian:
Are these people intimidated in any ~ l a y ?
Dr. Sjarifuddin:
/The civil serTice
• -', • , : ' "~, ". ~ _ ,.. ~ . • _ # - " ~~.' ~ _'" _" ~ - _. ~ , ~ _ ~ ; t :
creating a ne~" police force .there to set up
They' arc using o t ~ organisation for the time
to consolidate ·their positiO:1S in those areas.
..... .:. -:.:-:
"':,:::-::"':. :
S/58bPa.ge 76
The oivi1 service is not intimidated by the Central Government'but:we
only send orders not to co-operata with the Dutch and not to receive
salaries from the Dutch.
Commi'ssion:
.How does the situation here compare with the occupied countries in
EUi:'o"!?e?
D'..~1j·~h ::'l.iminate nevT Residents, Chiefs-of-Police and heads of Government
de!'c.::: ::~.,."'nts • They come into new to~ms, and they appoint n e ~ . , people,
.not o r u ~ " Residents, loorahs, but also Chiefs of the Police.
Commission:..
In these cases what do you want your people to do?
Dr. Sjarifuddin:
T11e general orders that were issued ~ " e r e that they were not to co-operate
UHih the Dutch.
Commission:
What, in your opinion, can they do?
Dr. Sjarifuddin: •.
Resist the Dutch in consolidating their positions.
COmm:!.SSJ.Oi.'l:
Do y.)'.l contend that they should leave the territory and come over to
R e ; " Q : ~ l i c a n territOr"J?
Dr. S j a r ~ f u d d i n :
Some of. them have left. If they cannot .do any good for tho people there.,
t!:J.f'q !Ill':'3t go. One hun.d.:ced and five of our police stayed at Malang. The
Dm,;::::: ep.,-.epted them 1;1:10. p,llid their salaries. They received orders from:
us and ' ~ h e y refused tna m.oney but the Dutch are creatins a new police
force. They are only using our people for the time being.
CommissiO::l.:
(·Il: ..;::':; ~,) .YO'l.t vrant ·them to do?
Dr Sj "''''',L1'''': ' ~ " ~ '• =-":'!"'i':_:~I..;~~J...~·
Leave Malang. They are
their own organisation.
beine because they want
Commission:--_....-vTould it not be better for the Republicans to remain at their posts
until the situo.tion ~ · r a s c10ared up?
Dr. S.jarifuddin:
But not if the heads are Dutch. It would then be a Dutch civil
organisation, not Republican.
Commission:
/This question
8/586Page 77
........... ,.,;... :.. -: ...
. '. .. ;:.;. ~ " .
This q.uestion has a certain bearing on the "cease fire" order because
presumably this increases bitterness.
Dr. Sjarifuddin:
In some cases civil servants were shot when they refused to co-operate
with the Dutch. r,oTe can give you the names.
Commission:
Hould you be prepared to enter into conference vli th the DUtch concerning
formation of'a'joint police force?
Dr. Sjarifuddin:
This is not possible at present. I thi~ after talks would be held With
the Tri-partite commission.
Commission:
Concerning the van Mook Line. vlhy do you think van Mook made his speech
on August 29th and not on the day of the "cease fire"order?
Dr. 8jarifuddin:
Because our troops are still there and we still m a L ~ t a i n communication
with them; also our civil service is still there and they all have orders
from. our Central Government at Jogjakarta. He are now trying to decide
the status of territory behind the van Hook Line. Deciding.the ~ t a t ~ s
of "cease hostilities" is a question of poli"Cics.
Commiss:J.on:
Hh.y did he make the statement on 29th August?
. Dr. 8jar1fuddin:
Meanwhile his troops a:dvanced in West Java, for instance, Caroet and
Tasikmaluya. They occupied these centres. The statement of the"'
van Mook line '\>TUS made on the same day as we recei-red the report
concerning the decision of the Security Council of forming a tri-partite
commission.
Commission:
Could a line be tracod on a map in accordance with the speech of van Mook?
Dr. Sjarifuddin:
No, because 'bhey never sent a communication o ~ the statement; they only
made the s t a t e ~ n t by radio.
Commission:
vfuat are the possibilities of re-opening negotiations concerning a
domarcation line?
Dr. Sjarifuddin:
It all depends on the Goodwill of both parties.
Commission:
Question re tri-partite commission.
Dr. S,jarifuddin:
/This lViil
8/586PaGe 78
This will depend, I think, on what political solution can be achieved
c . f t e r ~ " a r d s . This demarcation line could only be a temporary. measure
until wc have solved this problem.
Ccmmission:
Question concerning bands.
D ~ . Sjarifuddin:
There are no private forces. They were dissolved in May so' that in
tlTO years we will have the actual control.
Connnission:
Concerning c o n ~ o l of Republican forces. l'llio is responsible for the
discipline and c o n t ~ o l of the army?
Dr. Sjl.ll'ifuddin:
Tho Commander.in.Chief through me as M i n i s t e ~ f o ~ Defence.
Commission:
Does·this apply to Java and Sumatra?
~ . S j a ~ i f u d d i n :
Yes.
Commission:
Does Dr. Hatta as Vice-President have a parliamentary set-up similar
to that in Java?
Dr. 8jarifuddin:
Ho, he acts on his o ~ m authority. tV'e have also sent two High. Commissioners
who ar~ ~esp~nsible to the Cabinet. We brought this into effect after
JUly 21st· b e ~ a u s e communications were difficult. We still have
telo(S.C'uphic communications but not communications by ship or by air.
Commission:
Is it true that in Atjeh the armed forces are under the ~ o n t r o l o ~ the
No.sjoemi?
Dr. Sjarifuddin:
'rhe oraanisation is too small there. The Masjoemi has no meaning in .
SUllllltra•. The P.N. I ..is b.igGer in Java and Sumntra.
Commission:
It has been suggested that the number of casualties may be alleviated
b;}r the mutual agreement of both 'parties to withdraw supporting arms,
i.o. artillery, airplanes anu mortars.
Dr. Gjarifuddin:
Can't we agree With the Dutch that no artille~J will be used by the
Dutch, no tanks.
Cornmi seion:
Do you sUBgest that to the Dutch or to us?
Dr. 8j~rifuddtn:
II oug38 st
.:~.,' • I • - .... - :....,. - -4 • ~. ' ••: ~ •• ~ ~ . ~ '. - ••
. ,
.8/586Page 79
I sugscst it to you. It is one of the thinas that wo can do right now.
(Co~ission montioned amens themsolves that having mortars constitutes'
heavy artillery, etc. At the mention-of mortars, 8jarifuddin agreed.)
(The following notes 1'lere resumed after discussion of "suggestions for
reducing casualties" O l ~ for better observance of "cease fire'" had already
started.) ,
Commission:
Is there any prospect of negotiating an agreement between the Dutch
and Indonesians as to roads 1 ~ h i c h may be used for 'supplies?
Dr. Sjarifuddin:
He can agree to some roads. The main point is vlest Java where they
have declared the territory within the van Mook line to be Dutch
territory and on that count they feel they can move freely; but if our
troops are still there I,think the observance of the "cease fire" order
cannot be made, because the Dutch consider the movement of troops and ..
moppins up not as a breach of hostilities and because'they declared this
territory to be theirs; but if our troops are still there, we cannot.
order t h ~ m to surrender without,resisting.
Commission:
The Commission might consider some proposals with relation to West Ja~a~
Dr. Sjarifuddin:
East Java. There we have more regiments end they are now dispersed,
but troops are still there ••• ~ ••• I mean East of Malang.
Commission:
If you were to agree to certain roads for supplies to Dutch posts,
presumably the Dutch might be asked to reciprocate to a communication
road to troops in East Java.
Dr. 8jarifuddin:
And West Java.
Oommission:
Would¥ou be prepared to diSCUSS, .without altering the position in any
ifcy, the reducing of casualties with some of your military officers
and Dutch officers, with possibly an observer from the Consular 0ommission?
Dr. 8jarifuddin:
Qui to possibly, bu·b tho.n we prefer not to have taU:s in Djocja or
Butavia.
CoIlllll1ssion:
iiithout any complications at all you would be preparod? Evon to cut
out the use of artillory, that still means telks. Have you any
suggestions as to vrhere the talks might take place?
Dr. Sjarifuddin:
/Singapore.
SiI1!3apore.
Cnr-:misoion:
::."...... ; '.':',
Could there ~ l s o be political t a J k ~ on the same level?
Dr. Sjarifuddin:
Would it not be ~nticipating •••••••
(conversation concerning Three Power Commission and reduction of
casuulties on the n u m o n i ~ r i a n side could not be heard.)
Commiosion:
Could we get a definite proposal from you along those lines?
Dr. Sjarifuddin:
We cannot decide now.
Commission:
vTould you be willing for the Commission to explore With the Dutch the
possibility of putting into effect the suggestions being made today?
Dr. Sjarifuddin:
Yes.
Commission:
vrhat are the feelings of the population in re-occupied areas?
(statement in reply to this questi6n was read - copy attached hereto).
Commission:, .
What is the Republican attitude towards Separatism?
Dr. Sjarifuddin:
I do not think it is a movement, but it is inspired by the Dutch. It is
not a mOvement of the population itself •••••
commission:
Could we have a statement on the "scorched earth" policy?
Dr. Sjarifuddin:
It is one of the defensive measures, economically and in the military
•
.,
l?o Y09- have a ; l ~ s t of the "scorched earth" activities?
Sjarifuddin: ,
Yes, of all the result3 as far as the reports have been sent us, because
most are now occurring in Dutch-held territory. We still have reports
from people there. (Report was then read).
sense, too.
Commission:
Dr.
.. .-: . ~'.: ; .
CO!l'Jllissicn:
Does llscorched earth" also extend to destroying cropo?
Dr. Sjarifuddin:
In some places rice crops have been destroyed because wc discovered
tendency of tho Dutch was to take the crops as soon as they are there.
COIn.lmS sion:
lIt is
-------------------
6/586Page 81
It Le the definite policy as a weapon?
Dr. S jc.r}- t:uddin:
Y e ~ j •
Comm.:LsG5.on:
As 0. weapon for use during the Dutch attacks or during the present
situation?
Dr. Sjarifuddin:
Cnly in Dutch attacks.
Commission:
lie visited·a sugar factory where t h e ~ e was fire-wood piled up and we
were told that there was dynamite also for use in the "scorched earth"
policy. Is this true?
Dr. Sjarifuddin:
Only used in case the Dutch come .to that factory.
Commission:
In Sumatra there hnv0 been places destroyed recently where the Dutch
had not moved in.
Dr" S ,1~:.rifuddin:
But I think it was done ~.,hen Dutch troops moved towards those estates.
Commission:
Is it your policy at present with your troops remaininB in Dutch
territory to carry on destruction of facilities to avoid use of them
by the Dutch?
Dr. Sjarifuddin:
Yes. If the Dutch are going on with their attacks as in West Java,
\Te must do that to defend ourselves.
Commi3sion:
>: .
Is it t:ue that estates and factories have been fired over nisht because
they wore not defended although there was no direct provocation? Is
that part of the "scorched earth" policy too? .
Dr. S jarifuddin:
No, only if there is an attack on our own te~ritory, If there is still
0. resistance movement of the people in Dutch territory, then it is not
pert of the policy of the G o v e r r ~ n t ,
Commission:
Wv Wish to return briefly to the previous question - are the people's
fvelings'that they do not want Dutch interests hero or are they merely
against Colonialism?
Dr', Sj~ rifuddin:
It is a protest against the Colonial system, not against the D ~ t c h
as human belngs,
lIt has
- ~ - - - - - - - - - - -
8/586Page 82
Commission:
It flas be,m alleged that certain elements ~ ' 7 a n t the Dutch out of the
I:-;lands.
~ ~ 3 , j : : r i f u d d i n ~
Only the troops. Economically, lle need the Dutch.
Comroissicl::
Hhat are the economic conditions in re-occupied aJ:'eas - improvements
or otherwise since?
Dr. 8 Ijc.r1fuddin~
In the first place, where Dutch are occupying territories tlley force
the RepUblican currency to go out or they make decrees that a fixod
rute is accepted by the people. That, of course, is decreasing our
n:oney power there and it is not an improvement of the economic
uituation. vlhere there are Dutch troops, trade between Dutch-held
torritory and ours i6, of course, ma,de more difficult than 1l0rmD,lly.
I think these ~ : o tendencies make it v ~ r y difficult for our people
in Dutch-hold territory. It's a question of money and trade.
Commission:
Can you enlarge more on the monetary question? In some cases you are
still u a i ~ Japanese money?. ".~.
Dr. Sjarifuddin:
Only in 8umatra.
Commission:
It has a bearing •••• it has an effect on the feelings of the peoplo
towards the other side.
Dr. Sjarifuddin:
He cannot send our currenC"J to Sumatra. The Dutch have made it
impossible.
Conmrl3sion:
will you honour Japanese currency in 8umatra when the situation i3
cleared up?
Dr. Sjcrifuddin:
No, it will be changed for our currency.
:mat treatment do you give to Dutch money in Republican territory?
Dr. Sjarifuddin:
He hOod an agreement in November of 1946 thc.t Dutch and Republican money
could be used freely in occupiod areas end the border regions, but
actually Dutch monoy is not legal tender in Republican territory and
Rupublican money is not legal tender in Dutch territory.
Connnisr!ton:
/rro.s the
.... .... ':' '~~:~lf .' '.' .. ' .,' ,.' _ ....,. >,:.' .", .' ~. .' ,'-" : " ','
8/586Page 83
.••••••< ; •• •
Was the rate of exchanse fixed at that time between Dutch and
Republican money?
Dr. SJarifuddin:
No, ve could not reach an agreement.
COlllI:1isoion:
Has the value of Republican money increased or docreased?
Dr. Sjarifuddin:
Incroased.
Commission:
How ls the Republican note issue c o ~ ~ r o l l e d ?
Dr. SjarifuddJ1::
Since July 21st it has increased•
Commission:
Why? On what basis?
Dr. Sjarifuddin:
Because we need much more money.
Comission:
For what purpose?
Dr. Sjarlfuddin:
For war purposeS.
Commission:
You realise that that is liable to cause inflation?
Dr. Sjarifudd!n:
Yes.
Ccmmission:
Do you fir.d the purchase value remains steady?
Dr. Sjarifuddin:
It is going dmnl.
Commission:
Can you stop it?
Dr. Sjarifuddin:
We hope to stop it after the settlomont of this war.
C0mmbsicn:
In "That vTO.y is it bacl:ed ~ l 3 a i n s t production?
Dr. 8.jc.rlfuddi~:
The value 'of the produce l',hich •••• '
COInm.1.ss10n:
Do you have tariff of your own in the Republic ••• theoretically?
Dr. Sjarifuddin:
Yoa.
C0!ZlI;Jission:
/Are there any •••
'. • ;.... v. I" . . '. . .. " / ' . ;'• " \" 1. .." • of •
• ,,,; •• " pe' • I .. ..... ..' '. ri!"
.' ". , ~. ~ I ~ ~. • '. ..;. J • '. • • • • • ) •
\ ....' .', : " . •• • !
8/526Page 84
Are there any
Dr. 8jQrifuddin:
Free Trade.
Commis sion:
Hew old is that tariff?
Dr. 8jarifuddin:
.;. ;'.-;; . ~ '.. ' . :
Collllllission:
In regard to the economic conditions of the people, are there larBe
numbers of refugees in one part or the other ••• in Dutch or Indonesian
territories?
Dr. 8ja~~:
Thero are 728,000 refugees registered in Republican territory.
UDtt1i is the reason for movement of the refugees?
E ! : . . . . § } ~ f . ~ . f E ~
To 60t out of war areas and to avoid the distress of war.
Commission:
It is suggested that persons who have a certain amount ~f money in
R e p l ~ ~ l ~ Q a n notes may get out of Dutch t e r r i t o r ~ for the reason that
t't;::)'i€' : : ~ o t e 8 are no ~onger honoured. Is that a major factor?
Dr. S j ~ ~ ~ ? ; ~ : : : ; ~ ~ i . ~ } :
No, this movement sterted before the Dutch arrived.
Comm:i.sdL)T'J.:
r.I.... ;)': ':;ne Government feed the refugees?
:lITot i':,ll' ot them. A number of thom have money enough to buy their
o ~ - m food.
CommisaioIl:
In Th'J Cl1!JC.uct of its bus1ne:'Js 1 the Government has to have revenue
and.: 0.<\ 0. :'esult, taxes. Are these ta.::-::es in the form ~f money or goods?
pr. S jo.r~~·~~:l:f.li
In mcney and Boods. From. peasants we take goods according to the
lanJ r 8 U ~ system still in force.
Commis.- '~-"J:
V~1~~ happons to the refugees ••• are they put to work or in camps?
Dr. 8jo.~lfuddin:
~'le put them to 1mrk. It is not necessary to put them in camps because
~ l C can put them. in villal30o.
COIl'Juission:
IHave you
.". o· .' -.. .... !. .....
. , . ~ . .. . .. ........... ~ . . . .,. - .
• "." ". • • . ' • • ."" '. • 1il> ' •• " . • ••.• . _. ..."...
S/586puge 85
lIe.ve you me.ny ehincse refugees?
J.,}" • .2 .j8.r~.din:Alxmt 18,000.
Cr,rrrnission:
1,1l:1t is happeninG to them?
Dr. S . ~ a r i f u d d i n :
They are treated the samo a~ Indonesian refugees but a lot of them
have plenty of money and can feed themselves. They are doing business
aGain in Ropublican territory.
Commission:
Is unemployment a ~roblem With you?
Dr. S,1arifuddin:
Yes, because factol'ies and. estates were destroyed and thus the number
of unemployed lvas increased. We try to re-employ them in the villages.
There are about )0,000 unemployed.
Commission:
In territory occupied and controlled by Republic what is the percentage
of the population l)resently erupJ.oy-ed in w·o.r ~10rk and military duties?
Dr. Sjarifuddin:
It is difficult to unswer. We have said that some of our defense corps
(lre villagers and not regular troops. I ha'le hea.rd that in many places
various normal activities could not go on to the extent as before
because all wero engaged i n ' 1 ~ . i 1 1 t a r ; r . ~ u t i c s . For example, in
a g r i c u l t Q ~ a l work.
Cc.l'mssion:
I,nlat percentage of the population it; eMployed in military duties?
Dr. S.1erifuddin:
That is too difficult to unmrer.
Comruission:
Is it true thnt in certain areas some of the population has to work for
the military ono day per week?
Dr •. S"~~1.rifuddin:
Yes, I think it is about that.
CorotJisolon:
It hus beon mentioned that it might be possible that the Republican
Govornoent would negotiate certain t h i p ~ s if Dutch troops would
i'rithdraw . There i G a Good d01::1 of fear in Dutch terri tory in ce,se
of reprisals on people i·rorking on estates. How could that feeling
be cotmterllctcd?
Dr. S .j~; r ifuddin:
/He could
... - - • #"' • ~... • • ~
,. . -.. -. .
• '. r .. , '." .. .. ~ ...... \. ' • ~ • '.
.. . '" " '. " , ~ : / :." '. . .', '0' '. . , ' , , , " .
S/5861?nce 86
We could move our police with the troops •.
CI"'!:UIlissicn:
.. ;. ... ':':'..
'rhe difficulties would arise in any difference of time b e ~ r e e n
withdrawal of Dutch troops from an area, and the errival of' 'Tn9.(;mel?ian
police.
Dr. S~rifuddin:
He would have no objection if there is some kind of' intornational
control '0. to prove we are wiiling;
C o r O l ~ i S 3 i o n :
It would require a strong force because there would be presUmably ..
a number of private bands •
Dr. Sjal'ifudd1n:. '
vie can ~ ~ r t l y use our own police troops.
C o ~ s s i o n :
How large would the Republican police force be:
,Dr 0 S jar,ifud,din: .- ..Ther~ 1s ,about one to every 2,000 people. Our oivil police 1s'-30 ,000
~ . , ~ ; . : ;- '.': . ; .,! ~
in Djooja.
Ccprroisoi,on:
" .'
" " ':: '
Would it be adequate?. .: :'j.. .....,. ':". ~ " . ' ... ". .
Dr. S jari:fuddi~: ," ",
l ~ i th, e q u , i p ~ r i t from outside,~ . f'· :...., ' ~ . ' :.
Commission:' .
.; .
•
•• t~.. . ,
• • , • •• •• .,.. • .,.. .. ' • # ~ - •
, .. ,', ~ - '. . - ., "
• ". >. •• •
. ,. . '.... " . -' . \ , : . . '. .
s /5'J6? ~ o 87
APPENDIX VIII
R e ~ o r t of Conference between Netherlands East Indies
Government Officials and Consular Commission on
SeptembGr 29, 1947 at Batavia
•Represent:'.::.!3 the Netherlands East Indies Government:
Lieutenant General S. H. Spoor, l'Tetherlands Indies Army
Dr. J. E. van Hoogstraten, Head of Department of Economic Affairs
Raden Abdul Kadir Widjojoatmodjo, Recomba for West Java
and eight others.
Consular Commission:
Charles Eaton, Acting Consul General of Australia
WaIter A. Foote, Consul General of the United States of America
Tsiang Chia-tuns, Consul General of China
P. Vanderstichelen, Constu General of Belgium
Etienne Raux, CClliiul General of France
Francis M. Shepherd, C o n s ~ General of Great Britain
Charles A. Live~ood, Consul General of United States of America
T. Lambert, Consul General of Great Britain
* * * *
~~:
'He would like to know from the Netherlands East Inc.ies authorities your
definition of the word "cease fire" and the measures taken to give effect
to it in general ,terms.
Reply:
The order of cease fire that 'YTas Civen to us on August 4 meant to us tha.t
we had to stop every movement in the direction of RepUblican territory,
and every progress toward the direction of Djocja was stopped on the
m G ~ e n t ' of August 4 at 2400 hours. We had given the orders to troop,
cGIlll.llaIlders on August 4 at midnight and every movement was stopped. There
W.l,:J a little bit of confusion, I think, about the expression of cease
fire because I have seen the speech ~ ~ d the notes of the Security Council,
too, a."1.d in these notes the ex:!?ression IIcease fire" lTas used, and also
"cease hostilities" and sometimes even IIcease fighting'''. They are very
surely different expressions. Cease fire means that we sto:!? all military
movement and fighting; cease hostilities m e ~ " 1 . S a little bit more.
Psychologica.l "Tarfare is one of the very important elements and when we
cease hostilities, psychological warfare has to be ended forthwith, too.
vTe interpret that the cease fire order, as I told you, meant that we bad
Ita sto:!?
«" ~ .... - .... ~ . ". \ . ' < ~
. . " ,':::', " . ,,', " :' " " '. .,.. ", '.:
to skI' and etic~-;: to the lines reached by the troops on August 4 at 2400
h o t ~ s , and it was not allowed for any of our troops to move forward into
the direction o f B e ~ u b l i c a r i territory.
Commiscicn:
The resolutions of the Security Council read like this: (Security Council
resolution was reau) Did you reSard that as meaning in the military sense
cease hostilities or orily cease fire?
Reply:
The hostilities from our side ~ T e r e only the movement of our troops in the
direction of Djocja since we have no subversive action, no sabotage and
no radio propaganda. So, cease fire to us meant that 1"e had to stop
fighting and stop movement, and we didn't issue any other orders.
Commission:
YOtlr answer .means that there wel'e not in fact hostilities to cease but
only the forward movements?
Reply:
I think that military movements are a part of the hostilities and we only. , ,
used this part of the hostllities. At the moment to cease fire, 1'Te stopped
all military·mQ:vementa' towards Republican .territory and that was "that.
There was nothir..g else.
Commission:
That was the meaning of hostilities on your part?
Reply:
We stop~edfighting.
COIIllllis s i on: ,'j,.
:' . .;
It is your meaning, General, that hostilities include a number of actions
but actions that you were carrying out were purely militaX"J movements?
Reply:
That's. r i g h t ~
Commissicn:
And the f i g h ~ i n g occurred'as opposed to the other side's scorched earth
policy and psychological vrarfare?
Repl;l:
QUite ,right.
Ccmmissicn:
Did the Dutch have, any such policy at all?
Reply:
He.
Commission:
I am under the impression that 1Then an order for cease fire or cease
hostilities i8 gi .....en, it is usual for the opposing slaes to make scme
/arrangements
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - _ . _ - - - ~ . __ .
·...• ", - <.,•. " ~ -'.•..•• :._; . , ~
<1J:'rangenents v::.tlJ. 62,ch other r ~ C D . r . : l i n b a demE.::'cation line or some point
at \'Thich each sic.e 1 ~ i l l lwep i t3 troops. Has th'.'lre B.."":.Y kind or' att0.l11rt
nade to come to scme ag:re0rr.ent 1dth the Repu1Jlicans vTith rer;ard. tv that?
~ e ' P l y :
On At,gust 4 'l;Te hc.d l'ea..:hod "..:;10 v"bjcctive lil;'0S in Hest Java, 1I'!:.Ld.dla and
East Java and S t ~ ~ t ~ a . Ws orQered our troops taere that they had to stick
to the lir..es and to stand fant. On A11bUu'G 29 it ''la8 necessa17 for t4e .
Governor-Ger..eral here to 1lroaclc<J.st to the Republic to tell ths!:l v ~ : 1 a t t1:e
demarcation l i ~ e G were becau3e the R e ~ u b l i c a n G o ~ e r T i m e ~ t in Djocja did not
allovT their officials a . ~ d the population to u o - o ~ e r d t e with the Dutch-e
neither in the te:r.ritol'ies occu:9ied by the Dutch. Conseq,t1ently, it '{Tas
necesspry for the Governor-Ger..eral to b r o ~ d c a s t to Djocja that we did not
accept cmy Republican powers in thG Dutcheoccupied territories. Before
that it was not necesoary, an a ~atter ef f ~ c t , to fix the demarcation
lines because "both perties ~ l ~ W ~ u i t e ~ S ~ the lines o c c u ~ i e d by the Dutch
. troops cmd i'That the strateciccl si·tt'.£ltion ;'Iao, Becau:,e "'Te execut6d the
cease fire order very fast the genaral situati0n in the beginning was too
unsta"ble to fix definitely these d e m a r c ~ ~ i o n ~ ! u e s .
Commission:
:'Rave we had copies of the general orders issued to the troops to cease fire?
Re1?ly:
Yes. ife made a translation and se::.t Hi to you.
Commission:
Re8arding Dr. Foote's question, the psychological side of this--has there
been any propaganda'from your side for the continuation of the police
action?
Reply:
For the contir.uance of police action, no. We only made clear to the
population and Repu"blican officials that they were expected to co-operate
with the Dutch officers in Dutch-occupied territories.
Ccrnmission:
There has "been no propaganda for continuance?
Baply:
No.
Commission:
I should like to ask one question "because I haven't been able to read
as many documents as· I should l i l ~ e to have read- -there have "been so I:lany
of them. Did the Dutch authorities invite the" Republican officials in
Dutch-occupied al'easto carry on their duties, for example, to safeeuard
the population or to p ~ e v e n t destruction? I'would like to have General
Spoor en record.
- .:' .• '" ", . ' .... ',' .' -,,'-;-:"'. .... ,7-., _ 4 • ..... : ••:J., ~ -;';~.~ .
8/586:eagc 90
: ... ;.',
Re-ply:
It vas ene of the principles that as soon as "I're occupied Republican
terl'itories that the officials vho were in chair would stay there and
carry on with their duties. I{e made that 'luite clear to the population
and. to the Republic, too. It vlas r..ot our inta:ltion to replace them by
Dutch officials but that tney ';Tould stay there and sticlc to their duties.
Commission:
Do you consider it an act ef hostility for an official not to c o - c F e r a ~ e ?
. ~ :
I don't believe that this is a nilita~J matter ~ ~ d I kindly leave it to
one of the political a d v i s e ~ s to answer that 'luestion. (Raden Abdul Kad!r
Widjojoatmodjo, Rocomba for West Java c o n ~ i n u e d ) : I will answer this
'luestion. For instance, I was nominated. Recomba in I'Test Java and had to
carry out the o r d e ~ s of the Governor-General in settling the administration,
and it 'was not possible for me to do tr~t because of the ord.er from Djocja
at that time forbidding the civil servants to co-operate with the Dutch
and threatening those who were willing to stay to continue their duties.
80 the ~ c r evacuated the civil servants, there was a vacuum everywhere
and no one stayed. For instance, in Garoet, Tasikmalaya and Tjiamis ~ .:,
had to administer those people, but orders from DJocja made it impossible
for us to carry out our wish to give them the full administration of the
country.
Commission:
Do you regard it as an act of hostility?
~ :
It does not matter for the carrying out of administration.
COlnmission:
But we would like to know whether you did consider it that?
Repl;z:
In practice, every moment of the Republican side not to co-operate--it is
a negative attitude.
Commission:
Do you consider it hostile?
Reply:
I reGard it as only negative.
Commission:
RegardinG cease fire orders and measures you gave us, could you tell us
vThether you consider that the other side, that is, the Republican side,
has adopted the definition that you have given us? In other words, do
you consider them as breaches of cease fire--that may be due to differences
of interpretations.
fReply:
.' :.. .. () ,," It ~ ... '1 i:. • • ~~ -' .c • " "
.. .."( • • , t> , _ •
.. • - - • Ill" • -.' ' t ' l ~ ~ •
..'.. ..., • 4 " tJ ~ 9 .. ~ • • • ,jIO ,t:\.- _. •••• ~ _ ~ I ,"
• • -<. • • '",,' •• -
S/586~'age 91
Reply:
I must say there was not an opportunity to discuss this point with the
Republican officials, but our experience from October 14, 1946 when we
concluded the truce conferences and after the signing of the Linggadjati
Agreement on March 25 has been that there was still fighting all aloIJ8 our
perimeters, and I think the best way to answer your ~ u e s t i o n on point
number two is to ~ u o t e a. few orders from. the Republican side. (statements
that were read at this point will be found in Appendix II.) So I believe
that there must be some definite difference of interpretation.
Commission:
A definite difference of interpretation?
Reply:
Yes.
Commission:
Those orders, General, are not in conformity with the g e ~ e r a l order which
was broadcast from DjocJa, isn't that so?
ReplY:
That is right. on the other side, I am. sorry to say that these orders
were issued from Djocja, too, because General Oerip Soemohardjo, who is
Chief of Staff of Republican torces is stationed in Djocja.. I want
to give you a few examples •••
Commission:
Do you think that those orders were issued against any subsequent
movements of your troops after the cease fire order?'
Reply:
!'Io.
Commission:
I mean by movements from place to place in your occupied territories.
Reply:
In that case, the orders which I is!Jued could not have any effect with
regard to launching attacks on the troops where they were stationed.
Not against a certain movement.
Commission:
Just movements?
Reply:
No, because our troops are attacked where they are stationed, not only
when they are on the move.
Commission:
I quite understand that point. I mean the movement in your own area
where it obviously had to take place.
Reply:
Yes.
/Ccmmission:
· " _. .. .
.. -: . "...,. '. ". . . ""'.' . ., .' . . '." , "
'" . .' ,
8/586Page 92
Connnission:
T:b.at is'contrary to the order issued by President Soekarno on August 4 in
the last paragraph in whi'ch he says "I order all armed forces from this
moment ori to stand fast e.t your respective posts and to cease hostilities. tr
Reply:
Yes, but the speeches of the Prime Minister, Mr. Sjarifuddin, are c o n t r ~ J
to that and the orders of Soedirman and SQemoherdjo are contrary to this,
too, as it ~ m s our experience last year. I still remember that the orders
that General Soedir.man on December 26 issued cause quite a lot of trouble in
Sumatra in Palembang and Medan areas.
COIIDllission:
I thiruc it is a fact that orders were given by the Republican side to
resist any movement of Dutch troops within the areas occupied. Is- that so?
Re-gly:
Yes, that is right.
CoIIDllission:
Before we leave this point, may I ask one question? I don't think we have
this point 'cleared up yet. It is in our'notes that the Republicans accuseq.
the Dutch of delaying the transmission ofa request of the Security Council
for the cease fire until sometime on August. 4 itself. Can you tell us
anything about that?
Reply:
No, ~Te did not keep any telegrams' or orders back ~ l h i c h we got from. the
Security Council. We have sent that as, speedily as ~ T e could to the other
side. There is a story connected with this (which Mr. Eschaussiez explainer
as follows): Dr. Gani was asked if he could transmit it to Djocja and
the answer was negative. I think I know some details about this. The
address on the telegram was ver'J incomplete. It was addressed to
Sjarifuddin either in DJocJa or Java. I thinlc the 3rd of August ~ m s a
Sunday--the cable was delivered to the Far Eastern Office late in the
morning. It ~ i a 8 passed on to the NEI Government and was de:!;.ivered by
Dr. Koets to Gani that same afternoon, as soon as feasible. There ~ T a s
definitely no delay. If there was any delay it must have been held up
somevThere but not on the part of the Dutch officials.
Comission:
The Republican complaint was, I think, that the NEI Government was aware
that Dr. Gani had no communication ~ T i t h DjooJa and therefore delivery
to him ~Tas not suffioient.
Re'Ply:
I am sorrY·-in this case Dr. Gani'ITould not use his secret radio transm:i.t
from here. He was offered all faoilities and he declined to use them
/because
---.:_ J • ~ " • " ~ • '_I : ~ \. '
.' .' , ' ~ " ' , ' '..-"':-. ."." '. ~ , .
8/586P0f3c 93
. \: ,. -.because he said it was too late s l r e ~ d 1 ; ,Vould you like to have a statement
in writing?. , .
{'Commission said it "rouJ.d like a w'ritten Eltatement.}, . ".' .'
....,; ;.,-:
Commission:. : '. ' "
We would like'to know what general military measures were taken to give
effect to your definition of the cease fire order. I think you have th~m
already.
!!.8J'1 :V:
On AUgust 4 at the time of the police action several objectives were reached.
We have sent you copies trsnslated into English of the orders that were
issued to the troops. The troops had to stiok to their places and not BO
fo~rd and a f t ~ r that we had to mop up the country behind the lines'.
Commission:
: .. You bad' to mOp up?
Repl;z;=
Of course.
Commission:
, That applies to linea of communication?
Reply:
, Yea. :,
Comm1ssion: '.
And.t~ey.can,be 'oonsidered aB your patrols?
ReEl!!:
We have two kinds of patrols. Here to secure our front lines or
, p . ~ o a - t i o n lines, cne or two kilometers in front of the p o s ~ or the
B a ~ 1 6 0 n , and "'~ have patrols inside the territory to let them ~op up.
Q,ommission:
Do you consider that you are entitled ~ o the full US6 of the roads to
lOur f O ~ 1 a r d posta from the bases and that any attack on oonvoys or patrols
.between the,base ~ d the forward poet would be a bl~ach of the oease fire
order? '
RSJlll:
Yes.
Commission:
Wo~d you consider that to be the case whether or not the road was actually" .
patrolled and guarded.
Reply:
I thinl: thero is a military ex:Planat1on of "occupa.tion". You never cant " •
expect with a spearhead strategy that we used here to mvp up and to make
the countl7 'behind t ~ ~ safe at the same time of your strategical ~ o v e . m e n t ., , '
You have to do that afterwards to safesuard your lines.of communication.
/I think
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8/586Pago 94
.; ....
I think we have seen the same thing in the Pacific War and in France, and
everyvrhere--first'to reach ~ h e strategical objectives. Several places
were reached by the troops, but that does not mean that all the little
villages and hamlets are occupied by invasion troops. That goes afterwards.
You have to make safe the lines of commttnication. It is the same as we did
here, '
Commission:
You do consider then that an attack by the Republic on convoys or patrols
along those lines of communication would be a breach of the cease fire?
ReVJ.y:
. Yes, I do.
Commission:
Would you consider that to apply also to lateral communications between
advance positions? You. may have t~To spearheads and there may be a lateral
road of c o m m u n i c a t 1 o n ~ - w o u l d you regard it as a breach of the cease fire
if patrols moving along lateral lines of communications were attacked .by '.
the Republic?
RepliY:
Yes, sir. ,
Commission:
It is understood that there do exist a number of Republican formations which
are actually inside the area which you claim to control. VTould you rega~
Republicans in the SWIle "'tTay as h'3.ving .the. right to a line of communication
with their own territory?
Reply:
I think they better move out. I kIlO'TtT, however, it does not appl;y to mil!tary
la",. According to international law, a country or terrj.tory is cons.idered
occ'Upied when the occupying forces are able to send troops in ~ r h e r e v e r and
"rhenever to control the country. The SWIle is true· here •
Commission: .
The.point is this--that supposing there is a Republican ZOl1nation behind
your lines. That formation has been o r d e r e ~ to stand fast and to·cease fire
but it is presumably entitled to receive supplies and raticns f ~ o m its ~ ~ m
t e r r i t o ~ y and therefore if you consider it to be a breach of cease fire for
the Republicans to attack your lines of communication, "Tould it:not also
be a breach of cease fire for you to attack theirs even t h o t ~ h that is
uithin your line?
Reply:
Quite riGht. ·If it is true that these formatiOns are ordered to cease
fi6htinc;--but that makss all the difference because if they 1Tould stand
fast and. keep quiet, then we could come to some arra.neement. But they ,J,l"e
orderod to fight and to a t t a c ~ .
/Ccmmission:
" • _ • V ~.. " I. '::' • ,. • , , ,'.' - • ~
~ ' , .... I • ~ ~ ~....~. ~ :.... J ' ~ ...... 6>' ' .... f . • '
• ~ - r ••
8/5(36Page 95
Commission:
Do you cunsider your moppin(; up operations likely to be inter-preted by
the Republic to be a breach of the cease fire by the other side?
;Repll:
I Wll sure they '\Till because ioTe ImovT that the Republican, side considers it
this i'Tay. For instance 1 in the Tasilmialaya area and several other places
we occupied certain posts on· Aucust 4 at 2400 hours and when on A u g u s ~ 6
vTe went to secure another pla.ce in Tasililllalaya, the Republic cCnSic.sl'e,d
this as a breach of the cease fire order because we did not stCU1'1 fast.
'.':.
Commission:
Is there any diminution of attacks on patrols or is that continuin2 as
before?
Repll:
There is a diminution. It is d ~ t e to the p J . ~ o c e d u r e of mopping up attached
to patrolling.
Commission:
Yo,-\ are not getting so many casualties nOvT?
Reply:
No, vTe have captured C1uite a number of band leaders.
Commission:
RegardinG the naval bloakade, v ~ S there any difference in the operation
of the naval blockade after July 20 than before?
Reply:
I do not th:Lnk there ever was .a naval bloclrode. We did not call ita naval
blockade and it is not even similar. All vTe did was to controJ: rihatever
rTent into the country. vTe leept an eye on "That r~S beinc; taleen out of
the country so that no estate produce "Tas taken out. vTe kept entirely
within territorial w a t ~ r . s •••.•and t h e r ~ was no blockade in the
internationally 8c0epi:'3d se:1se of the i'Tord'; ~ti tnE'l vhole military action
made very litt.ll." r l : : . i · f . : J . r · a : ~ . G e to us. At the bS/3:t:ming, of the action vTe
stc:91?sd all s h ~ ..p:9inb i7.l c;tlr~a,in oper'aticnal aJ:'(ZIas and in some of the' places
s h i p ~ i n g is still stopped. That's ubout all.
Commissi ')3;:
No difference before July 2C?
Repl;v:
Very little, no. On July 20 we stopped shippinG in certain areas and
these areas are still prohibited.
CODlIT'.ission:
What ~Tas the reascn for that?
Reply:
To stop having any arms :l.mI?crted; that was the principc,l reaoon. And 'to
keep out ships that had no reason to came into the area, for their o,m
/oafety.
", -', '.' ',': /. ' " ":' .' \ ..- : - ':. -", ' ' .. ',' " '. /. ';., " .. ,"" '.
3/586Poge 96
safety. After the cease fire Cl' cease hostilities r1hen iTe found out that
things i10re still Going on as usual we thought it better to keep these
places ttnder control.
Commisoi0.E;=
Has Telol;:betonG one of these places?
Re9!l:
Yes, that was one of the places. But there is oame shipping. As you 1;nov1,
specj.al permits are given. ife always give special permits i1hen there are
people in distress for food or whatever.
COIll11ussi?l1:
Ha.s there any especially heavy amount ef arms traffic in the Sunda Straits?
Reply:
He stopped it, I hope. vle prohibited Md controlled it and stopped: it;,
. I hope we stopped all arms traffic com.:!.ne in.
CollJIllission:
You mentioned that the activities were confined very largely to t e l ~ i t o r i a l
waters. Do you recognize the ~ ~ Jurisdiction of the Republic over
territorial waters off the shores it controls?
Repl.l=
No, sir, not at all; we only recognize the ~ ~ control in parts of,
the islands where they have any actual control. ~ e y never bad any control
in territorial waters. In the truce, the sea is not even mentioned. After
the truce the Republic never even claimed any control or juricdicti.oll in
territorial waters. .
CoIllIllission:
Th6 question has a. certain importance frClIll the point of view of breaches
of the cease fire order because the Republicans have made allegations that
Dutch warships have come within the three-mile limit and have t.hereby
intorfered vath shipping and ships were afraid to go out and therefore
that was a breach of the cease fire order.,
Reply:
vlell, sir, according to rr.any, ti'.at is nonsense because the Republic has no
tel'ritorial vlaterl'3 at all. He' have all the right in the world to BO into
any place we like. They never even claiJlled it. They never mentioned it
after the truce.
Ccmm.:!.ss i on:
From the point of viei'l of internaticnal la", then, it is the viei-T of the
H.E.I. Government that a country which receives ! ~ ~ recoc;nition does
not have a de ~ control over its t e ~ i t o r i a l ira1iel'S.
Eeply:
No, this is a specia.l case. It rrae recoGIlized tha.t ~ ~ control existed
only in the places i-lhore they actually had control. They never i'.ad any
control in territorial waters.
S/5F3GPaeo 97
.....
..... ' .. :. ,,'
Commission:
That would apply also to the vle.ters just to the south of DjocjalGU'ta1
Reply:
Yes.
COlTimissicn:
One other p0int--it has been alleged that the Dutch aore bloc!\adinc the
Republican-held part of Madura and preventing food stuffs frcm goins in.
Do' you have anything to say about that?
~ :
No, tnere is no blockade at all. It is in the area of prohibited shipping.
If anyone wants to go in or out and there is a special reason l'le Give a
special permit. There has been an official and special order for all ships
cal':rying rice and other food s ~ u f f s from East Java to Hadura, from the
Department of Economic Affairs. The special order is also confirmed by
the Navy 60 that they are all passing.
C o m m i s s i ~ :
Can you c;ive us a definition of the phrase "police action" and tell us
what actually happened after July 20?
ReVll:
Yes,.. . from. a military point of vie"r, the intention of our operation was in
the first place to get possession of the' stooks of food because, as yvu
know, the food situation was very bad in this country, and in spite of all
agreements we could not get enough food for proper distribution among the
population; ss ' ~ n d l y , to bring peace and order.in these areas where we
had fOGd st;oclcs and on several estates l·,hioh lTere in the same areas with
the intention to finish the policy of destruction started in May all
around ovr rerimeters, because it was feared that destruction of property
carried on there l'lOuld continue contrar'J to Article :XIV of the Lingsadjati
Acresment. In spite of all our "larnings, you see, they "Tould not stop.'
The objectives were 1';est Java to the line of Tegal in the north and south
to B a n j ( ) " ' l . . , . , . ~ s - T . . i n ( ' . t j e . p ; in. H:Lo.dle Java. to Toent::lllg a...",.d Sale.t-l.[;e., to occupy
the w a t ( : . : < · , C ' ~ l ' . 3 t".::..:". '}.0C·.tl·i~!"..1 pla:.1ts vjtel to the wi:.. )l~ of M:'.:.d.l8 :lava,
as " T ~ 'rTJrc) V " J ~ : r f,::'re,:i.d. t ~ ' l e y "I10uld be d ~ J D t ' " C o y e ( l J and food o ~ o 0 1 ~ s in East·
Java. «if""" ")£1S:·.. ' .... ~; lJa~:~:), "IThic.tl is the mos.; im:Q::'~f.l.n·:i !'ioe e.:."Ja· in·that
part of t ~ s i : : ) f ~ " ' < 1 . Teo sej.1,I:) happened in the PJ.lem'b:l.;.:G oil fieJ.ds and
in Pn.df'..nr:,. 'rrhE-.;'s it iT!:!? :.necessary to get a 11~ii:.le bit morfl ;ir;J.'J,ce because
the f n - : i · . ~ , t . ~ O ~ \ I : ; . , = : , u ; . ) i ; · , ( ~ ~ ~ l e h3re; jn thi3 Hedan a:.'ea ~ o o(',(,'·.:.::y tile food
< 1 o ~ ' 1 l 1 c(,r ,·l.'-..T\", \?r, ;ri:1C i.,l);:lI!l. Ir,\;lF.:.t ·ilf'.l~ tc~ ';'.;';0 intention of t ~ 1 0 police'
action tw" b · ~ .....;'t;ed un the 2.1.st of July.
,; /Corr.llllssion:
.": ". ": ::',' -. . :' >"" ,".' -: '" - ' . -'.' . '. " ' ~ -"
S/SA6Pogo 98
Ce'llJ-:lhlSi,cn:-_....__ ..-
HC-,T ,vol'l.d you define this action, then? An action to stop destruction
and to j.'e. tl.!'e la'l'T Wld order? Can you define that?
..
.- ;.;.
Hep.!r:
Let us c e s c ~ i b e it in this way: we aimed at o c c u ~ a t i o n of economically
important areas in order to s a f e b ~ r d economic objectives and in general,
food stuffs. In Article XIV of the Lincsadjati Agreement it says: liThe
GovelI;rrenl::; ef the Republic recognizes the claims of all non-Indonesians
. to the restoration of their rights and restitution of their Goods, as far
as they are exercised or to be found in the territory over "Thich it
e : ~ e r c i s e s ~ ~ a u t h o r i ~ y . A joint conuuission "Till be set u ~ to effect
this restoration and restitution." •••••••and made possible the improvement
of the econcIDic condition of the population•
Commission:- _ - - . . . ; : . ; . ; . . . ~
That 'Hould be your definition of police action.
B e ~ l . v :
Yes.
Comm:tssicn:
I ilculd like to know by your definitj.cn vlha1. '~j' '38,6 would be vlhere you.can cet food for the population? Ifaving 0(;, :J.ed all these axeas, were
they t,he orlly areas \-There they are p j - : o d u \ ~ i n g food?
BeplY:
Those are the main areas.
C ( l m m i B ~ :
Havine occupied these areas, you can now suppl~' food for the population
in occupied areas?
Beply:
Yes.
C e m m i s s 1 . s . ~ :
Is thel'e a..TJ.y danGer that the food. sup~ly for the popUlation now in
unoccnpied areas vTould "ue l"UIlning too short?
ReplY:
No, I don t t thinl,: so. I think that I,ll". van HooGstraten can give you a
much better an'::vier than I can.
( ~ ~ . van TIoocstraten): In the beginning of the next year, yes. Because
as you cenbl£'!::en ~ - : n o v , the foed situation is controlled by the fact that
there is a rr~ill crop of rice and other food stuffs cominG on in May, June
and Ju.ly, and. then there is a. time of shortaGe of feed called "pat.jeklikll,
in the mcnths of January, February ond Hal'ch. But I "Tould lil;:e to tell
mere about the food situation later, lThen you aolc more about economic
conditions.
/Con:mission:
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!8/586l'Jago 99
.. ,".-::: .. , ::::.'
Can:mission:
There are a lot of allegations on the Republican side regarding air actions
taleen generally.
Reply:
VIe used the air force only for reconnaissance and to support the ground
troops in their action. No bom1;'ll"dments were allowed, we have not executed
any bombard.!l1ents on populated areas. We did not drop any bombs on the
population or Republican troops; only "Te did drop some on railway lines
just to pl'event the rolling stock from being taken a'Hay. He have made
t'\oTO mistakes--in the vicinity of 8alat1ga, two fighters have strafed a
train, and the same happened at Palembang where we have strafea a few cars,
that was all. There has been no destruction of villages or anything like
that and the air force was prohibited from dropping bombs on troops.
Moreover, at the beginning of the police action we destroyed Republican
military planes on the air strips. ',rhis was necessar"J as has been proved
by the dropping of a few bombs from a Republican plane on Semara.ng.
Commission:
You do not then consider air reconnaissance as e.. breach of cease fire?
Reply:
I· am speaking of police action--there was no cease' fire then.
Commission:
During the police action?
Reply:
~ r o •
Conllllission:
There has been air activity since the cease fire?
Rep.!l:
Yes •
Commission:
Including air reconnaissance?
Reply:
Yes, including air reeonnaissance.
Commission:
You do not consider that as a breach of cease fire?
Reply:
Air reconnaissance only in occupied areas.
COmmissio?:
That must be made clear because there are allegations. You do not know
of any air reconnaissance over Republican territory?
Reply:
I do not know of any but certainly there have been. "'\-lhen ~'1e received
intelligence information we must send a plane to have a look.
/Ccn:miss ion:
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... ", • '. ..', '.' "'. -, f" ". •••• • •
8/'586Page 100
Comm.iosicn:
The question ccmes up then, do you consider this a breach of cease fire?
~ :
He Md that when we anticipated a breach of the cease fire order from the
other side. I can't sit still and 1.ait until we are attacked-·I have to
take my measures against it.
C O I l l I l ' . i s s i ~ :
Normally it would be considered as a breach of cease hostilities and no
more?
.... . ~ .-:. - .. ' ..:..
Rel?ly:
That's right. When we intercept some orders from. the Republican side that
they'are going to attack certain areas we send out reconnaissance planes •
I don't think anyone 1n the world would complain a'bout any planes going
out on reconnaissance.
CoIllIllission:
Is there any machine gunning taking placei'
Re;ply:
After the cease fire, no.
Commission:
Allegations were IIl8A.e that paratroopB ~ ' e r e dropped on one or two occasions.
Reply:
I'm terribly sorry, sir, we nave paratroops but, please keep it under your
hats, we have no parachutes; they didn't get here in time. Please- tell
me ,.here.
Commission:
Tas1l<:malaya.
Reply:
:No, because we came from TasillJllalaya from Garoet. vTe did clrop some fuod
stuffs by parachute to oupply the troops--but no paratroops.
COllllUission:
The;J' r:.I:,:3' have seen some parachutes coming dovlIl. There is a definite
allegation that parachutes did come down and they probably did not lanow
if they were men or what. Is there any question of an air blockade?
Reply:
No, none at all. If we are 'i-Tarned that civil planes are coming over from
Singapore to Republican territory, for instance, Red CroBs planes, we
take all the n e c e s s a ~ J steps for safe conduct.
COIrllliseipn:
Not without warning?
~ p l ¥ :
During the police action, Republican planes :t'isked being shot dow.
/Commission:
----------------_._--- ---------
. '4 " •• ,,'. -.' '. • ~ . .... - • ',,~ -. .' -' ., ~ ':,'"
• ts " ~. • • '." .. _ • J. < J
8/,;86?ago 101
Commission:
~ to now? Is there any blockade u1' Republican territory?
;B£121y:
Air blockade now of Republican territory? We got two or three planes
:'rom Singa.pore iTith all kinds of medicjnes.
Commission:
All planes coming through must have previous notice} o t h e ~ - T i s e they are
liable to be shot down?
Reply:
Yes. But apart from that} all ~ l a n e 9 flying over HEI country have to aslt
permission and to follow reg\ua.tions as la.id down in the PICAO agreement.
Commission:
From the commencement of your police action, can you tell us the Decurity
measures you took regarding the poptuation in those territories including
foreign communities arld property including foreign property--right from
the start?
Reply:
In respect to our e ~ ~ e r i e n c e about the attitude of the Republican troops,
tl:e TNI and irreguJ.a.r bands} ~Te tried to secure the population in several
areas and in the villages by the speed of the operation. It was the only
thing we could do. vTe made a. few mistakss--one in Boemiajoe and one in
8alatiga because our troops came in first and then left the place and
under the present circumstances 'Then you go to a certain village you have
to stay there. When you go away, the irregular bands kidnap and murder
the people there on the allegation that they bave been co-opera.tive with
the Dutch. The other places where we came in first} in Salatiga} that
is right. And on the other side we have sent out patrols to rescue
people i-Tho were taken into Republican territory. \-le made t"TO mistakes
in B o e ~ i a j o e a . n ~ S a l a . t i g a .
Commission:
You can say that in the territory you occupied as q u i c r ~ y as you can for
security of the population. That iR the same as ragards property, too?
Reply:
Quite the same. For the Chinese cornmurlltj we tried to build up as soon
as possible a Chinese security corps to safeGuard Chinese lives and
propertj·. The Pau An '1'11.1.
CoIlltlission:
Could you tell us a little more about them--it does interest us. They
formed these,corps--did you arm them?
· .~ - - . .' .. . . ". ". . . ~'.
: '. .. .' ~'. . .' .'. .. .
8/586Pace lC2
:'.' ..".".'.
'.' . ~ . ' . ' .'. - ..'. ,'.. .... '
Re;Jly:
Because many Chinese ~ e r e killed and k i d n a p ~ e d during the volice
action and afterwards, they asked us if we could do scmething about it
to safeguard the villages anc protect lives and properties with our
troops, but it is, of course, very difficult to have military troops
evel7Where because then you are splitting up the troops and spreadinG
out the m;I.litary :f'OJ:'C6S. Our cooperation with the Chj,nese securit;y
ccrps is to give them armo as far as possible and we trained about
sixty of them in TJimahi. They got a very primary training there for
three ,,;reel;:s and we sent them back to the Chinese seoUl'ity corpo to act
as the corm:nandanta of the units. There must be some trained leadership
to rescue the people--without that, you would have difficulties. There
are several places ,rhere we have' units now of thls Chinese security
corps which are under these c c m m a ~ d ~ r s but they do not belong to the
Dutch armyj it is considered a police corps. They are under orders of
the reccmba of the district.
Comission:
You do not consider them part of the Dutch forces?
Reply:
No.
CODllllission:
Were those units built on the request of the Chinese or did you take
the initiative?
Reply:
No, on the request of the Chinese.
Cormnission:
I th~~ it is a fact that t h e ~ e are in some places prisoners of war
taking part in the security corps.
ReIlly:
I don't know ••• I don't think so. I don't ImolT of Chinose prisoners of
" ~ a r e ·You mentioned one point about flying reconnaissance--,,;,e also have
civilian airlines here and maybe those civilian planes are considered to
be a f:l shUng or military reconnaissance plane. It has nothing to do
with warfare--maybe they s e ~ e t i m e s are ~ o n s i d e r e d to be cennected with
hostilities.
Commission:
Do they fly on definite routes to avoid geing over Republican territory?
R,e12l y:
They do that as much as they can. Referring to the air action, at too
beGinning of vo1ice action we destroyed Republican planes. We did that
because they dropped a few bombs over Semarane. Of course we had no
air fights--we did not shoot any dOvm from the air./Ccmmission:
, . ' ~ : . . .••••F' U. ~ . , • •
" ~, .' . .. , .
S/586::'aGc 103
Commission:
It seems clear from the evidence that there are a number of irregular
bands , ~ h i c h may be described as bandits--"l'TOuld you agree that it is in
the interests both of the Dutch end the Republicans to get rid of those
people?
~ ;
I fully agree, sir.
Commission;
Do you t h i n l ~ any proeress is being made in that direction--on both
sides?
R e J ? l ~ r :
.. ::.'.I am sorry to say that there is only a slicht difference between the
irresular bands and the T1II. The irregular bands are sometimes under
orders of the TNI. Sometimes they put on their uniforms and sometimes
they take them"off. It's v e ~ J confusing.
Commission:
It has been stated that on some occasions when Dutch troops have
attacked a village after the cease fire, they have not given warning• ,., , • I ~
to the civilian population beforehand to evacuate.
ReplY:I',
That we attacked same Villages after the cease fire and did not warn
the civilian population?
Commission:
Inside--in the mopping up operation.
R e p l ~ T :
Yes, in the mopping up operation but we never used artillery on the
Villages. In cases like that we used artillery on enemy positions but
not on the villages themselves. Commanders have orders to be very
careful not to do any harm to the population because they can't do'
anything'about it.
Commission:
I think we can give JOu particulars.
Reuly:
They have orders not to do anything to the local population. I will
investiGate.
Commission:
About the s e c t ~ i t y measures--what is the policy of your occupation army?
As soon as you go into a plac~, do you post guards over property,
including foreign property, or do you guard just the most important key
/points
S/586Page 104
points of the c i t ~ ' just to prevent the irregular bands from iI.Jfiltrating
im:ide?
........ ,.
Renh:
Our 38neral policy on foreiGn property is this: it is impossible to put
gucrds on all the estates and every factm,'y here in Java. You would he,ve
to sp11t up your "Thole erm,y, and it could not do anythinG. \'[e have to
protect these p r o p e r ~ i e s and estates by mopping up the, irregular bands
and petrollins the area. In some vital points "Te put some mi;litar!
units. We try to get a Gt~d as soon ao possible from the o"mers of the
property to give them al~, pistols, to protect t h e m s e l v e s ~ and outside
these p ~ o p e r t i e s the troops are used to mop up. I can't put ten men in
every factory and on eve~! plentation•
Commission:
You think that :l:n Sunatra it ~ T O u l d be an eacy task••••••all that
territory ••••••
R ~ l ? . l y :
~ne situation in S ~ . t r a , I think, is, still better at the moment then in
s o ~ e parts of Western Java. He just have the Commander of Medan here.
11e still have same trouble in the v i c 1 ~ i t y of Bindjei because Atjehnese
forces have been fighting there and in Prapat becauae there 1a a ~apanese
captain, Inouie, who is still f i ~ l t i n g .
COIl'mlission:
\Iould you think you are able to clean up the area?
Re'!Jl:z:
Yes, I am sure of it.
Commission:
Have you any estimate of the time?
RenJ.7 :
T'.ro months from nQioT. I maintcin that one of the 2'ost difficult points
is ,That I call psychological "Tarfare. That is why I say that the
!,opulation is bebTeen the devil and the deep blue sea. He are doing our
mOP:9ing up operation but the Repub:'icen recio broadcasts "Fight the 'Dutch;
try to kill them". That is one of the d1fficulties vs have y,hile. 'I'Te ere
n o ~ p i n G up.
C o ~ ' ) . i : J : J ion:
Reve you made use of the separatist movement in eny part of the country
for protective purposes? On the east coast of Smnatra there is a
novement celled Daerah S t ~ a t r a Timor (?). T h ~ y have forned Cl. sort of a
home euard for protection among themselves in that part of the country.
Have you used them?
~ .~ ... ~ .. ~ ~ ~ ,.. . .' . . .
~ _. ~ ~ • '. • ~ , ....... ' • ,. ~ •• .... I. .' • '.
S/566?agc 105
Reply:
Yes, to a certain extent as Guards. Look here, I have told you thnt it
,·rcs one of the prin?iples to keel) all of the officials and all what ue
co.ll "bestuurs ll personnel in the chair to do their jobs. ive could support
them only if they. do their "Tork and carry on in the seme way. In the east
coast of Sumatra there comes from the population the request 1I"Te Hant to
help and we want to keep our country free from Atjeh and the Javanese.
Please '-Till you help US?II SO "Te are t!"']ing as much as possible to Bet
Indonesian police chiefs so that the army can withdraw to the several
Garrisons and to stay behind if we are not able to improve the situation.
~ n a t is the ~ e n e r a l policy of the Governor-General: to build up a police
force and security corps as soon as possible from the a u t o c ~ t h o n o u s
p o ~ u l a t i o n here.
Commission:
Regerding civil administration--could we get a general outline from the
~ m I side regarding the alteration or liquidation of Republican
administration and in general t e l ~ s the R e p ~ b l i c a n cooperation or
non-cooperation with your authorities?
ReplY:
General Spoor e.mphasized just now that we did not wish anything better at
the time of the police action than to find the whole of the administration
intact for it certainly was not our object to reinstitute the Dutch civil
administration. Although after the order from Dj,ocjakarta many people did
not trent to cooperate, ~ f f l did not put in Dutch officials •••••as a permanent
measure. To the contrary, even in these places where Republican officials
had gone in hiding or ran away, civil servants from our side took ell
pains to try to get them back, to find them and persuade them to resume
activities and carry on the administration. Specific orders uere issued
at the time of the police action to our people that it should be
understood that they only vent to the occupied a:i:'eas in an adVisory
capacity, to help the people along--not to change anything in their
e.dmnistration, only ,rherever it "Tas necessa!"'] to lend a helping hand, to
i ~ p r o v e the administration and eventually to orGanize a security corps,
but not to replace them.
Commission:
Hhat ;,as the actual result generally speaking?
Repl;;r:
The actual result ~ T a s that it ~ T a s difficult in various places to carry on
the administration, as some stayed but others ran a"Tay in accordance ,.,ith
the orders from the Republicc.n territo!"'] not to cooperate "Ti th us. U!' to
/nm'T,..
, ,
. . . :. ~ u .. . ." ~ . " . -. ." . . '. ,
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8/586Page 106
nOvT, I might say, we have been rather successful and after the firnt
uifficulties many of the old civil servants have c o m ~ 'back and the
['EJn,:ral idea is that, conditions are improvi11B.
CornmiC:3ion:-
. ~......, .
. : .':'-:'
: ~ .. , .. -. :- .-. '.',
I understand that you ordered them to stay in some places.
Reply:
'Yes end no. Sometimes they asked for it. It was solely that the;! were
p1'ohi01ted from Djocjakarta to coo}?erate 1'Tith us. So in some cases vTe
were told, "You might make thingo easier for us by ordering us to carry
on. If you order us, this gives us an excuse for acting against the
Republican orders." So 'ilhat could we do?
COJn.'1lisf3ion: I
Han there been any difficulty in paying these people? It has been said
that some of them refuse to accept ~ a y m e n t or have been peidin advance.
Repl;r :
That's right. They onl;}" wanted to receive payment as an advance. They
are afraid, of course. You remember the propaganda that has been issued
by Djocjakarta against what they consider nica money? Many people were
afraid to get paid in our legal tender, in nica money. What they:eaid
was "we will'consider thiS as an advance to keep peace with the other
" side."
-Commi3sibn:
A'case·"ras mentioned of a man who had stated to the Dutch authorities that
he had-been paid in advance for some considerable time by Republicans
i n ' R e ~ u b l i c a n money and that Republican money was worth nothing and he vras
not able to live on it. Do you know of any case of that kind?
Re'Pl:7 :
Of course pot. As far as I knOVT, in many places there might have been a
general order of the Republicans e.t the time of the police action-to }?ay
all the Republican civil servantG b'TO months in advance.
Commission: .
Are they aole to live on that advence?
Repl:! :-Certainly not. I could give you an example of this. For instanco, in
Palembe.nS I had a little chat 1T1 tl~ a brother of Hadji Agoes Salim, ';'Tho
is head of the P''.lblic Horks in PalembanG, and he told me that his salar:j
lTeS 600 JaIJaneso guilders per month. Fiye minutes aftervre.rds he told me
that et tho.t time one tin of rice cost 2400 Japanese guilders. I did not
think it poli te to ask him "'here he got the rest· of it.
/CcIDniDoion:
. -, . ~ ... .
. ' .. '. . , '. , .' , .' . , .. ' . .,',' - '.
',.
8/586P8I3c 107
CC1':r.~ Gt;.ion:-............-
In C':\388 of tl:et sort, what is your policy? Is it to ray these people
something in addition out of HEI f1.Ulds in order to enable them to live
and "rork?
~ E i P l , Z :
Yes, they Cet the full salary attached to that post. If they do the
'-lork, then they Get the full l J a l r ; , r ~ .•
Commission:
Even 'if they. have been paid in advance by the Republic?
R e p ~ ' ;
People i·rho work for us set a full salal'Y.
Commission:r.
Dr. van Mook, in his speech of AUGUSt 30, remarked that the present.
ReJ!'ublican Govenlinent iras leadin({ the COUlltry to rl.un and went on to say
that it is necessarJ under the police action to put en end to its
authority. I note that they mado I'Ja. Soptember 3 in a broadcast from
Djocjakarta, an official a n n o U J J , C ~ in which the people were informed
that the Dutch administration wae out to destrqy the Republican
administration. Has that exchanae ot stAtements made things more
difficUlt?
Renl,v:- It had no effect in pal'ticular. In the field the fear for reprisals
rexne.ins. As the situation is J:lOW 1n Hest Java, the major!ty' of the
Republican officials are co-operating; everywhere where they stay and
"mere they feel themselves safe, for instance, in Soekaboemi and
Poervrokerta1, nef\rly 100 per cent of the civil servants stayed- at their
jobs, in Geroet all ci.,n servants were evacuated by the 'l!NI.
Conunission:,.",', .'
Have any Republican officials been removed from office booause of their
~ o l i t i c a l views in arecs that you have occupied and been removed to
Ropublican territorj?
Bep1z:
Yes, in cases. Those officials incited others to strike. or to resist
the la"r, but not because of t.heir political vie;.rs alone, Only in a small
numbor of cases cid we re.move those officials to other places, in
occupied West Java, for instance, from Buitenzarg to Batavia.
Commission:
I iTO.n(j to know if t.ltat is an excuse for removaJ-
• _ , ...• ~ , • • ~. ~ ,;" f , ' "A • '.
, •. ...' c...... i) , , ,
8/586P:1g0 108
It is !lot done any lonGer. In ]l:l.ndoeng cmd Tjiardjoer, for instance, ue
have been uai ting for e, :lear and a half for the arrivel of the
TIep1.:blican officials 1vho uere evacuated by the TRI. He can't keep the
vacancies open. In the meantime, 1'Te have to go on with the'administration
and the civil service. In thoso cases I removed officials from new
terl'itories to f!11 tho vacancies.
COITJJ1tccion:
Getting back to the m i l i t a ~ r question, the van Hook line. I think the
demarcation line 1ms announced on August 29. Can you tell us why it 1 ~ S
put out on the 29th and not before? Is there any special reason for
that?
ReVlv:
Because it was necessa~J at that time to give a definite description of
the line because the Republicans did not accept that we control those
areas. So it was necess~J for Dr. van Mook to declare that we had
taken the power in these areas, that we should control the areas and that
no Republican power was accepted.
Commission:
It seemed rather a long time after the cease fire order and that you
had no special reason for it.
Reply:
~ ~ e demarcation line depends on two elements. In the first place, from
the tactical situation on August 4; the other reason was the
administrative division. \le had to use for the establishment of the
d e F . ~ r c a t i o n line the tactical objectives surrounded ,nth the
administrative borders.
COIJJr.'.iacion:
It ,Tes not made out with any discussion with the Republican side?
Repl:.":
No.
Commigs:'on:
The Republican Government on August 4 made a statement to the
United l ! e ~ i o n s in 'iThich they expressed their doubts 1Thether the cease fire
could be carried out unlee::s there 1Tere a demarcation line ',Thich v.,ould be
sUJel~ised by a third country. Did the ~ m I Government consider that
c t c ~ c m e n t worth taking action on?
Ro;?l:r:
I can't think "iTe did take any action on that.
!ColllIDission:
• • • • IQ
- . • I
,I. _" , ~
}. , .
• ~, " , • 4
8/586..'c.tfj __ 109
Commisaion:
You mean the demarcation line accepteble for both per'Cies so that t:le
cease fire order might be observed easier?
Repl;'l:
It is a pity that it could not he7e started on !~gust 4 when we had
occupied the objectives of the present de1JlZl.rcation line.
Commission:
On the question of the dell1£l.rcation line bet'YTeen the dates of August 5,
the day you ste.rted the cee.se fi;::"'.. and the day "101' proclaimed the
d e ~ ~ r c a t i o n line-ndUI'ing that time would military action be ~ d t h i n YOlxr
lines or without them?..;; ',: ,Reply:
Hithin, sir, because ~ f e stoIl'ped elery action on mi1niGht of August 4
and we did not make any step forward after Auguot 4.
Commission:
Certain cities were occupied after August 4 before the demarcation line
i-Taa proclaimed?
~ :
Yea, in the Dutch-controlled areas. You can't expect that by August ~
every Village and hamlet could be occupied Py Dutch tr.oops.
Commission:
But large e1ties (gave ne.mes of some) --they were occupied. u • before ·the
demarcation line i-TaS proclaillled by the Dutch. How can we understand
that this area i-TaS under your line because the line vTaS not drawn up?
Repg: .
May I show you the map at: Java? On the Republican side they knew quite
"Tell where i-Te were. And the demarcation line is the line we reached on
August 4, and i-Te considered t."lat t:1S territory behind it .was Dutch..
occupied territory. A f t e ~ , r a r d e we had to do the moppiDB up and to occupy
a few more places, of course; that is the situation; But w'e didn't
occupy any places outside the lines we reached on ~~~~st 4, and I believe
that Dr. van Mook made it c ~ e a r in, one of his l ~ e d i o speeches v e r ~ ' soon
at:ter August 4 that the mopping up operations here 'nas a Dutch militarJ
matter and could not be considered as a breach of tile cesse fire order.
Commission:
The line waa there even before you proclaimed it?
R e p ~ . , 7 :
It was there, and was not altered between August 4 and 29~ I could show
you that I had givan to Dr. van 1·:cck on August 5 or 6 a list of our
advanced poets end the places we had to mop up.
/Was the o ~ a t e m e n t
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8/586:;?agc 110
Connnission:
Hes the statement on AUGust 29 dictated somewhat by the speech of
Sjarifuddin about non-co-operation?
Reply:-
.: .. : ;-.
. ~.: .
Yes, that j.s one of the reasons-·.that is the main rea8011) as a matter of
fact. Then Dr. van Mook said, "Look here, ue consider this Dutch-controllee
area and you ha-.,e to co-operate in that area; otheruise you have to talre
over the administration and put your 01m peo.ple in".
Commission:
The next question is 1-That you ansvTered before- ..·what is the p r o ~ p e c t of
restoring l e ~ ' and order in these areas? You told us within two or three
months, but you qualified that with the question of propaganda •
Repl,y:
Yes, t1'TO or t h r e ~ months.
Commiss i on:
Now we come back to the same point--the cease hostilities and cease fire.
If that propaganda still goes on, does that period of two or tl1ree months
still stand good?
Repl¥':
Yes, but it 1nll mean more casualties. TYTO or three m o n t h s ~ - s i x weeks to
t"TO months.
Commission:
You think that it 1-rill still take ti-TO or three months but with more
casualties?
Reply:
Yes, because you know what I mean about psychological vrerfare--with the
orders from Djocja not to co-operate. You have r . ~ r e clashes and mere
casualties •
ConnnissiQ.n:
Have you found it more or less difficult to restore law and order in the
territory behind the van Mook line than you expected?
Reply:
As soon as we capture or neu.tralize the leaders or heads of gangs or the
irregular bands, then it does not Sive us Dluch trouble, but so long cs
vTe can not take these people--that has been OtW experience for centuries
and centuries--then you e.11Tays have the same difficulty.
COIJl.mission:
M'I question, '\-Tas '\-T!lether you found more of that sort of thing or less then
you expected.
/For technical
~ , . '. . ' • ,. • ~ _ t. W ... • '. • • ,
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8/586:P",£j0 111
For technical and political reasons ife could not intensi:y OlU' moppins
up operations b c ' ~ r e a n the cease fire and the ~ d d l e of Septenber because
ive hlld to keep our troops in middle Java, because we did not lrn01T i'That
t,he end of the s1tuation might h;. N C ~ J ' t h a t '\10 haV8 tl'oDsferred these
troops, the pacification gees verJ io.Gt. ! . ~ is very difficult to n a ~ r
because 1t changes from day to day. ife cen •••••••••ond it depends on
the mllita:::-y situation. .tmrl then the b:coadcasts from Djocja told that
NI'. S jahrir is ·oack iT1th en i ~ t s : . ' . , ~ ~ j : : ' c n e . l police corps to take over
Poeri-Tal:a:::,ta ana a fei" other places. T'nat dces : 1 0 ' ~ make the mopping up
o p e r a t i c ~ s easier.
Comm1ns1on:
He are aaldng n O ~ T ba:::t.use S '.' much h.:::.a been said about control of
Republican forces. He i'TQuld juot like to knovT your. vievTs as commander
of the Dutch forces.
~ :
In the be(31m,ing 1'Te hed the TBI and t ~ : C D the 'nII. At conferences of
Lord Killeern about the truce, he asked us what the situation vTes irlth
the Dutch and British forces. ~ n a t was in the beginning of '
October...the loth or 12th, 19116. \'[e gave hin a summary of British
and Dutch forceD and we lrnevr exactly ~ r h e r e all tIle for'c.;;s were
located. (Cave some ficrures) Then he asked 1 ~ . Sjahrir to give:him
a statement like tllat; ~ 1 r . Sjahrir gave a piece of pap-er to
Lord Killeern •••••Flrst division in Bats7ia, 20,000; second d i v i 3 ~ o n ,
20,000. He came up to ceven divisions in J'c.va of 20,000 people and
six div-isions in Sw..atra of 10,OOO•.•llltogether 200;000 soldiers. "ve
asked 1-1r. Sjahrir if the i r r e g 1 . ~ l a r ba11ds vrere included. He scid no,
he did not lrnmT h01'T strong they IWl'C, ",Thore they vTere, end things like
that. You can find it in the cO:iferE.nce notes about that. After that
we tried to inco!':!!or9.te the irreeu.:.o.r 'bands in the TBI end formed the
TNI. This in spite of the truce- : : : C : : ( ~ e ! l l o n t . ~ l e e£reed to stick to the
nurn.oel·s of the trooIl8--,·re had 91 Cl' 92 thouoand and they hed 200,000••
and not to reinfo:::'ce the s t r e n g ~ h of ou!' troops on both sides. ,{hat
.. . the real 'sitnation is I do not lr.nmr because it vTas in June 1947 du.ring
the laet conference here idth Sjahrir, Sjarifuddin, ven 1·1001-: 13.Dd
!!";j3clf, T , r l ~ G n vle d2GcuGsed the proolem aSain cnd '\ore gave them a
memorandum about building up the forces here ,r1th Indonesian trocps
and Dutch troops for defenGe purpo:Jss. He Gave them figm'e3 of t h ~
/Dutch
.' " ' ~ " . • '. '. " • -. . . ~ ' , .. ' • " "''''' ." >' '.'
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8/5%PaGa 112
Dutch and Indonesian police force and he promised to send me the figurG,3
of his troops immediately after"rerds. That was in J1.me ~nd I am still
,·raiting for his f ~ g u : c e s , so I canllot tell ~ r o u anything about it. MY
impression is that there are still some verJ strc',Jg bands under their
co::nm.and and irregular ba;:Jds on t;.. '3 ot:'1er side ,-,ha have their mm
commenders and troops ' ~ 1 0 a ~ e f i s n t i ~ g their o"m game and Djocjakarta
has not much control over these troops. ~ n e position of the Republican
C o m m e n d e r ~ 1 n - C h i e f and the R e p ~ ) l i c a n c O ~ J ~ n d e r s is very independent
because they have acce}?tod Ia.CJJ:'e Cl' less the Ja.pa:1ese s~rstem. The
con:me.nder-in-chief is not res1?onsible to tl:e Nil1ioter of iTar but
directly to Soekarno h L ~ e l f - - t h e came scheme as in Japan. Local
commenders like SOotomo do 'mat they like and that perhaps is one of
the explanations to JOur question. Eare we have the orders of Soekarno,
here vTe have the intercepted orders of militarj' people-.they are not
altogether the same..•stil1, I believe that ~ l l the other troops are not
strictly under the control of Djocjakartaj several commands are incependent.
~ ~ a m the Indonesian side, tiley tried to give them instructions just to
keep them in line. That is the general situation, I think.
Commission:
Would you think that the decree of control from the center--fram
Djocjakarta--is increasinG?
Repq:
I cannot answer that because I do not knovT. If it is increasing, its a
very bad show, I'm sorry to say, because tilen the fighting on our
perimeters is done under orders from Djocja.
Commission:.You have no evidence to ohmr that it is increasing?
Reply:
He hav~ no info!'!ll.9.tion.
Commissiom
iTe put this question to the Republican : p o o p l e ~ ~ a n ~ r sUP:]3estions for
reducing casualties for better observance of the cease fire order.
' r h ~ y brought out one point that they would be ~ - T i l l i n G to discuss--both
stdes to cease usinc e.rtillerJ fire. He "rould like to knm'T, as this
state reay go on for seme time, if there are any suggestions t ~ ~ G we as
e. Mission could put forth for reduction of casualties e.nd better
observance of the cease fire until the political situation is cleared up.
Repl:r:-I have one definite sUGgGstion-.to cease fightinC. That's the only
thing. lIt is not
, "~ , . . } . ~ .... - ,
- .. ~ - . " ' . - '. ' . ~ , '. '.' ·
, .-• • _ ..." • "7'. ~ . , ••.•
: • d..' - .':l. •• I • • .., '. • ... ". ~ ~ ~ , .'
S/586Pace 113
~33ion:
I~ is not possible under the circumstances o ~ mopping up. Is there any
other suggestion that con be put up for the sake of humanity and probably
get you to discuss with the Republican people? Is there anything
worthvThi1e that you, can advance? I know it is extremely difficult but I
think it is a question that we should ask. It will mean on a lower
level, of course.
R e l ' l ~ ' :
In the first place, to stop any propaGanda, incitinG the population to
fight end to cause trouble, stop the irreE,"Ular bandG from fightinG and
attacking and to stop fiGhting outside the denarcation lines. I cannot
give you any more sUGgestions.
Commission:
••••••• could a kind of armistice be s1gned •••••with the demarcation line
and a military zone •••••
ReJ;ll)t:
We signed a'kind of armistice on october 14 and between signtng ·the
LingcadJati Agreement and tile beginning of police action we had more than
a thousana breaches of the truce. We had restricted ouraelves to the
demarcation 11nes. On?-y from March 25 to July 21 there were more than one
thousand breaches of the truce.
Commission:
Inside your demarcation line?
.....<., ',', ,"
" .. ;.
R e l ' l ~ r :
Some of them, because we had restricted ouroelves to demarcation lines, but
many'uere attacks from outside.
Commisc;ion:
.No casualtios like now?
Renl.";' :
I:\), on1./ about forty a month.
Ii' thc.:l'e is a susgesMon put for,·rard, I am quite sure that the Mission
''f01.·l.J be plee.s0d to do anything it could about i t ...on a lm:er level.
He wanD "be qu~ to "toTilling to di.scuss the mattor .. but; I :>:''1n~,:ze it ls a.
most difl'tC'.I:;:': cL::.-; c.nd cannot be anC'..T?rClC e~::' e. '~:r.;h)::4,.:8 .:'Jtice. T..lJat
is the 0:11:1 tb iJG :'{<7 Lot h ' ~ 1 J l tr,e ot.:'er 8:c.e ... '';;.:18./ .h..Lt J.t} to save
civilian ( ' e . G ' ~ . ~ . 2 : r . i t : l 8 . , . C" r S ~ : ; ' L i l J i : ' G artillery fi1'O., ! ~ 823,110 to me that
until the thinG io clenrcd up completely, the caoualwies are Going on.
It seems to the C o m ~ i G 8 i o n Genorally that until you can clear it up
/completel,y
'. ; . i ' ' . '. :", . '-J"' : •
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8/586PaGs lIlt
.. '" ,, . '. :\ ~ ..
.....
. . .:.
completely or the politicel situation clears it up, the s i t u a ~ i o n ¥dll
GO on. It '''Quld be a Good thins to clear it up. If there is anythinG
w o r ~ h ¥ n l i l e , any sugcestion to put forward, we wotud be verJ pleased to
discus:J it.
(At this point there ¥ms some muffled discussion amonG verious
members of the group on the above SUbject.)
Commi3sion:
Is there any decrease in the violont propnGanda from the Republican side
'durine the last few weeks?
Rep,ly:
'Ho, not at all •
Commission:-,The proD8sanda is still c o n t ~ n u i n B on tIle same level?
Repl:r:
Yes.
Commissj,on:
I~ there' any'practical possibility of marking the demarcation line?
Beply:
I do not like the idea of marking the line because then you have to
plece little flags and then move the flags, some of which are booQy traps,
and tha't causes too many casualties. TheJr have ma!Js, too, so if we cut
a line on the map, 'everJone k n r n ~ s where' it is. Don't forget that after
the truce on October It it took months end months before "re could conie to
an aGTeement on the place of the demarcation line. Our representative
and Dr. Idenburgh went to several areas and Republican officials came
over thore, and said, 11 Our line is here. 1fe are here so you cannot be he1
Commission:.I think "re had better leave it at that. I think that on a lovrer level
they "Tould be qUite HillinG to discuss it.
Rep}..! :
Hhy not transfer irreGular bands and order tIle bands that are insiile to
GO out:Jide and stop fichtinG?
Commission:
That is coins to be very difficult. TIle! ere not Boing to alJree. They
definitely claim that ~ . t ie their territory. It is just the same es
a s ~ i n e the other side to go back. I do not think they would listen to
that. It is just anythinG that could hc.!Jpon, purely military I at the
present time to stop so many casualties. It is a definite sllggestion--a
LTeat achievement if that could be done.
/ltv suggestion
" I .. ~ . . • "'"~, ... '. ~ . ' " '. / ' RI' • 4
>'. •• ••
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• ~ • • • • . ' • / • .,'. • • • J ' . ' • .'
8/586Page 115
Repl~i:
~~ sUGGestion is not to use mines, snipers, looters.
CO!!ID'J,38 ion:
~ n e n you clear up the vrhole situation? •••••• if it could be done.
Anyway, it i s wort~mhile thinking r.;.bout.
Re-pl:'T,:
Yes. The suggestion from my Government is to build up the Indonesian
police for.ce inside the demarcation line e.s soon ac possible. That ,·ras
our sugGestion about establishing ~ Dutch-Indonesian gendarmerie. It
was refused. If you had a Dutch.Indonesian police force, gendarmerie,
then you would not be having this t r o ~ b l e . We could put our troops in
the garrisons and there ,muld be no mol'e trouble,
Cormnission:.\1e are approaching the subject on c very hiGh level novo
Repl;r:
He are.
Commission:
The nex.t question is the general idea of the feelings that you found of
the Indonesian population in re-occupied areas.
Rep1.y:
The more they knew of the security and safety aspect, the more they
co.operate with us. Poace and order are contegious, it will spread out
so if we establish a center vmere peace, and order ere, that center will
spread--as in West Java, In the middle of next month I vnll give the
~ e o p l e of West Java the oprortunity to meet the others to discuss the
political situation. Please believe me that I will do everything
possible so that in ~ l e middle of October there vnll be a meeting for
the people of West Java to discuos their Dolitical problems, but not only
from one side but from both Bides th0l'e is ~ r u o t to build up and to
reJhabilitate thiD count!'"'J.
CCL1rni~~:
You do no'b find e. b!'eat deal of tostility to Dutch people as Dutch people2
~ :
No. I think .that Dr, Foote can tell JOu about that. TIe has seen how
friendly people just evacuuted from Republican territo!'"'; are towards
the Dutch.
COJr.r:li n:31on :
Has there been much in the vlay of flight of the population in one direction
or another?
,. .' • .- .,' . , ' ~ • _ ,~. " AI
" ' '. ,.......'. . \.. .. .
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S/586Page 116
rr!le~r irere evacuated by the 'n1I into' places where the Dutch tro'ops and the
police force won't came in according to the calculation of the TNI.
CommisDion:
In other words, movements of poptuetion would be due mainly to ~ h e fear
of military action?
~ :
They i"ere afraid that ]?eoIlle ,rho stay in certain places will co-operate
idth the Dutch. Their feelinG is only kind of a fear that the RepUblican
spirit, attitude is not too strong; o t h e ~ " i s e , ~ e o p l e would have remained
in their places; for instance, in Garoet, there are 200 people back out of
a population of 10 to 12 thousand. If we could only set hold of one or
tirO thousand, the rest "Tould be '.filling to come back.
Commission:
ArisinG out of that there is this point: if at any time the Dutch troops
would withdra"T, do you think that there 'Y'ould be reprisals and disorders
in the territories?
ReVtl:Be~;een Soemidang and Cheribon we'had' evidence of this thing. They made
a statement from Djocjakarta in which they warned the population that tIle
Dutch troops won't stay.
Commission:
Do you think that Ina!1'j people "Tent to Republican territory because they
are •••••• Japanese currency •••••• 2 or 3 thousand Japanese currency ••••••
and they knm., Japanese currency is no Bood for them.
Reply:
It is possible, but not in general, perhaps in Sumatra.
Commission:
VUlct do you find the feelings of the population in re-occupied territory
among Indonesians? "That were their feelings when the Dutch entered
l"eCarding their relationship i71th the Republic? Did they welcome
the Dutch 60 that their relations with the population could be resumed?
ReVl:r:
I knoiT only the situe.tion in the western part of Java. I thinlc that "Te
have to get a bettor definition of the Republic because a lot of people
do 110t leno", in the dessa the.t there is a Republic; even if you ask the
people, they do not lrno'T the name of the President of the Republic. I
think it'is understandable Qecause 90 per cent of tIle people is illiterate,
because only the upper layer know of the existence of the R e p u b l i ~ .
/I'Tere they
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8/526Pe.;e 117
CO~~f3sion:_.-Here tl1ey i,relcominG the Dutch as liDerators?
~ :
',n1en i'T0 entered in the interior of Hest Java first there i.;aS El. certain
feel'. They were not welcoming the Dutch as liberators; they were
'.Telconung the Dutch as people vTho ,.ill liberate them from feel'.
Commission:
\.'hat Has that fear?
ITITi th regard
,
Revl.y- :I~ wes the fear f r c ~ Gangs an6 insecurity and re?risals. There ,ms no
f::eedom of movement. :Ho tl'ade during the Republic "las free from control
by the f o r c ~ s and il~esular bands, even for ] ? e o ~ l e to sell their rice.
Ccr:mJ.:!. ss i on :
.In otile~ words, do JOu think that'the p e o ~ l e do not welcome the Dutch
8,C Du.tch but as :geo:;>le i'lho call maintain laM and order?
Rep];;":
yes, because the common people can c a m ~ ~ r e things more than vre believe.
T h ~ ~ T have seen the DUtch Government before the war, then the Japanese
occupation, then the Republican Government.
Commission:
In othe::. i<TOrds, there is no political element in their feeling?
R e 1 ? l ~ r :
No, not in the masses.
Corura:i.ssion:
They 'H'ouJ.d '.relccme an:rone who comes who can free them from insecurity?
~ :
~ b k e them secure--yes.
Commissi.on:
Ca~ we have some idea of your idea of the scorched earth :golicy which has
been carried out by the Republicans and the general damage in the areas?
Re;91.,r:!-raj I add one thing to the discussion of the feelings of the population
in the occupied areas? I ',muld like to emphasize the.t there is a lot
of eye ',Tash:LnG in that. ma.tter. \'[e intercepted this signal from the
~ n : : o r n a t i o n s€'r"rice of t l ~ e Republicano .••vTe made So translation of i t.-
T l : e ~ " ask here of the people in Pe.kemberoe and Fort de Koelc areas that as
soon ~ s the consuls will come there they '"Till have a demonstration and
action wherein the population must declare that they want that tho
Dutch troops lecve Indonesia as soon as possible and that the population
does not r e c o B n i ~ e any other government but the Republican Government.
I will give JOU a translation of this.
•'I "".' - ~. -.' , ~~ G J • •.• rr .
Cl ".. ., '... • 'a .' • \l' ~ ( 11
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S/,&5Pe-Ce .lH3
CO~:'T:::' sr~ ::'or::
:- .. ",:.,
' , ! i ~ ~ l ~ r C [ " ' ~ l ' d to the scorched ee:cth :9Qlicy, you ImmT tha.t before the police
action took place the oe3truction of property of estates, of trees and
f a ~ t o r i e s was very formideble, and it ':mc the· :'.ntention of the Republicans
to intensify the scorched earth policy as· much as possible. That started
in early February 1947. In Februt1r'J 1 9 ! ~ ' ( l-1ohanmwd. Hatta. established the
SOBSI, the labor organization, but as a matter of fact, it is en
instrunent of propegancia of the Republic and anong the 1aborers in Java,
because he made a speech in Ilhioh he said that \:i th Article 14 of the
.LingGsdjati A g r e e ~ e n t , givinG beck the estates to foreigners and Dutch
~ e o p l e would not have anJ effect it the laborers could be organized to
sabotage the estates nod wau:d r~fU8e to work there. That was the
b0,31nning of it. A:::. seon as the Du.tcn "o\'ould take ~ n ~ r mili tar] action er
police measures I then they WO\u..a stc..rt destroying. From a mlitarJ point
of view and an academic point of view, what they have done here can't be
ca.lled scorched earth poliC'J, it is just destruction of property. They
have destroyed means of life of their ~ m population, like the rice
.crops. \-le have seen instructions;, they did not like to leave anythinB
behind, to make the situation as bad as possible eo they could sey that the
Dutch cannot manage the situation since they could not provide any food
or security. They also stimulate.d guerilla action so that the Dutch
cannot restore law and order. That is the reason that man;')" of the
properties of the estates and factories and of the personal property of ~ ~ e
foreigners here, and of the Chinese particularly, have been destroyed, but
it is not alvrays a matter of principle because <..men you go to the east
coast of Sureatra you ....rill f:l.no. not so many estetes have been destroyed.
vle can eA-p1ain tha.t because the mmerc have p a i ~ for non-deetruction to
the T!'TI. Hhen you go to TasilQlJele.ya you ca.n 8eB thnt there is e big
difference between TasikIm1ava and other cities. There is not' much
destruction in Chinese querters b e c ~ m s e the Chinese paid 500,000 guilders
for it. It i8 ~ c t a ~tter of policy or principle but a matter of
derltruction of property and a means of protectioll end life. If you
e . x e C ~ l t e the scorched eerth policy as the Russians did in the last war and
the Germans did in 1917 in northern France, first yO\.l evacuate all the
population and brine; them to pleces ....rhere they can be fed and protected..
but you cannot \lest:coy ti',G !;loans ef living so that j'OU cannet feed tb:::
:9'....;mlat ion. '1'1at i s ~'lha t h[l.:0~,.mCtl hero. !n ~ a n g k a l a n b r e . n d . a n lie made
onG of our rcutine r : a ' ~ r o 1 s four or five ldlfJS n0rth of 1-1.cdan and that
ileG the l"JaSOn t:1a":; the lccal R:::IJublican cCl:l!l1ander dtJstroy0d tho oil
fi:::lds at 11urlbl:aJ.·'.lnbradan at a d.istance of 25 kiloIll8tors.
t..rculd
, . . - , '. ~ ... . " ...' ..'. . . .... ' .'. ~ . . . . .
8/586Page 119
~ : o u l d you say t118.t the s ~ o r c h 0 o . ee.rth policy has had u;:;y military
bearing?
R e ' T ) l v ~---
.;.." '. " . ;',' ." .. :
: ~ ..;: :.,." ", , ;...... ,
It hea. of course, aemo rnli t a ~ ~ ' bearing, but also as you haye 1001:eo.
on the cou:ntry a : ~ o t , n c l here you see that Cluite a lot of bridges have been
eles"broyed\} The main d e 8 t r u ~ · G : i . o n ;;ao done to prope:cties UIlli eetatos o
Every d 0 ! : l t . l · u c t i o l ~ 1 ,..hen you ~ e goin[5 to move ~ has militar] bee.ri:1(; J
1'n1en we vTithci...·o'., in 1 9 1 ~ 2 from the J a ~ : . m e s e i'lO destl'oyed 'b:l:'idsos and. vital
plm1ts cut we did not d e s t ~ o y a l ~ of the food stuffs left f o ~ .the
;:Jrotection of the pOJ?ulation. 'VTe destroyed some fa:::tories a ; : l C ~ oil :!?lants
bec'rJ.se they cOi.'lstiJ.:;utcd Yitcl "vlar potentialities:>
Commisz:!.on:
Is t ~ a t still going on?
Re;pl.y:
It is still go1116 on ,...hen they havo a. chance I and stimt8.ated b ~ r
Djocjao
Commission:
That aotivity is still considerable?
R e 1 J ~ :
It is d e o r e a 6 i ~ ~ o 1 ~ e r e our troops move in we can give the people and
-properties some protection\}
C o m m i s s i o n ~
You have none of this scorched earth policy "lh1ch they put into practice
before July 21? Since then how do you estimate the d ~ e that WDS
actually scorched eerth? In ~ e r c e n t a s e of your expectation? You found,
for oxamp1e, most of the military objectives destroyed?
~ 1 J ; t Y :
Y0U mean in gUilders or in pounds? We fotUld just numbers of. rice mills
d e ~ ~ t r o y e c l o
. Q . 9 ; : m i : J s ~ . ~ n :
On the other hand, the important bridges and military objectives ,rere
left alone?
Yes) wc could move in as fUGt as p00sib1e becQvse thore was not
e r ~ ~ h i n g destroyed.
Hhat :9srcontage of your expectations lTas deatroyed?
/Mor0 than wo
. .. ~ ",',
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3/536?age 120
r . - ~ o l ' e than 1'10 eXI'ecte<l. vle 'TouJ.d not go so far as to expect that they
1 ' 1 0 t ~ l d deotroy the food for th.) populatioll. :Before Jul.'" 21 the dG::ltl'ttcticll
of fo.ctorieo i estates, b i ~ i Q g e s , etc. w ~ s already in proc3ss.
~ ~ ;
Then 1'1hat you 8XJ?ected to 11e dostroyod 17o.s not a:ld 1That you did net
erJ.18ct to be destroyed 11as?
Re'Ol~r~
Yos, you are right to a certatr:. e:,tel"t. In the first place the l1ater
and. !l0~Ter plant in \-lest Javaa.:.'.i l{tdclle ~ T a , , ; , a 'Toro saved beca.uso vTe had
a very' speedy action there, but yeu canno';; move :in as fast ao t!w.t in
every r ~ c e miLl, estate, wld ~ a c t o r J '
CoI!l!llission:
Do you think ~ ' o u r element oi" snrpriso Cc...'l16 in there?
Yes, that is right.
Commission:
I think your element of surpris0 had quite a lot to do with non.
destruction of both militm'y and non-military objectives in re-occupying
areas?
Re'O;LY:
That's right. I 'VTould like to add one thing to the scorched ea.rth
discussion. It is my impression from DJocja propaganda that the .
RepUblican Government urged the ~ I T anc laborero to destroy e v e r y t h i ~ ~
and now you ccnnot atop them a n J ~ r e j Djocja cannot control them now.
EVidently there exe still a lot of people vnlo would like to ~ o a little
bit of looting./
Co:mmissj,on:
vTe should like to discuss nClT the economic conditions in re-occupied
areas, improvoments or other-rise since.
Renly:
ene could talk very lengthily on oconor.Uc conditioruJ in the Nethcrlands
Indies before and after military police measures. I will t ~ J to cut it
do,m to the most vital points. The mest vital point in the economic
conditions in the Indies is the food situation in general and the rice
situation in p8.l·ticularp N01" to undorota'1d the :dce situation of this
country y'ou have to keep in mind a ntunoer of basic figurss--tllS o v e ~ a l l
figures based on Ina.n;)' years ef experience bofore the Wal': Java is
producing 4,000,000 tons of ricej the outer provincos have an import to
the extent of 300,000 tons of rice v1hich they need from els6i,horo. 'l'hoy
01'0 ver: low figures. Regulcu'ly Java could provide 200,000 of these
/300,000, and
~ . ' • .'j • • .~ ~ I' • •. '. .
'. ~ .,,' :'. .' ' . , : . . \ ..", '. . ~ . . .~, ,
S/586Page 121
.>'.
300,noo, and 100,000 should be imported from other countries. nlC whole
situa'ion was never qUite in balance. Five p e ~ cent more or less is a
normal variation o ~ the Java crop. Before the yr,ar we never had
difficulties with food or rice supplies because quite near to us are
three major rice ~ r o d u c i n g countries of tho worli--Burma, Indo-China,
and Siam. So i.,hatever rice yle needed i'le could b\.1.;Y· on the world market
level. After the war, this whole picture was disturbed. On the one
side, the three countries did not provide the rice they did before the
uar. As a matter of fact, i'le are ver'J much lackil"l.g in the••••••••rico.
There was a ver'J great amount of rice in the "Thole of Asia and the
Far East; therefore, it was more important that Java should provide a
1/* maximum of rice to the other parts of Indonesia. Java is not a country
where rice is produced on an even scale evory,·lhere. There are surplus
areas and many shortage aruas; as a matter of fact, to provide everyone
in Java with suffieiont rice, a major movement of rice all over the
countl"J by l o l " l ~ distance-.boat, train and truck--ia necessary. It amounts
to about one million tons of rice per yoar. It is a very difficult
instrument to hancUe. Moreover, 8S you know, you cannot eat rice as
you grow it; it has to be milled by mills which are mostly Chinese-aimed.
vlhen we stc.rted economic control after the war we found ourselves in the
difficult position that the main regions producing rice in Java wore under
the control of the Republic, which for the last two yoars has either been
not willing or able to export rice to other parts of Indonesia or other
g/* countries. We have been negotiating about this question. At a certain
stage, the Republic declared itself' willing to export rice to all parts
of I n d o n ~ s i a · . 4 0 , 0 0 0 tons to start with--ana it was formally agreed upon
under the chairmanship of the British General ccmmanding. Only about
4000 tons ever arrived in Batavia. On the other hand, the RepUblican
Government has repeatedly declared that t h e ~ r ~ l e r e able to deliver
700,000 tons of paii or 400,000 tone of milled rice to India. nle
President and Prime Minister of the RepUblic declared that this amowlt
was ready for delivery to India. Although i'1e have agreed that J ~ h i s should
bo done and althoueh the government of India has :9rovided officials to
help in this matter, no more than a total of 40,000 tons was ex,ortod.
So we have this biG difficulty: this country c ~ ~ o t be economically run
'Tithout rice, and rice was there but could not be m o v e ~ . It ia of vital
importance that we have control nOlT over main rice producing areas and
we are making a serious endvavcr to get this rice which is still available
Footnotes indicate points ccncerning which the NEI Govornment authoritieshave submitted elaborations, the latter to bo found in AppendiX I.
/movirlG
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S/586Page 1 ~ 2
moving. We thir.L~ that at least'50,000 tons from :Test J a , ~ and
100,000 tons from E o ~ t Java c ~ ~ be-moved now as a bare m i n i ~ u m , i1
1TU are successful in our endeavor. This means that it is not onJ..y
i""portant for the Indies 'but fOl' the l'Thole 'Jf :,sia because some of
~ h e rice 1"e get from JC!.va that we do not need can be givon ,to other
countries by IEFC.
The food situation in cities surrounded by narrou }?0rimoters
before the police action 1"a.S extremelj- bad and prices were veJ.'jr ,hi6h.
1/'* The result of the police action can bc very well seen in the fibUJ:'es
vhen you lmo.T that rice prices ,in Hest Java after the police action
havo been reduced from f. 2.00 a litre to f. 0.50; in Eo,st Java from
f. 3.00 to f. 0.45; in Mid.dle Java 'from f. 2.00 to f. O ) ~ O ; i.n
East Sun:atra fronl f. 6.00 to f. 2.00'; in Palembe,ng from f. 5.00 to
f. 0.90; in PadaDg from f. 1.50 to f. O. ~ci • l,!oreover, the index
figures of prices ::'01' foodstuffs havo bean reduced in places in
~ I e s t Java. These arc the 'official figures of the NEI Office of
Statistics: in Hest Java from 2600 in 1939 to'1550; in Middle Java
from 3300 to 1600; in East Java from 1700 to 1250; in Palembang
: ~ o m 5200 to 1700; in Pedang from 3300 to 1650; in Modan from
6500 to 1750. That means that prices for vital foodstUffs have gone
down by more than half. The end of this food blockade has very much
affected the Indonesian, Chinese and Dutch p e o ~ l e 1ivine within the
Dorimeters.
':±/* The second vit.al point is that by control cf the Republic over
the very important regions, the legal export of 1)l'oduce in a "flay
vhich .70uld benefit this country 1'ra.s rractically 'impcssible. The
main reascn was that the Republic wanted tG export estate produce
which l'TaS available on a big scalo without attolUptir..g to !l8.kc rules
ano. regulations tJlat revenue in foreign 0xch8.!'.(;c vlould be giVGn to
either the community as a lr1101e or to the mmer3. Iv.(y governmont
could not allovT vast quanti ties of estate produce to leave the CotUlt:::'y
•.,ithout a part ef it coinB to the leeal o.moro. There .Tas El. groat
deal of illegal export - -mainl::i to Sincapol'e- -ef estate and nativo
produce that m:ts to the detri.>ncnt of this c o t m t : ; . ~ y • Statistics ShOlf
that tho c o u n t r ~ r only receivod one-fifth of the value on tho .rorld
mQ.:::'ket. By means of t!le produce that lTent cut and by barter, gooo.s
'l-TerO purchased in Singapore, uero bl'ought over to 3umatra and Java
and sold in Republican areas ccainst very hiCh prices. They were brought
over and sold hero acainot a scarcity levol becaUSe textiles 'and other
* Footnotes indicate IJol.nts concerninG .lhleh ihe ~ m I Government authoritieshave oubmitted elaborations, the If"'.tter to be found in Append i x. r.
, " .• IS'.-". .,
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8/586Page 123
.. '.',' ,', ... ~
'.
goods were very scarce here. The produce lTao bou13ht by the same
traders in S i r ~ a p o r o on the world market level and in that way
four-fifths of very substantial values were lost for the Indies. After
the ~ o l i c e action, we have established a normal way in which export of
estate produce can be regulated, and·we.will see to it that everyone "mohas the rights on these products has a right to his legal share. This
iD of great im:::ertance for the vlCrld andf.or the Indies because they
get the real value on estate produce.
Pnother vital point: is that the wealth of this country is for a
Great part maQe up by western invested capital and estates under the
leadership of Dutch, English, P ~ e r i c a n s , etc. From the very start or
after war conditions, the Republic was reluctant against giving back
the estates to foreign owners, althOUgh in Article 14 of ~ h e L i D ~ g a d j a t i
Agreement it was declal'~d that all these estates and other things
iwuld be given bacle•. He have found that it ..,as v e r ~ " difficult to ",ork
this out. Yv im~rcssion is that the leaders in pewer of the Republic
are very much urn·';t.lling, . in reality, to let the Oimers go back to the
estates and rOSUIl1e managemt?nt. I will give you one example which' is
to me important because it was told to me by an Ehglishman. There is
a spinning mill l ~ 7 l o r c d ~ 50-50 Dutch-British owned; the British are
~ h e controll;Uli. i ? a : i : ~ : ; . r . ~ ' r .• represented by a Mr. Johnson. After the
LingcadJati A g r o c . i l i . ~ n t ~ , a a fO:J.'mally signed, Mr •. Jchnson ",as allowed 'co
visit this spinnir.g :ill]':., lfe was received there in a friendly ",ayand asked the leaders if they were willing to co-operate with the Dutch
and ~ l i s h . Some of them said "yes". Mr. Johnson told me that
afteri',ards he fotund out that those leaders who told him they were
willing to co-operate were direct~y afte~fards brought to l4ilang and..never returned to the factory. Then Mr. Jolmson returned to Batavia and
necotiated with Dr. Gani to get back the manaGer of the factory. vfuen
I ~,as in Djocja the Re;?ublic told me that this 1',as a tef!t case in ",hich
the Republic was shewing its willingness for the foreignors to go back
to the factories. I ~ . Johnson sent his main asoistant back to the factory
but he ..,as held u:; in Halang to make an acrocm..:nt ,·,ith the local labor.
He made a draft C'groemont and ai'ter a 1,hile brought it to Bctavia to be
acreed to by Dr. Gcni (l.nd me. After the draft u g r e e ~ o n t had bf)<-lr., signed,
im,crtant machiner-J "as brOUght a"ray from the factory and brcU{;l.t
olsciThere. This she",s how roluctant the Republic "as to keep their
promis0s. In general, I have been neGotiating n ~ s e l f after the
LingGadjati l ~ r 0 e m e n t for two months with Dr. Guni about questions like
this: can ",e at least in some regions start executine the promises of
/Article 14;
• .. '" • If'
. -. . :. \ • ~ ,I.
. " .. . ,'. f,. . .
•
8/586PaGo 124
;< ..•
Article lh j can we clil"ectly make a good working mw.ner in lThich l7e
exchange rice for textiles which are at present here? I have found it
a c t u a l ~ r impossible to come to any results because of the political
2/* situation. 'He could not come to terms on political issues until an
interim government is formed.. -until all political difficulties are
solved. That is one reason why it was important that police action be
twcen, ~ ~ d we have....... It is very clear that Java and other parts
of the RepUblic '\-Tant lots of things-·inducement goods, capital, f"t'om
other parts of the world and those goods can only be ~ u r c h a s e d if you
earn foreign exchange. It is impossible to earn foreign e x c h w ~ e . From
the very start after the police action, ~ ' r e have bl"Ought in the
R e ~ u b l i c a n territory under Ottr control very substantial emounts of
textilos, oils, kerosene, copra, m a r g e r i D ~ , flour, fish, salt, milk,
80a]?, etc. The ReIJublicE1.n Government, as was my Olm j." • '.' .. 1,. has a
tendency of telling the world that conditions in TIept .NCl' "ory are
good. They may have their eyes on some ShOlT places lch.J f···. ' s
Ilossible because conditions in Java va:ry so much. As l..' £ : .Lf.f.lOW,
they have never brought Dutch or foro1gners into poor places; for
instance, oUr 1Teakest point before the war was 13·odJonegono. I have never
talked toa foreigner or Dutchman lTho went to that place. He know that
the richest region for rice production is in East J a ~ , lThich this year
brought together a substantial quantity of rice and where p:r'actically
the whole popuJ.at1on wes walking naked; they did not even have rice
bags to cover themselves anymore. My personal impression after h a v i ~ ~
talked ~ n t h lots of Republicans in'private conversation in official
negotiations is: among RepUblican leaders there a r ~ very few men in
economic and t1r.anciaJ. fields. The ones 'chey have vThom I knOlT and
trust have either been put· aside or are in places where t ~ o y havo no
1Dfluence. In charge were people lTho are clever in ];1011tics and
~ p r o ] ? ~ a n d a . In all negotiations I was struck by the fact that the
Re]?ublic gave more value to outer appearances than to reality. For
example, the Minister of Food Froduction, a medical d o c t ~ r , promised me
J~hat he "-ITould provide, if his government vTere agroeable, 70,000 tons
of rice in Nay or April cut of East Java. Thoy se.itl that the rice
"-Iras available. I asked, "Can you move it to that point?" The reply
V811 "I el0 not think so". I said, "Hho is in charge of the whole rice
Ill.£U"1ipulation?" and he mentioned a certain name. I asked rrhat that man
* Footnotes indicate ]?oints concerning which the NEI GovElrnment authoritieshcve 8ubmitte<l ele.borations, the latt'Jr to be found in Appendix I.
/l;nS"-IT about
..... ". ~ , ' . • .... • # • .-'" i. lit ..
• 'O.. ". ..
• ., '. ': '.~ :.,: .,.' '. . '. " . . -. : ~ , ' , .' , .'.' " .'l!t •'.' . ~ .' ','
S/586Page 125
}mc)U about. rico. u!'Io more than that he can eat it", 1-mB the reply.
'I11Gn r l~L1llt to Dr. Gani a.r.d asked him if tho.t vms tl'tle and he said ,_
"r (LO l-x.t Imo·w ft• Everyone ImovTs that the manipulation of great
qUDnV:' --1;. f rice is an e:ctremelJr difficult thing even in no1'Il'&
timGG, let alone novr. He are not yet whore vTe vTant to be) but by the
fact that '\>Te nOlT have those regions under control and that conditions are
gl"nduolly clearing up, notv1i thstanding the scorched em'ch policy '\>Ti th
its groat dos-cruc:'ion, r think vTe arc proS1'essing and l10 are aware of
the 1100sibility to start a real rehabilitation of an eccnomic life in
the Indios. The Indies are an economic unit, and CQ.Il.not be divid.ed in.
tlTO or ~ l r e e or more portions. Java and the outer provinces belong
tOGether and the fact tlw.t there is political divis:l.on is detrimental
to this c o u n t l ' ~ r . HOlT wo have so much more tll1(ler control, vIe have unity
in tIle outor provinces e.nd Java and Sumatra where vre can really start
1-TOrkil".g and it is of r e a l l ~ i great importance that this work should
not be intt'Jl'rupted by fighting, looting, sabotage, scorched earth, etc.
CoIlJlI!issiol1:
Yeu refer to larGe exports of estate goods, mainly from Sumatra on. a
barter basis which means that; someone made an enormous profit. ~ v e r e ~ h e
RepUblicans able to control the destination of thosc profits?
Renly:
I mm7 on.ly of one end.eavor ~ j O get a:ny control over H--in Palemba.I:l6
by the l"cal Republican Government and where perhaps since the
becir.n:! ne of this year or later thoy took over the control of tt'ade
r1ith f:iingn:'ore themsclvGS.
COlmn:l.soion:
"mat :r.3D happened to the proceeds?
Renly:
' I h o ~ r 8l'e in the pockets of the traders.
C o I n 1 l l i s s , ~ :
Even '\>1hen the Republican Gov:"1'nmont itself took chorgs of the trade?
Rell1;L:
ITo, then +,r.o Hepublicnn Government 1-/oulJ. g<.::t -ci:" Jlrocclods thEm-wolves.
C o r m i o 8 i o n ~
i.1:Cll they hE'd takon control of that trade, iid they charge the
oir:lil£ll' scorci ty prices ao had boen cho.rgod before by tradurs?
Renl;::
YGS, as far as I u~d0rstood&
COInlJisgj..£!~:
~;1wn tho Dutch t.r'oops reoved into the country after Jnly 20, was
ecricultvro proceeding at a normal level and 1-1ere the IJcople-
/apart
----------------_._---_.
s/586Pace 126
epc.rt from ohol'tage of textiles, living a normal life?
~ :
lr You CGlIl S[1Jr ~Tes ~ 'but you must keep in mind that the general picture of
a ~ r i c ~ L l . t t u · a l conditions clirectly before the police action was quite
dii'fel'ent then in J a n ' t 1 e . l · ~ r , February and Narch. Generally s p e a l ~ : t n g , there
is never ~ r difficulty in Java in June, July and Ausust. Fr':lm now on,
difficulties start.
Ccmmission:
,';
But agriculture was p r o c e e d i r ~ in a fairly normal manner?
Ren1.l:
Yes, but extensive damage has been done to irrigation systems (irrigation
is ef C · : c n . ~ importance for the rice crop, as you Imoyr), partly due to
lack of control, partly to the devastation of forests "(oulich was considerable
§/* tunder the Japanese and lator tunder the Republic. MOre devastation of
forests "(o18.S caused on tho one side by the population 1-1ho was allowed to
cut down traes and. make rice fields in certain ~ e a s , p a r · t J ~ r b e ~ : a u s e the
whole of the railways ran on wood :1.nstead of coal. This caused floods
and s t o p ~ e d the irrigation channGls.
Comnrlssion:
So that apart from the main overa.ll adve :ltage in gettt!18 1.:>ack into
something liko crr..;an..:: latior~ eni gr;nl.rcal a : ~ c r : . : ' ) ~ . i ~ J c ( ' l r . . i . r t ~ l j r : of' the
Indies, you cle.:!.J1. th,~:'j y0 ....: r.,:'.d c:ri.1g to the : : , ; q , F : t . a t : c o : ~ : l : ' : < ~ . J , ; H a t e
relief in the '"/i8Y of' -ce::t.il':;S and other consUi'lption goods, improvement
in irriceticn--ar1;j;-!:;hil1G e::"ac?
Re1Jl~':
Transport c,f raedi0al s ....1~'!?l:i.e8; our medical officers are '1'101'king very
2./* hc.rd for ]!00l,l,) '/::0 2' ;; (5,:"~""~" '::~ CL.'1t: in. h09Pltals. B . ) ( ~ a : L . a e the
d.istribution S Y 8 j G ~ ~ l , ! S CC'!]') . ~ - 1 , ; } . L : r lac:":'ir.\13 in ufficip,n::;y they could
not get fe-od fl'CL! L'(Fl -.!.:Ceo.s '1There there i-18.S plenty of food to areas
'1rher€i tllel'o "(oras nothing.
Conllnissior!;
The:l:'e is one other Iloi':.t, ~ ' T h i c h does not come s"irictly '1iithln the
range of this partic,':L':.U.X' ~'.:.Asjicn~ I fL11 it d:i,:"fit:l.ll t to get un
e.r.s'lTer C1SiS"vi:IOrJ. Ce:;J. you t e ~ : ' : ' us ~ Y " j i r r i . , g about tho organization of
the c ~ r e ~ C J in R ~ p u b l i c a n areas?
~ e n l Y :
I i-1ill try to. lfter tI-.e vTar, tho RepUblican Govorr..ment maintained the
Jc.panece mc-noy. After a "(o1hile, I think after a ye&!' or so, they went
* F0ot~ctes indicc.~e ~oints ccncerning which the NEI Government authoritieshavu sub:aittod eleboro.ticIl3, the latter to be found in "ppendix I.
lover to
". ,:''',' . '.,'" ;" , ' , ' . :" . ,': , . ' " .' --- . , ~ . , .,
8/586Page 127
over to thtJir O'WIl RepubJ.ican money. The main difficulty with this
m o n e ~ r i:3 that it is so badly made that it can be counterfoited and
often ';110 countGrfeited paper money is better than the official. I
thi:nk, although I have no definite proof of it, that they have given
out f. 300,°00,000 und there is another 300,000,000 or 200,000,000
illegally going a r o t ~ 4 i . It must have beon c o u n t e ~ ~ e i t e d on a very
larGe scale.
tnat is the currency founded on? There is no gold reserve--is
t ~ ~ a t i o n sufficient?
Ren;tY:
I think that the currency is founded on a political basis. It still
has a political value.
COll1lllission:
Do you accept it at all?
Re'Ol;Z:
No. 1~ have to make it easier· for the population--an exchange to
1 : Q / ~ f start with a certain limit: 5 cents to every Republican rupiah..
Commission:
And Japanese money--is that continuing'i'
Re!l1,y:
In some parts to facilitate it for the popttlation.
Commission:
Do you think the Republic is able to export rice abroad.?
RenJ..;¥::
d:./~~ They claim that they are in a position to send rico to Ind.ia. Mr. Lambert
told me there was 5,000 tons ready for sh1pment.-pert of an agreement with
India.
CoI:l1llission:
There are certain stocks in Republican territories--porhaps sugar--badly
needed in the world. Is it the case that some provisional arrangement
came before the police action for the export of estate produce and the
creation of a special ftU1d into which funds cotud be paid?
Re'Dl?:
VTe havo already made a regtUlil.tion for our territory as far as the
estate produce is concerned"
* Footnotes indicate l)oints concerning which the rillI Governmen-i,' autho:r.i tiJS
have submitted elaborations, the latter to be found in ~ p ~ e n d j x ~ .
- 'n·· '. .. -.I. • • +tY',. , , i' - • ,'" I' ~ .
• • " . ' .:.; .'. ~ ..,' .f,G ~ ... ", I : ••• •••• •
S/586Page 128
Cornn.ission:
But no Gigroeement with t;le ~ e p u b l i c for export of ~ 7 h a t there may
be in Republican t e r r i t c ~ y ?
Ben1;Y::
I have tried for two months to moke some ag.,.·eemen·~ b·,.1.t have bean
entirely unsuccessful,
C 0 1 l l D 1 i s s i ~ :
Recently?
B.enlY:
Not since the police action•.. -.;.... . ... :-.;.'.;'
',','" . ":'::",':;.'
!APPENDTX I
"': ." .",
Footnote
aumber
1/
g.!
3./
'1./
8/"'86Page J.29
APPENDIX I
Elaborations Submitted by Netherlands East Indies Officials
in C o ~ e c t 1 o n with C e ~ i n Points Discussed in C o n f e r e n c ~
with Consula:r, Commissic1n on September 29, 1947
Java is not a country where rice is produced e v e r ~ 1 h e r e . ~ l e r e
are surpluB areas and. mnny shortage areas. To provid.e sufficient
rice to every region in Java a major movement of rice ell over the
country by long distances (boat, train, truck) is necessary; in all
about one million tons of rice a year.
At a certain stage the Republic decla.red }ferself .willing to
eXJ;lort rice to shortae;e areas of Indonesia, even when they are under
Dutch control.
In the negotiations concerning the solving of the food problem
which took place under the o h a 1 r m ~ s h i p of the British Commanding
General they promised to deliver 40,000 tons of rice to the NEI
Government and they promised to de11ver moreover a monthly quota of
about 12,000 tons. Those deliveries h O ~ T e v e r never took pla.ce Dnd
in total only about 4000 tone ever arrived in Batavia,
On the other hand the Republican Government repeatedly declared
that they were able to deliver 700,000 tons of padi (rice-in the ear)
or 400,000 tons of milled rice to India.
The President of' the Republic and her 1?rime Minister did make
several statements that this huge amount of rice was ready for
delivery to India.
Besides everywhere the TB! (TNJ) was blockading the Dutch
controlled areas and mnde every import of' rice and other food
stuffs to these areas imposAible.
The second vital point is the situution in the estates and che
export of' estate produce. During the R e p u ~ l i c a n administration
there was export of estate produce; the Republic ~ 1 a s getting this
produce by looting the Dutch and foreign estates, where the rightful
o ~ m e r s could not return. This export, mairlly to Singapore and the
Maley Union took place in the forn. of' bartors. Goods ~Tere pu!'chused
in f:ingapore and the Halay Union, brought over to Sl.llllatra and Java
and then sold in the Republican areas acninst very high prices (0
consequence of' the scarci t.y e:dsting in those areas), whilo the
lustl3te
,We could not come to terms on economic issues until an interim
. Government was formed and until all :political difficulties ,rere
solved.
In all ~ e g o t i a t i o n s vTith the Republic I. vTas struck by the fact
that the Republic gave more vaiue to outer appearances then to
realtty. If apparently t h ~ i r negotiations were going smoothly they
.,Tere already entirely satisfied and there has never been any
investigation to the aim of finding out whether the population '\-res
suffering or not. This applies also to the world, because only if
in the Indies will be established a strong centre of economic tIDity
it will be possible to deliver ever increasing quantities of scarce
export commodities to the world marl:et, 111:e oil, tee, coffee,
quinine, tobacco, rubber, sUSar, etc.
You can say yes, but you must keep in mind that the general
r.icture of the egrioulturel situat:on in the period just before the
rolice action is quite different to the p i c t t ~ e existing in the
<ll(i:f:rbhs of JanuEl.!"j, Februar~r and March. The rice harveot is due' in
tho months of June, Julv' and AU3ust of every y e ~ r so that in that
:period there is no shortage of food and economically everything is
going smoothly. But in tIle difficult months of Januery, February
end Mareh (the Indoneslans cell this period the Pe.tjeklik) when
the rice is failinG, the difficulties a l ~ r e y s start.
More devastation of foreots ~ l a s caused by the population ~ T h o
were allowed to cut do,m trees and make rice fields in certain
areas. The timber il8S then used for the r a i l ' T 8 ~ r s vThich did not use
/eoal
8/586Page 130
1./
APPENDIX I
estate produce '\-T8S smU;;6led out of the cotmtry against very 10"T
prices. In that 'T8y tl1e country ,'Tes gradually impoverishing as the
merket value of the Goods coming in was about one-fifth of the goods
going out. Moreover the exchange received 'IV this irregular e x : p o l ~ t
did not come to the benefit of the vThole popu.lation but come only
into the pockets of same shrewd businessmen.
Therefore my Government established the regulations of
28 January 1947, which regulations are not forming an economic
blockade. Native produce was free to go out from Republican areas
but estate produce v T o ~ d not be exported vr1'bhout a previous permit
of the !'!El: Government. In this vray fuxther looting of Euro:pean
estates was prevented " T ~ i l e the NEI Government had the opportunity to
control that sufficient goods were coming in. After the :police
action ••••••
'.
• .' .- -' _. • • ' ,J ' . : , . < ~' " ", - '. ' '. :,',' .,''" " .~. "' • .", . .r.,., • '. . ,!I" "
s/586Page 131
APPENDIX I
coal but \Tood instead. This devastation i'Tao causing serious
erosio11, ivhich erosion stopped the irrigction channels.
B e c a u s ~ the distribution s ~ r s t e m vas completel..y lackins in
e f f : ' c i e n c ~ r and besides to a large degree there ilas serious
corruption, the goods did not go from the surplus areas to the
shortage areas, but came into the hands o n ~ / of the Republican
officials and not in the hands of the suffering masses.
No, iTe are not prohibiting the use of this money but the NEI
Government and her orGanisations do not accept the Republican
currency. Shortly after the police action, in connection i1ith the
Lebaran (the most important and solemn Mohmaedan festival), in
several regions the Indonecians requested us to help thera to buy
Goods by exchan3inJ tlleir R e ~ u b l i c a n money, so as a.special m e ~ s u r e
PJ;J Government then alloi'red the NEI orGanisa'bions to accept the "
Republican money and to sell goods against the rate of 20 Republican
guilders = 1 ~mI Guilder, suoh to a certain limited amount.
!tI They claim that they are still in a position to send rice to
India.
Mr. ~bert told ne that Mr. Hatta mentioned that in the north
of Sumatra there i'TaS a g,uantit.r of 5000 tons of 1"1,::(" 'for export,
IJart of an agreement 'Ir1th India. '.ro my o p i n i o n , ' : ~ v . ; ; , r ~ this is
a political move, because the north of Sumatra has never been a
surplus area of rice •
. ~ .. ' ..
/f~PPEnDIX II
_: '. . : ~ '. t " ~ '., ,.... • .. ~" " '. • • , . .~. 1 ~, '.\ •
," • • , • ... ", ..... 1.
/n"
S 50b
Page 132
APPENDIX' 11 '
Re})o~t of Incidents read by General Spoor
On 26/8 Stuff VI DiY., (I\EDIR1) reported to COmmE. V and VII Divs:
IIReport dated 25/8:
Sector 2 - VI Div.: At 05.00 hours we mude preparations at Gempolkerep,
Bandung and Gebeg.
At 06.30 hours El. concerted attack at Bandung was lUUllched, shooting
lasted 12 minutes. 1I
Note NEFIS: GempoL~erep, Bandung and Gedek lie 2 or 3 kilometres
inside' the former line of demarcation, West of
ModJokerto.
On 21/8 Cornm. III Div. received a message from c. Troop COIlllil. :tn the
vicinity of Pekalongan, running:
11 Om' troops which were stationed around Kedoeng\·roeni (South of Pel.:alongen)
and were'ready to"attack three e n e ~ trucks, succeeded in shooting down
6 full-blood Dutchmen o ~ 20/8."
I
S.S. - 17 Regt. reported on 2/9 to Camm. III Div.:
"During the attack on Peke.longan ond Kedoengvroeni on 25/8 at 24.00 houro,
7 eneIn;'! soldiers were shot dead. 'rhe houses of the Ch11]eSe ,,,ere fired
at by us, 4 men of the C.P. of K e d o e n ~ " o e n i were killed by us. We burnt
~ , o " m 4 Chinese houses, c c c ~ p i e d b:r the Dutch. 11
On 20/8 Lt. Gen. OEF,IP SOEl';OHhRDJO issued the following order to the
Comms. I to VII Divs.:
liThe actions of our t ...·oops ohould be interlsified, especially at night.
Don't wait till Dutch fire-brands aro beforehand with JOU. Mind that you
ahre.ys take the 1nitiatiye."
On the occasion of the celebration of the Hohcmmedan Ne~r Year,
coincidinc "r:!.th the 2nd anniversary of the Deole,rat1on of Independence of
the ReIlublic, Maj. Gen. "BOmIC TOMO" uga:l.n dellvcred one of his notorious
speeches.
After expressinG hio best ,d:;hes for the New Year Boeng Tomo
described the s:!.tuation in the occupied territories, about which he
said i.a •
"Ever:' nieht one or tvro DntchL1.en are d:'sputched by our brother, who rei'u£'.:
Ita be suppressed"
. ...... - "'-
, •• •. • t • , " • • '..". -/.... . . ~ . 4" .' '. • .' •
8/5[6:::'u[je 133
APP+:rIDI:{ I!
to be s u p ~ : : ' · e s s e d . One by one they Co to hell, bravo, brothers! It can't
bo a sin to d i s p a t c ~ l a fe\T more."
Alter arGuing that, properly speaking the R.I. tOGether with the
United Ne.tions should carry out a police aGtion against the Dutch looter::
and bandits, Boeng Tono wound up hiG speech by s ~ y i n g :
"Bl'ethre11 in occupied territor:i.es: ,.,hen the Dutch are asleep you
.m1.,st throv oil cn theh' houses and then Get f::'re to them, or you can j1.'.S'C
cut their throats. 'l'his is v G r ~ r easJr, much eesier than 1 ~ i 1 l i n G a chie~.:en,
for in the latter case a pra~cr 8hould bc cs:d, vThereas thio is r.ot
necessary with the Dutch,
"HoYT, brethren, nothinG is more simple t l ~ a n to do 'That I 68.id. To-de-j"
is our Ne,., year I murdel" the Dutch and ta.:.>:8 their clothes as a rCl·Tard."
!APPEUDIX IX
- .. .,
.' : .. ' ..' '.' . \ ~ .. - '. .' :' .' \" . .' ..:..... .' .' ..
s/586Page 134
APPENj)IX IX
GCVE.r'JiIf.E:NT INFOBMATION SERVICE
Bate.vie, August 29th 1947 •
•• e •• ,aooeeoog'.oe"on".o ••
; Relet'.:Je on Friday :
; 29th AU3ust 1947
:et 20.45 hours Java-Time:. .••• e •••••• Q •••••••••••••••
B.
:.' .... .:,. -: .';..':':
r ~ ~ O ! ' r 9 ! . . = . ~ Dr. GOVERNOR GENEPAT..
At the termir:a·i.;icn of the police action in Java and 31.lIllatra on 4th
August 1 9 ! ~ 7 at 24.00 hours the t e r r i t o r ~ r within 1711ic11 the Netherlands lndics
Government took ove!' the direct responsibility fOl' la,·, and order included
tho follovnng areas:
I. JAVA
A. ~he par of West- and Middle Java, bounded:
a. to the North by the Java Sea;
b. to the West by the line Kramat - Sepatan - R.Pensodo~:an - Djata.k!
1 • Babakan 2 - K. Sab! (all inclusive), the Western boundary of
the District Leuwiliang, RSGency Buitenzorg (Bogor) and the
Western boundary of the Regency Sukabumij
c. to the South b'rJ the Indian Oceanj
d. to the East b ~ r the Eastern bounderJ of the District a,,,,mbonG,
Regency Kebm~en; the Eastern boundarJ of the Regency
Purbalingca, the Southern b o u n d a ~ 1 of the Regencies
Pekaloncan and Kendal, the Southern boundary of the Districts
Ambaravre and Seletiga, Regency SemarenG, including the
environs of Djubug in the District TenGeren, Regency
Semarang, the Eastern boundary of the District Singen-Kidul,
Regency Grobogan, and of the District Demak, Regency Demak.
The part of East Java, bounded on the Hest by the Northern-and
Western boundary of the District Grissee, Regency Surabaya, the
Hestern boundary of the District Tjermee, ReGency Surebaya, the
Western bounder! of the Regency Modjokerto, including the environs
of He.tudekon, Regency DjombanG, the vTetershed between the
river-basins of the K.Brentas ')nd the K.Konto (inclusi'''o) runninG
from ~ h e G.Andjesmoro across the G . B i r ~ - G.Djeruk -
G.Radjecr,Tcsi - G.Kedungtjangkruk - G.Tjobann(jante"l to the G.Butak
across the District Pudjon, Fecency l ' ~ l a n ~ the Southern bounderj
lof the Districts
'f • " • • "(t " ,',,. ., -.' ,
... ,. " ~ , . ~,
. ~ . . ...' ,
S/'l2GPag& 135
of the Districts Malang and Tumpang, Regency Nalang, ir.cluding the
part of tho District::; KeIlandjen and Bu1ul.a:;lE'.:1G, Regency Nalang,
to the line Pakisadji - - BUlulavTeng - G.Btu'1ng; and the Hestern
boundary of the Recency Lumadjang.
II. NADURA
The Districts BangkElan, K ~ b a n u j ~ ~ and Beliga of tae Regency Bengkalan
and the Districts Tordjun, Bnnder, P ~ ; 1 e k c s e n and Kotasampang of the Regency
Pamelcasan.
Ill. SUHATRA
A. Nbrth SUnllltra
Of the Residency S t ~ t r a t s E ~ s ~ C o n s ~ :
a. The t O l ~ ~ i t o ~ / betvreon the B . S c ~ a n B a n and the S.Asahan (both
rivers included);
b. TandjonspUl'a, s i t u ~ t e d en the north bank of the B . S e l ~ ! l g a n , and
also the raililay line or-d thE) roed Hhich connects the said
town with the area as d e f 1 n ~ d sUP 8, with its environs.
B. Middle Sume.tra
Of the Residency SUInatra's \leat Coast:
a. the sub-section Padang of the section Zu1d Benedenlenden;
b. the southern ~ t of the sub-sectien Pariamen of the section
Tanahdatcr, including the plain of Lubttirolung and Pasarusang
south of the B.Tapa.lcis (inclusive);
c. S1guntur Ml.,1.da and its environs in the northern pt.'"':: of ~ h e
sub-section Painen of the section Zuid Benedenlanden;
C. South Sun:.C'.tra
Of the Residency PalembanC:
a. an area in the section Palembanase Benedenlanden includina:
1. the sub-section O J a n ~ T I i l i r and Komoring-Hi1ir;
a. the southern part of the s u b - s o c t ~ o n ~ ~ s ~ . H i l i r and
Kubustreken and Palembanc ~r.d Banjuasinstreken, to the
north botmdod by A.Banjuas~n and the A.TeluktenBsu1ang
(both inclusive), to the west by the pipeline Keluang
K~rensrinGin (situcted on the A.Musi) - Pengabang
and across the river area of the S.Keruh to the west
of it,
b. The sub-section L e ~ q t a n g - H u l u and Lema~an8-Hilir of the
Ei.-.ction Palemben(3se Boven1andcn;
c. The sub~eection Ocal1~Eulu end the territory of the sub-section
Komel'ir'G Rv.lu north of the raihTay line and the road
B a t u r a d j e - i ~ r t a p u r a
. . . .... ., '. ts:". 1.1 ~
• '. ~ • a " • • _. " •
S/586Pac;e'l36
B a t u r a d j a - ~ a r t a p u r a of the section 0Gan and Komering-Hulu
(inclusive).
In accord with the principles upon ynlich the action was founded the
Netherlands ::i:nd ies Government f s intention yTaS that the several republican
officials and official orcanizatior:s ~ ' 1 O u l d continue their tasks in this
territorJ subject to her General responsibility.
Since hovever the present republ::.ce,n government at Djoc jakarta, even
after the Nethe::lends Government decided to cease hostilities persevered in
forbicding its officials under various threats to fulfill this task and
moreovel~ incited 0Ile;Jly as vlell as o t l 1 e ~ ' T i s e to continue regular ac.ts of
Violence, the Netherlands Indiss Government declares:
A. that no authority of the present government of the republic
Indonesia can be any longer recognized in the above mentioned
territories;
B. that c o n s e ~ u e n t l y the i n h a ~ : t a n t s of these ~ e r r i t o r i e s are
relieved of their duty to obey the said gcvernment and that
everJrbody is forbidden to follovT up the orders of that government;
C. that the republican officials in these territories can continue
their work in the general government under tee supremacy of the
Netherlands Indies government and under the conditions, applying
to that service, whereby they will be maintained in their functions
or will be reinstalled) barring proved unfitness of low conduct.
vTith regard to ftmctionaries who are superfluous in connection
~ · r i th the extent of the work, measureo vTill be tal<;en to employ
them else~'There;
D. that the republican offic:'ala, who do not ,dsh to continue their
work on these conditions, are c o n s i d e r ~ d to be relieved of their
functions.
E. that the officials under D, if they so desire or if they disturb
the law, direct or indirect, can be removed to the republican
territory;
F. that ~ J energetic restoration and energetic maintenance of law
and order a lastinc safeguard of all well meaning citizens and
foreigners of ever;/ natiornJ.i t ~ - vrill be effected against the
terrorism as practised or favoured by the actual republican
government and that the guarantees will be created lest in future
they shall fall a victim of possible retaliation or punishment on
that side.
The Government invites the inhabitentg end orJanisetions vTho are willj
to coo:?erete in the n e ~ T Doliticel construction to join her in an organized
/consultation,
s!5S6Page 137
=
C,.)Ljut;~:';L.".'~j.on, t~lat a pollticL'l.l orGanization be mauo ar, quicldy as possible
for til:-; c':JOvementioned "tol'rito:!.'ies \Thich can start its task in the frame of
the, ::?ri!lci::,?lsf5 of Linl3CadJo.t::. o.nd can be repreoented in the central interim
government, to be formed ns Goon as possible.
In t:le future ~ ~ ) ! 1 d u c t the, f o l ~ o \ " i n g o.iI!lD \'Till prevail:
Co. the complete reotol'r.tion o 1 ~ la\'T and order and the comulete... -'FiGo.rmument end ',ril1dil1G up of all armed organisations, who do not
recoGnise the authority of the ej:ioting nr.U recognised or still
, to be .formeu sovel~tlIjlent ol'f,';ens in the said tarri torios;
b. the speedy c o o p e r ~ t i o n between 0.11 parts of Indonesia whore law and
'order reign, for the ~ 1 r t h e r political construction in preparation of
the United States ot I:coonesie.;
c. the safeguardinG of the fl'eedom of religion and of the equality of the
religions in reC17,J:'d of tile goverOl!lsnt;
d. the restoration ot education on the basis of an efficient general
education of tlie'paople and an efficient continuance of higher and
teclmical education, ~ b . r ~ h O D e s t cooperation of political and
religious organioationm, w o r ~ n g In this field, will be gladly
aocepted;
€l., ',a' 8:r?e6dy restoration of the monetary and economic situations by
complete. cooperation in every field;
f •. a speedy restoration of the traffic by employing all available means,
personal as well as material.
B. the restoration of' 10.'1'1 for all, uho 'l'Tere driven away fl1 0m their
properties, industries or trades, takinG into consideration the
richts end interests of those 1vho have in ~ o o d faith a d m i n i s t r ~ t e d
such properties, or who have o'l'med a similar industries or trades;
h. a systemetic care of labour, that the most suitable work be found
for everybody, taking into concidcration the urgency of' the quick
formation of Indonesian leaders in every field and of' the
lrorking-llm"er since the Ja.panese occupation;
i. c, regula.tion of 30cio.l relations in such a. ."ray I that not only the
interests of emploj"el"s and employees ara brouGht into harmony and
the biGgest poscible c o ~ u n i t y of interests be furthered, but that
£11;)0 a reg'.lle.r social care in cooperation \'d. th the recognised and
still to be formed organisations of both eroups, 'l'nll be part of the
political econom,yj
J. a sY3tematic construction of the middle class, specially ~ h e
Indonesian middJe class together with the political and social
orGenisatic1s rnlich have t h i ~ ccnstruction in ,articular on their
program,/ APPEIlDIX X
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8/586Page 138
APPEIlDIX X
BataVia, 3 September 1947
Djocjalwl'to., Sept. 2nd (IIVoice 'of Free Indonesia")
~ ! C L A . L AI'JNOUNC::MENT OF THE RI:PUBLIC
OF nmONESIA
1•. Subsequent uron the statement of the Netherlands Government's
representative in Batavia, in vn12ch he outlined the extent of Dutch authority
since tIle outbreak of hostilities in certain places of Java, Stuuatra and
MadQ~a, the republican government ho.s the following statement to make.
2. The republican government state, categorically, that thu Dutch contention •
that t1:eir troo:ps have finally and completely occupied certain areas of the
de facto territory of the republic is in strict v e ~ i a n c e the truth and Gives
e willful vn·ong impression of the extent and nature of the Dutch penetration
of these areas in Java, Sumatra and Madura.
The republican Government asserts that up till now Dutch troops have
formally succeeded 1n occupying a number of tOvms and the main roads
connecting them, as well as several isolated localities. If there is any
question of civil and military authority, this will only operate in the
aforementioned towns and along the m i l i t a ~ J lines of communications, which
the DQtch have maintained. Those areas which lie outside and beyond these
to,vus and lines of communication are not in any ,vay under Dutch authority
but are in fact fully controlled by the established administration of the
republic, i1hich the people in these areas recognise as the only lawful
authori tJr •
3. The r e p u b l ~ c a n soVerl1lnellt, therefore, considers that the Dutch
decleration of definite demarcation lines for the areas occupied by their
troops, idthin \'1hich they claim that only the Dutch government has full
resp0nsibility of maintaining lair and order, in fact aims at:
e. extending the Dutch territory already occupied by Dutch troops;
b. extending and consolidating the Dutch military and political
stranglehold;
c. strengthening the Dutch civil administration, at the expense of
the existing republican adninistration, and in this way destroying
the latter;
6. anticipating the decis10n still to be made as a restut of
deliberation of the Security Council.
e. c ~ e a t i n e final m i l i t a ~ r , stratesic, economic and political
condi tions, 1-1h1ch iTill still further i!eaken and isolate the
republic.
/4. Besed on
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S/586Page 139
4. Based on the foregoing, tile republican Government states, categorically,
that it c ~ n n o t and will not accept the one-sided interpretation by the Dutch
of these so-called "occupied al"ees ll as demarcation lines. l1be republican
government mainte.ins to the fullest its standpoint that the occupied parts
of Java, Sumatra and ~~dt~e is a direct result of the colonial war which the
Dutch troops have launched against the republic.
5. Consequently, the only la,vi'ul authority il: the de facto republice.n
territo!"J of Java, Sumatra and Madura remains the authority of the republican
government. Therefore, those local republican authorities and citizens who
remain l o ~ r a l to the repu.blic in the8e areas have the right to remain so.!'
and this right !n.1,;:.3T, 1','3 2'.ccel'"Ged and respected by all, and therefore, it is
the duty of the r ; " l n · . \ J . ~ c . : l , n g 0 ~ r ' 3 : ~ ! 1 : : : l 0 : i t to '..lphold its responsibility tOHards
all those who are'su~porting tile r 6 ~ u ~ l i o ~ n cause.
Dated, Djocjakerta, Sept. 2nd, 1947
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