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Table of Contents

Part 1 - UAS OperationsChapter 1 GeneralChapter 2 Unmanned Aircraft System ManagementChapter 3 Operations and SafetyChapter 4 TrainingChapter 5 Flight Procedures and RulesChapter 6 Safety of Flight Messages and Aviation Safety Action MessagesChapter 7 Weight and Balance

Part 2 - UAS Safety1. Hazard Recognition and Risk Reduction Criteria2. Casualty Expectation Criteria3. Property Damage Criteria4. Midair Collision Avoidance Criteria5. Criteria for Reliability and Adequacy of Safeguards

Appendix A: Safety resources and informationA.1 Casualty Expectation References and Information SourcesA.2 Collision Avoidance References and Information SourcesA.3 Safeguards References and Information Sources

Appendix B: Range Safety Review Questions for UAV ProjectsB.1 Introduction To Review QuestionsB.2 UAV Background InformationB.3 Causes of “Loss Of Control”B.4 Review of Common SafeguardsB.5: The midair collision hazard and system interaction with Air Traffic Control.B.6 Questions About “Midair Collision” Hazards

Appendix C: Process DiagramsC1 Determine if the UAV is safe to flyC2 Determine Adequacy of UAS Risk ManagementC3 Determine if casualty expectation risk is acceptableC4 Determine if risk to property is acceptableC5 Determine if midair collision risk is acceptableC6 Determine adequacy of hardware safeguardsC7 Determine adequacy of software safeguards

C8 Determine adequacy of procedural safeguardsAppendix D: Casualty Expectation MethodologyAppendix E Instructions for Completing DCC Form 5401Appendix F: Small Unmanned Aircraft System UtilizationAppendix G Management Control Evaluation ChecklistAppendix H Terms and Abbreviations

AbbreviationsTerms

Appendix I AirspaceRolle COA 1Yuma COA 1

Appendix J Standard Forms

2 UAS Operations DCC

Part 1 - UAS Operations

Chapter 1 General

1-1 PurposeThis manual establishes procedures, rules, and responsibilities for—

a Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS), and unmanned aircraft crewmember (UAC) training and standardization

b The UAS Aircrew Training Program (ATP)c The UAS-related flight violationsd Command, control, operations and use of Rolle Field for UAS flighte The DCC UAS Standardization Programf DCC Safety of Flight (SOF) messagesg DCC Aviation Safety Action (ASA) messagesh UAS weight and balancei Nonstandard aircraft

1-2 Explanation of abbreviations and termsAbbreviations and special terms used in this manual are explained in the glossary.

1-3 Responsibilities

The YCAAa Maintain the UAS training and standardization literature for all operations related to UAS

from Rolle Field.b Manage the YCAA standardization and evaluation programs.c Monitor all UAS training evaluation and standardization.d Perform UAS safety management inspections, as appropriate.

UAS ownersOperators at Yuma Proving Ground (YPG) or the Barry M Goldwater Ranges (BMGR) will be subject to appropriate regulations.

The Director for Airport Operationsa Report UAS SOF/ASA conditions and issue SOF/ASA messages as covered in chapter b Be the technical proponent for weight and balance (chap 7).c Coordinate health hazard assessment and other medical aspects relating to UAS

operations.d Ensure compliance with Federal, DOD and local regulatory requirements for the

standardization, maintenance, training, operations, and effective risk management of UAS assets.

e Ensure that DCC tenants effectively command, control, and manage the UAS safety and standardization programs at Rolle Field.

f Have authority for final decisions in YCAA UAS Operations (or his designated representative).


The Airport Directora Ensure Development of training, standardization, and evaluation literature for UAS

training programs.b Oversee the overall training of weight and balance.c Monitor UAS training evaluation and standardization, when and if appropriate.d Ensure proper maintenance of Crewmember individual flight recordse Monitor the UAS Standardization Programf Oversee SOF messages

1-4 Management control evaluation checklista Appendix E is the applicable management control evaluation checklist. Managers will

use the checklist as daily guidance and will formally complete the checklist as scheduled by the Director of Operations functional proponents in the annually updated management control plan. Specifically, the checklist will—

1 Test whether prescribed controls are present, operational, and effective. Analytical techniques, such as statistical sampling, should be used when appropriate to conserve resources.

2 Identify areas where additions or reductions to existing controls are needed.3 Select corrective actions when deficiencies have been found that can be corrected

locally.4 Refer deficiencies that cannot be corrected locally to higher command levels for

assistance in correcting those deficiencies.5 Provide support for the commander’s annual statement on the adeqUACy of

internal controls within the organization.

1-5 Deviationsa Individuals may deviate from provisions of this manual during emergencies to the extent

necessary to meet the emergency.b Individuals who deviate from the provisions of this manual or Federal Aviation

Administration (FAA) regulations must report details of the incident directly to Airport Operations. The incident must be reported within 24 hours after it occurs.

c Alleged violations of Federal Aviation Regulation 91 (Title 14, Code of Federal Regulation 91 (14 CFR 91)) and/or U.S. military aviation regulations will be treated in accordance with paragraph 2–11.

1-6 Waivers and delegation of authoritya Authority to grant waivers rests with the Director of Operations.b Waivers required to be processed through the FAA or a host nation should be coordinated

and/or processed through the Airport Director.

Chapter 2 Unmanned Aircraft System Management

Section 1 Personnel authorized to fly and/or operate Unmanned Aircraft SystemsThe following personnel may fly and/or operate UAS:

a. The Crewmembers who—


1 Have complied with qualification, training, evaluation, and currency requirements of this manual for the UAS to be flown and/or operated.

b. Civilian employees of Government agencies and Government contractors who have—1. Appropriate military or civilian certifications or ratings in the system(s).2. Written authorization from the owning organization.3. Necessary compliance with qualification, training, evaluation, and currency

requirements of this manual (chap 4), and the contract and/or statement of work for the UAS to be flown.

4. A medical flight physical or an FAA equivalent.

c. The Crewmembers of foreign military services who have—1. Completed the course of instruction prescribed by an FAA equivalent or their

country’s aviation organization or service equivalent and have been awarded an appropriate Crewmembers designation.

2. Complied with qualification, training, evaluation, and currency requirements of their service or of this manual for the UAS to be flown.

3. Properly completed a Foreign Service disclaimer.4. Written authorization, including a disclaimer absolving the YCAA from liability

(unless a disclaimer is included under the provisions of an approved exchange program).

Note. Mission and risk approval procedures for these flights, as well as training and evaluation procedures, will be outlined in the unit standing operating procedures (SOPs).

Note. Minimum risk approval authority for these missions will be Airport Operations.

2-2 Crewmembers prohibited from performing unmanned aircraft crewmember dutiesThe following Crewmembers are prohibited from performing Crewmember duties:

a. Crewmembers in non-operational positions.b. Crewmembers attending nonflying courses of instruction of more than 90 days duration.

For reinstatement of qualification or currency requirements, refer to guidance in chapter 4, section I.

c. Those disqualified or temporarily suspended (including medical suspensions) or whose Crewmember status has been administratively terminated.

d. Crewmembers in an authorized leave status.

2-3 Unmanned Aircraft System operator and maintenance checklistsa. The publications and forms required by YCAA for UAS-operations will be physically

present for review by each Crewmember directly involved in the actual flight of the UAS prior to operation of any UAS.

b. The Crewmember operator checklists will be used for all operations—from preflight through post flight—before leaving the UAS. While airborne, the use of the checklist will be accomplished to the extent that the mission requirements and safety will allow. During emergency situations, required checks may be accomplished from memory.


c. Checklists will be used when making maintenance operational checks, maintenance test flights, and daily inspections.

d. Only YCAA-approved and current Crewmember manuals and checklists will be used.

2-7 Local flying rulesa. YCAA based operators will prepare and publish local flying rules. Rules will include the

use of training and maintenance flight areas, arrival and departure routes, and airspace restrictions as appropriate to control the UAS operations in their local flying areas.

b. Local operators may set altitudes based on noise abatement, fly-neighborly policies, or other safety considerations. All Crewmembers will become familiar with and adhere to the appropriate published local area traffic pattern altitudes.

c. Operations outside of DCC airspace will be conducted in accordance with FAA policy.

2-8 Special use airspacea. Operations in Special Use Airspace will be conducted in accordance with instructions

from the owning agency.b. Air traffic control services will be provided by MCAS Yuma ATCC.c. Restricted areas established for the purpose of aircraft and/or unmanned aircraft (UA)

operations may also be activated for UAS operations with prior coordination with appropriate agencies.

2-9 Unmanned Aircraft Systems lighting requirementsa. YCAA based UAS will be illuminated to FAA standards.b. Anti-collision lights will be on when UAS engines are operating.c. Aircraft position lights will be ON between official sunset and sunrise.

2-10 Flight violationsPolicies and procedures for reporting and investigating alleged flight rules violations are—

a. Violations. Any violation of local, state, military or FAA aviation regulation will be reported. Any person witnessing or involved in a flight violation involving civil or military UA, will report the violation as soon as possible. Violations will be reported to the Airport Director of Operations and MCAS Yuma ATCC.

b. Information reported. When reporting an alleged violation, as much information as possible should be given, to include—

1. Type and make of aircraft and/or UA.2. Tail number.3. Name of the mission coordinator (MC).4. Unit assigned, if military.5. Location where aircraft and/or UAS is based.6. Description of alleged violation, including—

(a) Specific reference to regulations violated.(b) What happened.(c) Time and date the alleged violation occurred.


(d) Where the alleged violation occurred.

7. Name and phone number of the individual reporting the alleged violation.8. Names, addresses, and phone numbers of additional witnesses, if any.9. Other pertinent information.

c. Investigation.1. Reports of alleged violations received from the local, state, military or FAA

agencies will be investigated.2. Based on the outcome of the investigation, appropriate administrative or financial

action will be taken.3. The release of all investigation reports, prepared under the provisions of this

manual, is prohibited except in accordance with Public Records Requests for "All Civilian" operations.

4. Requests for investigation reports for any Military related activity will be refered to the Department of Defense in accordance with the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). A copy of the request and a YCAA release will be provided to the Requestor and to the DOD FOIA office.

2-11 Mission approval processYCAA tenants will provide a list of those individuals who are authorized to approve YCAA based UAS operations.

a. Definitions.

1. Initial mission approval authority. YCAA tenants or their designated representatives determine the mission feasibility and either accept or reject the mission for the unit.

2. Final mission approval authority. Final mission approval authority must be on the tenant authorization letter and are responsible for accepting risk and approving all UAS operations within their lease / occupancy. They approve missions for a specific risk level. Individuals with final mission approval authority may only approve those missions where the assessed risk level is commensurate with their command level.

3. Risk assessment worksheets. YCAA tenants will develop local risk assessment worksheets to assess aircrew mission planning and risk. Risk levels are used to elevate items of interest to successive levels of authority for visibility and acceptance.

4. YCAA Form 5484. Copies of the YCAA Form 5484 (Mission Schedule/Brief) will be retained in Airport Operations files with the corresponding risk assessment worksheet for at least 30 days.

b. Mission approval process.

The mission approval process for UAS operations is accomplished in three steps that must be completed prior to mission execution.


1. Step one: Initial mission approval. The initial mission approval authority approves the mission in accordance with the commander’s policies and procedures by considering some of the following factors: alignment with the unit’s mission essential task list, aircraft required and available, availability of required special mission equipment, trained aircrew availability, other training and mission impacts, tactical and threat considerations, and so on. This step is not a detailed hazard and risk analysis for specific flight operations but rather an assessment of the unit’s capability to accomplish the mission. Initial approval may occur at different levels of command depending on how the mission is generated. For example, a mission generated at the brigade level might be accepted by the battalion operations officer while a platoon training mission might be accepted by the company commander.

2. Step two: Mission planning and briefing. This step involves detailed planning, risk assessment, and risk mitigation by the aircrew and review by the briefing officer and/or NCO. Briefing officers are authorized to brief missions regardless of the level of mitigated risk. Self-briefing is not authorized unless approved by the first officer in the grade of O–5 or above in the chain of command. Interaction between crew and briefer is paramount to identify, assess, and mitigate risk for the specific flight or mission. Briefing officers are responsible for ensuring key mission elements are evaluated, briefed, and understood by the MC. Mission briefing officers and/or NCOs will, at a minimum, review and assess the following key areas in the mission planning process:

i The flight is in support of an operational unit mission and has been approved by step one.

ii The crew understands the mission and possesses situational awareness of all tactical, technical, and administrative mission details.

iii Assigned flight crews have been allocated adequate pre-mission planning time and the mission is adequately planned to include performance planning, Notice to Airmen (NOTAM), and coordination with supported units.

iv Assigned flight crews are qualified and current for the mission in accordance with this manual, aircrew information reading file currency, and crew experience appropriate for the mission.

v Forecast weather conditions for the mission—including departure, en route, and arrival weather, meet the requirements of this manual and local directives.

vi Flight crews meet unit crew endurance requirements.vii Procedures in the commander’s risk management program are completed

and mitigated to the lowest level possible.viii Required special mission equipment is operational.

3. Step 3: Final mission approval. Based on the resulting mitigated risk, the appropriate final approval authority reviews the mission’s validity, planning, and risk mitigation and authorizes the flight and/or operation in accordance with the


commander’s policy. The final approval authority indicates authorization for flight by initialing the RAW and the briefing officer initials the YCAA Form 5484 indicating completion of the briefing. Briefing officers and final approval authorities may give oral approval if necessary. If a crewmember changes or a mission parameter changes which increases the resultant risk, the MC will be rebriefed and reapproved as required.

2-12 Noise abatement / Privacya Noise abatement policies will be disseminated by YCAA Airport Operations. YCAA

Tenants will develop and publish local noise abatement programs that minimize aircraft noise footprint on and near the airport and within the local flying area and establish good public relations programs to educate and inform the public.

b When operating in noise sensitive or populated areas, unless required by the mission, all YCAA based aircraft will maintain a minimum of 2,000 feet above the surface of the following: national parks, monuments, recreation areas and scenic river ways administered by the National Parks Service, National Wildlife Refuges, Big Game Refuges, or Wildlife Ranges administered by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, and wilderness and primitive areas administered by the U.S. Forest Service.

c YCAA aviation activities which normally operate in or adjacent to those areas listed in paragraph c, above, may enter into local agreements with the controlling agency to modify procedures required for mission accomplishment.

d UAS operations over populated areas will include specific mission briefing items on privacy.

Chapter 3 Operations and Safety

3-1 GeneralYCAA based UAS will be used for official purposes only.

3-2 Operational use missionsOperational use missions include those missions identified in the tenant lease. These UAS missions included:

a Actual or simulated tactical and/or combat operations.b Unmanned aircraft crewmember training.c Intelligence.d Counter-narcotics activities.e Support to search and rescue.f Research and development.g Maintenance flights.h Flight tests.i Repositioning or reassignment of aircraft.j Special use (humanitarian, disaster relief, and deployments).k Aeronautical research and space and science application.l Exercise command and/or supervision authority.


3-3 Prohibited missionsa YCAA based UAS will not be used to conduct flights for personal use.b YCAA based UAS operations will not be conducted outside of those areas authorized.c YCAA based UAS will not be operated in a manner outside of the definition of public

aircraft.

3-4 Safety functionsYCAA tenants will implement a mishap prevention program.

3-5 Mishap reports, investigations, and release of informationa Procedures for investigating and reporting UAS mishaps are prescribed in the YCAA

emergency plan. (TASK)b Casualties and notifying next of kin of personnel involved in accidents will be handled by

local law enforcement agencies.

3-6 Composite risk managementa YCAA tenants will integrate risk management into UAS mission planning and execution

at every level.b The risk management process begins at mission conception and continues until mission

completion. The process is applied with the goal of eliminating hazards where possible and reducing residual risks to acceptable levels.

3-7 Maintenance flights a Maintenance flights will be conducted per technical manual or appropriate UAS technical

manual guidelines.b Maintenance flights for UAS that have been provided to a contractor, as government-

furnished equipment, will be flown and/or conducted consistent with the provisions of the contract between the government and the contractor.

c The UAS crewmembers performing maintenance flights must be qualified and current.

3-8 Maintenance and operations checka Only authorized personnel will perform maintenance and operational checks on UAS in

accordance with the users current memorandum of agreement and appropriate UAS technical manuals, as applicable.

b System qualified personnel who are authorized to start, run up, and taxi UAS or control stations for the purpose of maintenance operational checks and are not qualified per paragraph 2–1a (1) and (2) will—

1 Undergo appropriate normal and emergency procedures training conducted by an instructor operator in the specific UAS for which the maintenance operational checks are to be performed.

2 Be evaluated semi annually by an instructor operator on all functions they are required to perform.

3 Have written authorization from the tenant. This authorization must specify the operations and checks permitted.

3-9 Requests for performance recordsThe policy for handling requests from tenants for authority to establish performance records by a UAS are handled on a case by case basis. Letters of authorization will allow periodic official


demonstrations of UAS for the purposes of establishing new performance such as speed and endurance records.

3-10 Purpose of performance recordsThe following policies apply to the use of YCAA UAS for the purpose of performance records.

a Only mature UAS will become eligible to establish new performance records. These UAS will be eligible 6 months after the first UAS is designated as authorized to transition Yuma airspace.

b Service requests to engage in public demonstrations to establish performance records and release information on new performance records will be submitted to Airport Operations and must included coordination with —

1 Local DOD agencies if involved.2 With other appropriate departments of the Government (for example, FAA,

Department of Transportation).3 With the National Aeronautics Association.

c. Requests in paragraph b, above, will be accompanied with a description of the specific UAS, full justification of the purpose of the record attempt, flight plans, and information supporting the attempt.

Chapter 4 Training

Section I Training Program and Literature

4-1. GeneralThe UAS Aircrew Training Program (ATP) will be in accordance with the appropriate UAS Aircraft Training Manual (ATM).

4-2. Waivers to training requirementsa Waivers to primary ATP requirements may be granted only by Airport Operations in

cooperation with a written request from the UAS operator.b Waivers will state the specific requirement that is to be waived.c The ATP requirements are waived for Crewmembers assigned to units, commands, or

installations with no UAS assets available. The Crewmember will maintain a current flying duty medical examination in accordance with FAA guidelines.

4–3 PublicationsLocal UAS Operator manuals and checklists are the primary references governing the operation of a specific UAS. Aircrew training manuals, field manuals, technical manuals, and training circulars will be used as required. When differences exist between this manual and other publications, the policy with the safest restrictions have precedence.

4–4 Flight Crew Information Files (FCIF)Units will establish and maintain crewmember training and a FCIF information reading file. Assigned and/or attached crewmember personnel will read and remain familiar with these files.


Reading files will include but are not limited to the local, state and federal publications, appropriate operator’s manuals, local policy letters, and unit and facility SOPs.

4–5 Aircrew Training Programa Local UAS operators must develop and maintain their own UAS Aircrew Training

Program to standardize crewmember training and evaluations.

b The training program outlined in Aircrew Training Manuals is mandatory for all crewmembers assigned to operational flying positions in UAS capable tenant organizations. The training program should include requirements for hours, tasks, and iterations identified in appropriate training manuals. This includes simulator training; and the annual flight examinations. Crewmembers will meet the training program requirements of the tenant organization to which they belong.

4–6 Unmanned aircraft crewmember qualification and refresher traininga Qualification training.

1 Formal training at other locations must be documented in the crewmembers training records.

2 Local transition training will be conducted as part of a formal qualification course.

3 To ensure standardization throughout the Yuma County Airport Authority UAS community, flight training will be conducted using the training and evaluation requirements prescribed in the appropriate UAS ATM.

4 Training a Crewmember in an UAS category other than that in which he or she is qualified to fly and/or operate is permitted only in a formal school course.

5 A statement of completed UAS and/or UAS system qualification (such as, synthetic aperture radar, or Airborne Standoff Minefield Detection System) must be documented in each crewmember’s training records.

b Refresher training. When Crewmembers have not flown within the past 180 days, they will receive refresher training prescribed in the appropriate UAS ATM. When UAS ground crewmembers have not conducted UAS ground crew-member duties within the past 180 days, they will receive refresher training according to the appropriate UAS ATM and technical manuals.

4–7 Annual Proficiency Check a Checkrides will be conducted and documented in accordance with the appropriate ATM.

b Crewmembers who fail to meet flight examination standards will not be authorized to participate in YCAA based UAS flight.

4–8 Emergency procedures trainingTraining in emergency procedures will be conducted per the appropriate ATM. A qualified instructor who is current in that MTDS of UAS will be present and in a position to gain immediate access to the required controls and/or console.


4–9 Hands-on performance test Each Crewmember must successfully complete periodic hands-on performance tests conducted by qualified instructor as applicable, per the appropriate ATM. Hands-on tests are—

a Standardization flight evaluation. The flight consists of flight maneuvers and/or procedures conducted in each primary, additional, and alternate UAS (paragraph 4–15) that a Crewmember is required to operate. The evaluation is conducted to determine the examinee’s ability to perform assigned flight duties. Airport Operations may, on a case-by-case basis, direct use of a compatible UAS flight simulator if circumstances preclude safe, affordable, or timely evaluation in the UAS (except for those external operator (EO) duties requiring actual takeoff and landing performance evaluation). The Standardization Flight Evaluation was designed to determine an operator’s proficiency controlling the UAS and, therefore, cannot be determined without a UAS operator physically being on the controls. A qualified instructor must be at the flight controls when performing their individual standardization flight evaluation. The evaluation will—

1 Be conducted as described in the appropriate ATM.2 Be conducted by a qualified instructor to establish initial qualification in a UAS

series and once each year during the annual checkride.3 Airport Operations may, on a case by case basis, direct use of a compatible UAS

flight simulator if circumstances preclude safe, affordable, or timely evaluation in the UAS (except for those EO duties requiring actual takeoff and landing performance evaluation).

b Proficiency flight evaluation. The evaluation is administered to any Crewmember in an operational flying position in any UAS-series group (paragraph 4–15) or UAS he or she is required to operate. The evaluation will be conducted—

1 At the discretion of Airport Operations.2 By a qualified instructor per the appropriate ATM.3 To determine an individual’s proficiency and/or currency.4 To determine which phase of training is appropriate for entry into or continuing in

the ATP.

Note. No-notice evaluations may be written examinations, oral examinations, UAS flight evaluations, or compatible UAS simulator evaluations.

c Post-mishap flight evaluation. This flight evaluation is administered to a crewmember to determine his or her ability to perform required duties following a UAS mishap. Crewmembers performing crew duties involved in a Class A or B mishap will be suspended from flight duties until successful completion of an evaluation. The evaluation will be conducted in the same type of UAS in which the mishap occurred. Crewmembers performing crew duties involved in a Class C mishap may be suspended from flight duties and required to successfully complete a flight evaluation at the discretion of Airport Operations. A qualified instructor will conduct the evaluation in accordance with the appropriate ATM).


d Medical flight evaluation. This flight evaluation measures a crewmember’s ability to perform required duties after incurring a medical disability. The evaluation will be administered upon the recommendation of the appropriate medical authority. The evaluation of flight duties will be conducted by a qualified instructor in accordance with the appropriate ATM.

4–10 Failure to meet Aircrew Training Program requirementsa Airport Operations will investigate when ATP requirements are not met. Airport

Operations will complete the investigation within 30 days of notification of the failure. After investigating, Airport Operations will—

1 Take one of the following actions:i Authorize up to one 30–day extension in order to complete the

requirements.ii Request a waiver of requirements per paragraph 4–2b.

2 Enter restrictions imposed and extensions granted into the crewmembers training record.

3 Enter extensions and waivers for the Crewmember into that operator’s training record.

4 Restrict the Crewmember from performing AC duties in the UAS until ATP requirements have been successfully completed.

b For primary UAS, if additional time is not granted, or if requirements are not met within the authorized period, Airport Operations will suspend the Crewmember from further Crewmember duties.

c The Crewmember who fails a hands-on performance test will be restricted from performing the duty for which evaluated. The restriction will apply to all UAS with similar operating and handling characteristics as listed in paragraph 4–16. Restrictions will be listed in the operator’s training record and will remain in effect until successful completion of a re-evaluation.

1 When the failure is in the crewmembers primary UAS, Airport Operations will—i Re-designate the individual to the appropriate RL.ii Authorize additional training if necessary.iii For Aircrew Member, payload operator (PO) or External Operator (EO),

re-evaluate or impose a temporary suspension from flying duties.iv For other qualified crewmembers, re-evaluate or remove the individual

from Crewmember duties.2 When the failure is in a crewmember’s additional or alternate UAS, Airport

Operations will—i Re-designate the individual to the appropriate RL.ii Authorize additional training if necessary.iii Re-evaluate, retrain, or restrict the Crewmember from performing duties

in that UAS.


4–11 Unmanned Aircraft System simulator training requirementsAnnual training requirement minimums will be in accordance with the appropriate ATM.

4–12 Aeromedical trainingThe Crewmember will receive aeromedical training per the appropriate ATM.

4–13 Currencya Currency requirements will be according to the appropriate ATM.b The Crewmember whose currency has lapsed must complete a proficiency flight

evaluation according to the appropriate ATM. Simulators may not be used to re-establish currency.

c Night currency requirements will be according to the appropriate ATM.d In areas where extreme environmental conditions may preclude safe operation of UAS

for periods exceeding 120 consecutive days, authorization for use of compatible simulators for maintaining AO currency up to 180 days may be granted by Airport Operations.

4–14 Similar Unmanned Aircraft SystemsCurrency in one series UAS will satisfy the requirement for all UAS within the series or group; separate currency is required for all other UAS. Series UAS with similar operating and handling characteristics are listed in the appropriate ATM.

Section II Unmanned Aircraft System Flight Crewmembers

4–15 Unmanned aircraft crewmembersThis manual establishes general guidelines for formal UAS flight crewmember qualification and training programs. Local UAS instructor operators and safety personnel should review the manual for correctness and applicability and provide AIrport Operations with their input. Local UAS operators will maintain on file in Airport Operations a current list of authorized UAS crewmembers . The crewmember list will specify the UAS duties and crew stations that the Crewmembers are authorized to occupy in accordance with this manual and operator manuals. Flight crews will be evaluated during their annual review period in each flight control crew station at which they are authorized to perform Crewmember duties.

4–16 Pilot in Commanda The Pilot in Command (PIC) of an aircraft is the person flying the aircraft who is

ultimately responsible for its operation and safety. The U.S. CFR Title 14, Part 1, Section 1.1 defines “Pilot in Command" as, "...the person who: (1) Has final authority and responsibility for the operation and safety of the flight; (2) has been designated as pilot in command before or during the flight; and (3) holds the appropriate category, class, and type rating, if appropriate, for the conduct of the flight."

b Local UAS operators will select the PIC based on their experience, maturity, judgment, and ability to effectively mitigate risk to the UAS and to the public. All PICs must be identified on the Local UAS operators crewmember list in Airport Operations. Local UAS operators will establish PIC training and certification programs. To ensure standardization training and certification programs, UAS operators should adhere to this manual and other local, state and federal regulations. The Pilot in Command will be—


1 Responsible and have final authority for operating, servicing, and securing the UAS they command.

2 Selected for each flight or series of flights.3 Qualified, current, and identified on the local operators authorized crewmember

list in the type of UAS to be flown.4 Listed in the flight plan or operation log.5 At a crew station with access to the flight controls.6 The instructor—when evaluating or instructing with access to the flight controls

—will be the commander of the aircraft. 7 Approved according to the mission approval process before each mission.

4–17 Aircrew Member a The Aircrew Member, when designated, will be—

1 At a crew station with access to the controls.2 Qualified and current in the aircraft type. 3 Briefed by the PIC.4 Listed on the flight plan or operation log.

b Flight trainees undergoing training and personnel performing limited cockpit duties according to paragraph 2–4 of this manual may perform AO duties when an instructor is at one set of controls. The instructor must be qualified and current in the type of aircraft being flown.

c When the operator’s manual or mission requires two operators as minimum crew, two operators qualified and current in the type of aircraft to be flown are required. When an instructor qualified in the type of aircraft being flown is at one set of controls, the following additional personnel meet this requirement:

1 Persons undergoing authorized training.2 Personnel performing limited duties according to paragraph 2–1 of this manual.3 Personnel approved by Airport Operations, in writing, when the following

conditions have been met:i Flight is for demonstrating and determining the capabilities of the aircraft.ii Flight will be in visual meteorological conditions (VMC).iii Specific simulated emergency procedures to be conducted will be briefed

and approved.iv light has been approved by Airport Operations. If any of the above

conditions cannot be complied with, a waiver may be requested according to paragraph 1–7 of this manual.

4–18 External operatorThe EO is the UAS crewmember responsible for the actual takeoff and landing of UAS not incorporating an automatic takeoff and landing system.

4–19 Mission coordinatorAirport Operations will select the MC based on recent aviation experience, maturity, judgment, and their abilities for mission situational awareness.Airport Operations will establish the MC training and certification program to ensure standardization and understanding for airspace,


weather, risk mitigation, mission approval process, and the system being employed. The designation of MC is an assignment of responsibility and is not a crew duty assignment. The MC will—

a Be selected for each flight or series of flights.b Participate in the mission approval process along with each AC of each aircraft and may

receive the final mission approval for all crews.c Be listed in the operation log.d Be responsible for crew briefings including mission changes and updates.e Participate in the airport’s no-notice program.

4–20 Instructorsa Instructors will train and evaluate Crewmembers in accordance with the appropriate

ATM.b Instructors must be designated, in writing, by Airport Operations and be qualified and

current in the UAS to be operated.c To become qualified as an instructor, the Crewmember must successfully complete one

of the following:

1 A airport operations approved instructor course in the aircraft category in which instructor duties are to be performed.

2 An instructor equivalency evaluation, administered by Airport Operations, in the aircraft category in which instructor duties are to be performed.

3 In the absence of a qualification course for the UAS, additional instructor qualification procedures will be developed by AIrport Operations for UA instructors who are already qualified per paragraph 4–22c (1) or (2) of this manual.

d The UAS with test flight procedures published in an appropriate ATM will be test flown by qualified maintenance instructors.

e Qualified maintenance instructors must be designated, in writing, by Airport Operations. They must be qualified and current in the UAS to be flown and meet standardization requirements of the appropriate ATM.

f Maintenance qualified instructors must comply with procedures in the appropriate UAS maintenance test flight manual.

g Contractor maintenance operators will be qualified in accordance with the provisions of YCAA 95–20.

4–21 Crew chiefThe crew chief is a ground crewmember who is required to perform duties that are essential to the flight operations of the UAS. The crew chief is responsible for coordinating actions of all ground crewmembers and will coordinate all actions as directed by the commander of the aircraft. Crew chiefs will be selected based on their level of experience, maturity, judgment, and ability to effectively mitigate risk to the aircraft and ground crewmembers. They will—

a Meet the requirements of paragraph 4–26c, below.b Be selected for each flight and/or series of flights.


c Be trained to perform crew chief duties according to the appropriate ATM.d Be designated, in writing, by AIrport Operations.e Train and evaluate crew chiefs and other ground crewmembers designated according to

paragraph 4–26c, below.f Assist the instructors with supervision and management of the ground crewmember

training program.

4–22 Unmanned Aircraft System ground crewmembera The UAS ground crewmembers (mechanics and technicians) that perform duties on the

UAS that are essential to specific phases of the maintenance mission will be—

1 Qualified to perform UAS and/or aviation maintenance operations.2 Trained to perform their duties in accordance with appropriate technical manuals.3 If required to perform duties as a technical inspector, designated (in writing) by

the Airport Operations.

b The UAS ground crewmembers that are authorized to start and runup for maintenance operational checks (mechanics and technicians) will—

1 Undergo appropriate normal and emergency procedures training conducted by an instructor.

2 Be qualified to perform UAS operations.3 Be evaluated semi-annually by an instructor on all functions they are required to

perform.4 Be trained by an instructor to perform their duties in accordance with appropriate

technical manuals.5 Have written authorization from Airport Operations. This authorization must

specify the tasks to be performed and will be posted in their training record.

c The UAS ground crewmembers (operators, crew chief, mechanics, and technicians) that perform duties on the UAS that are essential to specific phases of the flight mission will—

1 Undergo appropriate normal and emergency procedures training conducted by an instructor.

2 Be qualified to perform UAS operations.3 Be evaluated semi-annually by a crew chief or instructor on all functions they are

required to perform.4 Have written authorization from the Airport Operations. This authorization must

specify the tasks to be performed and will be posted in their training record.5 Be trained by an instructor or crew chief to perform their duties in accordance

with the appropriate ATM and technical manuals.

4–23 Unmanned Aircraft System ground observera The ground observer is trained to assist the AC in the duties associated with collision

avoidance, including but not limited to, avoidance of other traffic, clouds, obstructions, and terrain.


1 They are responsible for the visual deconfliction of airspace for UA while operating in the National Airspace System when required.

2 Aids to vision, such as binoculars, field glasses, or telephoto television may be employed as long as their field of view does not adversely affect the surveillance task.

3 The visual limitation will specify both a lateral and vertical distance and shall be regarded as a maximum distance from the observer where a determination of a conflict with another aircraft can be made. This distance is predicated on the observer’s normal unaided vision. Corrective lenses, spectacles, and contact lenses may be used.

4 Ground observers will also abide by the rules and regulations set forth in 14 CFR 91.17.

5 For duties as a ground observer, the inability to distinguish and identify without confusion the color of an object, substance, material, or light that is uniformly colored a vivid red or vivid green is disqualifying.

b Airport Operations will develop and publish policies and procedures for ground observers. Airport Operations will establish a training and certification program for ground observers to ensure standardization and understanding of the mission and airspace management process for personnel defined in paragraphs (1) through (7), below. When required for operations, the ground observer will attend the mission brief and be in place at the required observer position prior to takeoff and/or launch operations. Ground observer training will include at a minimum, but not limited to—

1 Identifying hazards to flight, communicating hazards, and advising the AC on actions to avoid mishaps.

2 Establishing two-way communication with the controlling shelter.3 Distinguishing airfield layout and usable runways, populated and/or congested

areas, dimensions of airfield airspace, Special Use Airspace surrounding the home airfield, and points of contact for ATC.

4 Determining typical approach and departure patterns for the UAS, as well as airfield traffic patterns.

5 Understanding radio calls and procedures, and call signs required for flight operations.

6 Knowing UAS and manned aircraft lighting requirements.7 Being familiar with the radio and having observer position orientation.

c All observers must have an understanding of applicable federal aviation, ICAO, host-nation regulations, and DOD FLIP applicable to the airspace where the UA will operate. Observers must not perform crew duties for more than one UAS at a time. Observers are not allowed to perform concurrent duties both as operator and observer.

d Ground observers will be evaluated semi-annually.


Section III Standardization

4–24 Unmanned Aircraft System Standardization Programa The YCAA’s UAS Standardization Program is designed to ensure a high degree of safety

while engaging in UAS operations. The standardization of flight operations will be achieved by employment of standard Crewmember tasks and the use of standard publications and checklists.

b UAS operators will—

1 Implement standardization policies and procedures.2 Ensure that YCAA based UAS are operated according to standard procedures in

ATMs and operator’s manuals.3 Designate instructors, examiners, evaluators, and unit trainers in support of

installations standardization committees.4 Ensure that required training, tests, and flight evaluations have been completed.5 Review and approve policies of standardization programs.

c The UAS unit SOP will be reviewed by the Airport Operations Director or his designated representative..

4–25 Airport Standardization and Evaluation Inspection Programa The Airport Standardization Evaluation Inspection (Stan Eval ) program assists Airport

Operations Director in assessing the compliance of aviation tenants. The Stan Eval team evaluates the management of aviation programs, provides staff assistance, and identifies internal and systemic issues for resolution. The focus of Stan Eval includes all aviation components and will be conducted on all UAS operators / tenants. The evaluation teams may be augmented by subject matter experts from other organizations as necessary to provide additional manpower or supplement YCAA expertise.

b Airport Operations may use their own teams or designate another agency to conduct the Stan Eval for them. The Stan Eval teams will be composed of subject matter experts.

c The Operations Director or his designated Stan Eval team will maintain a Stan Eval guide that outlines all applicable functional areas to be evaluated. As a minimum, the areas to be evaulated will include: flight operations, standardization, logistics, maintenance, safety, petroleum operations, training, airfield operations, and air traffic services.

d An evaluation will be conducted for all operators and tenants every 24 months or as directed by Airport Operations.

e The Stan Eval findings will be provided to the evaluated operators/tenants and YCAA management team upon completion.

Chapter 5 Flight Procedures and Rules

5–1 Generala All personnel engaged in the operation of UAS aboard Yuma International Airport will

comply with applicable—


1 Federal aviation regulations, laws, and rules.2 The ICAO regulations.3 The DOD FLIP.4 Aircraft crewmember’s manuals and checklists.

b Smoking and/or open flames are prohibited in, or within 50 feet of, all UAS.

c Aircraft must be grounded during refueling and loading or unloading of flammable or explosive cargo. Aircraft will be grounded for maintenance according to the appropriate maintenance publication.

d Flight data recorders.1 Cockpit voice recorders (CVRs), flight data recorders (FDRs), and digital source

collectors (DSCs) that are installed on aircraft and in control stations should be operational for all flights. However, a non-operational CVR, FDR, or DSC should not result in the cancellation of a flight. Information collected by these devices may be classified or sensitive in nature and should be identified as such.

2 In the event of a lost aircraft, all efforts for recovery must go through Air Operations and/or the FAA’s NTSB. Flight data information will be subject to inspection by the NTSB.

5–2 PreflightBefore beginning a flight, Crewmembers will acquaint themselves with the UAS mission, procedures, and rules.

a Planning. The operator will evaluate aircraft performance, departure, en route and approach data, NOTAM, and appropriate FLIP or DOD publications.

b Fuel requirements. At takeoff, the aircraft must have enough fuel to reach the destination and alternate airport (if required) and have a planned fuel reserve of—

1 Vertical takeoff and landing.i Visual flight rules (VFR) – 20 minutes at cruise.ii Instrument flight rules (IFR) – 30 minutes at cruise.

2 Fixed wing.i VFR (day) – 30 minutes at cruise.ii VFR (night) or IFR – 45 minutes at cruise.

Note. If the appropriate technical manual for an aircraft requires a higher value, or if cruise fuel requirement cannot be determined, technical manual requirements will be applied.

c Flight weather planning. Operators will obtain departure, en route, destination, and alternate (if used) weather information before takeoff.

1 Flight into icing conditions. Aircraft will not be flown into known or forecast severe icing conditions. If a flight is to be made into known or forecast moderate icing conditions, the aircraft must be equipped with adequate operational deicing or anti-icing equipment.


2 Flight into turbulence. Aircraft will not be intentionally flown into known or forecast extreme turbulence or into known severe turbulence. Aircraft will not be intentionally flown into forecast severe turbulence.

i Weather information will be based on area forecasts.ii Flights will be made in areas where encountering severe turbulence is

unlikely.3 Flight into thunderstorms. Aircraft will not be intentionally flown into

thunderstorms.4 VFR flight. Destination weather must be forecast to be equal to or greater than

VFR minimums at estimated time of arrival (ETA) through one hour after ETA. When there are intermittent weather conditions, predominant weather will apply.

5 IFR flight. Destination weather must be forecast, at ETA through 1 hour after ETA, to be not less than—

i Ceiling 400 feet above the decision point as listed in the operator’s manual.

ii Visibility 1 mile (1.61 kilometers).Note. When there are intermittent weather conditions, predominant weather will apply.

6 Area forecast. If there is no weather reporting service, the aviator may use the area forecast.

d Flight plan. Aircraft will file a flight plan prior to all flights. FAA Form 7233–1 can be obtained from Air Operations.

1 All tenant UAS that are instrumented for IFR flight and are flown by an instrument-rated operator will operate on IFR flight plans except when—

i Flight is primarily for VFR training.ii Time will not permit mission completion under IFR.iii Mission can only be accomplished under VFR.iv Excessive ATC departure, en route, or terminal area delays are

encountered.2 Note. Hazardous weather conditions must be avoided.3 Locally produced operation logs may be used for local flights.

e Alternate airfield planning. An alternate airfield is required when filing IFR to a destination under any of the following conditions:

1 The predominant weather at the destination is forecast, at ETA through 1 hour after ETA, to be less than—

i Ceiling 400 feet above the decision point as listed in the operator’s manual.

ii Visibility 1 mile (1.61 kilometers).2 An alternate is not required if descent from en route minimum altitude for IFR

operation, approach, and landing can be made in VFR conditions.

f Alternate airfield selection. An alternate airfield may be selected when the worst weather condition for that airfield is forecast for ETA through 1 hour after ETA to be equal to or greater than ceiling 400 feet above the decision point as listed in the


operator’s manual and visibility 1 mile (1.61 kilometers) or VFR minimums and descent from en route minimum altitude for IFR operation, approach, and landing can be made in VFR conditions.

g Equipment requirements. Aircraft and Global Positioning System (GPS) that have been certified for IFR flight according to airworthiness release using GPS for approaches may execute these approaches under IFR conditions.

h Weight and balance. The AC will ensure—1 The accuracy of computations on the DD Form 365–4 (Weight and Balance

Clearance Form F–Transport).2 The DD Form 365–4 is on file and accessible to the flight crew for the aircraft to

be flown.3 The weight and center of gravity will remain within allowable limits for the entire

flight. Several DD Forms 365–4 completed for other loadings also may be used to satisfy this requirement. In this case, the actual loading being verified must clearly be within the extremes of the loading shown on the DD Forms 365–4 used for verification.

5–3 Departure proceduresa All operators will comply with published nonstandard IFR takeoff minimums and

published UA departure procedures. Runway visual range may be used when takeoff is made from the runway for which runway visual range is reported.

b Special VFR flights within and departures from the Class D and E airspace are according to the procedures set forth by Air Operations.

5–4 En route proceduresa Instrument meteorological conditions. During instrument meteorological conditions

(IMC) flight, all instruments and communication equipment in the GCS will be kept in the “on” position and immediately available for use.

b Over-the-top flights. Aircraft will not be flown above a cloud or fog layer under VFR for more than 30 minutes unless—

1 The UA and crew are authorized to conduct IMC flight.2 All instrument flight rules and requirements can be met for the remaining flight.

c Communications1 IFR. Reports and radio phraseology will conform to DOD FLIP.2 VFR. Operators will monitor appropriate frequencies and make position reports as

required.d Over flying sensitive areas. Operators shall avoid over flight of national security areas

and wildlife conservation areas below 2,000 feet above ground level (AGL). Exceptions will be according to instructions in DOD FLIP.

5–5 Arrival proceduresa Approach. An approach may be initiated, regardless of ceiling and visibility.b Missed approach. The procedures as directed by ATC will be flown. Additional

approaches may be flown provided fuel, including reserve, is adequate. An ATC


clearance must be requested and approved before proceeding to another airfield. A change of flight plan will be made according to FLIP if time permits.

c Traffic patterns.1 Fixed-wing aircraft will be flown at 1200 feet above the surface of the airport

unless deviation is required to maintain proper cloud clearance. Exceptions will be as prescribed in FLIP or as directed by ATC.

2 Helicopter traffic patterns at Army heliports and airfields are normally flown at 700 feet AGL. At other airports, helicopters and vertical takeoff and landing aircraft will avoid the flow of airplane traffic.

d Landing. An aircraft will not be flown to the designated minimum safe altitude established for that system by the operator’s manual, local SOP for the airfield of intended landing, or as directed by ATC unless the following exist:

1 The approach threshold of the runway, or the approach lights or other markings, identifiable with the approach end of the runway or landing area, must be visible through onboard optical systems to the operator.

2 The aircraft must be in a position from which a safe approach to the runway or landing area can be made.

e Closing flight plans. When the flight terminates, the AC will ensure that the flight plan is closed as shown in DOD FLIP.

5–6 Emergency recovery proceduresEmergency recovery procedures will be developed as a contingency plan for IMC. Recovery procedures will be developed using approved DOD and/or U.S. Government procedures in the area of operations and will be coordinated with the servicing ATC. In locations without approved DOD and/or U.S. Government procedures, an emergency recovery procedure will be developed and coordinated with the servicing ATC. Pending approval, these recovery procedures will only be used in VMC or during an actual emergency. The risk associated with the recovery procedure will be mitigated through the mission approval process and further defined in Operations SOP. Manual entry of waypoint data is permissible when using emergency GPS procedures. Flight in IMC which violates FAA or ICAO regulations will be considered deviations according to paragraph 1–6 of this manual and will be treated according to paragraph 2–11 of this manual.

5–7 Use of airports, heliports, and other landing areasa The Crewmembers may operate UAS at airports and heliports classified as military,

Federal Government, or public only if the facility is suitable for operations and necessary Special Use Airspace (see paragraph 2–9) provisions have been implemented.

b Air Operations may authorize the use of other temporary landing areas off military reservations and Government-leased training areas. They must first obtain approval of the landowner or the approving authority and comply with the landing area requirements of the state. AIr Operations will consult with the appropriate agencies.

c Air Operations will set policies on the use of UAS landing sites on military reservations and field training areas.

d In the event of emergency conditions necessitating landing at other than approved landing facilities, Crewmembers should be aware that they may be charged for use of private facilities on public airports.


Chapter 6 Safety of Flight Messages and Aviation Safety Action Messages

6–1 Generala The SOF messages pertain to any defect or hazardous condition, actual or potential,

where a high risk safety condition or select medium risk safety conditions exist as determined in accordance with appropriate regulations.

b The ASAs pertain to any defect or hazardous condition, actual or potential, where a low risk safety condition or select medium risk safety conditions exist as determined in accordance with appropriate regulations. The ASAs convey maintenance, technical or general information, which will not require risk-mitigating actions, performed before the next flight and/or ground operations.

6–2 Exception to provisions of safety messagea Air Operations may authorize temporary exemption from safety message requirements.

Exemptions may only occur when matter of life or death in civil disasters or other emergencies are so urgent that they override the consequences of continued UA operation.

b Requests for waivers are submitted through the requesting operators/tenants to Air Operations.

c Air Operations is the approving authority for waivers to provisions of safety messages.

Chapter 7 Weight and Balance

7–1 OverviewThe UA platforms shall be within weight and balance limitations (as specified in the appropriate UAS operator’s manual) for the entire duration of a flight.

a Air Operations will supervise the direction of operator and tenant activities involving UA weight and balance.

b Air Operations shall monitor the overall training of UA weight and balance (paragraph 1–4j (2)).

c AIr Operations is the technical proponent for all operators and tenants weight and balance. Air Operations will—

1 Establish UA weight and balance requirements and procedures in coordination with all appropriate agencies.

2 Assist the AIrfield Manager in the development of UA weight and balance policy.3 Prepare and make technical data available on UA weight and balance.4 Procure and deliver weight and balance data for UAS operating under it’s area of

jurisdiction.5 Make engineering services available to assist service activities in solving UA

weight and balance problems.6 Provide technical assistance to contracting authorities in the certification of

civilian contractor qualifications for weight and balance.d Air Operations will—

1 Ensure effective application of these policies and procedures.2 Develop directives to implement these policies and procedures.3 Appoint, in writing, qualified weight and balance technicians.


7–2 Aircraft weight and balance classificationsa Civilian contractor weight and balance technician qualifications shall be verified by the

contracting authority.b Weight and balance technicians will—

1 Prepare and maintain up-to-date and accurate individual UA weight and balance files as described in paragraph 7–4, below, for all UA under their jurisdiction.

2 Perform the required review of individual UA weight and balance files as described in paragraph 7–6, below, for all UA under their jurisdiction.

3 Comply with UA weight and balance provisions of applicable modification work orders or technical manuals pertaining to UA modifications.

4 Provide training and assistance in the use of UA weight and balance data and load adjuster devices, when applicable.

5 Assure UA under their jurisdiction are weighed according to paragraph 7–7, below.

7–3 Unmanned aircraft weight and balance classificationsProper weight and balance classifications are stated in the appropriate operator’s manual and are defined as follows:

a Class 1a UA: recommended weight or center-of-gravity limits cannot be exceeded by loading arrangements normally employed in tactical operations and, therefore, need no loading control.

b Class 1b UA: weight or center-of-gravity limits sometimes can be exceeded by loading arrangements normally used in tactical operations. Therefore, limited loading control is needed.

c Class 2 UA: weight or center-of-gravity limits can be readily exceeded by loading arrangements normally used in tactical operations. Therefore, a high degree of loading control is needed. Also, all UA where weight and balance class is not stated in the operator’s manual shall be considered Class 2.

7–4 Unmanned aircraft weight and balance filea A weight and balance file is required for all Class 1b UA and Class 2 UA. This file shall

contain all of the UA’s weight and balance data. The UA designation and serial number shall be noted on the file folder. Each UA shall have its own file that shall be maintained in the historical files as well as a copy of the DD Form 365–4 in the logbook at the launch and recovery site during all UA launch and recovery operations.

b The file shall include the following forms and charts which shall be completed and retained in accordance with instructions of appropriate manuals.

1 DD Form 365 (Record of Weight and Balance Personnel).2 DD Form 365–1 (Chart A – Basic Weight Checklist Record).3 DD Form 365–2 (Form B – Aircraft Weighing Record).4 DD Form 365–3 (Chart C – Basic Weight and Balance Record).5 Chart E (Loading Data and Special Weighing Instructions). The original Chart E

placed in the weight and balance file by the UA manufacturer shall be retained in the file until a revised Chart E is presented in the UAS maintenance manual.


Following publication of the Chart E in the maintenance manual, the Chart E in the UA file shall no longer be required and shall be destroyed locally.

6 DD Form 365–4. Sufficiently completed DD Forms 365–4 shall be in the file, enabling the AO to determine proper UA loading for any normal anticipated unit mission and verify that the weight and center of gravity shall remain within allowable limits for the entire flight.

c Electronic computer data sheets may be used instead of any of the DD Form 365-series when information is identical to that required on the DD 365-series. Any computer data sheets which meet this requirement may be used.

7–5 Removal, addition, or relocation of unmanned aircraft equipmentWhen the UAS equipment that is part of UA’s basic weight is added to, removed from, or relocated within the UA because of maintenance or specific mission requirements, flight in this changed configuration shall not be accomplished unless the weight and balance change is documented by one of the following methods:

a Treating the additions, removals, or relocations as a permanent change by making entries on the DD Form 365–3 and establishing a new basic weight and moment. Also, if the change in basic weight or moment is beyond the limits stated in appropriate manuals, prepare new DD Forms 365–4 that reflect the new basic weight and moment to replace those in the weight and balance file.

b If the changes are of a temporary nature, make entries in accordance with appropriate regulation for a period not to exceed 90 days. Temporary equipment changes shall be considered changes in aircraft loading. These changes shall be entered in the “Corrections” table of the DD Form 365–4.

7–6 Reviewing the weight and balance filea Review of the weight and balance file is required for all Class 1b UA and Class 2 UA.

All DD Forms 365–4 in the UA weight and balance file shall be checked for accuracy in accordance with the criteria established in appropriate maintenance manual at least every 90 days. New forms must be prepared if changes are required. If no changes are required, the DD Forms 365–4 shall be re-dated and initialed in the date block to certify their currency.

b In addition, all weight and balance records shall, as a minimum, be reviewed every 12 months. The date due window shall follow appropriate manual requirements for recurring special inspections. This review must include a weight and balance inventory of the UA and the following statement entered on the DD Form 365–3: “Annual review and inventory completed.” The date and adjusted basic weight and moment shall accompany this entry.

7–7 Unmanned aircraft weighinga Each Class 1b UA and Class 2 UA shall be weighed when—

1 Overhaul or major airframe repairs have been accomplished.2 Modifications of 1 percent or greater of the UA’s basic weight have been applied.3 Any modifications or component replacements (including painting) have been

made for which the weight and center of gravity cannot be accurately computed.


4 Weight and center-of-gravity data records are suspected to be in error.5 The period since the previous weighing reaches 36 months for a Class 1b UA and

24 months for a Class 2 UA. The date due reweigh window shall follow appropriate maintenance manual requirements for a recurring special inspection.

b The weight records (365-series forms) supplied with a new UA may be used instead of an initial weighing.

c If these weighing requirements are not met, the UA status shall change to RED “X” until they are met.

d Any maintenance facility providing weighing service shall ensure that all UA weighing equipment under its jurisdiction has been tested and certified for accuracy according to specified technical manuals and at the intervals required.

Part 2 - UAS Safety

1. Hazard Recognition and Risk Reduction CriteriaThe DCC has established multiple criteria to examine flight safety to ensure a thorough review. Different viewpoints reduce the risk of unrecognized hazards and help to quickly identify and isolate deficiencies. The criteria are used to break up the “safe to fly?” question into a series of presuppositions:

1.01 Risk ManagementDCC procedures are based on guidance from safety specialists, existing reference standards and policies, and established procedures from ranges that routinely support UAV operations. Final authority to conduct a test or operation on a range rests with the Director of Operations or his or her designated representative. Our experience and policies help us establish definitive criteria for making this risk decision.

1.02 Why Risk Management is Required

1.02.1 ReferencesThese criteria can be compared to industry best practices and to what a reasonable person would do in similar circumstances. The technology and performance limits of unmanned aircraft systems continue to progress at a rapid pace. Our corresponding range safety methods, standards, and procedures must keep up with these changes. Our policies are never considered absolute and will be updated regularly.

1.02.2 ApproachRisk management is a process used by decision-makers to handle potentially hazardous operations. The objective of the risk management process is to ensure hazards are identified, evaluated and eliminated or to ensure that the associated risks are reduced to an acceptable level. Risk Management Criteria is a tool that we use to manage our UAV risk management program to ensure our safety criteria is met.

We apply risk management as a systematic approach performed on the complete system. We integrate the results as early as possible because risks are more easily managed in the planning stages of UAS operations. With adequate hazard analysis, Airport Operations can make informed decisions and apply the appropriate level of restrictions.


1.03 The Risk Management ProgramWhen our user's risk management program meets our criteria, they can avoid additional analysis that can become significant cost. On the other hand, if our user’s risk management program is not adequate, we can apply our criteria to focus on specific problem areas.

The hazards associated with the proposed UAV operations have been explicitly stated based on lessons learned and hazard analysis. Vulnerability to unidentified risk is reduced through hazard analysis efforts.

It is critical that both the DCC management structure and the user possess a technical and operational understanding of potential UAV system hazards to operate safely. This information also enables safety personnel to identify potential system hazards and review the existing hazard controls. Without explicitly identifying system hazards, the entire operation becomes vulnerable to hazards that may be present but are not recognized.


1.1 Hazards IdentifiedHazards associated with the proposed UAV operation can be identified based on system knowledge, hazard analysis, past experience, and lessons learned. The format used to identify the hazards is not critical, only that the hazards be clearly identified. Examples of documents that may identify hazards include hazard lists, hazard analyses, and user manuals. Tables 1.1-1 through 1.1-5 list generic hazard conditions and vehicle failure modes which can lead to loss of the UAV, a midair collision, serious injury, and/or death. The background information summarized in these tables is based on mishap data as well as UAV hazard analyses. These tables are generic, not all-inclusive, and may or may not apply to a specific vehicle or situation.

Table 1.1-1 Hazardous Conditions Which May Result in Uncontrolled Flight

Hazardous Condition

Cause

Loss of propulsion ● Engine failure● Fuel starvation● Stuck throttle● Icing: / weather

Loss of lift ● Structural failure● Icing: / weather

Loss of heading / attitude / position information

● Heading / attitude system failure

● Navigation system failure

Unplanned loss of link

● Radio frequency interference

● Flight beyond horizon

● Antenna masking● Loss of ground

control station● Software interrupt

between ground control station and air vehicle

● Atmospheric attenuation

● Inadvertent deactivation of autopilot

● Loss of satellite link

Loss of control ● Stuck servo


surface performance ● Autopilot failure● Icing / damage to

control surface

Loss of UAV electrical power

● Generator failure● Backup battery

failure● Excessive load

from payload

Loss of ground control station (GCS)

● Loss of GCS power

● GCS transmitter/ receiver / antenna failure

● GCS computer failure

Some mishaps occur when the vehicle impacts the ground even though the vehicle is still capable of controlled flight. This category of mishap is referred to as “controlled flight into terrain.”

Table 1.1-2 Hazardous Conditions Which May Result in Controlled Flight Into Terrain

Hazardous Condition

Cause

Mission planning error or operator error

● Flight below minimum enroute altitude

● Undetected man-made obstacles (towers, cables)

Altitude error ● Incorrect barometer setting

● Inadequate alert for altitude deviation

Navigation error ● Nav system failure

● Nav system discrepancy (INS vs. GPS)

● Map Display Inaccuracy


Failure to see and avoid terrain

● No capability● Autonomous

operation

Loss of link "fly home" mode

● Mission planning error for loss of link mode

Table 1.1-3 potential hazardous conditions and causes related to a mid-air collision with other aircraft.

Hazardous Condition

Cause

Navigation error ● Nav system failure

● Nav system discrepancy (INS vs. GPS)

● Map display inaccuracy

Altitude error ● Incorrect barometer setting

● Inadequate alert for altitude deviation

Unable to "see-and-avoid"

● Limited capability● Autonomous

operation

Mission planning error

● Inadvertent flight into established routes of other aircraft

Not seen by other aircraft

● Strobe / position lights inadequate or fail

● IFF failure● TCAS failure● ATC/UAV

operator comm link failure

Mishaps during takeoff and landing are a significant percentage of all UAV mishaps.


Table 1.1-4. Hazards resulting in takeoff and/or landing mishaps

Hazardous condition

Cause

Pilot induced oscillation

System latency

Automatic landing system failure

RFIHandoff errorsMissed approach procedures

Operator error Outside weather / wind limitsInternal pilot / external pilot handoff errors

Some factors can contribute to or exacerbate hazardous conditions and increase the chance of a mishap given that a hazardous condition exists. Table 1.1-5 lists some potential contributing factors and their causes.

Table 1.1-5. Contributing factors potentially resulting in vehicle loss

Contributing factor Cause

Inadequate operator response ● Failure to recognize flight critical situation● Flight-critical information missing,

erroneous, or ambiguous● Delays in information flow

Incorrect inputs of flight critical parameters ● Operator entry errors

Operator information overload ● Tasking requirements versus time available

● Sensory overload over time

Critical information unavailable, inadequate, blocked, etc.

● Design dependent

Latency of flight control commands ● Operator far removed from control loop● Non-deterministic software● Control link through satellite●

Operator fatigue ● Inadequate crew rest


● Task saturation● Long / boring mission

Control of multiple UAVs ● Workload issues

Software paths to unsafe state ● Unexpected reboot● Inadequate software safety process

The checklist in Appendix I Management Control Evaluation Checklist can also be used to help determine if there are any significant omissions from the range user’s risk management program. This list is not intended to be all inclusive for all UAV, missions/operations, or ranges but is provided as a basic guide or starting point.

1.2 Hazards Assessed.A hazard analysis must be performed and documented. This document shall include the level of risk associated with identified hazards. Once hazards are identified they should be expressed in terms of severity and probability of occurrence. This analysis allows the range and range users to focus on hazards which are critical and devote less attention to those that are clearly insignificant. The range may justify accepting some risks without controls if the severity is low, the probability is negligible, or the Director of Operations determines if the benefits outweigh the costs. If hazards are not assessed in terms of risk (severity and probability), unnecessary requirements may be placed upon the user or the range may accept undue risk.Severity assessment should be based on the worst credible outcome that can be reasonably expected. For range safety purposes, the severity of the hazard should be determined by its potential impact on people, property, and the environment. Measures of severity for program management can also consider system loss and degradation or mission loss. Severity categories are defined to provide a qualitative measure of the hazards severity. Table 1.2-1 lists common definitions for severity categories.

Table 1.2-1 Hazard Severity Categories

Description

Level Effect on people

Effect on Property

Environ

mental

Effects

Catastrophic

I Death, permanent disability

Greater

than $1

million

severe

Cr II Sever $200, majo


itical

e injury, permanent partial disability, hospitalization for 5 or more people

000 to $1 million

r

Marginal

III Minor injury, 1 or more lost workdays

$10,000 to $200,000

minor

Negligible

IV Less than minor injury

less than

$10,000

less than mino

r

A probability must be assigned to each identified cause of a hazard. A qualitative possibility may be assigned early in the mission planning stages and can be combined with the severity category to determine an initial risk assessment. The Risk Assessment Matrix in Figure 1.2-3 may be used to prioritize resources to evaluate and resolve hazards. The following are generally accepted definitions for probability.

Table 1.2-2. Hazard probability levels

Description

Level Incidents per 100,000 flight

Individual exposure rate

Fleet or inventory exposure rate


hours( note 1)

Frequent

A 100 or more Likely to occur frequently

Continuously experienced

Probable

B 10 to 99 Will occur several times in the life of an item

Will occur frequently

Occasional

C 1 to 9.9 Likely to occur sometime in the life of an item

Will occur several times

Remote

D 0.1 to 0.99 Unlikely but possible to occur in the life of an item

Unlikely but can reasonably be expected to occur

Improbable

E Lless than 0.1 So unlikely, it can be assumed occurrence will not be experienced

Unlikely to occur, but possible

1.3 Control Measures and Risk Decisions.Control measures to reduce risks to an acceptable level are identified.

Risks that are unacceptable in terms of severity and/or probability need to be controlled. The user must help identify specific strategies, tools, or safeguards to eliminate or reduce the risk to a level acceptable to the range.

The desired order of precedence for implementing control measures is as follows:● Design for minimum risk. Eliminate the hazard.● Incorporate safety devices.● Provide warning devices.● Develop procedures and training.

1.3.1 Design for Minimum Risk.The best way to control a hazard is to eliminate it by changing the design or adjusting the test and/or training requirements. If the hazard cannot be eliminated, design changes may reduce the risk to an acceptable level. Some examples of design or requirement changes, which may eliminate or reduce risk include:

● Including a highly reliable engine in the UAV design reduces the risk of loss of propulsion.

● Designing a series of tests with a gradual buildup in risk reduces the chance of sudden unexpected catastrophic failure.

● Confining test flights to an unpopulated area eliminates risk to people on the ground.● Designing a low-level route that avoids populated areas reduces risk of ground casualties

from system failures.


● Establishing policy to avoid icing conditions if the vehicle would be at risk in such conditions reduces the risk of icing induced loss of lift or loss of propulsion.

1.3.2 Incorporate Safety Devices.If the hazard cannot be eliminated through design change, fixed or automatic safety devices should be incorporated. Provisions for periodic functional checks for these safety devices should be instituted. Examples of safety devices include:

● Back-up battery in case of generator failure● Redundant communications link in case of failure of the primary link● Software “fly-home” routine in case of lost link● Independent flight termination systems

1.3.3 Provide Warning Devices.If the risk cannot be reduced adequately through design change or use of safety devices, warning devices that detect the hazardous condition and alert personnel of the hazard can be used. Procedures for functional checks of these warning devices should be incorporated.Examples of warning devices are:

● Engine performance safety data displays at the ground control station (i.e., overtemp alert)

● Strobe lights to make the UAV easier to see● “Low fuel” warning lights● Warning calls from air traffic control when the vehicle is approaching other traffic or

hazard/flight boundaries

1.3.4 Develop Procedures and Training.If it is impractical to eliminate hazards or reduce risk adequately through design changes or safety and warning devices, procedures and training can be used. Safety-critical procedures should be standardized and documented. Tasks and activities that are safety-critical may require certification of personnel proficiency. Examples of safety-related procedures and training include:

● Pre-flight checklists● Published cautions and warnings● Emergency procedures● Specific operating limits● Established operator qualification procedures● Requirements for personal protective equipment in specific situations (i.e., hearing

protection).Procedures and training should not be used as the only risk reduction methods for high risk hazards.

1.4 Hazard Controls.Control measures used in the hazard analysis are incorporated into range users test plan or procedure document.

The range user must show that identified control measures are incorporated, understood, and documented. If required, test procedures and monitoring of the control measures must be certified and in place. If the control measures are not implemented, or the implementation is not effective or sufficient, the hazard is still present. If hazards still exist after all control measures


are in place, the first step is to re-evaluate the hazard and control measures and verify that nothing was missed and no other solutions are available. Once this process has been established, documentation of all hazards, their respective control measures, and any remaining risks and recommendations must be presented to the appropriate level of authority for a waiver.

The deciding authority will consider the benefits versus the risks to decide whether a waiver will be granted.

1.5 Supervision.Follow-up evaluations of the control measures are planned in order to ensure effectiveness. Adjustments will be made before continuing with the test or operation. Independent review and approval of the documentation, hazard analysis, hazard controls, and test procedures and monitoring must take place prior to the test or operation. This monitoring of safety limits must take place on a continuing basis for each test and/or operation.

1.6 Alternatives If the Risk Management Criteria Are Not Met.lf normal risk management criteria are not met, the following alternatives may be exercised.

● Range may re-evaluate the hazard analysis incorporating changes such as flight parameters, flight path, and new information from the user.

● Range may impose restriction to planned flight to control identified risk.● Range may require additional control measures or safeguards to control identified risk.● User can request a waiver from the Director of Operations.● User may not get permission to fly on this range.

2. Casualty Expectation CriteriaFive separate criteria are used to determine if a UAV is safe to fly on a particular range. The first criterion, risk management, addresses the question “Are system hazards recognized and risk controls available?” The second criterion, casualty expectation, looks at these potential risks from the perspective of a specific range and the population, which may be exposed to that risk.

Casualty expectation is another measure of risk that can provide a basis for a range Director of Operation’s fly/no fly risk decision. It examines the risk to people on the ground from UAV operations being conducted overhead. Casualty expectation is defined as the collective risk or total risk to an exposed population; the total number of individuals who will be fatalities.

This criterion is met if the hazard is confined to unpopulated areas (see par. 2.1 below) or if the combined vehicle reliability and the population distribution beneath the planned route of flight results in a risk that is no greater than that for manned aircraft operations (see par. 2.2 below).

2.1 No Risk to Human Life Because Hazard Is Contained.The planned route of flight is acceptable, because the flight can be confined to unpopulated areas.

If the UAV is confined to an unpopulated area, there is no risk of a crash injuring people on the ground. This approach is called “containment.” Containment is typically used for flight-testing, high-risk operations, or if the probability of vehicle failure cannot be predicted.


To verify that potential hazards are adequately contained, the safety analyst should verify that the area is unpopulated, and there are adequate control measures on the vehicle to ensure it does not leave the range. Verification that the area is unpopulated is typically done by physically patrolling the range or monitoring it remotely with video. Containment can be also accomplished by erecting a barrier such as a fence.

The safety analyst should also determine if the vehicle is able to leave the range. For instance, is the vehicle’s maximum range greater than the distance to the edge of the unpopulated hazard area? Are there failure modes such as “lost link” or “stuck servo” which could result in the UAV leaving a safe area? The safety analyst should review the history of the vehicle or similar designs encountering these failure modes before determining if additional controls are required.

If necessary, an independent or highly reliable system, e.g., Flight Termination System (FTS), may be required to ensure the vehicle does not leave assigned airspace above the unpopulated hazard area. If a “fly home” or “emergency mission” software routine is used to keep the vehicle inside the assigned airspace, the evidence of software reliability must be reviewed. Chapter 5 discusses these review procedures.

System maturity may or may not support requirements for additional safeguards to keep the UAV inside assigned airspace. A mature system with a history of many mishaps should certainly be treated differently than a mature system with few mishaps.

2.2 Equivalent Risk to Manned Aircraft.A prediction of the average risk to people within the planned area of flight or along the planned route of flight is acceptable, and avoidance of high population density “hot spots” is considered.Casualty expectation provides an alternative to containment as a basis for making risk exposure decisions.

As a general policy, safety will be maximized consistent with operational requirements. All flights should strive to achieve complete containment of debris resulting from nominal and malfunctioning flights. However, if the planned mission cannot be accomplished under these conditions, a risk management policy may be used if authorized by Air Operations or his designated representative.

2.2.1 Casualty Expectation.Must be less than one casualty in a million flight hours.

One casualty in a million flight hours is a defined risk limit established by the DOD standard. This limit is derived from risks related to manned aircraft as well as system safety precedents.

The casualty expectation approach to measuring risk is based on the following premises, which will be amplified in this section:

● Acceptable risk in terms of casualty expectation (fatalities per flight hour) for manned aircraft has been defined within the system safety community.

● There is regulatory precedent that has limited risk exposure from range operations to the risk exposure comparative to overflight of manned aircraft.


● The history of risk exposure to people on the ground from overflight by manned aircraft is measurable in terms of casualty expectation.

● Therefore, defining a risk limit that is consistent with system safety precedents, regulatory precedents, and the history of risk exposure to people on the ground is reasonable.

2.2.1.1 System Safety and Casualty ExpectationsDefinitions established within the system safety discipline are consistent with a “one in a million” risk limit for casualty expectation.

● “High Risk” is defined as the probability of a fatality as “occasional” or likely to occur in the life of an aircraft, or likely to occur several times in the entire fleet or inventory of aircraft.

● “Serious risk” is defined as the probability of a fatality is “remote.” ● “Remote” is defined as unlikely to occur in the life of a specific aircraft, and unlikely but

can reasonably be expected to occur in the entire fleet or inventory of aircraft. ● “Medium risk” is defined as the probability of a fatality is “improbable.” ● “Improbable” is defined as so unlikely, it can be assumed occurrence may not be

experienced during the life of a particular vehicle, and unlikely to occur but possible for a fleet or large inventory of aircraft.

Risk exposure can also be defined in terms of flight hours. Using this method:● “Occasional” is defined as 1 to 9.9 incidents per 100,000 flight hours● “Remote” means as 0.1 to 0.99 incidents per 100,000 flight hours. ● “Improbable” is defined as less than 0.1 mishap per 100,000 flight hours.

2.2.1.2 Regulatory PrecedentBecause overflight by manned aircraft occurs on a routine basis, the risk of overflight by manned aircraft is considered “Acceptable risk.” There is regulatory precedent that has limited risk exposure from range operations to the risk exposure comparative to overflight of manned aircraft. Public Law 81-60 first used this concept in the establishment of a test range for the United States Air Force:

“Public Law (PL) 81-60. One precedent in U.S. law directly relates to the same hazard as the debris protection standard: in 1949, Congress enacted PL 81-60, Guided Missiles-Joint Long Range Proving Ground, which authorized the Secretary of the Air Force to establish a joint proving ground at the present-day Eastern Range location. The law, however, only authorizes the establishment of a range. Observations in legislative history delineate to a degree how the location must be chosen.

Contained within the language of legislative history is the requirement for safe operation of a range: “From a safety standpoint test flights will be no more dangerous than conventional airplanes flying overhead.” This language was clearly intended to allay public fears at the time missile testing was in its infancy, and was not intended to set future standards.

2.2.1.3 Casualty Expectation from Manned Aircraft


The history of risk exposure to people on the ground from overflight by manned aircraft is measurable in terms of casualty expectation. Several sources of mishap rate information show that using 1 mishap per million flight hours is a reasonable number when compared to mishap trends.

For the 18 years represented, the data shows a mean fatality rate of 1.8 fatalities per million flight hours due to aircraft flying overhead.

2.2.1.4 Methods of CalculationCasualty expectation is based on UAV reliability predictions or mishap history, crash kinetic energy, vehicle dimensions, flight path, and population along the flight path. Appendix D describes several approaches to calculating casualty expectation.

2.2.1.5 Qualitative Alternative.When empirical data is not available, this criterion is met if the route is confined to sparsely populated areas and qualitative methods indicate casualty expectation is negligible. Qualitative methods might include these approaches:

● UAV has a lower mishap rate than another UAV of the same size that was previously approved to fly the same route.

● Population density is sparser than required to achieve 1 casualty per million flight hours.● UAV may be made of extremely light material and unlikely to cause injury.● People potentially exposed to falling debris are sheltered or briefed on contingency

procedures in case of failure.

2.2.2 Route Selected to Avoid High Population Density AreaRoutes and altitudes are selected to minimize the possibility of the UAV falling into a congested area in the event of electronic or material malfunction. Route avoids densely populated areas, especially during phases of flight with increased risk.

2.2.2.1 Congested Area ConsiderationsThe route should avoid areas of high population density such as towns, schools, hospitals, stadiums etc., which would cause the momentary casualty expectation to exceed the acceptable level.

In most cases, population density data can easily be obtained from census data. There may be areas within the census tracts having a higher population density (schools, hospitals, stadiums etc.) which are not reflected in the average population density statistic used in the casualty expectation calculation.

The resolution size of the census tracts may produce an inaccurate casualty expectation, which may appear to be at an acceptable level. Therefore, consideration of additional criteria may be warranted to avoid these specific sites. Also, DOD and FAA policy guidance directs UAV and aircraft operators to avoid what they refer to as “congested areas.”

In planning and conducting the flight path to, in, and from operating areas, all activities operating UAVs shall select and adhere to those tracks and altitudes that completely minimize the


possibility of UAVs falling into congested areas in the event of electronic or material malfunction.

This instruction also requires that operations not create a perception of danger by the public.

This guidance is also consistent with FAA standards. FAR Part 91.119, Minimum Safe Altitudes, states: “Except when necessary for takeoff or landing, no person may operate an aircraft below the following altitudes:

a Anywhere. An altitude allowing, if a power unit fails, an emergency landing without undo hazard to persons or property on the surface.

b Over congested areas. Over any congested area of a city, town, or settlement, or over any open-air assembly of persons, an altitude of 1,000 feet above the highest obstacle within a horizontal radius of 2,000 feet of the aircraft.

c Over other than congested areas. An altitude of 500 feet above the surface, except over open water or sparsely populated areas. In those cases, the aircraft may not be operated closer than 500 feet to any person, vessel, vehicle, or structure.”

2.2.2.2 High Risk Phases of Flight.Different phases and types of flight test may have varying levels of risk. It may be acceptable to conduct a low risk operation over a densely populated area with a proven vehicle, but unacceptable over the same area with an unproven vehicle or during phases of flight where there is an increased mishap risk.

Some guidelines for which portions of a UAV flight should be considered “High risk” include:● Those flights where the probability of a failure is unknown, such as initial flights of a

new vehicle● Portions of a flight where the probability of failure is known to be high enough to result

in an “Unacceptable” or “Undesirable” risk as defined in the risk assessment matrix (previously described in section 1.2).

● Portions of a flight where this UAV or similar types of UAVs have experienced most of their failures. Examples include takeoff and climb-out, and approach and landing and functional check flights.

● Planned maneuvers intended to explore the edge of the vehicle’s performance envelope. Any unusual maneuvers that could lead to structural failure, loss of propulsion, or loss of controlled flight.

● Continued flight after failure of a redundant flight-critical subsystem. For example, after failure of a primary flight system and controlled flight is continuing on a backup system, the operators should consider a contingency plan a “safer” route back to base.

2.3 Alternatives if Casualty Expectation Criteria Is Not Met.● Choose route over less populated areas.● Evacuate area where casualty expectation is unacceptable.● Verify the probability of mishap.● Reduce impact energy (i.e. parachute).● Investigate the use of an FTS to contain vehicle inside less/non populated areas.● Investigate Return Home or other recovery mechanism.


● Investigate shelter factor and time of day.● Request a waiver from the Director of Operations.● Cancel the flight.

3. Property Damage CriteriaProperty Damage Criteria is an additional consideration in determining whether a UAV is safe to fly on a specific range. The risks associated with a UAV should be reviewed by using the “risk management” criteria and the vulnerability of people at a specific range or on a specific route of flight. These risks were previously examined with the “casualty expectation” criteria. This section will look at the vulnerability of property.

Casualty expectation criteria will normally drive “High risk” operations away from centers of high population and their associated properties. Some properties, because of the nature of their function, are located in unpopulated areas. Examples are range assets, hazardous materials storage sites, and culturally or environmentally sensitive sites. The “property damage” criteria ensure that these sites are given appropriate consideration when planning potentially hazardous operations.

Three objectives should always be accomplished when reviewing potential for property damage:● Determine what properties on the range or near the route of flight are vulnerable.● Determine what portions of the UAV flight are considered high risk.● Ensure high-risk portions of the flight avoid vulnerable properties.

3.1 Identification of High Value/High Consequence Properties.The facilities or properties that are vulnerable if a UAV crashes should be identified in the safety approval process. In terms of the hazard risk assessment (previously discussed in section 1.2), damage to a facility or property is unacceptable if its damage or destruction could result in one or more of the following severe consequences:

● Loss or degradation of a major function● Significant monetary loss● Significant environmental impact● Significant cultural impeach

Unacceptable loss of a major function is a subjective term that needs to be examined on a case by case basis. Examples of where loss of function is the most significant consequence might be damage to a satellite farm that is the only link to a national asset weather satellite or damage to weapon storage areas.

Significant monetary loss is defined for two levels of damage in terms of cost: catastrophic and critical.

● “Catastrophic” damage is defined as $1 million or more;● “Critical” damage is defined as loss between $200,000 and $1 million.

Catastrophic environmental damage is defined as “irreversible environmental damage which violates law or regulation. “ Critical environmental damage is damage that is reversible but causes a violation of law or regulation.


Culturally Sensitive Sites are those properties having value in terms of human experience, such as historical sites, religious sites, monuments, etc. A UAV mishap could effect cultural damage that would adversely impact current and future UAV operations.

Another consideration related to property is recovery of the vehicle. Some ranges have conventional munitions impact areas, which may be contaminated by unexploded ordnance and off limits to personnel. If a UAV should fail over such a site, its recovery would be difficult or impossible.

A history of UAV operations provides examples of vulnerable properties that we should avoid when conducting some UAV operations. This list is neither exhaustive nor all inclusive.

Table 3.1-1 Vulnerable Property And Damage Severity Results

Vulnerable Property Damage Severity Result

Munitions Testing or Storage Site

Catastrophic damage to facility or critical monetary lossLoss or degradation of a major function

Antenna Farm Loss or degradation of a major functionCatastrophic or critical monetary loss

Public Park, Monument or Property

Significant cultural impactSignificant environmental impact

Toxic waste storage site

Significant environmental impact

Fuel tank farm Initiation of catastrophic or critical monetary loss

Geothermal power plant

Catastrophic or critical monetary loss

Native American Sites/Property

Violation of negotiated local operating agreement, adverse impact on ability to conduct


future operationsSignificant cultural impact

3.2 UAV Route Considerations.The portions of the flight that are considered “High risk” should be identified prior to route selection so vulnerable properties can be avoided during that portion of flight. Guidelines for determining which portions of the flight should be considered “High risk” are provided in section 2.2.2.2.

3.3 Alternatives If Property Damage Criteria Is Not Met.● Change the route or area of operation to avoid the high consequence property or facility.● Reduce impact energy so no damage occurs (i.e., deploy a parachute).● Remove or shelter the vulnerable facility if possible.● Require use of an FTS to ensure vehicle doesn’t get near vulnerable sites.● Request a waiver from the Director of Operations to accept increased risk.● Cancel the flight.

4. Midair Collision Avoidance CriteriaThe Midair Collision Avoidance Criteria is an additional consideration in determining whether a UAV is safe to fly from a DCC facility. The risks associated with a UAV were reviewed by using the “risk management” criteria. Previously, the vulnerability of people and property at a specific range or on a specific route of flight to these risks was examined using the “casualty expectation” and “property damage” criteria. In this section the vulnerability of other aircraft will be discussed.

Collision is avoided by isolating the UAV from other aircraft or compensating for see-and-avoid capability differences with manned aircraft that increase risk of collision. The consequences of a midair collision with a manned aircraft are significant (high probability of fatalities and high cost property damage). Although flight rules have evolved for manned aircraft to avoid collision, UAVs may or may not be compatible with those rules due to latency, visibility, and direct control issues. Midair collision avoidance criteria focus attention on an examination of these issues.

4.1 Midair Collision Avoidance CriteriaThese criteria are met if the UAV is contained inside defined airspace and participants are adequately briefed. Such precautions are warranted because some UAVs may not be able to see and avoid other aircraft, or that ability may be unproven in initial flights of new vehicles.

Isolating an unpredictable or unproven vehicle from other aircraft ensures there is no opportunity for collision.

4.1.1 UAV ContainmentThe operator must provide assurance that the UAV can be contained within the restricted or warning area boundaries.


Rationale: The UAV must remain within its assigned airspace so there is no conflict with non-participant aircraft in other airspace. The hazard analysis or flight history of the UAV may indicate if there are failure modes that may result in the UAV leaving the restricted or warning area. Consider the following failure modes:

● Loss of navigation information: The vehicle may have limited navigation capability, vulnerability to a single point navigation system failure, or the operator station may be limited in the ability to recognize a navigation system discrepancy. Operation in a backup navigation mode (dead reckoning vs. GPS driven, for example) may lead to significant unrecognized position errors.

● An inability to set local altimeter, unrecognized altimeter discrepancy, or inadequate operator alert for an altitude deviation may cause the vehicle to leave the assigned altitude limits within the restricted or warning area.

● An inadequate mission planning system or erroneous mission plan may lead to flight outside of established boundaries.

● Loss of lift or loss of thrust can result in the vehicle descending below the assigned altitude or the lower altitude boundary of the restricted area. Non-participant aircraft below the restricted area boundary may be vulnerable.

● Loss of link: Without direct operator control, the UAV may fly outside the restricted airspace. Emergency mission or “fly home” routines should be examined to ensure the vehicle will be contained within the assigned area and altitudes.

● Autopilot failure or electrical power failure: Will the UAV quickly lose control and crash or continue flying until fuel is consumed?

Review of the system maturity of the vehicle, failure modes possible, and history of failures can help to determine if an independent flight termination system is required to keep the vehicle inside assigned airspace. The consideration of vehicle operating limits, local airspace geometry, and the presence or absence of emergency backup systems also help determine if an independent range flight termination system must be mandated to contain the vehicle within assigned airspace.

The DCC safety analyst should verify that Yuma Air Traffic Control (ATC) can monitor vehicle position for containment and communicate with UAV controllers in a timely manner. Some portions of intended flight area may not be visible to air traffic controllers because of radio frequency horizon effects, geographic shadowing, or other limitations of the monitoring system.

The safety analyst should ensure the flight is restricted to locations that can be monitored. The UAV ground control station may be beyond the communications line of sight of local air traffic control. The safety analyst should ensure both the primary and backup communications links with ATC are effective.

4.1.2 Exclusion of Other Aircraft.There is no absolute assurance that other aircraft can be kept out of the airspace dedicated to UAV mission use.


Rationale: To reduce risk, non-participants are notified of the hazardous airspace by defining hazardous airspace boundaries and activating NOTAMS. Examples of some approaches currently used include:

● Declaring predefined portions of airspace as temporarily “UAS use” for specific altitudes for UAV operation.

● Declaring predefined portions of airspace temporarily “UAS use” for flights of multiple aircraft including integrated UAV operation. An example of this approach is the MARSA (Military assumes responsibility for separation of aircraft) approach.

● Defining “UAV work areas” in local procedures manuals and activating them as needed.● Defining “UAV transit corridors” in local procedures manuals and activating them as

needed.

Yuma ATC should be able to monitor the airspace within and near UAS operating areas and communicate (directly or through controlling agency) with air traffic that may conflict. Where Yuma ATC monitoring capabilities are limited or do not exist, airspace might be controlled through scheduling or standardized local procedures. An example is:

● Visual observation of the area by ground observers in contact with the UAV ground control station can be used for low level operations. The decision-maker must be informed of potential risk associated with limitations of the ability to monitor and communicate with traffic in the restricted or warning areas.

4.1.3 Participant Coordination.UAV operators must ensure that flight crews and Yuma ATC understand the operation and recognize the limitations of the UAV. DCC “standard operating procedures” address routine operations. Local flight crews and some Yuma ATC personnel may not recognize hazards associated with a UAV. The vehicle may make unplanned, unusual, or erratic maneuvers due to normal UAV operation or control failures, loss of link, or system failure. These maneuvers may present an increased risk of collision with such participating aircraft as the “chase” aircraft. Also, the small size or stealthy design may make it difficult for participant aircraft to see the UAV. YCAA personnel will participate in local flight safety operations and briefings to ensure local flight crews and Yuma ATC are prepared to accommodate unusual maneuvers or low visibility. If a new vehicle is significantly different from UAVs normal for the area, a specific brief of the aircrew and Yuma ATC will be provided to prepare them to compensate for unusual maneuvers.

4.1.4 Traffic DetectionIn a manned aircraft, the pilot’s primary means of detecting other airborne objects (in visual meteorological conditions) is visual. Traffic advisory cues are typically available from air traffic control or from onboard devices such as the Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS).

In a UAV, initial detection of potential traffic might come from a number of sources, which may or may not be adequate. For example:


● The chase aircraft has the same visual detection ability as a manned aircraft but has the additional burden of staying close to the UAV, which may or may not be easy to track visually.

● If a camera is on board the UAV does it have the ability to detect vehicles coming from several directions at once, analogous to a pilot’s peripheral vision? Does it have an adequate field of view and scan rate to continuously monitor those sectors of the vehicles flight path to adequately detect potential hazards?

● TCAS information can provide situation awareness information to the UAV pilot’s ground control station so the pilot has a notion of what aircraft are in the area and can anticipate potential collision avoidance maneuvers. Is the vehicle so equipped? Similarly, IFF data repeated to the pilot’s Ground Control Station from Yuma ATC’s radar or airborne platforms such as AWACS or an E-2 can provide situation awareness information.

● A UAV completely dependent on air traffic control advisories for detection of conflicting traffic does not constitute the ability to see-and-avoid.

4.1.5 Threat RecognitionThe pilot of a manned aircraft can visually recognize a potential collision and perform evasive maneuvers to avoid that collision. The threat is recognized if the detected object’s relative bearing to the pilot’s aircraft does not change, and the object is getting larger. Potential collision threat alerts are also available from Yuma ATC and such onboard systems as TCAS. A UAV may not have these same abilities. The safety analyst should review the collision threat recognition capabilities of the UAV and determine if they are adequate for the situation. Several considerations for threat recognition follow:

● Will the operator use video camera inputs? Does camera acquisition depend on external cueing from other detection sources? Given that the camera sees another aircraft, does it have a demonstrated ability to determine if the vehicle is on a collision course or not? Is it easy to determine where the camera is pointed relative to the vehicle?

● Will the UAV depend on TCAS for traffic alerts? Will all other vehicles in the restricted airspace be equipped with TCAS?

● A UAV completely dependent on air traffic control advisories for recognition of a potential collision does not constitute the ability to see-and-avoid.

4.1.6 Collision Avoidance DecisionsIn a manned aircraft, the pilot can quickly decide how best to avoid a collision with a recognized airborne threat by climbing, diving, changing speed, or changing heading. In a UAV, because of differing situation awareness implementations and pilot/vehicle interfaces, there may be delays in deciding how best to avoid a collision and what action to take. For instance, the operator’s ability to affect the vehicle may be limited to adjusting and uploading a new flight plan to the UAV.


4.1.7 Collision Avoidance ManeuversThere may be a significant delay in the ability to implement a collision avoidance plan once the operator decides what to do. In a manned aircraft, the pilot can quickly and easily manipulate the flight controls. In contrast, the UAV operator may or may not have immediate access to the flight controls affecting speed, heading, and climb or descent. The operator may only be able to upload a new flight plan or execute a few canned avoidance maneuvers. Vehicles such as Predator with a pilot-in-the-loop will be easier to make quick course, speed, or altitude changes to get out of the way than vehicles that don’t have a pilot directly flying or are primarily autonomous. Also, some vehicles may be extremely slow and cumbersome and relatively less able to make nimble collision avoidance maneuvers. In such cases, the safety analyst needs to determine if there will be significant delays in moving the aircraft and ensure adequate precautions are made.

4.1.8 Collision Avoidance Time DelaysObviously, a UAV operator must be able to recognize a potential collision and maneuver out of the way before the other aircraft arrives. The relative potential closing speeds for a given type of airspace and the distance at which a potential collision is recognized determines the maximum time the vehicle operator has to make the decision to maneuver out of the way. Time to maneuver out of the way varies from situation to situation. Some typical situations result in 20-40 seconds of time between traffic alert and potential collision. For instance, some restricted areas with advisory services may give alerts when aircraft are 5 miles apart. For tactical jets with a relative closing speed of 700-900 kts., 20-25 seconds of warning time is typical. TCAS advisories at 3.3 miles of separation provide 20 seconds of warning time to vehicles with 600 kts. of relative closing speed.

Table 4.1.1 Nominal Times For Collision Avoidance Tasks

Collision avoidance task Seconds required to act

Pilot sees obiect 0.1

Recognize aircraft 1.0

Become aware of collision 5.0

Decision to tum left or right 4.0

Muscular reaction 0.4

Aircraft lag time 2.0

Total 12.5

The key thought here is that only seconds are available to avoid a collision. A vehicle that measures its see-and-avoid capability in a significantly longer time is not compatible with a see and-avoid environment.


4.1.9 Compensating For Delays with ATC InstructionVehicles with limited or no see-and-avoid capability are dependent on Yuma ATC for safe separation. Communication and control delays may increase in comparison with those of manned aircraft.

Vehicle response must match airspace conditions and requirements.

Vehicles with limited or no see-and-avoid capability are dependent on Yuma ATC for safe separation. Communication and control delays may be longer than those of manned aircraft. These delays may decrease or eliminate the ability of the vehicle to respond to Yuma ATC direction in a timely manner. If vehicle response does not match airspace conditions and requirements, there is increased risk of collision. The design of the UAV may include time delays in the downlink of information to the air vehicle controller or in the uplands of the controller’s commands to the vehicle. The time delay in the communications link between Yuma ATC and the air vehicle operator can also be an issue. Examples of sources of delays can include:

● An unusual ATC-to-vehicle ground station link - The normal link is UHF or VHF radio direct from aircraft to Yuma ATC. The UAV operator may be beyond line of sight of the ATC facility, and may have to depend on a telephone or other means of communication rather than radio direct from the aircraft.

● Non-deterministic software in the vehicle ground station may delay the display of decision information to the operator, or may delay transmission of critical flight commands.

● Human interface with the vehicle: some vehicles may require the operator to type in a new waypoint or flight plan to make a collision avoidance course change.

● Distance in communications link, especially if the command links use satellites.● UAVs operating “autonomously”: There may not be an operator monitoring, or the

vehicle may have lost its link to the ground station.

Each of these examples can result in delays in recognizing a potential collision or a delay in sending collision avoidance commands to the UAV.

4.2 Midair Collision Avoidance: FAA ApprovalFor all UAS flights in the National Airspace the FAA is responsible for aircraft separation and must authorize and approve the flight.

This criterion is met with both (1) documentation of FAA approval and (2) review and approval by the government sponsor.

4.2.1 FAA ApprovalUAVs that plan to enter the National Airspace System shall conform to FAA regulations and gain approval from the regional FAA representative. A Certificate of Authorization is required.


In general, UAS flights outside of restricted areas or warning areas will require approval. Users should coordinate early in the planning stages with the local FAA representative to identify the exact requirements.

At least 60 days prior to the proposed commencement of UAS operations, the operator shall submit an application for a Certificate of Authorization (COA) to the Western-Pacific FAA regional office. The request should include:

1 Detailed description of the intended flight operation including the classification of the airspace to be utilized.

2 UAS physical characteristics.3 Flight performance characteristics.4 Method of pilotage and proposed method to avoid other traffic.5 Coordination procedures.6 Communications procedures.7 Route and altitude procedures.8 Lost link/mission abort procedures.9 A statement from Air Operations that the ROA is “airworthy “

5. Criteria for Reliability and Adequacy of SafeguardsThere must be evidence to show that key safeguards will mitigate critical or severe risks. Safeguards must be provided if the hazard analysis requires it or if the UAV or test operation does not meet other safety criteria (e.g., casualty expectation, property damage, collision avoidance) without it. Typical systems that may be considered as safeguards include, but are not limited to:

● Emergency remote pilots● Flight termination systems● “Fly home” software routines● Parachutes

Procedures that are considered safeguards include emergency procedures, checklists that address safety critical systems, and documented warnings and cautions.

ALTERNATIVES IF CRITERIA NOT MET

The following alternatives apply to hardware, software, and procedural safeguards:

● Restrict operation to avoid specific hazard● Add an alternative safeguard to address the specific hazard● Request a waiver from Director of Operations to accept increased risk.● Cancel the flight

Additional guidance is provided below.


5.1 Hardware Safeguards.Evidence must show that the reliability of key hardware safeguards is adequate. The range may require one or more of the following:

● Show evidence of a reliability of 0.999 at 95 % confidence level in a representative environment.

Rationale: This reliability number (0.999 at 95% confidence) is the overall reliability goal for flight termination systems. The same goal can be used for other than FTS systems for safety critical applications. System reliability is demonstrated by:

1 Designing the system to be single fault tolerant2 Performing qualification, acceptance, certification, and pre-mission testing in accordance

with the FTS standard3 Maintaining strict quality control practices during fabrication, test, installation, and test.4 Performing a reliability prediction to show 0.999 probability is met. Use 150% of mission

time and analysis, using the applicable environmental factor. ● FTS subsystems meet the current RCC flight termination standard.

Rationale: If the hazard analysis indicates a flight termination system is required, a system that meets the RCC Standard 319-99 requirements should be acceptable at ranges. ● The safeguard subsystem meets an established reliability standard for that type of safeguard.

Rationale: If the safeguard is not a flight termination system, but is instead something not covered by RCC-319, the use of an industry standard related to that type of hardware might be appropriate. If the industry standard addresses the environment the system may be exposed to, there is then a basis for making an informed decision on system reliability. ● The system or safeguard has been tested and can be monitored in flight or will be explicitly checked before flight.

Rationale: New systems that have no industry standard can be used if the hazards are recognized and attention focused on the testing, pre-flight inspection, and in-flight monitoring of the system.

5.2 Software SafeguardsEvidence must show that the reliability of key software safeguards is adequate. Examples of software safeguards may include “Fly home” or “Emergency mission” routines in the event of lost link, and some “Emergency remote pilot” components. The range user’s risk management plan, as described in section 1 of this document, should identify if there are failure modes that are mitigated with software. If there are software functions that address critical hazards, the range safety analyst needs to know that the software function will work when required. The basic questions to be answered are as follows:

● Have all safety critical requirements been identified? Has the UAV been subjected to a software safety program? Have software functions been addressed in the hazard analyses?


● Have safety critical software requirements identified in the software safety program or hazard analyses been implemented?

● What assurance is there that these implemented requirements will work? Have they been tested? Can these safety critical software functions be tested before flight or monitored in flight?

Detailed guidance on software safety issues can be found in the Software Safety Handbook, Joint Software Safety Committee, and in NASA’s Guidebook for Safety Critical Software - Analysis and Development.

5.3 Procedural SafeguardsEvidence must show procedural safeguards are adequate. Examples of procedural safeguards are emergency procedures, checklists, operator certification, and training.

● Operator procedures that will be used as a safeguard must be documented.● Procedures must have been reviewed and approved by the Director of operations or

delegated representative.

Rationale: When a malfunction occurs, if the operator can respond quickly and accurately, the probability increases that the vehicle can be recovered safely or that damage can be minimized. The implications of specific safety critical failures are best considered beforehand, when system experts can lay out the best choices for the operators. Written procedures also allow the range to verify that procedures are compatible with local conditions. Checklists for specific safety critical procedures help to ensure complicated actions are performed correctly. Training and operator certification helps to ensure safety critical procedures are properly accomplished when required.

Appendix A: Safety resources and information

A.1 Casualty Expectation References and Information SourcesTitle 14 Code of Federal Regulations, Federal Aviation RegulationsPublic Law 81-60, Legislative History, 81st Congress, pg. 1235RCC Standard 321-00, Common Risk Criteria for National Test Ranges: Inert DebrisFor further information:National Transportation Safety Board: http://www.ntsb.gov/aviation

A.2 Collision Avoidance References and Information SourcesTitle 14, Code of Federal Regulations, Federal Aviation RegulationsFAA Order 7110.65U, 9 February 2012, Air Traffic ControlFAA Order 7610.4J Change 1, 3 July 2000, Special Military OperationsFAA Advisory Circular AC 90-48C, Pilot’s Role in Collision Avoidance

For Further Information:FAA Home Page: http://www.faa.gov


http://www.faa.gov/

http://www.ntsb.gov/aviation

FAA Publications Library: http://www.faa.gov/atpubs/default.htm Federal Aviation Regulations: http://www.faa.gov/avr/AFSIFARS/faridx.htm

TCAS Information:FAA TCAS and ADSB Web Page: http://adsb.tc.faa.gov/ MITRE Inc: http://www.mitre.org/pubs/showcase/tcas/tcas.html

A.3 Safeguards References and Information SourcesNASA-STD-S719.13A, NASA Software Safety Standard:http://satc.gsfc.nasa.gov/assure/nssS719 13.htm1NASA-GB-1740.13-96, ASA Guidebook for Safety Critical Software Analysis andDevelopment: http://www.ivv.nasa.gov/SWG/resources/SWG safetv.html STANAG 4044, NATO Standardization Agreement, Safety Design Requirements and Guidelines for Munitions Related Safety Critical Computing SystemsSoftware Safety Handbook, Joint Software System Safety Committee, December 1999:http://www.nswc.navy.mil/safetvIEC 150S, Functional Safety, Safety-Related Systems, International Electrotechnical Committee

Appendix B: Range Safety Review Questions for UAV Projects

B.1 Introduction To Review QuestionsThe Director of Operations is tasked to identify potential hazards on the range and ensure safeguards are put in place to reduce risk to an acceptable level, consistent with existing local policy guidance.

If the operational risks of a specific program exceed specified levels even after implementation of reasonable safeguards, a waiver decision is required from Director of Operations.

This is a “living document” intended as a tool for Airport Operations to evaluate new and ongoing UAV test programs. The document will help ensure the Director of Operations is fully advised and informed of all known risks. It also serves as a consistent approach to UAV program range safety reviews.

This appendix is focused on hazards that may result in the following consequences:● UAV crashes which may result in death or injury, or damage to property.● Mid-air collision between UAV and manned aircraft causing death or injury to pilot, or

damage to manned aircraft.

Each section provides questions based on past experience and lessons learned from other programs which focus on hazards and safeguards as outlined below:

B.2 UAV Background InformationBackground information about the UAV system is required to understand the system well enough to make a defensible risk assessment. This background information is used as a starting point for identifying potential system hazards and reviewing existing system safeguards. Items


http://www.nswc.navy.mil/safetv

http://www.ivv.nasa.gov/SWG/resources/SWG%20safetv.html

http://satc.gsfc.nasa.gov/assure/nssS719%2013.htm1

http://www.mitre.org/pubs/showcase/tcas/tcas.html

http://adsb.tc.faa.gov/

http://www.faa.gov/avr/AFSIFARS/faridx.htm

http://www.faa.gov/atpubs/default.htm

listed below are basic guidelines with potential reference sources that are helpful in satisfying the requirement for understanding the system.

B.2.1 Vehicle Description● Users handbook ● Physical dimensions● Weight (empty and max)● Mission description● Crew requirements● Description of command and control system● List if hazardous material associated with this vehicle

B.2.2 Vehicle Performance● Performance charts● Max altitude● Max endurance● Max range● Range vs. altitude (glide)● Cruise speed● Max speed● Rate of climb, rate of descent

B.2.3 Vehicle Safety History and Reliability1 Mishap history: What is the flight history of this model UAV?2 How many crashes and failures have occurred?3 What has been the corrective action to ensure the failures do not occur again?4 Any hazard analyses from contractor or system safety?5 Is there an estimate for system mean time between failures?6 How has this MTBF been determined (analysis or actual data)?7 What performance or environmental limitations were used to estimate system MTBF?8 Will the proposed test exceed any of these limitations?9 Is there a software safety program for this UAV system?10 What flight critical components are software controlled?11 Have software safety analyses been performed?

B.2.4 Operator Qualifications1 What personnel are involved in the mission and what are their functions? 2 What information do they have to make safety-related decisions?3 What is the basis of the qualification of the vehicle operators? 4 How much experience do they have? 5 How recently have they flown this type vehicle?

B.2.5 Hazardous MaterialsAny hazardous materials on board (flammable, toxic, energy storage, ordnance)?Can a crash start a fire?


B.3 Causes of “Loss Of Control”1 Vehicle loss of control can easily result in a mishap. If we can identify any potential

causes of “loss of control” that may have been overlooked, safeguards can be applied, or test conditions can be restricted to reduce risk to an acceptable level.

2 The following questions focus on system vulnerabilities previously experienced, some of which have resulted in mishaps.

B.3.1 Loss of Command Links1 What happens when command link is lost?2 How does vehicle respond if link is never re-established?3 How does the vehicle recognize that loss of command link has occurred?4 How does the UAV operator in the ground control station recognize loss of command

link has occurred?

B.3.1.1 Backup Communications Links1 Is there a backup command transmitter and receiver?2 Does the backup transmitter have the same or more “effective radiated power”?

B.3.1.2 Link Analysis1 Has RF link analysis been performed to verify both primary and backup transmitters can

communicate with the vehicle at the furthest point in its planned operation?2 Does link analysis address all RF links?

● Uplinks from primary and backup ground stations● Secondary uplinks from each ground station● Downlinks to primary and backup ground stations● Flight Termination Link

3 Does link analysis consider RF horizon?4 Is maximum range for each link explicitly stated?5 Is there at least 12 dB of signal excess in FTS link?6 How do you determine if the primary and backup transmitters are radiating specified

output power?7 How do you determine if the vehicle primary and backup command and control receivers

and FTS receivers are operating at specified sensitivity?8 Are there any nulls in the command transmitter antenna pattern? 9 Do the operators know where they are?10 Are there areas of RF masking due to location of antennas on the UAV relative to their

position and to ground station antennas? 11 Are there RF null spots based on orientation of the UAV?12 What is the link susceptibility to multipath? 13 What is the system response if multipath is experienced?

B.3.1.3 Radio Frequency Interference (RFl)1 What is the effect of RFI on the command and control system?2 Is there a frequency allocation for all RF links?3 What frequency does the UAV system operate on and does this cause any interference

with any other local systems?4 Is the backup command link sufficiently protected from spurious command signals?


B.3.2 Loss of Vehicle Position Information1 What are the sources of vehicle navigation position information to the UAV operator?

Are there redundant sources so the UAV operator can tell if there is a discrepancy?2 If the UAV operator loses primary position information, is control also lost?3 Does the UAV operator have access to any external sources of position information that

could serve as a backup (radar, IFF, binoculars)?4 How does the vehicle autopilot respond to loss of primary internal navigation source? Is

there a backup? What are the indications in the ground station to the UAV operator?

B.3.3 Loss of Flight Reference Data1 What are the on-board sources of position, attitude, heading, altitude, and airspeed

information to the UAV operator and/or autopilot?2 How does the vehicle autopilot respond to loss of primary attitude source?

a Is there a backup?3 What are the indications to the UAV operator?4 How does the vehicle autopilot respond to loss of primary heading source?

a Is there a backup?b What are the indications to the UAV operator?

5 How does the vehicle autopilot respond to loss of primary altitude source? a Is there a backup?

6 What are the indications to the UAV operator?7 How does the vehicle autopilot respond to loss of primary airspeed source?

a Is there a backup?b What are the indications to the UAV operator?

B.3.4 Unresponsive Flight Controls1 What will happen if a servo or flight control sticks or becomes unresponsive?

a How does the autopilot respond? b Is there a backup?

2 How quickly will the UAV operator recognize this?3 What happens if the throttle is stuck?

a How will the UAV operator recognize this condition? b Is there a recovery procedure?

B.3.5 Loss of Propulsion1 What happens to the vehicle when propulsion stops?

a Will sufficient velocity and electrical power remain for “controlled ditch” or “dead stick landing”?

2 Can the engine be restarted in flight?a Is the propulsion system affected by environmental conditions (temperature,

icing, dust, etc.)? b What are the limits?

3 Are the limits and failure modes confirmed by test data? a Are limits considered in test plan?b How is fuel volume or fuel utilization monitored?


B.3.6 Loss of Electrical Power1 What happens when primary electrical power is lost?2 Is there a separate battery bus?

a What does battery bus power? b Does automatic system load shedding occur if power is reduced? c Are there “essential busses” for reduced power operations?

3 Are all flight essential systems on an essential bus?4 Is there a battery power available time limit associated with loss of electrical power?

a How long?5 What if the UAV is too far from base to get back before power runs out?6 Does FTS activate if battery backup fails (i.e., fails “safe”)?

a Does FTS operate on an independent battery circuit?7 How is backup battery checked prior to takeoff?8 Safety backup system battery lifetime is a critical issue.

a How do you know how much emergency battery power is left? b Is battery usage data available on telemetry? c Is a battery use log kept?

B.3.7 Ground Control Station1 What is the source of electrical power for the ground control station?

a Is there an uninterruptible backup power source?2 What happens’ if electrical power is lost?3 Do backup command transmitter and emergency systems have adequate protection from

loss of electrical power?4 If power to the ground station is lost, does it affect how flight information is calculated?

a Do all flight parameters get reset to zero?

B.4 Review of Common Safeguards Many UAV designs take similar approaches (“return home” modes, FTS, parachutes, etc.) to safeguards in order to reduce the risk associated with loss of control. Some of these approaches have not always been adequate. This section asks questions related to the adequacy of those approaches to loss of control safeguards, based on previous experience with several UAV designs.

B.4.1 Degraded Modes of Flight1 What subsystems will fail and cause the UAV not to be able to continue flying?2 Loss of which subsystems will cause the flight to be aborted (i.e., precautionary “return

to base”)?

B.4.2 Return Home Modes1 Does this vehicle have an automatic “return home” feature (also called “reversion mode”

or “Preprogrammed Emergency Mission” in some vehicles) in the event of loss of link?2 What conditions cause the vehicle to go into “return home” mode?3 What does the vehicle do once it arrives at the “return home” point?

a Will it climb to a specific altitude? Orbit? b Can it land itself? c What is the timing and sequence of events?


B.4.2.1 Selection of “Return Home” Point1 Is the selected “return home” point a safe place to bring an uncontrolled vehicle?2 Can the “return home” point be any location, or just the takeoff point?3 Does flight path to “return home point” from all points in the test flight plan pass over

populated areas? a Will the vehicle cross any airspace boundaries? b Any mountains or towers higher than its altitude?

4 During “return home” mode, are altitude limits defined (airspace deconfliction question)? a Are these altitude limits compatible with the airspace? b What happens if the altitude limits are exceeded?

5 Will the vehicle be high enough and/or close enough to be in line of sight of primary and backup ground stations?

6 Are there multiple “return home” points?

B.4.2.2 Operator Entry of “Return Home” Mode Position1 How is the “return home” position entered?2 What safeguards prevent erroneous position input?3 If the UAV is required to go to an intermediate waypoint before the “return home” point,

how is the waypoint entered and how is it verified?4 Is there a pre-launch check of the “return home” mode?

a Can the “return home” mode “fly to” position be corrected or updated in flight?

B.4.2.3 GPS vs. Dead Reckoning (DR) Navigation Source and “Return Home” Mode1 How does “return home” mode navigate (dead reckoning, inertial nav, radio beacon

homing, GPS)?2 Is the reversionary mode tied to GPS?

a What happens if GPS is not being received or GPS jamming tests are being conducted?

3 Is there a DR (dead reckoning) “return home” mode if GPS or inertial driven navigation is unavailable or degraded?

B.4.2.4 Failure to Regain Control1 What happens if the UAV operator fails to regain control of the vehicle once it arrives at

the “return home” point and climbs to altitude? a Is there a time limit? b Does a “Fail Safe” event occur? c Does it try to land?

B.4.3 Ditching/Dead Stick LandingsWhat situations would cause the UAV operator to perform a forced landing?

B.4.3.1 Pre-planned Ditching Locations1 Do pre-planned ditching or forced landing locations exist?

a Can these locations be reached from any point in the planned route of flight?2 What are the criteria for the selection of those locations?3 How do you know if these locations will be clear of people?

a Will the locations be in a controlled area or under surveillance?


B.4.4 Flight Termination System

B.4.4.1 FTS Function1 Is a flight termination system (FTS) installed?

a What hazards does it address?2 What happens if the UAV is below the RF horizon for both FTS transmitter and vehicle

command and control links?3 What happens when the FTS activates?

a Shut off propulsion? b Tumble or glide? c Does it deploy a parachute?

4 Who has FTS activation command authority? a Vehicle Operator? b Mission Commander? c Range Safety?

5 How are vehicle termination parameters monitored?

B.4.4.2 FTS Transmitter 1. Where is the FTS transmitter located? 2. Does FTS coverage equal or exceed the command transmitter coverage? Does the coverage meet or exceed the maximum range the UAV will fly?

B.4.4.3 Flight Termination Criteria1 What are the criteria for command activation of the FTS? Do the criteria include:

● Loss of all tracking data?● After all other remedial actions have been taken, a vehicle that cannot be

contained within the operating area or range?● If during loss of link mode, a vehicle that does not fly to a predetermined “return

home” point?2 Are the FTS activation criteria adequate to ensure a “good” vehicle is not interpreted as

“bad,” causing inappropriate use of the FTS?

B.4.4.4 FTS Testing and Certification1 Who certifies the FTS as “flight ready,” and what processes are involved in issuing the

certification?2 Is the flight termination system independent of other vehicle systems?

a Does it have its own antenna, receiver, signal processing capability, and power supply?

B.4.5 Fail Safe Mode1 Is there a “fail safe” mode that comes into play if FTS command is not received?

a What conditions cause it to activate? b What happens (engine shut off, flight controls to “turn” or “tumble”)?

2 What causes self-activation of the flight termination system?


a Electrical power loss? b Loss of flight critical function? c Loss of FTS signal?

3 Is there a specified time delay between what triggers fail safe mode and actions taken to cause the vehicle to stop flying?

B.4.6 Parachute1 If the UAV has a parachute system, at what altitude will the chute deploy and what is the

impact and drift rate?2 What is the rate of descent at max weight?3 Are there altitude, airspeed, or attitude limits on deploying the parachute?4 Does the UAV have a weight-on-gear inhibit for the parachute system?

a How is it tested and is the status sent back to the ground with telemetry?5 Does the engine have to shut off prior to the deployment of the parachute, and what

happens if the engine fails to shut down? a Can the propeller cut the parachute shroud line?

B.5: The midair collision hazard and system interaction with Air Traffic Control.1 Successful completion of this review process will result in confidence that:

● Key system vulnerabilities have been identified● Safeguards have been verified to exist for these system vulnerabilities● Safeguards are adequate● Deficiencies or inadequacies of the proposed safeguards have been recognized

2 When the review is completed, the safety analyst will have enough information to clearly tell the project what deficiencies they must fix, to document for the Director of Operations the areas of risk, and to recognize the key range safety issues to monitor during the test.

B.6 Questions About “Midair Collision” Hazards

B.6.1 Airspace1 Will test procedures require exclusive airspace?

a If not, how will risk to other aircraft be minimized?2 If shared, is UAV airspace use compatible or incompatible with any type aircraft or type

mission?3 How will air traffic control occur with a UAV in the same airspace as manned aircraft?

B.6.2 UAV Routes1 Do planned test routes consider locations of published standard approaches and

departures? 2 Does the test plan specify standoff distances from densely populated areas

(schools/hospitals/nursing homes)? a Are those sites identified?

3 Are standoffs required for hazardous sites (fuel depots, weapons storage, etc.)?4 Does the test plan address standoff distances from small civilian airfields?5 Do “return home” mode locations account for standoffs?


B.6.3 Collision Avoidance1 How does the UAV operator “see and avoid” other aircraft that may be nearby (radar,

IFF, visual)?2 What does the vehicle use to ensure pilots of other aircraft will see it (TCAS, strobes,

bright paint scheme)?

B.6.3.1 Chase Aircraft1 If a chase aircraft is used to help ensure collision avoidance, is adequate standoff distance

specified? a Can chase pilot maintain continuous surveillance?

2 What communications provisions are in place between chase pilot, UAV operator, and range safety?

3 What is the procedure if the chase pilot loses visual contact with the U A V?

B.6.4 Interaction with Air Traffic Control1 Is there an existing UAV/ATC memorandum of agreement?2 Will Yuma ATC be briefed for this test or series of tests?

a What is included in the brief?3 Is there an explicit communication link between the UAV ground control and Yuma

ATC? a Is there a backup link in case of emergency?

4 What are Yuma ATC’s procedures if an unauthorized aircraft enters exclusive airspace being used by a UAV?

5 What are Yuma ATC’s procedures if UAV leaves exclusive airspace? a Does Yuma ATC monitor for this?

6 How do civilian airports and civilian aircraft corridors affect airspace use by UAVs?7 What are the weather minimums for this type vehicle?

a Can the UAV fly in clouds or IFR conditions?8 There may already be as much as a 30 second delay for control actions between Yuma

ATC and manned aircraft. a How much will this delay be increased with the operation of this UAV?

9 What is the procedure for “loss of IFF”? How will the UAV operator recognize that IFF is not working?

a Will the UAV return to base or continue its mission?


Appendix C: Process Diagrams C1 Determine if the UAV is safe to fly on this rangeC2 Determine adequacy of UAV risk management programC3 Determine if casualty expectation risk is acceptableC4 Determine if risk to property is acceptableC5 Determine if midair collision risk is acceptableC6 Determine adequacy of hardware safeguardsC7 Determine adequacy of software safeguardsC8 Determine adequacy of procedural safeguards


C1 Determine if the UAV is safe to fly


C2 Determine Adequacy of UAS Risk Management


C3 Determine if casualty expectation risk is acceptable


C4 Determine if risk to property is acceptable


C5 Determine if midair collision risk is acceptable


C6 Determine adequacy of hardware safeguards


C7 Determine adequacy of software safeguards


C8 Determine adequacy of procedural safeguards


Appendix D: Casualty Expectation Methodology Making an assessment of casualty expectation is not an exact science. The analyst has many factors to consider and there are many of the variables from case to case. The results are valuable because they can help the decision-maker reach a more informed decision on adjusting or approving a particular UAV route or operating area. The following guidelines are provided for the analyst to consider.

D.1 Calculating ExpectationsCasualty expectation is defined as the collective or total risk to an exposed population; i.e. the total number of individuals who will be fatalities. This approach to estimating casualty expectation uses the vehicle crash rate, vehicle size, and local population density, and is based on the equation:

CE = PF * PD * AL * PK * S

The variables are defined as:CE= Casualty ExpectationPF= Probability of Failure or Mishap per flight hourPD= Population Density per square mile.AL= Lethal AreaPK= Probability of a Fatality given a hit (usually assumed to be I)S= Shelter factor (if applicable)

The following paragraphs describe procedures for addressing each variable.Casualty Expectation is a cumulative calculation. Therefore, it must be calculated for each segment of the flight path and summed over the entire flight.

D.2 PROBABILITY OF FAILURE OR MISHAPThe probability of failure (PF in the casualty equation) or mishap is the expected number of mishaps in a given amount of time (typically flight hours). Several options can be used to determine a mishap rate based on the type and quality of vehicle history or reliability data available, and accuracy and/or conservatism required. These options include:

● Actual vehicle mishap data● Estimates based on reliability studies● Comparison by similarity● Worst case assumptions● A combination of these approaches

D.2.1 Probability of Failure Based on Mishap DataWhen available, the actual vehicle failure/mishap rate should be used. This computation requires the most recent year's mishap rate (or average of last 5 years) per 100,000 flight hours and includes the total number of crashes (or failure/mishaps) experienced within this time frame.Mishaps per 100,000 flight hours are the typical measure used for manned aircraft. The average probability of crash can be calculated directly from that number. For example, the Safety Center


gives a specific UAV's 5 year history as 700 mishaps in 100,000 flight hours, then the range converts that to PF= 0.007 crashes per flight hour. When using mishap data, the range must consider the following:

● The proposed operation may be more or less dangerous than the type of operation the mishap data is based on.

● The mishap data may be inaccurate. Some UAV programs may not record mishap data or keep an accurate log of flight hours.

● New UAVs may not have accumulated enough flight hours to make an accurate judgment.

● If it is a new vehicle, probability of failure data can be estimated by the number of failures encountered as flight hours accumulate.

Hours flown without failure 95% Confidence that PF is equal or less than

10 3 X 10-1

30 1 X10-1

100 3X10-2

300 1 X 10-2

This method assumes:● Stochastic system behavior● Exponential failure distribution● Constant system properties● Constant environmental stresses

These properties may not be present during initial test flights of a UAV.

D.2.2 Probability of Failure Based on SimilarityMishap data from similar vehicles might be considered in estimating probability of failure when adequate data is not available on the actual UAV. An assessment must be made of the differences between the baseline vehicle and the vehicle to be tested, and whether or not these differences significantly affect flight performance or controllability. For example, using Pioneer mishap data for a Pioneer variant might be valid; but using Pioneer data for a new VTOL UAV would be unacceptable.

D.2.3 Estimates from Reliability Studies

System safety or reliability assessments based on Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) or Failure Mode, Effects, and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) are basic options for predicting probability of failure when actual data is lacking. Fault trees are useful for analyzing complex components and systems. The FTA is a top-down technique that models failure pathways within a total system. The failures are tracked from a predetermined deficient event or condition to the failure that may be induced. FTAs can be used to identify interrelationships within the vehicle and the support systems, and to identify common cause failures.


On the other hand, FMECA can be used to analyze a system or process to determine how reliable the system and its components are, identify potential failure modes, and determine the effect and criticality of that failure and how these factors can be modified to avoid failures and increase reliability. The FMECA is a bottom-up technique for tabulating each system element that can fail and for assessing the consequences of each failure.

D.2.4 Worst Case AssumptionsIn extreme cases where failure/mishap and reliability data or time are not available to perform an in-depth analysis, a "worst case" approach can be examined. If the risk criteria can be satisfied, no further analysis is required. This approach will most likely result in an overly conservative estimate of failure, which may not matter if the UAV flight path is over an unpopulated or sparsely populated area.

Examples of "worst case" assumptions might be:● The UAV will crash once per flight.● The UAV will crash once per flight hour.● The UAV will crash in the most densely populated area

D.3 POPULATION DENSITYIn some cases when dealing with a small controlled area, range personnel counting the number of people or vessels in the area may acquire actual data. In most situations, however, population density can only be obtained through census data or local tax data. While population data is relatively easy to acquire, there are problems associated with such data that must be accounted for. For example:

● Population distributions are not uniform, but the model assumes they are.● Population data may be out of date. Census data is taken every ten years, and it takes a

year or more for it to be published. Therefore, the data must be corrected for annual growth rate, which may be negative in some areas.

● Population will vary with seasons.

The Census Bureau map below shows that Yuma County has a very low population density per square mile. The geographic area between Rolle Field and the BGWR has a population density of near zero.


Arizona Population Density

D.4 LETHAL AREALethal area is the area of the piece of concern (there may be multiple pieces if the vehicle breaks up), plus a buffer to account for the size of a person. The analyst may consider the terminal flight path of the UAV when determining lethal area. In some cases, the analyst may assume that the UAV is gliding. Then the lethal area footprint is the swath affected by the wingspan and buffer for the glide distance of the last 6 feet of altitude, plus the distance the vehicle needs to come to a stop.

AL = (L + 2B) * (W + 2B) or AL = (L + DG + DS + 2B) * (W + 2B)L = LengthW = WidthB = Buffer = 1 foot on all sides (commonly used range standard)DG = Glide distance at 6 ft. of altitudeDS = Distance to stop

D.5 PROBABLY OF FATALITY IF HITThe probability of fatality depends on the UAV's debris kinetic energy. UAV kinetic energy is estimated using the terminal velocity or VNE (velocity not to exceed) for powered flight, whichever is higher.

For DCC operations, local policy is that PK is assumed to be 1; that is, any individual hit by a UAV is assumed to be a fatality. Exceptions are not made for partial impact or other debris.

D.6 SHELTERThe "shelter" factor variable, as used in equation D 1-1, is an estimate of how exposed a population is to a vehicle or debris that may be falling. A shelter factor of “1" assumes that the entire population is exposed, and a shelter factor of "0" assumes that the entire population is completely sheltered. The shelter variable is an estimate of the protection houses, cars, and buildings provide and is based on how well those shelters reduce kinetic energy prior to debris impacting people.


Some analysts will use a shelter factor of "1" to be conservative. Others may make assumptions about what percentage of the exposed population is sheltered by buildings, homes, cars, boats, or trees. The Supplement to RCC Standard 321-00, Common Risk Criteria for National Test Ranges: Inert Debris, provides guidance on the size and type of debris required to penetrate materials like wood, fiberglass, various metals, and such structures as boats, homes, and commercial buildings.

Appendix E Instructions for Completing DCC Form 5401The briefer is responsible for ensuring that all key mission elements noted on the mission schedule/brief have been briefed according to this manual and for documenting completion of the briefing on the mission schedule/brief. Mission briefings may be in the form of an air mission coordinator’s brief, a detailed operations order, or locally developed briefing formats as long as all the minimum mandatory items are covered. The mission brief may be accomplished by telephonic or other means provided all key elements are addressed and recorded by both parties to the brief on the front side.

Note. Mandatory for all flights.

E–1 Configuration of briefingThe mission schedule/brief will be used to document the completion of required briefings. As a minimum, it will be maintained on file for the time period specified in this manual.

E–2 UseThe mission schedule/brief is provided for the commander’s use. Unit-developed forms may be used as long as all mandatory items are covered.

E–3 Regulations, standing operating procedures, and policiesInformation contained on the mission schedule/brief does not relieve the Crewmember from the requirement to know and adhere to applicable regulations, SOPs, and policies.

E–4 Command relationshipsSupporting and supported unit commanders will coordinate and designate command relationships to execute mission briefings when aircrews are separated from their parent unit.


Appendix F: Small Unmanned Aircraft System Utilization

F–1 PurposeThe purpose of this appendix is to establish regulatory guidance for Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems (Small UAS) operations. Small and micro UAS training, qualification, and currency will be according to DCC policies. All Small UAS operator personnel will receive familiarization training in airspace structure and airspace management and/or coordination and will comply with this manual.

F–2 Small Unmanned Aircraft System Training ProgramA Small UAS Aircrew Training Program will be established and operated according to appropriate training manuals.

F–3 Currencya To be considered current, a Small UAS operator must—

1 Perform a simulator launch, recovery, and a 15–minute flight of the Small UAS at least every 30 consecutive days.

2 Perform in a live launch, recovery, and a 15–minute flight of the Small UAS every 150 consecutive days.

b Tracking of actual flight time for a flying hour requirement is impractical and is not required. Individual flight records folders are not required; however, documentation of flight operations (sorties) for the purpose of tracking currency is required. The Director of Operations will establish procedures for maintenance of personal flight logs. A qualified sortie is a launch and recovery and 15–minute flight operations of the Small UAS.

c The Small UAS operator whose currency has lapsed must complete a proficiency flight evaluation according to the appropriate training manual. Simulators may not be used to re-establish currency.

d Waivers to currency may only be granted by the Director of Operations

F–4 Waivers to requirementsContractor/Company/Individual waivers to primary Small UAS requirements may be granted only by the Director of Operations.

F–5 Airspace usagea Small UAS operations will be conducted in accordance with this manual and applicable

FAA guidance. This includes the use of ground observers.b Where the appropriate qualifications are met, FAA allows access to the National

Airspace System outside restricted areas and warning areas as follows:1 All categories of UAS operations that are conducted wholly within Class D

airspace that are not over populated areas or within airspace requiring transponders.

2 UAS that weigh 20 pounds or less, may operate under the following conditions:


i Operations are conducted within Class G airspace, below 1,200 feet AGL, over military bases, reservations, or land protected by purchase, lease, or other restriction or that do not otherwise require a transponder.

ii The UAS remains within clear visual range of the pilot or a certified observer in ready contact with the pilot to ensure separation from other aircraft.

c Note. In these operations the UAS must remain more than 5 miles from any civil use airport or heliport. These operations require FAA advance notification and published NOTAMs to alert nonparticipating aircraft of the operation. For non-recurring operations, notification will be accomplished, and NOTAM published, no later than 24 hours in advance. Recurring operations (for example, training) must follow these notification procedures.

F–7 Minimum crew requirementsUnless the operator’s manual specifically states otherwise, the minimum crew to operate a Small UAS will be one approved school trained operator and an assistant. The assistant may be untrained.


Appendix G Management Control Evaluation Checklist

G–1 FunctionThe function covered by this checklist is the administration of the management control process.

G–2 PurposeThe purpose of this checklist is to assist assessable managers and management control administrators in evaluating the key management controls outlined below. It is not intended to cover all controls.

G–3 InstructionsAnswers must be based on the actual testing of key management controls (document analysis, direct observation, sampling, simulation, and so on). Answers that indicate deficiencies must be explained and corrective action indicated in supporting documentation. These key management controls must be evaluated at least once every 5 years. Certification that this evaluation has been conducted must be accomplished on YCAA Form 11–2 (Internal Control Evaluation Certification).

G–4 Test questionsa Director of Operations only.

1 Does the UAS operator utilize standardized aviation safety, standardization, regulations and procedures?

2 Has all DCC Flight Crew Information File information been sent to the UAS operator in a timely manner?

b User.1 Are airports, heliports, and landing areas approved for flight operations?2 Are local flying rules in agreement with Federal and DOD policies?3 Are applicable safety regulations and special-use airspace operation guidance

followed?4 Are violations of safety and special-use airspace guidance reported and

investigated by appropriate personnel per Federal and DOD guidance?5 Are Aircrew Training Programs carried out per applicable guidance to include

flying hours and synthetic flight training?6 Are personnel who do not meet proficiency requirements restricted from flight?7 Is UAS life support equipment available and maintained in accordance with

applicable guidance?8 Has the airspace been approved for UAS operations?


Appendix H - Terms and Abbreviations

Abbreviations

Abbreviation Description

AD Airworthiness Directive

AGL above ground level

AO Aircraft Operator or Aircraft Owner

Checkride annual proficiency check

ARMS Airport Resource Management Survey

ASA aviation safety action

ATC air traffic control

ATM aircrew training manual

ATP Aircrew Training Program

CAFRS Centralized Aviation Flight Records System

CFR Code of Federal Regulations

CVR cockpit voice recorder

FOIA Freedom of Information Act

FTG flight training guide

GCS ground control station

GPS Global Positioning System

IATF individual aircrew training folder

ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization

IFR instrument flight rules

IFRF individual flight records folder

IKTP initial key personnel training


IMC instrument meteorological conditions

IO instructor operator

MC mission coordinator

MQ mission qualified

MT master trainer

MTDS mission, type, design, and series

NOTAM Notice to Airman

PO payload operator

POI program of instruction

PM project manager

RAW risk assessment worksheet

RL readiness level

SB supply bulletin

SME subject matter expert

SOF safety of flight

SOP standing operating procedure

SO standardization instructor operator

SP standardization instructor pilot

S–PART semi-annual proficiency and readiness test

SUA special use airspace

SUAS Small Unmanned Aircraft System

UA unmanned aircraft

UAC unmanned aircraft crewmember

UAS Unmanned Aircraft System

U.S. United States

VFR visual flight rules


VMC visual meteorological condition

Terms

Term Description

Aeronautical information manual A manual that provides the aviation community with basic flight information and ATC procedures for use in the National Airspace System of the United States. It also contains items of interest to operators and aircrew members concerning health and medical facts, factors affecting flight safety, a operator and/or controller glossary of terms used in the Air Traffic Control System, and information on safety, accident, and hazard reporting.

Air traffic Aircraft and/or air vehicles operating in the air or on an airport surface, exclusive of loading ramps and parking areas.

Aircrew training manual (ATM) A publication that contains training requirements for flight crewmembers and programs for qualification, refresher, mission, and continuation training in support of the Aircrew Training Program (ATP), including unmanned aerial vehicle system crewmembers training programs.

Aircrew Training Program (ATP) Aviation aircrew standardized training and evaluation program.

Catastrophic failure Any failure that leads to the loss of the UAS(s).

Controlled airspace A generic term that covers the different classification of airspace (Class A, Class B, Class C, Class D, and Class E airspace) and defined dimensions within which air traffic control service is provided to instrumented flight rules flights and to VFR flights in accordance with the airspace classification (see the Aeronautical Information Manual).

Crewmember Includes all flight and ground crewmembers, and others who perform aircrew duties as listed in this manual.

Cross-country flight A flight extending beyond the local flying area or within the local flying area which is planned to terminate at a place other than the place of origin.


External operator (EO) The UAS crewmember who, in the absence of full automatic takeoff and landing systems, visually controls the UAS flight path, generally during takeoff and/or landing.

Flight crew station A station in an air vehicle that a flight crewmember occupies to perform his or her flight duty, for example, operator stations specified in operator’s manuals. For UAS, a station associated with the in-flight operation of a UAS at which flight controls may be used to control air vehicle flight; for example, air vehicle operator, external operator, or mission payload operator stations specified in the operator’s manual.

Flight crewmember Any instructor pilot, flight examiner, pilot, copilot, flight engineer and/or mechanic, flight navigator, weapon systems operator, bombardier navigator, radar intercept operator, sensory system operator, boom operator, crew chief, load-master, remotely operated aircrew crewmember, UAS operator, defensive and/or offensive system operator, and other flight manual handbook identified crewmember when assigned to their respective crew positions to conduct a military flight or any flight under the contract. For UAS, a UAM, EO, IO, MC, PO or SO assigned to duty during the in-flight operation of an aircraft.

Flight surgeon A medical officer that is a graduate of an approved military course of aviation medicine. References to flight surgeons include aeromedical physician’s assistant.

Ground crewmember The status assigned to Soldiers who have duties directly related to the preparation, launch, recovery and/or maintenance of UAS and/or their mission payload systems but not the in-flight mission.

Installation For Army Aviation Standardization Program purposes, continental United States Active Army posts, camps, or stations; ARNG states; Army Reserve commands; overseas corps, divisions, independent regiments, groups, and brigades. For other than standardization purposes includes U.S. Army Reserve facilities.

Instructor operator (IO) A UAS crewmember who conducts training and evaluation of Crewmembers and UAS unit trainers in designated UAS and promotes safety among aircrew crewmembers. Training and evaluation include air


vehicle operation, qualification, unit employment, visual flight, and crew performance.

Maintenance The inspection, overhaul, repair, preservation, and/or the replacement of parts, but excludes preventive maintenance.

Maintenance and operations check Systems check made on the ground through engine runup and taxiing. Checks made using auxiliary power or testing equipment to simulate, insofar as possible, actual conditions under which the system is to operate. These checks are made to ensure that air vehicle systems or components disturbed during an inspection or maintenance have been repaired or adjusted satisfactorily.

Mission coordinator (MC) The designated individual tasked with the overall responsibility for the operation and safety of the UAS mission.

National Airspace System All of the airspace above the surface of the earth over the United States and its possessions.

Night The time between the end of evening nautical twilight and the beginning of morning nautical twilight converted to local time.

Operational flying Flying performed by qualified personnel primarily for mission support or training, while serving in assignments in which basic flying skills normally are kept current while performing assigned duties. All flying by qualified members of the Reserve Component not on extended active duty is operational flying.

Remotely operated aircraft The FAA terminology for unmanned aircraft vehicle systems

Restricted area Airspace designated in FAR 1 within which the flight of aircraft and/or air vehicles, while not prohibited, is subject to restriction(s).

Safety of flight (SOF) messages Electrically transmitted messages pertaining to any defect or hazardous condition, actual or potential, that can cause personal injury, death, or damage to aircraft and/or air vehicles, components or repair parts where a medium to high risk safety condition has been determined.

Special use airspace (SUA) Airspace designated by the FAA with specific vertical and lateral limits, established for the purpose of


containing hazardous activities or activity that could be hazardous to nonparticipating aircraft and/or air vehicles. Limitation on nonparticipating aircraft and/or air vehicles may range from absolute exclusion to complete freedom of use within certain areas, depending upon activity being conducted.

Standardization instructor operator A qualified instructor operator designated by the commander, in writing, to supervise unit standardization programs. Primarily trains and evaluates other SOs and IOs.

Traffic pattern The traffic flow that is prescribed for aircraft and/or air vehicles landing at, taxiing on, or taking off from an airport or airfield.

Training mission Missions flown for flight qualification, refresher, or proficiency and/or currency training; ATP requirements, and authorized training exercises.

Unit trainer (UT) A UAS crewmember designated to instruct in areas of special training to assist in unit training programs and achieve established training standards.

Unmanned aircraft crewmember (UAC)

Flight and/or ground individuals who perform duties controlling the flight of an unmanned aerial vehicle or the operation of its mission equipment as well as preparation, launch, recovery and/or maintenance that is essential to the operation of the UAS.

Unmanned Aircrew Member (UAM)

The UAM controls and/or monitors the actual flight of the UAS from within a GCS, launch and recovery site, portable GCS, or similar device.

Unmanned Aircraft System Unmanned Aircraft System, includes platform, sensors, communication gear, launcher, landing system, ground control station.

UAS control station A flight deck without external flight environment clues (no direct visual contact with the UAS) used for control of UAS.


Appendix I Airspace UAS operations from the Yuma DCC will be flown only in airspace authorized by the FAA with a Certificate of Authorization (COA). The DCC has performed risk analysis on the following two airspace areas.

Rolle COA 1

Designated altitudes. Surface to 6,000 feet MSLTime of designation. ContinuousControlling agency. MCAS Yuma ATCC, Yuma International AirportUsing agency. Defense Contractor Complex, Airport Director, Yuma International Airport, Yuma, AZ


Yuma COA 1

Designated altitudes. 2,700' AGL to 6,000 feet MSLTime of designation. ContinuousControlling agency. MCAS Yuma ATCC, Yuma International AirportUsing agency. Defense Contractor Complex, Airport Director, Yuma International Airport, Yuma, AZ

Note: Use of the Yuma COA 1 requires extensive coordination and a comprehensive risk analysis. Yuma COA will only be approved for mature UAS and operators.


Appendix J Standard FormsSee following pages


Daily Mission ScheduleA B C D E F G H I J

Date Acft Cdr Crew Members

Call Sign ETD ETE AC Initials Briefer Initials Risk # Mission Result

DCC Form 5401

This form must be completed for every flight from DCC property. Items A-I must be completed before flight. Item J, Mission Result, is required immediately after flight or status change.

Mission StatusMC = Mission CompleteMNC = Mission Not Completed as BriefedMNX = Mission Cancelled


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