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the reality behind QM phenomenal appearances, or any

logically consistent realist interpretation that would satisfy

the requirements that Einstein laid down for a complete

physical theory (Einstein 1935). Thus the choice between

orthodox QM thinking and Bohms hidden-variables

postulate is not one that could be decided by appeal torefuting evidence in so far as such evidence is taken to

consist in the range of empirical data which provideon

the face of itequal support for both interpretations.

Rather it is a choice that involves such further

verification-transcendent criteria as intelligibility, causal-

explanatory power, and inference to the best (most

rational) means of assigning truth-values across the range

of quantum-theoretical statements. But if logic can always

be revised in response to empirical dilemmasas Putnam

contendsthen this solution will always seem the

simplest (least problematical) means of keeping those

dilemmas at bay. In which case any alternative theory that

involves ontological commitments beyond the QM

empirical data must appear an altogether less attractive

option, or one burdened with excess metaphysical

baggage. So there is, after all, some point to Feyerabends

objection that revising logic is just the kind of sly

procedure which, if consistently applied, must lead to the

arrest of scientific progress and to stagnation (Feyerabend

1981: 237). For whatever the problems with quantum

mechanics there can be no prospect of resolving them by

adopting an approachthat of three-valued logicwhich

precludes any rationally motivated choice between

orthodox QM and a rival theory (such as Bohms) with

substantive ontological and causal-explanatory content.

References

Bell, J. S. 1987 Speakable and Unspeakable in Quantum

Mechanics: collected papers on quantum philosophy.

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Bohm, David. 1957. Causality and Chance in Modern Physics.

London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Bohm, David and Basil J. Hiley. 1993. The Undivided Universe:an ontological interpretation of quantum theory. London:

Routledge.

Cushing, James T. 1994. Quantum Mechanics: historical

contingency and the Copenhagen hegemony. Chicago:

University of Chicago Press.

Devitt, Michael. 1986. Realism and Truth, 2nd edn. Oxford:Blackwell.

Dummett, Michael. 1977. Elements of Intuitionism. Oxford:

Oxford University Press.Dummett, Michael. 1978. Truth and Other Enigmas. London:

Duckworth.

Dummett, Michael. 1991. The Logical Basis of Metaphysics.London: Duckworth.

Feyerabend, Paul K. 1981. Reichenbachs Interpretation ofQuantum Mechanics. Realism, Rationalism and Scientific

Method. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Gibbins, Peter. 1987. Particles and Paradoxes: the limits of

quantum logic. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hacking, Ian. 1983.Representing and Intervening: introductorytopics in the philosophy of natural science . Cambridge:Cambridge University Press.

Holland, Peter. 1993. The Quantum Theory of Motion: anaccount of the de Broglie-Bohm causal interpretation of

quantum mechanics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Kripke, Saul. 1980.Naming and Necessity. Oxford: Blackwell.

Popper, Karl. 1982. Quantum Theory and the Schism in Physics.London: Hutchinson.

Putnam, Hilary. 1975a. Mathematics, Matter and Method(Philosophical Papers, Vol. 1). Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press.Putnam, Hilary. 1975b. Mind, Language and Reality

(Philosophical Papers, Vol. 2). Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press.

Putnam, Hilary. 1981. Realism, Truth and History. Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press.Putnam, Hilary. 1993. Realism and Reason (Philosophical

Papers, Vol. 3). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Putnam, Hilary. 1987. The Many Faces of Realism. LaSalle, IL:Open Court.

Putnam, Hilary. 1995. Pragmatism: an open question. Oxford:

Blackwell.Quine, W. V. O. 1961. Two Dogmas of Empiricism. From a

Logical Point of View, 2nd edn. Cambridge, MA: HarvardUniversity Press.

Redhead, Michael. 1987. Incompleteness, Nonlocality and

Realism: a prolegomenon to the philosophy of quantum

mechanics. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Reichenbach, Hans. 1938. Experience and Prediction. Chicago:University of Chicago Press.

Teller, Paul (1994). An Interpretive Introduction to Quantum

Field Theory. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.Wheeler, John A. and W. H. Zurek (eds.), 1983. Quantum Theory

and Measurement. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

z

Manindra Nath Thakur

D ebat ing Rea l ism(s ): M arx ism and Nyaya-V aisesika

Introduction

This paper argues that Marx has provided an adequate

framework for developing a universal philosophy of

liberation based on democratic negotiations among

different philosophical traditions. Critical realist

interpretation of Marx creates space for this to happen. As

these philosophical traditions are deeply rooted in the

social and geographical context in which they have

emerged, such negotiation enhances the possibilities of

Marxs ideas being more widely acceptable. I examine the

case of one of the important streams of Indian philosophy,

Nyaya-Vaisesika. Marxs realism is compared with that of

Nyaya-Vaisesika and the possibilities of democratic

negotiation between the two are explored.


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I think this project has become particularly important

with the collapse of Communist political systems, which

has created major theoretical and practical problems for

the socialist movements. A process of rethinking Marxism

that began in the early 1960s, particularly with Althusser,

Habermas and Cohen, is gaining new impetus. Thetheoretical crisis that Marxism is facing due to the eclipse

of the dominant Soviet interpretation has in fact provided a

creative space for rethinking Marxism. I think it is possible

to enrich Marxs theoretical tools by engaging with

different, other than European, philosophical traditions. It

is in this context that I would like to locate this paper. My

thesis is that Nyaya-Vaisesika realism has potential to

offer several significant ontological and epistemological

formulations for rethinking Marxism. The paper is part of

a larger project to explore the implications of such an

exercise for the philosophy of social science.

Marx and democratic negotiation among philosophical

traditions

What should be our attitude towards different

philosophical traditions available in different geographical

locations and cultural contexts? The standard European

answer to this question has been that philosophy originated

in ancient Greece; it is a unique contribution of the Greeks

to humanity. Other philosophical traditions are considered

insignificant and unimportant as far as serious

philosophical questions are concerned. Many great

Western philosophers and scholars have shared this idea.

Hegel, for example, considered philosophy as the

development of the consciousness of freedom and argued

that this was a Greek invention that reached its apex in the

modern Germanic nation. Consequently, he never took the

contemporary German scholars of Indian philosophyseriously. He conceded that Indian thought was abstract

and had developed its own formal logic. However, he

always believed that Indian philosophy reflects the

childhood stage of development of humanity with nothing

of genuine significance for modern philosophy. This

became the most accepted position among Western

scholars.Generally speaking, Marx seems to have accepted this

trend of rejecting non-European philosophical traditions.

Marx did, however, enter into democratic negotiation with

a wide variety of strands within the Western philosophical

tradition in order to arrive at his own overall position.

Thus his general understanding of dialectics was derived,

via Hegel, from a critical appreciation of the Ionian andEleatic schools of Greek philosophy. The concept of

dialectical contradiction was appropriated from

Heraclitus, dialectical argumentfrom Socrates, dialectical

reason from Plato, and so on (Bhaskar 1983a and 1995;

Engels 1974 and 1975). The rational kernel was

famously extracted from the mystical shell of the

Hegelian dialectic, which had seemed to transfigure and

glorify what exists. In its rational form, Marx himself

stressed,

it is a scandal and abomination to the bourgeoisie [], because

it includes in its positive understanding of what exists a

simultaneous recognition of its negation, its inevitabledestruction; because it regards every historically developed

from as being in a fluid state, in motion, and therefore grasps

its transient aspect as well; and because it does not let itself beimpressed by anything, being in its very essence critical and

revolutionary. (Marx 1976, 103)

Engels appreciated Hegel for providing a concept of the

worldnatural, historical, and intellectualas in process,

and for his attempt to trace out the internal connections

that made a continuous whole of all this movement and

development. According to Engels, Hegel was the first to

try to demonstrate that there was an evolution, an intrinsic

coherence, in history. His greatest achievement was that he

took up dialectics as the highest form of reasoning

descended from the Greek thinkers (Engels 1975).

Marxs materialism was derived in a similar way from

the Greeks via the modern French and English

philosophical traditions. That Marx was keenly sensitive tothe different historical and national contexts is well

suggested by the following comment in The Holy Family:

The difference between French and English materialismreflects the difference between the two nations. The Frenchimparted to English materialism wit, flesh and blood, and

eloquence. They gave it the temperament and grace that itlacked. They civilisedit. (Marx and Engels 1975, 12930)

Marx saw his work as provisional and open-ended,

destined for revision and possible supercession, and he

fully expected that the process of critical appropriation

would continue. It is thus very much in the spirit of his

work to continue the process of democratic negotiation

with different philosophical traditions available in

different geographical and social contexts. This point

seems important to make because Marxist scholars even inIndia would perhaps object to any possible negotiation

with Indian philosophy. At best, they have explored the

material roots of different Indian philosophical traditions. I

think there is a need to encounter these philosophies

purely at the level of their arguments. This is what I try to

do in this paper in relation to Marxism and Nyaya-

Vaisesika.

Critical realist reading of Marx

How to read Marx? Today there are a number of broad

approaches. Exponents of orthodox Marxism read Marx

as a positivist social scientist. It is argued that Marx was

attempting to develop a science of society, as Newton haddeveloped the science of nature. Marxs achievements

were the founding of a science of history (historical

materialism) and elaboration of the principles of scientific,

as opposed to utopian, socialism. This reading of Marx

could only produce one-dimensional Marxism, which was

deterministic. It failed to see the complexity of society and

the limitations of a positivistically conceived epistemology

of natural science in understanding society. It failed also to

understand that laws of society could not be the same as

the laws of nature. In the case of society, the subject is also

part of the object and therefore influences the social

reality. Failure to understand this complexity led these


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exponents to believe that Marx had discovered the laws of

society, as Newton had discovered the laws of physical

motion, and that they are universal and beyond any change

irrespective of changes in time and space. Such a reading

of Marx is very selective and limited in scope. Several

grey areas of theory are ignored, such as religion,nationalism, etc. It leaves little scope for appropriation of

further developments in science, social science and related

disciplines.

There has been much dissatisfaction with such a reading

of Marx. Particularly since the sixties, several attempts

have been made to read Marx differently. For instance,

Althusser, Habermas, and Cohen have suggested different

readings based on new sets of assumptions. Althusser

suggests a symptomatic reading that can explain

meanings of Marxs writings based on the problematic

he elaborates (Althusser and Balibar 1972). Althusser

wants to deconstruct the naturalist positivism of the

orthodox reading, but himself falls into structuralist

positivism. Althusser talks about the objectivity of the

structural logic and does not pay sufficient attention to the

role of agency. Agency is subordinated to structure, the

objectivity of which is positivised.

In Habermass reading, an attempt is made to turn the

key distinction of critical theory between emancipatory

and instrumental reason and praxis against Marx himself.

However, because Habermass own conception of labour,

and of science and nature, is positivistic, the reading he

gives is ultimately a version of the orthodox account

(Bhaskar 1983b).

Cohen, representative of analytical Marxism, has

suggested that Marxs arguments can be defended if they

are taken as functional explanations. He argues that

functional explanation as an intellectual device is

indispensable to historical materialism. He suggests thatMarx in the Preface to The Critique of Political Economy

has used a number of causally explanatory expressions.

For example, relations of production correspond to

productive forces; the legal and political superstructure

rises on the real foundations; the social, political, and

intellectual life process is conditioned by the mode of

production of material life; consciousness is determinedby

social being. Cohen suggests that Marx distinguishes two

items, the second of which he asserts to be in some way

explanatory of the first. These are functional explanations

in the sense that the character of what is explained is

determined by its effect on what explains it. For instance,

take Marxs statement that structure corresponds to the

achieved level of the productive forces. By Cohens logic,it means the structure provides maximum scope for the

fruitful use and development of the forces, and obtains

because it provides such scope. Similarly, to say that

being determines consciousness means that the character

of the ideas of a society has to be explained by their

natural tendency to sustain the structure of economic roles

called for by the productive forces (Cohen 1978, 2789).

There are several problems with Cohens suggestion that

we read Marxs explanations as functional, all of which

boil down to the fact that he operates with an implicit

positivist model of science and scientific laws and

introduces logical positivism into Marxism. This is what

Cohen inherits from the analytical philosophical tradition.

Cohens argument is further advanced by Elster and

Roemer and developed into Rational Choice Marxism

(RCM) by adapting Marxism to assumptions of neo-

classical economics. RCM argues that Marxs arguments

and theoretical formulations are incoherent and scattered.One has to put them together and reconstruct a theory by

weighing various theoretical statements and formulations

against each other. In this way, logically coherent

formulations can be derived. RCM inherits logical

positivism from Cohen and reads Marx only in that light.

In addition, Cohen and others have no concept of praxis,

whereas Marx always believed theories to be products of

practice, to influence practice and finally to be confirmed

by practice.

Marx conceived reality as a complex totality

constituted of integrated parts in dynamic relationship. The

idea of reality as a complex totality is very crucial.

Developments in modern science, particularly chaos

theory, tell us that even in natural science the positivistic

mechanism of the Newtonian model is no longer

appropriate. In fact, it is not possible to talk about

deterministic causal laws any more in nature. There are

many phenomena in nature which defy explanation in

terms of causal laws conceived as regularity statements.

One can at best talk in terms of possibilities.

In this context, Roy Bhaskars philosophy has made a

significant contribution. His concepts of multi-layered

ontology and epistemic relativity can help us in making

sense of Marx better. He argues that reality is multi-

layered and each layer has its own specificity. Modes of

knowing must address themselves to the specificity of

each layer. We can know some layers with relative

precision. Others, however, are far more open. The

concept of complex totality means that there are layers ofordered reality and chaotic reality and all layers partake of

both. Marxs object of study, society, is far more open

than the non-social world. Further, society itself is

stratified into different layers, some of which can be

known more precisely (e.g. the economy) than others (e.g.

matters pertaining to consciousness). This is why Marx

says that the material transformation of the economic

conditions of production [] can be determined with the

precision of natural science but not the legal, political,

religious, artistic or philosophicin short, ideological

forms in which men become conscious of this conflict and

fight it out (Marx 1975, 426).

The parts of this complex totality are dynamically

interrelated, grounding an array of interlocking generativemechanisms which causally influence but do not

determine events and actions. Marxs project is scientific

in that he seeks to uncover these generative mechanisms

and thereby explain patterns of events and actions. He

develops a science for this purpose that does not take fact

and value as separate, but as integral aspects of social

reality through which one can discover generative

mechanisms underlying appearances. Where appearance

and reality are not very discrepant, it is easy to discover

the mechanism behind the appearance; where there is a

vast difference it is more difficult. Marx uses dialectics to

establish the relation between the different layers of


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reality, different parts of the same layer and their dynamic

interrelationship.

Now, if Marx is read with this assumption in mind, one

would not search for positive laws of society in his work.

At times when Marx deals with relatively closed systems

or relatively ordered layers of reality, it might seem as ifhe is giving a positivist theoretical statement. I think such

statements must be read with caution because these are

statements regarding social reality, which is overall a

relatively open system, or relatively chaotic layer of

reality. At times, Marx has limited his analysis to one layer

and made passing reference to others. Here, I think, lies

the scope for expanding his insights. This is what one can

see in Marxs Capital, Volume I. He is dealing with

capitalist political economy without omitting to give hints

concerning religion, the state, etc. Let us pause to consider

from this point of view other methods of reading Marx.

The problem with orthodox Marxism is that it deploys

Marxs epistemology, which he formulated to understand

one layer, on all the other layers of reality. This leads

orthodox Marxism into reductionism. Althusser commits

the same mistake. His understanding of the interplay of

structures as generative mechanisms of social reality has

some validity. However, he takes the argument too far to

explain anything and everything in society. Habermas does

suggest that Marxism should appropriate developments in

human knowledge. However, he does not have the concept

of multi-layered ontology and relative epistemology. He

even forgoes Marxs gains related to the relatively closed

system of political economy by exorbitating the

epistemology of human psychology and language,

adequate to understand one layer of reality, to all other

layers.

Returning to the discussion on how to read Marx with

non-positivist assumptions, I would like to consider thescattered and at times seemingly contradictory statements

regarding certain phenomena in Marxs writings. I think

this reflects two things. One, that Marx is dealing with a

complex reality having several dimensions and multiple

appearances. At times, he talks about one or the other.

These seemingly contradictory statements are in fact

related to different dimensions and forms of reality.

Instead of being contradictory, they may be mutually

complementary. His comments on phenomena such as

religion are scattered. This is because, when he deals with

one layer of ontology, he keeps on connecting it with other

layers too. This does not mean that he has not considered

such phenomena seriously. The implication of this

argument for reading Marx is that his statements should bebrought together and put in one over-arching framework.

Analytical and Rational Choice Marxists also suggest this.

The problem lies with their test of validity of the

statements. They think that validity depends on logical

coherence. Marx thinks that validity depends on practice.

As Marx explains in the second thesis on Feuerbach, The

question whether objective truth can be attributed to

human thinking is not a question of theory but is a

practical question. Man must prove the truth, i.e., the

reality and power [] of his thinking in practice. The

dispute over the reality or non-reality of thinking which

isolates itself from practice is a purely scholastic

question(Marx 1975, 422). Therefore, the validity of the

theory should be tested in its capacity to explain the

reality. This is not to undermine the importance of logical

coherence but to place it in correct perspective.

To sum up, an alternative reading of Marx is possible on

the basis of the assumption that Marxs project is toexplore reality, which is a complex totality constituted of

interrelated parts in dynamic relationship. Such a project is

scientific in the sense that Marx wants to discover the

generative mechanisms of the social reality, which

generate the complex diversity of appearances. Therefore,

Marxs writings should be read as a record of his arduous

journey in search of knowledge of this complex social

reality. His theoretical statements are not positivist law-

like statements. They are accommodative, unfinished, and

expandable. This is particularly true in the case of his

engagement with relatively open systems. His scattered

statements may be collected together to give us a more

coherent understanding of multidimensional and complex

phenomena.

Marxism and Nyaya-Vaisesika

If Marx is read in this way, some crucial concepts are

opened for further exploration. His concept of ontology

and epistemology are opened up as crucial issues around

which the process of democratic negotiation among

philosophies might revolve. Marx as a realist believes that

reality exists independently of the subject. The subject

tries to make sense of the reality in the context of

collective consciousness in the form of knowledge.

According to the orthodox understanding, Marx assigns

primary importance to material realitysocial beingdetermines consciousness. Mind is not considered to be

part of reality, and consciousness is considered to bedependent on material reality and insignificant. However,

critical realist reading differs and argues that Marx has a

concept of multi-layered ontology and relative

epistemology. Mind is a part of reality, but does exist at a

different layer from the material reality.

Nyaya-Vaisesikas concepts of ontology and

epistemology seem to be similar to those of Marx. Nyaya-

Vaisesika is a full-scale philosophical system that has

contributed significantly to the realist discourse of the

Hindu philosophical tradition. Nyaya and Vaisesika are

two different schools which are commonly treated together

due to their fundamental agreement on a wide range of

issues. Nyaya deals with epistemological questions and

Vaisesika specialises in ontological issues. There are morethan eighty famous scholars in this tradition. Some source

books of this system, such as Nyaya Sutra and Vaisesika

Sutra, are attributed to Gautam and Kanad. This

philosophy is believed to have crystallised during the third

century BCE. (For a detailed history, see Potter 1995).

In fact, in some senses Nyaya-Vaisesika explores the

concept of ontology more exhaustively than Marx. Nyaya-

Vaisesika argues that the world is made up of a variety of

distinguishable particulars. The basic concern is to search

for the primary categories of what is real. It accepts that

whatever becomes subject to our knowledge is real. Thus

the basic substance of reality ispadartha. The idea is that


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every word exists to connote a real thing. This concept is

thus opposed to what Derrida has argued, that words have

meaning only in the context of discourses. Nyaya-

Vaisesika further divides padartha into eight categories:

dravya (substance), guna (quality), karmana

(action/motion), samanya (universal), visesa (particular),samavayaya (relation of inherence) and abhav (absence).

The five material substances are considered to have

special qualities (vises guna) of their own that distinguish

them from each other. Earth has colour, taste, and touch;

water has colour, taste, touch and fluidity; fire has colour

and touch; and air has only touch. Different combinations

of these dravysas come together to constitute of the variety

of material objects.

Space is a substance that allows the object to move

freely and gives meaning to the locations near and far.

Time is known through our experience of different

temporal modes. It allows us to make sense of all temporal

categories. Time and space have been considered crucial

dimensions of Marxist theory. However, two other non-material categoriesthe self and manas (mind)would

be considered debatable in a Marxist context. Though

Marx can be seen to have operated with adequate

categories of the self and mind, at least if he is read with

the help of critical realism, they have been ignored

significantly by the different Marxist thinkers. Let me

explore the possibilities of these two categories of the real

to argue that they are very crucial to our understanding of

reality in its all dimensions.

In Nyaya-Vaisesika the self is considered to be an

immaterial, eternal and all pervading substance. There is a

plurality of individual souls (atman) and their existence

can be inferred from the quality of consciousness. The

atman also possesses secondary qualities such as desire,aversion, pleasure and pain. All these qualities are non-

material, but very crucial for understanding the nature of

the self. Nyaya-Vaisesika considers atman different from,

but as real as, the body. Atman is also differentiated from

consciousness, sensations and mind. According to Nyaya-

Vaisesika, consciousness is not an essential attribute of the

self, it is only a contingent quality, deriving from its

association with the material world. Therefore, liberation

of atman means liberation from consciousness, pain,

pleasure, desire, aversion, etc. This is the stage ofmoksha

or kaivaly, as also explained by other Indian philosophical

traditions.

I think the self is a crucial category of the domain of the

real. In fact, Marxs concept of the real comprises thehuman being, nature, society and their interrelationship.

The concept of the human being in Marx has a concept of

self inherent in it, particularly when he talks of alienation.

However, this has remained a neglected aspect of Marxs

thinking. There has been a general tendency, particularly

among Indian Marxists, to reject such concepts as

religious and the opium of the people. Thinkers like

Althusser even went to the extent of arguing that such a

concept is to be found only in the early Marx, who was yet

to achieve the epistemological break to overcome these

Hegelian residues. Bhaskars concept of multi-layered

ontology allows us to capture this aspect of Marxs

thinking as it explores different dimensions of human

existence and considers all of them as part of the real.

Thus the individuals self is part of the complex reality yet

retains its visesa qualities. If we can think to make this

concept of self as real an integral component of the overall

project of Marxs understanding of society, it would yieldbetter results in terms of providing explanations for

phenomena like religion, culture and the human psyche.

The other non-material substance I want to discuss is

manas or mind. A statement by a friend of minean ex-

Marxist who had been involved in armed struggle and later

became a professor of sociologywill serve as a point of

entry to the discussion. He was ill and hospitalised for

quite some time. I inquired about the diagnosis. He

replied, there is a problem with my mind and the doctors

are treating my brain. I think this a very crucial difference

he has brought out, of which he was not conscious when

he was a Marxist. The brain is a material substance in

Nyaya-Vaisesika terms, made of a particular combination

of the five material substances; whereas mind is a non-material substance, the existence of which can only be

inferred. To be more specific, according to Vaisesika the

mind can not be directly perceived but its existence mustbe inferred in order to explain the apprehension of sensory

information from the sense organs and account for the

internal perception of the self and a whole host of effective

and mental states (King 1999, 109).

What are the implications of considering mind as part of

the real? Mind or manas does not produce new padartha

but gets involved in its production. It has a significant

impact on the material world. Viewing mind as part of thereal can help solve many problems created by the mind-

body dichotomy in philosophy. For instance, within

Marxism there is debate over whether consciousness can

be false. Marxs statement that being determines

consciousness has been interpreted in terms of a crude

base/superstructure model: changes in being issue in

automatic changes in consciousness, and therefore

consciousness has no autonomy and is sometimes false. If

mind were considered part of the real it would be possible

to argue that no consciousness can be wholly false as it is

product of the interaction between our mind and other

substances. Of course, there can be consciousness (or its

absence) of different levels depending on deepening

interaction and further exploration of the different layers

of the real. I think such a formulation has possibilities for

expanding Marxs explanatory horizons. It would be

possible to understand phenomena like religion, culture,

human interaction, and psychology better.

I would like to discuss two more categories of

substance: samanya (universal) and visesa (particular).

Nyaya-Vaisesika subscribes to the notion that every word

connotes a real thing, either material, non-material, or

relational. There are several words denoting universal

categories like horse, cow etc. What constitutes theseuniversal categories? How real are such categories? This

issue has been discussed in most philosophical traditions.

For instance, Plato considers only the universal, existing at

the level of timeless Idea(l)s, to be real. For him

particulars are manifestations of universals, and the latter


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are more real than the former. Buddhists reject the status

of universals as real. They argue that universals are only

mentally imputed categories. Universals are not intrinsic

properties of entities but, in contrast, conceptual constructs

deriving their validity from conventional acceptance and

past usage (ibid., 112).Nyaya-Vaisesikas position rejects both the Platonic and

the Buddhist concept of universals. It proposes a staunch

realism. It considers universals and particulars as

differentiated and of equal ontological status. It argues that

there are common characteristics and they get reflected in

particular examples. For instance, the class term horse

having some specific characteristics is distinguished from

a particular horse, in which these qualities are of course

available. According to Nyaya-Vaisesika the universal is

as real as the particular. The universal is not material but

like time, space, self and mind it is revealed to us through

perception, inference and experience. Nyaya-Vaisesika

accepts the Platonic concept of universals as real and the

Buddhist concept of particulars as real. The universal

exists without being dependent on the particular. However

it only exists in a visible form in particulars. Matilal

explains:

Nyaya-Vaisesika universals exist nowhere but in this world ofours, and particulars do not copy them but manifest them, or

allow the universals to reside in them. We can say, in

accordance with Nyaya, that the particular provides a homefor the universal. The only mystery in this is that when the

home is destroyed, the universal is rendered homeless, but itis not destroyed thereby! It maintains a homeless, i.e.

unmanifest, existence. It is spatially locatable and observable,

provided the relevant particular is observable. (Matilal 1986,

383)

Matilal makes it clear that in the Nyaya-Vaisesika systemuniversals are not present in a concrete form separately but

are always present in the existence of a particular.

According to Nyaya-Vaisesika every substance has its

own particularity (visesa) by which they are distinguished

from each other. For instance, all souls are characterised as

substrata of consciousness, but they are not identical. Each

soul is different from others and distinguished by its visesa

qualities. Similarly, minds are unique particularities and

should not be reduced to each other. In our everyday life

we do differentiate things on the basis of differences in

their nature. These particulars have some samanya

(general) qualities but also have some specific qualities.

Therefore, samanya and visesa are real and irreducible to

each other. Even the particular has its individual visesaand is therefore irreducible to other particulars.

I think this relation between samanya and visesa should

be acceptable to Marxism. What are the implications of

accepting this formulation for our understanding of

society? We must accept that there are some general

characteristics of society as well as specific qualities of

each society. Society cannot be defined as an

agglomeration of individuals, rather it is an ensemble of

social relations which is reproduced and changed by the

activities of individuals but is not reducible to them; it is

an emergent or higher level of existence having its own

specific qualities. At the same time individuals also have

their specific, emergent qualities, and they cannot bereduced to each other, or to society (or to their

neurophysiological drives). The individual as a samanya

and as a visesa category are irreducible to each other;

likewise, society as a samanya and as a visesa category.

They constitute the different layers of the real world. To

argue in this way also means to defend the individuality or

visesa ontological status of all these layers of reality.

Conclusion

I would like to conclude from the above discussion thatthere are possibilities of democratic negotiations between

different philosophical traditions in general and between

Marxism and Nyaya-Vaisesika, mediated by critical

realism, in particular. Through such negotiations we canaspire to arrive at a universal philosophy of liberation for

the contemporary world. I have argued that Nyaya-

Vaisesikas concept of ontology can contribute to Marxs

concept of ontology in a definite way. It can open up

Marxist theory to explore several new layers of the real

world. A similar exercise can also be carried out in the

context of epistemology and criteria of knowledge. Nyaya-

Vaisesika not only contributes to the field of logic, whereit represents an advance over Aristotelian formal logic, but

also combines logic with empirical evidence, and as such

has the potential to make significant contributions to the

field of Marxist epistemology.

References

Althusser, L. and E. Balibar. 1972. Reading Capital. London:

NLB.Bhaskar, R. 1983a. Dialectics, in T. Bottomore, (ed.) A

Dictionary of Marxist Thought. Oxford: Blackwell.

Bhaskar, R. 1983b. Theory of Knowledge, in T. Bottomore,(ed.)A Dictionary of Marxist Thought. Oxford: Blackwell.

Bhaskar, R. 1994. Plato Etc.: The Problems of Philosophy andTheir Resolution. London & New York: Verso.

Cohen, G. 1978. Karl Marx's Theory of History: A Defence.

Oxford: Clarendon Press.Engels, F. 1974. The Dialectics of Nature. Moscow: Progress.

Engels, F. 1975.Anti-Drhring. Moscow: Progress.

King, R. 1999.Indian Philosophy: An Introduction to Hindu and

Buddhist Thought. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Marx, K. 1975.Early Writings. Harmondsworth: Penguin.Marx, K. 1976. Capital. Volume I. Penguin: Harmondsworth.

Marx, K. and F. Engels. 1975. The Holy Family. Collected

Works, Vol. 4. Moscow: Progress.Matilal, B. 1986. Perception: An Essay on Classical Indian

Theories of Knowledge. Oxford and New York: Oxford

University Press.Potter, Karl H. 1995.Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophy, Vol. 2.

Delhi: Motilala Banarasidas.

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