dean divina compiled syllabus

8/11/2019 Dean Divina Compiled Syllabus

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POLITICAL LAW2009

NICASIO BOLOS, JR. v.THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and REY ANGELESCINCONIEGUE

G.R. No. 184082, March 17, 2009

J. Peralta

The rule on the three-term limit shows the clear intent of the framers of the Constitutionto bar any attempt to circumvent the three-term limit by a voluntary renunciation of office.

After three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot seek immediate re-election for afourth term. The prohibited election refers to the next regular election for the same officefollowing the end of the third consecutive term.

JOCELYN SY LIMKAICHONG v.COMELECG.R. Nos. 178831-32/G.R. No. 179120/G.R. Nos. 179132-33/G.R. Nos. 179240-41, April 1,

2009J. Peralta

Once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as aMember of the House of Representatives, the jurisdiction of the House of RepresentativesElectoral Tribunal begins over election contests relating to his election, returns, and

qualifications, andmere allegation as to the invalidity of her proclamation does not divest the

Electoral Tribunal of its jurisdiction.

LAND BANK OF THE PHILLIPINESv.CAROLINA B. VDA. DE ABELLO AND HEIRS OFELISEO ABELLO

G.R. No. 168631, April 7, 2009J. Peralta

Seizure of property would take effect on the payment of just compensation and not uponthe taking of the property. The value of the property at the time of payment is controlling in

determining the just amount of compensation not the value at the time of taking.

JOSE PEPITO M. AMORES, M.D. v .CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSIONG.R. No. 170093, April 29, 2009

J. Peralta

The mere fact that a particular position belongs to the career service does notautomatically confer security of tenure on its occupant. Such right will have to depend on thenature of his appointment, which in turn depends on his eligibility or lack of it. A person whodoes not have the requisite qualifications for the position cannot be appointed to it in the first

place or, only as an exception to the rule, may be appointed to it in an acting capacity in theabsence of appropriate eligibles.


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OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN v.FERNANDO J. BELTRANG.R. No. 168039, June 5, 2009

J. Peralta

The Office of the Ombudsman, in the exercise of its administrative disciplinary authority,is vested by the Constitution and R.A. No. 6770 with the power to impose the penalty ofremoval, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution of a public officer or employeefound to be at fault.

In administrative cases, substantial evidence is required to support any findings.Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind may accept as adequateto support a conclusion. The requirement is satisfied where there is reasonable ground tobelieve that the respondent is guilty of misconduct, even if the evidence might not beoverwhelming.

CARMELO LAZATIN, ET AL. v.HON. ANIANO A. DISIERTO, ET AL.G.R. No. 147097, June 5, 2009

J. Peralta

The doctrine of stare decisis enjoins adherence to judicial precedents. It requires courtsin a country to follow the rule established in a decision of the Supreme Court thereof. Thatdecision becomes a judicial precedent to be followed in subsequent cases by all courts in theland. The doctrine of stare decisis is based on the principle that once a question of law hasbeen examined and decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to further argument.

In this case, petitioners have not shown any strong, compelling reason to convince theCourt that the doctrine of stare decisis should not be applied to this case. They have not

successfully demonstrated how or why it would be grave abuse of discretion for theOmbudsman, who has been validly conferred by law with the power of control and supervisionover the OSP, to disapprove or overturn any resolution issued by the latter.

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINESv.RENE RALLA BELISTAG.R. No. 164631, June 26, 2009

J. Peralta

RTC, sitting as SAC, can act over all petitions for determination of just compensation tolandowners in accordance with Section 57 of RA No. 6657.The appeal to the DARAB of thedecision of adjudicator before a party can resort to the RTC is not necessary.

HEIRS OF EMILIANO SAN PEDROv.PABLITO GARCIA and JOSE CALDERONG.R. No. 166988, July 3, 2009

J. Peralta

Litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is essential to aneffective administration of justice that once a judgment has become final, the issue or causeinvolved therein should be laid to rest.


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The noble purpose is to write finis to disputes once and for all. This is a fundamentalprinciple in our justice system, without which there could be no end to litigations. Utmost respectand adherence to this principle must always be maintained by those who wield the power ofadjudication. Any act which violates such principle must be struck down.

PETRONILA MAYLEM v.CARMELITA ELLANO AND ANTONIA MORCIENTOG.R. No. 162721, July 13, 2009

J. Peralta

As found by the Court of Appeals, it is thus implausible that the surrender of the land byAbad could be interpreted as abandonment in contemplation of the law, in view of theunderstanding between him and petitioner that the surrender of possession would be merelytemporary. Suffice it to say that the allegation of abandonment is negated by the undisputed factthat Abad actually demanded the return of the property to him after the lapse of the one-year

period. Indeed, petitioners act of dispossessing Abad of the land awarded to him was merely

calculated to impair the latters vested right of ownership.

Abandonment or neglect, as a ground for the cancellation of an emancipation patent or

certificate of land awardrequires a clear and absolute intention to renounce a right or a claim, or

to abandon a right or property coupled with an external act by which that intention is expressedor carried into effect.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES REPRESENTED BY THE NATIONAL POWERCORPORATION v.SPOUSES RUPERTO LIBUNAO AND SONIA P. SANOPO & HEIRS OF

BENITA DOMINGOG.R. No. 166553, July 30, 2009

J. Peralta

Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its

owner by the expropriator. The measure is not the takers gain, but the owners loss. The word

"just" is used to intensify the meaning of the word "compensation" and to convey thereby theidea that the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, fulland ample.

LIMKAICHONG v.COMELEC/ BIRAOGO v.NOGRALES, ET AL./ PARAS v. NOGRALES,ET AL./ VILLANDO v.COMELEC, ET AL.

G.R. Nos. 178831-32/G.R. No. 179120/G.R. Nos. 179132-33/G.R. Nos. 179240-41 July 30,2009

J. Peralta

Once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as aMember of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC's jurisdiction over election contestsrelating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRET's own jurisdiction begins.

DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM (DAR)v.CARMEN S. TONGSONG.R. No. 171674, August 4, 2009


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J. Peralta

In determining just compensation, the cost of acquisition of the land, the current value ofthe like properties, its nature, actual use and income, the sworn valuation by the owner, the taxdeclarations, and the assessment made by government assessors shall be considered.

FRANCIS F. YENKO, ET AL. v.RAUL NESTOR C. GUNGON/RAUL NESTOR C. GUNGON v. FRANCIS F. YENKO, ET AL.

G.R. No. 165450/G.R .No. 165452, August 13, 2009J. Peralta

Reassignments involving a reduction in rank, status or salary violate an employees

security of tenure, which is assured by the Constitution, the Administrative Code of 1987, and

the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations.Security of tenure covers not only employees

removed without cause, but also cases of unconsented transfers and reassignments, which aretantamount to illegal/constructive removal.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINESv.SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION) AND VICTORIAAMANTE

G.R. No. 167304, August 25, 2009J. Peralta

Public officials enumerated in Section 4(a) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, may not onlybe charged in the Sandiganbayan with violations of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 or Chapter II,Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, but also with other offenses or felonies in relationto their office. The said other offenses and felonies are broad in scope but are limited only tothose that are committed in relation to the public official or employee's office.

CAROLINA R. JAVIER v.THE FIRST DIVISION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN and thePEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. Nos. 147026-27, September 11, 2009J. Peralta

Notwithstanding that petitioner came from the private sector to sit as a member of theNBDB, the law invested her with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, sothat the purpose of the government is achieved. In this case, the government aimed to enhancethe book publishing industry as it has a significant role in the national development. Hence, thefact that she was appointed from the public sector and not from the other branches or agencies

of the government does not take her position outside the meaning of a public office.

A public office is the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by which, fora given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, anindividual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to beexercised by him for the benefit of the public. The individual so invested is a public officer.

NATIONAL HOME MORTGAGE FINANCE CORPORATIONv.MARIO BAYARI ET. AL.,G.R. No. 166508, October 2, 2009


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J. Peralta

The COA, as one of the three independent constitutional commissions, is specificallyvested with the power, authority and duty to examine, audit and settle all accounts pertaining tothe revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and property owned or held intrust by the government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, including

government-owned and controlled corporations.

CARMELINDA C. BARRO v. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONSG.R. No. 186201, October 9, 2009

J. Peralta

The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgateits rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-

proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and decided in division,provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the Commission enbanc.

HON. VICENTE P. EUSEBIO, LORNA A. BERNARDO, VICTOR ENDRIGA, and the CITY OFPASIGv.JOVITO M. LUIS ET AL.,

G.R. No. 162474, October 13, 2009J. Peralta

Recovery of possession of the property by the landowner can no longer be allowed onthe grounds of estoppel and, more importantly, of public policy which imposes upon the publicutility the obligation to continue its services to the public. The non-filing of the case forexpropriation will not necessarily lead to the return of the property to the landowner. What is leftto the landowner is the right of compensation.

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK v .CAYETANO A. TEJANO, JR.,G.R. No. 173615, October 16, 2009

J. Peralta

The CSC shall have jurisdiction over appeals in administrative disciplinary casesinvolving the imposition of the penalty of suspension for more than thirty days; or fine in an

amount exceeding thirty days salary; demotion in rank or salary or transfer, removal or

dismissal from office.

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, REPRESENTED BY HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTOv. HEIRS OF MARGARITA VDA. DE VENTURA REPRESENTED BY PACITA V. PASCUAL,

ET AL.G.R. No. 151800, November 5, 2009

J. Peralta

The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over orders, directives and decisions of the Officeof the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases only. It cannot, therefore, review the


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orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in criminal or non-administrativecases.

THE HEIRS OF AURELIO REYESv.HON. ERNESTO D. GARILAO ET AL.G.R. No. 136466, November 25, 2009

J. Peralta

The power of administrative officials to promulgate rules and regulations in theimplementation of a statute is necessarily limited only to carrying into effect what is provided inthe legislative enactment.

JUDGE ADORACION G. ANGELES v. HON. MANUEL B. GAITE, ET AL.G.R. No. 165276, November 25, 2009

J. Peralta

Under the doctrine of qualified political agency, department secretaries are alter egos or

assistants of the President and their acts are presumed to be those of the latter unlessdisapproved or reprobated by him.Thus, as a rule, an aggrieved party affected by the decision

of a cabinet secretary need not appeal to the OP and may file a petition for certiorari directly inthe Court of Appeals assailing the act of the said secretary.

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINESv.TERESITA PANLILIO LUCIANOG.R. No. 165428, November 25, 2009

J. Peralta

In determining just compensation, the cost of acquisition of the land, the current value oflike properties, its nature, actual use and income, the sworn valuation by the owner, the taxdeclarations, and the assessment made by government assessors shall be considered. Thesocial and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers and by theGovernment to the property, as well as the non-payment of taxes or loans secured from anygovernment financing institution on the said land, shall be considered as additional factors todetermine its valuation.

GOVERNOR ORLANDO A. FUA, JR. v.THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT AND ELIZABETH S.ZOSA

G.R. No. 175803, December 4, 2009J. Peralta

The general rule is that before a party may seek the intervention of the court, he shouldfirst avail himself of all the means afforded him by administrative processes. The non-observance of the doctrine results in the petition having no cause of action, thus, justifying itsdismissal.

PHILIPPINE ECONOMIC ZONE AUTHORITY ET. AL.v.PEARL CITY MANUFACTURING

CORPORATION


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G.R. No. 168668, December 16, 2009

J. Peralta

In administrative proceedings, a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain ones side

suffices to meet the requirements of due process. The essence of procedural due process is

embodied in the basic requirement of notice and a real opportunity to be heard. "To be heard"does not mean only verbal arguments in court; one may be heard also thru pleadings. Whereopportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is nodenial of procedural due process.

BARANGAY SANGALANG v.BARANGAY MAGUIHANG.R. No. 159792, December 23, 2009

J. Peralta

The jurisdictional responsibility for settlement of boundary disputes between and amonglocal government units is to be lodged before the proper Sangguniang Panlungsod or

Sangguniang Bayan concerned, if it involves two or more barangays in the same city ormunicipality. If there is a failure of amicable settlement, the dispute shall be formally tried by thesanggunian concerned and shall decide the same within (60) days from the date of thecertification referred to.

LILY O. ORBASEv.OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN and ADORACION MENDOZA-BOLOSG.R. No. 175115, December 23, 2009

J. Peralta

In administrative cases, substantial evidence is required to support any findings.Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate

to support a conclusion. The requirement is satisfied where there is reasonable ground tobelieve that the petitioner is guilty of the act or omission complained of, even if the evidencemight not be overwhelming.

2010

ALVIN B. GARCIA v.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND TOMAS R. OSMEA

G.R. No. 170256, January 25, 2010J. Peralta

Paragraph 6, Section 2, Article IX of the Constitution empowers the COMELEC to"investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases for violation of election laws, includingacts or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses and malpractices. The Court will notinterfere with the finding of probable cause by the COMELEC absent a clear showing of graveabuse of discretion. This principle emanates from the COMELEC's exclusive power to conduct

preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable under the election laws and toprosecute the same, except as may otherwise be provided by law.


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NATIONAL ELECTRIFICATION ADMINISTRATIONv.CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION AND PEDRO RAMOS

G.R. No. 149497, January 25, 2010J. Peralta

Government officials and employees are prohibited under Section 7 (a) of RA No. 6713

from having direct or indirect financial or material interest in any transaction requiring theapproval of their office, since personal interest would be involved. Nonetheless, in the instantcase, when the NEA Administrator, subject to the confirmation of the Board, designates a NEA

personnel to an electric cooperative where a vacancy in a certain position occurs and/or whenthe interest of the cooperative or the program so requires, such designation is primarily gearedto protect the interest of the government and the loans it extended to the cooperative. Thus, anyNEA personnel so designated in the electric cooperative cannot be considered as having director indirect interest in the cooperative for its own personal interest, but only for the purpose of

protecting the interest of NEA as the primary source of funds for the electric cooperative.

On the other hand, Section 8, Article IX-B of the Constitution provides that no elective orappointive public officer or employee shall receive additional, double, or indirect compensation,

unless specifically authorized by law.

ABDUL GAFFAR P.M. DIBARATUN

v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS ANDABDUL CARIM MALA ABUBAKAR

G.R. No. 170365,February 2, 2010J. Peralta

The following are the three instances when a failure of elections may be declared by the

Commission: (1)the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed on account

of

force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes; (2)

the election in anypolling place had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting on

account offorce majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes; or (3)after the

voting and during the preparation and transmission of the election returns or in the custody or

canvass thereof, suchelectionresults in a failure to elect on account offorce majeure, violence,

terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes.

In the instant case, the elections in Precinct No. 6A/7A were suspended before the hour

fixed by law for the closing of the voting due to violence. Only 10 voters were able to cast their

votes out of 151 registered voters; hence, the votes not cast would have affected the result of

the elections. The concurrence of these two conditions caused the COMELEC

en banc

todeclare a failure of elections. When there is failure of elections, the COMELEC is empowered toannul the elections and to call for special elections.

RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, VICTOR F. BERNAL, AND RENE O. MEDINAv.EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, ET. AL.

G.R. No. 180050, February 10, 2010J. Peralta


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A province may be created if it has an average annual income, as certified by theDepartment of Finance, of not less than Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) based on 1991

constant prices andeitherof the following requisites: (i) a contiguous territory of at least two

thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as certified by the Lands Management Bureau; or (ii) a

population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) inhabitants as certified by theNational Statistics Office: Provided, That, the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area,population, and income of the original unit or units at the time of said creation to less than theminimum requirements prescribed herein. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprisestwo (2) or more islands or is separated by a chartered city or cities which do not contribute tothe income of the province. The average annual income shall include the income accruing tothe general fund, exclusive of special funds, trust funds, transfers, and non-recurring income. Inthe instant case, R.A. No. 9355 failed to comply with either the territorial or the populationrequirement for the creation of the Province of Dinagat Islands.

REPORT ON THE FINANCIAL AUDIT CONDUCTED ON THE BOOKS OF ACCOUNTS OF

THE MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURT, MONDRAGON-SAN ROQUE, NORTHERNSAMAR.A.M. No. P-09-2721, February 16, 2010

J. Peralta

Delayed remittance of cash collections by the clerk of court or cash clerk constitutes

gross neglect of duty and imposed the supreme penalty of dismissal. Hence, the imposable

penalty upon Gimena should be dismissal from the service. However, subsequent remittance ofthe subject amounts, as shown by the attached disbursement vouchers and acknowledgmentreceipts, with no outstanding accountabilities, can be taken as mitigating circumstances whichwarrant the imposition of the lower penalty of suspension of one (1) month without pay.

ATTY. LUCKY M. DAMASEN v.OSCAR G. TUMAMAO

G.R. No. 173165,February 17, 2010

J. Peralta

Quite clearly, from the tenor of the letter, it appears that the membership of Damasen

still had to be approved by the LDP National Council. Thus, notwithstanding Damasen s

procurement of a Certificate of Membership from LDP Provincial Chairman Balauag, the samemerely started the process of his membership in the LDP, and it did not mean automaticmembership thereto. While it may be argued that Damasen was already a member upon receiptof a Certificate of Membership from LDP Provincial Chairman Balauag, the Court cannot impose

such view on the LDP. If the LDP leadership says that the membership of Damasen still had tobe endorsed to the National Council for approval, then the Court cannot question suchrequirement in the absence of evidence to the contrary. It is well settled that the discretion ofaccepting members to a political party is a right and a privilege, a purely internal matter, whichthis Court cannot meddle in.

NATIONAL ELECTRIFICATION ADMINISTRATION v. VAL L. VILLANUEVA


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G.R. No. 168203,March 9, 2010

J. Peralta

Considering that the President has the power to review on appeal the orders or acts ofpetitioner NEA, the failure of respondent to undertake such an appeal bars him from resorting to

a judicial suit. It is settled that under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies,recourse through court action cannot prosper until after all such administrative remedies havefirst been exhausted. If remedy is available within the administrative machinery, this should beresorted to before recourse can be made to courts. The party with an administrative remedymust not only initiate the prescribed administrative procedure to obtain relief but also pursue it toits appropriate conclusion before seeking judicial intervention in order to give the administrativeagency an opportunity to decide the matter itself correctly and prevent unnecessary and

premature resort to the court. The non-observance of the doctrine of exhaustion ofadministrative remedies results in lack of cause of action, which is one of the grounds in theRules of Court justifying the dismissal of the complaint.

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR v. ATTY. MARY ANN PADUGANAN-PEARANDA, OFFICE OF THE CLERK OF COURT, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT IN CITIES,

CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY, MISAMIS ORIENTAL AND MS, JOCELYN MEDIANTE

A.M. No. P-07-2355,March 19, 2010

J. Peralta

Court personnel tasked with collections of court funds, such as Clerks of Courts andcash clerks, should deposit immediately with authorized government depositories the variousfunds they have collected, because they are not authorized to keep funds in their custody. Inthis case, respondents violated Supreme Court (SC) Circular No. 50-95, which commands thatall fiduciary collections shall be deposited immediately by the Clerk of Court concerned, uponreceipt thereof, with an authorized government depositary bank.

THE MUNICIPALITY OF HAGONOY, BULACAN, REPRESENTED BY THE HON. FELIX V.OPLE, MUNICIPAL MAYOR, AND FELIX V. OPLE, IN HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY v .HON.SIMEON P. DUMDUM, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL

TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 7, CEBU CITY

G.R. No. 168289,March 22, 2010

Consent is implied when the government enters into a business contract, as it thendescends to the level of the other contracting party, or it may be embodied in a general orspecial law such as that found in Book I, Title I, Chapter 2, Section 22 of the Local Government

Code of 1991, which vests local government units with certain corporate powersone of them

is the power to sue and be sued.The general rule spelled out in Section 3, Article XVI of the

Constitution is that the state and its political subdivisions may not be sued without their consent.Otherwise put, they are open to suit but only when they consent to it.

Be that as it may, a difference lies between suability and liability. Where the suability ofthe state is conceded and by which liability is ascertained judicially, the state is at liberty todetermine for itself whether to satisfy the judgment or not. Execution may not issue upon such


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judgment, because statutes waiving non-suability do not authorize the seizure of property tosatisfy judgments recovered from the action. These statutes only convey an implication that thelegislature will recognize such judgment as final and make provisions for its full satisfaction.Thus, where consent to be sued is given by general or special law, the implication thereof islimited only to the resultant verdict on the action before execution of the judgment.

ATTY. REYNANTE B. ORCEO v.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G. R. No. 190779,March 26, 2010

J. Peralta

The COMELEC had the authority to promulgate Resolution No. 8714 pursuant toSection 35 of R.A. No. 7166. It was granted the power to issue the implementing rules andregulations of Sections 32 and 33 of R.A. No. 7166. Under this broad power, the COMELECwas mandated to provide the details of who may bear, carry or transport firearms or other

deadly weapons, as well as the definition of firearms,

among others. These details are left tothe discretion of the COMELEC, which is a constitutional body that possesses specialknowledge and expertise on election matters, with the objective of ensuring the holding of free,orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections.

The COMELECs intent in the inclusion of airsoft guns in the term firearm and their

resultant coverage by the election gun ban is to avoid the possible use of recreational guns insowing fear, intimidation or terror during the election period. An ordinary citizen may not be ableto distinguish between a real gun and an airsoft gun. However, the replicas and imitations of

airsoft guns and airguns are excluded from the term firearmin Resolution No. 8714.

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION v.ALAN OLANDESCA

G.R. No. 171434,April 23, 2010

J. Peralta

When an employee is dismissed or suspended it is but logical that since he is barredfrom reporting to work the same negates his right to be paid backwages. He has no opportunityto work during the period he was dismissed or suspended and, therefore, he has no salary toexpect. However, the same does not hold true for an employee who is reprimanded. Areprimand usually carries a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt withmore severely. Under normal circumstances, an employee who is reprimanded is never

prevented from reporting to work. He continues to work despite the warning. Thus, in the case

at bar, since respondents penalty should only be a reprimand, this Court deems it proper and

equitable to affirm the CAs award of backwages.

HENRY JUNEDUEAS, JR. v. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL,

ET. AL.


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G.R. No. 191550May 4, 2010

J. Peralta

It is hornbook principle that the Courts jurisdiction to review decisions and orders of

electoral tribunals is exercised only upon showing of grave abuse of discretion committed by the

tribunal; otherwise, the Court shall not interfere with the electoral tribunals exercise of its

discretion or jurisdiction. Grave abuse of discretion has been defined as the capricious andwhimsical exercise of judgment, the exercise of power in an arbitrary manner, where the abuseis so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty.

RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, ET. AL. v.EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, ET.AL.

G.R. No. 180050,May 12, 2010

J. Peralta

Section 7, Chapter 2 of the Local Government Code provided that as a general rule, thecreation of a local government unit or its conversion from one level to another level shall bebased on verifiable indicators of viability and projected capacity to provide services, to wit:(a)

Income. It must be sufficient, based on acceptable standards, to provide for all essential

government facilities and services and special functions commensurate with the size of its

population, as expected of the local government unit concerned; (b)Population. It shall be

determined as the total number of inhabitants within the territorial jurisdiction of the local

government unit concerned; and (c) Land area. It must be contiguous, unless it comprises

two (2) or more islands, or is separated by a local government unit independent of the others;properly identified by metes and bounds with technical descriptions; and sufficient to provide for

such basic services and facilities to meet the requirements of its populace.

It must be emphasized that Section 7 above, which provides for the general rule in thecreation of a local government unit, states in paragraph (c) thereof that the land area must becontiguous and sufficient to provide for such basic services and facilities to meet therequirements of its populace.Therefore, there are two requirements for land area: (1) the landarea must be contiguous; and (2) the land area must be sufficient to provide for such basicservices and facilities to meet the requirements of its populace. A sufficient land area in thecreation of a province is at least 2,000 square kilometers, as provided by Section 461 of theLocal Government Code.The requirement of a contiguous territory and the requirement of a land

area of at least 2,000 square kilometers are distinct and separate requirements for land areaunder paragraph (a) (i) of Section 461 and Section 7 (c) of the Local Government Code.

A.Z. ARNAIZ REALTY, INC. REPRESENTED BY CARMEN Z. ARNAIZ v .OFFICE OF THEPRESIDENT

G.R. No. 170623,July 7, 2010


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J. Peralta

Due process, as a constitutional precept, does not always, and in all situations, require atrial-type proceeding. Litigants may be heard through pleadings, written explanations, position

papers, memoranda or oral arguments. The standard of due process that must be met inadministrative tribunals allows a certain degree of latitude as long as fairness is not ignored. It

is, therefore, not legally objectionable for being violative of due process for an administrativeagency to resolve a case based solely on position papers, affidavits or documentary evidencesubmitted by the parties.

GABRIEL C. SINGSON, ET. AL. v .COMMISSION ON AUDIT

G.R. No. 159355,August 9, 2010

J. Peralta

The RATA is distinct from salary (as a form of compensation). Unlike salary which ispaid for services rendered, the RATA is a form of allowance intended to defray expenses

deemed unavoidable in the discharge of office. Hence, the RATA is paid only to certain officialswho, by the nature of their offices, incur representation and transportation expenses.OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN v.PEDRO DELIJERO, JR.

G.R. No. 172635,October 20, 2010

J. Peralta

While petitioner has concurrent administrative disciplinary authority with the DECS overpublic school teachers, Section 23 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 provides that theOmbudsman may refer a complaint to the proper disciplinary authority. Under thecircumstances, it would have been more prudent for petitioner to have referred the complaint tothe DECS given that it would have been in a better position to serve the interest of justiceconsidering the nature of the controversy. Respondent is a public school teacher and is covered

by RA 4670, therefore, the proceedings before the DECS would have been the moreappropriate venue to resolve the dispute.

LOUIS BAROKC. BIRAOGO v.THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010/ REP.

EDCEL LAGMAN, ET. AL. v.EXEC. SEC. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., ET. AL.

G.R. No. 192935 & G.R. No. 193036,December 7, 2010

J. Peralta Separate Concurring Opinion

Albeit the President has the power to create ad hoc committees to investigate or inquire

into matters for the guidance of the President to ensure that the laws be faithfully executed, theTruth Commission was not created in the nature of the aforementioned ad hocinvestigating/fact-finding bodies. The Truth Commission was created more in the nature of a

public office.

In this case, the members of the Truth Commission are not officials from existinggovernment offices. Moreover, the Truth Commission has been granted powers of an

independent office as follows: 1)Engage or contract the services of resource persons,


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professionals and other personnel determined by it as necessary to carry out its mandate;

2)Promulgate its rules and regulations or rules of procedure it deems necessary to effectively

and efficiently carry out the objectives of this Executive Order and to ensure the orderly conductof its investigations, proceedings and hearings, including the presentation of evidence. 3) TheTruth Commission shall have the power to engage the services of experts as consultants or

advisers as it may deem necessary to accomplish its mission.

A valid classification must rest upon material differences between the persons, oractivities or thing included and excluded. Reasonable grounds must exist for making adistinction between those who fall within the class and those who do not. There is no substantialdistinction cited between public officers who may be involved in reported cases of graft andcorruption during the previous administration and public officers who may be involved inreported cases of graft and corruption during prior administrations in relation to the purpose ofending graft and corruption. To limit the investigation to public officers of the previousadministration is violative of the equal protection clause.

2011

MOISES TINIO, JR. AND FRANCIS TINIO vs. NATIONAL POWERCORPORATION/NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION v . MOISES TINIO, JR. AND FRANCIS

TINIOG.R. No. 160923/G.R. No. 161093. January 24, 2011

J. Peralta

It is settled that the nature and character of the land at the time of its taking is theprincipal criterion for determining how much just compensation should be given to thelandowner. Hence, the argument of the Tinios that the subject property should benefit from thesubsequent classification of its adjoining properties as industrial lands is, likewise, untenable.The Court, in a number of cases, has enunciated the principle that it would be injustice on the

part of the expropriator where the owner would be given undue incremental advantages arisingfrom the use to which the government devotes the property expropriated.

RE: ANONYMOUS COMPLAINT AGAINTS MS. HERMOGENA F. BAYANI FORDISHONESTY

A.M. No. 2007-22-SC, February 1, 2011J. Peralta

Dishonesty is defined as intentionally making a false statement in any material fact, or

practicing or attempting to practice any deception or fraud in securing his examination,

registration, appointment or promotion.

Thus, dishonesty, like bad faith, is not simply bad

judgment or negligence. Dishonesty is a question of intention. In ascertaining the intention of aperson accused of dishonesty, consideration must be taken not only of the facts andcircumstances which gave rise to the act committed by the respondent, but also of his state ofmind at the time the offense was committed, the time he might have had at his disposal for the

purpose of meditating on the consequences of his act, and the degree of reasoning he couldhave had at that moment.


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BENIGNO B. REAS v.CARLOS M. RELACIONA.M. No. P-05-2095, February 9, 2011

J. Peralta

Relacions failure to immediately return Reas salary check was improper and constituted

misconduct. According to jurisprudence, misconduct is a transgression of some established ruleof action, an unlawful behavior, or gross negligence by a public officer. The misconduct is graveif it involves any of the additional elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the law, ordisregard of long-standing rules, which must be established by substantial evidence. Otherwise,

the misconduct is only simple. That Relacion did not maliciously or deliberately take Reas

salary check rendered him liable only for simple misconduct.

ANGELINA C. LIM AND VIVIAN M. GABUANG v. MARIBETH G. AROMIN, RECORDSOFFICER I, OCC, MTC, MECAUAYAN, BULACAN

A.M. No. P-09-2677, March 9, 2011J. Peralta

The SC has emphasized that court personnel must devote every moment of official timeto public service. The conduct and behavior of court personnel should be characterized by ahigh degree of professionalism and responsibility, as they mirror the image of the court.Specifically, court personnel must strictly observe official time to inspire public respect for the

justice system. Section 1, Canon IV of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel mandates thatcourt personnel shall commit themselves exclusively to the business and responsibilities of their

office during working hours.

ABC (ALLIANCE FOR BARANGAY CONCERNS) PARTY LIST, REPRESENTED BY ITSCHAIRMAN, JAMES MARTY LIM v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND MELANIO

MAURICIO, JR.G.R. No. 193256, March 22, 2011

J. Peralta

Since the representative of the elected party-list organization becomes a member of theHouse of Representatives, contests relating to the qualifications of the said party-listrepresentative is within the jurisdiction of the HRET, as Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution

provides: Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an ElectoralTribunal, which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and

qualifications of their respective Members. Party-list nominees are elected members of the

House of Representatives no less than the district representatives are, the HRET hasjurisdiction to hear and pass upon their qualifications. By analogy with the cases of districtrepresentatives, once the party or organization of the party-list nominee has been proclaimedand the nominee has taken his oath and assumed office as member of the House of


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Representatives, the COMELECs jurisdiction over election contests relating to his qualifications

ends and the HRETs own jurisdiction begins.

LUCIANO VELOSO, ABRAHAM CABOCHAN, JOCELYN DAWIS-ASUNCION AND MARLON

M. LACSON v . COMMISSION ON AUDITG.R. No. 193677, September 6, 2011

J. Peralta

The COAs assailed decisions were made in faithful compliance with its mandate and in

judicious exercise of its general audit power as conferred on it by the Constitution. The COAadheres to the policy that government funds and property should be fully protected andconserved and that irregular, unnecessary, excessive or extravagant expenditures or uses ofsuch funds and property should be prevented.Thus, LGUs, though granted local fiscal

autonomy, are still within theauditjurisdiction of the COA.

CITY OF MANILA v. MELBA TAN TEG.R. No. 169263, September 21, 2011

J. Peralta

The concept of socialized housing, whereby housing units are distributed and/or sold toqualified beneficiaries on much easier terms, has already been included in the expanded

definition of public use or purpose in the context of the States exercise of the power of

eminent domain. The term public use has acquired a more comprehensive coverage to the

literal import of the term signifying strict use or employment by the public has been added thebroader notion of indirect public benefit or advantage.

ENRIQUE U. BETOY v . THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS, NATIONAL POWER CORPORATIONG.R. Nos. 156556-57, October 4, 2011

J. Peralta

The privatization and restructuring of the NPC was done in good faith as its primarypurpose was for economy and to make the bureaucracy more efficient.

2012

GONZALO PUYAT & SONS, INC. v.RUBEN ALCAIDE (deceased), substituted by GLORIAALCAIDE, representative of the Farmer-Beneficiaries

G.R. No. 167952, February 1, 2012J. Peralta

The right to appeal is not a natural right or a part of due process, but merely a statutoryprivilege and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of the

law.Time and again, it has been held that the right to appeal is not a natural right or a part of


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due process, but merely a statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the manner and inaccordance with the provisions of the law. The party who seeks to avail of the same mustcomply with the requirements of the rules, failing in which the right to appeal is lost.

SAMAR II ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. (SAMELCO II) AND ITS BOARD OF

DIRECTORS, composed of DEBORAH T. MARCO (Immediate Past President), ATTY.MEDINO L. ACUBA, ENGR. MANUEL C. OREJOLA, ALFONSO F. QUILAPIO, RAUL DEGUZMAN and PONCIANO R. ROSALES (General Manager and Ex Off ic ioDirector) v.

ANANIAS D. SELUDO, JR.G.R. No. 173840, April 25, 2012

J. Peralta

While the RTC has jurisdiction over the petition for prohibition filed by respondent, theNEA, in the exercise of its power of supervision and control, has primary jurisdiction todetermine the issue of the validity of the subject resolution.

It may not be amiss to reiterate the prevailing rule that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction

applies where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts and comes into play wheneverenforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme,has been placed within the special competence of an administrative agency.

ARCHBISHOP FERNANDO R. CAPALLA, OMAR SOLITARIO ALI and MARY ANNE L.SUSANO v.THE HONORABLE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 201112, June 13, 2012J. Peralta

Considering that the AES contract is not an ordinary contract as it involves procurementby a government agency, the rights and obligations of the parties are governed not only by theCivil Code but also by RA 9184. A winning bidder is not precluded from modifying or amending

certain provisions of the contract bidded upon. However, such changes must not constitutesubstantial or material amendments that would alter the basic parameters of the contract andwould constitute a denial to the other bidders of the opportunity to bid on the same terms.

HILARION F. DIMAGIBA, IRMA MENDOZA, and ELLEN RASCO

v.JULITA ESPARTERO, MA. BERNARDITA L. CARREON and MELINA SAN PEDRO

G.R. No. 154952, July 16, 2012

J. Peralta

The only exception for an employee to receive additional, double and indirect

compensation is where the law allows him to receive extra compensation for services rendered

in another position which is an extension or is connected with his basic work. The prohibition

against additional or double compensation, except when specifically authorized by law, is

considered a constitutional curb on the spending power of the government. In this case, when

petitioners were separated from LIVECOR, they were given separation pay which also included


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gratuity pay for all the years they worked thereat and concurrently in HSDC/SIDCOR. Granting

them another gratuity pay for the works done in HSDC under the trust agreement would be

indirectly giving them additional compensation for services rendered in another position which is

an extension or is connected with his basic work which is prohibited. This can only be allowed if

there is a law which specifically authorizes them to receive an additional payment of gratuity.

JOSE MIGUEL T. ARROYO v.DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE; COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS;HON. LEILA DE LIMA, in her capacity as Secretary of the Department of Justice; HON.

SIXTO BRILLANTES, .JR., in his capacity as Chairperson of the Commission onElections; and the JOINT DOJ-COMELEC PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION COMMITTEE

and FACT-FINDING TEAMG.R. No. 199082. September 18, 2012

J. Peralta

Cons titut ion ality of Join t-Order No. 001-2011

A. Equal Protect ion Clause

The equal protection guarantee exists to prevent undue favor or privilege. It is intended

to eliminate discrimination and oppression based on inequality. Recognizing the existence of

real differences among men, it does not demand absolute equality. It merely requires that all

persons under like circumstances and conditions shall be treated alike both as to privileges

conferred and liabilities enforced.

Joint Order No. 001-2011 cannot be nullified on the ground that it singles out the officials

of the Arroyo Administration and, therefore, it infringes the equal protection clause. The Joint

Committee was created for the purpose of conducting preliminary investigation of electionoffenses during the 2004 and 2007 elections. While GMA and Mike Arroyo were among those

subjected to preliminary investigation, not all respondents therein were linked to GMA as there

were public officers who were investigated upon in connection with their acts in the performance

of their official duties. Private individuals were also subjected to the investigation by the Joint

Committee.


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B. Due Process

It is settled that the conduct of preliminary investigation is, like court proceedings,

subject to the requirements of both substantive and procedural due process. Preliminary

investigation is considered as a judicial proceeding wherein the prosecutor or investigating

officer, by the nature of his functions, acts as a quasi-judicial officer. The authority of a

prosecutor or investigating officer duly empowered to preside over or to conduct a preliminary

investigation is no less than that of a municipal judge or even an

RTC Judge.

In the case, it must be emphasized that Joint Order No. 001-2011 created two bodies,

namely: (1) the Fact-Finding Team tasked to gather real, documentary and testimonial evidence

which can be utilized in the preliminary investigation to be conducted by the Joint Committee;and (2) the Joint Committee mandated to conduct preliminary investigation. It is, therefore,

inaccurate to say that there is only one body which acted as evidence-gatherer, prosecutor and

judge. More importantly, there was no proof or even an allegation that the Joint Committee

itself, tasked to conduct the requisite preliminary investigation against petitioners, made biased

statements that would convey to the public that the members were favoring a particular party.

1. As clearly explained above, the Comelec is granted the power to investigate, and where

appropriate, prosecute cases of election offenses. This is necessary in ensuring free,

orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections. On the other hand, the DOJ is mandated toadminister the criminal justice system in accordance with the accepted processes thereof

consisting in the investigation of the crimes, prosecution of offenders and administration of

the correctional system. It is specifically empowered to investigate the commission of

crimes, prosecute offenders and administer the probation and correction system.Also, the

provincial or city prosecutors and their assistants, as well as the national and regional state

prosecutors, are specifically named as the officers authorized to conduct preliminary

investigation. Recently, the Comelec, through its duly authorized legal offices, is given the

power, concurrent with the other prosecuting arms of the government such as the DOJ, to

conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses.

Section 1, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution expressly describes all the Constitutional

Commissions as independent. Although essentially executive in nature, they are not under the

control of the President of the Philippines in the discharge of their respective functions. The

Constitution envisions a truly independent Comelec committed to ensure free, orderly, honest,

peaceful, and credible elections and to serve as the guardian of the peoples sacred right of


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G.R. No. 174647, December 5, 2012J. Peralta

The determination of just compensation is the exclusive domain of the courts and thatthe executive and legislative acts of fixing just compensation are not conclusive or binding uponthe court, but should only be regarded as an initial valuation. Thus, in determining just

compensation, the RTC is required to consider the following factors: (1) the acquisition cost ofthe land; (2) the current value of the properties; (3) its nature, actual use, and income; (4) thesworn valuation by the owner; (5) the tax declarations; (6) the assessment made by governmentassessors; (7) the social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and thefarmworkers, and by the government to the property; and (8) the non-payment of taxes or loanssecured from any government financing institution on the said land, if any. If this was not therule, LBP or another agency like DAR might impermissibly usurp the essentially judicial functionof determination of just compensation.

2014

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE SECRETARY OF THE

DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYSv.TETRO ENTERPRISES, INC.

G.R. No. 183015. January 15, 2014J. Peralta

In expropriation cases, the owner of the private property should be compensated only forwhat he actually loses; it is not intended that his compensation shall extend beyond his loss orinjury. And what he loses is only the actual value of his property at the time it is taken. This is

the only way that compensation to be paid can be truly just; i.e., just not only to the individual

whose property is taken,but to the public, which is to pay for it. Thus, the trial court committed

an error when it admitted respondent's amended complaint which increased the amount claimed

as back rentals.

RALPH P. TUAv. HON. CESAR A. MANGROBANG, PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 22,RTC, IMUS, CAVITE AND ROSSAN HONRADO-TUA

G.R. No. 170701. January 22, 2014J. Peralta

Section 15 of RA 9262 or the Anti- Violence Against Women and Children Act of 2004 isvalid and constitutional. The issuance of Protection Order ex parte doesn't infringe theconstitutional precept of due process of law. Nor it is an invalid delegation of legislative power tothe court and to barangay officials.

LUIS R. VILLAFUERTA v.COMELEC and MIGUEL VILLAFUERTEG.R. No. 206698. February 25, 2014

J. Peralta

Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code states that the false representation in thecontents of the Certificate of Candidacy (COC) must refer to material matters in order to justifythe cancellation of the COC.


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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v.HENRY T. GOG.R. No. 168539. March 25, 2014

J. Peralta

The avowed policy of the State and the legislative intent to repress acts of public

officers and private persons alike, which constitute graft or corrupt practices, would be

frustrated if the death of a public officer would bar the prosecution of a private person whoconspired with such public officer in violating the Anti-Graft Law.

LABOR LAW2009

HERMINIGILDO INGUILLOM, ET AL.v. FIRST PHILIPPINE SCALES, INC., ET AL.

G.R. No. 165407, June 5, 2009

J. Peralta

In the case at bar, the required two notices that must be given to herein petitionersBergante and Inguillo were lacking. The records are bereft of any notice that would have given asemblance of substantial compliance on the part of herein respondents. Respondents, however,aver that they had furnished the employees concerned, including petitioners, with a copy ofFPSILU's "Petisyon." We cannot consider that as compliance with the requirement of either thefirst notice or the second notice. While the "Petisyon" enumerated the several grounds that

would justify the termination of the employees mentioned therein, yet such document is only arecommendation by the Union upon which the employer may base its decision. It cannot beconsidered a notice of termination. For as agreed upon by FPSI and FPSILU in their CBA, thelatter may only recommend to the former a Union member's suspension or dismissal. Nowherein the controverted Union Security Clause was there a mention that once the union gives arecommendation, the employer is bound outright to proceed with the termination.

RODOLFO B. ARCEO v. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS)


Petitioner is claiming benefits for the services he had render to the Government ServiceInsurance System for almost 28 years, claiming adenoma as disability caused by the stress hesuffered from being a Prosecutor. The GSIS, however, denied such claim as such ailment is anon-compensable disease. Upon appeal to the Court of Appeals, petitioner now alleges that healiment was not only adrenal but also cardiovascular disease. SC denies the petition stating that

Clearly, petitioner's failure to emphasize before the GSIS and the ECC the issue of whether he


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may be compensated for his alleged cardiovascular disease is fatal to his case, for by this

omission, he is deemed to have waived such issue.

"J" MARKETING CORPORATION REPRESENTED BY ITS BRANCH MANAGER ELMUNDODADOR v.CESAR L. TARAN


JMarketing Corporation claims that Cesar Taran is not entitled to any separation pay

and other benefits as the latter resigned from the corporation. However, the SC ruled in favor ofTaran.

As a general rule, separation pay need not be paid to an employee who voluntarily

resigns. However,an employer who agrees to expend such benefit as an incident of the

resignation should not be allowed to renege on the fulfillment of such commitment. In this case,Caludac, as OIC Branch Manager in Tacloban City, represented petitioner and was responsible

for overseeing respondent's work in pursuance of the company's goal of an increase in salesand customer satisfaction. Such control was manifested through the communications of

Caludac to respondent regarding the latter's performance.Corollarily, SC cannot fault Taran for

relying on Caludac's representations and promises, as in fact it was to him that he first verballyrelayed his plan to resign from the company.

EMCOR INCORPORATED v.MA. LOURDES D. SIENESG.R. No. 152101, September 8, 2009

J. Peralta

Emcor Incorporated claims valid dismissal due to retrenchment against Ma. LourdesSienes. SC, however, dismiss such claim as the burden of proving the validity of retrenchment

is on the petitioner. Evidence does not sufficiently establish that petitioner had incurred lossesthat would justify retrenchment to prevent further losses. The Comparative Income Statementfor the year 1996 and for the months of February to June 1997 which petitioner submitted didnot conclusively show that petitioner had suffered financial losses. In fact, records show thatfrom January to July 1997, petitioner hired a total of 114 new employees assigned in the

petitioner's stores located in the different places of the country.

SAN MIGUEL CORPORATIONv.EDUARDO L. TEODOSIO

G.R. No. 163033.October 2, 2009

J. Peralta

The nature of respondents work is necessary in the business in which SMC is engaged.

SMC is primarily engaged in the manufacture and marketing of beer products, for which

purpose, it specifically maintains a brewery in Bacolod City.Respondent, on the other hand,

was engaged as a forklift operator tasked to lift and transfer pallets and pile them from thebottling section to the piling area. SMC admitted that it hired respondent as a forklift operatorsince the third quarter of 1991 when, in the absence of fully automated palletizers, manualtransfers of beer cases and empties would be extensive within the brewery and its premises.


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Undoubtedly, respondent is a regular employee of SMC. Consequently, the employmentcontract with a fixed period which SMC had respondent execute was meant only to circumvent

respondents right to security of tenure and is, therefore, invalid.

BARON REPUBLIC THEATRICAL MAJOR CINEMA, ET AL.

v.NORMITA P. PERALTA ANDEDILBERTO H. AGUILAR

G.R. No. 170525,October 2, 2009

J. Peralta

Petitioner Pascual consistently denies that Aguilar was terminated from his employmentand that, instead, he abandoned his work and never returned after his request for salaryincrease was rejected. However, denial, in this case, does not suffice; it should be coupled with

evidence to support it.In the instant case, the Court finds no error in the ruling of the CA that

petitioners failed to adduce evidence to prove abandonment and rebut Aguilar's claim ofdismissal.

CELEBES JAPAN FOODS CORP. (ETC.)v.SUSAN YERMO, ET AL.


Petitioner seeks the application of the former ruling of this Court in Agabon and Jaka.Jaka has presented its audited financial statement to show that it was in such serious financialdistress as to justify the retrenchment of the employees concerned. As its retrenchment

program was undertaken in 1997, its deficit had ballooned to 123.61% of the stockholders

equity; thus, a capital deficiency or impairment of equity ensued; in 1998, the deficit grew

toP355,794,897.00 or 177% of the stockholder's equity. The deficit was shown to prove the

ground for the employees' dismissal, but it was not the sole basis of the court in fixing the

nominal damages in the amount ofP50,000.00 for each employee for Jaka's failure to comply

with the notice requirement. In the same manner, while petitioner in this case incurred a capitalimpairment which was much higher than its stockholders' equity, the same should not be theonly basis for determining the amount of nominal damages that should be awarded. The gravity

of the due-process violation should be taken into special consideration;

and, just like in Jaka,

the sanction should be stiffer, because the dismissal process was initiated by the employers

exercise of its management prerogative.

Significantly, there was no bona fide attempt on the part of petitioner to comply with thenotice requirements under Article 283 of the Labor Code. Records show that on November 7,2000, respondents were refused entrance by the guards manning the gate of the Davao FishPort Complex, based on a memorandum of even date issued by Romero, petitioner's Office


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Manager, stating that respondents had been terminated effective November 1, 2000.Respondents learned of the existence of such memorandum, which was posted only in theguardhouse on the day they were refused entrance to the gate. There was indeed no notice atall to respondents. Notably, there was not even any reason stated in the memorandum why theywere being terminated. We cannot overemphasize the importance of the requirement of thenotice of termination, for we have ruled in a number of cases that non-compliance therewith is

tantamount to deprivation of the employees right to due process.

EASTERN SHIPPING LINES, INC.v. FERRER D. ANTONIO

G.R. No. 171587,October 13, 2009

J. Peralta

In case of retirement, the employee shall be entitled to receive such retirement benefitsas he may have earned under existing laws and any collective bargaining agreement and other

agreements: Provided, however, that an employees retirement benefits under any collective

bargaining and other agreements shall not be less than those provided herein.

Clearly, the age of retirement is primarily determined by the existing agreement oremployment contract. In the absence of such agreement, the retirement age shall be fixed bylaw. Under the aforecited law, the mandated compulsory retirement age is set at 65 years, whilethe minimum age for optional retirement is set at 60 years.

Records show that respondent was only 41 years old when he applied for optionalretirement, which was 19 years short of the required eligibility age. Thus, he cannot claimoptional retirement benefits as a matter of right.

PATRICIA HALAGUEA, ET AL.

v.PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC.

G.R. NO. 172013,October 2, 2009

J. Peralta

Not every controversy or money claim by an employee against the employer or vice-versa is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the labor arbiter. Actions between employees andemployer where the employer-employee relationship is merely incidental and the cause ofaction precedes from a different source of obligation is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the

regular court.Here, the employer-employee relationship between the parties is merely incidental

and the cause of action ultimately arose from different sources of obligation, i.e., theConstitution and CEDAW.

Thus, where the principal relief sought is to be resolved not by reference to the LaborCode or other labor relations statute or a collective bargaining agreement but by the generalcivil law, the jurisdiction over the dispute belongs to the regular courts of justice and not to thelabor arbiter and the NLRC. In such situations, resolution of the dispute requires expertise, notin labor management relations nor in wage structures and other terms and conditions ofemployment, but rather in the application of the general civil law. Clearly, such claims fall
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/october2009/172013.htmhttp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/october2009/172013.htmhttp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/october2009/172013.htmhttp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/october2009/172013.htm


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outside the area of competence or expertise ordinarily ascribed to labor arbiters and the NLRCand the rationale for granting jurisdiction over such claims to these agencies disappears.

REYNALDO G. CABIGTINGv.SAN MIGUEL FOODS, INC.

G.R. No. 167706.November 5, 2009

J. Peralta

As to ruling whether there has already been strained relations between the petitionerand respondent, Court upholds the ruling of the NLRC finding the doctrine of strained relationsinapplicable to the factual circumstances of the case at bar, to wit:

Finally, it is noted that the position of warehouseman and inventory controller is stillexisting up to date. The nature of the controversy where the parties to this case were engagedis not of such nature that would spawn a situation where the relations are severely strainedbetween them as would bar the complainant to his continued employment. Neither may it besaid that his position entails a constant communion with the respondent such that hostilities maybar smooth interactions between them. Accordingly, We find no basis for an award of separation

pay in lieu of reinstatement.

RAMON B. FORMANTESv.DUNCAN PHARMACEUTICAL, PHILIS., INC.

G.R. No. 170661,December 4, 2009

J. Peralta

In the case at bar, petitioner, while still employed with the respondent, was compelled toresign and forced to go on leave. He was not allowed to participate in the activities of thecompany. His salary was no longer remitted to him. His subordinates were directed not to reportto him and the company directed one of its district managers to take over his position and do hisfunctions without prior notice to him.

These discriminatory acts were calculated to make petitioner feel that he is no longer

welcome nor needed in respondent company short of sending him an actual notice of

termination. We, therefore, hold that respondent constructively dismissed petitioner from theservice.


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2010

SARGASSO CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v . NATIONALLABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (4THDIVISION) AND GORGONIO MONGCAL

G.R. No. 164118,February 9, 2010

J. Peralta

There was a dearth of evidence directly linking respondent Mongcal to the commissionof the crime of theft, as his mere act of loading the dump truck with aggregates did not showthat he knew of Rasote's plan to deliver the load to a place other than petitioner's constructionsite. The only conclusion, therefore, is that petitioner illegally dismissed respondent Mongcal.

Under Article 279 of the Labor Code, an illegally dismissed employee "shall be entitled toreinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full backwages,inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed fromthe time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement." In

addition to full backwages, the Court has also repeatedly ruled that in cases wherereinstatement is no longer feasible due to strained relations, then separation pay may beawarded instead of reinstatement. The separation pay, as an alternative to reinstatement,should be equivalent to one (1) month salary for every year of service.

PNCC SKYWAY TRAFFIC AND SECURITY DIVISION WORKERS ORGANIZATION(PSTMSWDO), REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT, RENE SORIANO v .PNCC SKYWAY

COPORATION

G.R. No. 171231,February 17, 2010

J. Peralta

The words of the CBA were unequivocal when it provided that "the company shall

schedule the vacation leave of employees during the year taking into consideration the requestof preference of the employees." The word shall in this instance connotes an imperative

command, there being nothing to show a different intention. The only concession given underthe subject clause was that the company should take into consideration the preferences of theemployees in scheduling the vacations; but certainly, the concession never diminished the

positive right of management to schedule the vacation leaves in accordance with what had beenagreed and stipulated upon in the CBA.

SOLIDBANK CORPORATION v.NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, ET. AL.

G.R. No. 165951,March 30, 2010

J. Peralta

As a general rule, an employee who has been dismissed for any of the just causes

enumerated under Article 282of the Labor Code is not entitled to separation pay.Although by

way of exception, the grant of separation pay or some other financial assistance may be allowedto an employee dismissed for just causes on the basis of equity. The reason that the law doesnot statutorily grant separation pay or financial assistance in instances of termination due to a

just cause is precisely because the cause for termination is due to the acts of the employee. Insuch instances, however, this Court, inspired by compassionate and social justice, has in the
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past awarded financial assistance to dismissed employees when circumstances warranted suchan award.

DIVERSIFIED SECURITY, INC. v. ALICIA V. BAUTISTA

G.R. No. 152234,April 15, 2010

J. Peralta

Having firmly established that petitioner dismissed respondent without just cause, andwithout notice and hearing, then it is only proper to apply Article 279 of the Labor Code which

provides that an illegally dismissed employee "shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss ofseniority rights and other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to hisother benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation waswithheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement." In addition to full backwages, theCourt has also repeatedly ruled that in cases where reinstatement is no longer feasible due to

strained relations, then separation pay may be awarded instead of reinstatement.InMt. Carmel

College v. Resuena,the Court reiterated that the separation pay, as an alternative toreinstatement, should be equivalent to one (1) month salary for every year of service.

LIMA LAND, INC., LEANDRO JAVIER, SYLVIA DUQUE AND PREMY ANN BELOYv. MARLYN CUAVAS

G.R. No. 169523,June 16, 2010

J. Peralta

Marlyn Cuevas was dismissed on the ground of loss of trust and confidence relating tothe irregularity of funds. The Court finds as unsubstantiated petitioners' allegation regarding thesupposed failure of respondent to institute sufficient accounting standards leading to

irregularities committed in handling the companys Petty Cash Fund. The Court agrees with

respondent that in the six years that she rendered service to petitioners, her attention was never

called to any insufficient accounting standards that supposedly exist in the company. On thecontrary, respondent was able to present evidence to show that certain procedures werefollowed with respect to cash and check disbursements and collections. In fact, the ExecutiveVice-President and Chief Operating Officer of petitioner company who preceded herein

petitioner Javier and with whom respondent worked with for six years, executed an affidavitattesting to the competence, integrity and honesty of respondent as Manager and FinanceOfficer of petitioner company.

DANSART SECURITY FORCE & ALLIED SERVICES COMPANY AND DANILO A.SARTE v .MS. JEAN O. BAGOY

G.R. No. 168495,July 2, 2010

J. Peralta

Petitioners do not deny that said DOLE reports and Order are the only evidence theypresented to prove payment of respondent's money claims. Petitioners only assail the weightascribed by the Labor Arbiter and the CA to the evidence, asseverating that such documentsfrom the DOLE must be given greater importance as the NLRC did.

The Court has repeatedly ruled that any doubt arising from the evaluation of evidence as

between the employer and the employee must be resolved in favor of the latter.Moreover, it is
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settled jurisprudence that the burden of proving payment of monetary claims rests on theemployer.


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ERECTOR ADVERTISING SIGN GROUP, INC. AND ARCH JIMY C. AMOROTOv. EXPEDITO CLOMA

G.R. No. 167218,Jul y 2, 2010

J. Peralta

The validity of an employees dismissal from service hinges on the satisfaction of dueprocess, the basic components of which are the opportunity to be heard and to defend himselfand the dismissal is for any of the causes provided in the Labor Code of the Philippines. The

petitioners contend that Cloma was validly dismissed and with due process of law. However,nowhere in the records does it appear that Cloma attempted to deny allegations, yet it is equallycertain that the records do not contain any suggestion that petitioner, with respect to these threegrounds with which Cloma is charged, has tried to notify the latter of the said charges. Indeed,we find that petitioner has not complied with the basic requirement of serving a pre-dismissalnotice on Cloma. What is clear from the records is that the only notice that was given to Cloma

prior to his termination is the May 20, 2000 notice of termination informing him that hisemployment in the company has been severed for the causes mentioned. Therefore, no due

process accorded to him.

ELPIDIO CALIPAY v.NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, ET. AL.

G.R. No. 166411,August 3, 2010

J. Peralta

Calipay and the other complainants failed to sufficiently refute the findings of the LaborArbiter in their appeal filed with the NLRC. They simply insisted that they did not report for work,because they were already terminated. However, they did not present any evidence to provetheir allegation. On the other hand, as held by the Labor Arbiter, private respondents were ableto present the DTRs and Salary Vouchers of Calipay and the other complainants showing thatthey indeed reported for work even after their alleged termination from employment. Calipay andthe other complainants also failed to present evidence to prove their allegation that they wereforced to sign blank forms of their DTRs and Salary Vouchers. Abandonment is totallyinconsistent with the immediate filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal, more so if the same is

accompanied by a prayer for reinstatement.In the present case, however, petitioner filed his

complaint more than one year after his alleged termination from employment.

D.M. CONSUNJI, INC. v. ANTONIO GOBRES, ET. AL.

G.R. No. 169170,August 8, 2010

J. Peralta

Dismissal based on just causes contemplates acts or omissions attributable to the

employee.

Instead, respondents were terminated due to the completion of the phases of workfor which their services were engaged. Hence, prior or advance notice of termination is not partof procedural due process if the termination is brought about by the completion of the contractor phase thereof for which the employee was engaged. Petitioner, therefore, did not violate anyrequirement of procedural due process by failing to give respondents advance notice of theirtermination; thus, there is no basis for the payment of nominal damages.
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In sum, absent the requirement of prior notice of termination when the termination isbrought about by the completion of the contract or phase thereof for which the worker was hired,respondents are not entitled to nominal damages for lack of advance notice of their termination.


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CENTURY CANNING CORPORATION, RICARDO T. PO, JR., ET. AL. v.VICENTE RANDYR. RAMIL

G.R. No. 171630,August 8, 2010

J. Peralta

While employers are allowed a wider latitude of discretion in terminating the services ofemployees who perform functions which by their nature require the employers' full trust and

confidence and themere existence of basisfor believing that the employee has breached the

trust of the employer is sufficient,this does not mean that the said basis may be arbitrary and

unfounded. The burden of proving the validity of the termination of employment rests with theemployer. Failure to discharge this evidentiary burden would necessarily mean that thedismissal was not justified and, therefore, illegal. In the case at bar, there is neither directevidence nor substantial documentary evidence pointing to respondent as the one liable for theforgery of the signature of Po.

PICOP RESOURCES INCORPORATED (PRI) v.ANACLETO L. TAECA, ET. AL.

G.R. No. 160828,

August 9, 2010

J. Peralta

While it is incumbent for the employer to continue to recognize the majority status of theincumbent bargaining agent even after the expiration of the freedom period, they could only doso when no petition for certification election was filed. The reason is, with a pending petition forcertification, any such agreement entered into by management with a labor organization isfraught with the risk that such a labor union may not be chosen thereafter as the collective

bargaining representative. The provision forstatus quois conditioned on the fact that no

certification election was filed during the freedom period. Any other view would render nugatorythe clear statutory policy to favor certification election as the means of ascertaining the true

expression of the will of the workers as to which labor organization would represent them.

An "authorization letter to file a petition for certification election" is different from anactual "Petition for Certification Election." What is prohibited is the filing of a petition for

certification election outside the 60-day freedom period.This is not the situation in this case. If

at all, the signing of the authorization to file a certification election was merely preparatory to the

filing of the petition for certification election, or an exercise of respondents right to self-

organization.

PHARMACIA AND UPJOHN, INC., ET. AL. v.RICARDO P. ALBAYDA, JR.

G.R. No. 172724,August 23, 2010

J. Peralta

This Court finds that petitioners had complied with the requirements of law in effectingthe dismissal of respondent. Petitioners sent respondent a first notice in the form of a

memorandumdated June 26, 2000, warning him that the same would serve as a final notice for

him to report to work in Manila within 5 working days from receipt thereof, otherwise, hisservices would be terminated on the basis of AWOL. After receiving the memorandum,respondent could have requested for a conference with the assistance of counsel, if he so
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desired. Like in Solid, had respondent found the time too short, he should have responded tothe memorandum asking for more time. It, however, appears to this Court that respondent made

no such requests. On July 13, 2000, petitioners sent another memorandumnotifying respondent

that they are terminating his services effective July 19, 2000, after he repeatedly refused toreport to work despite due notice. Even if no actual hearing was conducted, this Court is of the

opinion that petitioners had complied with the requirements of due process as all that the lawrequires is an ample opportunity to be heard.

INSULAR HOTEL EMPLOYEES UNION-NFL v.WATERFRONT INSULAR HOTELDAVAO

G.R. No. 174040-41,September 22, 2010

J. Peralta

The prohibition against elimination or diminution of benefits set out in Article 100 of theLabor Code is specifically concerned with benefits already enjoyed at the time of the

promulgation of the Labor Code. Article 100 does not, in other words, purport to apply to

situations arising after the promulgation date of the Labor Code. Even assumingarguendothat

Article 100 applies to the case at bar, this Court agrees with respondent that the same does notprohibit a union from offering and agreeing to reduce wages and benefits of the employees. In

Rivera v. Espiritu,this Court ruled that the right to free collective bargaining, after all, includes

the right to suspend it.

While the terms of the MOA undoubtedly reduced the salaries and certain benefitspreviously enjoyed by the members of the Union, it cannot escape this Court's attention that itwas the execution of the MOA which paved the way for the re-opening of the hotel,notwithstanding its financial distress. More importantly, the execution of the MOA allowedrespondents to keep their jobs. It would certainly be iniquitous for the members of the Union tosign new contracts prompting the re-opening of the hotel only to later on renege on their

agreement on the fact of the non-ratification of the MOA.

NFD INTERNATIONAL MANNING AGENTS, INC./BARBER SHIP MANAGEMENT LTD. v.ERMERALDO C. ILLESCAS

G.R. No. 183054,September 29, 2010

J. Peralta

The Court holds that the snap on the back of respondent was not an accident, but aninjury sustained by respondent from carrying the heavy basketful of fire hydrant caps, whichinjury resulted in his disability. The injury cannot be said to be the result of an accident, that is,an unlooked for mishap, occurrence, or fortuitous event, because the injury resulted from the

performance of a duty. Although respondent may not have expected the injury, yet, it is commonknowledge that carrying heavy objects can cause back injury, as what happened in this case.Hence, the injury cannot be viewed as unusual under the circumstances, and is notsynonymous with the term "accident" as defined.

VARORIENT SHIPPING CO., INC., ET. AL. v.GIL FLORES

G.R. No. 161934,October 6, 2010

J. Peralta
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Varorient Shipping Co., Inc. were remiss in providing continuous treatment forrespondent in accordance with the recommendation of their company physician that respondentshould undergo a two-week confinement and physical therapy and, if his condition does notimprove, then he would have to be subjected to surgical decompression to alleviate the pain onhis right foot. Respondent's ailment required urgent medical response, thereby necessitatinghim to seek immediate medical attention, even at his own expense.

ST. LUKES MEDICAL CENTER, INC. AND ROBERT KUAN v.ESTRELITO NOTARIO


Under Article 282 (b) of the Labor Code, an employer may terminate an employee forgross and habitual neglect of duties. Neglect of duty, to be a ground for dismissal, must be both

gross and habitual. Gross negligence connotes want of care in the performance of one s duties.

Habitual neglect implies repeated failure to perform ones duties for a period of time, depending

upon the circumstances. A single or isolated act of negligence does not constitute a just cause

for the dismissal of the employee.

Under the prevailing circumstances, respondent exercised hisbest judgment in monitoring the CCTV cameras so as to ensure the security within the hospital

premises. Verily, assumingarguendothat respondent was negligent, although this Court finds

otherwise, the lapse or inaction could only be regarded as a single or isolated act of negligencethat cannot be categorized as habitual and, hence, not a just cause for his dismissal.

PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANT v.JOEY B. TEVES

G.R. No. 143511,November 15, 2010

J. Peralta

Assuming that respondent's absenteeism constitutes willful disobedience, such offense

does not war

dean divina compiled syllabus

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