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May 6, 2003 May 6, 2003 Davis-Besse Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Nuclear Power Station 1 IMC 0350 Meeting Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station

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Page 1: Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Stationexisting internal pump clearances – Pumps hydrostatic bearing clearances are less than Containment Emergency Sump strainer mesh – Debris in water

May 6, 2003May 6, 2003Davis-BesseDavis-BesseNuclear Power StationNuclear Power Station

1IMC 0350 Meeting

Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station

Page 2: Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Stationexisting internal pump clearances – Pumps hydrostatic bearing clearances are less than Containment Emergency Sump strainer mesh – Debris in water

May 6, 2003May 6, 2003Davis-BesseDavis-BesseNuclear Power StationNuclear Power Station

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Lew MyersChief Operating Officer - FENOC

Desired Outcome

Lew MyersFENOC Chief Operating Officer

•Discuss Recent Management Actions•Review Plant Activities CompletedSince Last Meeting

•Review Near Term Activities forPlant Testing

•Provide an Update of Issues andResolutions

Page 3: Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Stationexisting internal pump clearances – Pumps hydrostatic bearing clearances are less than Containment Emergency Sump strainer mesh – Debris in water

May 6, 2003May 6, 2003Davis-BesseDavis-BesseNuclear Power StationNuclear Power Station

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Meeting Agenda

Management Actions……………………………………...…..Lew Myers

Restart Test Plan………………………………………….….Mike Stevens

Challenges to Restart Test Plan and Plant Restart…...Mike Ross- High Pressure Injection Pump Replacement…..….…Framatome/George Beam- High Pressure Injection Modification……………………....MPR/Bob Coward

Operations Readiness………………………………………..Mark Bezilla- Appendix R Review

Quality Oversight Assessment…………..……………….Fred von Ahn

Safety Conscious Work Environment……………………Lew Myers

Containment Closeout………………………………………...Randy Fast

Page 4: Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Stationexisting internal pump clearances – Pumps hydrostatic bearing clearances are less than Containment Emergency Sump strainer mesh – Debris in water

May 6, 2003May 6, 2003Davis-BesseDavis-BesseNuclear Power StationNuclear Power Station

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Lew MyersChief Operating Officer - FENOC

Management Actions

Lew MyersFENOC Chief Operating Officer

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May 6, 2003May 6, 2003Davis-BesseDavis-BesseNuclear Power StationNuclear Power Station

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Management and Human PerformanceRoot Cause Statement:• There was less than an adequate nuclear safety focus

– There was a focus on production, established bymanagement, combined with taking minimum actions tomeet regulatory requirements, that resulted in theacceptance of degraded conditions

Management Actions

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May 6, 2003May 6, 2003Davis-BesseDavis-BesseNuclear Power StationNuclear Power Station

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Mike RossDB-Restart Director

Vito KaminskasDirector

Maintenance Management

Kevin OstrowskiDirector

Nuclear Maintenance

Rick MendeDirector

Work Management

Jim PowersDirector

DB Nuclear Engineering

John MessinaDirector

Support Services

Marc PearsonDirector

BV Services & Projects

Jim ByrneVice President

TMI2

Tim RauschGeneral Manager

Jim LashGeneral Manager

Tom CosgroveDirector

BV Nuclear Engineering

George KuehnVice President

Saxton

Bill PearceVice PresidentBeaver Valley

New to Position

Ken PechDirector

Nuclear Services

Dave EshelmanDirector

FENOC Support

Mark BezillaGeneral Manager

Mark BezillaVice President

Davis-Besse

Strengthening the Executive and Nuclear Site teams...

Fred vonAhnVice President – Oversight

Bob SaundersPresident

Gary LeidichExecutive Vice President

Lew MyersChief Operating Officer

Mike StevensDirector

Work Management

Bob SchrauderDirector

DB-Support Services

Jeannie RinckelDirector

Nuclear Fuels

Tom LentzDirector

PY Nuclear Engineering

Bill KandaVice President

Perry

Randy FastDirector

DB-Organizational Development

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May 6, 2003May 6, 2003Davis-BesseDavis-BesseNuclear Power StationNuclear Power Station

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Security

RegulatoryAffairs

Corrective ActionProgram

QualityServices

Bob SchrauderDirector

DB SupportServices

Rapid ResponseTeam

ConfigurationManagement

DesignEngineering

PlantEngineering

Jim PowersDirector

DB NuclearEngineering

MatrixedOrganization

Mike RossDirector

DB Restart

SAPBusiness Champion

EmergencyPreparedness

DB HumanResources

DB Communications

DB Safety

Training

HumanPerformance

RestartBuilding Blocks

Randy FastDirector

DB OrganizationalDevelopment

Mike StevensDirector

Maintenance

Outage Management& Work Control

Chemistry

Operations

RadiationProtection

Mark BezillaDB Vice President /

Plant Manager

Lew MyersChief Operating Officer

Davis-Besse Restart Organizational Chart

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May 6, 2003May 6, 2003Davis-BesseDavis-BesseNuclear Power StationNuclear Power Station

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Lew MyersChief Operating Officer - FENOC

Restart Test Plan

Mike StevensDirector - Maintenance

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Purpose• To prove the work performed thus far has been

effective to support operation of Davis-Besse• To take lessons learned from others to validate the

start up and safe operation of Davis-Besse

Restart Test Plan

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Primary System Readiness• Detailed inspection @ 50 psig, 250 psig, and

2,155 psig pressure• Validate requirements and the sensitivity of the

FLÜS system• Reactor Coolant Pump testing and operation• Baseline Reactor Head inspections• Control Rod System insertion time testing

Restart Test Plan

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Primary System Readiness• Perform Technical Specification surveillance tests

including the integrated Safety Features ActuationSystem Test

• Perform flow testing of systems– Use special flow instruments to validate system

operation– Establishes operating plant conditions

Restart Test Plan

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Secondary System Readiness• Places secondary plant components in service as

required for startup• Restore from lay-up preservation to operational

readiness

Restart Test Plan

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Secondary Systems• Main Steam• Main Condenser• Condensate• Circulating Water• Feedwater• Auxiliary Feedwater• Feedwater Heating

Restart Test Plan

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Lew MyersChief Operating Officer - FENOC

Mike RossRestart Director

Challenges to Restart Test Planand Plant Restart

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Plant Support Center• New Center Established to Address Restart Issues• Purpose:

– Focus on issues/modifications for Mode 4– Focus on required efforts after Mode 4

Mode 4/Mode 3 Status

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Outstanding Mode 4 Restraints

Mode 4/Mode 3 Status

0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

Ope

n M

ode

4 R

estr

aint

s

CRs 670 658 670 656 656 650 609 580 576 432 429 426 427 426 415 418 398 380 351 357 328 327 320 323

WO 470 455 450 440 455 437 359 374 350 350 311 300 239 240 240 242 234 234 230 210 210 210 210 202

Tes ting 352 352 352 352 350 350 348 348 355 355 355 355 404 404 404 407 398 398 398 409 409 409 332 332

Other 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 80 80 80 80 80 80 80

RSRB 385 385 378 370 350 348 340 348 348 348 304 304 304 304 304 304 289 289 280 257 244 244 247 235

To tal 1927 1900 1900 1868 1861 1835 1706 1700 1679 1535 1449 1435 1424 1424 1413 1421 1369 1381 1339 1313 1271 1270 1189 1172

3/30 3/31 4/1 4/2 4/3 4/4 4/8 4/9 4/10 4/14 4/15 4/16 4/17 4/18 4/21 4/22 4/23 4/24 4/28 4/29 4/30 5/1 5/2 5/5

Good

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Outstanding Mode 3 Restraints

Mode 4/Mode 3 Status

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

Ope

n M

ode

3 R

estr

aint

s

CRs 210 169 137 137 140 140 141 135 83 84 73 74 75 76

WO 172 121 114 114 119 119 119 119 119 94 94 94 94 89

Tes ting 302 317 317 317 317 317 317 317 317 312 312 312 244 244

Other 18 18 18 18 18 18 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 65

RSRB 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 39 39 39 35

To ta l 746 669 630 630 638 638 686 680 628 599 583 584 517 509 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

4/16 4/17 4/18 4/21 4/22 4/23 4/24 4/25 4/28 4/29 4/30 5/1 5/2 5/5 5/6 5/7 5/8 5/9 5/12 5/13 5/14

Good

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Challenges to Mode 4/Mode 3• High Pressure Injection pump hydrostatic bearing

issue - licensing submittal in progress• Safety Features Actuation System Relay

Replacement• Electrical Transient Analyses Program

Mode 4/Mode 3 Status

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Mode 4/Mode 3 Status

Challenges to Mode 4/Mode 3 (Continued)

• Low Pressure Injection Pump Cyclone Separators• 4160V Undervoltage relays• Air Operated Valve Program• Makeup Pump Over-current Relay Setpoint• Emergency Diesel Generator Room Temperature

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Mode 2/Mode 1 Status

Mode 2• 396 restraints to complete

Mode 1• 39 restraints to complete

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Background• Identified an issue between potential debris and the

existing internal pump clearances– Pumps hydrostatic bearing clearances are less than

Containment Emergency Sump strainer mesh– Debris in water from the containment emergency sump

could potentially block the ports that provide lubricationto the hydrostatic bearings resulting in pump failure

• Options to address issue include:– Replacement with HPI pumps that are not susceptible to

this degradation mechanism– Modify existing pumps to add internal strainer to

prevent debris from entering bearing

High Pressure Injection Pump

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Replacement Option:• George Beam, Senior Vice President - Framatome

Modification Option:• Bob Coward, Director of Nuclear Services - MPR

Decision focus: “What is right for the plant”

Technical Discussion of HPI OptionsThe Technical Merits of Each

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Replacement Option Scope• Engineering design and analysis• Procurement of replacement pumps and motors• Procurement of required piping, components,

fixtures• Removal of existing pumps and motors• Removal of interferences• Installation of replacement pumps and motors• Final acceptance test procedure• Participate in final acceptance testing

High Pressure Injection Pump

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Current Status/Work in Progress• Project approach is self-managed work team• Two pumps and motors procured

– In OEMs shop for upgrades and checkout– Pumps physically larger– Motors greater horsepower

• Important safety analysis, design and constructionwork remains to be completed

High Pressure Injection Pump

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Modification Option Scope• Modification design• Mock-up test specification• Analysis (rotordynamics, hydraulic, stress)• In-plant testing• Mock-up testing• Implement modifications• Post modification testing

High Pressure Injection Pump

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High Pressure Injection Pump Volute

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High Pressure Injection PumpVolute Modification

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High Pressure Injection PumpCyclone Strainer Modification

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Current Status/Work In-Progress• Conceptual designs complete (modification and

mock-ups)• Preliminary analyses complete• Testing specifications and detailed designs under

development

High Pressure Injection Pump

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Mark BezillaVice President/Plant Manager

Operations Readiness

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Accomplishments• Developed and Implemented Operations

Leadership Plan• Implemented Comprehensive Expectations

and Standards for Operators• Issued Operation’s Leadership Statement• Expanded Operator Observation Program• Performed Appendix “R” Fire Inspection• Completed Significant Training Accomplishments• Operations Led Significant Major Evolutions

Operations Readiness

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Industry Feedback• INPO has made three Assist Visits to review Operations

Readiness:– December of 2002– March of 2003– INPO Team Assessment, April of 2003

• Seven Operations Assessments by ManagementPersonnel from other Nuclear Plants:

– Oconee Nuclear Station, Arkansas Nuclear One, TennesseeValley Authority, DC Cook, Waterford, Perry, North Anna

• Company Nuclear Review Board Assessment– April, 2003

Operations Readiness

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Industry Feedback:• “Shift Managers are stepping up to their new

leadership roles”• “Standards are equal to or above industry norms”• “Operations is recognized as the Lead Organization”• “Ownership of equipment in plant is improved”• “Vertical alignment in Operations is very good”• “Every interviewee complimented the greatly

improved management attitude toward, andexpectation to identify problems”

Operations Readiness

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Industry Feedback• Opportunities:

– “Establish consistent implementation of Expectationsand Standards when stressful situations occur”

– “Improve facility housekeeping”

– “Improve use of Pre-job Brief Checklist”

– “Opportunities for improvement in three-waycommunications”

– “Improve procedure use”

Operations Readiness

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Continuing Improvement Plans• Continue “Just-In-Time” Simulator Training• Complete assigned actions from Operation’s

Section 2003 Business Plan• Continue emphasis on Safety Culture and Safety

Conscious Work Environment• Continue to coach Operators in establishing their

ownership role• Review the Secondary Plant Startup Plan and

Identify any Additional Training Requirements• Recommence the Initial SRO and RO License

Classes (scheduled for June, 2003)

Operations Readiness

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Lew MyersChief Operating Officer - FENOC

Quality Oversight Assessment

Fred von AhnVice President - FENOC Oversight

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Recent Assessment Activities• Operations Leadership

– Noteworthy improvements:• leadership• safety focus• ownership of reactor coolant system cleanliness

• Corrective Action/Condition Report Process– Implementation continues to be challenged

• Quarterly Reviews– Procedure compliance issues– Subsequent CREST condition report reviews

Quality Assessment Overview

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Lew MyersChief Operating Officer - FENOC

Safety Conscious Work Environment

Lew MyersFENOC Chief Operating Officer

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• March SCWE Survey Demonstrated GoodImprovement

• Two areas required further review(questions #35 & #36)

• Several actions have been taken to evaluate results– Response analysis - by questions and groups– Comparison to other programs

• Employee Concerns Program• Quality Assurance Program• NRC Allegations Program

– Personnel interview and feedback

Safety Conscious Work Environment

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Response Analysis

2002 / 2003 Comparison

<5% Negative ResponseBetween 5% and 10% Negative Response

>10% Negative Response

“Retaliation”Questions

“HIRD”Questions

2002 Survey 2003 SurveyNegative Responses Negative Responses

# Question ALL FENOC Contractor ALL FENOC Contractor

Total Number of Workers 386 280 84 1139 666 377

7 I can raise nuclear safety or quality concern without fear of retaliation 18.5% 22.1% 5.6% 7.1% 4.2% 9.9%

25I feel free to raise nuclear safety or quality issues on CRs without fear of reprisal

16.1% 18.4% 8.5% 5.6% 3.0% 8.5%

30 I can use ECP without fear of retaliation 14.6% 18.1% 4.0% 5.1% 3.2% 7.0%

35 I have been subjected to HIRD within the last 6 months 7.1% 8.9% 1.2% 8.1% 5.1% 10.9%

36I am aware of others who have been subjected to HIRD within the last 6 months

12.4% 14.6% 4.8% 15.3% 10.2% 22.3%

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Survey Analysis• Survey questions on Harassment, Intimidation,

Retaliation and Discrimination (HIRD) lackedclear focus to 50.7 issue

• Responses to HIRD questions were not clearlystated

• Responses are more consistent with recent (ECP)and Safety Culture survey results.– Worker concern about schedule pressure and directive

management rather than 50.7 HIRD concerns

Safety Conscious Work Environment

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NRC Allegations

1

0

2

3 3

5

8

3

9

4

1

3

4

1

0 00 0 0 0 0 0

1

2

3

2

0 0 0 0 0 00123456789

10

Jan-0

2Feb

-02Mar-

02Apr-

02May

-02Ju

n-02

Jul-0

2Aug

-02Sep

-02Oct-

02Nov-0

2Dec-0

2Ja

n-03

Feb-03

Mar-03

Apr-03

NRC AllegationsSubstantiated3-Month Rolling Avg

Safety Conscious Work Environment

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Safety Conscious Work Environment

NRC-Retaliation Allegations

0

1 1 1 1 1

0 0

6

1 1 1

0

1

0 00 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Jan-0

2Feb

-02Mar-

02Apr-

02May

-02Ju

n-02

Jul-0

2Aug

-02Sep

-02Oct-

02Nov-0

2Dec-0

2Ja

n-03

Feb-03

Mar-03

Apr-03

NRC - RetaliationSubstantiated3-Month Rolling Avg

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Safety Conscious Work Environment

ECP Trends

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

Jan-02

Feb-02

Mar-02

Apr-02

May-0 2

Jun-0 2

Jul-02

Aug -0 2

Sep -02

Oct-02

No v-02

Dec-02

Jan-03

Feb-0 3

Mar-03

Apr-03

ECP ContactsNRC Allegations

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Overall Survey Conclusions• Workers recognize responsibility to raise nuclear safety

and quality issues• Workers feel free to raise nuclear safety and quality

concerns without fear of retaliation through their chain ofcommand, through the Condition Report process, andthrough the Employee Concerns Program

• Pockets of negative perceptions in RP/Chemistry,Maintenance and Engineering departments

• Contractors have a more negative overall perception thanFENOC employees

• Additional senior management attention to SCWERP/Chemistry and Maintenance is required

Safety Conscious Work Environment

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Lew MyersChief Operating Officer - FENOC

Containment Closeout

Randy FastDirector - Organizational Development

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• Emergency Sump• Containment Coatings• Fuel Integrity• Environmentally

Qualified Equipment• FLUS• Boric Acid Inspections

• Decay Heat Valve Tank• Containment Air Coolers• Refueling Transfer Canal• Containment Pressure

Vessel• Corrective Action

Evaluations/CorrectiveActions

Containment Closeout

Project Scope

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Containment Health• Physical work and paper closeout in support of

Containment Health is in the final closure phase

Containment Closeout

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Lew MyersChief Operating Officer - FENOC

Closing Comments

Lew MyersChief Operating Officer - FENOC