decentralized despotism: how indirect colonial rule...

Decentralized Despotism: How Indirect Colonial RuleUndermines Contemporary Democratic Attitudes

Evidence from Namibia

Marie Lechler1 Lachlan McNamee2

1University of Munich2Stanford University

June 20th, 2016

M.Lechler and L.McNamee Decentralized Despotism: June 20th, 2016 1 / 27

Idea

During colonial times, southern and central Namibia were directlyruled by the German and South African authorities while northernNamibia was indirectly ruled.

As a consequence, the role of traditional authorities was much moreimportant in northern Namibia than in southern and central Namibia.This influence of traditional authorities in northern Namibia persiststo the present day.

Idea: use division of Namibia as natural experiment to identify thelong-term effects of indirect colonial rule.


Main result

We find that individuals living in the formerly indirectly ruled part ofthe country have lower support for democracy and the rule of law.

⇒ Hypothesis: local governance structures, which are organized on a’despotic’ basis (i.e. traditional leadership) undermine democratic attitudes


Table of contents

1 Motivation and historical background

2 Results

3 Conclusion


Motivation

Our project contributes to understanding of determinants of politicalattitudes and of viability of democratic systems.

We are able to document an important effect of the ongoing influenceof traditional authorities in Sub-Saharan Africa, who play a uniquelyimportant role in the governance of these countries.


Motivation

Adds to

literature about the importance of ’civic culture’ and individualpolitical attitudes for the viability of democratic institutions

Almond & Verba (1963); Inglehart (1988,1990); Persson & Tabellini(2009) and Fuchs-Schundeln & Schundeln (2015)

literature about long-term effects of direct vs indirect colonial rule

Iyer (2010), Acemoglu et al (2000, 2001)

literature about role of traditional authorities in Sub-Sahara Africa

Mamdani (1996); Dusing (2002); Acemoglu, Reed & Robinson (2013);Baldwin (2013, 2015); De Kadt & Larreguy (2014)


History of the border

Figure : Precolonial map of ethnicities (Murdock, 1967)



1884: Namibia becomes German colony

Germans settle in central and southern Namibia

Rinderpest epidemic devastated cattle-dependent communities, whichwere concentrated in central and southern Namibia in the 1890sStrength tribes living in the North and inaccessibility of the Northhamper settlements in the north

⇒ Germans easily conquered southern and central Namibia

1905: Introduction of the ‘’Police Zone” (police protection cannotcover entire protectorate)

Due to financial constraints German activities (administrative,economic and military) focus on Police Zone



Source: Miescher, Namibia’s Red Line, 2012



1915: Police Zone boundary and German policies of restrictingmovement were adopted by the South Africans.

1964: Police Zone boundary is formalized by Odendaal Commission

1990: Namibian independence. Transition to parliamentarydemocracy and homogenization of policies north and south of theborder.


Direct vs indirect rule

Indirect colonial rule in northern Namibia

Traditional authorities in the north were given a lot of politicalautonomy

Despotic, hereditary and authoritarian system

Influence persists even after independence and constitutes a parallelsystem of governance

Direct colonial rule in central and southern Namibia

German (and later South African) colonial administration directlyruled over this part of the country

Traditional authorities were given little or no political role

Since independence, people only experience governance via electedand accountable local representatives at all levels of government


Hypothesis

1. Indirect and direct colonial rule have persistent effects on democraticattitudes (test with OLS).

2. The key mechanism underlying this relationship is the ongoinginfluence of traditional authorities, which acts as a parallel despoticgovernance structure (test with 2SLS).


Data


Data

Political attitude data: Afrobarometer (1999-2008, 4 survey rounds)

Covers 166 EAs and 1426 individuals

Questions

Contact traditional authority: During the past year, how often have youcontacted a traditional ruler? (Scale 0-3)Support for democracy (Scale: 1-3)Courts make binding decisions (Scale: 1-5)How likely is law enforcement by authorities (Scale: 1-4)Questioning leaders vs respect for authority (Scale: 1-4)


Data

Table : Balancing table for observations from buffer zone

(1) (2) (3)Direct rule Indirect rule Difference

Contact traditional leader 0.24 0.79 0.55***

Age 33.4 36.3 2.90***

Gender 1.49 1.49 0.00

Education 3.80 3.82 0.02

Without food 1.31 1.10 -0.20**

Observations 254 1,164 1,418


The effect of indirect rule on political attitudes

Baseline estimation equation:

Yider = α + β · Indirectruled + X′iderγ + ηe + µr + εider

Y expresses the outcome variables (the measures for democraticattitudes) for individual i, living in enumeration area d, belonging tothe ethnic group e, being surveyed in round r.

Indirectrule is a dummy variable indicating whether the individuallives in an enumeration area which belonged to the indirectly or thedirectly ruled part of Namibia

X is a set of individual-level control variables

ηe are ethnicity fixed effects

µr are survey-round fixed effects.


Identification

Treatment: indirect vs direct colonial rule

independent of other factors affecting political attitudes close to thecolonial border (location of border exogenous to pre-colonial politicalattitudes)

Pre-treatment attitudes were the same within each ethnic group


OLS estimates

Table : Effect of indirect rule on political attitudes

(1) (2) (3) (4)Support Support Courts make Courts make

VARIABLES for democracy for democracy binding decisions binding decisions

Indirect colonial rule -0.178** -0.189** -0.169* -0.178*(0.0746) (0.0757) (0.102) (0.105)

Constant 2.493*** 2.660*** 3.557*** 3.844***(0.0908) (0.237) (0.130) (0.265)

Observations 1,347 1,329 1,392 1,375R2 0.019 0.036 0.089 0.103Ethnicity FE yes yes yes yesSurvey round FE yes yes yes yesControls no yes no yes# clusters 165 165 165 165

Results from OLS regressions including ethnicity and survey round fixed effects. Control variables are age,education dummies and income dummies. The sample consists of buffer zone observations only. Standard errors(clustered by Enumeration Area) in parentheses. *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1.


OLS estimates

Table : Effect of indirect rule on political attitudes

(1) (2) (3) (4)Law Law Respect Respect

VARIABLES enforcement enforcement authorities authorities

Indirect colonial rule -0.272** -0.298** 0.122 0.131(0.115) (0.116) (0.0890) (0.0899)

Constant 3.507*** 3.134*** 1.950*** 1.978***(0.127) (0.304) (0.121) (0.279)

Observations 1,026 1,009 1,396 1,379R2 0.043 0.061 0.096 0.110Ethnicity FE yes yes yes yesSurvey round FE yes yes yes yesControls no yes no yes# clusters 128 128 165 165

Results from OLS regressions including ethnicity and survey round fixed effects. Controlvariables are age, education dummies and income dummies. The sample consists of bufferzone observations only. Standard errors (clustered by Enumeration Area) in parentheses. ***p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1.


Robustness

Applying an ordered probit model Link

Using observations for the entire country (not only buffer zone) Link

Clustering observations on the constituency level (60 clusters insteadof 165) Link


Channel of causality

Identification of contact to traditional leaders as channel of causality byapplying 2SLS estimations.

→ instrument contact with traditional authorities with indirect colonialrule dummy


Effect of indirect rule on contact with traditional leaders

Table : Effect of indirect rule on contact with traditional leaders

(1) (2) (3) (4)Contact Contact Contact Contact

VARIABLES traditional ruler traditional ruler traditional ruler traditional ruler

Indirect colonial rule 0.555*** 0.391*** 0.373*** 0.350**(0.0700) (0.104) (0.103) (0.166)

Constant 0.240*** 0.887*** 0.439 0.307(0.0533) (0.122) (0.305) (0.462)

Observations 1,418 1,418 1,400 1,400R2 0.045 0.142 0.178 0.183Ethnicity FE no yes yes yesRound FE no yes yes yesRegion FE no no no yesControls no no yes yesF-Test 62.67 18.36 12.95 12.05# clusters 165 165 165 165

Results from OLS regressions. Control variables are age, education dummies and income dummies. The sampleconsists observations for the buffer zone only. Standard errors (clustered by Enumeration Area) in parentheses.*** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1.


2SLS results

Table : Effect of contact with traditional leaders on political attitudes

(1) (2) (3) (4)Support Support Law Law

VARIABLES for democracy for democracy enforcement enforcement

Contact traditional leader -0.429** -0.484** -0.684** -0.772**(0.216) (0.237) (0.329) (0.356)

Observations 1,347 1,329 1,026 1,009Ethnicity FE yes yes yes yesSurvey round FE yes yes yes yesControls no yes no yes# clusters 165 165 128 128First-stage F statistic 20.90 18.53 14.57 13.50

Results from 2SLS regressions including ethnicity and survey round fixed effects using indirect colonial rule asan instrument for contact with traditional leaders. Control variables are age, education dummies and incomedummies. The sample consists of buffer zone observations only. First-stage Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statisticreported. Standard errors (clustered by Enumeration Area) in parentheses. *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p<0.1.


2SLS results


(1) (2) (3) (4)Courts make Courts make Respect Respect

VARIABLES binding decisions binding decisions for authority for authority

Contact traditional leader -0.433* -0.480* 0.336 0.391(0.263) (0.281) (0.243) (0.252)

Observations 1,392 1,375 1,365 1,348Ethnicity FE yes yes yes yesSurvey round FE yes yes yes yesControls no yes no yes# clusters 165 165 165 165First-stage F statistic 20.10 18.18 17.72 15.75

Results from 2SLS regressions including ethnicity and survey round fixed effects using indirect colonial rule as aninstrument for contact with traditional leaders. Control variables are age, education dummies and income dummies.The sample consists of buffer zone observations only. First-stage Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistic reported. Standarderrors (clustered by Enumeration Area) in parentheses. *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1.


Robustness checks

Exclusion restriction: Living north of the border is uncorrelated with anyother determinant of political attitudes.

Potential concerns:

geography and culture Link

political socialization Link

selective spatial sorting Link

contemporary institutions Link

income and education Link


Effect on voting behavior

Table : Effect on voting turnout

(1) (2) (3)VARIABLES OLS Probit 2SLS

Indirect colonial rule -0.137*** -0.455**(0.0463) (0.182)

Contact traditional leader -0.527**(0.225)

Constant 0.328** 0.371(0.147) (0.295)

Observations 723 721 723R2 0.277Ethnicity FE yes yes yesSurvey round FE yes yes yesControls yes yes yes# clusters 91 91 91

Results from OLS, Probit and 2SLS regressions including ethnicity andsurvey round fixed effects. Control variables are age, education dummiesand income dummies. The sample consists of buffer zone observations only.Standard errors (clustered by Enumeration Area) in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1.


Conclusion

Indirect colonial rule has persistent effects on contemporary politicalattitudes and political behavior.

Key mechanism: influence of traditional authorities

⇒ Parallel despotic governance structure undermines support fordemocracy and the rule of law and and encourages to respect leadersrather than to question them.


Appendix

Table : Summary statistics for observations from buffer zone

Mean SD Min Max Obs

Contact traditional leader 0.7 1.0 0 3 1426Courts make binding decisions 3.9 1.0 1 5 1399Support for democracy 2.4 0.8 1 3 1352Enforce law: crime 3.3 0.9 1 4 1034Respect authority 2.5 1.1 1 5 1404Age 35.8 14.8 18 92 1421Education 3.8 1.8 0 8 1414Without food 1.1 1.2 0 4 1425


Robustness OLS: Ordered probit

Link

Table : Ordered probit model

(1) (2) (3) (4)Support Courts make Law Respect

VARIABLES for democracy binding decisions enforcement authorities

Indirect colonial rule -0.273** -0.200 -0.364** 0.132(0.124) (0.128) (0.165) (0.0943)

Observations 1,329 1,375 1,009 1,379Ethnicity FE yes yes yes yesSurvey round FE yes yes yes yesControls yes yes yes yes# clusters 165 165 128 165

Results from ordered probit regressions including ethnicity and survey round fixed effects. The sampleconsists of buffer zone observations only. Standard errors (clustered by Enumeration Area) in parentheses.*** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1.


Robustness OLS: Observations for entire country

Link

Table : Observations for entire country



Communal -0.0889*** -0.0456 -0.111** 0.124***(0.0331) (0.0416) (0.0545) (0.0416)

Constant 2.263*** 3.388*** 3.128*** 1.775***(0.117) (0.166) (0.178) (0.167)

Observations 4,598 4,826 3,263 4,134R2 0.027 0.057 0.053 0.097Ethnicity FE yes yes yes yesSurvey round FE yes yes yes yesControls yes yes yes yes# clusters 571 571 407 509

Results from OLS regressions including ethnicity and survey round fixed effects. The sample con-sists of observations for the entire country. Standard errors (clustered by Enumeration Area) inparentheses. *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1.


Robustness OLS: Cluster on constituency level

Link

Table : Cluster on Constituency level



Indirect colonial rule -0.189** -0.178* -0.298** 0.136*(0.0792) (0.0925) (0.123) (0.0700)

Constant 2.660*** 3.844*** 3.134*** 1.960***(0.273) (0.276) (0.390) (0.277)


Results from OLS regressions including ethnicity and survey round fixed effects. The sample consistsof observations for the buffer zone. Standard errors (clustered by Constituency) in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1.


Potential concern: Geography and culture

We only focus on individuals living within a 100km buffer zone of theboundary to ensure comparability between individuals surveyed onseveral dimensions (e.g. proximity to ports, the capital and the national

border, geographic characteristics)

We include ethnicity fixed effects to account for differences in ethniccultures

We include regional fixed effects as a robustness check, which doesnot change our results


Potential concern: Geography and culture

Link




Contact traditional leader -0.695* -0.870* -0.681 0.636(0.361) (0.509) (0.425) (0.411)

Constant 2.908*** 4.308*** 3.034*** 1.695***(0.401) (0.498) (0.404) (0.422)

Observations 1,329 1,375 1,009 1,348Ethnicity FE yes yes yes yesSurvey round FE yes yes yes yesRegion FE yes yes yes yesControls yes yes yes yes# clusters 165 165 128 165

Results from 2SLS regressions including ethnicity, survey round and regional fixed effects using indirect colonialrule as an instrument for contact with traditional leaders. The sample consists of buffer zone observationsonly. First-stage Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistic reported. Standard errors (clustered by Enumeration Area)in parentheses. *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1.


Potential concern: Different political socialization

Link

Indigenous population did not experience democracy in either thedirect or indirectly ruled areas of Namibia during colonial times.

Since the governance system of the south enabled the exploitation ofthe local indigenous population, if anything, the bias from differentexperiences with western institutions during the colonial era shouldbias against our hypothesis.

If this concern was true the effect should be larger for older people.Interaction effect is however insignificant.



Table : Effect of interaction between age and indirect rule on political attitudes

(1) (2) (3) (4)Support Courts make Respect

VARIABLES for democracy Law enforcement binding decisions authority

Indirect colonial rule -0.182** -0.320** -0.231* 0.0464(0.0828) (0.123) (0.118) (0.116)

Indirect rule x Old dummy -0.000124 0.0850 0.109 0.171(0.107) (0.123) (0.114) (0.143)

Old dummy -0.00334 -0.132 0.138 -0.171(0.0957) (0.114) (0.102) (0.131)

Constant 2.628*** 3.443*** 3.920*** 2.020***(0.225) (0.311) (0.252) (0.279)


Results from OLS regressions including interaction terms between colonial rule and a binary age dummy as wellas ethnicity and survey round fixed effects. The old dummy equals one if an individual is older than 31 years.The sample consists observations for the buffer zone only. Standard errors (clustered by Enumeration Area) inparentheses. *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1.



Table : Effect of interaction between age and indirect rule on political attitudes

(1) (2) (3) (4)Support Law Courts make Respect

VARIABLES for democracy enforcement binding decisions authority

Indirect colonial rule -0.0750 -0.308 -0.122 -0.00732(0.159) (0.200) (0.169) (0.211)

Indirect rule x age -0.00347 0.000334 -0.00170 0.00439(0.00450) (0.00458) (0.00404) (0.00521)

Constant 2.557*** 3.143*** 3.794*** 2.091***(0.254) (0.334) (0.277) (0.333)

Observations 1,329 1,009 1,375 1,348R2 0.036 0.061 0.103 0.140Ethnicity FE yes yes yes yesSurvey round FE yes yes yes yesControls yes yes yes# clusters 165 128 165 165

Results from OLS regressions including interaction terms between colonial rule and age as well asethnicity and survey round fixed effects. The sample consists observations for the buffer zone only.Standard errors (clustered by Enumeration Area) in parentheses. *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1.


Potential concern: Selective spatial sorting

Link

During the German and South African colonial rule, permanentmigration between the two parts of the country was prohibited.

We cannot rule out selective sorting after independence in 1990,however we believe this is unlikely to act as an important confounder.

In northern areas of Namibia, land is communally held and ties to one’sfamily, one’s community and to ancestral land rights are extremely closeMoreover, migration statistics from the Namibian Statistics Agencysuggest that permanent migration from the north, where it hasoccurred, has been economic in nature and primarily inter-regional aspoor laborers move to the larger cities of the south


Potential concern: Different contemporary institutions

Link

People living north and south of the border do not systematicallyevaluate the effectiveness of government institutions differently.

Inclusion of regional fixed effects ensures that we only compareindividuals living close to each other on the same part of theboundary, who are governed by the same national and regionalinstitutions nowadays.


Same contemporary institutions

Table : Balancing table

(1) (2) (3)Direct rule Indirect rule Difference

Government officials listen 1.22 1.26 -0.048[1.06] [1.08] (0.11)

Trust in police 1.78 1.91 -0.13*[0.85] [0.88] (0.070)

Trust in courts 1.83 1.91 -0.085[0.92] [0.95] (0.067)

Fear of unjust arrest 3.93 3.83 0.097[0.73] [0.93] (0.091)

Observations 253 1,163 1,416


Potential concern: Income

Link

Table : Effect of indirect rule on income

(1) (2) (3) (4)VARIABLES OLS OLS OLS Ordered Probit

Indirect colonial rule -0.204 0.0398 0.0147 0.0191(0.134) (0.163) (0.146) (0.148)

Contact traditional leader -0.106*** -0.109***(0.0333) (0.0360)

Constant 1.307*** 1.216*** 0.804***(0.126) (0.184) (0.229)

Observations 1,417 1,417 1,400 1,400R2 0.004 0.055 0.130Ethnicity FE no yes yes yesSurvey round FE no yes yes yesControls no no yes yes# clusters 165 165 165 165

Results from OLS regressions including ethnicity and survey round fixed effects. The sampleconsists of buffer zone observations only. Standard errors (clustered by Enumeration Area) inparentheses. *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1.


Potential concern: Effect of education

Table : Effect of indirect rule on education

(1) (2) (3) (4)VARIABLES OLS OLS OLS Ordered Probit

Indirect colonial rule 0.0147 -0.274 -0.158 -0.0892(0.189) (0.193) (0.150) (0.0987)

Contact traditional leader 0.0492 0.0293(0.0481) (0.0308)

Constant 3.802*** 4.038*** 5.068***(0.176) (0.225) (0.360)

Observations 1,406 1,406 1,400 1,400R2 0.000 0.025 0.240Ethnicity FE no yes yes yesSurvey round FE no yes yes yesControls yes yes yes yes# clusters 165 165 165 165

Results from OLS regressions including ethnicity and survey round fixed effects. The sampleconsists of buffer zone observations only. Standard errors (clustered by Enumeration Area) inparentheses. *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1.


Afrobarometer questions

Contact traditional leader

During the past year, how often have you contacted any of thefollowing persons about some important problem or to give them yourviews: A traditional ruler?

0=Never, 1=Only once, 2=A few times, 3=Often



Which of these three statements is closest to your own opinion?1: Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government.2: In some circumstances, a non-democratic government can bepreferable.0=Statement 2: Sometimes non-democratic preferable, 1=Statement1: Democracy preferable

Which of the following statements is closest to your view?1: Citizens should be more active in questioning the actions of leaders2: In our country, citizens should show more respect for authority.1=Agree very strongly with Statement 1, 2=Agree with Statement 1,3=Agree with Statement 2, 4=Agree very strongly with Statement 2,

Please tell me whether you disagree or agree: The courts have theright to make decisions that people always have to abide by.

1=Strongly disagree, 2=Disagree, 3=Neither agree nor disagree,4=Agree, 5=Strongly agree

How likely do you think it would be that the authorities could enforcethe law if a person like you committed a serious crime?

1=Not at all likely, 2=Not very likely, 3=Likely, 4=Very Likely



Education

What is the highest level of education you have completed?

0=No formal schooling, 1=Informal schooling, 2=Some primary schooling,

3=Primary school completed, 4=Some secondary school, 5=Secondary school

completed, 6=Post-secondary qualifications, 7=Some university, 8=University

completed,9=Post-graduate

Income

Over the past year, how often, if ever, have you or your family gonewithout: Enough food to eat?

0=Never, 1=Just once or twice, 2=Several times, 3=Many times,4=Always



How much of the time do think the following try their best to listen towhat people like you have to say: Elected Local Government Councillors?

0=Never 1=Only Sometimes, 2=Often, 3=Always

How much do you trust each of the following: The Police?

0=Not at all, 1=Just a little, 2=Somewhat, 3=A lot

How much do you trust each of the following: Courts of Law?

0=Not at all, 1=Just a little, 2=Somewhat, 3=A lot


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