deadly force statistical analysis 2008-2012 · 2017. 5. 2. · shots fired, page 20. the low...

Office of Internal Oversight Critical Incident Review Team

Deadly Force Statistical Analysis 2008-2012

Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department September 16, 2013

Douglas C. Gillespie, Sheriff

Prepared by the Office of Internal Oversight / Critical Incident Review Team of 32

CONTENTS

Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 4

Executive Summary .............................................................................................................. 5

Preface .................................................................................................................................. 8

Overview ............................................................................................................................... 9

Times and Days of OIS Incidents ........................................................................................ 10

Locations of OIS Incidents .................................................................................................. 10

Types of Dispatched Events ................................................................................................ 13

Setting and Outcomes of OIS Incidents .............................................................................. 13

Police Presence .................................................................................................................. 14

On-Scene Supervision ........................................................................................................ 14

Time on Scene Prior to Initial Shots Fired ........................................................................... 15

Officer Age / Race / Ethnicity /Gender................................................................................. 16

Officer Tenure ..................................................................................................................... 17

Officer Duty Assignments .................................................................................................... 17

Classifications of Officers (Rank) ........................................................................................ 18

Firearms Employed by Officers ........................................................................................... 18

Summary of Officer Shots Fired .......................................................................................... 18

Distances of Initial Shots Fired ............................................................................................ 19

Targeted Strikes .................................................................................................................. 19

Accuracy of Shots Fired ...................................................................................................... 20


Aspects of 2008-2012 OIS Incidents / Foot Pursuits ........................................................... 21

Aspects of 2011-2012 OIS Incidents / Low Lethality Force ................................................. 21

Subject Demographics (Age, Gender and Race/Ethnicity) .................................................. 22

Criminal Backgrounds of Subjects ...................................................................................... 23

Mental State of Subjects ..................................................................................................... 25

Weapons Employed by Subjects ......................................................................................... 26

Subject Shooting Summary ................................................................................................. 27

Threat Levels Associated with Subject Actions ................................................................... 28

Other OISs—Animal Shootings (2011 and 2012) ................................................................ 28

Animal-OIS Related Information .......................................................................................... 29

Officer-Related Information for Animal OISs ....................................................................... 30

Non-Shooting Deadly Force Events (2011 and 2012) ......................................................... 31

Appendix A .......................................................................................................................... 32


Introduction The Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department recognizes it has an obligation to the community to document, analyze, and publicly report data on police use of force incidents. The Critical Incident Review Team (CIRT) Deadly Force Statistical Analysis reflects the Department’s continued willingness and responsibility to be transparent and accountable. In an effort to build community trust and enhance its police service, LVMPD has taken steps to place police use of force incidents at the forefront, weighing national standards of analysis. This report contains summary data intended to track, evaluate, and respond with improvements in police training and practices as related to the use of force. The body of this report identifies demographics, categorizes interactions, and describes the circumstances surrounding the incidents, as well as the collective profiles of the individuals involved. Such information provides tremendous value by informing the agency of emerging trends and identifying training needs. The purpose of this analysis is to further refine police responses to both actual and potential violent interactions with the hope of preventing harm to both citizens and officers alike. This is a continuous process of critical self-analysis, adjustments to training, and regular education within the agency. The department and the public expects our police officers to respect the sanctity of human life above all else. Assessing the factors surrounding a deadly force encounter is an important step toward ensuring the safest possible outcome for all citizens and officers involved. Officers will resort to deadly force only after tremendous restraint and consideration of all reasonable alternatives. Each deadly force incident results from a unique set of circumstances. With this in mind, the Department has conducted a thorough review and analysis of each officer-involved shooting or deadly force incident. The end goal is to identify areas of improvement for the individual officer's performance and overall agency policy, practices, and training. Adherence to a predictable process of investigation and evaluation of the use of deadly force, while supporting openness and forthright communication, will continue the development of a trusting relationship between our law enforcement agency and the public we are sworn to protect and serve.


Executive Summary The second annual report prepared by the Office of Internal Oversight has been expanded to include an examination of five years of person-oriented officer-involved shooting (OIS) incidents for the period 2008-2012. The Executive Summary is intended to highlight the most significant findings, trends, patterns, or issues documented in the body of the report. Where appropriate, explanations are provided regarding measures being introduced by the Department to address and, in some cases, mitigate identified matters of concern.

1) There has been a definite downward trend in the number of OISs since 2010. The magnitude of the decrease has exceeded normal fluctuations in annual OIS counts and as such, signifies real progress in efforts to obtain permanent reductions. See Overview, page 9.

2) Few OISs result from self-initiated contacts by officers. Overall, a relatively small share of OISs

originated as traffic or person stops during the past five years. The one exception was 2009, when six of 19 OISs (32%) began as officer-initiated activities. Since 2008 (excluding 2009), fewer than one in eight OISs have been associated with officer-initiated contacts. See Types of Dispatched Events, page 13.

3) Although they generally occur infrequently, indoor OISs are deadlier than outdoor OISs because of

the short separation distances between officers and subjects in confined buildings. See Settings and Outcomes of OIS Incidents, page 13.

4) For the first time in five years, the majority of OISs in 2012 directly involved multiple officers.

Based on averages, there would have been 2.1 officers discharging firearms at each of the 2012 OIS incidents. See Police Presence, page 14.

5) Having police supervisors on scene at the time an OIS incident occurs does not reduce the lethality

of outcomes for involved subjects. Rather, the rate for fatal outcomes from 2008 through 2012 was significantly higher in the 29 incidents when supervisors were present (52%) than for the 58 incidents when they were not (33%). See On-Scene Supervision, page 14.

However, these statistics are somewhat misleading if only taken at face value. The duration of OIS incidents is a more influential factor with regard to subject related fatality rates than the presence of police supervisors (refer to Finding 6). Since few supervisors are initially on scene, the duration of the OIS incidents in which they participate tend to be lengthy, more than 35 minutes on average during the past two years. By comparison, OIS incidents in 2011 and 2012 without on-scene supervisors averaged approximately four minutes apiece. In general, fatal outcomes for OISs are more likely when involved police officers have time to organize and prepare themselves in responding to dangerous situations.

The finding regarding supervisors should not be interpreted as critical of their value to manage as well as defuse volatile situations. The scope of the report is such that it does not extend to an examination of the benefit provided by supervisors in successfully de-escalating incidents before deadly force is employed. The Department does not currently measure or record information regarding potentially deadly force incidents that are de-escalated. The figures associated with this finding are based solely on a limited number of events that rose to the level of an OIS.

6) Short duration OIS events, those lasting five minutes or less after officers arrive on scene, were

associated with a significantly lower subject fatality rate from 2010-2012 than for incidents lasting longer than five minutes. Comparatively, fatality rates for short and long duration OIS events were 30 percent and 62 percent, respectively. See Time on Scene Prior to Initial Shots Fired, page 15.


7) A general trend during the last five years is for a higher numbers of shots being fired by the police, on both per officer and per OIS incident basis. The average numbers of shots fired per officer (4.9) and per incident (10.3) in 2012 were the highest recorded since before 2008. The rising number of shots being fired corresponds in part to the higher percentage of incidents involving subjects who are both armed and assaultive. See Summary of Officer Shots Fired, page 18. The firearms training all police officers presently receive incorporates instruction on a shoot and reassessment technique intended to limit the number of rounds fired during OIS incidents.

8) While not part of a trend, the overall shooting accuracy of OIS officers in 2012 was the lowest

since before 2008. Twenty-three (23) percent of the rounds fired by police officers in 2012 struck intended targets (26 of 113). Even more significant, the accuracy of shots fired from distances of 21 feet or less was lower than for longer distances. Comparative accuracy rates for short and long distance firearm discharges in 2012 were 21 percent and 26 percent, respectively. See Accuracy of Shots Fired, page 20.

The low overall rate of shooting accuracy for 2012 is tied to four specific OIS incidents that involved officers being shot at or believing they were being fired upon. A total of 69 shots were fired by nine officers in those four incidents. Only four of the 69 shots (5.8%) struck intended targets.

9) OIS-related foot pursuits have become somewhat of a rarity in recent years. On average, foot

pursuits occurred during less than one in seven (4 of 29) OIS incidents in 2011 and 2012. See Aspects of 2011-2012 OIS Incidents / Foot Pursuits, page 21.

10) No low lethality force options, either tools or techniques, were associated with any of the 11 OISs

during 2012. See Aspects of 2011-2012 OIS Incidents / Low Lethality Force, page 21. 11) Compared to Clark County’s 2010 demographic profile, a disproportionately large share of recent

OIS subjects are classified as belonging to minority groups. The share of non-white subjects grew to 82 percent during the 2011-2012 timeframe. Although African Americans represent only nine percent of the local area’s population, they have accounted for 38 percent of OIS subjects in the last two years. See Subject Demographics, page 22.

Mistake-of-fact shootings by the police are the most significant factor contributing to the disproportional over-representation of African Americans OIS subjects. In mistake-of-fact shootings officers incorrectly perceive that subjects present immediate, life-endangering threats. In actuality, the actions of these unarmed subjects, while in some cases unintentionally provocative, are not assaultive. Introduced in 2012, the Reality Based Training (RBT) program police officers presently attend incorporates interactive scenario based instruction intended to improve on threat level determinations, and by doing so, limit the number of mistake-of-fact shootings.

12) The share of subjects exhibiting some aspects of suicidal behavior has trended higher during the

last five years, increasing from 22 percent in 2008-2010 to 31 percent in 2011-2012. The fact that seven of nine suicide-inclined subjects encountered during the last two years exhibited “suicide-by-cop” tendencies should serve as an impetus for the Department to encourage greater police officer participation in its long standing Crisis Intervention Team (CIT) training program. See Mental State of Subjects, page 25.

13) The share of subjects in possession of firearms during OIS incidents has trended higher during the

last four years, increasing from 45 percent in 2009 to 64 percent in 2012. See Weapons Employed by Subjects, page 26.


14) Subjects in possession of hand-held weapons other than firearms during OIS incidents are the most likely to be injured or killed by police gunfire. During the last five years, 19 of the 22 subjects (86%) included in this category were struck by shots fired at them. The high degree of probable harm associated with this group of individuals is primarily due to the short separation distances between officers and subjects at the time of these shootings, 12 feet on average. Being in such close proximity to threatening or assaultive subjects, most often armed with knives, contributed to a 72 percent accuracy rate for the shots fired by officers. See Weapons Employed by Subjects, page 26.

15) Officers directly involved in last year’s OISs were confronted with the highest overall level of

endangerment since 2008. This determination is based on a simple threat level analysis of subject actions immediately prior to the actual act of shooting by police officers. Subjects were definitively assaultive in five of the 11 OIS incidents that occurred during 2012. In this case, “assaultive” means that the intentions of subjects to harm officers or other individuals have been clearly demonstrated rather than assumed. In most situations, “assaultive” subjects had already employed deadly force before officers discharged their own firearms in response. See Threat Levels Associated with Subject Actions, page 28.

16) Atypically, a third of the animal-oriented OISs for 2012 involved non-domesticated species.

Animals such as coyotes and chimpanzees present unique challenges in terms of their inherent danger and unpredictable behavior. The three non-domesticated animals encountered in 2012 incidents were not shot until each was determined to be a probable threat to public safety. See Other OISs, page 29.


Preface Regarding trends, fluctuation has been the most constant, easily observable characteristic associated with the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department’s OISs during the last 12 years. A distinct wave pattern is in place, one marked by periodic crests and troughs of activity. The fluctuations have been so pronounced that until recently, definitive trends towards either more or fewer OISs failed to establish themselves. However now, there have been two consecutive years with declining numbers for the first time in at least 12 years. Further, the declines recorded in each of the years is substantial, a 29 percent drop from 2010 to 2011 followed by an even larger 39 percent decrease from 2011 to 2012. The magnitude of the multi-year decrease from 2010 to 2012 has exceeded the breadth of normal fluctuations in annual OIS counts. Therefore, it is being taken as a sign of real progress resulting from the Department’s efforts to reduce the number of deadly force events. One other notable statistical indicator further supports the belief that positive change will be more enduring than in the past. In terms of elapsed time between OISs, the 104 day period recorded during mid to late 2012 is by far and away the longest since 2005. Even more significant, only one OIS occurred over a span of 191 days in 2012, from mid-April to late October. In all likelihood, the 191-day stretch is the longest period associated with a single OIS since the Department’s founding in 1973. With absolute certainty it is the longest period of minimal activity since before 2004, the point in time when such measurements began. The most remarkable aspect of the 191-day period is the size of the gap between it and the next longest such span, which covered 137 days in 2004. The period of minimal activity in 2012 is nearly 40 percent longer than the duration of the 2004 interval. Statistically, it appears that real, lasting progress has been made in reducing the number of OISs during the last two years. Continuing efforts on the part of the Department to drive numbers down are intended to ensure that recent gains are maintained and endure long term. While annual counts will continue to fluctuate upward and downward within each future wave cycle, the objective is to decrease the size of upcoming waves, and by doing so, establish a progressive trend of continuous improvement. As noted in the Introduction, this year’s edition of the Deadly Force Statistical Analysis has been expanded to address five rather than two years of person-oriented OIS activity. The following chapter focuses almost exclusively on person-oriented OISs for the period 2008-2012; the content includes a broad-based examination of pertinent aspects of these deadly force events and significant factors contributing to recent OIS levels and trends. A second change in this year’s report is the addition of the statistical table found in Appendix A. It is intended to supplement information provided in the main body of the report. The table provides relevant facts and figures regarding person-oriented OISs for the five-year timeframe. The remaining two sections of the report address animal-oriented OISs and deadly force events other than those requiring the police to use standard firearms and ammunition. Unlike person-oriented OISs, the assessments for these topics continue to be based on the two most recent years of comparable data, in this case 2011 and 2012. Five-year analyses will not be introduced until 2015 because of concerns regarding the reliability and/or completeness of pre-2010 data.


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INTERVAL BETWEEN INCIDENTS LONGEST INTERVALS 2008 = 60 DAYS 2009 = 44 DAYS 2010 = 45 DAYS 2011 = 58 DAYS 2012 = 104 DAYS

Overview There were 11 person-oriented OIS incidents in 2012, a 39 percent decrease from the previous year and an even more impressive decrease of 56 percent from 2010. The 2012 count represents the lowest number of OISs in the past five years and equals 2005 for the least number of annual OISs since before 2000. Of the 11 subjects associated with OIS incidents for 2012, five were injured and four killed. The four deaths are one-third the number of the all-time high recorded during the previous year [see Figure 1] and represent the Department’s lowest annual total of recorded fatalities since before 2000.

Time Intervals between Person-Oriented OIS Incidents

Less than half of the person-oriented OIS incidents for 2012 occurred within 30 days of one another (5 of 11). This is quite different from the previous two years, a period during which the distribution of the vast majority of OISs fell within the same 30 day, short interval timeframe [see Figure 1A]. The highest frequency rate for the past five years occurred in 2010, when 88 percent of the OIS incidents (22 of 25) were separated from one another by 30 days or less.

For 2012, the shortest interval between OIS incidents was less than eight hours (01/31/12 to 02/01/12), while the longest interval was 104 days (7/17/12 to 10/29/12).

Figure 1

Figure 1A


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Times and Days of OIS Incidents

Reversing a previous trend, most of the person-oriented OISs for 2011 and 2012 occurred during the initial six hours of the day, from midnight to 6:00 AM [see Figure 2]. Approximately 34 percent of the combined incidents for these two most recent years took place during the six early morning hours. The temporal distribution of OISs was quite different prior to 2011. Most incidents had previously taken place during the final six hours of a day, from 6:00 PM to midnight. Back then, the early morning hours represented the least active timeframe and accounted for merely 16 percent of OIS incidents. With regard to OIS distribution patterns by day of week, activity levels have been highest on Tuesdays, particularly during the past two years, and lowest by a small margin on Fridays. Based on five years of data, activity on Tuesdays, with a total of 16 OISs, is 60 percent higher than on Fridays, with a total of 10 OISs.

Locations of OIS Incidents The specific locations for each of the 87 person-oriented OIS incidents that have occurred during the last five years are provided in Figure 3, a street map of the Department’s urban service area. Older incidents from 2008-2010 are differentiated by color and shape from more recent ones—those that occurred during 2011-2012. Two loose clusters of activity emerge from the overall distribution pattern of plotted OIS locations. The most concentrated cluster is located in the northwestern portion of the urban service area, roughly centered at Smoke Ranch Road and North Jones Boulevard. Nineteen (19) OISs have occurred within a four-mile radius of this intersection. The northwest cluster has become less active in the last two years and experienced a southward shift in OISs. A slightly more diffuse OIS cluster is located in the southeastern portion of the urban service area, centered at US-95 and Boulder Highway. There have been 18 OISs within an elliptical zone roughly the same size as used to define the northwestern cluster. Unlike the northwestern cluster, activity levels have remained fairly constant in the southeastern cluster during the last five years; however, more recent activity has tended to shift northward within the zone.

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Figure 2

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The eight area commands represent the most expansive level of police geography for the Department. Their boundaries and service areas are provided in Figure 3, the previously referenced OIS location map. In terms of where OISs occurred, Northwest Area Command (NWAC) had been the activity leader in the four years prior to 2012.

Location of OIS Incidents (continued)

Figure 3


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However, none of the 11 person-oriented OISs for 2012 occurred in NWAC. As a result, NWAC’s five-year total of 20 OISs, while still the highest, is no longer a clearly dominant amount. Five-year activity levels in Southeast Area Command (SEAC), a geographically smaller and less populous area, now stand at 16 OISs [see Figure 3A]. Southeast Area Command is unique in that it is the only area command to have had two or more OISs within its service area during each of the past five years.

Northeast Area Command (NEAC) and Enterprise Area Command (EAC), with 13 and 12 OISs respectively, are one tier down from NWAC and SEAC in terms of five-year activity levels in combination with their consistent, year-to-year representation as OIS locations. On the other end of the spectrum, Convention Center Area Command (CCAC), a service area that includes most of the Las Vegas tourist corridor, has not had an OIS since 2009, and only one OIS during the entire five-year evaluation period. Focusing on 2012, four of the 11 OISs occurred in Bolden Area Command (BAC) and three occurred in SEAC. As mentioned previously, no OISs occurred in CCAC or NWAC during 2012.

Figure 3A


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SERVICE CODES 413 = PERSON WITH WEAPON 415 = ASSAULT/BATTERY 417 = FAMILY DISTURBANCE 467= VEHICLE STOP 468= PERSON STOP

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Types of Dispatched Events The “400” codes assigned to dispatched events loosely identify the types of situations police officers may encounter when responding to calls for service. Figure 4 highlights the five most common types of calls for service associated with OIS incidents during the 2008-2012 timeframe. Together, these five categories of dispatched service calls accounted for 56 percent of the 87 events culminating in OISs. The wide diversity of circumstances preceding OIS incidents is demonstrated by the fact that 21 distinct “400” codes have been identified within the last five years of OIS statistical data. It is notable that during this five-year period, 14 of the 87 OIS incidents (16%) began as officer-initiated activities (traffic or person stops). In 2012, only one of 11 OISs (9%) began as either of these two most common types of officer-initiated activities.

Setting and Outcomes of OIS Incidents With the exception of 2011, the vast majority of OIS incidents have occurred outdoors during the last five years [see Figure 5]. In 2011, 10 of 18 OISs (56%) occurred indoors. None of the other years since 2008 recorded indoor shares greater than 26 percent. Overall, approximately 75 percent of the 87 OISs have occurred outdoors during the last five years. As noted in last year’s report, it appears the setting of OIS incidents is a determining factor with regard to the degree of outcome lethality. The fatality rate associated with OIS incidents for 2011 was 67 percent (12 of 18). By comparison, the fatality rate for the other four years, all with few indoor OISs, was a much lower 32 percent (22 of 69). Although limited in scope, the five-year correlation analysis of setting and outcomes clearly indicates that the subject is more likely to be shot and killed if the OIS occurs indoors rather than outdoors. Factors that contribute to the deadlier nature of indoor encounters are the short distances separating officers and subjects, and the confining nature of indoor spaces. Distances between officers and subjects averaged 10 feet indoors and 33 feet outdoors during the last five years.

Figure 4

Figure 5


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OFFICERS PER OIS INCIDENT

# OF OISS

# OF SHOOTING OFFICERS

1.68 1.48 1.50 2.09

Police Presence In total, 24 of the 133 police officers who discharged their weapons during the past five years have been directly involved in at least two OISs. Ten of these 24 officers discharged their weapons in three or more separate OIS incidents over the course of their careers. Most recently, two (9%) of the 23 officers who fired their weapons in 2012 had been directly involved in prior OISs. These two officers had one additional OIS apiece. For the last five years, the majority of OIS incidents have involved a single police officer discharging his or her weapon (59 of 87 incidents). The percentage share of single officer firearm discharges had remained consistently high until last year. A significant changeover occurred in 2012. For the first time, the majority of OISs involved multiple officer firearm discharges (6 of 11 incidents). This was the only period during the last five years that experienced an average of more than two directly involved officers per OIS [see Figure 6]. The number of directly involved officers per OIS had averaged 1.5 from 2008 – 2011, and never exceeded 1.68 officers per OIS in any of those four years. What made 2012 so unusual was the elevated frequency of OISs that involved not just two, but three or more directly involved officers as well. The top three multiple officer incidents that occurred during 2012 included three, four and at the upper end, five officers.

On-Scene Supervision

Police supervisors were on scene at OIS incidents prior to deadly force being used 33 percent (29 of 87) of the time during the last five years. Most recently, the presence of supervisors decreased significantly from 44 percent (8 of 18) in 2011 to 18 percent (2 of 11) in 2012. Having supervisors on scene did not reduce the lethality of outcomes for involved subjects. Rather, the rate for fatal outcomes during the 2008 through 2012 period was significantly higher in the 29 incidents when supervisors were present (52%) than in the 58 incidents when they were not (33%). Caution is advised before drawing conclusions regarding the value of supervisors to manage as well as defuse volatile situations. The scope of this study does not extend beyond examining an extremely limited number of incidents that rise to the level of OISs. Nor is there any analysis regarding the benefit provided by supervisors in successfully diffusing situations that might otherwise have required police officers to resort to the utilization of deadly force.

1.29

Figure 6


23%

33%

22%

16%

6% TIME ON SCENE UNTIL INITIAL SHOTS FIRED

01 MINUTE OR LESS 02 MINUTES TO 05 MINUTES 06 MINUTES TO 15 MINUTES 16 MINUTES TO 60 MINUTES 61 MINUTES OR MORE

AVERAGES 2008 = 44.6 MINUTES 2009 = 10.7 MINUTES 2010 = 06.8 MINUTES 2011 = 54.1 MINUTES 2012 = 07.4 MINUTES

2008-2012 87 TOTAL OISS

Time on Scene Prior to Initial Shots Fired Enormous year-to-year differences exist regarding time on scene at OIS incidents by police officers before initial shots are fired. The average time until the initial discharge of weapons has fluctuated from a low of 6.8 minutes in 2010 to a high of 54.1 minutes in 2011. The steep increases associated with high years such as 2008 and 2011 can be explained by a few anomalous barricaded suspect or hostage incidents that, in some cases, extend for lengthy periods of time, such as 13 hours. During the last five years, initial shots were fired by police officers within five full minutes of arriving on scene in approximately 56 percent (49 of 87) of all OIS incidents. Figure 7 summarizes some of the time related aspects of encounters with subjects prior to officers employing deadly force in firearms discharges.

Based on what has occurred during the last three years, the data on short-interval discharges (those under six minutes) appears to indicate that the length of time that passes before shots are fired plays a role in determining the overall degree of outcome lethality for subjects. The fatality rate associated with 33 short-interval discharges recorded from 2010 through 2012 was 30 percent. The corresponding rate for the remaining 21 OIS incidents from those same three years, all characterized by longer interval discharges (those exceeding five full minutes in length), was considerably higher (62%). In a general sense, it is appropriate to assume the risk of death to OIS subjects increases substantially when incidents are not resolved quickly.

Figure 7


31%

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AGES OF DIRECTLY INVOLVED OFFICERS

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AVERAGE AGE 2008 = 34.8 YRS. 2009 = 36.3 YRS. 2010 = 33.7 YRS. 2011 = 36.4 YRS. 2012 = 33.7 YRS.

2008-2012 137 TOTAL DIRECTLY INVOLVED OFFICERS

Figure 8

Officer Age / Race / Ethnicity /Gender The average age of the police officers who discharged their weapons during OISs has remained nearly constant during the last five years, varying by a span of less than three years [see Figure 8]. On average, police officer age was slightly lower in 2012 (33.7) than 2011 (36.4) due primarily to the direct involvement of five SWAT officers, all over 40 years of age, in a pair of 2011 incidents. When broken down into age groups, the largest share of officers are in their 30s (42%) and not surprisingly, the smallest share (3%) is associated with officers who are at least 50 years old. With regard to gender, only two percent of the officers were female (3 of 137). In terms of race and ethnicity [see Figure 9], 82 percent of the police officers who discharged their weapons in OIS incidents during the last five years are categorized as “white” (112 of 137). However, there are significant differences on a year-to-year basis in the size of the “white” officer share, from a high of 91 percent in 2009 (29 of 32) to a low of 59 percent in 2011 (16 of 27). The lower share of “white” officers in 2011 resulted from a significant, one-time increase in the number of Hispanic officers. Other than the nine directly involved Hispanic officers during 2011, none of the three applicable minority groups (African Americans, Asians, and Hispanics) have been represented with more than three officers in any of the five years.

The distribution by race and ethnicity of the 137 police officers directly involved with 2008–2012 OIS incidents breaks down as follows: five percent African American, one percent Asian, 12 percent Hispanic and 82 percent “white.” Compared to the Department’s overall commissioned police officer demographic profile, Asian and African American officers appear to be slightly underrepresented while the opposite can be said for Hispanic and “white” officers. The distribution of all commissioned police officers as of 2012 by race and ethnicity is as follows: 7 percent African American, 3 percent Asian, 11 percent Hispanic and 77 percent “white.”

1% 5%

12%

82%

RACE/ETHNICITY OF OIS OFFICERS

ASIAN

AFRICAN AMERICAN

HISPANIC

WHITE


Figure 9


47%

25%

24%

4%

JOB TENURE OF DIRECTLY INVOLVED OFFICERS

05 YEARS OR LESS

06 TO 10 YEARS

11 TO 20 YEARS

21 YEARS OR MORE

AVERAGE TENURE 2008 = 7.7 YEARS 2009 = 9.4 YEARS 2010 = 6.1 YEARS 2011 = 9.2 YEARS 2012 = 7.3 YEARS


80%

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OFFICER DUTY ASSIGNMENTS

AREA COMMANDS

GANG CRIMES UNIT & SWAT

ALL OTHERS

OFF-DUTY

AREA COMMAND BREAKDOWN 2008 = 77.8% 2009 = 84.4% 2010 = 83.8% 2011 = 70.4% 2012 = 82.6%


Officer Tenure The tenure patterns of police officers directly involved in OIS incidents tend to mirror those associated with age. Officers were generally younger and slightly less tenured (length of employment) in 2012 than in 2011. On average, the tenure of those officers who discharged their weapons was approximately 21 percent lower in 2012 than 2011: 7.3 years compared with 9.2 years, respectively [see Figure 10]. Much of the reason for higher tenure levels, not just in 2011 but other years as well, is attributable to the direct involvement of significant numbers of SWAT officers and/or detectives, most of whom typically have considerably more years of service with the Department than patrol officers.

Since 2008, 64 of the 137 officers with direct OIS involvement had been employed by the Department for five years or less at the time of the incidents. While the associated 47 percent share may seem disproportionately high, it is in fact largely consistent with the tenure characteristics of the patrol officers stationed at area commands. At least with respect to years of service, the profile of commissioned personnel at area commands continues to be dominated by the record number of new police officers hired by the Department between 2005 and 2010.

Officer Duty Assignments Approximately 80 percent of the police officers who became directly involved in OIS incidents during the last five years were assigned to area commands and primarily performing patrol-type duties at the time (110 of 137). Other than area commands, officers assigned to the Gang Crimes Bureau, SWAT and Traffic Bureau are the most likely to participate in an OIS incident. In 2011, a total of eight officers from these three bureaus were directly involved in five of that year’s 18 OISs. The duty assignments of officers at the time of their OIS involvement are summarized in Figure 10A.

Regarding off-duty shootings, a total of three police officers had been involved in three OIS incidents during the three years prior to 2011. Each of these off-duty officers was assigned to an area command.

Figure 10A

Figure 10


13

21

32

23 21

3 6

2 4 1 2

5 3 0 1

0

10

20

30

40

2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

# O

F FI

REA

RM

S

PISTOL RIFLE SHOTGUN

FIREARMS EMPLOYED BY OFFICERS DURING OISS

2.6

4.2 3.8 4.7 4.9

3.3

7.1

5.6

7.0

10.3

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

AV

ERA

GE

# O

F SH

OTS

FIR

ED

SHOTS FIRED PER OFFICER & OIS

PER OFFICER PER INCIDENT

Classifications of Officers (Rank) As would be expected, the vast majority of police officers who became directly involved in OIS incidents were PO IIs at the time (117 of 137 OIS officers). PO IIs are officers with more than a year of service time beyond Field Training. The level of PO II involvement in OISs has averaged just over 85 percent during the five years since 2008. An interesting note regarding PO IIs is the fact that they accounted for 100 percent of the officers directly involved in OISs for the first time during 2012. Sergeants, none of whom discharged a firearm in 2012, represent the next largest rank-based classification group (12 of 137 OIS officers). Participation levels for sergeants peaked in 2009; a year during which six became directly involved in OIS incidents.

Firearms Employed by Officers Over the course of the last five years there has been a subtle shift in the mix of firearms discharged by police officers directly involved in person-oriented OIS incidents. Pistols constituted 76 percent (66 of 87) of employed firearms during the 2008-2010 timeframe. The remaining 24 percent of weapons included 11 rifles, all AR-15s, and 10 shotguns [see Figure 11].

What had already been a predominant share of pistols further increased to 88 percent in the most recent two-year period (2011-2012). During these same two years, the corresponding share for long guns (rifles and shotguns) fell to 12 percent, half of its previous level. Of the five employed rifles, two were specialty types assigned to SWAT officers. Most notable regarding long gun declines, only one shotgun with standard ammunition was employed by any of the 50 officers directly involved in the 29 OIS incidents that occurred during 2011 and 2012.

Summary of Officer Shots Fired The 23 police officers directly involved in person-oriented OIS incidents during 2012 fired a total of 113 rounds, which equates to an average of 4.9 rounds per officer and 10.3 rounds per incident [see Figure 12]. While each of these two performance indicators reached five-year highs in 2012, one did so with a substantial increase. Last year’s 10.3 rounds per incident figure is approximately 45 percent above the next highest rate of 7.1 in 2009, and more than three times higher than the 3.3 rounds per incident rate recorded for 2008. Most of the increase is due to the high number of officers directly involved in 2012 OISs (2.1 per incident). The actual number of shots fired in 2012 during individual incidents ranged from a high of 30 to a low of one, which occurred once.

In terms of rounds fired per police officer, the five-year trend is upward, but not nearly as steeply as compared to rounds per incident. Annual rates have risen each year except for 2010. The 2012 rate of 4.9 rounds per officer is nearly double the 2008 rate of 2.6. Specifically regarding 2012 figures, the actual number of shots fired by individual officers ranged from a high of 13 (occurred once) to a low of one round being fired (occurred three times). Although it is not statistically unusual to see an average of one officer out of 20 fire 10 or more rounds during an OIS, having as many as 4 of 23 do so in the same year (occurred in 2012) is atypical.

Figure 11

Figure 12


Distances of Initial Shots Fired The average distance of initial shots fired by police officers directly involved in OIS incidents increased by 17 percent from 2011 to 2012 [see Figure 13]. The most unique aspect of 2012 firing distances is the low percentage of officers firing at targets from close range, in this case 10 feet or less. The 22 percent share associated with close-proximity shootings for 2012 is half that of the previous year, and the lowest rate for any of the last five years. Also notable, the actual distances of initial shots fired during 2012 by all 23 OIS officers ranged from a high of 90 feet to a low of four feet, which occurred twice. Regarding maximum shooting distances, 2012 is the only year since 2008 that did not have at least one shot fired from beyond 100 feet.

Targeted Strikes Twenty-six (26) rounds fired by the 23 police officers involved in person-oriented OIS incidents during 2012 struck targeted subjects. From a performance measurement perspective, the 26 rounds equate to an average of 1.13 strikes per officer and 2.36 strikes per incident. Both of these indicators posted declines from the previous year (42 percent for strikes per officer and 20 percent for strikes per incident). The average of 1.13 strikes per officer recorded for 2012 stands at its lowest level since 2008. Also notable, the actual number of shots fired in 2012 that struck targeted subjects ranged from a high of eight (with five officers firing) to a low of one, which occurred once. During 2012, subjects were struck by five or more rounds in two of the 11 OIS incidents.

34%

29%

22%

8%

7%

INITIAL FIRING DISTANCES OF OFFICERS

01 FOOT TO 10 FEET 11 FEET TO 25 FEET 25 FEET TO 50 FEET 51 FEET TO 100 FEET 101 FEET OR MORE

AVERAGE DISTANCES 2008 = 29.0 FEET 2009 = 37.3 FEET 2010 = 29.2 FEET 2011 = 27.1 FEET 2008-2012

137 TOTAL DIRECTLY INVOLVED OFFICERS

Figure 13


20

41

57 53

26 26

94

83

73

87

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

# O

F SH

OTS

FIR

ED

ACCURACY OF OFFICERS' SHOTS HITS MISSES

43.5%

30.4% 40.7% 42.1% 23.0%

13 16

48

34

15

5

41

51

36

56

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

# O

F SH

OTS

FIR

ED

ACCURACY OF SHOTS FIRED WITHIN 21 FEET

HITS MISSES

72.2% 48.5% 21.1% 28.1% 48.6%

Accuracy of Shots Fired Overall, collective shooting accuracy declined sharply last year for the 23 police officers who discharged their firearms during OIS incidents. Twenty-three (23) percent of all rounds fired struck intended targets in 2012 (26 of 113) compared to 42 percent in 2011 (53 of 126). The 2012 accuracy rate is the lowest recorded during the last five years [see Figure 14].

The low overall rate of shooting accuracy for 2012 is tied to four specific OIS incidents that involve officers being shot at or believing that they were being fired upon. A total of 69 shots were fired by nine officers in those four incidents. Only four of the 69 shots (5.8%) struck intended targets. The accuracy rate for 2012 rises to the 50 percent level, 22 hits out of 44 shots fired, when the four noted OIS incidents are excluded from computation.

As would normally be expected, shooting accuracy is, to a large degree, dependent on distances to target. Such was not the case this past year. The accuracy of the 71 shots fired by police officers during 2012 from distances of seven yards (21 feet) or less to targeted subjects was approximately 21 percent [see Figure 15]. The overall accuracy of the remaining 42 shots fired from beyond 21 feet was a slightly better 26 percent. Two incidents, one involving a barricaded subject and the other an attempted apprehension by the Career Criminals Section, skewed the accuracy rate for distances of 21 feet or less. Officers who discharged their weapons within 21 feet of these two subjects struck the intended targets twice out of 42 total shots fired.

Figure 15

Figure 14


Aspects of 2008-2012 OIS Incidents / Foot Pursuits Two foot pursuits, involving Career Criminals Section detectives in one case and patrol officers in the other, occurred during the 11 person-oriented OIS incidents in 2012 (18%). There were also two OIS related foot pursuits in 2011, both of which involved Gang Crimes Bureau officers. It is notable that the 75 percent lethality level associated with subject outcomes of the four 2011 and 2012 OIS incidents with foot pursuits is considerably higher than the same rate for all other OIS incidents within that two-year period. Three of the four subjects who fled on foot were eventually shot and killed by police officers. The fourth subject was apprehended without being harmed. The high mortality rate associated with these outcomes should be viewed cautiously because it is based on an extremely limited number of occurrences. In contrast to recent findings, the mortality rate for OIS subjects involved in the 15 foot pursuits that occurred during the preceding three year period (2008-2010) was a much lower 20 percent. Foot pursuits associated with OIS incidents declined significantly after peaking at eight in 2010. The reduction corresponds with the introduction of a revised foot pursuit policy that became effective in February, 2011. The new policy placed additional emphasis on safety concerns for both police officers and the public.

Aspects of 2011-2012 OIS Incidents / Low Lethality Force None of the traditional forms of low lethality force such as Electronic Control Devices (ECDs) or drag stabilized “beanbag” shotgun rounds were utilized in conjunction with the 11 person-oriented OIS incidents that occurred during 2012. In one instance, a threatening subject was intentionally struck by a police vehicle. A vehicle strike exceeds low lethality parameters and is considered deadly force. In contrast to 2012, low lethality force was applied in six of the 18 OIS incidents that occurred during the prior year (33%). A single type of low lethality weapon/technique was used in each of the six applicable 2011 incidents. ECDs were used most often (three times), followed by two “beanbag” shotguns, and a single low speed Pursuit Intervention Technique (PIT) car stop. It is notable that lethality levels associated with subject outcomes for the six 2011 OIS incidents involving low lethality weapons/techniques are considerably higher than all other OIS incidents within the last two years. Five of the six OIS subjects involved with low lethality incidents were shot and killed after attempts were made to either subdue or capture them by less deadly means (83%). As previously stated with regard to foot pursuit data, lethality rates, whether high or low, should be viewed with caution when based on a limited number of occurrences.


7 8

12

3 2

2

5

5

10

2

4

6

8

4

7

1

1

1

14

20

25

18

11

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

# O

F O

IS S

UB

JEC

TS

ASIAN AFRICAN AMERICAN HISPANIC WHITE

RACE/ETHNICITY OF OIS SUBJECTS

NON-WHITE SHARES 2008 = 50.0% 2009 = 60.0% 2010 = 52.0% 2011 = 83.3% 2012 = 81.8%

Subject Demographics (Age, Gender and Race/Ethnicity) The average age of the 11 subjects associated with person-oriented OIS incidents in 2012 was less than two percent lower than in 2011, 34.6 years compared to 35.1 years, respectively. In none of the last five years has the average age of subjects fallen below 30 years. The actual ages of individual OIS subjects for 2012 ranged from a high of 56 to a low of 19. Three of the 11 subjects were over 40 years of age in 2012 (27%). The fact that one of the 11 subjects was female stands out statistically. There have only been two females among the 88 total OIS subjects since 2008 (2.3%). In terms of race and ethnicity, the majority of subjects associated with 2012 OIS incidents were identified as African American (7 of 11). The share of African American subjects rose from 22 percent in 2011 to 64 percent in 2012. The remaining four OIS subjects for 2012 were split equally among Hispanics and “whites” [see Figure 16]. The cumulative, five-year distribution of the 88 subjects associated with 2008-2012 OIS incidents by race and ethnicity breaks down as follows: 33.0 percent African American, 3.4 percent Asian, 27.3 percent Hispanic and 36.4 percent “white.” Except for Hispanics, these shares differ significantly from the overall demographic pattern in Clark County. The distribution of countywide population in 2010 by race and ethnicity is as follows: 9.1 percent African American, 7.6 percent Asian, 27.9 percent Hispanic and 54.5 percent “white.”

Although not showing up in cumulative data, there has been a distinct increase in the non-white shares of OIS subjects during the last five years. Year-to-year non-white shares varied between 50 and 60 percent during the 2008-2010 timeframe. Non-white shares increased sharply in 2011 to above 80 percent, and remained at that elevated level last year. The distribution by race and ethnicity of the 29 subjects associated with the more recent 2011 and 2012 OIS incidents breaks down as follows: 38 percent African American (11 of 29), three percent Asian (1 of 29), 41 percent Hispanic (12 of 29) and 17 percent “white” (5 of 29). Although some amount of imbalance is associated with the recent shares of Asian and Hispanic subjects, the numbers and percentages of African Americans and “whites” involved in OISs merit continuing efforts on the part of the Department to address and lessen long standing community perceptions of bias and disparate treatment. The share of “white” OIS subjects for the 2011-2012 timeframe was 17 percent, well below the group’s nearly 55 percent population share. At the other extreme, the share of African American subjects stood at 38 percent, more than double that of “whites” and more than four times the group’s nine percent population share. Uncharacteristically, at least from a strictly statistical standpoint, there has been more than double the number of African American OIS subjects compared to “whites” during the last two years in spite of their much smaller population base.

Figure 16


28 35

4

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35

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10

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20

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30

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40

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50

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60

WHITE ALL OTHERS WHITE ALL OTHERS

# O

F SU

BJE

CTS

KILLED/WOUNDED UNINJURED

OIS SUBJECT OUTCOMES BY RACE/ETHNICITY

87.5%

62.5%

12.5%

37.5%

21%

11%

23%

45%

NO RECORD

MISDEMEANOR ARREST(S)

FELONY ARREST(S)

VIOLENT CONVICTIONS(S)

SUBJECTS WITH VIOLENT CRIMINAL HISTORIES 2008 = 53.8% 2009 = 40.0% 2010 = 32.0% 2011 = 66.7% 2012 = 36.4%

CRIMINAL RECORDS OF SUBJECTS PRIOR TO OISS


Mistake-of-fact shootings are the most significant contributing factor to increasing the level of disproportionality that currently exists among OIS subjects based on their race/ethnicity. There have been five such shootings during the past two years, all of which involved African American subjects. In mistake-of-fact shootings officers incorrectly perceive that subjects present immediate, life endangering threats. In actuality, the actions of these unarmed subjects, while in some cases inadvertently provocative, are not assaultive. Based on the five most recent years of statistical information, the race and ethnicity of subjects belonging to minority groups does not appear to be a determining factor in the severity of OIS outcomes. Nearly 88 percent of “white” subjects were injured or killed during the OIS incidents that occurred during the 2008-2012 timeframe (28 of 32). The comparable rate for all other subjects (African American, Asian, and Hispanic) is 63 percent (35 of 56). Figure 17 presents additional information pertaining to the lethality of OIS subject outcomes by race and ethnicity.

Criminal Backgrounds of Subjects Seventy-nine percent of the known subjects associated with 2008-2012 OIS incidents have been previously arrested (69 of 87). Of those subjects with arrest records, more than half were convicted of violent crimes at some point during their life (39 of 69). With regard to officer safety concerns, it is particularly relevant to note that 16 of the 29 subjects involved in OIS incidents during the last two years had previous violent crime convictions (55%). Figure 18 presents additional information pertaining to the interactions of subjects with the criminal justice system prior to their OIS involvement.

Figure 17

Figure 18


4

3

11

6

1

2 2

5

4

2

3

2 2

4

1

5

13

7

4

7

0

3

6

9

12

15

2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

# O

F O

IS S

UB

JEC

TS

SUBJECT IMPAIRMENTS (DRUGS & ALCOHOL)

DRUGS ALCOHOL DRUGS & ALCOHOL NONE/UNKNOWN

KNOWN IMPAIRED SUBJECTS 2008 = 64.3% 2009 = 35.0% 2010 = 72.0% 2011 = 77.8% 2012 = 36.4%

Condition of Subjects (Drugs & Alcohol) Slightly less than 60 percent of OIS subjects during the last five years were believed to have been under the influence of drugs or alcohol at the time of their deadly force encounters with the police (52 of 88). The most common source of subject impairment was drugs, either taken alone or in combination with alcohol. Most of the 37 subjects under the influence of drugs had consumed one or more of the following substances: cocaine, methamphetamines, marijuana, or debilitating large quantities of prescription medications. Based on numbers alone, alcohol appears to be somewhat less of a factor than drugs as a substance adversely affecting the subjects’ state of being (27 of 88). Drugs were also present in 12 of the 27 instances of subjects under the influence of alcohol. While the information regarding drugs and alcohol provides a useful measure of subjects’ judgment when confronting the police, it should be noted that there is less than absolute accuracy associated with these statistics. Drug and alcohol determinations were based on observation, self-admission, and for fatalities only, toxicological testing during autopsies. The low percentages of impaired subjects in 2009 and 2012, indicated on Figure 19, may at least partially result from fewer OIS deaths, and therefore, less official reporting by medical examiners.

Figure 19


2 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 3 1

5 4 4 6

3 6

14 17

8 6

0

4

8

12

16

20

24

28

32

36

2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

# O

F SU

BJE

CTS

MENTALLY UNSTABLE HYPER-AGITATED SUICIDAL BEHAVIOR NORMAL OR UNKNOWN

MENTAL CONDITION OF SUBJECTS

SUBCATEGORY OF SUICIDAL BEHAVIOR SUICIDE-BY-COP TENDENCIES

2008 = 2 2009 = 1

2010 = 1 2011 = 4 2012 = 3

Mental State of Subjects A certain amount of subjectivity is required in order to classify the mental state of OIS subjects at the time of their deadly force encounters with the police. Determinations regarding mental state are largely based on observations of on-scene officers, along with pertinent information obtained during follow-up investigations.

In spite of what might be expected, considering the violent nature of encounters typically associated with OIS incidents, the majority of subjects since 2008 appeared to present themselves in a relatively "normal" manner (51 of 88). However, the share of subjects classified as “normal” decreased from 63 percent during the 2008-2010 timeframe to 48 percent in the last two years. Conversely, the share of subjects classified as exhibiting varying degrees of suicidal behavior rose from 22 percent during 2008-2010 to 31 percent during 2011-2012. Seven of the nine suicide-inclined subjects encountered during the last two years exhibited “suicide-by-cop” tendencies. Additional information concerning the mental condition of subjects for each of the last five years is provided in Figure 20.

Figure 20


9 9

14 11

7

2 4

2 2 2 0 1 2

0 0 2 2 1 2

0 1 4

6 3 2

048

1216202428

2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

# O

F SU

BJE

CTS

FIREARM KNIFE VEHICLE OTHER NONE

WEAPONS POSSESSED BY OIS SUBJECTS SUBJECTS WITH FIREARMS

2008 = 64.3% 2009 = 45.0% 2010 = 56.0%

2011 = 61.1% 2012 = 63.6%

Weapons Employed by Subjects Nearly 82 percent of the subjects associated with OIS incidents that occurred during the last five years were in possession of weapons (72 of 88). Firearms, primarily pistols, predominated as the weapon of choice for armed subjects [see Figure 21].

The share of subjects possessing firearms has been on the increase since 2009, rising from 45 percent that year to 64 percent in 2012. In spite of this trend, there is no well-defined converse relationship with unarmed subjects. The shares of unarmed subjects have varied little since 2009. Subjects armed with firearms, or any other type of weapon, are much more likely to be killed by the police than their unarmed counterparts. Based on OIS results obtained for the last five years, armed subjects have a 44 percent chance of being shot and killed, while the likelihood of such outcomes for unarmed subjects is a much lower 13 percent. It is noteworthy that subjects in possession of hand held weapons other than firearms, primarily knives, are the least likely to remain unharmed. Only three of 22 subjects included in this category were not injured or killed by police gunfire (14%). Comparative information regarding OIS outcomes based on subject armament is presented in Figure 22.

Figure 21

22

10 2

15

9

5

13

3

9

50

22

16

0

10

20

30

40

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FIREARMS OTHER WEAPONS UNARMED

# O

F O

IS S

UB

JEC

TS

OUTCOMES BASED ON SUBJECT ARMAMENT 2008 - 2012

KILLED WOUNDED UNINJURED

FIREARM MORTALITY RATES 2008 = 55.6% (5 OF 9) 2009 = 33.3% (3 OF 9)

2010 = 21.4% (3 OF 14) 2011 = 72.7% (8 OF 11)

2012 = 42.9% (3 OF 7)

Figure 22


6 3

5 5 3

15

19

13

17

13

3 2 2 4

2

0

4

8

12

16

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24

2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

# OF SUBJECTS SHOTS FIRED STRIKES ON OFFICERS

OIS SUBJECTS WHO FIRED WEAPONS

ACCURACY OF SHOTS 2008 = 20.0% 2009 = 10.5% 2010 = 15.4% 2011 = 23.5% 2012 = 15.4%

Subject Shooting Summary

The shares of subjects who discharged a firearm at police officers during OIS incidents have remained nearly constant at a 27 to 28 percent level for the last two years. Eight subjects, in eight separate OIS incidents, fired a total of 30 rounds in 2011 and 2012. Six of the 30 rounds struck three officers; one in 2011 and two in 2012 [see Figure 23]. Nine officers have been shot by OIS subjects during the last five years. One of these officers, off-duty and at home when shot, died from sustained injuries [see Figure 24]. A tenth officer sustained minor injuries from a vehicle strike in 2010. All totaled, 22 subjects fired 77 rounds at the police. The 13 strikes on officers equates to a 17 percent accuracy rate.

1

3 1

1 1 1

1 1

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

# O

F P

OLI

CE

OFF

ICER

S

ON-SCENE OFFICER WOUNDED OR INJURED OIS OFFICER WOUNDED OR INJURED OIS OFFICER KILLED

OFFICER INJURIES RESULTING FROM SUBJECT ACTIONS

2008-2012 137 OIS OFFICERS

215 ON-SCENE OFFICERS

Figure 24

Figure 23


8 5 6 4 5

4 10 12

9 4

2

5 7

5

2

048

1216202428323640

2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

# O

F SU

BJE

CTS

PROVOCATIVE THREATENING ASSAULTIVE

SUBJECT ACTIONS PRIOR TO OISS

32%

44%

24%

FIVE-YEAR TOTAL

2008-2012 88 SUBJECTS

Threat Levels Associated with Subject Actions There are degrees of threat associated with the actions taken by subjects in the presence of police officers just prior to the application of deadly force. For analytical purposes, these various subject actions have been placed into one of three threat level categories. Determinations regarding the classification of subject actions have been made retrospectively by the Critical Incident Review Team (CIRT) and based on best available information, including but not limited to officer perceptions at the time of the OISs. Explanations of threat categories are provided in the following set of ascending order definitions. Provocative – Subject actions are such that they are perceived, correctly or not, as being potentially threatening. In actuality, no one has become seriously endangered. Examples of provocative situations include: 1) an unexpected appearance or motion that takes an officer by surprise, 2) furtive movements perceived as reaching for a weapon, 3) physical movements, such as a lunge towards an officer and 4) passive or active physical resistance without a weapon. Threatening – Subject actions are such that they can be correctly perceived as an imminent, serious threat. A violent act or extremely endangering situation is ready to manifest itself. Examples of threatening situations include: 1) drawing a firearm without intending to surrender it, 2) aiming/pointing a firearm in the direction of an officer, and 3) wielding other weapons such as knives in an aggressive attack mode posture. Assaultive – Subject actions are such that the danger associated with a violent act or life threatening situation has clearly manifested itself, such as in shots fired instances. Officers no longer have to assume what a subject might do since the actions provide positive proof of intent. Based on an analysis of the threat posed by OIS subjects, police officers in 2012 confronted the highest overall level of endangerment since 2008. Five of the 11 subjects in 2012 were assaultive (45%). In three of the five incidents subjects shot at officers. In one of the other two incidents, a subject’s arm made contact with an officer while attempting to stab him with a knife. The remaining incident involved an extremely agitated subject repeatedly threatening the life of a female hostage by holding a knife to her throat and using her as a human shield. On the other end of the threat scale, only two of the 11 subjects for 2012, 18 percent, did not turn out to be legitimate threats, even though the inadvertent provocative actions of each were perceived to be threatening. Comparative information regarding the degrees of threat posed by subject actions is presented in Figure 25.

Figure 25


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NO INJURIES INJURIES FATALITIES

# O

F A

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ALS

OUTCOMES OF ANIMAL-ORIENTED OISS FOR 2011-2012

LIVESTOCK NON-DOMESTICATED DOGS

0

2

5

0

2 2

0

4 3

0 0123456

ATTACK ON OFFICER

ATTACK ON OTHER

ATTACK IMMINENT

ATTACK PROBABLE

HUMANE SHOOTING

# O

F IN

CID

ENTS

ANIMAL OIS INCIDENTS BASED ON ENCOUNTERED SITUATIONS

2011 2012

Other OISs—Animal Shootings (2011 and 2012) There have been nine animal-type officer-involved shooting incidents in each of the last two years. Of the nine animals connected with 2012 OIS incidents, three were injured and five others were killed as a result of police intervention. Dogs accounted for two-thirds of the involved animals (6 of 9). The other three animals, all encountered in urban settings, included two coyotes, and a chimpanzee. The various outcomes for the 23 animals associated with the 18 animal-type OIS incidents that occurred during 2011 and 2012 are collectively summarized in Figure 26.

Animal-OIS Related Information Aggressive dogs initiated the vast majority of the animal-type OIS incidents that occurred during the last two years. Combined statistics for 2011 and 2012 indicate that a total of 17 dogs were involved in 13 of the 18 total incidents (72%). Further, officers found themselves confronted by pairs of dogs in four of the 13 canine incidents (31%). All four of the multi-dog encounters occurred in 2011. With respect to breed, 12 of the 17 dogs were identified as Pit Bulls (71%). No other breed accounted for more than two dogs. It is also notable that with one exception (a chimpanzee), the animals that directly threatened officers or the public were dogs. In two incidents, both of which occurred in 2012, attacking dogs either bit or attempted to bite a police officer. In the more serious attack, an on-scene officer was bitten and sustained significant injuries from a Department K-9. In two prior year instances, officers took action after observing dogs attacking persons or their pets. In the remaining nine dog-related incidents, officers discharged their weapons to ward off what they believed to be imminent attacks. Figure 27 provides a breakdown of the types of situations encountered by police officers before deciding to discharge their firearms.

Figure 26

Figure 27


The most unusual aspect of animal-type OISs in 2012 was the number of situations involving non-domesticated animals. As previously mentioned, coyotes and a chimpanzee were the focus of attention in three of the past year’s nine OISs incidents. In each of these confrontations, officers believed that they had no recourse other than to act when they did or risk probable harm to the public. With respect to the chimpanzee, a deadly force solution became appropriate when the escaped animal, a large male exhibiting aggressive behavior, began to approach a group of onlookers. A female chimpanzee that accompanied the male was tranquilized and captured without being harmed.

Officer-Related Information for Animal OISs All but one of the 18 animal-type OIS incidents that occurred during 2011 and 2012 resulted in the direct involvement of a single police officer. In the one multi-officer incident, a coyote was killed on elementary school property after being shot by three officers. Pertinent information about these 20 officers is provided in the following collective profile. In terms of race and gender, 80 percent of the officers were “white” (16 of 20) and almost exclusively male (19 of 20). On average, they were 36.2 years old and had been employed by the Department for 8.7 years at the time of the OISs. Regarding rank, 90 percent of the officers were line-level commissioned employees (18 of 20). The other two officers were sergeants. Thirty-eight (38) total shots were fired, an average of 1.9 per officer per incident. Nearly 74 percent of the shots fired hit intended targets (28 of 38). As previously mentioned, one on-scene officer incurred injuries as a result of dog bites. None of the directly involved officers were injured.


Non-Shooting Deadly Force Events (2011 and 2012) There have been five deadly force events other than OIS incidents that occurred during the last two years, four in 2011 and one in 2012. In three of the five events, all from 2011, officers utilized the Pursuit Intervention Technique (PIT) to disable vehicles they were following. By policy, the PIT maneuver is considered a deadly force when performed on high-center-of-gravity vehicles, or in all cases at speeds of 40 mph or above. Police vehicles were used more directly as weapons in the other two deadly force incidents. The earlier of the two incidents involved a low speed vehicle ramming at less than 10 miles per hour. In the other instance an unmarked police vehicle intentionally struck an armed and threatening subject. This vehicle strike, which took place in 2012, became necessary when the driver observed the fleeing subject point a firearm at other officers who were in foot pursuit. The subjects associated with four of the five 2011 and 2012 events exhibited assaultive behavior, firing on trailing police cars during two vehicle pursuits, backing into an officer in another instance, and drawing down on pursuing officers with a pistol in the most recent 2012 incident. The only other subject was resistant in that she disregarded an attempted traffic stop and continued to drive away from the police until a PIT maneuver was used to end the vehicle pursuit. In terms of lethality, the five events resulted in one death, to the subject struck and pinned by a police vehicle; however, the death was the result of gunshot wounds rather than the vehicle strike. Other than the death, minor injuries were sustained by one or more subjects in each of the three deadly force PIT incidents from 2011. All of the PIT related injuries were due to forcible stops for the vehicles as they came to rest. Two police officers also sustained injuries during these incidents. In 2011, a plainclothes narcotics detective received minor injuries when a subject backed his car into the officer, momentarily pinning him against the driver’s door of his vehicle. In 2012, a second plainclothes officer was shot and wounded by the subject who had been struck and pinned beneath a police vehicle.


Appendix A Statistical Summary For Person-Oriented Officer-Involved Shootings (2008 - 2012)

STATS 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

# of OISs 14 19 25 18 11

OISs with Fatalities 06 05 07 12 04

OISs with Injuries 04 09 09 02 05

OISs without Injuries 04 05 09 04 02

Longest Interval Between OISs (days) 60 44 45 58 104

# of Directly Involved POs 18 32 37 27 23

POs per OIS 1.29 1.68 1.48 1.50 2.09

Average Minutes On-Scene Until Initial Shots Fired 44.6 10.7 6.8 54.1 7.4

Average Age of POs 34.8 36.3 33.7 36.4 33.7

Average Tenure of POs 7.7 9.4 6.1 9.2 7.3

# of "White" POs 15 29 33 16 19

# of "Non-White" POs 03 03 04 11 04

Shares of POs with Multiple OIS Involvement 16.7% 28.1% 18.9% 18.5% 17.4%

# of Shots Fired by POs 46 135 140 126 113

Average # of Shots Fired per PO 2.56 4.22 3.78 4.67 4.91

Average # of Shots Fired per OIS 3.29 7.11 5.60 7.00 10.27

# of On-Target Shots (Strikes) 20 41 57 53 26

Average # of Strikes per PO 1.11 1.28 1.54 1.96 1.13

Average # of Strikes per OIS 1.43 2.16 2.28 2.94 2.36

Average Initial Firing Distances (Feet) 29.0 37.3 29.2 27.1 31.8

Accuracy of Shots Fired by POs 43.5% 30.4% 40.7% 42.1% 23.0%

# of OIS Subjects 14 20 25 18 11

# of "White" Subjects 7 8 12 3 2

# of "Non-White" Subjects 7 12 13 15 9

% of Subjects with Prior Violent Criminal Convictions 53.8% 40.0% 32.0% 66.7% 36.4%

% of Subjects Believed to be Drug/Alcohol Impaired 64.3% 35.0% 72.0% 77.8% 36.4%

% of Subjects Exhibiting Mentally Impaired Behavior 57.1% 30.0% 32.0% 55.6% 45.5%

Shares of Subjects Carrying Firearms 64.3% 45.0% 56.0% 61.1% 63.6%

# of Subjects Who Shot at the Police 06 03 05 05 03

# of Shots Fired by Subjects 15 19 13 17 13

Average # of Shots Fired per Subject 2.50 6.33 2.60 3.40 4.33

# of On-Target Shots (Strikes) 03 02 02 04 02

Accuracy of Shots Fired by Subjects 20.0% 10.5% 15.4% 23.5% 15.4%

# of POs Shot & Killed 00 01 00 00 00

# of POs Shot & Wounded 03 01 01 01 02

# of POs Injured (by Vehicle) 00 00 01 00 00

deadly force statistical analysis 2008-2012 · 2017. 5. 2. · shots fired, page 20. the low...

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