davidson mcneill 2012 olympic park - clark university

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2012 49: 1625 originally published online 19 September 2011Urban StudMark Davidson and Donald McNeill

ParkThe Redevelopment of Olympic Sites: Examining the Legacy of Sydney Olympic

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The Redevelopment of Olympic Sites:Examining the Legacy of SydneyOlympic Park

Mark Davidson and Donald McNeill

[Paper first received, December 2009; in final form, May 2011]

Abstract

This paper examines the redevelopment of the site of Sydney’s 2000 summerOlympics, locating it within debates over the legacy of these events. The paperdescribes some of the key stakeholders involved in the redevelopment and planningof the site. It provides an overview of the regulatory context and governance bodiesthat have structured the space since the staging of the Olympics, then identifies twokey areas of private-sector involvement, in event space and in business development,where tensions emerged over how the site should best be governed.

1. Introduction

The hosting of an Olympic Games is one ofthe most sought after events to be pursuedby state governments. However, after aseries of significant public debt crises fol-lowing the hosting of the Olympics, partic-ularly in Montreal (Levine, 2003) andAtlanta (Andranovich et al., 2001), theissue of legacy has moved to the centre ofthe Olympics bidding process and widerdebates over the benefits of the Games (forexample, Gold and Gold, 2008; Newman,2007). Indeed, legacy has been made a

significant aspect of the bid evaluationprocess by the International OlympicCommittee (IOC) in their OlympicCharter, the IOC’s Agenda 21 and theIOC’s Olympic Games KnowledgeManagement (OGKM) programme.Furthermore, this emphasis on legacy hasbeen accentuated in the context of a widersustainability agenda that continues todirect attention onto the long-term impactsof large urban development projects(Kornblatt, 2006). As a result, there has

Mark Davidson is in the Graduate School of Geography, Clark University, 950 Main St Worcester,Massachusetts 01610, USA. E-mail: [email protected].

Donald McNeill (corresponding author) is in the Centre for Cultural Research, University ofWestern Sydney, Locked Bag 1797, Penrith, New South Wales, NSW 2751, Australia.E-mail: [email protected].

49(8) 1625–1641, June 2012

0042-0980 Print/1360-063X Online� 2011 Urban Studies Journal Limited

DOI: 10.1177/0042098011417022 at CLARK UNIV on March 28, 2013usj.sagepub.comDownloaded from


been a long-standing interest in the integra-tion of Games planning with the develop-ment of new economic development zones,key features of both the Barcelona (1992)and Athens (2004) Games (for example,Gospodini, 2009), as well as a less pro-nounced but extremely valuable commen-tary on the public finance landscape thathas followed the Games (Searle, 2002).

In this paper, we examine the aftermathof the 2000 summer Olympics andParalympics in the main Sydney site atHomebush in the central west of the met-ropolitan area, and consider how the NewSouth Wales (NSW) state government andthe Sydney Olympic Park Authority(SOPA) have addressed the long-termmanagement of legacy. The paper focuseson the conflictual nature of its developmentas a ‘retrofitted’ event space and its popu-larity as a form of business park, set withinlarge and diverse recreational parklands.The paper identifies the key stakeholdersfrom both the private and public sectors,and traces the competing visions for thesite’s development. We draw attention tothe importance of seeing the Olympic Parkas a specific property market, a mix of pub-licly owned leisure areas, cross-subsidisedby the development and leasing of particu-lar sites in order to drive revenue. A keycontribution of the paper is to address the‘texture’ of this market, where the state‘‘must also be considered as a local contin-gency’’ (Beauregard, 2005, p. 2435), alongwith a diverse set of property developmentand corporate lessee interests. As we shallshow, the state itself has to be regarded as ahighly contested, strategic site of party fac-tionalism, bureaucratic inertia, managerialcultures and interagency dissonance, as wellas playing the more orthodox role ofmarket regulator and development enablerin major sites of urban regeneration(Fainstein 2001). The paper builds on the

nuanced analysis by Searle and Bounds ofthe early planning of Olympic Park, whichidentified the

drive by the [NSW] government to achieve

maximum economic return from its land

holdings, via sale or lease [and a] state policy

of reducing local impediments to develop-

ment (Searle and Bounds, 1999, p. 166).

The paper is based on a year-long study ofSydney Olympic Park, between March 2008and February 2009, during which the authorswere given unprecedented access to officersof the Sydney Olympic Park Authority andother site stakeholders. We conducted semi-structured interviews with eight officers,working in a range of areas in the Park. Inaddition, and with the help of the SydneyOlympic Park Business Association(SOPBA), we interviewed five representa-tives of large businesses, including AcerArena, the Accor hotels, CommonwealthBank of Australia as key office tenant and arepresentative of a major property developer,as well as the Association’s CEO. To gain aninsight into the perspectives of neighbouringcommunities, we conducted interviews and/or focus groups with representatives of com-munity associations and local councils adja-cent to the site.

2. The Political Rationale ofOlympic Legacy Strategies

There is now increased emphasis on gener-ating a strong functional legacy for the sitesof the Olympic Games (for example, Prior,2006). However, Olympic sites are spaceswith huge sunk costs. Hence, the staging ofan Olympics is often justified by the argu-ment that the public costs of infrastructureprovision, site clearance and facilities con-struction will lever in private investmentand in turn sponsor a wider area-led

1626 MARK DAVIDSON AND DONALD MCNEILL



regeneration. Hosting the Olympics there-fore sees the state acting primarily not as amanager and/or regulator, but as a specula-tive investor, using its planning authority toabsorb risk, stimulate and execute, asopposed to manage, urban development(Harvey, 1989). This state entrepreneurial-ism is often driven by a coalition of leadingprivate-sector stakeholders (along withmajor public institutions and agencies)(Cochrane et al., 1996) and tends to beopposed only by community groups pro-testing against loss of amenity, or fiscal con-servatives worried at the long-term impactson public finance.

Such opposition to hosting the Games isunsurprising given the huge costs involved,the most recent summer Games have beenestimated as costing AU$6.6 billion (Sydney2000), 8.9 billion Euros (Athens 2004) andUS$16 billion (Beijing, 2008). Even the bid-ding process for the Games itself representsa major public investment (Law, 1994;Whitelegg, 2000). Thus the IOC’s biddingprocess now places significant emphasis onthe planning of post-games legacy, makingit an objective ‘‘to promote a positive legacyfrom the Olympic Games to the host citiesand host countries’’, one of the IOC’s 16goals in its Olympic Charter (IOC, 2007,p. 15). Yet it remains difficult, if not impos-sible, to identify the costs of hosting; this isdespite attempts to improve the correlationof benefits using, for example, input–outputanalysis (Zhang and Zhao, 2007). This prob-lem is confounded by the opaque account-ing measures often used by city and nationalgovernments to allocate public spending(Kasimati and Dawson, 2009; Kirkup andMajor, 2006; Waitt, 1999).

The major challenge faced by states thathost the Games is that of debt financing thehuge sunk investments in transport, sportsfacilities, media infrastructure, accommoda-tion and precinct development. While thiscan be used to leverage central government

funding for nationally significant projects,this often speculative investing can, at itsmost extreme, generate a fiscal crisis of thestate (Harvey, 1989). A notorious exampleof this was the 1976 Montreal Olympics, itsrelated CDN$1.5 billion debts only beingcleared in 2006. Vancouver’s 2010 winterGames generated similar concerns as thecity council’s credit rating was downgradedin the face of growing costs relating to theOlympic Village at South-east False Creek.Given that the penalisation of public debtburden has been a key neo-liberal disciplin-ing device (Hackworth, 2002; Harvey,2005), failure to achieve planned budgetingthreatens to trigger credit-rating down-grades and higher interest payments. Insuch cases, the implications of the stateacting as speculator become realised in theform of welfare and social service cutbacks(Hackworth, 2002; Harvey, 2005).

A further challenge concerns the problemof what to do with facilities which withoutcareful community and commercial engage-ment will become largely redundant in termsof both use and exchange value after the endof the Games. As the Olympics host a widerange of sports that rarely receive largepublic audiences at other times, it is very dif-ficult to design facilities that can be efficientlyre-used for post-Games. Even the centralOlympic stadium can often struggle to beefficiently re-used. The Barcelona 1992 sta-dium was for many years used only for spar-sely attended American football matches,then as a temporary home the Espanyol foot-ball club, and now lies largely vacant. Legacyplanning for the 2012 London Olympic sta-dium has been dominated by debates overthe most appropriate tenant. The most suit-able user in terms of crowd size—TottenhamHotspur—planned to remove the athleticstrack and significantly redevelop the sta-dium, thus raising the ire of the athleticscommunity. Perhaps as a consequence, the2012 stadium leasing agreement was

REDEVELOPING SYDNEY OLYMPIC PARK 1627



subsequently awarded to West Ham Unitedwhich, despite having smaller crowds,offered to retain the athletics track and dolittle to alter the stadium fabric. The relega-tion of this club in 2011 from the PremierLeague raises doubts about whether it will beable to fill the stadium in future. Around theworld, most Olympic cities have seen manyof their facilities demolished, or else leftunderused or in disrepair.

Yet these problems have rarely dampenedpolitical enthusiasm for hosting the Games.For some, this relates to the lack of optionsavailable to city governments in the contextof a wider coercive neo-liberal agenda thathas drastically constrained economic strat-egy options (Andranovich et al., 2001;Harvey, 1989). However, it also relates tothe fact that legacy benefits come in twoforms: the hard (i.e. economic and infra-structure) and soft (i.e. place image andcivic pride) (Kornblatt, 2006). Hence, acombination of accounting difficulties andthe feel-good benefits delivered to electedpoliticians from a successful bid means thatcost–benefit analysis does not dictate ratio-nale. It is also worth noting that soft benefitsare, occasionally, not purely associated withthe generation of hosting-related fiscalincome (see Hiller, 2000, on Cape Town’s2004 Olympics bid).

Soft benefits have also become a greaterfocus in the Olympic bidding competition. In1996, the IOC adopted UNCED Agenda 21to ‘‘achieve sustainable development throughsport’’ (IOC, 1999), amending the OlympicCharter to include the following statement

the IOC sees that the Olympic Games are

held in conditions which demonstrate a

responsible concern for environmental issues

and encourages the Olympic Movement to

demonstrate a responsible concern for envi-

ronmental issues, takes measures to reflect

such concern in its activities and educates all

those connected with the Olympic Movement

as to the importance of sustainable develop-

ment (IOC, 1999, p. 7).

All subsequent bidding cities have respondedto this brief through a wide-ranging embraceof sustainability, where a host of environ-ment and social outcomes that cannot neces-sarily be reflected in balance sheets have beenpromised. Sydney’s 2000 Games was notablefor being the self-proclaimed ‘first greengames’ (Chalkley and Essex, 1999) and morerecently the Vancouver (2010) and London(2012) Games have embraced sustainabilityas a key planning rationale. Of course, thereremain significant debates over both themeanings and levels of commitment to sus-tainability in host cities (see Holden et al.,2008).

Yet despite a growing concern with non-fiscal outcomes, particularly with respect tosustainability, governments continue to usethe Games primarily as an economic devel-opment strategy. This involves striking abalance between delivering the desired capi-tal works and retaining high credit ratings—preferably AAA—from agencies such asStandard and Poor, bringing the ability toaccess credit at favourable interest rates(Hackworth, 2007). As Weber notes

local governments have the capacity to pre-

serve a realm of provision of public goods—

although the nature of these goods and ser-

vices are often themselves transformed by the

manner in which they are financed (Weber,

2010, p. 253).

The management of post-Games legacy hastherefore increasingly involved an attemptto balance greater returns from the sale orlease of state assets, with a set of other,potentially contradictory, goals (such asimprovements in public transport andaffordable housing supply). Indeed, theIOC has structured its bidding competitionin an attempt to limit fiscal commitments




and maximise sustainability outcomes. Anassessment of legacy outcomes thereforeinvolves not only a consideration of multi-ple objectives, but also a concern over theiron-going compatibility.

3. The Governance of Legacy

The current shape of Sydney Olympic Parkemerged from the successful 1993 bid for the2000 Games. In 1995, the newly formedOlympic Co-ordination Authority (OCA)took control over a 760-hectare site in westcentral Sydney from the Homebush BayDevelopment Corporation, established by theNSW State government in 1992 to ‘‘promote,co-ordinate, manage and secure the orderlyand economic development of the growthcentre at Homebush’’ (Growth Centres(Development Corporations) Amendment Act1992). When the OCA took control of thearea, it was posed with significant remediationchallenges, including asbestos, dioxin andpesticide contamination, a consequence ofdecades of unrecorded industrial and domes-tic dumping (Beder, 1993). It included landformerly occupied by the state abattoir and amajor brickworks, until relocation led to thesite’s dereliction in the 1980s. The sections ofthe site adjacent to the Parramatta River hadbeen used as a ship-breaking yard and for anumber of chemical factories since the 1920s.As a consequence, by the late 1970s, this sliceof west central Sydney was heavily pollutedand uninhabitable. Remediation and redeve-lopment of the site began in the 1980s, as aprivate business park and Bicentennial Park(a large recreational park with protected natu-ral heritage areas) were established on sectionsof the site. However, the Olympics were seenas a vehicle for integrating this area within awider spatial development framework.

The master planning for the 2000Olympic Games therefore involved signifi-cant site clean-up, helping to establish astrong sustainability legacy for the Games, as

well as the creation of the required sportingfacilities (see Briese, 2001; Searle, 2002).Perhaps the greatest legacy has been the on-going remediation of the 425-acre parklands,which dominate the site in terms of area.They have become one of the most visited‘regional’ parks in NSW, with a large resi-dential catchment radiating in all directions.The area contains significant wildlife reserves(for example, the Brickpit, a disused excava-tion site that is protected to allow the Greenand Golden Bell frog to thrive) and rem-nants of the Cumberland Plain Woodland.It also includes heritage listed historical sitessuch as the Newington Armory, an old navalsite on the Parramatta River foreshore.These sites, several of which were sculptedinto artificial viewing hills, still requireexpensive, ongoing, environmental monitor-ing and development restrictions. However,they have become a popular recreationalsite, also acting as venues for activities suchas wedding receptions, corporate away-daysand educational tours.

The Parklands have a very clearly definedset of management principles, enshrined invarious pieces of legislation, including thestatutory Plan of Management for theParklands at Sydney Olympic Park (2003),required and authorised by the SydneyOlympic Park Authority Act (2001) andadopted in 2003. The Park itself contains 17management precincts, each with a detailed,legislatively regulated set of characteristicsas regards planting, ecosystems and humanuse. As a result of this legislation, the park-lands have not been subject to developmentactivities, but their location adjacent to thetown centre and integrated management bySOPA allow the parklands to be leveragedas a distinctive feature for commercialtenants; a key potential tool in staff attrac-tion and retention. In fact, the costs ofmaintaining the polluted sites are expectedto be borne by the revenues generated bythe town centre site. In 2006, the NSW




State government modified SOPA’s over-arching governance authority with theestablishment of a parallel body known asthe Parklands Foundation. This not-for-profit organisation is intended primarily asa revenue-raising venture, using the publicfoundations of New York’s Central Parkand London’s Royal Parks as models.

Such revenue maximisation is driven bythe fact that, as with most mega events,development and maintenance costs farexceeded initial projections. In 2002, theAuditor-General reported that the net costof the Olympics totalled AU$6.5 billion(over double the bid estimate), withapproximately AU$1.7 billion of this beingborne by the public purse. While thisincluded a range of Olympic sports projectsdotted across the metropolitan region, thebulk of the investment was made at themain Homebush Bay site, where the major-ity of Olympic activities took place (seeFigure 1). Major developments includedthe 80 000-seat Olympic Stadium (currentlynamed ANZ Stadium), a 21 000-seat indoorarena, the SuperDome (currently namedAcer Arena) and the Olympic Village (soldpost-Games on the open market as theNewington neighbourhood). A new railwaystation formed the core of the site, themajority of which was remediated and con-verted into the 425-hectare MillenniumParklands, generating extensive grasslandsand wetlands habitat from one of the mostpolluted sites in Australia.

In order to develop a governance frame-work for the development of the commer-cially zoned areas, stadium management,parklands maintenance and general opera-tional needs such as security, events and traf-fic management, SOPA was established bythe NSW State government in 2001 by theSydney Olympic Park Authority Act 2001. Itreplaced the Sydney Organising Committeefor the Olympic Games (1993–2001) andOlympic Co-ordination Authority (1995–

2002), both of which had previously man-aged the site solely for its Olympic opera-tions and functions. SOPA is responsible forplanning and managing the Olympic site,ensuring that it becomes a valued asset andliving legacy. Its mission is to ‘‘develop andmaintain, to international standards, aunique and integrated township called‘Sydney Olympic Park’’’ (SOPA, 2010).SOPA’s principal role has been to ensurethat the space delivered a return on the fixedcapital investment the NSW governmenthad made in preparing for the 2000Olympics. This role has been legislated to bereduced over time, with stipulated year-on-year budget reductions shrinking stateexpenditure on the bureaucracy.

SOPA’s responsibilities include the con-tinued management of the site remediation,enforcement of planning legislation for thetown centre and parklands areas, manage-ment of some of the remaining Olympicfacilities and responsibility for basic serviceprovision such as waste disposal, mainte-nance and provision of roads, trees andpublic spaces. Hence, SOPA carries outsome of the activities normally associatedwith local councils. Immediately followingthe 2000 Games, SOPA produced the 2002Master Plan, which identified eight develop-ment sites in the newly designated towncentre around the train station that wouldbe used for commercial, leisure, education,retail and cultural purposes (Lochhead,2005). However, that plan was deemed inad-equate because it did not fully integrate theneeds of the region. An assessment of thelong-term potential of the site was underta-ken and a new plan, Vision 2025, was devel-oped (adopted in 2005). Its task was tocreate a vision that would transform SOPinto a ‘‘vibrant urban centre, while main-taining the primacy of the public realm andvenues for major events’’ (Lochhead, 2005,p. 219). The plan attempted to integrate thespace within its regional context




Sydney Olympic Park is a unique place that

offers a sustainable solution to Sydney’s bur-

geoning population while enhancing the qual-

ity of life for the people of Western Sydney

(SOPA, 2002, p. 4).

However, it was also distinguished by agreater emphasis on intensifying develop-ment on the site, proposing

a denser urban centre with a greater variety of

uses, a residential population of 25,000, and

24,500 daily workers and students. Under this

long-term plan, the Park will retain its cur-

rent amenity and event capacity but will have

increased economic and community viability

(SOPA, 2002, p. 6).

Within the Master Plan, the key rationale forplanning was outlined

Sydney Olympic Park has proven to be a suc-

cessful major sporting, exhibition and enter-

tainment venue, but this alone is not

sufficient to ensure the on-going viability of

the site. Alternative uses will have to be

Figure 1. Central area of Sydney Olympic Park in 2011. Map by Borce Dimeski.




introduced into the area to ensure that there

will be a sufficient population of people

living, working and visiting the site and to

contribute to a dynamic and lively place to

support existing venues and to maximise

best use of significant infrastructure invest-

ment (SOPA, 2002, p. 15).

This vision has since been replaced byMaster Plan 2030 (SOPA, 2010), whichbuilds on Vision 2025, but with an evenhigher density form of compact urbanisa-tion, based on proximity to the railway sta-tion, and with a general rise in buildingheights. The draft was released in July 2008,and was approved in early 2010. As well assetting a future development path, theMaster Plan 2030 also provides an evalua-tion of the achievements realised since 2000.These include: ‘‘world class event venues’’,‘‘the largest remediation project of its kindin the history of Australia’’, ‘‘the creation ofone of the largest metropolitan parklands inAustralia’’, ‘‘the establishment of one of theworld’s largest wastewater recycling sys-tems’’, ‘‘a solar powered suburb’’, ‘‘bestpractice to environmental sustainability’’,‘‘high quality landscape reconstruction’’,‘‘high quality architecture’’ and a ‘‘businesspark hosting more than 50 companies’’(SOPA, 2010, p. 17).

Master Plan 2030 divides the site intonine precincts and reflects a far higher levelof coherence and urban design thinking inhow the site develops than in previousplans. Each precinct has distinct, and pre-scribed, floor-space ratios, site configura-tion ratios and land use and building heightcontrols. Perhaps the two key precinctsinclude Central, which allows for new 20-to 30-storey high-rise commercial towersalong Olympic Boulevard, gradually repla-cing the low-rise pre-Olympic businesspark with a mixed-use neighbourhood ofcommercial, residential (zoned as 10-storeyblocks) and retail, organised around a new

street pattern; and Parkview, a predomi-nantly residential neighbourhood whichincludes new high-rise residential apart-ments, of up to 24 storeys.

The Master Plan sits within the contextof the NSW government’s MetropolitanStrategy (NSW Department of Planning,2005). In this plan, the NSW governmenthas positioned SOP alongside a number ofunique regional activity centres, rankedhierarchically as a ‘Specialised Centre’behind the ‘Global City’ (i.e. Sydney CBD)and ‘Regional Cities’ (such as Parramatta).Specialised Centres are identified as keysites of clustered assets and employment,and offer a range of space uses which areunable to be catered for in traditional cen-tral business districts

Sydney Olympic Park has been identified as a

specialist economic centre . Sydney Olympic

Park’s location at the geographic heart of

Sydney, and its infrastructure legacy from the

Sydney 2000 Olympic and Paralympic Games,

has ensured excellent road and rail access

from most places in the greater metropolitan

area (SOPA, 2010, p. 18).

A key feature of the 2030 Master Plan was tozone land for a number of high-rise residen-tial developments, an important element ofNSW government’s urban consolidationagenda. This projects a base of 14 000 newresidents.

To summarise, legacy planning for the2000 Games has always been within thecompetence of the NSW State government,with SOPA acting as a powerful executiveagency for day-to-day governance, with theMinister for Planning being the ultimatestate arbiter. However, in recent yearsSOPA’s influence has gradually beenreduced (see Table 1), with a reduction instaff numbers and an increasing attempt tomaximise revenues from leasing and events.As we discuss later, this included the




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establishment in 2008 of the HomebushMotor Racing Authority (HMRA), havingreached agreement with V8 SupercarsAustralia to hold a major motor racingevent in the Park on an annual basis. Underthe Homebush Motor Racing Authority(Sydney 400) Act (2008, no. 106), an epon-ymous new authority (i.e. HMRA) wasestablished.1 The Act established a six-member Event Implementation Committee,consisting of a CEO, one representative ofSOPA, three other NSW governmentagency representatives, including the police,and one representative of the race promo-ters. Significantly, the Act authorised theHMRA to cordon off particular areas of thePark site to stage the race, effectively super-seding SOPA’s authority over the area forthe duration of the race (including site pre-paration), being required only to consultwith SOPA during this period.

This lack of accountability had long beenin evidence. As Owen (2002, p. 329) notes,Auburn Council, the local authority withoversight of much of the Olympic precinct,and which has the highest number offoreign-born residents of any NSW localgovernment area, were shut out of much ofthe planning process, again a typical out-come of agency-led Olympic site prepara-tion. The post-Games settlement left Auburnwith oversight of the Newington AthletesVillage. The remainder of the parklands andfacilities remained within SOPA’s control(with the exception of the Showgrounds site,as we discuss later). While in 2004, SOPAand Auburn Council signed a Statement ofCo-operation which entailed a range ofsporting, landscape and infrastructureimprovements, there remains no directlyelected territorial government for the Gamessite and no ‘mayor of Olympic Park’, giventhe lack of incorporation of the site withinexisting municipalities.

4. Event Space

A significant concern during the Olympicprocess was the degree of intraurban com-petition between Sydney’s major eventspaces (Searle, 2002). Prior to the staging ofthe Games, Sydney’s key sports stadia (theSydney Cricket Ground and the Sydneyfootball stadium) were clustered aroundMoore Park in Paddington, in the city’sinner east. The operators of the stadium,Stadium Australia Group,2 sought to com-pete with these venues by attracting rugbyleague and AFL matches usually played atclub grounds in and around Sydney. Thestadium was also partially financed throughthe sale of 12 000 Gold memberships of 30years duration to members of the public,who each paid $10 000. By 2009, the sta-dium had garnered more success but stillremained locked in competition with theMoore Park venues. Stadium AustraliaGroup successfully agreed deals with theSydney-based Bulldogs and Rabbitohsrugby league teams and rugby union sidethe Waratahs. In addition, they securednaming rights deals first with the telecom-munications provider Telstra and then withthe banking group ANZ. As the most visi-ble legacy of the Olympics, the main stadiahave remained significant—but privatelyleased (Searle, 2002)—players in the Park,regularly showcasing both Sydney-basedclub sides and Australian national teams.

SOP’s other major event space, the21 000-seat Acer Arena, has evolved fromthe Olympic basketball and trampolinevenue into a successful entertainmentvenue, in spite of early struggles (Searle,2002). The US Billboard music magazineranked the Arena as the third most success-ful arena in the world for 2008, behind theO2 Arena in London and Madison SquareGarden, New York. These rankings arebased upon the gross income per seat




generated by each event. ACER Arena’sheadline events include media events (suchas music awards, including Aria and MTV),religious events (Hillsong), world-famousrock bands (Coldplay, Bon Jovi) and majorclassical music events (Andre Rieu).Interviews with Acer Arena managementreveal that this success has been pivotal tothe continued attraction of internationalacts to Sydney. They explained this successas a consequence of the wide open spacesand substantial car parking available at thePark. The latter, a AU$63 million facilitybuilt by the NSW government before theOlympics, was viewed as particularly impor-tant given the fact that the majority of theACER Arena’s patrons live to the north andnorth-west of the Park, in Sydney’s high-income, car-dependent suburbs. As a conse-quence, there is some concern in AcerArena’s management that the continuedevolution of the town centre will presentnew issues for it, particularly around man-aging public space and patron behaviour.There is also concern that the changing sta-keholder composition of the Park will takeemphasis away from the event basis of thePark’s current operations.

The replanning of the site is complicatedby the presence of Sydney Showgrounds, aquasi-autonomous enclave within the Park,held and operated on a 99-year lease by theRoyal Agricultural Society of NSW (RAS).As a consequence, this organisation is oneof the Park’s key stakeholders. The leaseconditions, a 99-year lease with another 99-year lease option, are particularly favourablesince the NSW government negotiated thatthe Society be moved from its previoushome in Moore Park. This reorganisation ofland holdings was stimulated by the NSWState government’s entrepreneurial devel-opment agenda (see Searle and Bounds,1999) that saw the RAS relocate from cen-trally located Moore Park, allowing this siteto be developed as a Fox Studios television

production centre and theme park. Therelocated Showgrounds consists of 12 signif-icant venue spaces, including the open-aired, partially covered Main Arena (15 000capacity for sports, 30 000 for concerts) anda large exhibition pavilion known as theDome (up to 7000 covered), along with anarray of other sites and pavilions offered forhire (see Figure 1). The Showgrounds hostsover 400 events of various sizes a year, butthe key event is the Easter Show, whichbrings an unrivalled number of visitors(900 000 visitors in 2009) to the Park, fol-lowed by the Big Day Out, a major open-airsummer pop festival. During both events,much of the town centre is dominated byeither the expanded operations of the RASor visitor management around the train sta-tion. The State-government-sponsoredO’Neill tourism review (O’Neill, 2008)highlighted the relative lack of space formajor conventions in Sydney and arguedthat the Showgrounds was currently under-utilised and could be upgraded at relativelylow cost. This would almost certainlyexacerbate current space conflicts, such asthe impact of major events on the Park’ssurrounding residential communities.

The most significant conflict has beenthe NSW government agreement with V8Supercars Australia to hold an annualmotor racing event—the ‘‘Sydney Telstra500’’—in the Park. Controversially, thenState Premier Nathan Rees agreed to pro-vide a $30 million subsidy to the organisersin order to secure the race and, prospec-tively, generate $100 million of tourist rev-enues over five years. Since 2008, theparklands have therefore been subject toboth permanent and temporary construc-tion activities relating to the installation ofthe racetrack and enclosures to house theestimated 150 000 spectators (NSW AuditOffice, 2010) that come to the event over itsthree-day duration. This development hasinvolved the destruction and replanting of




at least 300 mature trees throughout thepark. Interestingly, the race was seen aspotentially beneficial by some park stake-holders, but not others, given the disruptioncaused by increased works traffic, the con-struction and dismantling of the race infra-structure, and the more general negativeimpact to the site’s competitive advantageas a site of sustainability. The latter has beenan important marketing concept for someof the site’s commercial office developers.

Events remain a key element of the Parkspace, but will increasingly have to mitigatethe negative externalities of their activitiessuch as noise and congestion against thespace demands of other users, particularlythe rapid projected growth in the residen-tial community.

5. Business Space

We are a little critical of government for not

having had a master plan for beyond the

Olympic games . We are little disappointed

that, four years on, the infrastructure has not

arrived (Anthony Duffy, then Chief Executive

of Sydney Olympic Park Business Association

(SOPBA); quoted in Brooke, 2004).

An important issue for the Park has been thegradual transition from being a state-runand regulated space, to one with increasingprivate-sector involvement. Large busi-nesses, whether as property actors or majortenants, have begun to emerge as significantpolitical stakeholders through SOPBA.Established in 2000, the business associationprovides the usual services of a chamber ofcommerce, providing a unified voice forbusiness within the Park and offering mem-bers networking and social opportunities.SOPBA is currently governed by a board ofdirectors which includes representatives ofproperty owners (Colonial First State), thestadia (ANZ Stadium and ACER Arena),

tenants (Commonwealth Bank of Australia)and the hotels (Accor), along with the CEOof SOPA and the CEO of the RAS. The asso-ciation has thus emerged as a key stake-holder in debates on how the Park mightdevelop, and actively lobbies state govern-ment. This is particularly important giventhat the infrastructure lag noted by its CEOin 2004 remains significant. For example,the public transport services to the Parkremain limited, with very few direct trainlinks to central Sydney, thus continuing thePark’s relative dependence on car transit.The route for the much-heralded, but end-lessly postponed, West Metro light rail linkcould also link the Park to inner Sydney.

Regardless of these transport debates,SOPBA seeks to maximise Olympic Park’slocational assets. Sited adjacent to a maturepark, a river and the reclaimed parklands,the Park can justifiably claim to be one ofSydney’s most attractive business locations,particularly in contrast to the other majorsuburban office parks such as Norwest andMacquarie Park. With its expansive publicspaces, clusters of heritage buildings andrelatively tranquil atmosphere, the Park hasincreasingly been marketed as possessing aparticular locational asset, that of the ‘qual-ity of life’ business district. Commercialdevelopments in such districts are seen topossess a set of advantages in that they areperceived to possess health benefits such ascleaner air, stronger visual amenities, moreopportunities for healthier routines such aslunch-time walks and close proximity tosports or leisure facilities (Hitchings, 2010).As Nevarez (2003) has described in hisstudy of businesses in such districts innorthern California, this offers advantagesto employers in terms of worker retention,as well as being easier to market to relocat-ing firms.

In an attempt to enhance worker satis-faction, SOPA, working in partnership withSOPBA, CBA and GPT, set up the Lifestyle




Program in 2007. Offered to employeesworking within the Park and a selection ofneighbouring residents, the programme wasaimed at differentiating the business centrefrom others in Sydney. Its benefits includeorganised social events (such as educationalwalks, trivia quizzes), discounted tickets forsports events and a range of services other-wise unavailable within the Park such as carrepair and dry-cleaning. The programmewas influenced by a similar model in opera-tion at Chiswick Park,3 a business parklocated in west London, and aims to fosterthe physical and social interaction of work-ers, improving productivity and well-being.

For commercial property developers,this can prove to be a comparative advan-tage to existing sites in the metropolitanarea. The town centre is split into anumber of development sites.4 In the run-up to the 2000 Olympics, these sites wereauctioned off to a number of private land-owners. Some sites remained the propertyof SOPA and have been gradually releasedonto the market under the usual mechan-isms of tender and subsequent grant of lea-sehold. A number of these sites have passedinto the hands of institutional stakeholders,such as pension funds and listed propertytrusts. The two major landowners in thePark—apart from SOPA—are GPTProperty Trust and Century Bankminster(part of Century Funds Management). Inaddition, there are a number of smallerlandowners. Interestingly, this presents ascenario where some of the commercialproperty developers have been among themost ardent defenders of the parklands,particularly in the debates surrounding theV8 Supercars event, given fears that thevalue of the public assets would be nega-tively affected.

SOPA have placed increasing emphasisupon dense commercial and residentialdevelopment around the Park’s train stationin the town centre precincts. The advantages

of such campus or park-like locations reflectdifficulties in finding, and affording, high-specification office towers in the primaryCBD. Their disadvantages include poorarticulation with existing public transportroutes and a lack of the dense business net-works (i.e. CBD clustering) for conductingface-to-face business transactions. In MasterPlan 2030, SOPA projected an employmentbase of 28 500, a target far higher than thatprojected in the previous NSW west centraldraft sub-regional plan (NSW, 2007). Thisraises a number of challenges about howbest to achieve the optimal employmentmix in order to diversify the Park, avoidinga reliance on one or two major firms whichmay relocate. It also required a stance onwhether the type of development opportu-nities sought by the property developmentindustry—usually higher density than thatidentified in the Master Plan 2030—areconducive to the retention of the Park’sunique ambience. Indeed, the property peakbody made specific recommendations at thePlan’s public review that it should havehigher floor-space ratios and larger floor-plates along commercially (i.e. office andretail) zoned strips. They argued that

if the draft master plan is not amended in con-

sultation with the major landowners and other

stakeholders, little commercial development

will proceed in the short to medium term

(Property Council of Australia, 2008, p. 2).

This vision of an employment centre isdriven by the fact that SOP requires signifi-cant intervention by private developers andlandowners to subsidise the ongoing costs ofthe Parklands. However, it should not beforgotten that the state is using its planningauthority in order to stimulate this develop-ment to increase both the returns on its ownproperty developments and land values.

This has meant that the major influenceson the culture of the Park are the key




commercial tenants, particularly theCommonwealth Bank of Australia (CBA)and Accor Hotels. In mid 2006, the CBAannounced the relocation of 12 000 non-branch staff to three sites in Sydney, 5000of which were moved to SOP. The bankoccupied two adjacent, newly built, six-storey office buildings, housing a range offunctions including trader support, callcentre work and a training facility, but witha secondary role as a ‘continuity’ site, aback-up for use in a major disaster such asa terrorist attack. The large floorplate,23 000 square metre site suited the bank’svery high technology specifications(Ambler, 2005). The site has been pur-chased and developed by two of the banks’property funds, Commonwealth BankProperty Fund and Direct PropertyInvestment Fund, both managed by theCBA’s Colonial First State property com-pany. Such funds are key players in thecompetitive fortunes of the differing busi-ness districts within any major metropolis,but act as major stakeholders within thenascent commercial area of the Park’s towncentre (Ambler, 2005).

By contrast, the other major commercialtenant is Accor, the multinational hotelgroup, which owns and manages fourhotels in the SOP town centre: an Ibis andNovotel development (constructed at thetime of the Olympics) and a high-endPullman hotel and budget Formule 1, bothconstructed at the end of the 2000s. Thedevelopment of the Pullman reflects thevery high occupancy rates that had beenrealised by the Novotel. The hotels, sitedacross from the Olympic stadium, areimportant for a number of reasons: first, asa means of generating a throughput ofdiverse guests; secondly, providing addi-tional amenities to non-guest Park users,such as bars and restaurants; thirdly, con-necting the Park to the wider metropolitaneconomy, including firms in the nearby

Rhodes, Ryde and Silverwater employmentlands; fourthly, providing added capacity toSydney’s MICE (meeting, incentive, confer-ence, events) market, particularly for com-panies priced or booked out of Sydney’shighly constrained CBD market. Thus, andperhaps surprisingly, Olympic Park hasemerged as a successful hotel destination,meeting a variety of demands via its centrallocation in metropolitan Sydney.

The Olympic site is evidently attracting agrowing number of corporate tenants.However, it is not clear that having a smallnumber of high-value tenants is the optimalapproach to building the density of transac-tions, and traded and untraded dependencies,that make for a successful commercial neigh-bourhood. The development of Olympic siteshas often been accompanied by a desire tocross-subsidise the heavy infrastructure costsby developing the site to its most profitable,rather than most socially desirable, rent. AsRaco and Tunney (2010) have shown in rela-tion to the preparation of the London 2012site, this means that small and medium-sizedbusiness (SMEs) tend to be unfavourablyviewed by development authorities and manyhave been forced to relocate during the devel-opment process. While Sydney’s site retains anumber of SMEs, it will remain a challenge tocontinue to balance the commercial demandsfor a diverse business community with thecomplex space demands of other users.

6. Conclusion: Sydney OlympicPark’s Contested Legacy

This paper has sought to examine howSydney Olympic Park’s post-Games legacyhas been shaped by a number of state strate-gies to generate a return on the initial invest-ment. We have argued that it is important todiscuss the political economy of state invol-vement in such legacy debates. In order toachieve its objectives, in the absence of suffi-cient private capital to appropriate




development, the NSW State governmenthas used its strong centralised powers to actas both developer and planning authority.This is a typical situation in market econo-mies, as Harvey has argued

On the one hand the neoliberal state is

expected to take a back seat and simply set

the stage for market functions, but on the

other it is supposed to be activist in creating a

good business climate (Harvey, 2005, p. 79).

As has long been the case in NSW, certainelected political figures have pushedthrough fiscally dubious and environmen-tally destructive events through stealthypolitical lobbying, as in the case of the V8events. The absence of a democratic gov-ernance mechanism will become a signifi-cant challenge, as the growing residentialpopulation will seek greater accountabilityin the operation of the Park. Even withinthe business community there are occa-sional conflicts between the ambitions ofmajor tenants as well as the need to balancethe needs of small and medium-sized busi-nesses with the large corporations that existwithin the Park (Raco and Tunney, 2010).

In the decade following the games, thePark has therefore undergone a degree ofcommercialisation with parallels to otherOlympic sites and bids (for example, seeCochrane et al., 1996; Shoval, 2002). As withAthens (Gospodini, 2009) and Barcelona(McNeill, 1999), preparing development sitesfor market creates a significant public debtburden in terms of sunk costs. There is thuspressure to use the sites for the most com-mercially intensive returns in order to gener-ate the revenues which can be returned toState coffers. However, this may not generateoptimum urban policy outcomes, certainly interms of environmental sustainability andsocial integration. Furthermore, the State’sobjective to make the Park an economicallyself-sufficient entity brings it into conflict

with its Games-related pledges (i.e. sustain-ability and community benefit) and some ofthe normative best-practice planning objec-tives formulated in its various master plans.In addition, the State is faced with the chal-lenge of producing a mixed-use precinctwhich adheres to carefully considered urbandesign guidelines and generates requisite rev-enues, whilst at the same time, countering thelobbying by the property peak body for largerfloorplates. Here, the complex texture offunctionally interdependent CBD marketsidentified by Beauregard (2005) has to bereplicated by the State planning agency inorder to achieve an appropriate mix of func-tions (residential, educational, leisure, office,retail and so on) as well as produce invest-ment returns. This is challenging, given thatresidential and commercial property marketsin particular are often asynchronous. Theimplications of this have been multiple andcertainly highlight a series of tensions, includ-ing the lack of emphasis on affordable hous-ing provisions, an over-reliance on car-basedtransit for Park visitors and workers, a lack ofa clear labour market strategy and conflictingpublic space uses. The post-Olympics legacyof the site will thus pose significant govern-ance challenges in coming years, as it maturesinto a fully functioning zone of metropolitanSydney.

Notes

1. See: http://www.legislation.nsw.gov.au/sessionalview/seesonal/TITLE/Homebush%20Motor%20Racing%20(Sydney%20400)%20Act%202008%20No%20106.pdf.

2. Stadium Australia Group (SAG) leased theAU$670 million stadium from the NSWgovernment until 2031. In 2006, thedebt-laden SAG was taken over by its banker,ANZ, at a nominal cost. SAG is now a whollyowned subsidiary of Stadium Investments PtyLtd, a company that is wholly owned byDiversified Infrastructure Trust which is, inturn, managed by ANZ.




3. See: www.enjoy-work.com.4. These sites can be viewed at: http://www.

sydneyolympicpark.com.au/developing_and_commercial/commercial_opportunities/development_sites.

Funding Statement

The authors are grateful to the Sydney OlympicPark Authority and the University of WesternSydney Research Partnerships for jointly fund-ing this project.

Acknowledgements

The authors would like to acknowledge the offi-cers of the Sydney Olympic Park Authority, therepresentatives of the business community, parksworkers and users, and residents from neighbour-ing localities who gave their time to be inter-viewed for the project. All opinions remain theresponsibility of the authors. They are also grate-ful to Jen Li and Arjun Chauhan who providedinvaluable research support and to Borce Dimeskifor his preparation of the map.

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