ETHNIC RELATIONSA CROSS-CULTURAL ENCYCLOPEDIA

ENCYCLOPEDIAS OF THE HUMAN EXPERIENCE

David Levinson, Series Editor

ETHNIC RELATIONS

David Levinson

ABC-CLIOSanta Barbara, California

Denver, ColoradoOxford, England

A CROSS-CULTURAL ENCYCLOPEDIA

Copyright © 1994 by ABC-CLIO, Inc.

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Levinson, David, 1947-

Ethnic relations : a cross-cultural encyclopedia / David Levinson

p. cm. — (Encyclopedias of the human experience)

Includes bibliographical references (p. ) and index.

1. Ethnic relations—Cross-cultural studies—Encyclopedias.

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Preface, vii

ABKHAZIANS AND GEORGIANS, 3ALBANIANS AND SERBS, 5ANTI-SEMITISM, 6APARTHEID, 10ARMENIANS AND AZERBAIJANI TURKS, 12ASSAMESE IN INDIA, 14ASSIMILATION, 15AUTONYM, 18

BAHA'IS IN IRAN, 21BASQUES IN SPAIN AND FRANCE, 23BOAT PEOPLE, 24BODO IN INDIA, 27BOSNIANS-CROATS-SERBS, 27

CASTE, 33CATALANS IN SPAIN, 37CATHOLICS AND PROTESTANTS IN NORTHERN

IRELAND, 39CHAKMA IN BANGLADESH, 41CHECHEN-INGUSH IN RUSSIA, 43

COLONIALISM, 44CONSOCIATIONAL DEMOCRACY, 49COPTS IN EGYPT, 50CULTURAL RELATIVISM, 51CYPRIOTS, 53

DIASPORA, 55

ETHNIC CLEANSING, 61ETHNIC CONFLICT, 62ETHNIC HUMOR, 70ETHNIC IDENTITY AND SOLIDARITY, 73ETHNIC MEDIA, 79ETHNIC NATIONALISM, 81ETHNOCENTRISM, 85ETHNOCIDE, 88

FlJIANS AND INDO-FIJIANS, 91

FOREIGNERS IN GERMANY, 93FRENCH-CANADIANS IN CANADA, 96

GENOCIDE, 99GHETTO, 104GYPSIES AND TRAVELERS IN EUROPE, 105

v

CONTENTS

CONTENTS

HATE (BIAS) CRIMES, 109HINDUS AND MUSLIMS IN INDIA, 111HOPI AND NAVAJO, 113HUMAN RIGHTS, 114HUNGARIANS IN ROMANIA (TRANSYLVANIA), 119HUTU AND TUTSI IN BURUNDI AND RWANDA, 121

INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, 125INDIGENOUS RIGHTS, 127IRREDENTISM, 135ISRAELIS AND PALESTINIANS, 136

KASHMIRI, 141KURDS, 142

MARTIAL RACES, 147MIDDLEMAN MINORITIES, 148MIGRANT WORKERS, 149MINORITY, 155MINORITY RIGHTS, 157MISSIONS, 159MIXED-ANCESTRY PEOPLES, 164MOLDOVA, 168MYANMAR (BURMA), 169

NAGAS IN INDIA, 173NATIONAL MINORITY, CHINA, 174NATIONAL MINORITY, EUROPE, 175NEPALESE IN BHUTAN, 176NIGERIA, 177

OSSETES AND GEORGIANS, 181

PACIFICATION, 183PANETHNICITY, 186PEOPLES OF THE NORTH, 188PIDGINS AND CREOLES, 189

PLURALISM, 191

RACE AND RACISM, 195REFUGEES, 200REVITALIZATION MOVEMENTS, 204RUSSIANS IN THE FORMER SOVIET UNION, 208

SCAPEGOAT, 211SIKHS IN INDIA, 212SINHALESE AND SRI LANKAN TAMILS, 214SlTUATIONAL ETHNICITY, 216SLAVERY, 218STEREOTYPES, 224SYNCRETIC CULTURES, 225

TIBETANS IN CHINA, 227TIMORESE IN INDONESIA, 229TOURISM, 230TRANSNATIONAL MIGRATION, 235TRIBE, 238

VIETNAMESE IN CAMBODIA, 241

WORLD SYSTEM AND ETHNIC RELATIONS, 245

XENOPHOBIA, 247

International Organizations Concerned withEthnic Relations, 249

Bibliography, 265

Illustration Credits, 281

Index, 283

vi

Ethnic relations is a topic of much concern inthe world today, and because ethnic conflict isnow considered to be the major form of violentconflict around the world, some argue that eth-nic relations is the most important issue facedby the world community. Ethnic relations todayare important not just because of these highlyvisible and troubling ethnic conflicts, but alsobecause there are a number of relatively newforms of ethnic relations that need to be sortedout by the members of cultural groups in con-tact with one another.

Through labor migration and the spread ofrefugees in the last 25 years, some nations suchas England, France, and Germany, which wererelatively homogeneous culturally, are now hometo large populations of people who look differ-ent, speak different languages, and bring withthem different cultural traditions than the tra-ditional population. Thus, some culturally ho-mogeneous nations around the world arebecoming multicultural with major implicationsfor the internal structure and dynamics of thosesocieties.

In other nations, past colonization strippedmany groups—usually the indigenous peoples—of their land, rights, and traditional cultures; inthe twentieth century, they live as second- orthird-class citizens in their homelands. Aroundthe world, these groups are asserting their rights,causing a major shift in the nature of relationsbetween state governments, other citizens, andthe indigenous communities within their bor-ders. In still other nations, ethnic minorities areasserting their rights and demanding equal treat-ment under the law; in the extreme, ethnic mi-norities in a number of nations are seekingindependence as autonomous nation-states orprovinces in order to preserve their culture. Fi-nally, the end of colonialism in Africa and else-where in the twentieth century alongside otherfactors has led to competition for economic andpolitical power among indigenous ethnic groupsin many nations and the difficult task of creat-ing a single nation-state from a mix of differentcultural groups.

Thus, patterns of ethnic relations around theworld are varied today and different from thosein the past when it was more common for onegroup within a nation or one nation to domi-nate others simply through the use of force. Thisvariety is mainly a post-World War II develop-ment and is due to a mix of factors includingthe end of colonialism; the more rapid spread ofa world economy; a rapid increase in the num-ber of migrants, refugees, tourists, and others,creating more extensive and intensive contactamong peoples from different cultures; and agrowing concern with human rights in the worldcommunity, as reflected in the work of theUnited Nations and other organizations.

Among the alphabetically arranged entriesin this volume, I provide two major categoriesof information relevant to ethnic relations. Thefirst is definitions and cross-cultural informa-tion about general topics in ethnic relations suchas assimilation, conflict, genocide, and tourism.Also included are definitions and cross-cultural

vii

PREFACE

PREFACE

information about processes and structures thatunderlie or are major components of ethnic re-lations, such as irredentism, ethnocentrism,stereotyping, and race.

The second category of information is in theform of descriptive profiles of 38 ethnic con-flicts around the world. The purpose of theseprofiles is fourfold: (1) to provide examples ofthe five major forms of ethnic conflict aroundthe world—separatist, internal rivalry, conquest,survival, and irredentist; (2) to provide real-lifeexamples of many of the concepts discussed inthe volume, for example, refugees, ethno-nationalism, human rights, indigenous rights,genocide, and ethnocide; (3) to provide descrip-tive summaries of the ethnic groups involved inconflicts today; and (4) to describe the history,issues, causes, consequences, and current statusof major ethnic conflicts around the world as ofearly 1994. Space limitations mean that not ev-ery ethnic conflict around the world can be pro-filed here. Some important ones not profiled arethose involving ethnic political rivalries inKenya, political rivalries in South Africa, andthe independence movement in NewCaledonia. Other conflicts such as that in Af-ghanistan, which are not clearly or mainly eth-nic, are also not included. The 38 conflictscovered here are, however, representative of con-flicts around the world in general. Informationin the profiles comes from a variety of sources.In addition to those listed at the end of eachprofile, key information sources include theEncyclopedia of World Cultures, the Informa-tion Please Almanac for 1994, and the RefugeeReport. Current events information is taken fromnewspaper and television news reports, with thetwo most important of these sources being theNew York Times and "The McNeil-Lehrer NewsHour" on PBS.

In the back of this volume readers will findan annotated directory of organizations whoseprograms have an impact on ethnic relations ona global scale. An end-of-book subject index

provides an additional point of access to infor-mation in the entries.

As in other volumes in this series, the dualemphasis is on both similarity and variationacross cultures around the world. Thus, the defi-nitional and conceptual entries provide examplesdrawn from many different cultures to describevariation across cultures. Similarly, the profilesof conflict situations are of 38 different conflicts,but as a group they serve as contemporary ex-amples of many basic and global features of eth-nic conflict and ethnic relations.

Ethnic relations is a relatively new topic ofstudy and an exceedingly complex one. It drawsthe attention of anthropologists, geographers,sociologists, political scientists, historians, hu-manists, economists, biologists, journalists, gov-ernment officials, and others. Each of theseprofessions brings with it a different perspectiveto the study and our understanding of ethnicrelations. The perspective in this volume is pri-marily within the anthropological framework;however, information from other perspectives isincluded as well. Especially when the perspec-tives differ widely, I have tried to bring in infor-mation representing the alternative viewpoints.Among basic issues as yet unresolved by studentsof ethnic relations are the definitions of suchbasic concepts as ethnicity and ethnic group, thedelineation of clear markers of ethnic groupidentity, and the basic mechanism of ethnic iden-tity and solidarity. Issues such as these remainunresolved because the study of ethnic relationsis relatively new; the multidisciplinary perspec-tive, while broadening our understanding of eth-nic relations, also brings with it more complexityand alternative viewpoints; and the global na-ture of ethnic relations makes it necessary for usto consider variation as well as similarities acrosscultures.

For persons born and raised in the UnitedStates, much about ethnic relations in other partsof the world may seem new and strange. This isbecause in many ways beliefs about and the struc-

viii

PREFACE

ture and dynamics of ethnic relations in theUnited States are different from those elsewhere,for at least three reasons. The first is that in theUnited States there has long been a belief in eth-nic assimilation—that is, life will be better forall and the United States will be a more power-ful nation if each group gives up much of its ownidentity for a shared identity as Americans.While this model has some truth in the case ofAmericans of European ancestry, so far it doesnot accurately describe the experience of manyAmericans of African, Latin American, or Asianancestry. Still, though, it is a powerful beliefshared by many Americans and one that differsfrom that of many other peoples around theworld, who take the opposite view that theirnation or culture will be better off if it is ethni-cally homogeneous. A second major reason isthat the United States, with the exception of itsseveral million native American Indian peoples,is a nation of immigrants or descendants of im-migrants. Thus, ties to the ethnic homeland andnative language that are so much a part of eth-

nic relations and especially of ethnic conflict else-where are less important for Americans. A thirdmajor reason is that despite far more rapid com-munication and transportation, the UnitedStates has always been and to a large extent stillis isolated from other nations and ethnic groupsaround the world and lacks a history of suchconflict. For these and other reasons, conceptssuch as consociational democracy, irredentism,and ethnic conflict over homelands are largelyforeign to the experience of most Americans. Atthe same time, of course, some aspects of ethnicrelations are quite familiar, such as race and rac-ism, genocide, and ethnic conflict over scarcesocietal resources such as employment or edu-cational opportunities. But our understandingof these familiar issues can benefit by consider-ing how they are defined and experienced inother cultures.

In closing, I would like to thank DianeWyckoff for her assistance in preparing the pro-files of ethnic conflicts and Patricia Andreuccifor her library and general research assistance.

ix

ETHNIC RELATIONSA CROSS-CULTURAL ENCYCLOPEDIA

The Republic of Geor-gia encompasses 26,911square miles and is bor-dered by the Black Sea

on the west, Turkey and Armenia on the south,and Azerbaijan on the southeast. It is separatedfrom Russia on the northeast by the main rangeof the Caucasus Mountains. Georgia was an-nexed by Russia in 1801 and entered the USSRin 1922, becoming a constituent republic in1936. In 1993 Georgia's population was esti-mated at 5.5 million, 70 percent of which wasethnically Georgian. The remainder of the popu-lation is composed of small percentages of otherethnic groups, the largest being Armenians at 7percent and Russians at 6 percent. The officiallanguage is Georgian, and in 1989, 33 percentof the people considered Georgian their nativelanguage. In the former Soviet Union, Russianwas a mandatory school subject, and approxi-mately 33 percent of Georgians, mainly thoseliving in cities, speak the language fluently. On9 April 1991, following the collapse of commu-nism and a 99-percent-in-favor vote on a refer-endum for Georgian independence, Georgia

declared itself a sovereign state. Most Georgiansbelong to the Georgian Orthodox Church.

The autonomous region of Abkhazia is lo-cated within the Republic of Georgia, covering3,300 square miles between the Black Sea andthe Caucasus mountain range. Abkhazia is bor-dered by Russia on the north, and by the Geor-gian provinces of Svanetia and Mingrelia on thesouth. As of 1989 the population of Abkhazians(cxApswa, their self-designation) was estimatedat 102,938. Abkhazians constitute about 2 per-cent of the population of Georgia. Although themajority of Abkhazians reside within their ownautonomous region, they constitute a minority(about 18 percent) of the population in their ownland. Other groups in Abkhazia include Geor-gians, Russians, Mingrelians, Armenians, Ukrai-nians, and Greeks. About a third of Abkhazianslive in towns or cities, with the majority of ruralAbkhazians living in the northern sector of therepublic. Although Georgian is the official lan-guage, the Abkhaz language is widely usedamong Abkhazians, and belongs to the north-west Caucasian family. In the 1940s and 1950s,as part of an attempt to Georgianize theAbkhazians, the Abkhaz language was bannedin public domains. Nearly 80 percent ofAbkhazians are also fluent in Russian. Approxi-mately 50 percent of Abkhazians are OrthodoxChristian, and the other half are Sunni Muslim.In the past, Abkhazians had close ties to otherpeoples in the Caucasus, such as the Circassians;these ties were weakened during the Soviet pe-riod when communication among differentgroups was channeled through the central gov-ernment in Moscow.

It is generally believed that the Abkhaziansare the indigenous people of the territory thatthey currently inhabit. There is archaeologicalevidence of their presence as far back as 4000B.C. In the eighth century, the Abkhazian tribescame together to form one ethnic entity distinctfrom others in the region by language and cus-toms, but in the tenth century Abkhazia lost its

3

maalBBBSHHSm

Aabruazians anand

GEORGINS

ABKHAZIANS AND GEORGIANS

Man in Sukhumi left homeless from Georgian-Abkhazian hostilities.

independence and was integrated into the unitedGeorgian state. In the seventeenth century theyseparated from the unstable Georgian polityand became an independent polity, and underthe influence of the Ottoman Empire manyAbkhazians converted to Islam. Abkhaziansfought for independence from tsarist Russiaduring the first half of the nineteenth century,but were defeated in the 1870s. The subsequentexodus of nearly half the Abkhazian populationto surrounding regions, mainly in Russia, re-sulted in the current situation where Abkhaziansare a minority in their homeland. Abkhazia en-joyed a decade (1921-1931) of independenceunder the former Soviet Union, but in 1931 Jo-seph Stalin (himself a Georgian) declaredAbkhazia a republic within Georgia, and along

with leaders in Georgia began a Georgianizationprogram. Through forced relocations, deporta-tions, and executions the Abkhazian populationwas reduced to 17.1 percent of the populationof Abkhazia. In addition, efforts were made todestroy Abkhazian culture by rewriting its his-tory to describe Abkhazians as recent arrivals tothe region, closing Abkhazian schools, and ban-ning Abkhazian publications in the Georgianlanguage. Even today, many Georgians viewAbkhazians as a guest people in Georgia andsome even deny that Abkhazians are a distinctethnic group.

The current violent separatist conflict be-tween Abkhazians and Georgians is a repeat ofthis old pattern of Abkhazian quests for inde-pendence and Georgian repression. In the late1980s, taking advantage of the glasnost and de-centralization movements sweeping Russia,Abkhazia requested a return to its status as anindependent republic, similar to that which theyenjoyed from 1921 to 1931. In 1991 their plansleft open the possibility of association with theRussian Federation. Upon Georgia's indepen-dence from the USSR, a new attempt at so-calledGeorgianization of Abkhazia began. Abkhaziaresisted, declared its sovereignty, and united withother ethnic minorities in the Caucasus regionof Georgia and Russia. In August 1992 Georgiamoved troops into Abkhazia, destroyingAbkhazian cultural institutions in the capital cityof Sukhum. The Abkhazians resisted, and inAugust 1993, in response to armed Abkhazianresistance, Georgian head of state EduardShevardnadze declared martial law in the region,effectively putting himself in direct control andbanning all political protests. The effect of mar-tial law was minimal and fighting continuedthrough 1993, resulting in the loss of more than2,000 lives. In the later months of 1993,Abkhazians won some significant battles as theyacquired control over the main route that con-nects Sukhum, the capital of Abkhazia, to therest of Georgia. The situation is further compli-

4 A

ALBANIANS AND SERBS

cated by allegations that Russia has been sup-porting Abkhazia both economically and mili-tarily. There are claims that Russian troops havefought alongside Abkhazians, and that Russianmercenaries have aided the Abkhazians. Geor-gia feels betrayed by Russia, which it believescovets Abkhazia for itself. Russia has officiallydenied these allegations.

Many Georgians outside of Abkhazia be-lieve not only that the region should not be al-lowed to secede for political reasons, but that infact Abkhazians are not ethnically different fromGeorgians and therefore have no need for a sepa-rate state. Abkhazians see themselves as facinganother situation in which their survival as apeople is threatened by the Georgians, and be-lieve that they have the opportunity to protecttheir future by establishing their own indepen-dent state.

Benet, Sula. (1974) Abkhasians—The Long-Living People of the Caucasus.

Hewitt, B. George, and Elisa Watson. (1994)"Abkhazians." In Encyclopedia of World Cul-tures. Volume 6, Russia/Eurasia and China,edited by Paul Friedrich and Norma Dia-mond, 5-10.

Lang, David M. (1966) The Georgians.

Suny, Ronald G. (1988) The Making of the Geor-gian Nation.

ALBANIANS ANDSERBS

Serbs were the largest ofthe ethnic groups thatformed the former Yu-goslavia. In 1990 there

were an estimated 8.5 million Serbs in Yugosla-via; the overwhelming majority are now foundin Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Serbia is lo-cated in the Balkans, and is bounded by Hun-

gary to the north, Romania and Bulgaria to theeast, Albania and Macedonia to the south, andthe former Yugoslav republics of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia on the west. Duringthe era of the Yugoslavian nation, the borders ofSerbia expanded greatly because of the conflictwith the Croats and the Bosnian Muslims.Whether these borders become permanent isdependent on the outcome of ongoing hostili-ties with the Bosnians. Serbia also encompassesthe formerly autonomous province of Kosovo-Metohija, the home of about 2 million Alba-nians, with the Serbs a minority in the province(10-15 percent of the population). Serbs speaka dialect of Serbo-Croatian, which they write ina Serbian variation of Cyrillic script.

Serbs moved into the region now known asSerbia about A.D. 500-600 and had establisheda Serbian polity by the ninth century. In the four-teenth century the region was conquered by theOttoman Empire and many Serbs fled west tothe Alps. After a series of revolts, Ottoman con-trol ended, and in 1830 Turkey recognized Serbiaas an autonomous unit, although still a posses-sion of the Ottoman Empire. In 1882 it becamean autonomous state, and in 1918 Serbia wasjoined with Croatia and Slovenia as a conditionof the Treaty of Versailles; after World War II,Yugoslavia was created. Serbia was a largely ru-ral, agricultural region, but since World War II,the population has become mainly urban, andwage-earning has become a major source of in-come for most families. Most Serbs are adher-ents of Serbian Orthodoxy.

As noted above, about 2 million Albanianslive in the Kosovo Province in southwesternSerbia, which borders Albania. Another 3.5million Albanians live in Albania. Albanianstrace their ancestry to the Illyrians, who arrivedfrom the east in what is now Albania in at least1000 B.C. Slavic speakers, presumably includingancestors of modern-day Serbs, began enteringthe region from the north and east by the sixthcentury, and the Illyrians fled from what is now

5A

ANTI-SEMITISM

the Kosovo region. After rule by various em-pires, Albania became an independent republicin 1918. Under Ottoman rule most Albaniansconverted to Islam, and perhaps as many as 70percent are nominally Muslim, although from1967 to 1990 Albania was officially an atheistnation.

The conflict between the Serbs and Alba-nians in Kosovo Province is an irredentist onewith both claiming ownership of the province.The Serbian claim rests on the claim of firstsettlement, the symbolism of the region as thesite of the Serbian defeat by the Ottoman Em-pire in 1389, which solidified the Serbs as anethnic group, and current Serbian political con-trol of the province. The Albanian claim alsorests on claim of first settlement, as well as onthe demographic reality that they constituteabout 90 percent of the population in the prov-ince and are the fastest growing ethnic group inEurope. The nation of Albania, while morallysupporting the Kosovo Albanians, is not a sourceof material support due to its own weak eco-nomic and military stature in the region. Whilethe dispute over the Kosovo region goes backcenturies, the current conflict began in 1989when Albanians vigorously sought greater self-determination for the region. These wishes wererebuffed by the ruling Serbs and in 1990, in re-sponse to continued demands, the Serbian gov-ernment declared a state of emergency in theKosovo Province, ended autonomy, and insti-tuted direct rule from the Serbian capital ofBelgrade. As part of direct rule, Albanians havebeen dismissed from their jobs, hospitals andhealth clinics shut down, schools closed, news-papers banned, and restrictions placed on rightsto political assembly. The Albanians have re-sponded by calling on international opinion andcreating their own institutions—schools andhealth clinics staffed by Albanians dismissed bythe Serbs—and in 1993 they independentlyelected their own Parliament. So far, the con-frontation has been largely nonviolent, although

at least two dozen Albanians have been killedby border guards along the Albania-Kosovo bor-der, and by 1993 the Serbs had an army of100,000 near the Serbian border, creating fearamong the Albanians that the Serbs might beplanning a Bosnian-style ethnic cleaning cam-paign. At this point, the Albanians are withoutmilitary options and are counting on their siz-able majority population in the region to be adeterrent to Serbian aggression. Calls by theAlbanian government for outside interventionhave not led to any international mobilizationand Serbia has made it difficult for outside ob-servers to assess the situation.

Halpern, Joel M., and Barbara Kerewsky-Halpern. (1986) A Serbian Village in Histori-cal Perspective.

Hasluck, Margaret. (1954) The Unwritten Lawin Albania.

Simic, Andrei. (1973) The Peasant Urbanites.

ANTI-SEMITISMAnti-Semitism is thehatred of, discriminationagainst, and persecution

of Jews simply because they are Jews. The termwas first used by the German political writer andanti-Semite Wilhelm Marr in 1879 in his pam-phlet "The Victory of Judaism over German-ism." In fact, the label Semite is a misnomer asthere is no such thing as a Semitic people orrace. Rather, Semitic refers to a group of relatedlanguages that includes Hebrew, Arabic, Ara-maic, and Assyrian. Anti-Semitism, however,refers specifically to hatred of Jews, and not tospeakers of other Semitic languages.

Anti-Semitism can take a number of dis-tinct forms, including economic, religious,racial, political, and social. Economic

6 H

ANTI-SEMITISM

Caretaker at synagogue in Los Angeles wipes off swastika, December 1938.

H 7

ANTI-SEMITISM

anti-Semitism is reflected in government poli-cies or social practices that deny Jews certaineconomic opportunities available to non-Jews.These can include restrictions on enrollment ineducational institutions; outright banning ofJews; quota systems; denial of access to certainprofessions; social pressures to take up profes-sions considered inferior, such as moneylendingin the past; and special taxes levied on Jewishlandowners, such as those that were commonin Europe up to the late 1800s. Religious anti-Semitism is hatred of Jews because they are of adifferent religion; in the past this meant non-Christian, and recently some experts suggest thatIslamic anti-Semitism may be religious in partas well. Much of the history of anti-Semitismrevolves around the persecution of Jews becauseof a theological difference with Christianity andthe belief that Jews were responsible for thedeath of Jesus Christ. Racial anti-Semitism ap-peared in Europe in the late 1800s after Jewswere effectively emancipated in many nations,and was based on the notion that Jews were adistinct "race" who were strangers and outsidersin every nation where they lived. Additionally,because Jews were perceived as a distinct race,Jewishness was viewed as an inherent trait thatwas passed on through birth; one could not be-come a non-Jew. Political anti-Semitism is theuse of or stirring up of hatred or resentment ofJews by political parties or leaders as a means ofgaining or retaining political power. Politicalanti-Semitism is a form of scapegoating—theblaming of Jews for various societal problems.Social anti-Semitism is the exclusion of Jewsfrom all or some of the social institutions of so-ciety. In medieval Europe, for example, Jewswere residentially excluded—required to live inJewish quarters called ghettos, or on Jewishstreets in villages. In the twentieth century inthe United States, informal housing patternseffectively confined Jews to certain neighbor-hoods and excluded them from various socialorganizations.

While there was some prejudice against Jewsprior to the Christian era, anti-Semitism as ithas existed throughout the centuries is mostly aproduct of Christianity. The basis of Christiananti-Semitism contains three related beliefs: (1)that Jews killed Christ and bear a collective re-sponsibility for that act, (2) that Jews are eviland do the work of the Devil, and (3) that Jewsare beyond redemption. After A.D. 321, whenChristianity became the religion of ImperialRome, these beliefs led to restrictions on Jews,although they were never fully enacted as theempire fell into a period of decline. The declineof the Roman Empire was followed by a shortperiod of general acceptance of Jews in Europeby theologians, some of whom argued for theprotection of Jews.

However, the Middle Ages saw Christian anti-Semitic beliefs about Jews transformed into prac-tice throughout Europe. Anti-Semitismthroughout the Middle Ages was frequent andcommon, taking the form of expulsions from cit-ies and nations, wholesale massacres, forced sui-cides, attempts to force mass conversions, bans onmembership in craft guilds and universities, andthe required wearing of distinctive clothing suchas hats or a cloth marker on outer garments. Writ-ings and art of this period were filled with stereo-typical portrayals of Jews, often depicted as inleague with the Devil. Two surviving developmentsfrom the Middle Ages, particularly among ruralpeoples in Europe, are the blood libel and PassionPlays. The blood libel claims that Jews ritually killChristian children and use their blood in the prepa-ration of unleavened bread eaten during the Pass-over holiday. Passion Plays openly depict Jews asthe murderers of Christ and the enemy of Chris-tianity; they were and remain a popular form ofentertainment.

During the reformation, the fate of Jewsdepended on the dominant Christian religionin the nation or region. Catholicism and theLutheran branch of Protestantism were stronglyanti-Semitic, while the Calvinist branch of Prot-

H8

ANTI-SEMITISM

estantism was less so. In Catholic nations, theghetto emerged in the sixteenth century as amechanism for isolating Jews from the rest ofsociety. During the Enlightenment, beginningin the early eighteenth century, Jewish isolationbegan to lessen, and various theologians andphilosophers argued for the treatment of Jewson equal terms with Christians.

In the nineteenth century, the racist versionof anti-Semitism emerged in what is now Ger-many and Austria, with Jews considered geneti-cally different and inferior, and classified asoutsiders. This racial anti-Semitism became afeature of German daily life. In Russia, Jews wereconfined to a region known as the "Pale of Settle-ment" and were the object of frequent riots,looting, killings, expulsions, and government-organized or backed pogroms. In Russia, andlater in Austria, Germany, and elsewhere inEurope, racial anti-Semitism was merged withpolitical anti-Semitism as political leaders usedJews as scapegoats to explain political and eco-nomic problems and to direct attention awayfrom government failures. Racial/political anti-Semitism culminated in the rise of the Nazis inGermany and the subsequent genocidal killingof some 5 to 6 million Jews between 1941 and1945 in what is called the Holocaust. During thissame period, anti-Semitism was also reflectedin the refusal of some nations, such as the UnitedStates and Canada, to accept any significantnumber of Jewish refugees fleeing Nazi perse-cution.

A survey of 60 nations in 1991 indicatedthat anti-Semitism is still common around theworld. In fact, the survey indicates that anti-Semitism reached its highest point since WorldWar II in 1991, and that Europe remains themost common arena for anti-Semitism. One el-ement of the revival of anti-Semitism is revi-sionist history that downplays or altogetherdenies the Holocaust. Although countered bymainstream historians, this literature enjoys awide reading around the world. In formerly

Communist nations of Eastern Europe, such asPoland, Hungary, and Romania, political anti-Semitism has reappeared as a component of thexenophobia and nationalism that has emergedwith efforts to establish capitalist economies anddemocratic governments. In Poland, for example,some political leaders and political parties areopenly anti-Semitic, blaming various economicills on Jewish influence and control. In fact, thereare less than 5,000 Jews in Poland, with virtu-ally no political power, suggesting a phenom-enon called anti-Semitism without Jews—Jewsare to blame even if they are not an actual physi-cal presence. In Germany, where the small Jew-ish population of about 35,000 is stronglyassimilated, anti-Semitism has reemerged as partof the neo-Nazi xenophobia, but is unsupportedby the state. In the former USSR, anti-Semitismhas also reemerged alongside nationalism in na-tions such as the Ukraine and Russia, but offi-cial policies designed to protect minority rightsand the freedom of Jews to emigrate has less-ened its impact. A relatively new form of anti-Semitism is the Islamicization of anti-Semitismin Arab and Muslim nations as part of the on-going Arab-Israeli and Israeli-Palestinian con-flict and the spread of Islamic fundamentalism.That anti-Semitism is increasing in Egypt, the oneArab nation with peaceful relations with Israel, isa sign to some that peace in the Middle East maynot bring with it an end to anti-Semitism nor anend to Israeli animosity toward Arabs.

See also GENOCIDE; GHETTO; MIDDLEMAN MI-NORITIES; RACE AND RACISM; SCAPEGOAT; STE-REOTYPES; XENOPHOBIA.

Anti-Semitism World Report. (1992).

Curtis, Michael, ed. (1986) Antisemitism in theContemporary World.

Gutman, Israel, ed. (1990) The Encyclopedia ofthe Holocaust. 4 vols.

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Lipstadt, Deborah. (1993) Denying the Holocaust:The Growing Assault on Truth and Memory.

Wistrich, Robert S. (1991) Antisemitism: TheLongest Hatred.

Wyman, David S. (1984) The Abandonment ofthe Jews: America and the Holocaust 1941-1945.

Apartheid is a form ofethnic stratification par-ticular to the nation of

South Africa, the major features of which arethe segregation of whites and nonwhites, andbeliefs in the biological purity of all races, as wellas white biological and cultural supremacy. Theideal was complete separation of whites and non-whites; however, this was never completely thereality because interaction that benefited whiteswas permitted (although severely circumscribed).The system served as a mechanism by which thewhite numerical minority (about 17 percent ofthe population) maintained political control andexploited the African majority (about 70 per-cent of the population) as a source of labor.Apartheid is now ending in South Africa, as Af-ricans are becoming full participants in the po-litical system and as the numerous laws enactedunder apartheid are being repealed.

In its fully developed form, apartheid cameinto being following the 1948 national election.However, separation of whites and nonwhitesand exploitation of the latter by the former hadbeen a major feature of South African societysince the arrival of Dutch settlers in the 1650s.At first, when European settlement was mainlyon the coast, small slave colonies were estab-lished. Later, in the 1700s and 1800s, Dutchsettlers, called Boers and now referred to asAfrikaners, established all-white regions in theinterior. In 1902 the British deposed the Dutch,

established South Africa as a British colony, andbanned Africans from political participation.During these centuries of European expansionand domination, the basic elements of apartheidwere put in place, including separation of whitesand nonwhites (black Africans, mixed-ancestryColoureds, and Asians), the exploitation of Af-rican labor, and the confinement of Africans tonative reserves that occupied only 13 percent ofthe land.

With the election of the Afrikaner-backedNational party in 1948, the apartheid systembecame the official government policy with vari-ous laws based on the separation of whites andnonwhites, and white dominance, being enactedto ensure compliance with the policy. The basicfeatures of apartheid have been labeled by soci-ologist Pierre van den Berghe as microsegregationy

mesosegregation, and macrosegregation.Microsegregation refers to policies and prac-

tices designed to eliminate or limit interactionbetween whites and nonwhites and include:

1. Classifying all newborn citizens as black,white, Asian, or mixed ancestry

2. Segregating public spaces such as parks andbeaches, public facilities, and services suchas hospitals and public transportation

3. Prohibiting Africans from entering white ar-eas except to perform work, usually of amenial nature

4. Establishing separate schools for whites andAfricans

5. Outlawing African opposition parties andjailing and torturing political opponents

6. Disenfranchising Africans in nationalelections

7. Preventing Africans from serving in themilitary

8. Paying whites and white retirees more thanAfricans

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APARTHEID

9. Requiring Africans to carry identificationbooks to be shown to white authorities ondemand

10. Outlawing sexual relations and marriagebetween Africans and whites

Mesosegregation refers to the policy of sepa-rate development started in the 1950s, theprimary manifestation of which was the estab-lishment of racially homogeneous residentialareas. Macrosegregation is an extension ofmesosegregation, as it was the actual placementof Africans in racially segregated homelands. Thekey elements of meso- and macro-segregationwere the establishment of African homelandsand the assignment and/or transfer of Africansto those homelands. Some of the homelandswere classified as independent nations (Transkei,

Bophuthatswana, and Venda), and their resi-dents and those assigned to live there were nolonger considered citizens of South Africa. Un-fortunately, since other nations did not recog-nize these homelands as independent nations,their residents then became nationless. Addi-tional measures called for the administrativelinking of urban African neighborhoods withhomelands, restrictions on relocation from onehomeland to another, and a crackdown on "ille-gal" Africans in white zones.

Beginning in the late 1970s, and then ac-celerating from the late 1980s into the 1990s,was a weakening and finally an end of the apart-heid system with the adoption of a new nationalconstitution in December 1993 that made blacksand whites equal as a matter of governmentpolicy. Initially, this weakening took the form

Park in central Johannesburg, South Africa, 1965. Benches are "for whites only."

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ARMENIANS AND AZERBAIJANI TURKS

of the rescinding of some of the harshest ele-ments of the homelands policy and administra-tive inaction in implementing some provisions.In the late 1980s and early 1990s, various laws,such as those requiring racial classification ofnewborns and detention of political prisoners,were abolished. The April 1994 national elec-tion produced a transition in political power toAfricans led by Nelson Mandela. A combina-tion of internal factors and sanctions applied bythe world community and individual nationsultimately led to the end of apartheid. Internalfactors include political resistance by the Afri-can National Congress, an expanding economythat required more African laborers in whiteurban areas, and the psychological impact ofSouth Africa's exclusion from the world com-munity. Outside action that likely pressured theSouth African government to alter its policiesincluded the United Nations-imposed armsembargo, trade restrictions, and the refusal offoreign banks to loan the South African gov-ernment and South African institutions moneyfor capital investment.

As in other nations, the end of colonialdomination (in South Africa in the form ofapartheid) has created conflict among groupsover political power. The African National Con-gress, with a large but not exclusively IXhosaconstituency, has been the dominant Africanpolitical party, and took power following theApril election. The Zulu, who dominate theInkatha Freedom party, are eager to maintainpolitical control in the Natal, their homeland,as well as to assure themselves a place in the na-tional government. For their part, a minority ofAfrikaners are demanding an independent prov-ince for themselves, which they call volkstaadt,or people's state. Both groups were deeply di-vided over whether they should participate inthe April elections, but despite some preelectionviolence, the election was marked by a high voterturnout followed by a peaceful transition ofpower.

See also CASTE; COLONIALISM; MINORITYRIGHTS; RACE AND RACISM.

Kalley, Jacqueline A. (1989) South Africa underApartheid.

Lambley, Peter. (1980) The Psychology of Apartheid.

Marquard, Leo. (1962) The Peoples and Policiesof South Africa.

Smith, David M. (1983) Living under Apartheid.

van den Berghe, Pierre L. (1978) Race and Rac-ism: A Comparative Perspective. 2d ed.

. (1981) The Ethnic Phenomenon.

ARMENIANS ANDThe Republic of Arme-nia is located in thesouthwestern region ofthe former Soviet Union,south of Georgia, north

of Iran, east of Turkey, and west of the Republicof Azerbaijan. In total, Armenia encompasses11,306 square miles. Its population in 1993 wasestimated at 3.6 million, 93.5 percent of whichwere ethnic Armenians, the others being mainlyKurds, Russians, and Ukrainians. Prior to therecent conflict with the Azerbaijani Turks, per-haps 6 percent of the population of Armenia wasAzerbaijani. Armenia is called Hayasdan by itsinhabitants, who refer to themselves as Hay.Armenians are Christian, having converted toChristianity as early as A.D. 300. Most Arme-nians belong to the Armenian Apostolic Churchcentered in the Republic.

Sixty percent of Armenians reside inYerevan, the capital city. What is now Armeniaproper was formerly called Eastern Armenia,with Western Armenia located in eastern Tur-key. To escape the Turkish genocide of 1915,which led to at least 1.5 million Armenian

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AZERBAIJANITURKS

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ARMENIANS AND AZERBAIJANI TURKS

deaths, many Armenians fled from the westernregion to the eastern region or elsewhere, creat-ing an international Armenia diaspora. In thelate nineteenth century the tsarist governmentin Russia tried to forceably convert the Arme-nians to the Russian Orthodox Church. Arme-nia became part of the USSR in 1922 andbecame an independent state when the SovietUnion collapsed in 1991.

The Republic of Azerbaijan is 33,400 squaremiles, bordered by Russia and Georgia on thenorth, Iran on the south, Armenia on the west,and the Caspian Sea on the east. In 1993 its popu-lation was estimated to be 7.3 million, with 83percent being Azerbaijani Turks and the remain-der being Russian and Armenian. The republicforms the northern sector of Azerbaijani territory,with the east and west Azerbaijani provinces inIran forming the southern sector. Azerbaijanis areadherents of Islam; about 75 percent are Shi'ite,and 25 percent are Sunni. The official language isAzerbaijani, a dialect of Turkish, although theSoviet government considered it a separate lan-guage. Azerbaijani culture, which has been re-pressed both in the former Soviet Union and Iran,is a synthesis of elements from pre-Islamic Turk-ish, Iranian, and Islamic cultures.

Azerbaijan joined the Soviet Union in 1922and became an independent state when theUSSR disbanded in 1991. Azerbaijan and Ar-menia both suffered under the Russification pro-grams of the Soviet era, and both are nowmembers of the Commonwealth of IndependentStates created from the former Soviet republics.Nationalism is strong in both nations and con-tributes to the reluctance of either party to settlethe current conflict peacefully.

Armenian-Azerbaijani relations have alwaysbeen difficult. Where the Christian and Mus-lim worlds meet, the region has been the localefor violent conflict for centuries, and as a resulthas been ruled by various empires including theIranian, Persian, Roman, Ottoman, Mongol,and Russian.

The current conflict between the Armeniansand the Azerbaijani Turks dates to the 1920sand is irredentist, involving conflicting claimson the enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh, locatedwithin the Republic of Azerbaijan, but affordeda distinct status by the Soviet government in1923. Nagorno-Karabakh is inhabited mainly byArmenians, who see it as part of their ancestralhomeland—a claim contested by the AzerbaijaniTurks. Its population is approximately 170,000.

In the past five years since the fighting hasintensified, more than 3,000 people have beenkilled and hundreds of thousands have been dis-placed. In 1988 the Armenian majority inNagorno-Karabakh demanded autonomy, pro-moting demonstrations of support in Armeniacountered by anti-Armenian riots in Azerbaijan.In Nagorno-Karabakh, the Azerbaijani militiaattempted to expel Armenians from the region.In response, Armenia began a military offensivein which they opened a "corridor of life" fromArmenia to the enclave, allowing refugees easieraccess to Armenia. Already trying to cope withpoverty and homelessness, Armenia was struckby an earthquake in 1988 that left 500,000people homeless. This created further problemsfor the Armenian government and lessened theirwillingness to accept large numbers of Arme-nians from Nagorno-Karabakh. Still, tens ofthousands of refugees have settled in Armenia.In 1992 the Azerbaijani blocked gas pipelinesto Armenia, making winters unbearable with-out heat.

Officially, Armenia has not entered into thewar, although popular opinion clearly is support-ive of the Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh. ForArmenia to recognize the enclave formally wouldbe the equivalent of declaring war on Azerbaijan,which Armenia apparently prefers to avoid dueto international repercussions. For example,Azerbaijan's historically close relationship withTurkey poses a large threat to Armenian au-tonomy. Despite such possibilities, for the mostpart Armenia has had its way in the war, and

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after five years, nearly 3,000 deaths, and the dis-location of hundreds of thousands of noncom-batants, Armenia has gained control of almostthe whole Nagorno-Karabakh territory, as wellas another area inside Azerbaijan and a land cor-ridor to Armenia. In part, Armenian success hasbeen the result of political unrest in Azerbaijanthat has left the republic essentially leaderless attimes.

Attempts at peace plans negotiated by theUnited States, Russia, and Turkey have beenunsuccessful, and Armenia has renderedAzerbaijan virtually incapable of real resistance.Nearly 1 million people in Azerbaijan have beendisplaced. The road to a peace settlement willbe long and difficult, a continual danger beingthe involvement of Turkey, Iran, and Russia, allof whom have reportedly increased their mili-tary presence at their borders with Azerbaijan.

See also IRREDENTISM.

Altstadt, Audrey L. (1992) The AzerbaijaniTurks: Power and Identity under Russian Rule.

Matossian, Mark K. (1962) The Impact of SovietPolicies in Armenia.

Suny, Ronald G. (1983) Armenia in the Twenti-eth Century.

ASSAMKSK ININDIA

The name Assamese re-fers to two categories ofpeople. First, it refers tothe residents of the state

of Assam in northeast India, a population thatincludes the indigenous Assamese, indigenoustribal peoples, and immigrants from Bangladesh(mainly Muslim Bengalis), Hindus from else-where in India, and refugees from Myanmar(Burma). Second, it refers to the indigenous

Assamese, descendants of the original inhabit-ants of the region. Although population figuresare unreliable, it is likely that the indigenousAssamese are now a numerical minority inAssam, a development not unrelated to theAssamese ethnic separatist movement that tooka violent turn from 1987 to 1991. The state ofAssam is connected to the rest of India by a nar-row corridor through Himalayan states andBangladesh, and is bordered by the nations ofBangladesh, Myanmar, Bhutan, and China.Geographically, politically, and culturally, theAssamese and Assam State have always beensomewhat isolated from mainstream Indian so-ciety. In 1981 the population of Assam was esti-mated at over 21 million, with less than half ofthe population speaking Assamese. Assam (thencalled Asam or Aham) was originally ruled byShan peoples from Myanmar, and modern-dayAssamese culture reflects influences from South-east Asia. The modern boundaries of Assamwere established during the 1880s during the pe-riod of British colonial rule that also saw thearrival of peoples from other regions who came asmigrant laborers to work on the tea plantations.

The regions economy is undeveloped de-spite abundant natural resources. Nearly 25 per-cent of India's crude oil comes from Assam, aswell as most of its tea and jute. Assam is inhab-ited by a variety of ethnic groups, with theAssamese proper, Bengalis, and Indian Hindusthe most prominent. The Assamese religion is aform of Hinduism. The Bengali community iscomposed primarily of those who settled inAssam seeking refuge from the poverty of theirBangladesh homeland.

The ongoing effort by the Assamese to pro-tect their cultural and political integrity andmaintain their traditional homeland began in theearly 1980s when Assamese students led a cam-paign to persuade the Indian government in NewDelhi to halt the flow of immigrants fromBangladesh, who were blamed by the Assamesefor the region's economic problems. The cam-

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paign officially ended in 1985 when an agree-ment was reached with then-prime ministerRajiv Gandhi and local elections put a new stategovernment into office. Shortly after, a majorethnic separatist movement emerged, under thename the United Liberation Front of Assam(ULFA), whose expressed goal was to establisha socialist nation in Assam. At first, the ULFAenjoyed much popular support by using claimsthat India was neglecting the region, and from1987 to 1990 ran an independent, officially un-recognized government. Between 1987 and 1990the ULFA collected the equivalent of severalhundred million dollars from Assamese planta-tion owners and other businesses, claiming thatthese companies had been exploiting the natu-ral resources without reinvesting their profits inthe region. Some tea plantations ceased opera-tion rather than accede to what they saw as ter-rorist demands by the ULFA. Over these fewyears, the ULFA became increasingly violent,and popular support turned to fear and suspi-cion as the population witnessed the executionof police and government officials. Much of themoney collected by the ULFA was used to pur-chase weapons from international arms dealers,particularly in Myanmar and Singapore. Finan-cial resources were also used to support militarytraining and establish contacts with other mili-tant ethnic groups in neighboring nations. Muchof the military training took place in Myanmar,and although the Myanmar government did notopenly support the ULFA, it is likely that it wasaware of the group's mission and activities.

In response to the terrorism and money col-lecting (which some called extortion), the In-dian government banned the ULFA in 1990,deposed the state government, and sent in anIndian army contingent to restore order. In 1991the ULFA kidnapped six officials and oil execu-tives, who were released six months later. InJanuary 1992 negotiations between Prime Min-ister Narashima Rao and the moderate factionof the ULFA produced an accord that gave the

Assamese more political autonomy, major In-dian investment in Assam, and constitutionalprotection for the small Assamese communities.However, with a continuing weak economy,minority status for the indigenous Assamese, andother ethnic unrest in the region, Assam remainsa region with potential for future ethnic conflict.

Cantlie, Audrey. (1984) The Assamese.

ASSIMILATIONAssimilation is the pro-cess through which anethnic group loses its

distinct cultural and ethnic identity and is ab-sorbed by another group. The assimilation pro-cess can take three forms. First, it can be a processthrough which immigrant groups conform toand ultimately become part of the dominant cul-tural group in their new homeland. In the UnitedStates, this process is called Anglo conformityin reference to the assimilation of European eth-nic groups to the dominant Anglo-Saxon cul-ture of the United States. For the assimilatinggroup, assimilation progresses through a seriesof stages. The first stage is cultural assimilation,or acculturation, during which the ethnic groupchanges its values and norms to conform to thevalues and norms of the dominant cultural group.This involves learning and using the languageof the dominant group, becoming a citizen ofthe nation, altering traditional beliefs about thenature of the world, and changing religious prac-tices to conform to dominant religious practices.For some groups, where assimilation is blockedby the dominant culture, the process ends at ac-culturation—for example, African-Americans inthe United States and Cape Coloureds in SouthAfrica. In other groups, cultural assimilation isfollowed by structural assimilation in which

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Maori women and children, New Zealand. Childrenare often the first to adopt customs of other cultures.

members of the ethnic group begin to partici-pate in relationships with institutions and mem-bers of the host society. These include the use ofprofessional services; friendships with peoplefrom mainstream society or other ethnic groups;membership in political parties, labor unions,civic organizations, and other voluntary associa-tions; and residence in ethnically mixed neigh-borhoods. Structural assimilation is thenfollowed by a series of other types of assimila-tion including identificational (one's self-identity becomes based on being a member ofthe host society), marital (intermarriage withmembers of other ethnic or religious groups),behavioral and attitudinal (the degree of dis-crimination the group actually encounters, orbelieves that it does), and civic (participation inhost-society political issues, such as agreementwith the majority on key issues, and interest inissues of importance to the general population).

This general pattern of assimilation thattakes place over two or three generations is typi-cal of the experience of many European ethnicgroups in the United States, although all groupshave also retained some aspects of their tradi-

tional culture, as reflected in food preferences,eating patterns, the importance and patterningof family relationships, religious practices, anduse of the native language in private or the re-tention of certain native terms.

The assimilation of Italian-Americans in aChicago suburb from the 1890s through the1940s is an example of this form of assimila-tion. Single Italian laborers began settling in thecommunity in the 1890s. At first they were asmall, isolated group who lived next door to oneanother in an area covering only a few blocks.By 1911 they had established a local society, builttheir own church, and retained the services of apriest. Their isolation from the outside commu-nity at this time was also encouraged by the nega-tive stereotyping of the neighboring English andGerman communities who saw the Italians asdirty, violent, and unwilling to learn English. In1917 the situation began to change rapidly asItalians supported the war effort through thepurchase of war bonds, and Italians who servedin the U.S. military returned from World WarI; in 1919 an Italian was elected alderman, andhe stressed the importance of becoming anAmerican and the value of hard work in orderto succeed. His efforts were supported by theAmerican Legion, which ran an Americaniza-tion program in the community. In 1923 theassimilation process began gathering momen-tum as Italians moved to other neighborhoodsin the town, began giving their children Ameri-can first names, and married Catholic non-Italians. Additionally, employment opportuni-ties for men expanded, and more were employedin the skilled trades and sales than previously.Contact with the dominant culture furthereroded the traditional culture as baseball andbowling replaced bocci as the favorite sports, andstage shows replaced more traditional forms ofentertainment. Following World War II, chil-dren began attending college, and the Italiancommunity became politically influential byelecting members to local government positions.

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The second type of assimilation process isknown as the "melting pot," and suggests thatall ethnic groups contribute something of theirtraditional culture, resulting in a new, distinctculture. The melting pot process involves fourstages: (1) contact between groups, (2) compe-tition, (3) accommodation, and (4) assimilation.While at one time the United States was oftendescribed as a melting pot, it is now clear thatthe Anglo-conformity model is a more accuraterepresentation of the U.S. situation regarding theassimilation of European immigrants. It is alsothe case that in some ways the United States is atriple melting pot, with immigrant groups form-ing Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish overarchingethnic collectives. Modern Canadian culture issometimes described as the product of a melt-ing pot process involving European immigrantgroups that has produced a new Canadian na-tional consciousness different from the found-ing French and British cultures. Canada is alsoan officially multicultural and bilingual nation.

The third assimilation process results in asituation of partial assimilation where the mi-nority group adopts many aspects of the domi-nant culture while at the same time retainingmany of its own customs and beliefs. The Chi-nese in Thailand, who constitute about 10 per-cent of the population and work as farmers, storeowners, and businessmen, are an example of thisassimilation pattern. The Chinese speak bothChinese (among themselves and at home) andThai (in public and business). Many Chinesechildren attend Thai schools, but many parentschoose to send their children to Chinese bilin-gual schools and, if they can afford the cost, sendolder children to schools in Taiwan. Chinesebusinessmen belong to the Chinese associations,but they also belong to the Thai counterparts,and have helped to forge alliances between Thaiand Chinese associations. Many Chinese andThai are Buddhists, but the former areMahayana Buddhists and the latter TheravadaBuddhists. Additionally, some Chinese continue

traditional ancestor worship, and most celebrateChinese holidays such as the New Year. Finally,intermarriage is somewhat limited between thetwo groups and kinship practices differ, with theChinese emphasizing relations through thefather s line and the Thai through the mother'sline. Thus, while the Chinese are an integral partof the Thai economy, they remain separate inmany ways from the Thai community andmaintain many traditional Chinese beliefs andcustoms.

Another form of assimilation is forced assimi-lation or ethnocide, in which the dominant groupseeks to eradicate the minority culture or cul-tures and totally integrate the group into main-stream culture. Forced assimilation has beencommon in some regions of settlement coloni-zation such as the United States, where govern-ment policies at various times have been directedat totally assimilating American Indians. Forcedassimilation was also the policy in the formerSoviet Union where non-Russian ethnic groupswere "Russified"—forced to use the Russian lan-guage in place of their native tongue, partici-pate in the Russian-dominated government andeconomy, accept the official Soviet version ofhistory, and give up their traditional religion.These practices have mostly ended with the col-lapse of the Soviet Union and there is now alarge-scale effort by dozens of ethnic minoritiesin the former Soviet Union to re-create their tra-ditional cultures.

From a worldwide perspective, assimilationin any form is relatively unusual in most nations,where the pattern has been either one of exclud-ing minorities from mainstream society or lim-iting participation to the level of acculturation.Those countries where assimilation has beencommon are the United States, Canada, Aus-tralia, Brazil, Argentina, and Israel. But even inthese countries, some groups have not been as-similated—in the United States and Canada,American Indians and African-Americans; inIsrael, Arabs, Beta Israel (Falasha), and others;

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in Brazil, the indigenous Indians; in Argentina,Jews; in Australia, aboriginal peoples; and inNew Zealand, the indigenous Maori. In gen-eral, it seems that assimilation is more likely tooccur when the groups are physically similar (dif-ferent skin colors being a major bar to assimila-tion in many nations throughout history);culturally similar, especially if they speak thesame or related languages; the new group issmall; the new group is lower in status than thehost group; the new group is dispersed through-out the host nation; and the group wishing toassimilate is an immigrant rather than an indig-enous group.

While many nations resist assimilatinggroups that are culturally or physically different,there are also ethnic groups that themselveschoose to resist assimilation. In the United Statesand Canada, these include the immigrantAmish, Hutterites, Mennonites, Old Believers,Hasidic Jews, and Doukhobors.They have man-aged to remain separate and avoid assimilationby living in their own homogeneous communi-ties, retaining the use of their native language(although many individuals are bilingual), requir-ing endogamous marriage, strictly adhering totheir traditional religion, and engaging in eco-nomic enterprises that are mainly self-sufficientor do not require intensive interaction by allmembers of the group with other American andCanadian communities.

See also ETHNOCIDE; SYNCRETIC CULTURES.

Bun, Chan Kwok. (1993) "Rethinking Assimi-lation and Ethnicity: The Chinese in Thai-land." International Migration Review 27:140-168.

Burnet, Jean R., and Howard Palmer. (1989)Coming Canadians: An Introduction to a His-tory of Canada's Peoples.

Gordon, Milton. (1964) Assimilation in Ameri-can Life: The Role of Race, Religion, and Na-tional Origins.

Jebsen, Harry, Jr. (1976) "Assimilation in aWorking Class Suburb: The Italians ofBlue Island, Illinois." In The Urban Expe-rience of Italian-Americans, edited by PatGallo, 64-84.

O'Leary, Timothy J., and David Levinson, eds.(199$) Encyclopedia of World Cultures. Volumely North America.

Olson, James S. (1979) The Ethnic Dimension inAmerican History.

Thernstrom, Stephan, ed. (1980) Harvard En-cyclopedia of American Ethnic Groups.

Thompson, Richard H. (1989) Theories ofEthnicity: A Critical Appraisal.

van den Berghe, Pierre L. (1981) The EthnicPhenomenon.

An autonym (also calledan auto denomination orself-name) is an ethnic

group's name for itself. Although it would seemthat every ethnic group would be called by thename it prefers for itself, this is not always thecase, especially for many small, non-Western cul-tures. One common result of contact betweenEuropean colonial nations and indigenouspeoples was the renaming of the latter by theformer. This renaming took place for a numberof reasons. In some cases, the group's name foritself is the same as the word for people or thepeople in its language. For example, the Navajo(a large American Indian nation, numberingabout 200,000) autonym is Dine, meaning "thepeople." Similarly, the Kapauku people of PapuaNew Guinea call themselves Me, also meaning"the people" in their language. Often, the group sname for itself was not used by outsiders; they

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instead gave the group a different name, whichthen became the most often used name for thegroup. Outsiders sometimes ignored the people sown name for themselves because the two usesof the same word confused other outsiders(mainly the white colonizers, traders, or mission-aries who had first outside contact with thegroup), or because the outsiders cared little aboutwhat the people called themselves. New namesassigned by outsiders were often based on somelocal environmental factor or some unique fea-ture of the group. Thus, the Navajo are calledsuch because they were agriculturalists; the wordprobably derives from a neighboring AmericanIndian group's word for "cultivated field," indi-cating the importance that the Navajo placedon agriculture. Similarity, the Pawnee, an Ameri-can Indian nation of the plains, called themselvesChahiksichahiks, meaning "men of men." Thename Pawnee is a corruption ofpariki, meaninghorn and referring to the traditional men's hair-style with the scalplock stiffened and curved likea horn. Ignoring native names and imposingtheir own on indigenous peoples was anothermanifestation of the ethnocentrism and racismthat characterized European colonization. Notuncommonly, the indigenous people regardedsome of these names as derogatory and did notuse them to identify themselves.

Today, many of these names are seen as in-appropriate because they were imposed by out-siders, and as many of the indigenous peoplesaround the world seek political and cultural self-determination, they are reviving the use of theirautonyms. This is especially true in groups thatview the names imposed by outsiders as deroga-tory or stereotypical. So, for example, the Ajie-speaking people of New Caledonia now callthemselves Kanak as part of their struggle forpolitical independence. Similarly, in NorthAmerica, theTipai-Ipai nation of southern Cali-fornia prefers to be called Kumeyaay, its tradi-tional name for itself, while the Nootka ofVancouver Island now prefer Westcoast People.

This trend toward the reintroduction ofautonyms is not confined to Western peoples.Upon the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991,the Belorussians renamed their republic Belarus.Similarly, the Slav-Macedonians of what wassouthern Yugoslavia are seeking nation statusunder the name Macedonia, a movement resistedby Greece, which believes that the name morecorrectly belongs to the northwestern region ofGreece.

The situation with regard to ethnic groupnames has now become exceedingly complex,and some groups are known by multiple names.For example, Vietnamese hill people are stillcalled Montagnards (French for "mountaineers")by Westerners, Muong by the ethnic Vietnam-ese, and they call themselves Mo/y meaning"man." Similarly, Cambodians are called Cam-bodians or Khmer by outsiders, and call them-selves Khmae. In Colombia, where skin color,ethnicity, and social class became interconnectedthrough colonialism, the recent development ofblack consciousness and political movementshas led to a complex naming system for Afro-Colombians. The label Afro-Colombians isactually a generic one, and is rarely used by thepeople themselves. Negro, meaning "black," isused by some Afro-Colombians, but is consid-ered insulting by others. Moreno, meaningbrown, and gente de color are also used as self-names by some. People on the Pacific coast of-ten use libres, meaning "free people," whilecosteno, meaning "coastal dweller," is understoodas a general reference to Afro-Colombians, asmany live on the coast.

The widespread practice of ethnic groupsrenaming themselves is an important demon-stration of self-determination for these groupsand their individual members as it symbolizesthe end of colonial dominance and, not surpris-ingly, often accompanies efforts to achieve po-litical, legal, social, and economic autonomy. InNorth America, numerous indigenous nationsand minority groups are now opting for their

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own names, or choosing names more consistentwith their history and cultural traditions:Dine (formerly Navajo or Navaho), African-Americans (formerly Colored, Negroes, blacks),Latinos (formerly Hispanics), Inuit (formerlyPolar Eskimo), Westcoast People (formerlyNootka), Tohono O'Odham (formerly Pima),Quechuan (formerly Yuma), and Teton or

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Lakota (formerly and incorrectly Sioux), amongothers.

Levinson, David, ed. (1991-1994) Encyclopediaof World Cultures. 10 vols.

Wade, Peter. (1993) Blackness and Race Mixture:The Dynamics of Racial Identity in Colombia.

A

BAHA'IS IN IRANAs of 1993 there wereabout 5.5 million peopleworldwide who consid-

ered themselves adherents of the Baha'i faith,although no official membership had been pub-lished. The largest populations of Baha'i werefound in India and Malaysia, each with nearly 1million followers. The population estimates forIran vary from 150,000 to 300,000, making theBaha'i community a small religious minority inMuslim Iran, with a total population of 62.8million.

Iran is a Shi'ite Muslim nation, the onlynation whose official religion is that particularbranch of Islam. Iran was predominantly SunniIslam until the sixteenth century, when the con-version to Shi'ite began. A major difference be-tween Shi'ite and Sunni is in determiningqualifications for the succession of the prophetMuhammed. Shi'ites maintain that hereditarysuccession is the only acceptable means for thespiritual leader.

The Baha'i faith has its origins in one of themany sects within the Shi'ite Muslim religionand, through a number of changes in the belief

and doctrine of the religion, has emerged as arelatively "new" world religion. The Baha i faithis directly preceded in its developmental line bythe Babis, an extremely militant group who wereprepared to die in order to convert the wholeworld to their faith. As a result, Babis were sub-ject to mass repression in the mid-eighteenthcentury, finally resulting in the execution of theirspiritual leader, the Bab. The Baha'i faith beganin the quest for his successor and the change inthe new leader's methods and beliefs. Baha'ullaand his successors in turn transformed militantBabism into Bahaism, a quiet, peaceful, andfaithful sect who have never collectively advo-cated violence of any sort. In the last century,Bahaism has become well established through-out the world as its own religion, as it has movedaway from traditions that bound it to other reli-gions with which it was associated. It has, ofcourse, remained influenced by several majorworld religions by virtue of its history and loca-tion of origin, and has been generally character-ized by peaceful expansion and harmoniousrelations with adherents of other religions, withthe exception of the small population in Iran.

Among the major tenets of modern Bahaismare: (1) the belief that all religions are derivedfrom the same ultimate beliefs and that all areequally valid; (2) the holy personages and proph-ets of all religions are manifestations or messen-gers of the same deities; (3) the requirement of acommunal gathering every nineteenth day; and(4) egalitarianism in the form of ignoring wealthdistinctions and stressing equality between thesexes participating in the Baha'i religion.

Baha'is in Iran have been persecuted for aslong as they have existed as a group, and indeedprior to that, when the religion had not yetevolved from Babism. In fact, many of the cur-rent popular attitudes toward Baha'is stem in partfrom the fact that Iranians have taken little no-tice of the transformation from Babism toBahaism. Memories of militant Babist tacticshave carried over to the present day and form

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the basis of stereotypes that are not based oncurrent reality. The larger problem is thatBahaism is not recognized by Iranian Shi'iteMuslims as a religion, and therefore Baha'is arenot classified as a religious minority. Instead, theyare second-rate citizens, not equal, and in dan-ger of persecution although the Iranian consti-tution currently offers protection for religiousminorities. Baha'is are not Muslims, althoughthey do believe in Muhammed as well as manyother prophets before him. They also, however,believe in prophets who came after him, andherein lies a basic conflict with Islam. If Baha'isdid not follow some Islamic beliefs and believedin an entirely different set of prophets, Baha'imight be considered a religion by Muslim andIranian law. But since they acknowledgeMuhammed as an important prophet, but rejectthe notion that he was the last, Bahaism is seennot as a separate religion but rather as heresy.There are only five pillars of Islam; the mostimportant is to proclaim faith in Allah and be-lief in Muhammed as his only (last) prophet.Acknowledgment of his existence is required andany (perceived) rejection of his importance isunacceptable. For this reason, the extreme per-secution of the Baha'is has not drawn sympathyfrom the majority of Iranians. Regardless of thefact that participation in partisan politics is notpermitted within the religion and is in factgrounds for expulsion, Baha'is have been accusedof numerous alliances within unpopular regimes.Baha'is around the world have pledged loyaltyto the government in power in Iran, and havealways stood by that pledge, regardless ofwhether or not they believed in the currentsystem.

The persecution of the Baha'i communityin Iran has been intense. Reports of torture ofBabis date to the mid-eighteenth century, justprior to the emergence of Bahaism. For well overa century, Baha'is have been socially, economi-cally, and physically persecuted by society as wellas the government, to an extent seldom seen in

any other nation in recent times. That any Baha'isettlements remain in Iran is a testimony to theirenduring faith and sense of community. At timesBaha'is have been the victims of random vio-lence carried out by Iranian citizens but insti-gated directly and publicly by the government.They have been forbidden to publish their lit-erature or to worship openly. Their schools havebeen closed and ceremonies such as marriagehave not been recognized by the government.In the early 1980s, many spiritual leaders wereexecuted or imprisoned for belonging to theBaha'i faith, with official explanations given asfabricated criminal offenses. Throughout theBaha'i community, countless people have beenvictims of mob lynching, stoning, and deathsinvolving torture. No prosecution of anyone in-volved in the death of a Baha'i has been reported.

The Baha'i community has also been thevictim of economic persecution by the state aswell as by individual citizens. Destruction andseizure of personal and commercial propertyfrom Baha'is resulted in losses equivalent to tensof millions of dollars (from a population of, atmost, 300,000) by the early 1980s. All propertybelonging to Baha'is collectively has been offi-cially confiscated by the government, and dis-missal from employment for being a Baha'i iscommon.

Rather than halt persecution of Baha'is inreaction to international public opinion, the Ira-nian government has chosen to deny or defendits actions. Because of limited contact with theWestern world for over a decade, the current sta-tus of the Baha'i community is unclear, althoughthere is no doubt that they are still a persecutedminority, given the authoritarian, fundamental-ist nature of recent Iranian governments. InDecember 1993 in Iran, three Baha'is were sen-tenced to death for "holding feasts, owningbooks, and being 'unprivileged infidels at warwith the Muslim nation.'" In the same month,the United Nations General Assembly voted tocensure Iran for human rights violations because

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of Iranian repression of the Bahai religion andculture.

Cooper, Roger. (1982) The Bahais of Iran.

EsslemontJ. E. (1980) Bahaullah and the NewEra. First published 1923.

The Basque countrycovers 20,747 square ki-lometers in the borderregion of Spain and

France. The large majority of the Basque popu-lation, which totaled nearly 3 million in 1975,lives on the Spanish side, with only about 10percent of the population in France. There areseven distinct regions in Basque country: Fourare in Spain (Bizkaia, Gipuzkoa, Nafarroa, andAraba) and three in France (Lapurdi, Behe-Nafarroa, and Zuberoa). The Basques refer toBasque country as Euskal-Herria or Euskadi(meaning "country of the Basques") and the on-going ethnic separatist movement seeks to makethe region an autonomous Basque nation. About30 percent of Basques speak the Basque languagefluently, with the majority speaking either Span-ish or French as their primary language. TheBasque language is a language isolate, and is un-related to any other language. Basque language-education programs have been effective inincreasing the number of Basque speakers. Al-most all Basques are Roman Catholics.

The origin of the Basques is unknown, al-though they were a recognizable population inthe region before the Middle Ages. Their his-tory has been one of successful resistance to in-cursions and rule by various external powers,including the Romans, Gauls, Moors, French,Castilles in Spain, and various other Europeankingdoms. Following the French revolution,autonomy in the French region was weakened

by centralized rule from Paris, and in the nine-teenth and twentieth centuries internal wars inSpain weakened Basque political autonomy.Basque control of their homeland was alsothreatened in the nineteenth century by the ar-rival of many people from elsewhere in Spain towork in the developing industries of the region.Also, Basque culture was harshly repressed un-der the Franco regime until the rise of democ-racy in Spain in 1975. To this day, Basques andnon-Basques in the region maintain social dis-tance between themselves.

At present, the economy in the region isbased on a combination of industry (now pre-dominant), agriculture, tourism, and fishing onthe coast. With steel plants, major shipbuildingfacilities, and various tourism opportunities, theBasque region is one of the most prosperous inSpain. Agriculture is predominant in the south-ern reaches of the Basque region, where wheat,olives, and grapes are particularly importantcrops.

The history of outside efforts to conquer theregion, and the arrival of Spanish workers by theturn of the twentieth century, led to a Basquenationalist movement that has grown substan-tially over the course of the century. In reactionto the political repression under Franco in Spain,the ETA (Euskadi to Azkatasuna, or "BasqueHomeland and Liberty") organization wasfounded, becoming the principal vehicle for re-sistance and ethnic separatism in the region, anddeveloping a worldwide reputation as a violentterrorist group willing to kill civilians in orderto achieve its goals. While civilians are amongthe more than 700 who have died in the ethnicconflict of the last three decades, most attackshave been aimed at the police, army, and GuardiaCivil The latter is a Spanish paramilitary civilguard whose presence in the Basque region isdeeply resented, and whose visibility is a sourceof tension and violence. The ETAs primary po-litical support comes from the Herri Batasunapolitical party.

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With the arrival of democracy in Spain, theBasques became more involved in national af-fairs and more interested in protecting their in-terests peacefully. In early 1989 the ETA agreedto a cease-fire and peace talks with the Spanishgovernment, talks that ended when each sideaccused the other of reneging on previouslyagreed-to promises. Violence then resumed, withthe ETA claiming responsibility for bombing arail line. The Basque community moved towardgreater internal political cohesion in 1992 as theBasque National party, the dominant party inthe Basque region, and the Herri Batasuna partybegan talks to operate for a common goal. Alsoin 1992, Spanish concern over possible Basqueterrorism increased due to the World's Fairscheduled for Seville and the Summer Olym-pics scheduled for Barcelona. Crackdowns onBasques in France, long thought to be a shelterfor ETA leaders, resulted in a number of arrests.The conflict took on a wider international scopewhen alleged ETA members in Uruguay werearrested and faced deportation.

While some terrorist activity has been at-tributed to the ETA in France, the attacks havebeen designed mainly to capture the attentionof the Spanish government. It has long beenbelieved by Spanish authorities that the ETAregards the French Basque region as a safe ha-ven, out of the reach of troops stationed alongthe border. In 1987, France and Spain signed anantiterrorism agreement that has served to in-crease the number of arrests of members of theETA, such as those in France noted above. Atthe present time, there are indications that amore moderate view dominates the Basque com-munity, while both the Spanish and French gov-ernments remain inflexible as regards the issueof Basque autonomy.

Heiberg, Marianne. (1989) The Making of theBasque Nation.

Ott, Sandra. (1981) The Circle of Mountains: ABasque Shepherding Community.

Wieviorka, Michel. (1993) The Making of Ter-rorism. Translated by David G. White.

Zulaika, Joseba. (1988) Basque Violence: Meta-phor and Sacrament.

BOAT PEOPLE

Douglass, William A. (1975) Echalar andMurelaga: Opportunity and Rural Exodus inTwo Spanish Basque Villages.

A term used since 1978for refugees from South-east Asia, primarily

Vietnam, boat people refers to emigrants who fledby boat (and land) to seek asylum in other na-tions, mainly the British Territory of HongKong, but also in Thailand, Malaysia, Indone-sia, and the Philippines.

The large-scale emigration from Vietnamfollowing the Vietnam War began with some200,000 people leaving between 1975 and 1977,with many settling in the United States. Thisinitial wave of Vietnamese was composed of in-dividuals linked to the United States and thedefeated South Vietnamese government, andtherefore tended to be better educated, havemore wealth, and were more likely to be Chris-tian than the Vietnamese who fled in later years.Their adjustment to the nations in which theysettled, such as the United States, Canada, Nor-way, New Zealand, France, and Australia, tendedto be smoother than those who left in subse-quent years.

The exodus of the boat people began in 1978when about 85,000 people, mostly from ruralareas, left Vietnam to seek refuge in Indonesia,Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines, and HongKong, from where they hoped to immigrate toother nations. Many of those who fled Vietnamdid so in unseaworthy crafts, and even those thatwere seaworthy were subject to attack by pirates,

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a presence on these seas for centuries. Between1978 and 1993, about 800,000 people were re-settled in nations of second asylum where theyexpected to stay permanently. Up until 1988,most of these refugees eventually moved on tonations of settlement, with the United Statesadmitting the majority, and significant numbersof Vietnamese also settling in Canada, Austra-lia, France, Germany, Britain, and Norway. It isestimated that only half of those who left ulti-mately reached their destinations in the South-east Asian refugee camps; about 90,000 peopleremain unsettled, approximately 45,000 of themin Hong Kong detention centers.

The boat people population actually is com-posed of two distinct ethnic groups—the Viet-namese and the Chinese who resided inVietnam. In 1978 hostilities broke out betweenVietnam and China; the Vietnamese govern-ment encouraged the Chinese to leave, butcharged them a large exit fee, which forced manyto become boat people. About 280,000 fled tosouthern China and are now permanently settledthere. Others fled to refugee centers in HongKong and elsewhere, and ultimately settled inWestern nations, as did the ethnically Vietnam-ese boat people. As elsewhere in their diaspora,many of the Chinese had been shopkeepers andsmall-business owners in Vietnam, and had as-similated in varying degrees into Vietnamesesociety.

For the ethnic Vietnamese who fled after1978, a variety of factors was responsible for thecontinued large flow of refugees into the 1990s.Among these were dislocations and economichardships caused by the Vietnam War, economicsanctions placed on Vietnam by the UnitedStates and other nations after the war, the diffi-culties for rural peoples in the South in adjust-ing to Communist rule, and the lure of expectinga better life in the West.

Following the Chinese departures in 1979,the number of boat people seeking refuge annu-ally ranged from 20,000 to 75,000 through 1986.

Boatload ofVietnamese refugees off the shoreof Hong Kong, 1989.

More significantly, during this period the num-ber leaving the refugee camps for resettlement(mostly in Western nations) was higher each yearthan the number of new arrivals. Thus, whilethe flow of boat people continued, their totalnumber in refugee centers declined. In 1987,however, the situation reversed, a pattern thatescalated in 1988 with the number of new arriv-als (45,000) nearly double that of those depart-ing for resettlement. From 1988 on, the majorityof asylum-seekers came from what had beenNorth Vietnam prior to unification in 1975;before 1988, asylum-seekers came mainly fromthe former South Vietnam.

Beginning in 1988 the boat people becamean international issue, with questions raisedabout the accuracy of their classification as po-litical refugees, the quality of care in refugee cen-ters, the role of Vietnam in encouraging them

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to leave, and the role and responsibility of theinternational community and the United Na-tions, which had been managing the process andthe refugee centers. Driving this questioning was"compassion fatigue" in both the asylum andsettlement nations, meaning that they were run-ning out of patience, time, and resources to dealwith the increasing refugee flow, especially sincemany suspected that those from North Vietnamwere not political refugees but economic refu-gees fleeing poverty, and as such were not en-titled to asylum and resettlement. In reaction,Hong Kong began efforts in 1988 to determinerefugee status, and in 1989 the internationalcommunity adopted the Comprehensive Plan ofAction (CPA) to end the boat people problem.The CPA is designed to classify asylum-seekersas either political or nonpolitical refugees, toencourage the return of nonpolitical refugees toVietnam, and to deter nonofficial departuresfrom Vietnam.

The CPA program, which used monetarypayments to induce nonpolitical refugees to re-turn to Vietnam (this aspect of the program wasdropped in 1991 because of abuses), and still usesdenial of access to Western nations for resettle-ment, has been effective. Some 36,000 individu-als voluntarily repatriated to Vietnam by 1993,and only 12 asylum-seekers arrived in HongKong in 1993. Various aspects of the programhave been questioned by human rights and refu-gee advocates. First, it is exceedingly difficult todetermine whether or not a person is a politicalrefugee, making it easy for officials wishing toreturn asylum-seekers to classify them asnonrefugees. Second, the living conditions inmost, if not all, refugee centers have been rou-tinely described as horrendous and inhumane,leading some to believe that such conditions maybe evidence of a policy of "humane deterrence"meant to encourage refugees to return home.Third, in 1989 and again in 1991 following arepatriation agreement between Britain andVietnam, Hong Kong actively engaged in in-

voluntary repatriation, a practice that puts po-litical refugees at risk of persecution, imprison-ment, or death on return to their homeland.Fourth, despite reassurances from the U.N.,which monitors and manages the program, someadvocates question the quality of life affordedreturnees in Vietnam. For the international com-munity, the goal remains the same—an end tothe boat people problem—meaning the place-ment of all 90,000 boat people still in refugeecenters (half in Hong Kong) and an end of theflow of refugees from Vietnam, which seems tohave occurred in 1993. In February 1994 theVietnam exodus was declared officially over bythe U.N., and Vietnamese refugees in the fu-ture will not be granted special status but will betreated like other refugees seeking asylum in thecountry where they arrive. As for refugees settledin Western nations, their experience has beenmixed, although it seems that over time the qual-ity of their lives has improved.

Del Mundo, Fernando. (1993) "VietnameseReturnees Find New Hope in the Future."Refugees 92: 34-36.

Donnelly, Nancy D. (1992) "The ImpossibleSituation of Vietnamese in Hong Kong's De-tention Centers." In Selected Papers on Refu-gee Issues, edited by Pamela A. DeVoe,120-132.

Gold, Stephen}. (1992) Refugee Communities.

Grimes, Seamus. (1993) "Residential Segrega-tion in Australian Cities: A Literature Re-view." International Migration Review 27:103-120.

Hauff, Edvard, and Per Vaglum. (1993) "Inte-gration of Vietnamese Refugees into theNorwegian Labor Market: The Impact ofWar Trauma." International Migration Re-view 27: 388-405.

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Knudsen, John Chr. (1992) "To Destroy You IsNo Loss/" In Selected Papers on Refugee Is-sues, edited by Pamela A. DeVoe, 133-144.

BODO IN INDIAThe Bodo are a tribalpeople located in theCachar district of the

northeastern Indian state of Assam and also inNagaland State. Assam is bordered on three sidesby China, Myanmar, and Bangladesh, and isconnected to the rest of India by a narrow landcorridor. The state of Assam, though named forwhat was once the dominant ethnic group—theAssamese—is now home to a mix of ethnicgroups and the scene of considerable ethnic con-flict. The Bodo are predominantly Hindu culti-vators of rice who account for approximately 10to 15 percent of the state's 23 million people.The area most heavily populated by the Bodo isnorth of the Brahmaputra River, although theystill only account for, at most, 40 percent of thepopulation in northern Assam. The whole stateis rich in oil, tea, timber, and jute, but it is thenorthern tea-growing regions of Tezpur,Darrang, Goalpara, and Kokrajhar that have suf-fered from the violent destruction of bridges, rail-roads, roads, schools, stores, and homes in anotherof India's many indigenous rights conflicts.

The Bodo began their campaign for an in-dependent state within India in 1988, citing eco-nomic and social neglect by the state governmentand the nontribal Assamese. Their desire for aseparate homeland has manifested itself in theform of a guerrilla war led by young militantsdrawn largely from the All Bodo StudentsUnion. Indian paramilitary groups have beendispatched to the region in an effort to containthe violence and destruction. The Bodo rebel-lion has concentrated its efforts on controllingthe region's supplies and halting the transporta-tion of tea, the major export of the state of

Assam. Bodo extremists have called for totalshutdowns of all economic activity to protestneglect by the government in response to theirdemands. Those who have not complied withthese demands have been harassed and evenkilled as a result.

It is unlikely that state and central govern-ment will meet these demands from such a smallpopulation, especially to discourage numerousother tribes of the region and elsewhere in Indiafrom seeking separate states as well.

Danda, Dipali G., and Sanchita Ghatak. (1985)The Semsa and Their Habitat. Anthropo-logical Survey of India, Memoir No. 64.Calcutta.

BOSNIANS-The ongoing war in theformer Yugoslavia beganin 1991 with Croatiaand Slovenia declaring

independence from Yugoslavia, and continuesinto 1994. Fighting among the Serbs, BosnianMuslims, and Croats has resulted in over100,000 deaths and has created over 1.7 millionrefugees. The conflict has also added the termethnic cleansing to the lexicon of ethnic relations.

The modern nation of Yugoslavia began in1918 as the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, andSlovenes, with the name changed to Yugoslaviain 1929. Following devastation in World WarII, the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslaviawas formed as a Communist nation under therule of Marshal Tito in 1945. The World WarII experience, in which many Bosnians andCroats supported the Germans while the Serbsresisted and suffered Nazi atrocities, is one fac-tor underlying the current conflict among thesegroups.

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Communist Yugoslavia was composedof the six states of Slovenia, Croatia, Ser-bia, Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, andMacedonia. Following Tito s death in 1980, vari-ous steps were taken to preserve the multiethnicnation, including a presidency that rotated amongthe various ethnic groups and street signs in boththe Latin (for Croats) and Cyrillic (for Serbs) ver-sions of Serbo-Croatian. Still, conflict between theCroats and Serbs continued, and in 1991 bothCroatia and Slovenia declared themselves inde-pendent republics, followed by Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia. The post-1991version of Yugoslavia is composed of only the re-publics of Serbia and Montenegro, and is not rec-ognized as the nation of Yugoslavia by the entireinternational community.

Serbs were the largest of the ethnic groupsthat formed the former Yugoslavia. In 1990 therewere an estimated 8.5 million Serbs in Yugosla-via; the overwhelming majority are now foundin Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Serbia is lo-cated in the Balkans and is bounded by Hun-gary to the north, Romania and Bulgaria on theeast, Albania and Macedonia on the south, andthe former Yugoslav republics of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia on the west. Due tothe conflict between the Croats and the BosnianMuslims, the borders of Serbia have been ex-panded greatly from what they were during thedays of the Yugoslavian nation. Whether theseborders become permanent is dependent on theoutcome of ongoing hostilities with theBosnians. Serbia also encompasses the formerly

Serbians fleeing the Republic of Krajina folio wing Croatian attack, February 1993.

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autonomous provinces of Kosovo-Metohija, thehome of about 2 million Albanians, with theSerbs a minority in the province (10-15 percentof the population), and Vojvodina, with a largethough minority population of Hungarians.

Slavic peoples began entering the Balkanregion between the fifth and seventh centuries.They encountered the Illyrians, already settledon the plains, whom they displaced into thehighlands. The Illyrians were subsequently re-ferred to as Vlachs, and eventually reemerged asa distinct though separate group within Slavicsociety. From the ninth century, the Slavs weresubject to outside pressures from the Germans,Hungarians, Austrians, and the Byzantine Em-pire, all of which influenced migration and settle-ment patterns throughout the region. Beginningas early as the thirteenth century, the region cameunder Ottoman influence, which eventuallycaused many Slavs to flee into the highlands andeast, and others, such as large numbers of Alba-nians and Bosnians near the coast, to convertfrom Christianity to Islam. The conversion ofBosnians to Islam is another factor in the cur-rent conflict between the Serbs and Bosnians.The Serbs, who fought against the OttomanEmpire and were forced to flee, see the Bosniansas collaborators who benefited economically andpolitically by converting to Islam. The decay ofthe Ottoman Empire, beginning by 1800, al-lowed the Slavs to migrate back into the low-lands and reestablish settlements there.

Serbs moved into the region now known asSerbia about A.D. 500-600 and had establisheda Serbian polity by the ninth century. In the four-teenth century the region was conquered by theOttoman Empire, and many Serbs fled west tothe Alps. After a series of revolts, Ottoman con-trol ended, and in 1830 Turkey recognized Serbiaas an autonomous unit. In 1882 it became anautonomous state; in 1918 it was joined withCroatia and Slovenia, and after World War IIincorporated into Yugoslavia. Serbia was a largelyrural, agricultural region, but since World War

II the population has become mainly urban, andwage-earning has become a major source of in-come for most families. Serbs speak a dialect ofSerbo-Croatian, which they write in the SerbianCyrillic script. Most Serbs are Eastern Ortho-dox Christian.

In the former Yugoslavia, Croats (also calledCroatians) numbered about 4.5 million, withabout 3.5 million in Croatia. The others, wholived in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, andSlovenia, have now fled those regions due to theongoing war. The Croats live mainly in ruralareas, although in southern Croatia the major-ity live in cities. The Croats emerged as a dis-tinct ethnic group in the seventh century, andafter centuries of self-rule became linked withHungary in the twelfth century. They were thenunder Austrian (Hapsburg) and Ottoman rule,and a part of the Austro-Hungary Empire. Af-ter World War I, they joined with Serbia andSlovenia to form the predecessor of the modernYugoslavia, and following World War II becameone of Yugoslavia's six states. In 1991 Croatiabecame an independent nation. Croatians aremainly Roman Catholic.

Bosnians, or Bosnian Muslims, numberedabout 1.8 million in the Bosnia-Herzegovinastate of the former Yugoslavia. They constituted44 percent of the state's population, with Serbsaccounting for 31 percent and Croats 17 per-cent. The current population of the republic andthe ethnic distribution are unknown, but the fig-ures are now far different from those of 1990.Bosnian Muslims live primarily in the cities,where they hold many professional and govern-ment positions. Although called "Turks" by someSerbs, Bosnian Muslims are ethnically Serbs.They converted to Islam under Ottoman rulebeginning in the fifteenth century. Many of thosewho converted were Bogomils, considered a he-retical sect outside both Catholicism and Or-thodox Christianity. Under Ottoman rule,Bosnian Muslims were freed from paying thetaxes extracted from the Slavic peasants; they

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often lived in or near fortified towns and wereestablished as a merchant class. Bosnian religiouspractice was not repressed under Communistrule, and Islam most closely resembles that prac-ticed in Turkey. It is less rigorous than Islampracticed in the Middle East, with perhaps one-third of Muslims marrying non-Muslims.Bosnians also eschew Islamic fundamentalismand claim that an independent Bosnia would bea secular state with religious freedom guaran-teed for all. As with the Serbs and Croats,Bosnians speak a variant of Serbo-Croatian.

The distinction among the Serbs, Croats,and Bosnians is based on a combination of kin-ship, language, and religion. Bosnians reckondescent bilaterally (through the lines of bothmother and father) and generally count back onlyabout three generations. For Serbs, descent ismore important; they emphasize the father's lineand count as far back as nine generations. Croatsare somewhere in between these two extremes.All three ethnic groups speak Serbo-Croatian,although dialect differences mark the home re-gion of speakers. Finally, religion is the mostvisible marker of ethnic identity, as the threegroups are adherents of different religions, andthe symbols of those religions, such as churchesor mosques, mark the ethnic makeup of differ-ent rural communities or urban neighborhoods.During the war, religious buildings have been afrequent target for the opposing groups.

The war in Croatia began in 1991 follow-ing the 25 June decision by Croatia to secedefrom Yugoslavia and become an independentnation. Preferring that Yugoslavia remain a na-tion composed of its six states and concernedabout the welfare of 600,000 Serbs residing inCroatia, Serbia responded by invading. Thebattle was waged by the Serb-dominatedYugoslav army and local Serb militia against theCroatian state army, with the latter badly over-matched, at least initially. Outside observers sug-gested that, despite evidence of Croat attempts

to ethnically cleanse regions of Serbs, the Serbswere mainly interested in creating a "GreaterSerbia" crafted from Serbia proper and regionsof other republics with large Serb populations.By the end of the year the Croats had halted theSerb advance and had begun to reclaim somelost territory. In January 1992 both sides agreedto a cease-fire and pledged to allow a UnitedNations peacekeeping force to patrol the regionsof greatest conflict. In March a U.N. force of1,500 entered the region to patrol mainly Serb-held areas called U.N. Protected Areas, and whilehostilities largely ceased, ethnic cleansing by bothsides continued by means of the forced expul-sion of entire communities. In January 1994Serbia and Croatia entered into agreements thatfor all practical purposes established Croatia asa separate nation and called for the establish-ment of formal relations between the two na-tions. The agreement also created hope that theprotracted conflict between Croats and Serbnationalists in western Croatia might soon end,as Serb support for the nationalists was clearlyweakening.

All told, the Serb-Croat war produced morethan 10,000 deaths, left over 13,000 people un-accounted for, and drove nearly 700,000 Croatsfrom their homes. About half are now refugeesin other former Yugoslav republics and Euro-pean nations including Germany, Hungary, andSwitzerland, while the remainder are internallydisplaced in Croatia. Peace between Croatia andSerbia will likely lead to the return of many refu-gees and the permanent resettlement of inter-nally displaced peoples, mainly Croats inCroatia.

The ongoing war in Bosnia-Herzegovinabegan in 1992 as a Serbian reaction to a Bosniandesire for independence. The exact motivationfor the attack by the Bosnian Serb forces andthe Serb-dominated Yugoslav National Army isnot clear. Some view the assault as motivated bya Serbian desire to be the majority ethnic group

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in the region. Others see it as a Serbian land-grab against a weaker neighbor, and still otherssee it as a Serbian effort to prevent the estab-lishment of an Islamic state in the Balkans. Oldanimosities between the groups also play a rolein the conflict, and perhaps are a factor in theextreme nature of the violence and the numberof civilian victims. The Bosnia war began with aSerbian invasion of eastern and northern Bosnia,and the killing and driving out of Bosnian Mus-lims and Croats. The Serbs used a combinationof artillery attacks on civilians, torture, massa-cres, mass rapes, forced detention, expulsions,burnings, and looting in a campaign of ethniccleansing designed to leave the regions inhab-ited only by Serbs. In some places Serbs werethe dominant population; in others, a minority.For their part, the Croats attacked westernBosnia in an effort to drive out Serbs andBosnians and to create a purely Croat zone inBosnia. As of January 1994, with the war con-tinuing, over 100,000 people have been killed;over 60,000 are missing; 1.1 million fled the re-gion and are now refugees, mainly in the otherformer Yugoslav republics; and 740,000 are dis-placed within Bosnia. What was Bosnia-Herzegovina is now divided among the Serbs,Croats, and Bosnians. The Serbs control two-thirds of the region. The Croats control a smallnorth-south strip along the southwestern bor-der with the region of Croatia on the AdriaticSea. Bosnia controls a strip running through thecenter of the region from west to east and thennorth, to the northwest corner bordering Croatiaand Serbia, as well as enclaves in Serb-controlledeastern Bosnia. A number of cities in Bosnia-held territories such asTuzia, Sarajevo, Gorazde,Zepa, and Srebrenica are designated as safe ar-eas by the U.N. As of January 1994 a better or-ganized Bosnian army was making inroadsagainst Serb-held towns and cities, and by mid-year, signs of a Bosnian-Croatian alliance wereemerging.

Efforts by the international community toend the fighting, despite charges against all threegroups of a general lack of concern for the rightsand lives of civilians, have been limited and in-effectual. For the most part, the European com-munity and the U.N. have attempted to providehumanitarian aid through convoys, airlifts, andrefugee-assistance programs; have tried to limitthe dispersal of refugees to other areas of theformer Yugoslavia; and have threatened varioussanctions as well as the use of ground troops andair strikes. Peacemaking efforts were hinderedby disagreements about strategy and tacticsamong European nations and the United States.Negotiations backed by the U.N. and EuropeanCommunity have accomplished little, and nu-merous cease-fires have been openly violated bythe Serbs. Economic sanctions imposed by theU.N. on Serbia and Montenegro, the banningof flights over Bosnia, an arms embargo, andefforts to inspect detention camps have donelittle to deter the Serbs.

The Serbs see themselves as the victims of aWestern anti-Serbian campaign, and defendtheir actions on the grounds that they were com-pelled to act to save 1.5 million Serbs strandedin the newly independent nations of Slovenia,Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina. As regardsCroatia, there is evidence that efforts were madeto remove Serbs from the region. Serbs are alsoperplexed by their belief that other nations seemto have forgotten that they resisted the Nazis,and suffered for their actions, while the Croatsaided the Nazis. Most observers now expect thatany resolution will be on Serbian terms and willresult in the partition of Bosnia into Serb, Croat,and Bosnian Muslim zones. So far, the Bosnianshave resisted Serbian and Croatian offers ofpeace based on a partitioned Bosnia and theEuropean Community's desire for a similar re-sult. In January 1994, as part of a peace agree-ment between Serbia and Croatia, the leadersof the Serb and Croat regions of Bosnia also

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entered into an agreement that called for theestablishment of diplomatic relations betweenthe two de facto regions. This development isexpected to put more pressure on the BosnianMuslims to accept a partitioned Bosnia.

Balkan War Report. (1992-) Bulletin of the In-stitute for War & Peace Reporting.

Erlich, Vera S. (1966) Family in Transition.

Halpern, Joel M., and Barbara Kerewsky-Halpern. (1986) A Serbian Village in Histori-cal Perspective.

Hammel, Eugene A. (1993) "Demography andthe Origins of the Yugoslav Civil War." An-thropology Today 9: 4-9.

Lockwood, William G. (1975) European Mos-lems: Economy and Ethnicity in Western Bosnia.

Magas, Branka. (1993) The Destruction of Yugo-slavia: Tracking Yugoslavia's Break-Up 1980—1992.

Sekelj, Laslo. (1993) Yugoslavia: The Process ofDisintegration. Translated from Serbo-Croatian by Vera Vukelic.

U.S. Committee for Refugees. (1993) WorldRefugee Survey.

32 B

CASTECaste refers to two dif-ferent but related formsof human social organi-

zation. First, it pertains to the rigid hierarchicalsystem of social organization of South Asia. Sec-ond, it means a particular type of social group ina multiethnic society.

Caste GroupsGroups classified as caste groups, such asAfrican-Americans in the United States,Gypsies and Jews in Europe and elsewhere,and Burakumin (formerly called eta) in Japan,are so defined because membership in the groupis determined by birth and is for life, marriageis restricted to other members of the group,the groups have a clear rank within the society'shierarchy, and the group is stigmatized—con-sidered morally inferior, ritually impure, orgenetically inferior—and therefore discriminatedagainst.

For example, traditional Amhara society inEthiopia was hierarchically organized into anumber of strata. At the top were the emperor,wealthy landowners, and the clergy; below them

were various categories of merchants, farmers,and craftsmen; lower still were the castelikeblacksmiths, potters, and tanners; and at thebottom were the freed slaves, considered beneathor outside the hierarchy. Castelike groups suchas the Beta Israel (blacksmiths) and Cushites(tanners) lived in separate communities, wererestricted to only economic relations with theAmhara, and were allowed to marry onlywithin their social category. Similarly, the Shluhin Morocco had three social classes and threecastes: (1) aristocracy, (2) religious classes suchas descendants of Muhammed, (3) commoners,(4) mixed-ancestry peoples who were mainlyblacksmiths and artisans, (5) Jews, and (6) slaves.The last three categories fit the definition of castegroups. Experts are not in complete agreementas to the appropriateness of the use of the casteconcept in this way as a label for distinct groupsas opposed to a caste system, and, in fact, castegroups are really outcaste groups and thereforeoutside the system, not part of it. That is, theyare considered to be impure and are outside thehierarchical social structure of the societies inwhich they are found. Still, the notion of castegroup tends to distinguish groups who livealmost completely outside society from otherminority groups whose exclusion is less extreme.

Caste in South AsiaThe term caste is from the Portuguese casta, andwas used by Portuguese explorers in reference tothe system of social organization—now com-monly known as the caste system—they foundupon their arrival in India in the fifteenth cen-tury. Although the caste system in South Asia iswell described and its dynamics generally un-derstood, it is often difficult for outsiders to fullycomprehend the nature, dynamics, and perva-siveness of the caste system among Hindus inSouth Asia. Part of the difficulty is that, in termsof daily life, the term caste actually refers to threedifferent indigenous concepts generally used bythe people of Hindu India and South Asia.

33

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CASTE

First, it refers to the several-thousand-year-old overarching varna system, in which all indi-viduals and groups in Hindu society are classifiedinto four ranked categories:

Brahman The highest caste category orvarna and the highest caste group in anylocale. The Brahmans were traditionallypriests and served in that role for their vil-lage, or more commonly for specific fami-lies within the village. Brahmans are alsoteachers, government workers, and land-owners. In recent times, many Brahmanshave moved to the cities and entered pro-fessions while continuing to control land asabsentee landowners. The Brahmans' highstatus derives from their ritual purity, asevidenced by most being vegetarians, theirability to read Sanskrit, and their knowledgeof Hindu ritual. There are hundreds ofBrahman castes in South Asia and South-east Asia.

Kshatriya The second highest caste cat-egory, located mainly in northern India;many of the castes within this varna claimdescent from warrior castes of the past.Kshatriyas eat meat (but not beef), and weretraditionally defenders of the caste systemand the supremacy of the Brahmans. Today,they are primarily landowners and profes-sionals.

Vaisya The third-ranked caste category,composed of a large number of castes, manytraditionally engaged in trading, farming,and moneylending in northern India, wherethey are a key element in the village econo-mies of the region.

Sudra The lowest of the four caste catego-ries, composed of hundreds of castesthroughout India. Traditionally they aresmall-scale farmers, although in the citiesthey may be found in all occupations. Thoseoriginally classified as Sudras several thou-sand years ago may have been aboriginal

peoples of darker skin color than the Indo-Aryan settlers who formed the three highervarna.

A fifth caste (actually an outcaste) category,although not considered as such in the originalvarna system, is the Untouchables (also knownas Panchamas, Pariahs, Harijans, Adi-Dravida,and since 1949 as the Scheduled Castes). Un-touchables are those castes who rank below theSudra varna. Both the number of Untouchablecastes and former Untouchables (this categoryand discriminatory practices directed at its mem-bers are now illegal in India) is unknown, al-though they may number some 200 millionindividuals in South Asia.

While the caste system in general, and thevarna categorization in particular, is associatedwith Hindu India, the social organization ofnon-Hindu groups in South Asia such as Mus-lims, Jains, and Jews is also characterized by anoverarching caste structure. For example, whileIslam has no caste structure and such a structureis absent in Islamic groups outside South Asia,in Pakistan's Islamic society there are fourcastelike categories. At the top are groups thattrace their ancestry to the Middle East—theSayyid, Shaikh, Mughal, and Pathan. Secondin rank are the Muslim Rajputs; third is a col-lection of occupational castes; and fourth, thesweepers, roughly the equivalent of Hindu Un-touchables.

The second indigenous use of the term casteis in reference tojati. Jati are hereditary occupa-tional castes or clusters of castes who tradition-ally performed specific tasks within the villageor region. There are several thousand^// in In-dia, and many are still so identified, althoughthey no longer perform the traditional occupa-tion. Eachy^//, of course, is classified in one ofthe five varna. Traditionally, at the village level,and to some extent at the regional level, \hzjatiswere linked through thejajmani system. In thejajmani system, occupational castes or families

34 e

CASTE

within castes provided services for other castesor families. Traditionally, the caste was paidthrough reciprocal service or with food, althoughmore recently, financial payments have becomethe norm. For example, in one northern Indianvillage there are 12 castes and outcastes. TheKhati (carpenter) caste repairs agricultural toolsfor the Brahman (priest), Baniya (trader), Nai(barber), and Jat (farmer) castes, and receivesservices from seven other castes. In addition tothis structured economic relationship, thejajmani system also contains many social rulesthat reinforce the hierarchical nature of the castesystem by restricting contact between higher andlower ranked castes. The strict rules of endoga-mous marriage and caste membership for lifethrough birth ensure the vitality of the system.The jajmani system has persisted for hundredsof years, or even longer in many villages; in somevillages it is the primary mechanism of socialand economic cohesion. Some observers see thejajmani system as an efficient and effective formof local social and economic organization; oth-ers find it an oppressive form of organizationthat benefits the higher castes and exploits thelower ones, especially the Untouchables.

The third indigenous use of the term casteis in reference to gotra, kinship groups within ajati who marry members of other gotra withinthe samey'tfri and who may live in the same vil-lage or region and own property jointly.

Basis of the Caste SystemThe Hindu caste system is intimately tied to theHindu beliefs of karma and dharma. Anindividual's caste position is determined by hisor her karma (behavior in a previous life). Anindividual's future caste position is determinedby his or her dharma (behavior in the currentlife). Thus, acting as prescribed by caste status isthe only way an individual can achieve a highercaste rank in the next life. Relations among castesand individuals are governed by the notions ofritual purity, pollution, and obligatory service.

The caste hierarchy is based on the degree ofpurity exhibited by each varna and is maintainedby rules that prohibit contact by lower (less pure)castes that would pollute the higher caste. Inaddition, higher castes do not engage in workthat is considered to be polluting to that caste,such as leather-working. As suggested by thejajmani system at the village level, the obliga-tions involved in giving and receiving servicesare a key component of the caste system andserve to make it an economic as well as a socialsystem.

At a more concrete level, the survival of thecaste system has rested on five basic practices:

1. Marriage within the caste

2. Eating and drinking only with members ofthe same or equal castes

3. Membership for life in the caste of one'sbirth

4. Occupational specialization, with each casteengaged in only one occupation

5. Hierarchical arrangement on the basis of theconcepts of pollution and purity

While membership in a caste is for anindividual's entire life, meaning that no indi-vidual can enter a higher caste, castes themselvescan move into a higher varna category. For ex-ample, a caste could take on a ritually purer oc-cupation. A second and more common way is toemulate the behavior of a higher caste—by us-ing Sanskrit in prayer, retaining Brahman priests,adopting a vegetarian diet, and other purer ritualbehaviors. This process, widespread throughoutIndia, is known as Sanskritization.

Changes in the Caste SystemOver its several-thousand-year history, the castesystem in South Asia has undergone a numberof changes. The bases of the different varna clas-sifications changed at various times; the rulesgoverning the behavior of the varna also changedand underwent reinterpretation by religious

35C

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Untouchables in India traditionally performed rituallypolluting tasks such as shoe-making and repair.

leaders and scholars. The number and types ofjati have also varied as occupations became moreor less important, and as new ones appeared andold ones disappeared. Under British rule, cer-tain varna such as the Brahmans enjoyed spe-cial status because their history of literacy andscholarship made them ideal choices for employ-ment in government service. Additionally, theBritish empowered some lower ranking y^/f insome regions by allowing them to vote, whichin turn created caste associations who could actas voting blocs.

Both before and following independence in1948, there has been increased concern aboutthe fate of the Untouchables in the caste sys-tem. The Indian Constitution of 1949 banneddiscrimination against Untouchables and led tothe development of various affirmative-action

programs to benefit the Untouchables, now of-ficially called Scheduled Castes, and other poorand disadvantaged groups such as the Sched-uled Tribes. Official lists of these groups definedthem and made their members eligible for spe-cial aid and education programs.

Today, the majority of Indians still live inrural villages. Although outcastes are protectedby law, at the local level they are still mostly land-less field laborers who are considered to be ritu-ally polluted and therefore banned from usingpublic wells or entering Hindu temples. In theserural communities the now dominant castes areoften mid-level castes who increased their wealthand political power through government landreforms, agricultural support, and economic andpolitical opportunities created by the migrationof high-caste landowners to the cities. At thesame time, in some locales Scheduled Casteswith many members have emerged as powerfulvoting blocs who can effectively challenge thelandowners in elections, a source of conflict andviolence in some communities. The Sudra castesalso see the Scheduled Castes as a threat to theirinterests because of the advantages that accrueto the latter from affirmative-action programs,and are now demanding equal treatment forthemselves.

See also ANTI-SEMITISM; APARTHEID; MIXED-ANCESTRY PEOPLES; RACE AND RACISM.

Berreman, Gerald D. (1979) Caste and OtherInequities: Essays on Inequality.

Brass, Paul R. (1983) Caste, Faction and Party inIndian Politics: Faction and Party. Volume 1.

. (1985) Caste, Faction and Party in In-dian Politics: Election Studies. Volume 2.

de Reuck, Anthony, and Julie Knight, eds. (1967)Caste and Race.

De Vos, George, and Hiroshi Wagatsuma, eds.(1966) Japans Invisible Race.

36 e

CATALANS IN SPAIN

Dumont, Louis. (1970) Homo Hierarchicus.

Hockings, Paul, ed. (1992) The Encyclopediaof World Cultures, Volume 3y South Asia.(See articles on Brahman; Castes, Hindu;Kshatriya; Muslim; Sudra; Untouchables;Vaisya; Appendix).

Kolenda, Pauline. (1978) Caste in ContemporaryIndia: Beyond Organic Solidarity.

Lagace, Robert O., ed. (1977) Sixty Cultures.

Lewis, Oscar. (1965) Village Life in NorthernIndia.

Mandelbaum, David G. (1970) Society in India.2 vols.

Myrdal, Gunnar. (19(44) An American Dilemma.

van den Berghe, Pierre L. (1981) The EthnicPhenomenon.

CATALANSIN SPAIN

In 1993 the populationof Spain was estimatedat 39.1 million. Of thatnumber, approximately

28 percent are Catalan, with Catalans also form-ing about 1 percent of the population of France.As are Spaniards generally, Catalans are almostall Roman Catholics. Although Catalans areknown in the popular press as residents of theSpanish region of Catalonia, the area known asPaisos Catalans (Catalan countries) is actuallymuch larger and includes three regions in Spain,eight provinces, one French department, and theindependent state of Andorra. It covers 69,032square kilometers bordering northeastern Spainand southeastern France.

Contemporary Catalans can trace their pres-ence in the region to at least A.D. 700. Cataloniabecame an independent kingdom in the eighthcentury and united with Aragon in the twelfthcentury to form the Aragon-Catalon Empire,which remained a major power in the western

Mediterranean region into the fifteenth century.In 1469 the marriage of Ferdinand and Isabellaunited Aragon-Catalonia with the western re-gions of Castile and Leon, forming the core ofthe modern Spanish nation. Economic and po-litical power then shifted to the western prov-inces; those in the east, such as Catalonia, foughtto maintain their cultural and political autonomy.Revolts in the seventeenth and eighteenth cen-turies were suppressed by the centralized gov-ernment. At the same time, many of the regionsof Spain that had previously been independentpolitical entities, such as Catalonia, retainedsome political autonomy—at least until the lateeighteenth and nineteenth centuries, whenSpain's separate administrative structures weredivided into centrally controlled provinces.Catalonia was partitioned into the provinces ofBarcelona, Gerona, Lerida, and Tarragona, andeach province reported primarily to Madridrather than to one another, weakening regionalties. Despite this political breakup, the nationalidentity of Catalans has survived in large partbecause of their efforts to preserve Catalan lan-guage and culture.

Economically, Catalonia has been one of theleading regions in Spain since the eighteenthcentury. Not only was Catalonia one of the firstregions to industrialize, it remains a leading con-tributor to Spain's economy. Although the so-cial classes in Catalan society may have differedon certain local issues, they usually coalesced intheir belief that the central government was notgiving back to Catalonia nearly as much as itwas receiving. Indeed, the central governmentseemed to concentrate on more backward areasof Spain. As a result, political parties in Cataloniatended to concentrate more of their efforts onlocal concerns rather than national issues.Madrid began to view these parties and localpolitical organizations as a threat to central con-trol, rather than as a mechanism for dealing withlocal issues for which the central governmenthad neither time nor interest. Catalans have a

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CATALANS IN SPAIN

tradition of relying on local political organiza-tions and authorities rather than the central gov-ernment, and they tend to accomplish more inthis manner than other regions of Spain wholack strong, local organization.

Despite such organizational success,Catalans were overlooked when it came to posi-tions in central government institutions. Thislack of satisfactory representation in Madrid ledto increased frustration with the central govern-ment. Positions in central public institutionstended to be filled by people from the less de-veloped areas of Spain. Since Catalonia was ofsuch economic importance to Spain, any real orperceived threat of straying from the central gov-ernment resulted in increased central control todiscourage separatist movements. Only whenDictatorship was revoked and the Republic wasdeclared in 1931 was Catalonia s autonomousgovernment, "Generalidad," given substantialrecognition from Madrid. However, this onlylasted until the end of the civil war and the be-ginning of Franco's dictatorial regime. Havingreceived autonomy from the Republic, Catalonianaturally took that side in the civil war.

Catalonia suffered under Franco's rule. Allautonomous political institutions were abolishedand any opposition groups were outlawed. Lead-ers of all local political organizations were ex-ecuted or exiled, and replaced by pro-Francosupporters. Throughout Franco s entire regime,only a few conservative Catalan politicians heldsignificant political posts. Perhaps more dam-aging was Franco s official policy of cultural re-pression. The regions language, folklore, andpolitical traditions were attacked relentlessly. TheCatalan language was outlawed anywhere out-side the home, including in church. This policywas enforced most strictly in schools, whereteaching the language was not permitted. Thestudy of Catalan culture and history was bannedin universities, and even local folk music was notallowed. Immigration to the Catalan region alsoincreased dramatically until less than half the

working class was originally from Catalonia.Certainly, the ominous presence of Franco s para-military Guardia Civil added to the air of op-pression and fear. Catalonian boycotts and strikesin the 1950s were not taken lightly by theGuardia Civil, and harsh police activity tendedto follow relatively peaceful demonstrations byCatalans. Opposition was not tolerated.

Substantial relief from such oppression wasnot achieved until Franco's death in 1975, atwhich point Juan Carlos was sworn in as kingand presided over the dissolution of Franco'sinstitutions in a relatively smooth transition toliberal democracy. Pressure from Catalonia, aswell as the Basque region, for major structuralchange heightened the already potentially ex-plosive situation.

Unlike the Basque region, pro-regionalsentiment in Catalonia had never shown itselfin a widespread movement for complete inde-pendence. Since the late 1970s, Catalonia's 17autonomous states have again been recognizedby the central government, and local institutionshave attempted to rebuild Catalonia's nationalidentity. Catalan is again the main language ofschools and government. Today, the situation inCatalonia has improved dramatically since theyears of Franco's dictatorship. But Catalans stillremember that their frustrations only intensi-fied under Franco; they did not originate withhim. While Catalonia has never called for inde-pendence, they seek greater political autonomyin which the region's own history, identity, andinstitutions would be recognized within theSpanish state. One major means of cultural au-tonomy is the teaching and use of the Catalanlanguage rather than Spanish. The populationis about evenly split between Catalan and Span-ish speakers, with some being bilingual. At theSummer Olympics, Catalans asked that Catalanbe treated as an official language along withSpanish and English. In some towns and cities,instruction is being offered in Catalan ratherthan Spanish. This policy is resisted by those

38 v

CATHOLICS AND PROTESTANTS IN NORTHERN IRELAND

who believe that Spanish will better serve theirchildren in a nation and world where Spanish isa far more widely spoken language.

Hansen, Edward. (1977) Rural Catalonia underthe Franco Regime: The Fate of Rural Culturesince the Spanish Civil War.

McDonogh, Gary. (1986) Good Families ofBarcelona: A Social History of Power in the Co-lonial Era.

Medhurst, Kenneth. (1982) The Basques andCatalans.

Woolard, Kathryn. (1989) Double Talk: Bilin-gualism and the Politics of Ethnicity inCatalonia.

minority as regards equal opportunity inemployment and housing. The conflict is alsocharacterized by considerable ethnocentrismand stereotyping, with a long history of theEnglish defining the Irish as socially inferior.The ongoing conflict over Northern Irish inde-pendence from Britain and linkage with Irelandinvolves a mix of issues including the last ves-tiges of British colonialism; irredentist desiresby the Northern Irish Catholics, the Irish in Ire-land, and overseas Irish communities; issues ofminority rights; and social-class conflict. Tosome extent, Northern Ireland is divided alongreligious lines, with Protestants and Catholicstending to associate primarily with others oftheir own religion. However, this bifurcation ofNorthern Irish society is more extreme in ur-ban than rural settlements.

In 1920 the British Parliament passed theGovernment of Ireland Act, which legislatedpartition of Ireland, forming what is now knownas the Republic of Ireland and leaving NorthernIreland as a province under British rule. Thisreflected centuries of British control and civilunrest in a geographically united Ireland. Dur-ing the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries,compensation was given to British soldiers inthe form of large plots of Irish land. By the nine-teenth century, 80 percent of the land in a pre-dominantly Catholic Ireland was controlled bythe Protestant British elite (known as the As-cendancy), who accounted for less than 10 per-cent of the population. The British governmentlater concentrated its colonization efforts in Ul-ster, the northeastern province, in an attempt todismantle the strongly Catholic Gaelic culture.This effort succeeded only in Ulster, and wasdue to the large number of Protestant Scots whoemigrated to the area. The resulting hostility hashad negative effects for all involved. For example,during the course of industrialization in Ulster,it would perhaps have been beneficial to theProtestant working class to support the reformsdemanded by the Catholic population of Ireland.

39V

The last remaining sec-tion of Ireland that isunder British rule,Northern Ireland com-prises six of the ninecounties of Ulster:

Antrim, Armagh, Down, Fermanagh,Londonderry, and Tyrone. In 1993 the censuspopulation totaled 1.57 million for the 5,463-square-mile area. The majority of the popula-tion occupies the eastern portion of the province;the western half remains largely undeveloped.The populace is divided into two major religiousgroups: Roman Catholics (34.9 percent) andProtestants (58.2 percent), the overwhelmingmajority of which are Presbyterian. Cross-cut-ting religious affiliation are ties to Ireland or Brit-ain, with the majority of Catholics seeingthemselves as Irish and the majority of Protes-tants seeing themselves as British. In additionto religion and national allegiance, the groupsare also divided economically. The Catholics per-ceive themselves as a discriminated-against

RBHtHltHHSHIBBHnHwSHB•BJBBBBIBBBI

ilaBBSli

CATHOLICS AND PROTESTANTS IN NORTHERN IRELAND

The working classes of both religious affiliationssuffered much the same problems as a result ofBritish rule. But the religious fervor of the eraprevented most Protestants from becoming sym-pathetic to the Catholic demands for change,and kept them loyal to the British government.As a result, working-class Protestants were littleinclined to fight for economic reforms that infact would have served their own interests. Sev-eral minimal concessions to the Catholic demandfor Home Rule served only to escalate tensionsbetween Catholics and Protestants, promptingthe appearance of such militant groups as theUlster Volunteer Force and the Irish Republi-can Army (IRA). By the early twentieth cen-tury, after continuous failure on the part of theBritish government to implement any effectivereforms, and in reaction to the growing threatof civil war, a compromise was reached in theform of the Government of Ireland Act, whichestablished the Republic of Ireland and keptBritish sovereignty over the six counties of Ulster.

Although Northern Ireland was intended tobe a safely Protestant state, the large minorityof Catholics included in the geographic areaensured that religious and class conflict wouldremain a presence. From its beginning, North-ern Ireland has been plagued with violence.Vigilante groups, essentially formed in theprepartition days, developed into organized mili-tary and political forces with support within Ire-land and among segments of Irish communitiesoverseas, especially in the United States. Re-sponding to the growing violence and to numer-ous requests by the Unionists in NorthernIreland, in September 1920 the British govern-ment organized the Ulster Special Constabu-lary. One branch of the Constabulary, eventuallyknown as the B Specials, became particularlyaccomplished in organizing murderous attackson Catholic communities. These acts of terror-ism, along with continued sectarian rivalry, suc-ceeded not only in keeping Protestants loyal tothe Ulster government but in further stirring up

Catholics, who were rapidly becoming essentiallypowerless. To ensure this continued Protestantloyalty, the British fostered the rivalry and insti-tuted policies favoring the Protestant population,further separating the religious factions of theworking class. As a result, violence increased onboth sides. More than 700 northerners werekilled, and more than 25,000 Catholics fled thecountry.

During the 1960s and 1970s, while theworld witnessed the civil rights movement in theUnited States, a similar movement emerged inNorthern Ireland. Partially enabled by a seriesof reforms implemented to appease the Catho-lic community, these reforms allowed greaterupward socioeconomic mobility for Catholics,particularly in the area of education, and resultedin the growing presence of a Catholic middleclass. However, mass demonstrations by theCatholic community prompted the formation ofProtestant vigilante groups, who viewed theseactions as serious threats. Bombing campaignsby both the Ulster Volunteer Force and the IRAbecame more frequent. The violence escalatedeven more after the British government senttroops to Belfast and Londonderry to control it.

After 50 years of civil strife, the British gov-ernment, with William Whitelaw at the helmas secretary of state for Northern Ireland, re-sumed direct control over Northern Ireland in1972, not short of occupation of major cities bythe British army. Working closely with BrianFaulkner, former prime minister of NorthernIreland under Unionist rule, they gained sup-port for power sharing with the (moderate)Catholics, and were thus able to win promisesfrom both the British government and the Re-public of Ireland of cooperation with northernauthorities. The Republic of Ireland furtheragreed to step up measures against the IRA, whohad turned their terrorism focus outside North-ern Ireland since the 1950s. In 1974 a coalitiongovernment was formed and called the North-ern Executive. Although this coalition was com-

40 <e

CHAKMA IN BANGLADESH

posed of members of both the Protestant andCatholic communities, the number of groupsopposed to this coalition far outweighed thosewho supported it, and the anti-power-sharinggroups eventually brought about the demise ofthe coalition government. At that point, all pro-posed options for a new government with anypolitical viability whatsoever were absolutelyopposed by the Catholic community. The for-mation of the Ulster Defense Association(UDA), recruited mainly from the Protestantworking class, meant the strong possibility ofcivil war in the province. The UDA was un-equivocally opposed to any form of Catholicsupport, from Provisional IRA to moderates.The three major military groups present in theprovince have clashed on several occasions indifferent combinations. British army/IRA,UDA/British army, and the ever-present IRA/UDA conflicts have kept the region at a stand-still and allowed very minimal progress. At thispoint, both the Catholics and the Protestantswould prefer that the British army withdraw, butboth groups have convinced the British govern-ment that a withdrawal of military troops willensure civil war in Northern Ireland. Britishpopular opinion has turned to disgust and areadiness to be rid of the problem. British civil-ians have been victims of IRA terrorism on toomany occasions to sympathize with their plightany longer. Any action by one group seems onlyto trigger an emotional response by another and,at this point, no groups or coalition of groupshave succeeded in implementing a successfulsolution to the problem. The 1990s have seenan increase in IRA terrorism directed at civiliantargets in Northern Ireland and Britain, includ-ing bombings in the cities of London andManchester. The late 1993 development of di-rect talks between the British government andSinn Fein (the political wing of the IRA), andprivate discussions with the IRA itself, havecreated some hope for a peaceful resolution.Out of these talks came a joint declaration

that all parties who renounce violence arewelcome to participate in future negotiations,that Northern Ireland will remain part of Brit-ain so long as its citizens wish it to, and thatIreland might revise its constitution to weakenits claim to Northern Ireland. At the sametime, violence by both the IRA and Protes-tant extremists continues.

Darby, John, ed. (1985) Northern Ireland: TheBackground to the Conflict.

Harris, Rosemary. (1972) Prejudice and Tolerancein Ulster: A Study of Neighbours and "Strang-ers" in a Border Community.

Lebow, Richard N. (1976) "Vigilantism inNorthern Ireland." In Vigilante Politics, ed-ited by H. Jon Rosenbaum and Peter C.Sederberg, 234-258.

Moxon-Browne, Edward. (1983) Nation, Class,and Creed in Northern Ireland.

CHAKMA INBANGLADESH

The People's Republic ofBangladesh is located inSouth Asia on the northbend of the Bay of Ben-

gal. The nation encompasses 55,813 square milesand is bordered by India on the east, north, andwest, and by Myanmar (formerly Burma) on thesoutheast. In 1993 the estimated population was114 million with a remarkably homogenous eth-nic constitution of 98 percent Bengali, the over-whelming majority of whom are Muslim. Theremaining 2 percent is composed of Bihariand tribal peoples, including the Chakma, orChangma, as they call themselves. The ongoingconflict between the Chakma and theBangladesh government concerns Chakmaefforts to regain indigenous rights lost during

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British colonialism and which further erodedafter independence.

The Muslim conquest of the Bengal regionof South Asia began in the late twelfth and earlythirteenth centuries, following nearly a millen-nium of successive Buddhist and Hindu rule.During this gradual Muslim invasion, much ofthe local population converted to Islam. Mus-lim rule held until the mid-eighteenth century,when Britain gained control of the area that isnow Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan. Britishrule was most favorably accepted by the Hindupopulation, who responded to the Westerniza-tion of the region more readily than did theMuslims. When the independence movementbegan to develop in the late nineteenth century,the goal of the Hindus was a free, secular state.Muslims advocated a separate Islamic state (Pa-kistan), which was established in 1947. TheBengal region then found itself a part of twoseparate nation-states. In India, the westernportion of Bengal became the Indian state ofWest Bengal, and the eastern portion becameEast Pakistan, separated by some 1,000 miles ofIndia from Pakistan proper. In 1971 civil warbroke out in East and West Pakistan (Bengalisversus non-Bengalis), which resulted in Indianintervention and the establishment of the na-tion of Bangladesh (or "Bengali Homeland")in 1974.

The Chakma are a tribal group who inhabitthe Chittagong Hills of southeasternBangladesh. Some Chakma also live in India (theChittagong Hills region extends into the Indiannortheast). The Chakma are of Southeast Asianorigin and the Buddhist faith, and comprise themajority of the tribal population in theChittagong region, with a 1981 population of212,000. It is believed the Chakma immigratedto what is now Bangladesh from Burma (nowcalled Myanmar) around the sixteenth century.At that time the area was under Muslim con-trol; the British had not yet arrived. The Chakmaentered into a trade agreement with the Mus-

lim leaders and were allowed to live in theChittagong Hills. After the British gained con-trol of the area in the late eighteenth century,there was periodic fighting between the Chakmaand the British until 1787, when Chakma raja(leader) Janbrix Khan signed a peace treaty withthe British government that maintained peace-ful relations until the end of British rule, andthe hilly region maintained an officially desig-nated tribal status. This tribal status was revokedin 1964, and in the years since there has been aninflux of Bengali Bangladeshis who are over-whelmingly Muslim. As a result, the Chakma(and other tribes) no longer represent the ma-jority in this region; the Chakma now make uponly 30 percent of the population. The indig-enous language is extinct and the Chakma nowspeak a dialect of Bangla, the language of theBengali majority.

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, theChakma (and the other regional tribes) beganto demand greater autonomy and an end to theMuslim influx. In 1972, after a rejection of thesedemands and only a year after the emergence ofBangladesh as a new nation, the tribal groupsformed an organization called the ShantiBahini(meaning "Peace Force"), which has since essen-tially evolved into a guerrilla army. The ShantiBahini is not a separatist group; they do not wantindependence from Bangladesh. Rather, theyseek protection of the regions demographic char-acter (end of Muslim settlers), free elections,greater economic and political powers, and theformation of an autonomous state withinBangladesh. The political wing of the ShantiBahini is thejana Sanghata Samiti (or "People'sStruggle Organization").

Since the emergence of Bangladesh, the in-flux of Muslim settlers to the previously tribalregion, and the establishment of the ShantiBahini, the Chakma have been subjected to abitter military campaign by the Bangladesh gov-ernment, which has sent nearly 51,000 refugeetribespeople into India since 1986, mainly into

42 e

CHECHEN-INGUSH IN RUSSIA

the Indian state of Tripura. In recent years thecentral government and the Chakma have at-tempted to negotiate a solution, and in 1993 Indiaand Bangladesh agreed to a plan for the return ofthe refugees, and Bangladesh agreed to halt theflow of nontribal peoples into the region.

Bessaigner, Pierre. (1958) Tribesmen of theChittagong Hill Tracts.

Chakravarty, S. R., and V. Narain, eds. (1986)Bangladesh: History and Culture.

Chaudhuri, Buddhadeb. (1991) "EthnicConflict in the Chittagong Hill Tracts ofBangladesh." In Economic Dimensions ofEthnic Conflict, edited by S. W. R. de A.Samarasighe and Reed Coughlan.

CUKCHKN-IXGUSHChechen-Ingushetia is apredominantly Muslimenclave within thenorthern Caucasus re-

gion of Russia. Chechenia and Ingushetia wereseparate administrative territories until 1934,when they were joined by the Soviet governmentinto the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Repub-lic. The traditional Chechen-Ingush territory islocated northwest of Georgia, reaching fromapproximately 42 to 44 degrees north latitudeand about 45 to 46 degrees east longitude. In1989 the combined population was estimated at1,194,317, composed of 237,438 Ingush and956,879 Chechen. This figure includes commu-nities formed in Jordan, Turkey, and Syria in themid-nineteenth century by Chechen and someIngush who fled there following wars with theRussians in the Caucasus. The Chechen andIngush languages are distinct from one another,although in those areas where the groups co-habited, both languages are spoken. Tradition-

ally written in Arabic, the script was changed toLatin and then Cyrillic during the Soviet pe-riod. Because of Russian dominance, mostIngush are fluent in Russian, as are someChechen.

Regular contact between the Russians andChechen-Ingush began in the 1600s when Cos-sacks invaded the region, and relations have beendifficult ever since. The invasion of the Caucasusled to Russian domination and drove someChechen and Ingush south to Turkey, Jordan,and Syria. During the eighteenth and nineteenthcenturies, the Chechen and Ingush convertedfrom their traditional animistic religion to Is-lam, a move that was most likely politically mo-tivated. It is believed that the groups made theconversion in order to align themselves with theCaucasian resistance to the Russians. Today Is-lam is the religion of the overwhelming major-ity of the population and has become a keyelement in their ethnic identity. Following theRussian Revolution, Chechen-Ingush cultureflourished for about two decades before it wasrepressed under Joseph Stalin. In 1944 Stalinforcefully deported the Chechen-Ingush to Si-beria. Although the official reason was that theChechen-Ingush collaborated with the Nazis,it was more an attempt at cleansing the area ofMuslims in case of an invasion by Turkey, aMuslim nation. The group was not allowed toreturn to their region until 1956 in what wasofficially labeled "rehabilitation." In their ab-sence, their republic had officially ceased to ex-ist. Present-day tensions between the Ingush andthe Ossetes stem from this period in which ter-ritory previously controlled by the Ingush cameunder Ossetian control.

Conflict with the Russians, however, re-mains a greater threat to Chechen-Ingush cul-tural and political autonomy. In reaction to thebreakup of the Soviet Union and the establish-ment of an independent Russian nation to becomposed of former administrative regions,in 1991 the Chechen-Ingush mounted an

naUiKKifti

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independence movement led by GeneralDjokhar Dudayev, who was elected president inOctober of that year with nearly 85 percent ofthe vote. In November the Chechen-IngushAutonomous Republic declared its independenceand secession from Russia. Russian presidentBoris Yeltsin imposed emergency rule on theregion in an attempt to suppress another in aseries of separatist conflicts facing the formerSoviet Union and threatening economic andpolitical stability. The emergency-rule decreeincluded the dispatch of nearly 600 troops tothe region and a confiscation of firearms. At thistime, the status of the Chechen-Ingush regionas an independent republic remains unresolved.

Nichols,Johanna. (1994) "Chechen-Ingush."InEncyclopedia of World Cultures. Volume 6,Russia/Eurasia and China, edited by PaulFriedrich and Norma Diamond, 71-76.

COLONIALISMColonialism is a form ofethnic, political, andeconomic relations in

which people from one society dominate mem-bers of another society (or societies) that is geo-graphically distant and whose members arephysically, culturally, and linguistically different.This form of colonialism is called exploitationcolonialism, and differs from settlement coloniza-tion, in which a distant people displaces anotherpeople or peoples and settles their territory, asoccurred in the European conquest of NorthAmerica, Australia, and New Zealand. Since thesixteenth century, nearly all regions of the worldhave been at some point under European colo-nial domination. The only large regions not sub-ject to such domination are Russia, China,Thailand, Iran, and Afghanistan. The major Eu-

ropean colonial powers were Britain, France,Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Spain, andPortugal. Denmark and Italy were minor colo-nists, while Japan colonized Korea and islandssouth of the Japanese archipelago. With the ex-ception of Hong Kong, which will return fromBritish to Chinese control in 1997, all colonialterritories are now either independent or semi-independent nations. However, in some placesexploitation colonialism has been replaced bynewer forms of colonialism such as internal co-lonialism, neocolonialism, and Third Worldcolonialism.

Internal colonialism is a form of majoritygroup-minority group relations in which theminority group is treated much the same as acolonized group under exploitation colonialism.Thus, internally colonized groups perform a dis-proportionately high share of low-paid, unskilledlabor, are subject to control by the majority, areviewed and treated ethnocentrically in accordwith dominant culture values, and are the vic-tims of a racist ideology. For example, in theUnited States, African-Americans and Mexican-Americans have been described as internallycolonized because they have been coerced,through physical force or economic control bythe white majority, to live in a foreign society,their participation in American society is re-stricted, and their traditional cultures are con-sidered inferior by the majority white population.Internal colonialism also refers to the incorpo-ration of culturally different regions into a na-tion, such as Brittany into France.

Neocolonialism refers to the political andeconomic relations between developed and de-veloping nations (mostly former colonies) in theworld, where the former are able to benefit, atleast in part, from previous colonization gainedfrom their superior power and wealth. Amongthe common features of neocolonialism are anemphasis on the production of raw materials forexport in formerly colonized nations, large tradeimbalances between developed and developing

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nations, tourism as a major source of incomein developing nations, political control by aWestern-educated elite, and a high rate of im-migration to industrialized nations.

Third World ColonialismThird World colonialism is a postcolonial phe-nomenon in which formerly colonized regionsthat have become independent nations colonizeindigenous, minority peoples within theirboundaries as part of economic development,territorial expansion, and the building of a na-tionalistic sentiment. Bangladesh's efforts to ex-ploit the resources in the territories of internaltribal peoples and Indonesia's efforts to acquireterritory and integrate numerous indigenouspeoples into Indonesian society are two recentexamples.

Indonesia is an island nation (over 13,000islands) covering some 735,268 square miles ofland and water, with a population of 187 mil-lion in 1993. Under Dutch rule from 1697 to1942, it became an independent nation in 1949.Culturally, politically, and economically, the na-tion is controlled by the Javanese, Madurese, andBalinese, three related island cultures who com-prise about 63 percent of the national popula-tion. There are altogether over 300 culturalgroups in Indonesia. Despite this diversity, thereis commonality across Indonesian cultures—about 87 percent of the people are Muslim, theirrigation of rice is the primary traditional sub-sistence activity of most groups, and nearlyall speak Austronesian languages. As part ofits nation-building program, the Javanese-dominated Indonesian government has engagedin a number of Third World colonial activities,most of which are little different from earlier Eu-ropean colonialism. These include the takingof territories by military force (such as EastTimor and Irian Jaya), the establishment of theJavanese-based Bahasa Indonesian as the na-tional language, and the resettlement of Javaneseon other islands, particularly those distant from

African immigrants camped on a street in suburbanParis to protest the scarcity of decent low-income

housing, 1992.

Java and the capital city of Jakarta. Indonesiancolonialism has been most aggressive in Irian Jayaand East Timor. Irian Jaya is the western regionof the island of New Guinea, and the dozens ofindigenous peoples there are culturally unrelatedto the peoples of Indonesia. In 1969 Indonesiasimply made a province of what is now Irian Jaya,an action reinforced by military invasion andoccupation, forced relocation of indigenouspeoples, and indoctrination into Indonesian cul-ture. Timor, an island in eastern Indonesia, hasbeen occupied by the Indonesians since 1975,and the campaign to incorporate the island andits people into Indonesia has led to massivepopulation relocation and to the killing of sev-eral hundred thousand indigenous Atoni.

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Exploitation ColonialismThe two key elements of exploitation colonial-ism were the technological superiority of theEuropean colonists over the native peoples inthe New World, Africa, Southeast Asia, and thePacific, and the use of a racist ideology to justifythe genocide and ethnocide typical of both settle-ment and exploitation colonialism. Some colo-nial powers such as Germany and Britain viewednon-European peoples as nonhuman, and thusnot entitled to the same treatment afforded Eu-ropeans. Other colonial powers such as Spain,Portugal, and France were less racist, althoughthey still viewed non-Europeans as inferior formsof humanity who would benefit from colonialdomination. Exploitation colonialism was con-fined mainly to tropical or subtropical climaticregions, primarily because such regions were nothospitable locales for settlement colonization.Rather, because of heat, humidity, and diseases,tropical regions took a high toll on Europeansettlers. The landscape was rarely suitable forEuropean-style agriculture, and many tropicalregions were heavily populated by native societ-ies—for example, West Africa—that could of-fer stiff resistance to European attempts to takeland and resources.

Exploitation colonialism was primarily aneconomic arrangement in which the colonizersused native labor to extract raw materials fromthe colony. The raw materials were transportedto the home country for consumption or for theproduction of goods, some of which were thensold back to indigenous peoples in the same colo-nies. Although there were variations from colo-nizer to colonizer and region to region (detailedbelow), there were four key elements to success-ful exploitation colonialism. First, the residentEuropean population was small, and was in-volved mainly in administering the territory andmanaging the native labor force. Second, Euro-pean control was often established through theuse of military force and the construction of atransportation system that facilitated the flow

of raw materials from the interior to ports forshipment to Europe. Third, colonial economicenterprises such as coffee, tea, and banana plan-tations and mining operations were completelyreliant on local labor to exploit local resources.Fourth, local labor was managed through "indi-rect rule"—that is, European administrators usedlocal ethnic-group leaders as their agents. Localleaders were often rewarded financially for theirefforts and kept in power by the Europeans, whoplayed on existing ethnic rivalries. Laborers weremade dependent on European wages once theywere drawn into the money economy as con-sumers of European-produced goods.

Colonialism and Ethnic RelationsColonialism had a number of immediate andlong-term effects on ethnic relations in what isnow defined as the Third World. First, underthe colonial systems there was a nearly absoluteseparation of Europeans from native peoples,with the former constituting the upper class andthe latter a class of workers. Second, colonialuse of existing ethnic rivalries and ethnic man-agers tended to make some groups dominantover others, which often led to ethnic conflictsuch as that involving the Hutu and Tutsi inBurundi and Rwanda, and the Sousse and othergroups in Guinea. Third, the artificial nationalboundaries created by the colonial powers inAfrica ignored already existing tribal boundariesand has led to ethnic tensions in manymultiethnic African nations such as Kenya andNigeria, hampering both political and economicstability. Fourth, in Latin America there wasconsiderable interbreeding between Europeancolonists and indigenous peoples and Africans(slaves), producing a whole new social categoryof mixed-ancestry peoples, and a new social or-der in which relative skin color became a majorinfluence on social status, a pattern that is onlynow beginning to weaken as both the indigenouspeoples and African-Americans emphasize theirethnicity rather than skin color. Fifth, mission-

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ary activities, which almost always accompaniedcolonization, led to the large-scale conversionof many peoples to Christianity, the demise ofmany indigenous religions, and the developmentof new, syncretic religions based on a mergingof traditional religions and Christianity.

The following three case studies focus onthree different colonial powers—Britain, France,and Spain—in three different places—India,West Africa, and Mexico—and highlight someof the major effects on native cultures of colo-nial domination strategies such as division andconquest, indirect rule, the use of ancient ethnicrivalries, and forced population migrations, aswell as the continued effects of those practices.

British Colonialism in Northeast IndiaPrior to the imposition of British rule, the prin-cipal inhabitants of the region of northeast In-dia called Jhankhand were dozens of tribalgroups, today called Scheduled Tribes. Amongthe major groups are the Santals (comprised ofa dozen or more named subgroups), Oraons,Mundas, and Hos. Traditionally, they were allforest peoples, subsisting through the exploita-tion of the environment, primarily by plow ag-riculture and slash-and-burn farming practices,but also by hunting, gathering, and fishing. Theforest not only provided food, shelter, and rawmaterials but also occupied a central place in theirworldview and religion. Another key definingconcept for these tribal peoples was diku, mean-ing a nontribal outsider whose culture stood inopposition to the central themes of their owntribal culture. Each group was governed by vil-lage leaders and religious leaders although, be-fore the arrival of the British, a form of feudalismhad already developed, with regional leaderscalled rajas owning much of the land, rentingland to poorer individuals who farmed it,and collecting taxes from the inhabitants of theirterritory.

The British colonial goals were (1) to placeregional maharajah under their control, thereby

giving the British control of the region, and (2)to pacify the region so that trade could flow safelyacross northern India to and from the Bay ofBengal. British methods included physical force,such as executions and village burning; the cre-ation of a British administrative structure, withresponsibilities for oversight of the indigenouspopulation resting with the British officials; andisolation of the "tribals" on the equivalent of res-ervations while the remainder of the land wascontrolled and exploited by the British. Theeffects on the indigenous peoples were far-reaching: They were deprived of the right tocontrol and use much of their land, and famineforced many to migrate to Assam for work ontea plantations. There also were forced migra-tions to cities, displacement of the majoritypopulation by nontribal migrant workers, andurban growth that turned some tribal commu-nities into internal colonies. Following Indianindependence, efforts were made to reverse theeffects of colonialism on the tribal peoples acrossIndia. These included their designation asScheduled Tribes, special positive discriminationprograms such as preference in hiring and guar-anteed legislative representation, and inclusionin the regional political-party leadership. How-ever, the tribals remain a numerical and socio-logical minority in their homeland, and todaysome are involved in sometimes violent conflictin order to regain their indigenous rights andcontrol over a share of the region's resources.

French in West AfricaThe nation now called Guinea was a colony ofFrance from 1898 to 1958. Before French rule,this area went through over a century of indig-enous rule. From 1770 to 1830 the region wasruled by the Islamic Almany Empire of FutaDjallow, who used Islam and military power tounify separate hill kingdoms into a centralizedcultural and political whole. From 1870 to 1898,the region was ruled by the Mandinka Empire,who used military force rather than Islam as the

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unifying power before they were defeated by theFrench. The first task for the French was to es-tablish control, which they accomplished by ig-noring the Islamic hierarchy and instead usingclan leaders as their local representatives. Theiruse of clan leaders had the added advantage ofreigniting old clan rivalries and boundary dis-putes, thereby rendering any kind of coordinatedopposition to French rule virtually impossible.In addition, the French established a small eliteof ethnic Soussou teachers, administrators, andtechnicians in the city of Conakry, a group thatwas pushed toward French citizenship follow-ing World War II. Economically, the Frenchwere mainly interested in the coffee and bananacrops, and they built railways and towns inlandto support these activities. Following indepen-dence in 1958, a major task facing the Guineagovernment was to establish ethnic cooperation;that is, to reverse the French-encouraged pat-tern of ethnic rivalry and separatism. To do so,the government mandated ethnic representationin the national assembly and attempted to bal-ance the economic contributions made by dif-ferent groups to the national economy. However,economic stability was never achieved and eth-nic equality did not last, with the Soussou re-maining in many of the key government andeconomic positions while other groups suffered theeffects of economic crises such as unemployment.

Spanish in Latin AmericaPrior to the arrival of the Spanish in 1519,Mexico and Guatemala were the home ofAmerican Indian nations who subsisted prima-rily as farmers. While there were wealth distinc-tions within these nations, the acquisition ofwealth was important only as a source of socialstatus. The Spanish, on the contrary, were in-terested in exploiting the land and people forraw materials that could be converted into goodsfor sale. Within the first century of coloniza-tion, the Spanish established gold and silvermines; farms growing wheat, sugar cane, cacao,

and indigo, as well as processing centers; andcattle, pork, and sheep ranches. All of these en-terprises were managed by Spaniards, with theIndians providing the labor. When there werenot enough Indians, slaves from Africa and Asiawere imported to fill the gap. Initially, Indianlabor was obtained under the encomienda sys-tem, in which Spanish settlers had the right totribute and work from Indians in certain villages.This system was replaced by a regulated laborsystem in which Spanish royalty controlled thetemporary allocation of Indian laborers to Span-ish settlers. By 1650 about 80 percent of the In-dian population had died, primarily because ofEuropean-introduced diseases, but also frommilitary campaigns and famine. In order to fur-ther exploit the remaining Indian labor, the ha-cienda system evolved, with Spanish colonistsowning estates and the Indians living in small,exclusively Indian communities. The Indiansworked for the Spaniards, and as they becameeconomically and psychologically dependent onthem, they developed into a rural peasantry, anentirely new socioeconomic category in the NewWorld. Despite the economic distance betweenthe Spanish and Indians, there was considerableinterbreeding, producing a new social categoryof individuals of mixed ancestry called mestizos.Unlike the Indian peasants, mestizos were indi-vidualists interested in personal power andwealth, rapidly becoming political and economicmiddlemen in the Spanish system. Many werelater prominently involved in the Mexican andGuatemalan revolutions, land reform move-ments that ended the hacienda system andformed the new generation of political leaders.

See also ETHNOCENTRISM; RACE AND RACISM;REVITALIZATION MOVEMENTS; SLAVERY; SYN-CRETIC CULTURES.

Balandier, Georges. (1970) The Sociology of BlackAfrica.

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Blauner, Robert. (1972) Racial Oppression inAmerica.

Boahen, A. Adu. (1987) African Perspectives onColonialism.

Corbridge, Stuart. (1987) "Ousting Singbonga:The Struggle for India's Jharkhand." In Co-lonialism and Development in the Contempo-rary World, edited by Chris Dixon andMichael Heffernan, 153-182.

Dirks, Nicholas B., ed. (1992) Colonialism andCulture.

Hechter, Michael. (1975) Internal Colonialism:The Celtic Fringe in British National Devel-opment, 1536-1966.

Hurtsfield, Jennifer. (1978) "'Internal' Colonial-ism: White, Black and Chicano Self-Concep-tions." In Ethnic and Racial Studies 1: 60-79.

Nietschmann, Bernard. (1988) "Third WorldColonial Expansion: Indonesia, DisguisedInvasion of Indigenous Nations." In TribalPeoples and Development Issues: A Global Over-view, edited by John H. Bodley, 191-207.

Slowe, Peter M. (1991) "Colonialism and theAfrican Nation: The Case of Guinea." In Co-lonialism and Development in the Contempo-rary World, edited by Chris Dixon andMichael Heffernan, 106-120.

van den Berghe, Pierre L. (1981) The EthnicPhenomenon.

Wolf, Eric. (1959) Sons of the Shaking Earth.

CONSOCIATIONALA consociational de-mocracy is a form of na-tional organization thatis thought to be tied to

peaceful ethnic relations in multiethnic nations.The consociational democracy was first de-scribed by political scientist Arend Lijphart.Originally applied to the Netherlands, it has sub-

sequently been used to account for peaceful re-lations among ethnic groups in Switzerland,Austria, Belgium, and Lebanon, and has beensuggested as a solution to ethnic conflict inCanada, Northern Ireland, and emerging ThirdWorld democracies.

At its core, a consociational democracy is anation where ethnic relations are peaceful be-cause of cooperation at the national level amongthe elites representing each ethnic group. Eth-nic elites cooperate with one another when theirmutual interests, such as political power andwealth, are more likely to be met through eth-nic cooperation than through ethnic competi-tion. The four primary features of consociationaldemocracies are (Lijphart 1977): (1) "govern-ment by a grand coalition" of representatives ofthe ethnic groups in the nation; (2) "the mutualveto or concurrent majority rule"; (3) propor-tional representation on government bodies andin government employment and in the distribu-tion of government funds; and (4) "a high de-gree of autonomy for each segment to run itsown internal affairs."

In addition, characteristics of nations witha consociational form of government include aclear separation among the ethnic groups, a bal-ance of power among the groups, an externalthreat shared by all groups, a moderate level ofnationalism, relatively little economic and po-litical pressure on the national system, and smallsize. Additionally, it seems clear that consocia-tional deomcracy does not occur in multiethnicsocieties where ethnic variation is based on physi-cal differences such as skin color.

The consociational democracy is more a pre-scription for peaceful ethnic relations in societ-ies where a long history of contact has not led toassimilation than it is a description of the actualstate of ethnic relations in any nation. With theexception of Switzerland, there is probably nonation in the world that is currently a consocia-tional democracy. Switzerland's situation is alsounique because of its physical isolation from

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COPTS IN EGYPT

other nations, and the absence of resources thatwould have made it desirable as a target for con-quest. It seems that if consociational democracywere to be an alternative to other forms of eth-nic relations in multiethnic nations, it wouldwork best where the ethnic groups are alreadyintegrated through mixed living patterns, inter-marriage, a shared role and benefits from soci-etal institutions, and perhaps a common religion,such as in Belgium.

See also PLURALISM.

Barry, Brian. (1975) "Review Article: PoliticalAccommodation and Consociational De-mocracy." British Journal of Political Science5: 477-505.

Brass, Paul R. (1991) Ethnicity and Nationalism.

Lijphart, Arend. (1977) Democracy in PluralSocieties.

van den Berghe, Pierre L. (1981) The EthnicPhenomenon.

The Coptic Church isthe oldest church ofEgypt, dating back to

the first half of the first century A.D. This an-cient religion is essentially a breakaway sect ofChristianity, distinguished in 451 when the pa-triarch Dioscorus I was forced to defend his ver-sion of Christianity before a council led by theeastern emperor Marcion. In fact, the breakawaysect is actually the original, orthodox version ofthe church that eventually condemned it.Dioscorus believed in the orthodox interpreta-tion of the coexistence of the divinity and hu-manity of Christ, and rejected the more moderncatechetical school of Alexandria, which wasmuch more of an arena for free religious think-

ing and scholastic endeavor. What is now dis-tinguished as the Coptic Church are descendantsof those followers who believed that this wasbasically heresy and clung to the original, or-thodox roots of the religion and their beliefsabout the nature and person of Christ. Dioscoruswas condemned by the council and exiled. Fromthis division of the Christian faith, two forms ofChristianity emerged. One accepted the rulingsof the council and became the mainstream formof Christianity; the other followed the con-demned school of thought—this was the CopticChurch.

Copts are the most direct link to the Phara-onic history of Egypt; the name Copt is aderivative of the Greek word meaning "Egyp-tian. "The theological dispute that prompted theCopt split with Rome preempted a period of per-secution of the Copts by the Byzantine emper-ors in an effort to rid Christendom of anyseparatism. Copts, or Egyptians, were subjectedto violence, humiliation, and extreme taxation.Not until the Arab invasion of Egypt was therean effective barrier between the Christians of theEast and the West. While many Copts eventu-ally converted to Islam after the Arab invasionof the seventh century, many more remainedloyal to the Coptic Church and lived in relativeharmony with their Muslim neighbors.

In recent decades, Copts in Egypt, whonumber 10 million and make up the proportion-ately largest religious minority in the MiddleEast, have come under attack by Muslim fun-damentalists who seek to make Egypt an Islamicnation. The recent persecution of Coptic Chris-tians is part of a larger fundamentalist initiativethat emerged in the late 1970s. The aim of thesefundamentalists is to destabilize the country withthe use of violence. There are many fundamen-talist organizations, most of which not only con-done but advocate the taking of power by theuse of force. They see this as more than a politi-cal agenda; they view it as a religious duty.

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Attacks on Christians by Muslim funda-mentalists range from public verbal and physi-cal harassment and abuse to massacres such as aMay 1992 incident in which Muslims gunneddown 13 Christian peasants while they werefarming their land. Bombings and the burningof Christian homes and businesses are no longerrare occurrences in Egypt. On a less violent scale,Coptic Christians are the victims of discrimina-tion by the Egyptian government, which has allbut removed Copts from positions of power andresponsibility in government and the businesscommunity. While Copts once enjoyed politi-cal and economic prominence in Egypt, Parlia-mentary representation of Copts in 1993 is lessthan 1 percent, compared to as much as 10 per-cent in the 1940s. Although the current admin-istration of President Mubarak, who has beenin office since 1981, is relatively liberal and secu-lar, it is drawing increased criticism from Coptleaders, who maintain that discrimination is alltoo common and that efforts to contain funda-mentalist violence are both too little and too late.

The Coptic response to its own persecutionhas been peaceful and passive. More than half amillion have left the country in the last decade,and those who remain follow a policy ofnonaction. They remain firm in their profoundspirituality, which they say has carried themthrough the past nearly 2,000 years. The officialstand of the church is to reject social and politi-cal activism and other confrontational ap-proaches, and instead to be patient. In line withthis approach, there is little evidence that anyextremist Coptic organizations have emerged inthe past few decades.

Masri, Iris Habib el. (1978) The Story of the Copts.

Wakin, Edward. (1963) A Lonely Minority: TheModern History of Egypt's Copts', The Chal-lenge of Survival for Four Million Christians.

The concept of culturalrelativism is used in thestudy of other cultures asboth a guiding principle

and as a general ethical principle governing thecross-cultural perspective. The concept cameinto general use in anthropology in the 1930swhen it was generally viewed as a dictum thatthe customs and beliefs of one culture cannot becompared to nor judged on the basis of the cus-toms and beliefs of other cultures. This relativ-istic view of cultures was partly a reaction to theimplicit or explicit racist and ethnocentric so-cial evolutionary thinking of the late 1880s, inwhich cultures of the world were rated on "civi-lization" scales based on the assumption thatWestern culture was superior and non-Westerncultures inferior. The relativistic perspective wasalso based on the widespread belief among so-cial scientists that culture is adaptive and func-tional, and therefore all beliefs and customs of aparticular culture exist because they are of somebenefit to that culture.

Today, while some social scientists continueto employ this extreme relativistic view of cul-tures, others use the concept in a less rigid senseto mean that every culture should be studied andunderstood in the context of its possibly uniquepossibilities and limitations, while at the sametime leaving open the possibility that some be-liefs and practices maybe harmful and less adap-tive than beliefs and customs found in othercultures. For example, a belief that illness anddeath is caused by witchcraft may be less adap-tive than a belief in the germ theory of diseasecausation that allows many diseases to be curedor prevented. This application of the concept ofcultural relativism allows those who study orwork with people from other cultures to questionand reject cultural practices such as racial discrimi-nation and child-beating, which are harmful to thevictims, while at the same time avoiding ethno-centric judgments of the culture itself.

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An alternative to the relativistic view is theuniveralist view of cultures. In this view, becauseof underlying biological and cultural factors, thebasic features of all cultures are seen as essen-tially the same; they differ only in the detailshaving to do with actual behaviors, beliefs, orcustoms that are manifestations of those basicfeatures. Additionally, some of these features areseen as elementary, and therefore as the basis ofother features of culture. For example, the in-cest taboo that prohibits sexual relations betweencertain categories of relatives is found in all so-cieties, and it is elementary in the sense that itstructures other relations, such as who may marrywhom.

There is actually no one universalist posi-tion. Absolute universals are features, such asmarriage, that appear in all cultures. Near-universals are features, such as romantic love,that appear in nearly all cultures (88 percent ofcultures, in one survey). Statistical universals arefeatures that appear in a greater number of cul-tures than would be expected by chance alone.For example, words that mean "little person" areused in many cultures to refer to the pupil of theeye, evidently because one sees his or her ownreflection in another's eye.

Cultural universals result from a number ofprocesses including: (1) diffusion, or the spreadof cultural features from one culture to anotherthrough either peaceful contact or conquest; (2)common human experience; for example, allpeople in all cultures react to certain common-alities such as the weather; and (3) biologicalevolution, which has created inherited predis-positions in the human central nervous sys-tem that lead to some like behaviors in allpeople.

If one accepts the universalist view (in anyform) it is then logically possible to take it onestep further and compare cultures, or even ratethem on scales indicating the relative quality oflife in the culture. Anthropologist Raoul Naroll,

for one, attempted to rate the nations of theworld in terms of the physical and mental healthof their citizens and the degree of brotherhood,progress, and peace, among other attributes, dis-played by the nation. He concluded that Nor-way was an exemplary society and one that couldbe held up as the standard for other societies.Similary, the United Nations compiles and pub-lishes a Human Development Index that mea-sures the happiness of the citizens of thecountries of the world based on three factors—life expectancy, education, and individual pur-chasing power. The results of the 1993 Indexplace the following ten countries at the top ofthe list: Japan, Canada, Norway, Switzerland,Sweden, the United States, Australia, France,the Netherlands, and Britain. At the bottom ofthe list are poor, developing nations in Africasuch as Somalia, Gambia, Mali, and Afghani-stan. The index also shows that within nationsthere are often wide discrepancies in the qualityof life between different groups and regions. Forexample, in all nations the quality of life is higherfor men than for women, and in the UnitedStates, the quality of life is much higher forwhites than for other ethnic groups.

See also ETHNOCENTRISM.

Benedict, Ruth. (1934) Patterns of Culture.

Berry, John W., et al.(1992) Cross-Cultural Psy-chology: Research and Applications.

Brown, Donald E. (1991) Human Universals.

Edgerton, Robert B. (1992) Sick Societies: Chal-lenging the Myth of Primitive Harmony.

Hanson, F. Allan. (1975) Meaning in Culture.

Naroll, Raoul. (1983) The Moral Order: An In-troduction to the Human Situation.

United Nations. (1993) Human DevelopmentReport.

e52

CYPRIOTS

The island of Cyprus isan independent republiclocated in the eastern

Mediterranean Sea 64 kilometers south of Tur-key and 96 kilometers west of Syria. In 1991the population was estimated to be 708,000. Thecapital is Nicosia, with a population of 166,000.The island encompasses 3,572 square miles, andis 141 miles long and 59 miles wide at its widestpoint. The population is comprised of two ma-jor ethnic groups—Greeks and Turks—as wellas small populations of Armenians and MaroniteChristians.

For more than 3,000 years the large major-ity of the population has been Greek; in 1991,78 percent were estimated to be Greek in bothlanguage and culture. Greek Cypriots are gen-erally members of the Orthodox Church ofCyprus, which is essentially a spinoff of the East-ern Orthodox Church. It was officially formedwhen the then-Christian Cypriots were subjectto the Byzantine Empire in the second and thirdcenturies. The church was granted autocephalousstatus in A.D. 488. Although archaeologicalrecords trace settlement on Cyprus to before6000 B.C., it is believed that the first Greek im-migrants began to arrive around 1200 B.C., andby 700 B.C., Greeks comprised a major portionof the population.

Cyprus has been ruled by several empires,from the Assyrians to the Persians to directGreek rule in 323 B.C. Control of the islandbounced back and forth among different rulersand was subject to frequent crusades until 1571,with the Turkish invasion. Ottoman rule ofCyprus lasted for approximately 300 years, dur-ing which time Muslim Turks established them-selves as a strong and sizable minority on theisland. Although Turkey maintained sovereigntyover the island, unsatisfactory local rule and thefear of Russian penetration of the OttomanEmpire led to the establishment of a Britishadministration with promises of rapid deploy-

ment of troops in the event of an attack by Rus-sia. When Turkey entered World War I, the is-land, which was fighting on the opposite side,was immediately annexed by Britain. Cyprusbecame a British colony in 1925.

During the period of shifting control andBritain's 60-year hold over the island, twodistinct and contradictory political agendasemerged within the Greek and Turkish commu-nities on the island, and have since then playeda key role in the ongoing ethnic conflict. Enosis,or the desired state of union with Greece, camejust short of a battle cry for the Greek popula-tion. On the other side was Takism, or separa-tion of Turks by Turks from the rest of Cyprusinto an autonomous, independent nation. Intypical British colonial fashion, a series of inef-fective reforms and generally unacceptable po-litical conditions led to frustration for both theGreeks and Turks, with the years between 1931and 1959 plagued by violence on both sides, in-cluding bombings and demonstrations. In 1931Greek members of the Legislative Councilwalked out of the Government House as angrycrowds calling for enosis set it ablaze. This andother such demonstrations of the desire by GreekCypriots to unite with Greece mobilized Turk-ish sentiment toward the British despite the factthat as a group they fared no better under Brit-ish rule. British government, in essence, becameanother wedge between the Greeks and theTurks, driving them farther apart and sendingthem to opposite sides of the political spectrumrather than allowing them to cohabitate in a rela-tively peaceful manner. As agitation for enosiscontinued to increase, it culminated in bothGreek and Turkish revolts.

Finally, in a three-way effort by the GreekCypriots, Turkish Cypriots, and the British, andwith the intervention of the United Nations,Cyprus was granted independent republicstatus by virtue of a constitution that allowedfor participation by both Cypriot groups in the

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legislative, judicial, and executive branches ofgovernment. In theory, this represented compro-mise by all parties, but in practice it may havebeen too much of a compromise for each, andviolence continued in spite of the island's newstatus as an independent republic. Fearing thatthe conflict might lead to a full-scale war be-tween Greece and Turkey over control of the is-land, the U.N. sent a peacekeeping force toCyprus in 1964 in an effort to contain the situ-ation. A decade later, in reaction to the attemptedassassination of the Cypriot president by Greece,Turkish forces seized the northern part of theisland and established a Turkish state in that re-gion. However, this independent status has neverbeen formally recognized by any nation otherthan Turkey.

The current situation in Cyprus has notimproved a great deal. Although there is less vio-lence accompanying the Greek/Turkish conflict,this is mainly because the two groups live apartfrom one another as much as possible, and arebasically separated by a guarded border. Thenorthern third of Cyprus remains Turkish—theso-called Turkish Republic of Northern Cypruscontinues to be recognized only by Turkey, andU.N. officials estimate that 30,000 Turkishtroops are stationed along the unofficial borderseparating the two regions. The presence of thesetroops provides Greece with a constant reminderof the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974—aninvasion that Greeks feel went unpunished. Al-

though the presence of U.N. forces has man-aged to keep peace in Cyprus, the two Cypriotcommunities have continued to grow apart inways that cannot be controlled by laws or troops.Atrocities committed by both sides against theother are not easily forgotten, and those fami-lies displaced by the regional division are un-likely to forgive those who forced them to leavetheir homes. In fact, approximately 180,000Greek Cypriots were either forced to leave orfled the northern portion of the island, andnearly 60,000 Turkish Cypriots were forcednorth. The United States and the other mem-bers of the U.N. Security Council have tried tolead Turks and Greeks toward a compromise thatwould reunify the island into a single state withautonomous Greek and Turkish regions. TheU.N. has stated that it cannot maintain peace-keeping forces on the island indefinitely, al-though they have already been a presence fornearly 30 years.

Ertekun, N. M. (1984) The Cyprus Dispute andthe Birth of the Turkish Republic of NorthernCyprus.

Kyle, Keith. (1984) Cyprus.

Loizos, Peter. (1981) The Heart Grown Bitter: AChronicle of Cypriot War Refugees.

Szulc, Tad. (1993) "Cyprus: A Time of Reck-oning." National Geographic 184: 104-130.

e54

ously, to that homeland in one way or another,and their ethnocommunal consciousness andsolidarity are importantly defined by the exist-ence of such a relationship.

This definition covers a very broad range ofcommunities; however, until recently the labeldiaspora has commonly been reserved for ethnicgroups with a sizable percentage of their popu-lation living outside their homeland for at leastseveral generations but who maintain some ties,even if only symbolic, to the homeland. Fromthis perspective, four major diasporas are theJewish, Indian, Chinese, and African. A descrip-tion of each provides some insight into the com-monalities that make each a diaspora and alsoilluminates the cross-cultural variation indiasporas.

DIASPORAThe mass movement ofa people or some signifi-cant percentage of a

population from its homeland to another terri-tory or territories is a common feature of hu-man history. A diaspora is a particular form ofcommunity formed by a mass movement andresettlement characterized by the following(Safran 1991, 83):

(1) they, or their ancestors, have been dispersedfrom a specific original "center" to two or more"peripheral," or foreign, regions; (2) they retaina collective memory, vision, or myth about theiroriginal homeland—its physical location, history,and achievements; (3) they believe that they arenot—and perhaps cannot be—fully accepted bytheir host society and therefore feel partly alien-ated and insulated from it; (4) they regard theirancestral homeland as their true, ideal home andas such the place to which they or their descen-dants would (or should) eventually return—whenconditions are appropriate; (5) they believe thatthey should, collectively, be committed to themaintenance or restoration of their originalhomeland and to its safety and prosperity; and(6) they continue to relate, personally or vicari-

Jewish DiasporaThe Jewish diaspora, which has lasted for 2,600years, is considered the oldest, and at one timethe term diaspora referred specifically to the Jew-ish one. For 2,000 years the diaspora existedwithout a Jewish state, and for 1,500 years theJewish community existed only as a diaspora.The homeland was reestablished with the stateof Israel in 1948, although, in a developmentnot found in other diaspora-homeland relations(except for the establishment of Liberia byAfrican-Americans), Israel was organized onprinciples taken from diaspora communities.One of the most important was the recognitionof and allowance for two distinct diaspora reli-gious traditions—Sephardic and Ashkenazic.The Jewish diaspora has existed as such forso long for a number of reasons. The most im-portant is simply the absence of a physicalhomeland to return to. Others include the clas-sification of Jews as outsiders by many host so-cieties, bans on intermarriage with non-Jews,occupational specialization, a distinct religion,a distinct yearly and weekly calendar and dailyschedule, and the central role played by the

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synagogue as an institution of community co-hesion for diaspora communities. The Jewishdiaspora differs from others also in that it hasnot been fixed in a particular place. Rather, theJewish diaspora has been migratory, with com-munities relocating, sometimes voluntarily butmore often because of expulsion. In the post-World War II world, the major diaspora centeris in North America. The major diaspora ofEurope disappeared with the deaths of 5-6 mil-lion Jews in World War II. The modern diasporais characterized by relative freedom to practiceJudaism openly, the right to settle in Israel, andsupport for Israel and Judaism through local,regional, national, and international networks oreducational, social, political, community, andphilanthropic organizations.

African DiasporaThe African diaspora is often equated with theJewish one, as both were formed through forcedexpulsion from the homeland and also becauseboth groups have long histories of suffering asvictims of persecution in their diasporas. TheAfrican diaspora is mainly the product of sla-very, first by Islamic nations, and later, on a muchlarger scale, by European colonial nations ex-porting slaves to the New World. The majorAfrican diaspora centers are Canada, the UnitedStates, the Caribbean islands, Middle America,and northern South America, particularly Bra-zil, Suriname, Colombia, and Venezuela. TheUnited States and Brazil today have two of thefour largest African-ancestry populations in theworld, and in both nations they are the largestethnic group.

The large diaspora in Britain is a product ofsecondary migration from former British pos-sessions in the Caribbean. Here, as with mostdiasporas, there is considerable internal varia-tion within diasporas. Thus, in the United States,in addition to variation based on social class andplace of residence, there is also internal differ-entiation on the basis of religion and culture, with

a notable distinction between those whose an-cestors were slaves in the United States and thosewhose ancestors were slaves in the Caribbean,such as Jamaicans, but who later migrated to theUnited States. Although the African diasporain the New World dates to the early sixteenthcentury, physical and emotional ties to the Afri-can homeland are mainly a twentieth-centurydevelopment. Because of a loss of links to thehomeland cultures (at the time of enslavementthe modern nations of Africa did not yet exist),the African homeland ties are to the Africancontinent or, more specifically, to sub-SaharanAfrica.

Diaspora ties to the homeland take a vari-ety of forms. These include missionary activi-ties to convert Africans to Christianity,back-to-Africa efforts, educational initiatives,special interest in political developments in Af-rica by the African-American community, sup-port for African national independencemovements, and the support of organizationsthat support African cultural, political, and edu-cational activities. Recently there has also beenthe purposeful incorporation of African culturalelements into New World black culture. In theCaribbean and South America, this has takenthe form of a more visible and political practiceof syncretic religions, such as Voudun in Haiti,that are based on a mix of African and Catholicelements. In North America, links to the Afri-can homeland are now visible through the wear-ing of African dress, ornamentation, andhairstyles; giving children African names; con-version to Islam; the development of syncreticlifestyle ceremonies combining African andAmerican rituals, and the Kwanzaa first fruitsfestival in the winter. However, as with the Jew-ish diaspora in North America, there has been nolarge-scale movement to return to the homeland.

Indian DiasporaThe Indian diaspora is composed of more than11 million people who were, or whose ancestors

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Chinese New Year's celebration in San Francisco. Performance of traditional rituals in diaspora communities helps

maintain cultural links to the homeland.

were, from India now residing in 136 differentnations. Nations outside of India with the larg-est Indian populations in 1980 were Nepal (3.8million), Sri Lanka (1.3 million), Malaysia (1.2million), Mauritius (625,000), Great Britain(500,000), Guyana (425,000), Trinidad and To-bago (421,000), the United States (365,000), andFiji (300,000). The Indian diaspora is probablythe most widespread of all and, with sizablepopulations in some nations, the most extensivein human history. It is also one of the oldest,dating to ancient times when people from northIndia migrated north and east into central Asia,Southeast Asia, and west to East Africa. Dur-ing the British colonial period beginning in the1800s, migration increased dramatically as theBritish exported Indians to other colonies inAfrica, the West Indies, and Fiji, where they

worked as plantation workers, indentured ser-vants, and low-level clerks and administratorsin the colonial governments. More recently, andespecially since the 1950s, Indian migration hasbeen by choice, often involving highly educatedIndians seeking employment or additional edu-cation in the Western world, particularly in theUnited States, Canada, Australia, and theMiddle East. In the modern period, there hasalso been considerable secondary migration fromnations in Africa, Fiji, and elsewhere to theWestern world. While all migrants in the In-dian diaspora are from the nation of India, someethnic or regional groups such as the Sikhs,Gujaratis, and Punjabis make up a dispropor-tionate percentage of the diaspora community.

Today, the Indian diaspora has six types ofcommunities, based on their status within the

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host nation. In Sri Lanka, Fiji, and formerlyin South Africa under apartheid, Indians aresecond-class citizens who coexist alongside adominant group—whites in South Africa andSinhalese in Sri Lanka. In Fiji, indigenousFijians seized political control in 1987, and al-though Indo-Fijians are legally full citizens insocial, political, and religious contexts, they havebecome second-class citizens. In Sri Lanka,however, one Indian community—the Tamils ofSri Lanka—are in open rebellion and seek po-litical autonomy. In Trinidad-Tobago the Indi-ans are independent and enjoy full rights,although colonial structures and sentiments re-main strong. In Malaysia and East Africa theIndians are an auxiliary minority whose welfaredepends on conformity to majority policies. InMyanmar (formerly Burma) and previously incentral African nations such as Uganda, Indi-ans are at considerable risk and face expulsionas scapegoats in times of political or economicunrest. In the United States, Canada, and GreatBritain, Indians seek permanent residence andexpect to assimilate. Finally, in the Middle East,Indians, like all other foreigners, are guest work-ers essentially without rights and without anyexpectation of permanent residence.

Although there is variation over time andfrom place to place, Indians maintain extensiveties with India, or more particularly with thehomeland region or community. Indians in EastAfrica continue to see India as their ultimateplace of residence and many return there uponretirement. For Indian merchants, India is amajor supplier of goods, often through kinshipnetworks. India is also a major source of spouses,with some Indians returning home to findspouses to take with them to the diaspora home.Contact with India is also maintained throughIndian entertainers and religious leaders whotravel to overseas communities as well as Indianmovies shown privately and publicly overseas.Finally, diaspora Indians pour vast sums of

money into the Indian economy through invest-ments, purchases, and remittances, which in1980 alone totaled some $4.46 billion.

Chinese DiasporaThe Chinese diaspora, commonly referred to asthe Overseas Chinese, is composed of majorChinese urban populations in Southeast Asiaand North America, and smaller populationselsewhere, including the Caribbean and Europe.Unlike the Jewish and African diasporas, whichresulted from expulsion, and the Indian, whichis partially voluntary and partially forced, theChinese diaspora is mainly voluntary, both inSoutheast Asia and North America. Thediaspora began in the fourteenth century inSoutheast Asia when the Chinese were drawnto major ports. After 1842 the Chinese wereemployed as laborers in colonial enterprises, andin Southeast Asia the colonial powers set themup as middlemen. Overseas Chinese now formlarge populations in Indonesia, Malaysia,Singapore, and Thailand, and are active partici-pants in the national economies of all SoutheastAsian nations, except perhaps for Vietnam, fromwhich many were expelled in the 1970s. TheOverseas Chinese diaspora is diverse. Those whoarrived and stayed before the 1850s often inter-married, and many of their descendants nolonger identify themselves as ethnically Chinese.In the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore, and In-donesia, syncretic Chinese-indigenous culturesdeveloped, such as the Baba of Singapore andthe Peranakans of Indonesia, which exist as dis-tinct communities alongside the Chinesediaspora and the indigenous population. Chi-nese have assimilated most rapidly in Buddhistnations such as Thailand, where they arecoreligionists with the indigenous population,and less so in the Muslim nations of Malaysiaand Indonesia. Chinese solidarity and identityis maintained throughout the Southeast Asiandiaspora by the building and maintenance of

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temples, communal halls, dialect associations,economic associations, and involvement in fam-ily-owned businesses, which today may take theform of multinational corporations. In somenations, such as Indonesia and Thailand, a ma-jority of Overseas Chinese speak the host lan-guage at home, suggesting a future of permanentresidence and weaker ties to the homeland andother diaspora communities.

HomelandThe notion of homeland is extremely importantin diasporas, as symbolic, emotional, and mate-rial ties to the homeland may bond the diasporacommunity together and distinguish it fromother groups in the host nation. However, withinany diaspora there is often considerable internalvariation based on social class, place of residence(urban or rural), length of residence in the hostnation, region of emigration, language, and poli-tics. These internal variations also affect the ex-tent to which different subgroups within adiaspora feel and act on ties to the homeland.For example, Lubavitcher Hasidic Jews in theUnited States are closely linked to Israel and theirleader actively tries to influence Israeli policies.The Satmar Hasidic Jews, though culturallysimilar to the Lubavitchers and also resident inNew York City, reject the state of Israel and seekno contact with it. Similarly, younger Chinesein the Philippines who are prevented from learn-ing Chinese have fewer ties to China and aremore assimilated into Filipino life than are ear-lier generations.

As with variation within a diaspora, there isalso marked variation when comparisons aremade across diasporas. Jewish homeland ties goback 2,600 years, although for most of this timethere was no physical homeland to which theycould return. African-American homeland tiesare not to a specific culture or place, but to anentire continent. The intensity of Indian tiesrange from those in the East African diaspora

who retire in India to those in the United Stateswho maintain ties but become U.S. citizens;Chinese ties are mainly to southern China, thearea from which most Chinese emigrated.

The presence of homeland ties raises the is-sue of divided loyalties, which can create ten-sion and conflict between diaspora and hostcommunities. That is, the diaspora may be sus-pected of putting the interests of its homelandahead of the interests of the host nation. This isone reason that diasporas are sometimes deniedcitizenship or scapegoated in times of politicalor economic unrest. The political relationshipsinvolving the diaspora, the homeland, and thehost nation may take any of seven forms:

1. The diaspora may attempt to directly influ-ence homeland policies

2. The diaspora may attempt to influence thehost government to aid the homeland

3. The homeland government may seek assis-tance from the diaspora

4. The diaspora may seek protection from thehomeland government

5. The host nation may try to use the diasporato influence the homeland government

6. The diaspora may attempt to influence host-nation organizations to assist the homeland

7. The homeland government may ask the hostnation to influence the diaspora

See also ANTI-SEMITISM; ASSIMILATION;IRREDENTISM; MIDDLEMAN MINORITIES; MIGRANTWORKERS; SLAVERY; SYNCRETIC CULTURES.

Cohen, Steven. (1983) American Modernity andJewish Identity.

Harris, Joseph E., ed. (1982) Global Dimensionsof the African Diaspora.

Kilson, Martin, and Robert Rotberg, eds. (1976)African Diasporas: Interpretive Essays.

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Lim, Linda Y. C., and L. A. Peter Gosling.(1983) The Chinese in Southeast Asia. Volumely Ethnicity and Economic Activity. Volume 2,Identity, Culture, and Politics.

Murphy, Joseph M. (1993) Working the Spirit:Ceremonies of the African Diaspora.

60 B

Safran, William. (1991) "Diasporas in ModernSocieties: Myths of Homeland and Return."Diaspora 1: 83-99.

Sheffer, Gabriel, ed. (1986) Modern Diasporasin International Politics.

Bosnian Muslims are a Slavic people who haveresided in the region for centuries. Their ances-tors converted to Islam during the four centu-ries of Ottoman rule.

Serbian ethnic cleansing, carried out bySerbs living in Bosnia and the Serbian-controlledformer Yugoslavian military, has driven about700,000 people from Bosnia, forced about600,000 to relocate within the region, and killedtens of thousands. Those who fled went mainlyto Croatia, with many sent on to refugee campsin Germany. Ethnic cleansing methods includerape of women and girls, murder of individuals,assassination of local political leaders, mass ex-ecutions, seizure of property, house and barnburnings, placement in detention camps, and theseige of the capital city, Sarajevo. The Bosniansare opposed to and have resisted ethnic cleans-ing, preferring the continuation of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a multiethnic republic.

Beyond the Serbian desire for control of ter-ritory, factors cited as contributing to the ethniccleansing campaign in Bosnia are the three dis-tinct regional cultures (Bosnian, Croatian,Serbian) and religions (Islam, Catholicism, Or-thodoxy); the loose confederation forged underCommunist rule; Serbian control of the formerYugoslav military; historical conflict, dating mostrecently to Croat and Bosnian Muslim collabo-ration with Nazis during World War II in thekilling of Serbs; and the failure of the EuropeanCommunity to intervene actively.

While the term ethnic cleansing has beenapplied specifically to Serbian actions in Bosnia,human history is filled with other instances ofthe same types of actions for the same purpose.In Europe, Nazi efforts to exterminate the Jews(called the "final solution" by the Nazis) andGypsies are recent examples. Earlier attemptsin Europe focused on the Armenians and Slavs.Some of the treatment of the native peoples ofthe New World by European colonizers also fits

61

EThis term probably wasfirst used in 1988 in theformer USSR to de-scribe the conflict be-

tween Armenians and Azerbaijanis in theNagorno-Karabakh region. It was introduced tothe international community by journalists quot-ing Serbian nationalists in 1992. In the contextof the former Yugoslavia, the term refers to theSerbs' systematic effort to create purely Serbianareas in areas of Croatia, Serbia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina that were formerly multiethnic. InSerbia, the non-Serbian peoples were mainlyCroats and Hungarians, most of whom fled toCroatia and Hungary following the dissolutionof Yugoslavia. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, the non-Serbian peoples were Bosnian Muslims (about41 percent of the republic population of 4.4 mil-lion) and Croats. As Croatia controls the north-western areas of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatiansfound shelter there or in Croatia. Thus, Serbianethnic cleansing was directed primarily atBosnian Muslims. Like Serbs and Croats,

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ETHNIC CONFLICT

under the label of ethnic cleansing, as does thetreatment of indigenous peoples in Asia andAfrica.

See also ETHNOCIDE; GENOCIDE.

CONFLICT

Ethnic conflict meansviolent conflict amonggroups who differ fromone another in terms of

culture, religion, physical features, or language.For the last several years, ethnic conflict has beenthe most common form of collective violence inthe world. In 1988 the majority of the 111 vio-lent conflicts in the world involved minority andmajority groups within nations. In July 1993there were no less than 25 ethnic conflicts thatinvolved the regular use of violence—mass kill-ings, executions, terrorist bombings, assassina-tions, lootings, rapes, and forced expulsions—byone or both groups to achieve their aims. In ad-dition, there are several dozen other conflicts thatare mostly nonviolent, and hundreds of situa-tions of political, economic, and cultural repres-sion that may eventually erupt into open conflictand violence.

Although attention is always drawn to thebloodiest and most protracted of conflicts—Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland;Serbs, Bosnian Muslims, and Croats in theBalkans; Sri Lankan Tamils and Sinhalese in SriLanka; Kurds in the Middle East; Armeniansand Azerbaijanis in Nagorno-Karabakh—themany nonviolent conflicts should not be ignored,as they are the seedbeds of future violent con-flicts. Nonviolent ethnic conflict often takes theform of political, economic, or cultural repres-sion of ethnic minorities, and includes restric-tions on voting, burdensome taxes, exclusionfrom certain professions, residential isolation,educational quotas, prohibitions on the use ofthe ethnic language, and restrictions on religiousworship. A1989 survey lists 261 minority groups

(many of which are ethnic groups) in 99 of126nations as the victims of such oppression, sug-gesting a long and troubled future for ethnic re-lations around the world.

Another form of ethnic conflict is legal con-flict, which is occurring with some frequency inNorth America, Australia, and other areas wherenative peoples (American Indians, Inuit/Eski-mos, and Aleuts in North America; aboriginalpeoples in Australia; Maori in New Zealand; andSaami in Nordic nations, among others) areseeking to reestablish their legal, economic, po-litical, cultural, and religious rights through pe-titions to the state and national governments,and through legal action. Their goals are to re-store ownership of their ancestral lands or toreceive compensation for the lands that arenow owned almost always by nonindigenouspeople, official recognition as a distinct politicalentity, freedom from state and some federallaws, religious freedom, and the right to self-determination and self-government.

Ethnic conflict often involves more than justconflict among the groups; often there is con-flict among factions within each group, and othernations and peoples often become involved. InSri Lanka, for example, the conflict between theSinhalese and Sri Lankan Tamils has been ac-companied by assassinations, bombings, and ri-ots by political factions in both groups, andviolence directed at Muslim communities in SriLanka. Similar situations have occurred inNorthern Ireland, Azerbaijan, and elsewhere aspolitical rivals and their followers battle for in-fluence and power. Often the key policy distinc-tion between factions is the support forpeaceful-accommodation resolutions to the con-flict versus violent-conquest resolutions.

At the international level, ethnic conflictsalso usually involve nations and citizens of na-tions who are not direct combatants in the con-flict. Ethnic conflicts are a major cause ofrefugees and displaced persons who seek safetyin noninvolved nations, nations that are support-

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ive of their interests, or nations with large eth-nic confederate populations. These large refu-gee populations (further discussed under"Refugees" in this volume) put heavy economic,social, and political stress on the host nation andmay lead to ethnic conflict within that nation(as is the case in Germany), which gives the hostnation a stake in seeing the external conflictquickly resolved. While those forced to flee areusually members of the warring groups, othernoncombatants may be affected as well. In SriLanka, in addition to the Tamils who fled northand east and out of the country, and the Sinha-lese who fled south, hundreds of thousands ofMuslims not involved in the conflict fled fromthe eastern Tamil region to safety in the westernregion.

In addition to accepting refugees, nationswith an interest in the conflict or ties to one ofthe groups may choose to become directly in-volved by assisting one ethnic group, as with theBritish in Northern Ireland, Turkey and Greecein Cyprus, and India in Sri Lanka, to name afew. Additionally, even if a government remainsofficially neutral or uninvolved, its citizens willoften support members of their ethnic group inanother nation, as can be seen in Jewish supportfor Israel and Irish-American support for IrishCatholics in Northern Ireland. For many people,mother country sentiments remain powerful, andfeelings of ethnic solidarity quickly convert intopolitical and economic support when the secu-rity of the homeland is threatened.

Types of Ethnic ConflictAlthough students of ethnic conflict often lumpall such conflicts together as a single type ofhuman conflict, ethnic conflict actually takes avariety of forms. One key distinction is betweenconflicts that occur in unranked situations ver-sus those in ranked situations. In an unrankedsituation the ethnic groups are relatively equalin power or perceive themselves to be so; in aranked situation, the ethnic groups in a nation

are ordered in a hierarchy of power. Conven-tional wisdom holds that ethnic conflicts will bemore common and less amenable to control inunranked situations where the groups are incompetition for wealth and power, and whereone group is not powerful enough to repress theother groups. Another distinction related to thisfirst one is between conflicts in the developingworld and those in the industrialized world. Theformer often center on competition between eth-nic groups for political dominance, while thelatter often involve separatist movements by eth-nic minorities and repression by the government.A third distinction can be made among differ-ent types of violent ethnic conflict on the basisof the goals of the participants in the conflict.From this perspective, violent conflicts in theworld today fall into five categories:

1. Separatist Movements. Violence occurs aspart of an effort by an ethnic group to be-come politically independent, or as part ofan effort by a nation to prevent the groupfrom doing so. Such conflicts are quite com-mon and most often involve minority groupsseeking to establish an independent nationin their ancestral homeland, which is nowcontrolled by the nation within which theylive.

2. Internal Rivalry for Autonomy, PoliticalPower, or Territorial Control. Violence oc-curs as part of a conflict between ethnicgroups in one nation or between an ethnicgroup and the government over access to andcontrol of economic resources, politicalpower, territory, or political autonomywithin the nation. When the goals of thegroup seeking autonomy or more power orwealth seem unattainable, they may shifttheir goal to separatism. Such conflicts areespecially common in former colonies, andto a large degree result from colonial poli-cies that purposefully created rivalries be-tween indigenous peoples and also afforded

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more education, status, and government orbusiness responsibility to one group. Uponindependence, these multiethnic nations areoften faced with ethnic competition for po-litical power that pits those who enjoyedmore power under colonial rule with thosenow seeking power. Because of the histori-cal link to colonial policies, such conflictsare most common in former colonized na-tions in South Asia and Africa.

3. Conquest. Violence occurs as part of a warbetween two or more nations where ethnicdifferences between the groups is a majorfactor in the animosity between the groups.The objective of the war might be the con-quest of the other ethnic group, or thegroup's removal from all or some of its terri-tory. Such conflicts are now quite rare.

4. Survival. Violence occurs as part of an at-tempt by a national government to forciblyassimilate, harm, remove, or drive out anethnic minority or deprive them of social,religious, political, or economic rightsgranted other residents of the nation. Whilemost such conflicts in the world today aremainly nonviolent (although political riot-ing is not uncommon), these conflicts havethe potential to explode into violence inmany nations around the world.

5. Irredentist. Violence occurs as part of an at-tempt by an ethnic group(s) or nation(s) toregain or retain territory on the basis of analleged ancestral or historical right to theterritory. Often the territory is controlled byanother nation, but is located adjacent to,and the population is mainly of, the ethnicgroup dominant in the nation seeking own-ership. Irredentist conflicts are very commontoday, and are often the result of nationalboundaries established during colonialtimes, or in eastern Europe during the eraof Soviet dominance. These boundaries of-ten ignored existing ethnic boundaries and

claims by local groups to their ethnic home-lands.

The following table lists the major ethnicconflicts around the world as of January 1994—the ethnic groups involved, the nations in whichthey are occurring, and the type of conflict, basedon this five-type typology. Some conflicts, ofcourse, are of more than one type because themotivations of the conflicting groups are differ-ent or because political factions within one groupmay have different goals. Descriptive profiles ofmost of the conflicts listed below can be foundin this volume. Nonviolent survival conflicts in-volving issues of minority rights are generallynot included; a full list of these may be found inthe publications by Gurr cited below.

Religious ConflictClosely related to and sometimes indistinguish-able from ethnic conflict is religious conflict—conflict between two groups who adhere todifferent religions. Since the religion of conflict-ing groups is often the most visible symbol ofgroup differences to outsiders, many conflictsbetween ethnic groups are often assumed to bereligious in nature. However, this is often only amisperception by outsiders unaware of long-standing hostility between the groups and com-peting territorial claims; not all ethnic conflictsresult from religious differences, nor is all reli-gious conflict considered ethnic conflict. Eth-nic conflicts such as those involving the Kurdsin the Middle East and the Basques in Spaininvolve groups of the same religion (Islam andCatholicism, respectively), although there areother cultural differences between the groups.In some conflicts, such as between the Protes-tant and Catholic Northern Irish, religiousdifferences are present, but other factors—economic conditions and political repression—are more basic causes. In other conflicts, such asthat between the Israelis and Palestinians, reli-gious differences are a major barrier to peaceful

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Ethnic Group(s)

Abkahzians, GeorgiansAlbanians, SerbsArmenians, Azerbaijani TurksAssameseBaha'iBasquesBodoBosnians, SerbsCatalansCatholics, ProtestantsChakmaChechen-IngushCoptsCroats, SerbsCypriotsIndo-Fijians, FijiansForeigners in GermanyFrench CanadiansGypsies and TravelersHausa, Yoruba, IgboHindus, MuslimsHungariansHutu, TutsiIsraelis, PalestiniansJakun, TivKachin, Karen, MonKashmiriKurdsKurdsLuo, KalejinNagasNepaleseOssetesRussiansRussians and UkrainiansShi'ite Muslims (Marsh Arabs)SikhsTamils, SinhaleseTibetansTimoreseVietnamese

Ethnic Conflicts in 1994

Nation

GeorgiaSerbiaAzerbaijanIndiaIranSpainIndiaBosnia, SerbiaSpainNorthern IrelandBangladeshRussiaEgyptCroatiaCyprusFijiGermanyCanadaEuropeNigeriaIndiaRomaniaBurundi, RwandaMiddle EastNigeriaMyanmarIndiaIran, IraqTurkeyKenyaIndiaBhutanGeorgiaFormer Soviet RepublicsMoldovaIraqIndiaSri LankaChinaIndonesiaCambodia

Conflict Type

SeparatistSurvival, IrredentistIrredentistSeparatist, SurvivalSurvivalSeparatistSurvivalSurvival, Conquest, IrredentistSurvivalSeparatist, IrredentistSurvivalSeparatistSurvivalSeparatist, Conquest, SurvivalSeparatistSurvivalSurvivalSeparatist, InternalSurvivalInternalSurvival, InternalSurvival, IrredentistSurvival, InternalSurvival, Separatist, IrredentistSurvivalSurvival, InternalSeparatist, IrredentistSeparatistSurvival, IrredentistInternalSeparatistSurvivalSeparatistSurvival, InternalSeparatistSurvivalSeparatist, Survival, InternalInternal, SeparatistSurvival, SeparatistSurvivalSurvival

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relations, but are not the only cause of the con-flict. Finally, there are some conflicts that areessentially religious in nature, such as betweenMuslims and Hindus in India, although in thiscase the two groups are actually quite similarculturally.

Perhaps the most common form of ethnicconflict is the persecution of religious minori-ties. Today, groups suffering from persecutioncaused mainly by religious differences (althoughissues of economic and political competition arerarely absent altogether) include Copts in Egypt,Baha i in Iran, and Shi'ite Muslims (called MarshArabs) in southern Iraq.

One special form of religious conflict in-volves the efforts of religious fundamentalistmovements to replace secular rule with religiousrule. While Christian, Hindu, Jewish, and otherfundamentalist movements can be found aroundthe world, it is the Islamic fundamentalismmovement that draws the most attention.

Islam is one of the major world religions,with over 950 million adherents worldwide in1993, slightly less than half the number of Chris-tians in the world. A follower of Islam is calleda Muslim in English, a term now preferred toMoslem, which was conventionally used untilabout 20 years ago. Islam was founded byMuhammed in what is now Saudi Arabia be-tween A.D. 610 and 632. The sacred book of Is-lam is the Qur'an (Koran), which is consideredto be the one true statement of God's word and,in the view of Muslims, supersedes divine rev-elation as set forth in the Jewish and Christianbibles. Muslims follow the Five Pillars of Islam:(1) accepting and testifying that there is no godexcept Allah and that Muhammed is his trueprophet; (2) praying five times daily, in the di-rection of Mecca; (3) fasting during the monthof Ramadan; (4) giving alms to the poor; and(5) making a pilgrimage to Mecca, the holy land.Beyond a system of belief and worship, Islam isalso a prescription for life, and Muslims live theirlives in a manner consistent with Islamic

requirments. Thus, like Judaism, Islamic prac-tice is filled with rules and prescriptions for dailylife that go beyond religious practice. The twomain branches of Islam are Sunni and Shi'ite;each, especially Shi'ite, has a number of distinctsubsects.

Although its origins are in the Middle East,over the centuries Islam spread through trade,conquest, migration, and conversion to NorthAfrica, northwest Africa, central Asia, southAsia, and Southeast Asia. Today, the four na-tions with the largest Muslim populations arenot in the Middle East but in Asia—Indonesia,Bangladesh, Pakistan, and India. Of these, Pa-kistan, like Iran in the Middle East and theSudan in Africa, is an Islamic rather than a secu-lar nation. All other nations with majority Is-lamic populations are secular.

Although the nations with the largest Is-lamic populations are outside the Middle Eastand North Africa, Islamic fundamentalism iscentered in the Middle East where Islamic andArab identity are closely interrelated, contrast-ing with Christian and Western identity. At thesame time, Islamic fundamentalism is global inthat some Muslims in many nations adhere tothe political agenda of the movement. In addi-tion, whether fundamentalism is directly in-volved or not, Muslims are involved in ethnicconflicts in Bosnia, Serbia (Albanian Muslims),Cyprus (Turkish Muslims), Georgia, Azerbaijan,the Philippines (Muslim separatists on the is-land of Mindanao), India (Muslims in generaland in Kashmir in particular), Sri Lanka, Israel,France, and Nigeria. In the United States, thebombing of the World Trade Center inNew York City in 1993 produced a rise in anti-Muslim and anti-Arab feelings among the gen-eral U.S. population.

The fundamentalist movement in theMiddle East centers on efforts by fundamental-ists to replace secular governments in a numberof—if not all—nations with Islamic govern-ments, or governments that adhere to Islamic

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values. To achieve this end, Islamic organiza-tions have sought power through elections andhave resorted to violence, including assassina-tions, terrorism, riots, strikes, and the persecu-tion of non-Muslim minorities. Fundamentalistshave also mounted what are called "culturaloffensives" in some nations, such as Egypt, toreplace secular guidelines with Islamic principles.For example, efforts have been made to banWestern art and literature, change the schoolcurriculum, and require women and girls to wearveils. In the affected nations, the responses tothe perceived threat have varied—Tunisia, Al-geria, and Egypt have reacted by forcibly repress-ing fundamentalist organizations; Jordan hasallowed them political participation, and fun-damentalists hold the majority in the Jorda-nian parliament; and Saudi Arabia has soughtto placate them while the royal family maintainsabsolute control. In many nations outside theregion, where fundamentalism is seen as a pos-sible threat to order and secular rule, some eth-nic conflicts are motivated at least in part by adesire to limit Muslim power.

The roots of the current Islamic fundamen-talism movement go back 1,400 years to thefounding of Islam and the ensuing and never-resolved conflict with the values of Western civi-lization and Christianity, and the frequentmilitary battles between the Islamic world andthe West. For the past 300 years Europe has hadthe upper hand, to the point that the politicalmap of the modern Middle East is a product ofEuropean colonialism, and Western customs andproducts are found throughout. The fundamen-talist movement, by creating independent Is-lamic nations and a unified Arab polity basedon Islam as it existed in the past, is in large parta reaction to Western domination. Thus, therhetoric of the movement stresses anti-Western,anticolonial, and anti-imperialism themes andtargets governments, institutions, and individu-als believed to be loyal to, or examples of, theseWestern themes. In accord with Islamic belief,

the movement is a Holy War, or struggle involv-ing a battle over Good versus Evil, to many ifnot all Islamic participants, and an Islamic vic-tory and the conversion of others to Islam is atriumph by Good.

Causes of Ethnic ConflictAs yet there is no complete answer to the ques-tion of cause and, given the different types ofethnic conflict and the various situations inwhich they occur, the question may ultimatelyrequire several, perhaps related, answers. In at-tempting to explain ethnic conflict in general aswell as specific conflicts, one must consider thebasic nature and strength of ethnic ties, situ-ational factors that may encourage the develop-ment of ethnic solidarity and ethnic-basedcompetition, and the actual motives articulatedby the groups. As regards ethnicity, political sci-entist Donald Horowitz reminds us that ethnicsolidarity is "powerful, permeative, passionate,and pervasive." Additionally, some biologicallyoriented researchers suggest that strong feelingsof ethnic solidarity and ethnic conflict have theirroots in human biological evolution, and thus itis not surprising that ethnic groups will fight todominate other groups or to protect their owninterests. Another not necessarily contradictoryline of thought is that in many nations over thelast several decades, ethnic groups have emergedor reemerged as interest groups whose memberscoalesce as a means of gaining political and eco-nomic power. Recently, a number of situationalfactors have drawn special attention as causes ofethnic conflict, including the end of centralizedrule in former Communist nations; the end ofcolonial or colonial-style rule in Africa and Asia;the ideal of democracy, which places groups indirect competition for power and political con-trol; and economic inequalities among ethnicgroups both within and across nations.

In a recent attempt to explain rebellions byminority groups, political scientist Ted Gurr hassuggested a complex theory incorporating many

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factors, in the most general sense, that may berelated to ethnic conflict: (1) the minority group'shistory and current status, which includes thegroup's degree of disadvantage relative to othergroups in the nation, the strength of the group'sself-identity, the extent of group cohesion andits capacity to mobilize its resources, and theextent of repression by the dominant group; (2)the opportunities available to the group for po-litical action including the control exercised bythe ruling regime, the group leader's strategy andtactics, and shifts in state power that provide theopportunity for rebellion; (3) global processesthat intensify grievances such as the modern statesystem, which stresses nationalism and central-ized control, and the global economy, which hasled to the economic exploitation of some groups;(4) the international spread of conflict, whichmay involve the same group such as the Kurdsin a number of nations or the spread of conflict

from one group to other groups; and (5) the ef-fects of state power on political action such asthe form of government, which may lead thegovernment to try to resolve the minority group'sgrievance or alternatively to repress it.

Managing and Resolving Ethnic ConflictsMany experts now believe that most ethnic con-flicts are uniquely resistant to resolution and thatthe international community and national gov-ernments would be wiser to invest their resourcesin managing and controlling these conflictsrather than in trying to resolve them. Recentexperience suggests that this is sound advice—while conflict-resolution efforts do sometimesproduce formal accords, they rarely yield long-term peace and harmony. Ethnic conflicts inCyprus, Northern Ireland, Bosnia, Sri Lanka,and northwest India were all "settled" by accords,but the conflicts quickly flared up anew and con-

Displacement of people is common in ethnic conflict, as with these Palestinians expelled into southern Lebanon byIsrael in December 1992.

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tinued. In most situations, ethnic conflicts endonly through the subjugation or expulsion of onegroup by the other, a resolution likely to leavethe loser unsatisfied and ready to resume theconflict when the opportunity presents itself inthe future, which can be several decades away.

Ethnic conflicts are resolution-resistant fora number of reasons. First, we need to remem-ber Donald Horowitz's point that ethnic soli-darity is "powerful, permeative, passionate, andpervasive." Second, the stakes in ethnic conflictsare often, or are believed by the combatants tobe, very high—the survival of their group, theirdomination by another group, or their domina-tion of the other group. These are the very is-sues that precipitate the strong ethnic solidaritydescribed by Horowitz, and are the reasons forwhich members of ethnic groups are willing tokill and die. Third, ethnic conflicts are usuallynot just disputes about tangible objectives, suchas political control or access to employment, butalso involve powerful xenophobic and ethnocen-tric feelings and symbols, and the resultingscapegoating and stereotyping tend to make suchconflicts particularly impervious to rational reso-lution. Fourth, the international experience hasso far produced few permanent alternatives toethnic conflict in multiethnic nations and re-gions. The United States is perhaps the onlynation that holds to the view that a nation willbe stronger by assimilating all peoples into onenational whole, although that goal has yet to beachieved. A few other nations adhere to a plu-ralism model with groups sharing power, but ofthese, Canada is burdened by the French-Canadian separatist movement and Switzerlandby the Jura autonomy movement. While Bel-gium and the Mauritius seem free of protracted,violent conflict, they, along with Switzerland,are unique situations that do not provide a modelfor most other nations. Fifth, ethnic rights andethnic conflict are neither legally recognized norregulated at the international level and are stillto a large extent treated as internal matters, to

be resolved by the nation itself. Unfortunately,in most situations the state itself is a party to thedispute or has a stake in the success of one groupat the expense of another group. Thus, the stateis often a self-interested and ineffective force forpeaceful, long-term ethnic-conflict resolutionthat leaves all parties satisfied. Additionally, be-cause ethnic conflicts are defined as internalmatters, United Nations and multination alli-ances have generally restricted their involvementto peacekeeping and rescue missions designedto limit the fighting and have played a lesser rolein long-term resolution. Similarly, the activitiesof nongovernmental organizations are mostlygeared to assisting refugees and displaced per-sons, and sheltering, feeding, and treating thevictims.

Ongoing ConflictViolent ethnic conflict will likely continue andspread to other ethnic groups in the now-independent republics of the former SovietUnion, in south Asia, in developing nations inAfrica, and in Europe. In the former Soviet re-publics, the conflict will most likely take twoforms. First, it will continue to pit ethnic mi-norities against the majority groups such as theAbkhazians and the Georgians. Second, it willpit the national groups against the Russians whohave settled in these nations since the seven-teenth century and who occupied key economicand political positions during the Soviet period.Some of these Russian minorities will either beforced to give up power, assimilate, or leave forRussia. South Asia is already the arena for con-siderable ethnic unrest, including Tamils andSinhalese in Sri Lanka, Assamese and Bodo innortheastern India, Chakma and other tribalpeoples in Bangladesh, Sikhs in India and Paki-stan, Kashmiri in the disputed Kashmir region,Muslims and Hindus in India, and Burmese andethnic minorities such as the Karen and Mon inMyanmar. Because of the overwhelming socialand economic change in south Asia and the

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complex mix of ethnic, occupational (caste), re-ligious, and language groups, continuing esca-lation of conflicts over access to political powerand economic opportunity is expected. In Af-rica, with 40 nations, over 700 ethnic groups,large Muslim and Christian populations inWestern nations, and with groups in a numberof nations already vying for political power, con-flict will continue, although not all conflict isalong ethnic lines. In Europe, a pattern of con-tinuing conflict persists between ethnic minori-ties (including both linguistic minorities andnational minorities) and the state in the former'squest for political autonomy or independence.Additionally, the emerging pattern of conflictand violence directed at non-European immi-grants and refugees can be expected to continue.Finally, in South America, the violence directedat American Indians in the Amazon and else-where by those seeking to exploit the lumber,mineral, and other resources of the region arelikely to continue.

See also COLONIALISM; ETHNOCENTRISM;ETHNOCIDE; GENOCIDE; HUMAN RIGHTS; IN-DIGENOUS PEOPLES; MINORITY RIGHTS; RACEAND RACISM; SPECIFIC ETHNIC CONFLICTS.

Binder, David, and Barbara Crossette. (1992)"As Ethnic Wars Multiply, U.S. Strives for aPolicy." New York Times. 7 February: 1,14.

de Silva, K. M., and S. W. R. de A. Samara-singhe. (1993) Peace Accords and Ethnic Con-

flict.

Elmer, Glaister A., and Evelyn A. Elmer. (1988)Ethnic Conflicts Abroad: Clues to America's Fu-ture? AICF Monograph Series, no. 8.

Esposito, John L. (1984) The Islamic Threat:Myth or Reality.

Gurr,Ted R. (1993) Minorities at Risk: A GlobalView ofEthnopolitical Conflicts.

Gurr, Ted R., and James R. Scarritt. (1989)"Minority Rights at Risk: A Global Survey."Human Rights Quarterly 11: 375-405.

Horowitz, Donald L. (1985) Ethnic Groups inConflict.

Lewis, Bernard. (1990) "The Roots of Mus-lim Rage." Atlantic Monthly. September:47-60.

Messina, Anthony M., et al., eds. (1992) Ethnicand Racial Minorities in Advanced IndustrialDemocracies.

Miller, Judith. (1992) "The Islamic Wave." NewYork Times Magazine. 31 May: 22-26, 38,40, 42.

Minority Rights Group. (1990) World Directoryof Minorities.

Rupesinghe, Kumar. (1987) "Theories of Con-flict Resolution and Their Applicability toProtracted Ethnic Conflicts." Bulletin of PeaceProposals 18: 527-539.

Ryan, Stephen. (1990) Ethnic Conflict and In-ternational Relations.

Samarasinghe, S. W. R. de A., and ReedCoughlan, eds. (1991) Economic Dimensionsof Ethnic Conflict.

Stavenhagen, Rodolfo. (1987) "Ethnic Conflictand Human Rights: Their Interrelationship."Bulletin of Peace Proposals 18: 507-514.

ETHNIC HUMOREthnic humor is "a typeof humor in which funis made of the perceived

behavior, customs, personality, or any other traitsof a group or its members by virtue of their spe-cific sociocultural identity." (Apte 1985, 108)Ethnic humor is a component of ethnocentrismas it serves to reinforce the values of the in-groupby portraying the out-group in negative, stereo-typical terms. Stereotyping is a key component

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of ethnic humor; the humor would not be un-derstood nor considered funny unless the mem-bers of the culture all shared the same image ofthe group that is the butt of the humor.

Ethnic humor takes a variety of formsaround the world and is usually expressed in thesame ways other forms of humor are expressedin a culture. Common expressions of ethnic hu-mor are through jokes, riddle-jokes (such as lightbulb jokes in which the answer is a negative ste-reotype), imitative gestures, and rhymes, prov-erbs, and caricature. For example, the Taosimitate the dress of the Santa Clara and Navajoin ceremonies, Chicanos ridicule whites bytranslating Spanish names into their often-humorous English forms (for example, MariaDolores de la Barriga becomes "Mary StomachPains"), and Hungarian children learn the fol-lowing rhyme:

Stork, stork, turtle-dove,Why are your feet bleeding?Turkish children have cut them up,Hungarian children will cure them,

With pipes, drums, and violins....

Ethnic humor is a component of ethnic re-lations in all cultures, as some people in all cul-tures amuse themselves and others by ridiculingmembers of other cultures. It is likely that eth-nic humor is more common, more cutting, andof greater social importance when it involvesgroups that are in conflict, such as those whosecontact has resulted from colonization and large-scale immigration. The ethnic groups whosemembers constitute the American populationhave been brought together both by New Worldcolonization and immigration, and ethnic con-flict and competition have long been commonfeatures of American life, as indicated by thewealth of derogatory ethnic jokes told today andin the past. For example, a popular joke bookpublished in 1921 titled Jokes for All Occasionscontains jokes that portray and ridicule, in ste-reotypical terms, Americans of African, Latin

American, Jewish, Italian, Finnish, Japanese,Chinese, Dutch, American Indian, Scottish,Irish, and Asian Indian descent, as well as for-eigners in general. A few of these jokes displaythe negative stereotypical images typical of earlytwentieth-century America. The following storydepicts African-Americans as lazy and ridiculestheir speech:

The foreman of a Southern Mill, who was muchtroubled by the shiftlessness of his colored work-ers, called sharply to two of the men slouchingpast him."Hi, you! Where are you going?""Well, suh, boss," one of them answered, "we isgoin' to de mill wid dis-heah plank.""Plank! What plank? Where's the plank?" theforeman demanded.The colored spokesman looked inquiringly andsomewhat surprisedly at his own empty handsand those of his companion, whom he addressedgood-naturedly:"Now, if dat don't beat all, George! If we hain'tgone an' clean forgitted dat plank!"

Another joke ridicules Latin Americans for thelack of political stability in their region as com-pared to the United States:

At a reception by the Daughters of the Revolu-tion in New York City appeared a woman fromone of the Latin-American States. She wore alarge number of decorations and insignia. It wasexplained that she was a Daughter of all 238revolutions in her own country.

A third joke ridicules the Italian immigrant, whowas a frequent target of ethnic humor as part ofa broader pattern of anti-Italian sentiment in theearly twentieth century:

The Italian workman in the West was warnedto look out for rattlesnakes. He was assured,however, that a snake would never strike untilafter sounding the rattles. One day, while seatedon a log, eating his lunch, the Italian saw a rattle-snake coiled ready to strike. He lifted his legscarefully, with the intention of darting away onthe other side of the log the moment the rattlesshould sound their warning. But just as his feet

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cleared the top of the log, the snake struck outand its fangs were buried in the wood only afraction of an inch below the Italian's trousers.The frightened man fled madly, but he tookbreath to shriek over his shoulder:

"Son of a gun! Why you no ringa da bell?"

These three examples are of ethnic humor di-rected by the majority (white Americans ofnorthern European ancestry) at ethnic minori-ties. Equally common is the reverse, where eth-nic minorities make majority groups the butt oftheir humor. However, one key difference is thatwhile the majority often expresses its humoropenly, as in the book where these jokes werepublished, minorities are more careful and ridi-cule majority groups in private for fear of of-fending the more powerful group. The ethnichumor of minorities may also serve the functionof releasing aggression and hostility. As with theethnic humor of majority groups, the content ofminority-group ethnic humor often portraysthe majority in stereotypically negative ways,often emphasizing moral weakness or inappro-priate social behavior. The following African-American joke emphasizes white immorality:

Two Negro women in domestic service are com-paring notes.

"At my place," one complains, "I have a terribletime; all day it's 'Yes, Ma'am,' 'Yes, Ma'am,' 'Yes,Ma'am.'"

"Me, too," comments the other, "but with meit's 'No, Sir,' 'No, Sir,' 'No, Sir.'"

Mountain whites in Appalachia do not trustoutsiders and delight in stories in which theytake advantage of outsiders:

A middle-aged widow contracted with a largecorporation to build herself a "shell house," asmall frame building without interior partitionsor finish. As security, she mortgaged a small tractof her land to the construction company.

As an informant related the story:

Well, Lucille had her a place all bulldosed offlevel, where she wanted them fellows to buildher little house. When they brought the lumber,

they put it down the hill from the level place.Then about two days after that, the carpenterscome and built the house where the lumber was.Well, let me tell you, they never did get Lucilleto pay for that house. She got it free, becausethey didn't put it where she wanted it. Of course,they took that other piece—the one she put inthe contract. But she got herself a house free andclear.

The western Apache often express their percep-tion of "the Whiteman" through humor, includ-ing cartoons in the tribal newspaper, jokes,caricature, and clowning. One aspect of socialinteraction among western Apache men is jok-ing imitations that portray whites such as teach-ers, doctors, and government workers, amongothers, as loud, aggressive, boorish, overlyfriendly, immodest social incompetents. Thisbehavior, while not very common, serves torecount white mistreatment of the westernApache.

Ethnic humor is also sometimes used todefine the boundary and clarify the relationshipbetween different ethnic groups. The followingJicarilla Apache joke emphasizes the boundarybetween American Indians and whites and thehistorical basis of the inequality between the two:

An Indian comes into a bar, blanket, featherand all.

He puts two strings of cheap beads on the barand orders a drink. The beads are to pay for thedrink. The bartender refuses to accept. The In-dian says, "Why not. Your ancestors sold myancestors this stuff for one Manhattan."

This joke is similar in message to another inwhich treaties between American Indian nationsand the U.S. government are described as con-taining this clause: "The (American Indian na-tion) shall keep the land for as far as the eye cansee and for as long as the waters shall run or 90days, whichever comes first." Ethnic humor isalso used by individuals to establish ties withother members of the ethnic group and as animpression management technique in dealing

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with outsiders. For example, joking referencesby Italian-Americans to the Mafia or their tiesto it play on the negative stereotype of Italian-Americans as gangsters, increasing their powerand influence in encounters with non—Italian-Americans, who do not know if they should takethese references seriously or not.

A final form of ethnic humor is derogatoryhumor directed at the group by members of thegroup. For example, ethnic comedians in theUnited States often imitate and mock the dress,mannerisms, and accents of immigrants in theirown ethnic group. Such behavior perhaps allowsthe immigrants to laugh at their own sometimesdifficult adjustment to the United States and alsoserves an assimilative function in publicly mark-ing traditional customs that are not acceptable.Similarly, African-American comedians oftentell poverty and Ku Klux Klan jokes to African-American audiences. Jokes such as "Down whereI'm from the Klan is so bad they put a cross onyour front yard and then they come and ask youfor a match," or "We were so poor our daddyinvented the limbo when he tried to enter a paytoilet" allow African-Americans to share in andexpress anger about their common experienceof discrimination.

See also ETHNOCENTRISM.

Apte, Mahadev L. (1985) Humor and Laughter:An Anthropological Approach.

Basso, Keith H. (1979) Portraits of'the White-man': Linguistic Play and Cultural Symbolsamong the Western Apache.

Crocchiola, Stanley F. L. (1967) The JicarillaApaches of New Mexico, 1540-1967.

Di Leonardo, Micaela. (1984) The Varieties ofEthnic Experience: Kinship, Class, and Genderamong California Italian-Americans.

Dundes, Alan. (1987) Cracking Jokes: Studies ofSick Humor Cycles and Stereotypes.

Fenton, William N. (1957) Factionalism at TaosPueblo, New Mexico.

Hannerz, Ulf. (1969) Soulside: Inquiries intoGhetto Culture and Community.

Hicks, George L. (1976) Appalachian Valley.

Jokes for All Occasions (1921).

Pettigrew, Thomas F. (1964) A Profile of the Ne-gro American.

Viski, Karoly. (1932) Hungarian Peasant Cus-toms.

West, Stanley A., and June Macklin, eds. (1979)The Chicano Experience.

ETHNIC IDENTITYThe basis of ethnic rela-tions is the presence andinteraction of membersof different ethnic

groups. Ethnic identity refers to the reality andthe process through which people identify them-selves and are identified by others as membersof a specific ethnic group. Ethnic solidarity re-fers to the sense and degree of cohesion felt bymembers of an ethnic group.

Ethnic IdentityEthnic identity involves self-identification as amember of an ethnic group and external ascrip-tion by others. The complexities resulting fromthis duality are indicated by perceptions of Gypsyethnic identity in the United States. Outsiders(non-Gypsies) view all Gypsies as the same andoften define them in stereotypical terms as dis-honest and thieving, governed by a "king," andas engaged in certain occupations such asfortune-telling, prostitution, carnival work, andasphalt and auto-body repair. For Gypsies inNorth America, the distinctions they draw be-tween themselves and others and among them-selves are finer and multilayered. First of all,

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regardless of their affiliation, Gypsies distinguishbetween Gypsies and non-Gypsies (called gazein the Rom language). Gypsies distinguishthemselves from non-Gypsies on the basis of fivecore values held by all Gypsy groups: (1) thepurity of Gypsies versus the pollution of non-Gypsies, which is played out behaviorally in vari-ous taboos and restrictions on contact withnon-Gypsies; (2) ultimate loyalty to the familyand kin group; (3) the restriction of group sociallife to group members only; (4) emphasis onusing one's "wits" in economic relations withnon-Gypsies; and (5) mobility. In addition tothe Gypsy/non-Gypsy distinction, Gypsies alsodistinguish among different types of non-Gypsies, following the "racial" classificationsystem typical of mainstream American soci-ety—whites and nonwhites, including African-Americans and Asians. Additionally, someGypsy groups distinguish among eastern, south-ern, and western Europeans.

While non-Gypsies view all Gypsies as com-prising one ethnic group, the Gypsies themselvessee considerably more variation. In the UnitedStates, there are four Gypsy ethnic groups: Rom(with Lowara, Macwaia, and Kalderash sub-groups), Rominchels, Ludari, and Black Dutch.In addition, Irish and Scottish Travelers, whoare not Gypsies, are often perceived as such bynon-Gypsies. Self-designation as a member ofone of the Gypsy ethnic groups is based on de-scent from members of the group, use of the lan-guage of the group, following rules of purity andrespect, adherence to appropriate social roles,participation in work requiring exploitation ofnon-Gypsies, and physical appearance. This be-lief in ethnic group identity is played out in theperceptions the groups have of one another andthe rather limited interaction between groups.The Rom see themselves as the only real Gyp-sies; questioning whether all Rominchels andLudari are actually Gypsies, they restrict inter-action with them. The Ludari are more likely tointeract with the Rominchels, but question

whether the Rominchels are real Gypsies; theytend to see the Rom as like themselves but moreaggressive and better off financially. TheRominchels see all the groups as Gypsies; theyacknowledge that the Rom follow traditionalcustoms more closely than do the others, but atthe same time resent the Rom view of them asnot real Gypsies.

The Gypsies' self-ethnic identification sys-tem points to another salient feature of ethnicidentity. Every ethnic group has its own classi-fication system. Exactly where a given individualplaces himself or herself in the system varies,depending largely on the individual's relation-ship to the person with whom he or she is com-municating and the context in which thequestion or issue is raised. For example, a RomGypsy male would identify himself as a Gypsyto a non-Gypsy, as a Rom to a Rominchel, as aLowara to another Rom, and as a member of aparticular kin group to another Lowara.

As has happened with the Rominchels, af-ter the groups assimilate into American societythey become defined as less Gypsy by more tra-ditional Gypsy groups, although the ethnic iden-tity situation of Gypsies in the United States isrelatively static. That is, the identity of the groupsand of individual group members tends to re-main constant from one ethnic interaction situ-ation to another. For other ethnic groups and inother parts of the world, the situation can bequite different, and one's ethnic identity can bechanged.

In many parts of the world, ethnic identitychange also requires migration to and settlementin a new locale where the individual's ethnic pastis unknown or doesn't matter. This is true inmuch of Latin America and also India, whereone's caste status is far less significant in the cit-ies than in rural villages. One place where a shiftin identity does not require relocation is the vil-lage of Saraguro in the Highland Ecuador. Thecommunity residents are defined as either whites(village or rural) or native Indians. The social

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category of mestizo so common throughout LatinAmerica is not important in Saraguro. The op-tion to switch identity is available to all residents,although it is not a step taken easily and anymove is generally preceded by discussions withone's family. Most shifts are from Indian to whiteidentity, and are described in the community as"He made himself white" or "He has turned him-self white" or "He was Indian before, now he iswhite." Fewer numbers of individuals shift frombeing white to Indian, or from Indian to whiteand then back to Indian. One pattern of theIndian-to-white shift is for an Indian woman tomarry a white man and take white identity atthe time of the marriage. A second major pat-tern is for Indians who have little land or fewcattle to move to town and take up white occu-pations, which they hope will be more lucrative.To become white means to speak Spanish (whichmost who convert already do), adopt white cloth-ing styles, and cut one s hair short in the whitestyle. While one motivation to becoming whiteis to overcome poverty, white status is also at-tractive because it allows fuller participation inthe local society, including the freedom to runfor political office.

In the modern world, political consider-ations often enter a group or individual's deci-sion about how to define their or another group'sethnic identity. This is because in manypostcolonial situations, ethnic identity can be-come a mechanism for access to power. In Co-lombia, for example, Afro-Colombians areseeking to assert their unique identity and eth-nic status in the context of a national agendathat deemphasizes ethnic differences and stressesColombian nationalism in its place. In a differ-ent situation, the Krymchaks of Crimea in theformer Soviet Union, although clearly of Jewishorigin and identified as Jewish by themselves andothers, claimed in the face of religious persecu-tion during the 1950s that they were not in factJewish, as they were descended from Crimeanpeoples who had converted to Judaism. For po-

litical reasons, the government accepted thisredefinition of ethnic identity and consideredKrymchaks a distinct ethnic group, a step that hashastened their assimilation into Russian society.

Interaction among members of differentethnic groups requires a sharing of mutually rec-ognizable symbols of ethnic identity. These sym-bols serve as cues enabling the individuals tointeract, often in stereotypical ways that reflecteach individual's understanding of the other'sculture. The major markers and symbols of eth-nic identity are natural physical characteristicssuch as skin color, hair texture, facial features,and body shape; created markers include cloth-ing style, jewelry, hairstyle, and alterations to thebody in the form of tattoos, scarification, andpiercing. Additionally, some markers might beimposed on the group; for example, Jews wererequired to wear distinctively styled hats andyellow badges in medieval Europe. A secondprimary marker is language, as different ethnicgroups speak different native languages. Lan-guage can also be a symbol of ethnic identity forindividuals in assimilated groups who now speaka language different from the native, and whosephysical characteristics do not easily mark eth-nic identity. For example, in the United States,members of many European-ancestry groupswill use words or phrases from their native lan-guages when communicating with other mem-bers of the same ethnic group, but not with orin the presence of outsiders.

Ethnic SolidarityEthnic solidarity can be thought of as composedof three elements, or, put another way, as mani-festing itself in three major forms. First, ethnicsolidarity might involve ethnic groups in a soci-ety distancing themselves from one another.Second, it might involve the development of astronger sense of identity and cohesion withinthe group. And, third, it might involve thegroup's taking on the status of an interest groupand thereby becoming an advocate for the

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Azerbaijani Turks celebrating Nourooz, the spring festival. Public ceremonies such as this one build ethnicsolidarity in many ethnic communities around the world.

interests of the group, often in competition withother ethnic groups.

A variety of explanations has been set forthby social scientists to explain continuing and re-emerging patterns of ethnic solidarity displayedby members of specific ethnic groups around theworld. The three that continue to draw the mostattention are primordialism, circumstantialism,and oppositionalism.

The basic assumption of primordialism is thatfeelings of ethnic solidarity and communalityshared by members of a group persist over timeand across space. For example, many Americansof Polish ancestry in some ways still "feel" Pol-ish and often maintain some ties, perhaps onlyemotional but sometimes economic, political,and social as well, to the nation of Poland andto other people of Polish ancestry. These tiespersist despite the reality that these people wereborn and live in the United States, speak En-glish, see themselves as Americans, and expectto live their entire lives in the United States.

Many other Americans of other ancestries and,in fact, many people around the world maintainthese same sorts of ties to "their" ethnic group,even though they spend much of their time apartfrom it or far from the "homeland."

The primordial approach seeks to explainthis persisting sense of ethnic solidarity by iden-tifying those factors that cause the sense of iden-tity to continue. Anthropologist Clifford Geertz(1963, 259) lists a number of such factors:

By a primordial attachment is meant one thatstems from the "givens"...of social existence: im-mediate contiguity and kin connection mainly,but beyond them the giveness that stems frombeing born into a particular religious commu-nity, speaking a particular language...and follow-ing particular social practices.

Thus, people feel a sense of ethnic solidaritybecause they live near other members of the samegroup, are related to one another, share the samereligious beliefs and practices, speak the samelanguage, and/or share some common customs.

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Most social scientists accept the primordialapproach as a reasonable way to explain ethnicsolidarity in groups where that solidarity haspersisted at about the same level of intensity fora long time. Thus, the primordial approach canbe seen as a valid way of explaining the highlevel of solidarity felt by members of the Amishcommunity in the United States—they live nearone another (mainly in rural farm communitiesin Ohio, Indiana, and Pennsylvania); many arerelated to one another, as evidenced by the fewfamily names in the communities; they speakGerman at home; practice their own Anabaptistreligion; and share numerous customs such ascommunal barn-raising, style of dress, prefer-ences in art, and recipes. The primordial ap-proach has also served well in explaining thesolidarity felt by members of the 5,000 or so non-Western cultures of the world. In the past,though not so much today, these groups dis-played all the features listed by Geertz.

Many social scientists, however, question theusefulness of the primordial approach as an ex-planation for ethnic solidarity in situations wherethe intensity level of solidarity felt by groupmembers tends to wax and wane over time.Those who take this position argue, for example,that the primordial approach does not explaincompletely the very strong sense of ethnic soli-darity that reemerged among members of thedozens of ethnic groups in the former SovietUnion in the 1990s. This reemergent solidarity(it had existed prior to Russian and Communistrule) led to the formation of distinct ethnic na-tions such as Lithuania, Georgia, Tajikistan, andat least 14 others. Social scientists suggest thatwhile some primordial feelings may be involvedhere, it is other, more immediate factors that trig-ger the dramatic reemergence of ethnic solidar-ity displayed in this situation and others like itaround the world. These immediate factors fallunder the label of circumstantialismy the secondmajor approach used by social scientists to ex-plain ethnic solidarity.

As the name suggests, circumstantialismrests on the premise that ethnic solidarity re-sults from either internal or external conditions.Ethnic solidarity might directly result from achange of circumstances, such as increased reli-gious repression or economic opportunity in asociety, or it might be the result of a rationalchoice by ethnic group leaders to use their eth-nic identity to secure political, social, or eco-nomic benefits for the group. In this view, ethnicsolidarity becomes most visible in situations ofcompetition among ethnic groups, with thegroups operating as interest groups. Situationalethnicity is a widespread form of this tendency.This view suggests that ethnic solidarity is notcertain nor constant, and instead may be imper-manent, flexible, and responsive to externalforces, particularly the nature of relations withother ethnic groups and the opportunities andadvantages members of one group expect to ac-crue through identification with another group.To some extent, the circumstantial approach as-sumes a degree of rational choice on the part ofthe participants; that is, individuals will affiliatewith a group and act collectively when they thinkit is in their best interest to do so. In this regard,ethnic group leadership is of major importance;to be effective, leaders must show members howthey will benefit.

In colonial and postcolonial situations, anumber of conditions are likely to produce aheightened sense of ethnic solidarity and the useof that solidarity to achieve political and eco-nomic power. These include economic growth,political change, movement of one group intothe traditional homeland of another group, andcompetition for employment opportunities. TheFulani of Nigeria provide an example of a groupwho changed their identity and the basis oftheir identity a number of times to ally them-selves with the British colonists and therebyenhance their own political and economicposition. The Fulani were recent arrivals in Ni-geria, claimed to be Arabic in origin, and were

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practicing Muslims. Beginning in the early1800s they spread Islam throughout northernNigeria and became the rulers of the region,converting, and to some extent subjugating, theindigenous Hausa and other groups in the pro-cess. The Fulani self-identification as ArabianMuslims fit well with British racist ideology andthe desire to control the local population throughindirect rule, a role the British awarded theFulani. The two groups collaborated in identi-fying the Fulani—because of tradition, religion,and race—as the natural rulers of the region. TheBritish permitted the use of the name Fulaniy

and then Hausa-Fulaniy which allowed them tokeep the support of local pastoralists and to con-tinue to claim traditional authority. In fact, theFulani were not the traditional rulers of the re-gion, were not from Arabia, were not ethnicallyHausa, and had imposed Islam through oftenviolent means on the local indigenous groups.However, their self-identification and the fic-tional basis of that identification served the pur-poses of the British rulers, who thereforesupported it.

The third approach to ethnic solidaritymerges some elements of the first two. Knownas oppositionalism, it rests on the premise thatthe oppositional process between ethnic groupsis the basic cause of the persistence of ethnicgroups. Central to this interpretation are theconcepts of'persistent identity systems and the op-positional process. A persistent identity system isa culture that has survived over time in a cul-tural environment where it successfully resistedeconomic, political, and religious assimilation.Such cultures are also characterized by an iden-tity that clearly differentiates them from othercultures. This identity is generally based on thereal or symbolic notion of an ethnic homelandand the use of their indigenous language. Forexample, Basque identity is based in part on theconcept of the Basque homeland and the use ofthe native Basque language. For Jews, on theother hand, in diaspora for some 1,500 years,

the ideas of homeland and ethnic language werelargely symbolic, as they did not live in Israeland Hebrew was used only for religious purposes.An oppositional process, the second feature ofoppositionalism, refers to attempts by one eth-nic or national group to incorporate another eth-nic group, and resistance by the latter to theformer. It is this process of opposition that leadspersistent oppositional systems to develop; andthe ethnic groups then persist over time due tothe use of a shared language in communication,a sharing of basic values, and a political organi-zation or mechanism for the achievement of theirgroup goals.

See also ASSIMILATION; DIASPORA; TRANS-NATIONAL MIGRATION.

Earth, Frederick, ed. (1969) Ethnic Groups andBoundaries: The Social Organization of Cul-tural Difference.

Belote, Linda S. (1983) Prejudice and Pride:Indian-White Relations in Saraguro, Ecuador.

Geertz, Clifford. (1963) The Interpretation ofCulture: Selected Essays by Clifford Geertz.

Hechter, Michael. (1986) "Rational ChoiceTheory and the Study of Race and EthnicRelations." In Theories of Race and Ethnic Re-lations, edited by John Rex and David Ma-son, 264-279.

Khazanov, Anatoly. (1989) The Krymchaks: AVanishing Group in the Soviet Union. ResearchPaper No. 71.

Royce, Anya Peterson. (1982) Ethnic Identity:Strategies of Diversity.

Salamone, Frank A. (1986) "Colonialism and theEmergence of Fulani Identity." In EthnicIdentities and Prejudices: Perspectives from theThird World, edited by Anand C. Paranjpe,61-70.

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Salo, MattT. (1979) "Gypsy Ethnicity: Implica-tions of Native Categories and Interaction forEthnic Classification." In Ethnicity 6: 73-96.

Scott, George M., Jr. (1990) "A Resynthesis ofthe Primordial and Circumstantial Ap-proaches to Ethnic Group Solidarity: To-wards an Explanatory Model." Ethnic andRacial Studies 13: 147-171.

Shils, Edward. (1957) "Primordial, Personal,Sacred and Civil Ties." British Journal of So-ciology 8:130-145.

Spicer, Edward. (1971) "Persistent Identity Sys-tems." Science 401: 795-800.

Stack,]. R, Jr., ed. (1986) The Primordial Chal-lenge: Ethnicity in the Contemporary World.

Thompson, Richard H. (1989) Theories ofEthnicity: A Critical Appraisal.

van den Berghe, Pierre L. (1981) The EthnicPhenomenon.

ETHNIC MEDIAThe term ethnic mediarefers to informationcommunicated through

mechanisms of mass communication directed atethnic groups. The media employed includeprint media such as newspapers (dailies, biweek-lies, weeklies), magazines, newsletters, calen-dars, political and educational reviews, religioustracts, and yearbooks; radio; television; andmotion pictures.

Ethnic media potentially serve four majorfunctions. First, they link scattered communi-ties and help create a united cultural and politi-cal group. For example, Norwegian-languagenewspapers and magazines circulated to Nor-wegian communities through the United Statesin the late 1800s and early 1900s helped main-tain a shared Norwegian identity despite geo-graphic dispersal. More dramatically, radio and

television in Greenland played a major role inuniting the dispersed Inuit population into apolitical unit, a group then able to achieve homerule. Second, ethnic media help maintain a senseof ethnic identity by linking diaspora commu-nities to the homeland. In immigrant media,important focal points are reports and editorialsabout events in the homeland or effects on itfrom national and international developments.For example, Jewish English-language weekliesin the metropolitan New York City area regu-larly report on events in Israel and political de-velopments in the United Nations, Middle East,and United States that affect Israel. Homelandties are so important that homeland governmentssupport some ethnic publications; an example isPakistan Affairs, published by the Pakistan Em-bassy in Washington D.C., which reaches about25 percent of Pakistanis in the United States.Third, ethnic media help revitalize and main-tain the traditional culture and ethnic pluralism.This is the major function and often the explicitgoal of ethnic media in contemporary indigenouscultures, particularly Eskimo and Inuit groupsin Alaska, Canada, and Greenland, and ethnicminorities in the former Soviet Union. Ethnicmedia help maintain cultural identity and in-tegrity in a number of ways:

1. The use of the native language—even if onlyfor some programming or in some publica-tions—increases the importance of thelanguage in day-to-day communication,standardizes dialects, provides a model forthose who do not speak the language, anddistinguishes members of the indigenouscommunity from outsiders.

2. Coverage of news and the presentation ofinformation of interest to the communitythrough news reports, essays, editorials, andinformational, educational, and entertain-ment programming represents the agendaof the ethnic group and affords it priorityover other news and information.

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3. The community bulletin board functionhelps involve community members in com-munity events.

4. Advertising by local merchants, many ofwhom are members of the ethnic commu-nity, strengthens the local economy and en-courages members of the community to uselocal stores and services.

5. Ethnic media efforts that succeed become apublic symbol of ethnic group vitality andthe group's will and ability to survive anddevelop its own cultural institutions withina dominant society.

6. Ethnic journalists who are strongly sup-portive of ethnic solidarity and identityoften become influential in the commu-nity due to their high visibility, speakingat public forums and serving as role mod-els for children.

The fourth and final function of ethnic media isthe opposite of the third function of culturalmaintenance—to encourage assimilation intomainstream society. Ethnic media may serve thispurpose, although not always by design, in anumber of ways:

1. While ethnic journalists often support eth-nic solidarity, they are also frequently in con-tact with mainstream society and useinformation from the mainstream press,which may reflect the interests of the domi-nant society.

2. Use of mainstream designs and styles, suchas spot news, talk shows, quiz shows, soapoperas, and standards of decency, may re-place traditional ways of sharing informa-tion such as through gossip or groupnewspaper reading.

3. In order to survive, ethnic media must ap-peal to the widest possible audiences, whichoften include individuals or communitiesonly marginally affiliated with the core eth-

nic community, and which may dilute thecontent of reports and programming withmainstream values and ideas.

4. Ethnic media are often published or pre-sented in the dominant language eitherwholly or in part, thereby weakening the useof the native language.

5. The use of modern technology may disrupttraditional values, patterns of interaction,and music and art styles.

The ethnic media played a major role inmaintaining group identity and ties to the home-land, and easing assimilation among most if notall immigrant groups in the United States. Tensof thousands of ethnic newspapers and maga-zines sprang up during the era of the great Eu-ropean and Asian immigration to the UnitedStates in the late 1800s and early 1900s, and inthe mid-1960s ethnic media reappeared againin a great number of variations as part of theLatin American and Asian immigration. Thecontents usually feature news and opinion piecesabout and events relevant to the homeland, so-cial news, literature and literary criticism, andessays on American citizenship. Although manyefforts were short-lived and only a few newspa-pers and magazines continue to appear, evenfailed efforts are a source of pride in ethnic com-munities. While some publications were meantfor the entire ethnic group, many were publishedfor localized communities in large cities such asChicago and New York, and others were pub-lished as a means of communicating the viewsof particular political or religious factions withinthe larger ethnic community. For example,Armenian-Americans have access to two dailynewspapers—Hairenik (Fatherland), establishedby the nationalistic Tashnag political party, andBaiker (Struggle), established by the more con-servative Ramgavar party, as well as weekliespublished by each party. Similarly, the Albanian-American community supports three maga-zines—Jeta Musilmane Shqiptare (Albanian

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Muslim Life) for Muslim Albanians, DritaEvertete (The True Light) for Orthodox Alba-nians, and Jeta Katholike Shqiptare (AlbanianCatholic Life) for Catholic Albanians. In largecommunities, a range of specialized publicationsmight have enough readers to survive. In Chi-cago, for example, the large Czech communitysupported magazines aimed at Czech womenand farmers, and a satirical review, in additionto the usual array of newspapers and magazines.

The success of immigrant publications restedon a core of intellectuals to found and write it,as well as a large, localized population to sup-port it. Over time, as the second and third gen-erations stopped using the native language, manyimmigrant publications shifted to English, andthen declined in circulation or ceased publica-tion as the population assimilated and dispersed.For example, in 1910 there were 58 weekly and232 monthly Swedish-language publications inthe United States with a circulation of 650,000.By the 1970s only 5 were left, with a circulationof no more than 15,000.

In the United States today, the Latino popu-lation supports active and growing ethnic me-dia featuring Spanish- and English-languagepublications, as well as radio and television pro-grams distributed to wide markets via satelliteand cable. In general, the Latino ethnic mediaserve similar preservation and assimilation func-tions as did the earlier European ethnic media.

In recent years, a number of indigenousAmerican Indian, Eskimo, and Inuit commu-nities in North America have been actively de-veloping native-language, bilingual, andEnglish-language media featuring ethnic news,information, and entertainment. The media havetaken the form of newspapers and other printpublications, radio, and television, which is ableto reach a very large audience via satellite. Manyof these efforts are only just beginning and maynot be successful, but nearly all are undertakenwith the explicit goal of helping to preserve thenative culture and providing balance to the as-

similative force of the mainstream media thatappeal to the younger generation.

See also ASSIMILATION; ETHNIC IDENTITY ANDSOLIDARITY; PLURALISM.

Riggins, Stephen H., ed. (1992) Ethnic Minor-ity Media: An International Perspective.

Subervi-Velez, F. A. (1986) "The Mass Mediaand Ethnic Assimilation and Pluralism: AReview and Research Proposal with SpecialFocus on Hispanics." Communication Re-search 13: 71-96.

Thernstrom, Stephan, ed. (1980) HarvardEncylopedia of American Ethnic Groups.

ETHNICAny consideration of theconcept of ethnic na-tionalism, and its appli-cation to ethnic relations

across cultures, requires a definition of key con-cepts associated with the idea of ethnic nation-alism. These include nationalism, nation, state,nation-state, national sentiment, national cul-ture, national character, ethnic separatism, andethnic nationalism. It must be noted that stu-dents of ethnicity and ethnic relations comingfrom a wide range of disciplines do not utilize asingle definition of any of these concepts, andin fact the concepts are often used imprecisely,especially concerning ethnic relations in a glo-bal sense.

Nationalism is an ideology, a political strat-egy, and a type of social movement that devel-oped following the French Revolution. As anideology, nationalism encompasses the idea thata social group (a nation or nation-state) has theright to create its own laws and develop and sup-port its own institutions, that each nation is

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unique, and that the world is composed of thesenation-states. As a political strategy and socialmovement, nationalism has been a major forcefor the organization of the world into the 200nations that exist today.

The rise and spread of nationalism is tied toindustrialization, colonization, racism, and thespread of capitalism outside of Europe. In thepost-World War II world, nationalism is linkedto the end of colonialism and the beginning ofstate-building in the Third World, and to thedemise of Communist governments in Europe.Contrary to the expectation of some experts, thespread of nationalism as both an ideology andmovement has accompanied the expansion of theworld system in which all nations are linked to-gether economically, and to a lesser extent po-litically, as national borders have become morepermeable in terms of the flow of people, goods,services, information, and culture. As a relativelyrecent phenomenon, nationalism is an "inventedtradition" in that members of the nation-state

(generally the elites) find, recall, make up, andstress visible symbols of cultural themes that sig-nify their national cultural identity. These sym-bols are often expressed in language, music,dance, theater, literature, folklore, and other en-during symbols, as well as in more basic aspectsof culture such as patterns in interpersonal rela-tionships and social structure. For example, Dan-ish society in the eighteenth century was muchlike other European societies, particularly forthose who lived in feudal states and towns.However, a purer Danish culture existed amongthe rural peasantry, and this tradition forms thebasis of modern Danish national identity. Keymodern-day features of this cultural traditioninclude the Danish language, communalism andcooperative work organizations, sexual freedom,gender equality, participation in voluntary asso-ciations, citizenship, and folk arts and crafts. Thenotion of nationalism encompasses all citizensof a nation—rich and poor, urban and rural, menand women—and the only criterion is accep-

GeneralDjokhar Dudayev among his supporters in the Chechen-Ingush independence movement. The status of theChechen-Ingush region as an independent republic remains unresolved.

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tance as a citizen of the nation-state. Throughthis process of nationalism, modern nations havecome into existence with a clear sense of iden-tity that distinguishes them from their neighbornations. Thus, there is a Dutch nation, a Nor-wegian nation, and a Swedish nation, in boththe political and cultural senses. This process isnow nearly complete for most industrializednations, and is a major issue for Third Worldpostcolonial states seeking to develop national-istic sentiments with a population composed ofnumerous ethnic groups with their own histo-ries, traditions, and homelands.

The term nation is used with considerableimprecision and has a variety of meanings. Inone usage it refers to an ethnic group (whichdefies easy definition as well) that is organizedand mobilized for political action. In this usage,an ethnic group is one whose members feel ashared sense of identity and solidarity on thebasis of a shared language, religion, culture, his-tory, or race, or alternatively, a group that coa-lesces in the context of external oppositionalforces. The term state can be used alone, and issometimes used in conjunction with nation, asin nation-state. When used alone, state refers toa political entity with clear boundaries; sover-eignty over its own territory; established criteriafor citizenship; one system of law for all; state-backed institutions of socialization, such as aneducation system; and social and cultural mecha-nisms to promote the allegiance of its citizenry,such as a national flag or anthem. This samedefinition is also used by some for nation, creat-ing confusion about the difference between thetwo. The difference is suggested by the defini-tion of nation-state as a nation whose bound-aries are the same as a state. Nation-states, sodefined, are rare in the modern world, and thosethat qualify, or nearly qualify, such as Japan orKorea, are sometimes called culturally homoge-neous states. Thus, nation-state is often used tomean a nation or state in the political sense, with-out regard for the degree of cultural homogeneity.

Associated with, and perhaps componentsof, nationalism and nation are national senti-ment, national culture, and national character.National sentiment is a shared sense of groupidentity and cohesiveness among people re-siding within geographical and culturalboundaries. Patriotism, a related and morelimited concept, refers to loyalty to the state.The national culture of a nation-state is theunique way of life of its people—their values,beliefs, customs, history—that distinguishesit from other nations. The concept is derivedfrom anthropological research on non-West-ern cultures and the idea of cultural pattern-ing, or consistency within cultures. Whethermodern nations have a national culture sharedby all members is questionable, especially inregard to ethnically heterogeneous societies.National character refers to the shared per-sonality traits of members of the same nation.The notions of national culture and characterare given much attention in ethnic humor andare components of ethnocentrism and stereo-typing. For example, jokes about the titles ofpapers to be given at a conference on elephantresearch point to stereotypical views of na-tional character (Dundes 1987, 109-111):

The Englishman gives his paper on "ElephantHunting in India."

The Russian presents, "The Elephant and theFive-Year Plan."

The Italian offers, "The Elephant and the Re-naissance."

The Frenchman delivers, "The Love Life of theElephant."

The German gives, "The Elephant and theRenazification of Germany."

Finally, the American rises to give his paper on"How To Build a Bigger and Better Elephant/'

Ethnic separatism refers to an acted-upondesire by an ethnic group (usually an ethnic mi-nority) within a nation-state dominated by

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another ethnic group to become politicallyautonomous and form its own nation-state. Theindependence movements of the Basques inSpain, Sri Lankan Tamils in Sri Lanka, andAbkhazians in Georgia are examples of separat-ist movements.

Given these definitions, ethnic nationalismcan be thought of as an ideology that supportspolitical movement toward the formation andexistence of a nation-state composed of eitherthe members of a single ethnic group, or a groupwhose culture dominates the other ethnic groupsresident in the nation-state. Most nation-statesin the world today are of these types, with themajority in the second category. Only a few na-tions such as Japan and Saudi Arabia are ethni-cally homogeneous, and the presence of migrantworkers, refugees, and indigenous minoritiessuch as the Burakumin in Japan, and Bedouinand Palestinians in Saudi Arabia, suggests thateven these nations are not demographically ho-mogeneous. However, there are exceptions tothese general patterns. In Mauritius, four eth-nic groups have set aside differences in religion,language, and culture to form a nation-state. InSwitzerland, regional ethnic autonomy (Ger-man, French, Italian) is emphasized and a strongsense of nationalism controlled.

In the world since World War II, three pat-terns of nationalism have been most obvious.First, following the end of the war—and moreimportantly, the end of colonialism in Asia andAfrica—formerly colonized states became inde-pendent and faced the problem of buildingnation-states along boundaries created by the co-lonial powers from a cultural fabric often com-posed of dozens of cultures who had been unitedonly in a political sense during the period of co-lonial domination. In Nigeria, for example, thereare over 200 ethnolinguistic groups; in Kenya,several dozen; and in Indonesia, over 100. Insome nations one group, such as the Javanese inIndonesia, are numerically and politically domi-nant, and maintain dominance by including in

the process some groups such as the Balinese, andviolently repressing others such as the Timorese.In other nations politics are dominated by com-petition among different ethnic groups, such asthe Hausa-Fulani and Yoruba in Nigeria, andwhen the political process fails, violent confron-tation may result. In still other nations, groupsnumerically dominant or visible in one regionmay seek more power, or even independence, asexemplified by Muslims on Mindanao in thePhilippines or Muslims in the Kashmir.

The second pattern is ethnic separatistmovements in some Western nations where re-gionally localized ethnolinguistic groups seekpolitical autonomy or complete independenceand their own nation-state. Many of these move-ments predate World War II, although they haveremained viable, and some have become evenmore active, as group leaders perceive threats tothe group's autonomy from the national govern-ment. In movements of this type, as among theQuebecois in Canada, Bretons in France, andBasques in Spain, a major concern is the loss ofthe use of one's native language through assimi-lation into a nation with another language (En-glish in Canada, French in France, and Spanishin Spain).

The third pattern is the splitting up of theformer Soviet Union and states of Eastern Eu-rope (the former Yugoslavia and Czechoslova-kia) and the reunification of Germany to formnation-states with one ethnic group numericallyand politically dominant.

These three patterns are producing a worldwith more nation-states than in the past (almost200 now compared to about 50 in 1900), withmany of these nation-states built and governedon models that stress the primacy of one ethnicgroup.

See also CoNSOCiATiONAL DEMOCRACY; ETH-NIC CONFLICT; ETHNIC IDENTITY AND SOLIDAR-ITY; INDIGENOUS PEOPLES; PLURALISM; TRIBE;WORLD SYSTEM AND ETHNIC RELATIONS.

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Anderson, Benedict. (1991) Imagined Commu-nity: Reflections on the Origin and Spread ofNationalism. Rev. ed.

Anderson, Robert T. (1975) Denmark: Success ofa Developing Nation.

Bendix, Regina. (1992) "National Sentiment inthe Enactment and Discourse of Swiss Politi-cal Ritual." American Ethnologist 19: 768-779.

Conner, Walker. (1994) Ethnonationalism: TheQuest for Understanding.

Dundes, Alan. (1987) Cracking Jokes: Studies inSick Humor Cycles and Stereotypes.

Eriksen, Thomas H. (1993) Ethnicity and Na-tionalism: Anthropological Perspectives.

Foster, Robert]. (1991) "Making National Cul-tures in the Global Ecumene." Annual Re-view of Anthropology 20: 235—260.

Gellner, Ernest. (1983) Nations and Nationalism.

Handler, Richard. (1988) Nationalism and thePolitics of Culture in Quebec.

Hobsbawm, Eric, and Terrence Ranger, eds.(1983) The Invention of Tradition.

McDonald, Maryon. (1989) "We Are Not French!"Language, Culture and Identity in Brittany.

Nagel, Joane. (1993) "Ethnic Nationalism: Poli-tics, Ideology, and the World Order." Inter-national Journal of Comparative Sociology 34:103-112.

Segal, Daniel A. (1988) "Nationalism, Com-paratively Speaking. "Journal of Historical So-ciology 1: 301-321.

ETHNOCENTRISM

SEPARATISM

See ETHNIC CONFLICT; ETHNOCENTRISM; INDIG-ENOUS PEOPLES; MINORITY RIGHTS.

Ethnocentrism is thebelief that one's own cul-ture is superior to other

cultures, and the judging of other cultures by thestandards of one's own culture. Ethnocentrismis a cultural universal in that it is displayed tosome degree by members of all cultures. Aroundthe world, people in many ethnic groups tend toconsider their groups to be more peaceful, friend-lier, and more trustworthy than other groups;on the other hand, when comparing themselvesto other groups, they are less concerned aboutbeing higher achievers, stronger, more attrac-tive, or wealthier. When considered from across-cultural perspective, ethnocentrism is bestviewed as a continuum, with some cultures dis-playing little ethnocentrism, others expressingsome, and still others a great deal. In addition,a single culture may be more ethnocentric in re-gard to some groups and less ethnocentric inregard to others. In general, ethnic groups whoare culturally and linguistically similar, or wholive near one another and interact regularly, areless ethnocentric toward one another than aregroups without such close ties.

However, even in situations of peaceful con-tact, ethnocentrism may not be completely ab-sent. For example, the Toda, Badaga, andKurumba peoples of South India are involvedin a symbiotic trade network with one another.This does not, however, prevent the Badagafrom seeing themselves as superior to the eco-nomically poorer Toda, the Toda as feeling su-perior because they do not eat meat, and bothgroups from viewing the Kurumbas as danger-ous sorcerers. Similarly, in the various predomi-nantly Catholic regional cultures of thePhilippines, who all regard themselves as Fili-pinos, the members describe one another in eth-nocentric, stereotypical terms—Tagalogs areproud and boastful, Pampangans are material-istic and self-centered, Ilocanos are hard-work-ing and aggressive, and Bisayans are fun-lovingand passionate.

laBBSBI

85e

ETHNOCENTRISM

In situations of open ethnic conflict, ethno-centric beliefs of superiority are often tied to feel-ings of mistrust and fear; actions are designedto limit contact with members of the other groupand to discriminate against them. This is thesituation between Jews and Arabs in Israel, wherethe Jews are the political, economic, and numeri-cal majority and the Arabs are a discriminated-against minority. Arabs believe that Jews do notvalue the family and lack dignity, and see themas racists who discriminate against Arabs, do nottrust Arabs, and do not want to live near Arabsor have them as friends. Jews, for their part, re-gard Arabs as primitive and limited, do not trustthem, and do not want to live near them or havethem as friends. In situations of violent ethnicconflict, as in Israel, Northern Ireland, and SriLanka, ethnocentrism is accompanied by xeno-phobia, discrimination, prejudice, physical sepa-ration of the groups, and extreme negativestereotyping. Ethnocentrism seems to be a com-ponent of all situations of violent conflict amongethnic groups, although the presence of ethno-centrism does not necessarily mean that violencewill follow.

One very common pattern of ethnocentrisminvolves neighboring groups of different levelsof economic development. The hill (tribal) andplains (peasant) Pathan of Afghanistan have verydifferent images of themselves and each other.The hill Pathan see themselves as free, hospi-table, brave, and never willing to compromise,while they view the plains Pathan as weak, quickto compromise, inhospitable, and under govern-ment control. The plains Pathan see themselvesas not living up to traditional standards of Pathanbehavior, but describe the hill Pathan as wild,petty, calculating, and unruly. The actual andperceived differences between the hill and plainsPathan are the result of nearly 30 years of sepa-ration and the gradual integration of the plainspeople into the wider Afghanistan society.

Today, ethnocentrism is a major cause ofproblems between the Western, industrialized

portion of the world and developing nations inthe Third World. The basic assumption under-lying efforts of U.S. policymakers to provide as-sistance to Third World nations in developingstronger economies and more stable politicalsystems is that what has worked in the West willwork elsewhere. This is an ethnocentric assump-tion. Thus, following Western models, agricul-tural change centers on replacing extendedfamilies, or broader kin groups, with nuclearfamily farms; political succession is based on re-placing hereditary succession with free elections;previously independent professional armies areplaced under civilian control; and labor relationsare based on collective bargaining rather than aclient-patron system. Experience shows thatmany peoples in Africa and Asia do not acceptthese basic cultural changes simply because out-siders—no matter how well meaning—believethem to be "better" than traditional ways. As aresult, many nations now reject Western-styleeconomic and political development and searchinstead for solutions more in accord with theirown beliefs and customs. Additionally, there hasbeen a reemergence of traditional beliefs andpractices such as Islamic fundamentalism andthe assumption of power by traditional Fijianleaders in Fiji, as well as the persistence of cul-tural practices such as female genital mutilationpracticed in Africa, despite external efforts toend such procedures.

Ethnocentrism is a universal feature of hu-man life. Because it is present in all ethnic con-flict situations, numerous explanations have beenoffered for its existence and persistence. Onecommon explanation—which also applies to eth-nic conflict—is that ethnocentrism is a rationalchoice made by members of an ethnic group whoare competing with other ethnic groups for scarceresources such as political power or territory.Many other explanations emphasize the social-psychological aspects of ethnocentrism, and sug-gest that it reflects aggression displaced from thein-group to an out-group, or a projection of feel-

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ETHNOCENTRISM

ings of low self-worth or weakness onto others.Evolutionary explanations suggest that ethno-centrism is a biologically determined responseto external threats against the group. Finally,explanations based in sociobiology point to a kin-group basis of ethnic groups and the role ethno-centrism plays in aiding the reproductive successof group members in competition with mem-bers of other groups for limited resources. Atthis point in time, all explanations are essentiallyconjectures that await careful testing—a diffi-cult task because ethnocentrism is so commonaround the world.

Regardless of why ethnocentrism occurs, itis clear that one major way ethnocentric stereo-types of other peoples are spread and reinforcedis through the mass media. In the past, reportsby explorers and missionaries played the majorrole in shaping and reinforcing preconceivedideas of the "inferior" or "bizarre" ways of life ofother cultures. Columbus returned from the NewWorld to report on the cannibalism practicedby the native peoples he encountered. His re-ports—though untrue—were taken so seriouslythat the word cannibalism (taken from Canib,the name assigned the islanders) came into com-mon usage. Columbus's first report was followedby centuries of untrue or exaggerated reports ofcannibalism and human sacrifice practiced bynon-Western peoples. In this case, these ethno-centric stereotypes were only one part of a pat-tern of genocide and ethnocide that ultimatelydestroyed many native cultures in the NewWorld.

Ethnocentric descriptions have more re-cently been reinforced by portrayals of otherpeoples in literature and the popular press. Thepeoples of Africa, for example, are often por-trayed in homogenized, stereotypical ways inWestern literature: as uncivilized and devoid ofhumanity in Joseph Conrad's Heart ofDarkness\as gentle and submissive in Hemingway s shortstories; and as gentle, suffering, and in need ofrescue in Alan Paton s Cry, the Beloved Country.

All of these images ignore the basic reality thatAfrica is the home of more than 700 culturalgroups who differ widely in the extent to whichthey are gentle, submissive, suffering, or in needof rescue. More recently, as the television newsmedia takes Westerners to non-Western places,ethnocentric portrayals are more immediate. Forexample, news coverage of the rescue mission inSomalia in 1992-1993 emphasized the use ofkhat (a mild narcotic) by Somali men, suggest-ing that it keeps them in a constant stupor. Thereports failed to note that the use of khat moreclosely resembles the use of coffee by millionsof Americans each morning than it does drugaddiction.

Ahmed, Akbar S. (1980) Pukhtun Economy andSociety: Traditional Structure and EconomicDevelopment in a Tribal Society.

Brewer, Marilynn B., and Donald T. Campbell.(1976) Ethnocentrism and Inter group Attitudes.

Granqvist, Raoul. (1984) Stereotypes in WesternFiction on Africa: A Study of Joseph Conrad,Joyce Gary, Ernest Hemingway, Karen Blixen,Graham Greene, and Alan Paton. Umea, Swe-den: Umea Papers in English, no. 7.

Hockings, Paul. (1980) Ancient Hindu Refugees:Eadaga Social History, 1550-1975.

LeVine, Robert A., and Donald T Campbell.(1972) Ethnocentrism: Theories of Conflict,Ethnic Attitudes, and Group Behavior.

Reynolds, Vernon, Vincent Falger, and Ian Vine.(1987) The Sociobiology of Ethnocentrism.

Smooha, Sammy. (1987) "Jewish and Arab Eth-nocentrism in Israel." Ethnic and Racial Stud-ies 10, no. 1.

Sumner, William Graham. (1979) Folkways andMores.

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Wiarda, Howard}. (1985) Ethnocentrism in For-eign Policy: Can We Understand the ThirdWorld?

ETHNOCIDEEthnocide is a term firstused in print by Frenchanthropologist Georges

Condominas in 1965 to refer to French coloni-zation in Vietnam. It is derived from the Latincaedere (to kill) and the Greek ethnos (nation).In general, it means the extermination of a cul-ture, but not involving the physical extermina-tion of the individual members of the culture.Forced assimilation, ethnicide, and culturalgenocide are alternative names for ethnocide.The notion of ethnocide as something differentfrom genocide was implied in Raphael Lemkin s1944 definition of genocide, which brought theissue to the forefront of world debate. However,on a reality basis, it is often difficult to distin-guish between genocide and ethnocide, and thetwo tend to co-occur in European settlementcolonizations of the New World and Pacific.

Throughout human history, one commonform of ethnocide has been the forced conver-sion of religious minorities, although this ofteninvolves genocidal actions as well, especially thethreat of death if one does not convert. How-ever, in many situations the ultimate goal ofadherents to the majority religion was the eradi-cation of the minority religion, not the killingof all its followers. Examples of ethnocide forreligious purposes include Spain's forced con-version of Jews in 1492; the oppression of OldBelievers in Russia; the persecution of Hugue-nots, Anabaptists, and others in Europe; the kill-ing of Kazakh Islamic religious leaders (mullahs)by the Russians in the purges of the 1930s; and,more recently, the persecution of the followersof Baha'i in Iran. Although some adherents do

convert and others are killed, for many the mostcommon response is to flee and seek residencein nations where they will not be persecuted, andfor those who stay to practice their religion insecret. In Spain after 1492, for example, manyJews (called Converses) converted to Catholicism,but continued to practice Judaism in secret.Later, when some immigrated to lands of greatertolerance such as Brazil, they resumed the openpractice of Judaism.

While ethnocide can be considered as a phe-nomenon distinct from genocide, behaviors andpolicies that fall within the rubric of one or theother often co-occur. This has been especiallytrue in those regions of the world settled byEuropeans in the last five centuries—the NewWorld, southern Africa, and Australia. The in-digenous cultures of these regions have beensubjected to both genocidal and ethnocidal actsthat have reduced the overall population fromtens of millions or more to only a few million,and the number of distinct cultures from severalthousand to less than a thousand. Most of theselosses have resulted directly from the killing ofthe indigenous peoples and from the spread ofEuropean-introduced diseases, but ethnocide hasalso played a role. In this context of settlementcolonization, ethnocidal acts include:

1. Banning the use of the native language

2. Forced relocation from the traditional home-land to a distant and environmentally dif-ferent place

3. Economic disruption of the traditionaleconomy (economic genocide), includingthe deliberate destruction of fields and or-chards, damming or diversion of rivers, de-struction of natural resources such as wildgame, and exploitation of the people as slavelabor or as low-wage laborers

4. Banning the practice of the indigenous reli-gion and forced conversion to the religionof the settlers

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ETHNOCIDE

5. Placement of the people on reservations orreserves

6. Mixing of peoples from different culturesand politically defining them as a singlegroup

7. Removing children from their families andplacing them in nonindigenous homes orschools

8. Instituting educational systems that ignoreor denigrate the traditional culture and teachinstead the language and culture of anothersociety (while this was a common form ofethnocide in the past, definition of such be-havior as ethnocide today is much moresituationally specific, as in some polyculturalsettings where parents of indigenous chil-dren encourage the teaching of the domi-nant culture as a means of ensuring theeconomic viability of their children in thefuture)

9. Replacing traditional forms of governmentwith others modeled on the government ofthe dominant culture

10. Policies or actions that ignore the social, cul-tural, economic, and health needs of the vic-tims of ethnocide or genocide

11. Denial of the right of cultural and politicalself-determination

In the Russian Empire and then the formerSoviet Union, ethnocide took the form ofRussification. Russification was the formal policyof the Tsarist governments and the Communistparty, whose goal was to replace regional andlocal cultures with Russian culture. Programsimplemented to bring about the policy includedsettling large numbers of ethnic Russians in non-Russian regions (Russians form sizable minori-ties in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, for example),placing Russians in senior political and economicpositions, banning the practice of native reli-gions, forced settlement on collective farms or

in villages, and the use of Russian in the schoolsand as the official language. Current conflictsinvolving Russians and the indigenous inhabit-ants of many former Soviet republics such asMoldova, Lithuania, and Kazakhstan reflectlong-repressed animosities felt toward the morepowerful Russians, and a desire for cultural andpolitical autonomy.

Beyond the means used, and the results ofthose means, a major difference between geno-cide and ethnocide is how the dominant groupdefines the victims. In genocide, the victims areusually defined as being subhuman, or somehowso different from the perpetrators that the geno-cide can be excused as not involving human be-ings. In ethnocide, the victims are not seen assubhuman or nonhuman, but rather as cultur-ally, economically, or religiously inferior, and theethnocidal acts are often justified as an effort toaid or civilize these inferior peoples. This rea-soning has been a major justification for variousrelocation, reservation, boarding school, andmissionary programs in the United States fromthe earliest contacts with American Indiansthrough the 1990s. However, despite the goodintentions of some individuals, these ethnocidalacts are almost always motivated by a desire togain control of land or other resources controlledby native peoples.

The indigenous rights movements aroundthe world today is a reaction to both genocidaland ethnocidal policies and practices of the past.These rights movements are motivated by a de-sire to revitalize cultures that were weakened byethnocide. Various objectives include native con-trol of indigeneous land; traditional forms ofgovernment; the teaching and use of the nativelanguage, which often involve deemphasizingthe language of the dominant society; and thefreedom to practice the traditional religion.

See also ETHNOCENTRISM; GENOCIDE; HUMANRIGHTS; INDIGENOUS PEOPLES; MINORITYRIGHTS; RACE AND RACISM.

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Bodleyjohn. (1982) Victims of Progress.

Condominas, Georges. (1965) L'Exotique estQuotidien.

Cooper, Roger. (1982) The Eahais of Iran.

Davis, Shelton H. (1977) Victims of the Miracle:Development and the Indians of Brazil.

Friedrich, Paul, and Norma Diamond. (1993)Encyclopedia of World Cultures. Volume 6,Russia/Eurasia and China.

Jonassohn, Kurt, and Frank Chalk. (1987) "ATypology of Genocide and Some Implica-tions for the Human Rights Agenda." InGenocide and the Modern Age, edited by IsidorWallimann and Michael N. Dobkowski, 3-20.

Lemkin, Raphael. (1944) Axis Rule in OccupiedEurope.

Lincoln, W. Bruce. (1993) The Conquest of aContinent: Siberia and the Russians.

Stannard, David E. (1992) American Holocaust:Columbus and the Conquest of the New World.

90 ®

Fiji is an island nationcomposed of 322 islands(106 inhabited) in thePacific Ocean. It is lo-

cated between 15 and 22 degrees south latitudeand 175 and 177 degrees west longitude, andcovers about 18,400 square kilometers. In 1989the population was 737,104, of whom 351,966were Fijians and 337,557 Indo-Fijians (Fijiansof Asian-Indian ancestry whose ancestors werebrought to Fiji by the British colonists in thenineteenth century). Sixty percent of the popu-lation lives on the main island of Viti Levu, thelocation of the capital city of Suva. Fiji has beeninhabited for over 3,500 years. Sustained con-tact with Europeans began in the early 1800s,and most Fijians were converted to Christianityby the middle of that century. Fiji was underBritish colonial rule from 1874 to 1970. From1970 to 1987, Fiji was ruled by democraticallyelected governments, the last of which was over-thrown and replaced in 1987 via two militarycoups. The current ethnic strife involves eco-nomic, political, and cultural conflict betweenthe Fijians and the Indo-Fijians. The former,

who seized control in the 1987 coups, haveimplemented and built on existing policies grant-ing them preferential treatment and politicalpower. The Indo-Fijians, on the other hand, nowsee themselves as a discriminated-against eth-nic group, wrongly denied access to the politicalleadership achieved through the election of 1987.

Traditional Fijian society was based on asubsistence economy emphasizing the exploita-tion of root crops such as taro and cassava, andfishing. Life centered around the villages, andFiji was organized into a number of chiefdoms,with each ruled by a chiefly clan. Other impor-tant groups were the extended family, subclan,clan, and clan federations. Under the British,the traditional Fijian culture (save for the reli-gion) was largely ignored, with the British con-tent to rule through influential chiefly clans andto allow most Fijians to lead a traditional life.Today, 60 percent of Fijians live in rural villages(where by law they own at least 83 percent ofthe land), although wage labor and migration totowns is becoming more common. Additionally,developments since 1987 have accelerated theavailability of higher education and the numberof government positions open to Fijians. Also,the British legal system is being modified to in-corporate traditional elements, such as an em-phasis on the avoidance of conflict and the fearof supernatural punishment.

Indo-Fijians were brought to Fiji by theBritish to work as indentured laborers on theislands' sugar and coconut plantations. The bulkof them, some 60,000, arrived between 1874 and1920. Most members of the Indo-Fijian com-munity are adherents of Hinduism, with Islamand Sikhism also present. Regardless of theirplace of origin in India and religion, all Indo-Fijians have been treated as a single ethnic groupby the British and Fijians. Under British rule anethnic-based division of labor was encouraged.Europeans managed the businesses and politi-cal affairs of the nation. Indo-Fijians worked onthe sugar cane and coconut plantations, and later

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VFijians And

Indo-Fijjlans

FlJIANS AND iNDO-FlJIANS

as traders. Fijians participated in traditional sub-sistence activities and the harvest of copra, whichwas processed into coconut oil for export. Thesmall Chinese community was involved in retailtrade. The British used ethnic rivalries to divideand maintain control of the population, and theethnic division of labor was also reflected inhousing, education, and political participation.

At the time of independence in 1970, Fijiwas a nation divided along ethnic and social lines,with a history of nondemocratic rule (traditionalchiefly clans and the British administrators),with a new constitution that called for a parlia-mentary democratic form of government. Thenew national constitution also preserved vari-ous traditional Fijian political and economiccouncils and alliances, afforded all Indo-Fijiansfull citizenship, and used ethnicity as a criterionin allotting seats in the parliament. From 1970to 1987, elections generally left power with acoalition formed by Fijian chiefs and wealthyEuropean and Indo-Fijian leaders. Most Indo-Fijians supported a rival party, which strove fora "one person, one vote" policy that favored thethen numerically dominant Indo-Fijians andwould serve to control Fijian power. During thissame period, the Fijians, regarding themselvesas the original inhabitants of the nation, beganto assert their authority in order to reverse per-ceived inequities in education, housing, and eco-nomic opportunities, and also to reestablish thepower of the chiefs. At the same time, increasedwealth, the development of distinct wealth-basedsocial classes, and the influence of labor unionsestablished new political alliances that crossedethnic lines, and in 1987 resulted in the electionof a government supported by a coalition ofIndo-Fijians and Fijian workers. This new gov-ernment and its replacement were quickly over-thrown by two coups led by the military. Underthe ensuing governments, affirmative-actionprograms for Fijians have developed, chiefs andchiefly councils have been given increased power,and the military has been made exclusively

Fijian. In reaction, tens of thousands of Indo-Fijians have fled, making those who remain anumerical minority who claim to be the victimsof religious, cultural, and economic discrimina-tion, including the burning of Hindu templesand Islamic mosques, restriction of movement,and reverse discrimination in employment andeducation.

The current ethnic conflict in Fiji is causedby a mix of factors including the British colo-nial policies of importing foreign workers, notinvolving the Fijians in the developing economy,and using a divide-and-conquer strategy to rule;Fijian and Indo-Fijian unfamiliarity with de-mocracy; the Fijian tradition of hereditary ruleby chiefs, chiefly clans, and chiefly alliances; andpostindependent economic growth that createdwealth differentials as well as cross-ethnic pat-terns of economic and political interests. Fromthe viewpoint of the Fijians, they are the indig-enous people of the nation (and the victims ofpast colonialism as well), and as such are en-titled to rule their nation; they also feel they havethe right to preferential treatment to compen-sate for past wrongs. The Indo-Fijian percep-tion is much different. They see themselves aslosing their constitutionally guaranteed status asfull citizens, with the result that they are now adiscriminated-against minority in the nationwhere most were born and wish to remain. Todate, the conflict has been mainly political andeconomic, with little violence, a developmentsome attribute to the patience of the Indo-Fijians.

Hays, Terence, ed. (1992) Encyclopedia of WorldCultures. Volume 2> Oceania. (See articles onBau, Lau, and Rotuma).

Howard, Michael C. (1991) Fiji: Race and Poli-tics in an Island State.

Lawson, Stephanie. (1991) The Failure of Demo-cratic Politics in Fiji.

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FOREIGNERS IN GERMANY

Naidu, Vijay. (1992) "Fiji: Ethnicity and thePost-Colonial State." In Internal Conflict andGovernance, edited by Kumar Rupesinghe,81-102.

Nayacakalou, R. R. (1975) Leadership in Fiji.

FORCEDASSIMILATION

See ETHNOCIDE; HUMAN RIGHTS; INDIGENOUSPEOPLES; MINORITY RIGHTS

FOREIGNERS INGERMANY

The Federal Republic ofGermany, located incentral Europe, encom-passes 137,838 square

miles and borders Denmark, the Netherlands,Belgium, France, Switzerland, Austria, Czecho-slovakia, and Poland. Germany is overwhelm-ingly inhabited by ethnic Germans (93 percent),most of whom are either Protestant or RomanCatholic. A very small minority (about 35,000)of German Jews is a mere fraction of the largerpopulation that once existed in Germany, butwho either fled or were destroyed by Hitler's Naziregime in the 1930s and 1940s. The remaining7 percent of Germany's population, approxi-mately 6.5 million people, are considered for-eigners, despite the fact that some have been inGermany for decades and many were born there.Of these, the largest minority is Turkish Mus-lims, numbering approximately 1.8 million. Be-cause German citizenship is still defined byblood, officially Germany has no immigrants.

Historical records of German-speakingpeoples begins when they came into contact withthe Romans in approximately 55 B.C. For manyyears German-speakers inhabited a much larger

portion of central Europe than present-day Ger-many. At its largest, prior to World War I, theGerman Empire consisted of 208,780 squaremiles. However, throughout its history, it hadbeen fragmented into more than 300 smallerprincipalities. After World War I, Germany wasforced to cede large portions of its land to France,Poland, and Denmark, and in addition, lost allof its colonies. In the decade preceding WorldWar II, in what is known as the Third Reich,the National Socialist (Nazi) party came topower under Adolph Hitler. A second attemptat global hegemony was led by Hitler and theThird Reich, culminating in the Holocaust andWorld War II. After Germany's defeat in WorldWar II, the victorious Allies administered zonesof occupation. The Federal Republic of Germany(West Germany) was formed by the zones oc-cupied by France, Britain, and the United States,and the German Democratic Republic (EastGermany) was formed from the zone occupiedby the Soviet Union. The city of Berlin, locatedwithin East Germany (but not part of it) wasjointly occupied by the four powers until 1948,when the USSR withdrew to East Berlin andcut off supplies to the remainder of the city. Thisprompted a huge airlift by the Allies to WestBerlin, and the USSR's erection of the BerlinWall as a barrier separating the two sides in 1961.The two Germanics were reunited in 1990 afterthe collapse of communism in East Germanyand the subsequent opening of the Berlin Wall.The unification of West Germany, which hadexperienced great economic growth since the endof World War II, and East Germany, which waseconomically stunted by communism, came asthe result of negotiations by the United States,France, Britain, and the Soviet Union, as wellas East and West Germany. The United FederalRepublic of Germany is now a full member ofthe North American Treaty Organization(NATO).

The joining of two such economically polar-ized countries has presented great difficulties

F 93

FOREIGNERS IN GERMANY

for the German government (led by ChancellorHelmut Kohl), with difficulties exacerbated bythe simultaneous problem of dealing with a massinflux of foreign asylum-seekers from elsewherein Europe, especially the former Yugoslavia.Until recently, these asylum-seekers had only toclaim to be politically persecuted at home to re-ceive government care in housing, clothing, andwelfare. In a country already suffering from ris-ing unemployment and other economic woes,some citizens have begun to focus their angeron the foreigners among them—those whomthey feel are using resources that are rightfullytheirs. This frustration has manifested itself inviolent terrorism against those considered for-eign. Although these right-wing extremists donot constitute a majority, and mass demonstra-tions against ethnic violence have been held byalarmed citizens, groups now referred to as neo-Nazis and Skinheads are particularly disturbing,considering Germany's recent history of intol-erance and violence in the mid-twentieth cen-tury. Since the nineteenth century, Germany hasbased its citizenship solely on blood, and haslargely considered its population to be an ethnicone, rather than defining nationality in legalterms. There are, in fact, many people that haveresided in Germany for decades, some even bornthere, who have never been considered citizensbecause of a different ethnic background. Thesepeople, and not just the recently arrived asylum-seekers, have been the victims of an increase incrimes by right-wing extremists, who argue thatthey are "taking Germany back."

Since the 1989 collapse of communism andthe Berlin Wall, the neo-Nazi youth movementand groups such as the Skinheads have beengaining momentum. Attacks such as the 1993incident in Soligen, in which five Turkish womenwere burned to death in their home, have be-come increasingly common and have forced thegovernment to recognize that these are not ran-dom acts of violence, but organized acts by suchhate groups as the Skinheads. This neo-Nazi

reaction has been attributed, at least partly, tothe mass influx of asylum-seekers since 1989.Critics say that the German government is nottaking responsibility for social control, particu-larly of these young hate groups who seeminglyhave no political ideology other than anger andviolence. Those right-wing politicians who pointto the neo-Nazi hate groups as evidence of eco-nomic crisis have no official connection withthem. However, in 1993 the German govern-ment passed a law that strongly restricted theright of foreigners to seek political asylum inGermany—a demand of both the political Rightand the rightist hate groups. Although a major-ity is needed to amend the constitution in sucha way, critics accuse the government of encour-aging hate groups to believe that violence is aneffective means of achieving political goals.

Previously, anyone who could get to Ger-many and claim political persecution at homewas able to seek asylum. This is no longer thecase under the constitution, and yet the violencecontinues. This is largely due to the fact thatapproximately 6.5 million foreigners reside inGermany without citizenship. Approximately1.8 million of these are Turks, invited to Ger-many in the 1960s and 1970s as "guest work-ers," who have resided with their families inGermany for decades. Their sons and daugh-ters, born and raised in Germany, are emergingas a new class of workers and sophisticated in-tellectuals who consider themselves to be moreGerman than Turkish, and are increasingly de-manding recognition as German citizens. Thevast majority of these people are not relying onthe government for welfare, and are in fact pro-ductive members of society. However, the neo-Nazi youth hate groups make no distinctionbetween them and any other "foreigner."Thesegroups also target those they call Aussiedler—people who are "ethnic Germans" and who,according to the German constitution, are auto-matically entitled to German citizenship undera "right of return." The Aussiedlers do not seem

94 F

FOREIGNERS IN GERMANY

Neo-Nazi rally in Halle, Germany, 1991, commemorating the fall of the Berlin Wall. The neo-Nazis have beencharged with numerous attacks on nonethnic Germans in Germany.

very German to Skinhead gangs, who frequentlytarget them as victims. Skinheads are subject toa gang mentality and apparently become morecaught up in committing acts of violence thanin carefully selecting their victims. In many cases,groups unsuccessful in finding the person theyoriginally intended to victimize may instead fo-cus their rage on the next non-German they findunacceptable on that particular day. Those es-pecially at risk are anyone who appears physi-cally different from themselves, including Turks,Africans, Asians, and anyone who "looks Jew-ish." "White Power" is a Skinhead cry not onlyin Germany, but in other countries as well. Ger-many, however, is under especially close watchby a world not entirely convinced that the unifi-cation of Germany—the largest country in Eu-rope—is such a safe idea. In reaction to violenceagainst foreigners, most recently includingAmerican athletes, the German government hastaken steps toward loosening its citizenship re-quirements, publicly denouncing such violent

assaults, and increasing the numer of police andinvestigators assigned to hate-crime cases. Thegovernment response may be having a positiveeffect, as the number of hate crimes declinedfrom 2,366 in the first 11 months of 1992 to1,699 in the first 11 months of 1993. At the sametime, though, violence continues against a broadrange of foreigners, including December 1993attacks on Russians, Turks, and asylum-seekers.

Ardaghjohn. (1987) Germany and the Germans:An Anatomy of a Society Today.

Craig, Gordon. (1982) The Germans.

Kramer, Jane. (1993) "Neo-Nazis: A Chaosin the Head." The New Yorker, 14 June: 52-70.

Peukert, Detlev. (1987) Inside Nazi Germany:Conformity, Opposition and Racism in Every-day Life.

95F

FRENCH-CANADIANS IN CANADA

b OURTHWORLD

See INDIGENOUS PEOPLES.

FRENCH-CANADIANS IN

CANADA

Canada is made up often provinces (Alberta,British Columbia, Man-itoba, New Brunswick,Newfoundland, Nova

Scotia, Ontario, Prince Edward Island, Quebec,and Saskatchewan) and two territories (Yukonand Northwest territories). Canada is a mem-ber of the British Commonwealth of Nationsand became completely independent of Britishrule in 1982. The total population was estimatedat 27.4 million in 1992. Canada is officially abilingual (English and French) and multiculturalsociety, and unlike in the United States, assimi-lation is not the model for ethnic relations. Thetwo major ethnic groups are those of Englishancestry (Anglophones), who make up the ma-jority of the population, and those of French an-cestry, who constitute about 24 percent of thepopulation. French-Canadians are further sub-divided ineo groups—Quebecois (those who livein the Province of Quebec) and Francophones(those who live elsewhere in Canada); there isalso a large French-Canadian diaspora in thenortheastern United States dating to the mid-nineteenth century. The Canadian populationalso includes people who trace their ancestry tovarious European and Asian nations, and a groupcomposed mainly of those who arrived from theCaribbean. The American Indian and Inuitpopulations are found mainly in the north andwest.

The ongoing ethnic conflict centers onQuebecois separatism, dating to the 1600s and

the beginning of the English and French ri-valry for control of Canada. Except for a re-volt in 1837 and terrorist activity in 1970 (andswift reaction by the Canadian government),the conflict has been peaceful and now occu-pies a central place on the Canadian politicalagenda.

Quebec has a total population of 8 mil-lion, of whom about 90 percent are Quebecois.It is the second largest province after Ontario,which has a population of about 10 million.Once largely agricultural, Quebec is now ahighly industrialized province, with only 2percent of the people engaged in agriculturalwork. The population is socially stratified intoa powerful though minority Anglophone sec-tor and French-Canadian business and pro-fessional, middle, and working classes, the lastcomposed of unionized workers and agricul-tural laborers. Quebec has experienced eco-nomic difficulties since the early 1970s andhas the highest unemployment rate of anyCanadian province. In accord with the Cana-dian constitution, Quebec has its own parlia-ment, which manages health, educational,economic, and social matters in the province,but as a part of Canada, other matters areunder the jurisdiction of the national govern-ment. The legal system combines French civillaw with British criminal law. French-Canadians are mainly Roman Catholic,although the influence of the church hasweakened considerably since the 1960s.French is the official language of Quebec andis a key feature of French-Canadian autonomy.French-Canadians outside of Quebec havedifficulty maintaining the use of French out-side the home, while Anglophones in Que-bec complain of discrimination based on theiruse of English. Thus, linguistic conflict be-tween the French- and English-speakingcommunities is both a real struggle and onethat symbolizes the underlying conflict be-tween two different cultural traditions.

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FRENCH-CANADIANS IN CANADA

The first Europeans to reach what is nowCanadian land were the Norse in about A.D.1000. In 1497-1498, the Italian explorers Johnand Sebastian Cabot, sailing for England, werethe first Europeans to make a landing in Canadawith any subsequent ramifications. French navi-gator Jacques Carrier claimed eastern Quebecfor France in 1534, and in 1608 Samuel deChamplain founded Quebec City. France ruledCanada until 1760, and nearly all contemporaryFrench-Canadians trace their ancestry to Frenchsettlers who arrived during this 150-year period.The English were also active in settling the re-gion during this time, and although they stayedmainly in the east, French and English conflictover Quebec and other territories was not un-common. English-French conflict in Canadawas part of a broader pattern of conflict and in-volved King William s War and the War of Span-ish Succession in Europe. The French-and-Indianwars in Canada from 1756 to 1763 ended in En-glish victory and control of the entire region, withNew France becoming an English colony.

During the period of French settlement andindependence, New France was a distinct soci-ety and culture based on the language, culture,and law of France. It had a powerful RomanCatholic clergy, a feudal economic and socialsystem, and a fur trade exclusively with France.Thus, French-English conflict, both then andnow, is not based simply on competition for land,but on the coexistence of two very different so-cieties. In 1774 the English rulers recognizedFrench distinctiveness in the Treaty of Quebec,which granted the latter cultural autonomy. Untilthe mid-1800s New France, or Lower Canadaas it had come to be called, functioned as asemiautonomous region with its own culture andparliament, and church leaders maintainedpeaceful relations with the English rulers. In1867 modern Canada began to emerge with thefounding of a federation of five provinces; LowerCanada, mainly French in population and cul-ture, was renamed Quebec. Canada continued

to expand (adding five more provinces by 1949),evolving economically and politically into amodern industrial nation.

Although Quebec was, and continues to be,involved in Canadian development and growth,some Quebecois felt left out of the process; oth-ers prefer to be separate, desiring that Quebecbecome an independent nation based on itsFrench culture. Thus, the French-Canadianquestion in Canada is one that pits the separat-ists against the nationalists or federalists, whowant Quebec to remain within the federation.This is an issue that divides not only Quebecoisbut also English-speaking Canadians outside theprovince, some of whom (particularly those fromthe western provinces) question why Quebec isentitled to any type of distinct status.

The question of Quebec independence hasbeen a major issue of Canadian politics since themid-1940s. Major national political parties havegenerally opposed Quebec independence, withthe Conservatives preferring assimilation and theLiberals generally granting concessions in theform of increased autonomy to keep Quebec inthe federation. Opinion within Quebec has alsobeen divided, and after much agitation for sepa-ration from Canada, in 1980 provincial votersrejected such a move, perhaps because of diffi-cult economic conditions that led many to be-lieve it would be more advantageous to remain apart of Canada. The Meech Lake Agreement of1987 assured Quebec independent status withinthe Canadian federation, but it is seen as lessthan adequate by some separatists who wantQuebec to have virtually complete authority overforeign policy, defense, and economic mattersthat are currently under the control of the na-tional government. In 1994 the separatist Re-form party forms the largest opposition party tothe controlling Labor party in the national Par-liament, which means that separatism is likelyto remain a major political issue. It is expectedthat another referendum on separation will beheld in 1995.

97&

FRENCH-CANADIANS IN CANADA

Pilon, Use. (1990) "French Canadians." In Era-Hamilton, Roberta. (1988) Feudal Society and cyclopedia of World Cultures. Volume 1, North

Colonization: The Historiography of New America, edited by Timothy J. O'Leary andFrance. David Levinson, 130-133.

Legendre, Camille. (1982) French Canada in Wade, Mason. (1968) The French Canadians,Crisis: A New Society in the Making? 1760-1967. 2 vols.

98 F

GKNOCIDKThe term genocide wascoined in 1944 by thePolish-American scholar

Raphael Lemkin and is from the Greek genos(race or kind) and tide (to be killed). The 1948United Nations Convention on Genocide pro-vides the most generally accepted definition,one that has now been ratified by over 100nations:

In the present Convention, genocide means anyof the following acts committed with intent todestroy, in whole or part, a national, ethnic, ra-cial or religious group, as such:

(a) Killing members of the group;

(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm tomembers of the group;

(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group condi-tions of life calculated to bring about its physicaldestruction in whole or in part;

(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent birthswithin the group;

(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group toanother group.

To the categories covered in the U.N. Conven-tion, some scholars add political and economic

groups. By broadening the definition in this way,repression involving the killing or forced relo-cation of political opposition groups can also beconsidered a form of genocide. Examples of suchacts in this century include the Soviet Union inWorld War II, the Peoples Republic of Chinaduring the Cultural Revolution, the Indonesiangovernment against Indonesian Communists,and the El Salvador government against El Sal-vadorian Leftists. PoRticide is the label some-times used instead of genocide when the victimsare political groups. Such acts, however, are notsubject to U.N. intervention, although the U.N.has never directly intervened in any activity sim-ply because it was considered genocide.

Various attempts have been made by socialscientists to develop classification systems to helporder and explain the numerous types of geno-cides that have occurred throughout human his-tory. One classification scheme developed byHelen Fein differentiates among genocides thatappeared before the rise of modern nation-states:(1) those to eliminate other faiths, (2) those toeliminate rival tribes, and those carried out bynation-states, (3) mass killings to legitimize po-litical power, (4) to kill indigenous cultures, and(5) to kill rebellious elements. Another typol-ogy distinguishes among four major types, onthe basis of the purpose of the genocide: "(1) toeliminate the threat of a rival; (2) to acquire eco-nomic wealth; (3) to create terror and (4) toimplement a belief, theory or an ideology."(Jonassohn and Chalk 1987,12) The fourth typeis further subdivided into four subtypes basedon whether the group targeted for genocide andthe accusations against it are true or false. A thirdtypology developed by Barbara Harff lists fourtypes on the basis of the political context inwhich the genocide occurs: (1) postwar,postimperial, (2) postcolonial, (3) postcoup orpostrevolution, and (4) conquest. This typologyis also of explanatory importance as it suggeststhat a precondition for genocide is national up-heaval due to lost wars, political consolidation,

99

u

GENOCIDE

revolution, rebellion, or conquest. If such up-heaval occurs in a society with marked ethnic,value, or religious variation, genocide might re-sult, especially if no other societies intervene toprevent it. The presence of marked differencesamong cultural and religious groups in nearlyall nations where genocide has occurred suggeststhat genocide is a product of plural societies.

Although much current attention is focusedon genocides in the twentieth century, mostgenocides in human history have been perpe-trated by colonial powers against the indigenouspeoples of the New World, Australia, and south-ern Africa. The majority of victims have beenthe cultures and native peoples of the Caribbean,North America, Middle America, and SouthAmerica who, beginning with Columbus s sec-ond expedition in 1494, were the target ofgeno-cidal and ethnocidal policies and acts that insome places continue today. These peoples werefirst targeted by the colonial governments—Por-tuguese, Spanish, French, and English—andthen by the national cultures that succeeded thecolonists as the rulers of the New World. Al-though the details vary from place to place,genocidal activities usually involved direct gov-ernment involvement or support; a racist beliefsystem that defined the native peoples as sub-human; raids and wars to kill native men,women, and children; the public execution ofleaders; forced relocations; placement on reser-vations; removal of children; massacres; the pur-poseful spread of European diseases such assmallpox, from which the native people had nonatural immunity; enslavement; and wars amongnative groups caused directly or indirectly bygovernment policy or action.

Although the size of the pre-Columbianpopulation is unknown, a comparison of histori-cal estimates (now considered to be reasonablyaccurate) with more recent estimates and cen-sus figures indicates the enormity of the NewWorld genocide. Within 100 years ofColumbus's arrival, the Caribbean population,

composed mainly of about 10 million Arawaksand Caribs, had disappeared entirely. InMesoamerica, the population was reduced fromabout 30 million to under 300,000 in less than100 years. In North America, an indigenouspopulation of about 15 million declined to a lowof 237,000 in 1900, and has now increased toabout 2 million. In South America, a nativepopulation of nearly 40 million declined to443,000 by 1570 and is now about 15 million.Some deaths resulted from the nonpurposefulspread of European diseases such as smallpox,measles, mumps, whooping cough, and cholera,but it is not unreasonable to assume that at least50 percent were the direct result of genocide orthe indirect result of ethnocide. In short, some95 percent of the population of the New Worldwas exterminated as a result of the arrival of andsettlement by Europeans.

The situation is much the same in regard tothe disappearance of New World cultures, al-though it is impossible to estimate how manyactually existed in 1492. It is likely, though, thatin North America at the time of European con-tact at least 1,000 different languages were spo-ken, a number that has decreased to about 100;efforts are under way to revive the use of somethat have fallen into disuse. In South Americaand Middle America, numerous cultures disap-peared, and in the Amazon they continue to dis-appear. In the Caribbean there are no remainingnative cultures, although some survivors who fledto Middle America merged with others to formnew cultures such as the Miskito. (See end ofarticle for a list of extinct New World cultures.)

The situation in Australia was much thesame, although because the number of aborigi-nal cultures and individuals was much less, therewere fewer to be exterminated. The Australiangenocide that has drawn the most attention wasthe extermination of the Tasmanians by the Brit-ish. At the time of British arrival in 1803, Tas-mania had been inhabited for some 23,000 years.In 1803 the total number of Tasmanians (the

100 G

GENOCIDE

Group ofTasmanians in the mid-1800s. Following English settlement in 1803, the 2,000-3,000 Tasmaniansthen living were hunted and killed. The culture has been extinct since the late 1800s.

island's inhabitants were actually a number ofrelated though politically distinct groups) wasbetween 2,000 and 5,000. By 1876 the last full-blooded Tasmanian was dead—the result of warsmeant to kill them off and forced relocation.

In the twentieth century, the two genocidesthat have drawn the most attention are the kill-

ing of about 1.5 million Armenians by the Turksin 1915-1917, and the killing of about 6 mil-lion Jews, 500,000 Gypsies, and other groupsby Nazi Germany during World War II. TheNazi genocide of Jews led to the ongoing inter-est in genocide we see today. It has also becomea matter of controversy as to whether this event,

101G

GENOCIDE

102

Major Genocides of theTwentieth Century

Perpetrator Victim Year

Germany Herero 1904

Turks Armenians 1915-1917

Germany Jews, Gypsies 1938-1945

USSR Chechen/Ingush, 1943-1968Karachay, Balkars,Jews, Meskhetian Turks,Crimean Tatars

Pakistan Baluch 1958-1974

Iraq Kurds 1959-

Angola Kongo 1961-1962

Paraguay Ache 1962-1972

Tutsi (Burundi) Hutu 1965-

Nigeria Igbo 1966

Uganda Karamojong, Acholi, 1971-1986

Lango, Asians

Indonesia Timorese 1975

Myanmar (Burma) Muslims 1978-

Iran Baha'i, Kurds 1981-

Serbs Bosnian Muslims 1992-

referred to as the Holocaust, is a singularlyunique event in human history or the most ex-treme case of a human history filled with geno-cide. Both the Armenians and Jews weremiddleman minorities, a type of social group thatis often the target of discrimination and geno-cide. (A middleman minority is a cultural groupthat serves in an economic middleman positionin a society in which it is a cultural minority.)Some well-known middleman groups are theOverseas Chinese throughout Southeast Asia,Asians in Africa, and Jews in Europe. The fol-lowing is a list of major genocides (not includ-ing politicides) of the twentieth century.

The following is a partial list of New World cul-tures that are physically or culturally extinct dueto genocide and/or ethnocide.

North America

Alsea Mugulasha

Apalachee Nicola

Atakapa Okelousa

Bayogoula Pamilco

Beothuk Pamunkey

Biloxi Piro

Calusa Quinipissa

Chakchiuma Secotan

Chawaska Siuslaw

Chimariko Southampton Inuit

Coahuilteco Susquehanna

Conestoga Takelma

Coos Tangipahoa

Costano Timucua

Cusabo Tlatskanai

Edisto Tolowa

Hitchiti Tsetsaut

Jumano Tutelo

Kamia Umpqua

Karankawa Wappinger

Kwalhiokwa Washa

Mackenzie Inuit Wenrohonron

Manso Yamasee

Mobile Yana

Molala Yuki

Mosopelea

Middle America and the Caribbean

Acaxee Boyaca

Aguacadibe Cahibo

Ameyao Caizcimu

Arawak Camaguey

Bainoa Carib

Bani Cayaguayo

Barbacoa Chiapanec

Bayamo Ciboney

Bayaquitiri Ciguayo

s

GENOCIDE

Cochimi

Cubanacan

Cuciba

Guaimaro

Guamahaya

Guanachahibe

Guaniguanico

Hanamana

Havana

Hubabo

HuereoTIgneri

Jaqua

Lucayans

Macorize

Maguan

Maguana

Marien

Marisi

Mayaguez

Ornoray

Pai-Pai

Paya

Sabaneque

Tahue

Taino

Totorame

Xixime

Toromona Yabaana

Tupinamba Yahgan

Uantuya Yakaroa

Urumi Yapua

Wainuma Yura

Warpe

See also ANTI-SEMITISM; APARTHEID; ETHNOCIDE;HATE (BIAS) CRIMES; RACE AND RACISM.

Davis, Shelton H. (1977) Victims of the Miracle:Development and the Indians of Brazil.

South America

Arikem

Atsawaka

Ayomen

Bisaniwa

Boanarf

Botocudos

Buijana-Piri

Care

Chaima

Chandinawa

Ciguaje

Eno

Fa-al

Gani

Genambi

Icaguate

Imihita

Inapari

Juri

Kabbdena

Kamaka

Karamanta

Kariri

Kenkateye

Kiyasinga

Koeruna

Kokonuko

Kueretu

Makawahe

Makusa

Manitsawa

Mariate

Mekka

Mongoyo

Morike

Mura

Nobenidza

Ona

Pamiwa

Pase

Puri

Riama

Shaninawa

Shereu

Siary

Sura

Tamanako

Tapiira

Tapuya

Taruma

Tekiraka

Tiniwa

Dobyns, Henry E (1966) "Estimating AboriginalAmerican Population." Current Anthropology 7:395-416.

Dow, James. (1995) The Encyclopedia of WorldCultures. Volume 8> Middle America and theCaribbean.

Fein, Helen, ed. (1992) Genocide Watch.

Gutman, Israel, ed. (1990) The Encyclopedia ofthe Holocaust. 4 vols.

Harff, Barbara. (1987) "The Etiology of Geno-cide." In Walliman and Dobkowski, 41-59.

Jaimes, M. Annette, ed. (1992) The State of NativeAmerica: Genocide, Colonization, and Resistance.

Jonassohn, Kurt, and Frank Chalk. (1987) "ATypology of Genocide and Some Implica-tions for the Human Rights Agenda." InWalliman and Dobkowski, 3-20.

Kuper, Leo. (1985) The Prevention of Genocide.

Lemkin, Raphael. (1944) Axis Rule in OccupiedEurope.

Lizarralde, Manuel. (1992) Index and Map of theContemporary South American IndigenousPeoples. Unpublished manuscript, Universityof California at Berkeley.

O'Leary, Timothy}., and David Levinson, eds.(1990) The Encyclopedia of World Cultures. Vol-ume 1, North America.

1033

GHETTO

Reynolds, Henry. (1981) The Other Side of theFrontier.

Rummel, R. J. (1991) Chinas Bloody Century:Genocide and Mass Murder since 1900.

Stannard, David E. (1992) American Holocaust:Columbus and the Conquest of the New World.

Ternon, Yves. (1981) The Armenians: History ofa Genocide.

Walliman, Isidor, and Michael N. Dobkowski,eds. (1987) Genocide and the Modern Age.

GHETTOGhetto refers to an areawithin a city occupied bya distinct ethnic group.

The term is evidently derived from the Italiangeto vecchio meaning "old foundry," referring tothe former use of the site of the Jewish ghettoestablished in Venice in 1516.The Venice ghettowas one of a number established in Europeancities in the fifteenth through seventeenth cen-turies designed to keep Jews physically separatefrom the predominantly Christian population.In towns and villages too small to house a ghetto,all Jews were required to live on a single street.In a city, the Jewish ghetto was usually sur-rounded by a wall; a locked gate closed Jews inat night. During the day they were permitted toleave the ghetto and interact openly with non-Jews. The question of whether Jews preferredliving in ghettos (as it was safer for them to livethere) or were forced to do so is a matter of de-bate, although it is clear that segregation in ghet-tos was part of a larger pattern of persecutionincluding the wearing of special clothing ormarkers of ethnic identity, exclusion from manyoccupations, and the payment of special taxes.Jewish ghettos largely disappeared in westernEurope as a result of the French Revolution andreforms in the 1800s.

In the twentieth century the label ghetto hasbeen applied to urban neighborhoods occupiedmainly by members of a distinct ethnic group,especially African-American neighborhoods inthe United States, immigrant Turk and Greekneighborhoods in Germany, and aboriginalneighborhoods on the edges of cities in Austra-lia. A strict definition of ghetto, and classifica-tion of an area as a ghetto, requires that a specificethnic group be the sole or majority populationin the ghetto. Exactly what spatially constitutesa ghetto is unclear; it may be an entire neigh-borhood, a block, or perhaps even a single build-ing. A ghettoized ethnic group is one in whichall or most of the group resides in a ghetto. Inthe United States in 1980, for example, 60 per-cent of African-Americans lived in cities, themajority in neighborhoods that were mainlyAfrican-American. Another 22 percent lived insuburban neighborhoods, again mainly African-American in population, adjacent to the cityneighborhoods. Thus, some 82 percent of Afri-can-Americans, a large majority, lived in mainlyAfrican-American neighborhoods, meeting thestrict definition of ghetto and ghettoization.

While a salient feature of communitiescalled ghettos is occupation by a single ethnicgroup, a neighborhood is rarely labeled ghettounless the residential group is a discriminated-against minority who are poorer than the gen-eral population. In fact, the term ghetto carrieswith it the assumption that those who reside inthe ghetto are socioeconomically inferior to thegeneral population and socially isolated from itto a large extent. While, and perhaps because,ghettos are the home of disadvantaged ethnicoutsiders, they are also often the center for theexpression of ethnic identity in the form of localeconomic institutions, churches, schools, restau-rants, and entertainment.

Cross-culturally, neighborhoods called ghet-tos take a variety of forms including the one-ethnic-group form in the United States,neighborhoods occupied by a number of distinct

104 <s

GYPSIES AND TRAVELERS IN EUROPE

economically disadvantaged groups, and immi-grant communities in cities. In addition, thepattern of residential segregation is often accom-panied by considerable economic interactionbetween ghetto residents and outsiders, and themovement of individuals or families to mixedcommunities outside the ghetto.

See also ANTI-SEMITISM.

Eban, Abba. (1984) Heritage: Civilization andthe Jews.

Grimes, Seamus. (1993) "Residential Segrega-tion in Australian Cities: A Literature Re-view." International Migration Review 27:103-120.

O'Laughlin, J, and G. Glebe. (1984) "Residen-tial Segregation of Foreigners in GermanCities." TijdschriftvoorEconomische en SocialeGeografie 74: 373-384.

Peach, Ceri, Vaughan Robinson, and Susan Smith,eds. (1983) Ethnic Segregation in Cities.

Wirth, Louis. (1928) The Ghetto.

GYPSIES ANDTRAVELERS IN

EUROPE

An exact definition ofGypsy or Traveler is im-possible, although inmost countries in whichthey live, identification

of an individual or community as Gypsy is rela-tively easy. The three defining characteristics ofGypsy are a nomadic or formerly nomadiclifestyle, an economic system based on the pro-vision of products or services to non-Gypsies,and marriage within the group, which reflectsthe powerful dichotomy Gypsies make betweenthemselves and non-Gypsies. Gypsies are peoplewhose place of origin is outside Europe—pre-

sumably India—while Travelers are peoples in-digenous to Europe such as Irish and ScottishTravelers, Jenischen in Switzerland, andWoonwagenbewoners in the Netherlands. In-termarriage between the two categories has insome places made the distinction problematic,and some experts now prefer the designationGypsy-Travelers, while others prefer Roma orRomany peoples for Gypsies, and for the restthe more generic term peripatetics. Populationestimates vary widely, placing the number ofGypsies and Travelers in Europe between 2 and9 million. Recent estimates indicate the follow-ing countries have the largest Gypsy populations:Romania (3.5 million), Hungary (900,000),Slovakia (750,000), Croatia (750,000), Bulgaria(750,000), Spain (650,000), Russia (500,000),and France (500,000).

Experts generally believe that Gypsies firstentered Europe about A.D. 1000, having mi-grated from northern India through the north-ern Middle East. Some bands moved west andnorth, while others remained in southeasternEurope. These latter groups, the ancestors of themodern-day Rom, spread out from southeast-ern Europe in the mid-nineteenth century andare now found throughout the world.

European reaction to Gypsies was of twomajor types. In western Europe, Gypsies were aregular target of genocidal and ethnocidal gov-ernment policies and actions designed to exter-minate or deport them. They were consideredpariah communities and were excluded from anymeaningful participation in society. In the Neth-erlands, for example, from 1420 to 1750 theywere persecuted, expelled, and even hunted forbounties offered by the government. From 1750to 1868 they were assumed to have disappeared.From 1868 to today, when Gypsy groups immi-grated to the Netherlands, they were again per-secuted (the Dutch turned over several hundredGypsies to the Nazis for execution during WorldWar II). In England, up to recent times, Gyp-sies were frequently expelled; at times, those

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GYPSIES AND TRAVELERS IN EUROPE

Gypsies fleeing from Romania in front of the Praguemain railway station in the Czech Republic.

caught associating with them were subject tocriminal punishment. In southern and easternEurope the situation was different, and Gypsieswere often integrated into the economy andtreated better, although they were never fullyassimilated in any country. In Slovakia, whichalways had a large Gypsy population, theyworked as craftsmen and musicians for both bar-ons and peasants, and served as soldiers in thearmy. Such occupations meant that they werelargely settled and economically assimilated intoSlovak society. In Bulgaria, Gypsies worked asserfs during the period of the Romanian king-

dom, then as middlemen, and in specialized oc-cupations such as musicians and performers.

Since the fall of the Communist govern-ments in eastern Europe, Gypsies have becomefrequent victims of hatred, persecution, and dis-crimination, and many have fled west—a de-parture from history, when they were generallysafer in the east. In general, the old stereotypeof Gypsies as lazy, dirty, dishonest, criminal, andsickly has reemerged following the end of cen-tralized control of free speech and ethnic rival-ries. In Hungary, the unemployment rate amongGypsies is 40-45 percent, three times the na-tional average. In Slovakia they are blamed bygovernment officials for half the crime in thecountry and are described as having a high al-coholism rate. In Germany, Slovakia, the CzechRepublic, Poland, Hungary, Romania, andCroatia there have been assaults on Gypsies andtheir property in the last several years. In Ro-mania, in one of the worst incidents, 4 Gypsieswere killed, 17 of their homes were destroyed,and 130 people—the entire community—wereforced to flee in fear for their lives. There is alsoevidence that some governments are lax in crack-ing down on those who attack Gypsies. For ex-ample, again in Romania, of 16 recent incidentsinvolving Gypsies, only the Gypsies have beenprosecuted. Anti-Gypsy sentiment is not con-fined to eastern Europe; a recent survey in En-gland, for example, indicates that 66 percent ofthe population do not want Gypsies as neigh-bors. In fact, the condition of life for Gypsiesacross Europe is generally worse than that ofthe general population. In eastern Europe, manyGypsies have become unemployed as the de-mand for low-skill labor has declined, and theGypsy literacy rate is often below the nationalaverage. In most nations Gypsies are blamed forthe problems of others and are not perceived asvictims; little effort is being made to deal withGypsy social and economic problems. Efforts

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by Gypsy organizations and those working onbehalf of Gypsy rights have not led to mean-ingful reform.

Cottaar, Annemarie, Leo Lucassen, and WimWillems. (1992) "Justice or Injustice? ASurvey of Government Policy towards Gyp-sies and Caravan Dwellers in Western Eu-rope in the Nineteenth and TwentiethCenturies." Immigrants and Minorities 11:42-66.

Gmelch, Sharon B. (1986) "Groups that Don'tWant In: Gypsies and Other Artisan,Trader, and Entertainer Minorities. "AnnualReview of Anthropology 15: 307-330.

Hancock, Ian F. (1992) "The Roots of Inequal-ity: Romani Cultural Rights in Their His-torical and Social Context." Immigrants andMinorities 11: 3-30.

Liegeois, Jean-Pierre. (1986) Gypsies and Travelers.

Piasere, Leonardo. (1992) "Peripatetics." In Ency-clopedia of World Cultures. Volume 4, Europe,edited by Linda A. Bennett, 195-197.

1079

Hate or bias crimes arebehaviors defined by the

[fi3M state to be illegal andsubject to criminal pun-

ishment if they cause or are meant to cause harmto an individual or group because that individualor group is different. Difference can be definedbroadly or narrowly, but generally involves dif-ferences based on physical characteristics (in-cluding those based on race or physicaldisability), religion, ethnicity, and sexual orien-tation. Cross-culturally, and even within a singlenation, the concept of hate crime has little mean-ing. In many nations "hate" crimes are not dif-ferentiated as a distinct type of crime as they arein the United States. What may be consideredhate crimes may be tolerated when directedagainst some groups but not against others, andthe degree of acceptability of attacking typicalvictims of hate crimes may also change over time.The cross-cultural difficulties in dealing with thenotion of hate crimes are varied; for example, inRomania those who attack Gypsies rarely if everface arrest and trial, while similar attacks on eth-

nic Romanians do lead to arrest and trial. In Ja-pan, until 1992, non-Japanese residents (mostof whom are Koreans and Taiwanese) were rou-tinely fingerprinted. Acts that Germany callshate or bias crimes are called Rightist crimes inthe United States. Verbal insults hurled byAmerican teenagers at teenagers of other ethnicgroups, acts widely accepted as a part of adoles-cent life in the 1950s, are now reported to au-thorities as bias crimes. In all cultures, the notionof bias crimes is also confused by issues of freespeech and assembly rights, and by the relation-ship between bias crimes and government-sanctioned discrimination, which is not consid-ered a crime. Finally, bias crimes are difficult toidentify and count accurately because many (es-pecially verbal assaults) are never reported, re-ports by activist groups may inflate the counts,reports by police may deflate the counts, anddefining a crime as a bias crime requires a policeor judicial official to make a judgment about themotivation of the alleged perpetrator.

Bias crimes include a wide range of behav-iors, all of which are defined as misdemeanorsor crimes even if they are not motivated by biasor hatred. In the United States they generallyinclude verbal harassment; physical assaults;vandalism, including the destruction or defac-ing of property such as religious buildings;threatening through acts such as cross burnings;insults delivered through the mail or by phone;and homicide. Defining a crime as a hate crimemight bring with it a harsher punishment, as inGermany, where concern over neo-Nazi violencedirected at Turks and others has led to increasedsurveillance of alleged neo-Nazi groups, morearrests, and longer jail sentences than would oth-erwise be meted out for convicted perpetrators.

Although little is known about the patternsand causes of hate crimes, some informationfrom a few states in the United States and Ger-many indicates that the crimes are usually com-mitted by young men who feel economically

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HHate (BIAS

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victimized by others who have taken jobs andopportunities the young men believe are right-fully theirs. The "others" are often members ofother ethnic groups, particularly those who canbe marked as different by their physical appear-ance—African- and Asian-Americans in theUnited States, Jews (whose institutions such asthe synagogue mark them as different), andTurks and other non-Germans in Germany.However, one frequent target of hate crimes ishomosexuals, with ethnic or racial difference ir-relevant. In fact, what is important about hatecrime in terms of the perpetrator's motivation isnot that other groups have actually caused theperpetrator harm, but that they are perceived asso doing. Thus, blaming members of othergroups is often irrational, suggesting that strongethnocentric, xenophobic, and racist sentimentsare involved in hate crimes.

Perpetrators are often described as peoplewho have low self-esteem, have divorced par-ents, have no high school diploma, are unem-ployed, and who view violence as an appropriatemeans of settling conflicts. Although numerousgroups associated with bias crimes exist in theUnited States and elsewhere, most attention hasbeen drawn to so-called Skinheads—groups ofyoung men whose individual life profiles fit themodel noted above. However, the targets ofSkinhead groups are not predictable. In theUnited States, for example, persons of Asian orAfrican ancestry and homosexuals are commonvictims, while Jews are rarely targeted.

While the targets of hate crimes are knownin a general sense to the perpetrators, most at-tacks evidently arise spontaneously, not uncom-monly following group meetings and theconsumption of alcoholic beverages. Thus, thevictims are often selected randomly—often thefirst person or persons from a possible targetgroup the perpetrators encounter. Even then, thedefinition of a target might be quite flexible, asfor some German Skinheads for whom "anyone

who looks like a Jew" is an appropriate target.Due to the often random nature of the attacks,weapons are rarely used and damage to propertytends to be minimal. Of course, some assaultsare planned, such as attacks on Turkish housesin some German cities.

In addition to stiffer punishments for biascrimes, programs to control the problem in theUnited States and Germany have also focusedon changing the behavior of the perpetratorsthrough counseling, social skills training, bootcamp-type training, and behavioral confronta-tion. To control violence against foreigners, theGerman government has taken steps towardloosening its citizenship requirements, publiclydenounced such violent assaults, increased thenumber of police and investigators assigned tohate crime cases, and initiated training programsfor perpetrators. What effect these programs arehaving is unclear; in 1993, according to the FBI,there were 7,684 reported hate crimes in theUnited States, and a large but unknown num-ber of unreported crimes. Sixty-two percent ofthe crimes involved racial bias, 18 percent reli-gion, 12 percent sexual orientation, and 8 per-cent ethnicity.

See also ETHNOCENTRISM; FOREIGNERS IN GER-MANY; RACE AND RACISM; SCAPEGOAT; XENO-PHOBIA.

Kramer, Jane. (1993) "Neo-Nazis: A Chaos inthe Head." The New Yorker, 14 June: 52-70.

Mock, Stephan, and Guide Meyer. (1993)"Breaking the Cycle of Violence." Refugees93: 22-23.

Moore, Jack B. (1993) Skinheads, Shaved forBattle: A Cultural History of AmericanSkinheads.

H110

HINDUS AND MUSLIMS IN INDIA

HINDUS ANDMUSLIMS IN INDI^

The Republic of India isa nation with a 1993 es-timated population of897 million. The capital

is New Delhi, with a population of 8.3 million,ranking third in size in the world behind Bombayat 12.5 million and Calcutta at 10.8 million.India is bordered by Pakistan on the northwest;China, Nepal, and Bhutan on the north; andMyanmar and Bangladesh on the northeast. Itis now a federal republic composed of 25 statesand 7 union territories. India s official languagesare Hindi and English, although there are at least16 major languages and numerous dialects pres-ently spoken throughout the country. Manymodern Indians are descendants of the inter-breeding of earlier inhabitants of the region withAryan tribes who invaded the subcontinentaround 1500 B.C.

The Indian population is composed of twomajor religious groups: Hindus and Muslims,with small numbers of Christians, Sikhs, andJains. Hindus comprise about 82.6 percent ofthe population and number about 760 million,while Muslims comprise 11.3 percent and num-ber some 95 million. India is today the localefor a number of ongoing ethnic conflicts, themost widespread and perhaps most threateningto Indian development and stability being onebetween segments of the Hindu and Muslimpopulations, particularly in the north.

Hinduism itself has been described as morea way of life than a faith, although it is certainlyone of the world's oldest religions. In fact, Hin-duism predates almost all others (except Juda-ism, for example). It is difficult to give a concisedefinition of what it means to be a Hindu. With330 million gods (Krishna, Shiva, Shakti, andRama are among the best known) and only afew precepts to live by, it is easier to describeHinduism as it contrasts to Islam than by itself.It is important to note that Hinduism is morethan a religion in India, as its tenets (ritual pu-

rity and rebirth, for example) are guiding prin-ciples that provide the framework for social, po-litical, and economic relations between individualsand communities, especially in rural India.

Islamic peoples (variously called Muslim,Moslem, Mahommedan, Mohommedan,Musulman) in India are actually not ethnicallydifferent from Hindus; the large majority oftoday s Muslims are descendants of Hindus whoconverted to Islam. To a large extent, Muslimand Hindu communities in India interact peace-fully, with both following a castelike structurein rural communities. At the same time, Mus-lims of south Asia (India, Pakistan, andBangladesh) are different culturally from Mus-lims of the Middle East, largely because theylive among or near the majority Hindu popula-tion and interact with it on a daily basis. Still,the religious beliefs and practices among thevarious Muslims remain the same, as there islittle room for variation in the Islamic religion.As elsewhere, the Five Pillars of Islam are fol-lowed by Muslims in India: (1) accepting andtestifying that there is no god except Allah andthat Muhammed is his true prophet; (2) pray-ing five times daily, in the direction of Mecca;(3) fasting during the month of Ramadan; (4)giving alms to the poor; and (5) making a pil-grimage to Mecca, the holy land.

Hinduism became the dominant religion onthe Indian subcontinent after the third century.Control over the subcontinent shifted repeat-edly until the seventeenth century, when theBritish gained control over most of it. India re-mained a British colony until the first half ofthe twentieth century, when Indian demand forconstitutional reform found a leader in MahatmaGandhi. In 1947 England partitioned theircolony into the dominions of India and Paki-stan; the latter became a Muslim nation. Indiawas established as a secular state, housing sev-eral religions, but the large majority was, andstill is, Hindu. Although Mahatma Gandhi

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Hindu temple on the site of a sixteenth-centuryMuslim mosque in 1990. The Hindu nationalists,led by the right-wing BJP, maintained that themosque was built on the exact site of the birth-place of the Hindu god Rama. The effort to re-move the mosque was challenged by V. P. Singh,then prime minister of India. In response, the BJPwithdrew its parliamentary support for the gov-ernment during a crucial vote of confidence inNovember 1990, causing it to lose its majority.Hundreds were killed across the country in aseries of protests and riots related to the removalof the mosque, finally resulting in its destruc-tion in a bloody raid by Hindu nationalists inDecember 1992. Throughout this time the BJPhas maneuvered its way to a position of recogni-tion as a national party, and is certainly a politicalforce to be reckoned with in the northern states.

Critics have accused the BJP of fanning thefears of paranoid Hindus who believe that the largeMuslim minority has been given special treatmentand too much power and leverage. Fears stem alsofrom acute violence in the Muslim-majority state

Militant Hindus at Babri mosque in Ayodhya, India, 1992. The Hindu extremists razed the 430-year-old mosqueto clear a site for a proposed Hindu temple.

advocated nonviolence, the sundering of colo-nial India into present-day India and Pakistanwas done amid bloody Hindu-Muslim riotingin which nearly 200,000 people were killed.

From its inception, India has been plaguedwith periods of unrest, rioting, massacres, anddemonstrations between Muslims and Hindus,although on a smaller scale the two groups dointegrate daily. Despite the periodic unrest, theCongress party, embodiment of the ideal of secu-lar democracy, ruled India virtually unchallengeduntil recent years. A Hindu Nationalist move-ment (with the aim that India be a Hindu na-tion rather than a secular state) has taken shapein the form of both a political party and a vio-lent conflict. The Bharatiya Janata party (BJP),led by L. K. Advani, has campaigned on the is-sue of Hindu nationalism. The BJP has grownat a remarkable rate; merely a fringe politicalorganization in the 1970s, they gained 2 seats inparliament in 1984, and in 1993 held not lessthan 119 (out of 533). The BJP gained much ofits momentum around the issue of building a

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of Jammu and Kashmir, where a Kashmir sepa-ratist movement has gained momentum in the pastfew years. The BJP has been accused of posing asevere threat to the secular principles on which thenation was founded.

The BJP finds a large base of support inHindu youths, particularly students. The youngpeople have also joined activist groups such asthe Shiv Sena in Bombay, which has an unprec-edented 40,000 members. In the past the ShivSena campaigned in Maharastra State (of whichBombay is the capital) on a platform in whichthey proposed to prevent outsiders from migrat-ing to the state in search of employment in or-der to preserve such opportunities for currentresidents. In its latest and most violent campaign,Hindu nationalism, the Shiv Sena instigated anine-day-long attack on the Muslims of Bombay,firebombing and charging Muslim residentialand business communities, and killing more than600 Muslims. In February 1993 the government,led by P. V. Narashima Rao, responded effec-tively for the first time by suppressing a massivedemonstration by the BJP and Hindu national-ist forces in New Delhi. Over 100,000 peoplewere arrested across the country and over 1,000in the capital alone. Election results in Decem-ber 1993 suggest a lessening of anti-Muslim sen-timent; the BJP suffered wholesale defeats andlost control of the state assemblies in the north-ern states of Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh,Rajasthan, and Himachal Pradesh.

HOMELAND

See DIASPORA; IRREDENTISM.

Ahmad, Imtiaz, ed. (1981) Ritual and Religionamong Muslims in India.

Chaudhuri, Nirad C. (1979) Hinduism: A Reli-gion To Live By.

Hockings, Paul, ed. (1992) The Encyclopedia ofWorld Cultures. Volume 3, South Asia.

Mann, E. A. (1992) Boundaries and Identities:MuslimSy Work and Status in Aligarh.

Zaehner, R. C. (1962) Hinduism.

HOPI AND NAVAJOThe Hopi (also calledMoqui or Tusayan) arean American Indian na-

tion who live on their reservation in the north-eastern portion of Arizona. In 1988 the Hopitribal enrollment was 6,624; today there may beas many as 10,000. Their language is part of theShoshonean branch of Uto-Aztecan. The Hopipeoples7 first contact with Europeans came in1540 with the Spanish explorer FranciscoVasquez de Coronado. In the seventeenth cen-tury attempts were made to convert the Hopi toChristianity, but following the destruction ofSpanish missions toward the end of the centurythere was little contact between Hopi and set-tlers. In the latter half of the nineteenth cen-tury, there was further contact with Americans,and the first reservation was established in 1882.Today there are approximately 11 compact vil-lages in which the Hopi live. Each village haselected representatives who convene a tribalcouncil, in accordance with the tribal constitu-tion adopted in 1936, to adjudicate clan landdisputes and warfare. Religion is central to Hopilife; kivas, or ceremonial chambers, are scatteredthroughout villages and among houses, and areused for sacred ceremonial purposes and as club-houses for men. Additionally, there are severalother natural shrines outside the village to whichHopi make pilgrimages to offer prayers to theirdeities. The Hopi are a farming people with areputation for nonviolence.

The Navajo (also called Apaches de Nabaju,Dine, Dineh, Dinneh, Nabajo, Nabaju) are lo-cated in Arizona and New Mexico. Their tradi-tional home had been on the Colorado Plateau,

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and the present Navajo reservation encompassesapproximately 25,000 square miles in the FourCorners area of the Southwest (Arizona, Utah,Colorado, and New Mexico). In 1988 their to-tal population was estimated at approximately200,000, making them one of the largest Ameri-can Indian nations in North America. Whilemost remain on the Navajo Reservation (about150,000) there are substantial Navajo popula-tions in Southwest cities as well. Their languagebelongs to the Apachean branch of theAthapaskan family.

Originally hunters and gatherers, after theirmigration from Canada to the Southwest theNavajo adopted agriculture and became nomadicsheepherders. Although in the sixteenth centurythe Spanish managed to subjugate other Ameri-can Indian tribes, the Navajo resisted conquest.The annexation of New Mexico in 1848 led toan American military campaign in 1874 thateventually ended the Navajo wars. In 1868 atreaty was signed that allowed the Navajo to re-turn to their original homeland and establisheda reservation. The Navajo have not traditionallybeen town dwellers, preferring instead asemimobile existence. Only since the nineteenthcentury, following the establishment of the res-ervation, have the Navajo lived in extended fam-ily encampments. Until political organization ofthe tribe was instituted in 1923 (modeled afterU.S. parliamentary democracy), there was nosystem of formal ranking of authority other thankinship relationships.

For more than a century the Hopi and theNavajo have been trying to resolve a land dis-pute. In 1868, following the pacification of theNavajo and their release from federal internment,they returned to the northeast area of Arizonathat, in 1882, became the Hopi Reservation. TheHopi Reservation is surrounded entirely by Na-vajo land, and the federal government has hadno success in keeping Navajos from settling inHopi territory. This eventually led to a lawsuitin 1962, and a federal district court declared the

land a Joint Use Area. After the Hopi pressedthe matter further, claiming that the Navajo re-fused to share the land, Congress passed theNavajo-Hopi Resettlement Act in 1974. TheResettlement Act called for negotiations to de-termine the repartitioning of the land into clearlydefined Hopi and Navajo sections. A resettle-ment commission was also established to orga-nize relocation. The issue finally went back tothe courts, where the land was divided in half(between 10,000 Hopi and 200,000 Navajo).Relocation, which mainly affects the Navajo, hasbeen long and costly; as of 1992, 3,000 Navajoremained to be moved. For the Navajo, reloca-tion means a disruption to their culture, andhardship for many elderly residents of the re-gion. Mediation has continued in order to de-termine the use of sacred shrines located on eachtribe's property—a major issue of dispute andone whose violation quickly opens old woundsand hinders progress toward a final settlement.

Kluckhohn, Clyde, and Dorothea Leighton.(1946) TheNavaho.

Nagata, Shuichi. (1960) Modern TransformationsofMoenkopi Pueblo.

Ortiz, Alfonso, ed. (1983) Handbook of NorthAmerican Indians. Volume 1C\ Southwest.

Titiev, Mischa. (1944) OldOraibi:AStudyoftheHopi Indians of Third Mesa. Papers of thePeabody Museum, Harvard University 22(1).

HUMAN RIGHTSInterest in the basicrights of individuals goesfar back in human his-

tory, and such rights are mentioned in the OldTestament, the Magna Carta, and the U.S. Dec-laration of Independence. However, only sincethe end of World War II has the issue of human

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rights emerged as a major focus of worldwideconcern and international relations, and onlysince the 1940s have such rights been viewed bythe world community as protected by interna-tional law. The emergence of the human rightsissue and its continuation as a major worldwideissue are the result of a number of factors. Theseinclude the genocide and other large-scale hu-man rights violations of World War II; the ero-sion of colonialism; the demand for rights byindigenous and minority peoples; and the verycommon human rights violations of torturingpolitical prisoners, political repression, and massrapes that have occurred in numerous nations inthe last 50 years.

The basic definition and framework for thesubsequent consideration of human rights is con-tained in the Universal Declaration of HumanRights adopted and proclaimed by the UnitedNations General Assembly resolution 217 A(III) of 10 December 1948. This document,reprinted in full below, establishes as a moralprinciple that all human beings are entitled tocertain rights and freedoms. The Universal Dec-laration has been followed by numerous otherdocuments focusing on specific rights or catego-ries of rights pertaining to genocide, protectionof war captives and victims, collective bargain-ing, prostitution, children, refugees, prisoners,slavery, marriage, forced labor, racial discrimi-nation, cultural rights, political asylum, mentalretardation, hunger and malnutrition, disabledpersons, religion, and medical care.

From the viewpoint of ethnic relations, hu-man rights violations against entire ethnic groupsare fundamentally different from those againstindividuals. Human rights violations involvingethnic groups are purposeful acts intended toharm both individuals who are members of aspecific ethnic group and the group itself. Suchviolations commonly include mass killings, de-portations, rapes, denial of food and housing,torture, detention without due process, destruc-tion of dwellings and material possessions, and

destruction of cultural, educational, and religiousinstitutions. When a national government is di-rectly involved in ethnic conflict, it may be aperpetrator of rights violations and simulta-neously render itself unavailable as a protectorof victims' rights. Similarly, when ethnic groupsengage in terrorism against civilian populations,they too are guilty of human rights violations.

Efforts to apply the concept of human rightsto ethnic groups have produced three contro-versies in the international community. The firstis whether the concept of human rights as setforth in the Universal Declaration and subse-quent documents applies only to individuals orwhether it also applies collectively to religiousgroups, ethnic minority groups, and indigenouspeoples. It is clear from the policy and practicein many nations that, as regards certain matters,ethnic groups do have a collective, corporateidentity. For example, land claims and otherrights asserted by American Indians have beenadjudicated in courts or settled by administra-tive bodies within the framework of the group'srights. Similarly, in New Zealand, the Maoriright to political representation is a group right,not an individual right. However, when it comesto rights defined as human rights, the questionof whether those rights apply only to individu-als or to groups as well is not clear. Human rightsadvocates argue for the latter view as a way ofmore broadly protecting human rights, whilemany national governments adhere to theindividual-rights-only position as a means ofdefining human rights as an internal matter.Efforts at applying rights protection to entiregroups has led to many unanswered questionssuch as: What is an ethnic minority? Is groupsize a reasonable criterion for measuringgroup existence? Does a group need to be local-ized to exist? How does one measure groupcohesiveness?

The second controversy concerns the issueof differentiation versus discrimination, whichoften arises when one group is afforded some

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rights denied to other groups. The controversyarises because in many nations ethnic minoritygroups want to be treated differently, often tomaintain their cultural integrity or regain rightslost during times of colonial domination. Thequestion is whether this differential treatmentof groups, as in affirmative-action programs forAfrican-Americans in the United States or likeprograms for Untouchables in India, is a formof discrimination, either against individualmembers of the group or against members ofother groups who are not eligible for differen-tial treatment. Outsiders sometimes see thesespecial group rights (designed to reverse the ef-fects of past discrimination) as a form of reversediscrimination. In general, when groups aregiven collective rights, these groups tend to have

a clear ethnic identity and membership, are dif-ferent from other groups, and can be awardedrights on the basis of objective criteria that alsocan be applied to other groups.

The third controversy concerns the cross-cultural validity of current conceptions of hu-man rights; some non-Western nations regardthese views as reflecting Western values andtherefore ethnocentric. Some experts considerthis ethnocentrism a hurdle to the universaladoption and enforcement of human rights pro-tections. From a cross-cultural perspective, muchattention has been focused lately on Islam andIslamic nations and the need to balance univer-sal human rights concepts with Islamic practicessuch as the use of amputation as a punishmentfor crime.

UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS

PREAMBLEWhereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of theequal and inalienable rights of all members of the hu-man family is the foundation of freedom, justice andpeace in the world,

Whereas disregard and contempt for human rights haveresulted in barbarous acts which have outraged the con-science of mankind, and the advent of a world in whichhuman beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and beliefand freedom from fear and want has been proclaimedas the highest aspiration of the common people,

Whereas it is essential, if man is not to be compelled tohave recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyr-anny and oppression, that human rights should be pro-tected by the rule of law,

Whereas it is essential to promote the development offriendly relations between nations,

Whereas the peoples of the United Nations have in theCharter reaffirmed their faith in fundamental humanrights, in the dignity and worth of the human personand in the equal rights of men and women and havedetermined to promote social progress and better stan-dards of life in larger freedom,

Whereas Member States have pledged themselves toachieve, in cooperation with the United Nations, thepromotion of universal respect for and observance ofhuman rights and fundamental freedoms,

Whereas a common understanding of these rights andfreedoms is of the greatest importance for the full real-ization of this pledge,

Now, therefore,

The General Assembly,Proclaims this Universal Declaration of Human Rightsas a common standard of achievement for all peoplesand all nations, to the end that every individual andevery organ of society, keeping this Declaration con-stantly in mind, shall strive by teaching and educationto promote respect for these rights and freedoms andby progressive measures, national and international, tosecure their universal and effective recognition and ob-servance, both among the peoples of Member Statesthemselves and among the peoples of territories undertheir jurisdiction.

Article 1

All human beings are born free and equal in dignityand rights. They are endowed with reason and con-science and should act towards one another in a spiritof brotherhood.

Article 2

Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms setforth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind,

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such as race, color, sex, language, religion, political orother opinion, national or social origin, property, birthor other status.

Furthermore, no distinction shall be made on the basisof the political, jurisdictional or international status ofthe country or territory to which a person belongs,whether it be independent, trust, non-self-governing orunder any other limitation of sovereignty.

Article 3

Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security ofperson.

Article 4

No one shall be held in slavery or servitude; slavery andthe slave trade shall be prohibited in all their forms.

Article 5

No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhu-man or degrading treatment or punishment.

Article 6

Everyone has the right to recognition everywhere as aperson before the law.

Article 7

All are equal before the law and are entitled withoutany discrimination to equal protection of the law. Allare entitled to equal protection against any discrimina-tion in violation of this Declaration and against any in-citement to such discrimination.

Article 111. Everyone charged with a penal offense has the rightto be presumed innocent until proved guilty accordingto law in a public trial at which he has had all the guar-antees necessary for his defense.

2. No one shall be held guilty of any penal offense onaccount of any act or omission which did not constitutea penal offense, under national or international law, atthe time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavierpenalty be imposed than the one that was applicable atthe time the penal offense was committed.

Article 12

No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference withhis privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to at-tacks upon his honor and reputation. Everyone has theright to the protection of the law against such interfer-ence or attacks.

Article 13

1. Everyone has the right to freedom of movement andresidence within the borders of each State.

2. Everyone has the right to leave any country, includ-ing his own, and to return to his country.

Article 14

1. Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in othercountries asylum from persecution.

2. This right may not be invoked in the case of prosecu-tions genuinely arising from non-political crimes or fromacts contrary to the purposes and principles of the UnitedNations.

Article 8

Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by thecompetent national tribunals for acts violating the fun-damental rights granted him by the constitution orby law.

Article 9

No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detentionor exile.

Article 10

Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and publichearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, inthe determination of his rights and obligations and ofany criminal charge against him.

Article 15

1. Everyone has the right to a nationality.

2. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationalitynor denied the right to change his nationality.

Article 16

1. Men and women of full age, without any limitationdue to race, nationality or religion, have the right to marryand to found a family. They are entitled to equal rights asto marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution.

2. Marriage shall be entered into only with the free andfull consent of the intending spouses.

3. The family is the natural and fundamental group unitof society and is entitled to protection by society andthe State.

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HUMAN RIGHTS

Article 17

1. Everyone has the right to own property alone as wellas in association with others.

2. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.

Article 18

Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, con-science and religion; this right includes freedom tochange his religion or belief, and freedom, either aloneor in community with others and in public or private, tomanifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, wor-ship and observance.

Article 19

Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and ex-pression; this right includes freedom to hold opinionswithout interference and to seek, receive and impartinformation and ideas through any media and regard-less of frontiers.

Article 20

1. Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful as-sembly and association.

2. No one may be compelled to belong to an association.

Article 21

1. Everyone has the right to take part in the govern-ment of his country, directly or through freely chosenrepresentatives.2. Everyone has the right to equal access to public ser-vice in his country.

3. The will of the people shall be the basis of the au-thority of government: this will shall be expressed inperiodic and genuine elections which shall be by uni-versal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret voteor by equivalent free voting procedures.

Article 22

Everyone, as a member of society, has the right to socialsecurity and is entitled to realization, through nationaleffort and international co-operation and in accordancewith the organization and resources of each State, of theeconomic, social and cultural rights indispensable for hisdignity and the free development of his personality.

Article 23

1. Everyone has the right to work, to free choice ofemployment, to just and favorable conditions of workand to protection against unemployment.

2. Everyone, without any discrimination, has the rightto equal pay for equal work.

3. Everyone who works has the right to just and fa-vorable remuneration ensuring for himself and hisfamily an existence worthy of human dignity, andsupplemented, if necessary, by other means of socialprotection.

4. Everyone has the right to form and to join tradeunions for the protection of his interests.

Article 24

Everyone has the right to rest and leisure, including rea-sonable limitation of working hours and periodic holi-days with pay.

Article 25

1. Everyone has the right to a standard of living ad-equate for the health and well-being of himself and ofhis family, including food, clothing, housing and medi-cal care and necessary social services, and the right tosecurity in the event of unemployment, sickness, dis-ability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihoodin circumstances beyond his control.

2. Motherhood and childhood are entitled to specialcare and assistance. All children, whether born in orout of wedlock, shall enjoy the same social protection.

Article 26

1. Everyone has the right to education. Education shallbe free, at least in the elementary and fundamentalstages. Elementary education shall be compulsory. Tech-nical and professional education shall be made gener-ally available and higher education shall be equallyaccessible to all on the basis of merit.

2. Education shall be directed to the full developmentof the human personality and to the strengthening ofrespect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. Itshall promote understanding, tolerance and friendshipamong all nations, racial or religious groups, and shallfurther the activities of the United Nations for the main-tenance of peace.

3. Parents have a prior right to choose the kind of edu-cation that shall be given to their children.

Article 27

1. Everyone has the right freely to participate in thecultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts and to

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HUNGARIANS IN ROMANIA (TRANSYLVANIA)

share in scientific advancement and its benefits.

2. Everyone has the right to the protection of the moraland material interests resulting from any scientific, lit-erary or artistic production of which he is the author.

Article 28

Everyone is entitled to a social and international orderin which the rights and freedoms set forth in this Dec-laration can be fully realized.

Article 29

1. Everyone has duties to the community in which alonethe free and full development of his personality is pos-sible.

2. In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyoneshall be subject only to such limitations as are deter-mined by law solely for the purpose of securing due rec-ognition and respect for the rights and freedoms ofothers and of meeting the just requirements of moral-ity, public order and the general welfare in a democraticsociety.

3. These rights and freedoms may in no case be exer-cised contrary to the purposes and principles of theUnited Nations.

Article 30

Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as im-plying for any State, group or person any right to en-gage in any activity or to perform any act aimed at thedestruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forthherein.

See also ANTI-SEMITISM; APARTHEID;ETHNOCIDE; GENOCIDE; INDIGENOUS PEOPLES;MINORITY RIGHTS.

An-Na'im, Abdullah! A., ed. (1992) HumanRights in Cross-Cultural Perspective: A Questfor Consensus.

Brownlie, Ian. (1992) Basic Documents on Hu-man Rights.

Felice, William. (1992) The Emergence of Peoples'Rights in International Relations.

Heinz, Wolfgang S. (1991) Indigenous Popula-tions, Ethnic Minorities and Human Rights.

Lawson, Edward, ed. (1991) Encyclopedia ofHuman Rights.

Ramaga, Philip V. (1993) "The Group Conceptin Minority Protection." Human RightsQuarterly 15: 575-588.

Stavenhagen, Rodolfo. (1987) "Ethnic Conflictand Human Rights: Their Interrelationship."Bulletin of Peace Proposals 18: 507-514.

Van Dyke, Vernon. (1985) Human Rights,Ethnicity, and Discrimination.

Whalen, Lucille. (1989) Human Rights: A Ref-erence Handbook.

Transylvania is a regionin Romania. Its popula-tion of about 8 million(35 percent of the popu-lation of Romania) is

multiethnic—about 70 percent Romanian, 22percent Hungarian, 4 percent German, and lessthan 1 percent Serbian. Hungarians disputethese numbers as underestimates, and the Hun-garian population in Transylvania may actuallybe as high as 25 percent. This disagreement isonly one of many conflicts between the twogroups; perhaps the most important disagree-ment concerns the settlement history of the re-gion. Although Transylvania currently has nopolitical boundaries and is therefore not officiallydesignated, the area is usually defined as includ-ing all the territory of Romania west and northof the southern and eastern Carpathian Moun-tains, extending to the borders of Hungary andthe Ukraine; it therefore occupies 41.9 percentof the land area of Romania. For the Hungar-ians, interest in Transylvania is twofold. First,they have an irredentist interest; Hungariansregard Transylvania as a region of Hungarythat should be returned to it. Second, Hungar-ians are an ethnic minority in the region, and

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HUNGARIANS IN ROMANIA (TRANSYLVANIA)

both during and following Communist rule theirrights have been threatened by Romanian eth-nic nationalism. Romanian concerns includemaintaining control of a territory they view as apart of Romania and the home of a Romanianmajority, and building a modern nation in thepost-Communist era. The Romanians perceivethe presence of a large Hungarian minorityas interfering with ethnic solidarity in nation-building.

The official language in the Transylvanianregion is Romanian, although the version spo-ken there is slightly different from that spokenelsewhere in the country. Likewise, the Hun-garians in Transylvania speak Hungarian, alsoslightly different from that spoken in Hungary.Hungarians are predominantly Roman Catho-lic, with large minorities of Calvinists and Uni-tarians. Romanians have a small minority ofRoman Catholics (about 6 percent), but mostare followers of the Eastern Orthodox Church.

The Hungarian and Romanian versions ofthe history of the Transylvanian region are mark-edly different and constitute a major factor inthe current ethnic strife. Modern Romanianancestry can be traced to the intermarriage ofRomans and Dacians after the Roman conquestof Dacia in A.D. 105-106. According to Roma-nian history, this population has been the con-tinual inhabitant of the Transylvanian region,retreating only briefly from the open spaces toescape the invasions of different nomadic groups.Hungarians maintain that they gradually ex-panded into the Transylvanian region after firmlyestablishing control in present-day central Hun-gary. They claim that Transylvania was not in-habited by Romanians during the tenth andeleventh centuries when Hungarians establishedsettlements there. Current archaeological evi-dence is not of sufficient quantity nor trustwor-thiness to support either version. Additionally,since the Hungarian and Romanian ethnicgroups as now defined did not exist 1,000 yearsago, it is difficult to decide claims in the present

on the basis of ties to a murky past.Transylvania was, in any case, conquered by

the Hungarians and became an integral part ofthe kingdom after 1526, when the OttomanTurks defeated Hungary and occupied its cen-tral region for more than a century. During thistime the Transylvanian region became a semi-independent principality, attracting many Ro-manians and others seeking refuge from theTurkish-occupied Balkans. It was not until thelate 1600s that the Austrian Hapsburgs, who hadbeen occupying the western and northern regionsof Hungary, defeated the Turks and establishedcontrol. After several unsuccessful uprisings, re-volts, and attacks by revolutionary Hungarians,the dual monarchy of Austria-Hungary was es-tablished. Austria-Hungary was defeated inWorld War I and forced to sign the Treaty ofTrianon at Versailles in 1920. As a result ofthis treaty, Hungary lost 68 percent of its to-tal surface area to various surrounding coun-tries, and Transylvania was ceded to Romania,who had long viewed Transylvania as rightfullytheirs. This shift of control is a basic factor inthe ongoing disupute between Hungary andRomania.

Under Communist control, the relationsbetween Hungarians and Romanians inTransylvania were often tense, but violent con-frontation was controlled by the governmentsecurity apparatus. Following the overthrow ofCommunist leader Nicolae Ceausescu in 1989and continuing into the mid-1990s, tensionsincreased as the Hungarians demanded politi-cal, educational, and cultural rights denied themunder the Communist policy of forced assimi-lation, while the Romanians are more concernedwith forging a unified Romanian nation.

Kligman, Gail. (1988) Wedding of the Dead:Ritual, Poetics, and Popular Culture inTransylvania.

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HUTU AND TUTSI IN BURUNDI AND RWANDA

Verdery, Katherine. (1983) Transylvanian Vil-lages: Three Centuries of Political, Economic,and Ethnic Change.

HUTU AND TUTSIIN BURUNDI AND

RWANDA

The Hutu and the Tutsiare the major ethnicgroups in the East Afri-can nations of Rwandaand Burundi. Prior to

colonization (and as is currently the case), theTutsi were the numerical minority and the Hutuwere the majority. The Tutsi were traditionallyherders and the Hutu were farmers, with thelatter considered socially inferior by the former.In fact, traditional social and political organiza-tions were more complicated, and the dominantTutsi group was the Tutsi-Hima, found mainlyin the south. Both the Tutsi and Hutu were or-ganized on the basis of patrilineal clans that ex-isted as corporate groups. The Hutu and Tutsiwere closely linked to one another by a series ofinterlocking patron-client relationships at alllevels of the social hierarchy. Ethnic conflict wasrare, and disputes more commonly involved clansor ruling lineages called ganwa. Much attentionhas been paid to the difference in physical ap-pearance—the tall, thin Tutsi and the shorter,stout Hutu. Whether this dissimilarity had a rolein precolonial Tutsi dominance is unclear, al-though it is evident that the colonial powers fa-vored the appearance of the Tutsi.

In both nations, the Hutu form a large ma-jority of the population, but the relative statusesof the groups and the nature of ethnic conflictin the two nations have been quite different.Once part of German East Africa, Rwanda andBurundi became Belgian mandates in 1923 andshared one administration (known as Ruanda-Urundi). In 1962 Urundi gained full indepen-dence and became Burundi, and Rwandafollowed. Violent ethnic conflict has been an on-

going problem in each nation since indepen-dence, fueled in part by Hutu-Tutsi rivalries thatpredated colonial rule, a regime that placed theminority Tutsi in key government and economicpositions, and postcolonial rivalry for politicaland economic dominance. In addition to hun-dreds of thousands of dead, the conflict hasbrought about refugees and internally displacedpersons. With world attention drawn to the cri-sis in the 1990s and political reform in bothcountries, the conflict was moving toward peace-ful resolution until April 1994. The problems ofdisplaced persons and refugees, who have livedin neighboring nations for as much as 30 years,have not yet been resolved completely.

The Republic of Rwanda has an area of10,162 square miles and is located in the centralAfrican rift valley. It is bounded by Uganda onthe north, Zaire on the west, Burundi on thesouth, and Tanzania on the east. In 1993 thepopulation was estimated at 7.4 million, com-posed of 90 percent Hutu, 9 percent Tutsi, and1 percent Twa. About 74 percent of the popula-tion are Christian, 25 percent follow traditionalreligions, and 1 percent are Muslim. The offi-cial languages are French and Rwanda. Bothbefore and during colonial rule, the Tutsi mi-nority maintained dominance over the largeHutu majority. In 1959, during Belgium admin-istration, the Hutu mounted a bloody revoltagainst the Tutsi, leaving approximately 12,000dead. Nearly 120,000 Rwandians fled to Burundiand other neighboring countries. By the 1990ssome 250,000 Rwandians (mainly Tutsi) wereliving as refugees in neighboring nations, andsome 350,000 were internally displaced inRwanda. Since independence in 1962, Rwandahas been ruled by the majority Hutu. Through-out the 1980s the Hutu refused requests by theTutsi refugees to return to Rwanda. Civil warbroke out in October 1990, precipitated by theformation of the Rwandan Patriotic Front, arebel force composed largely of Tutsi refugeesin Uganda. The Tutsi rebels invaded Rwanda,

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A group of Rwanda refugees watches a French armored vehicle in southern Rwanda. The French presence points tothe often transnational nature of ethnic conflicts.

demanding greater freedoms for Tutsi in Rwandaand the right of refugees to return. The civil warresulted in more deaths and refugees, and at least80,000 displaced persons within the nation.However, it also led to talks between the Hutugovernment and Tutsi rebels that, along withpolitical reforms already under way, created anopportunity for peaceful coexistence between thegroups. Among major changes were tentativeagreements by the two groups to share powereventually, allow all refugees to return, and holdmultiparty elections in 1993. However, violencedirected by conservative Hutu against Tutsi in1993 disrupted the peace process and real, per-manent change has yet to take place. In June1993 the United Nations Security Counciladopted a resolution establishing a small peace-keeping force to monitor the border of Ugandaand Rwanda, in hopes of stopping the violenceby preventing the smuggling of weapons.

President Juvenal Habyarimana was killedin a plane crash in April 1994, and civil war in-volving the Tutsi Rwandan Patriotic Front andthe Hutu-dominated government resumed. Ina few months, the war has produced hundredsof thousands of deaths and massive refugeeproblems in neighboring nations. In June1994 a French force of 2,500 soldiers enteredthe nation to protect civilians from furthermassacres.

The Republic of Burundi is an area of 10,759square miles, roughly the same size as Rwanda.It borders Rwanda on the north, Zaire on thewest, and Tanzania on the east. As of 1991, thepopulation was 5,831,000, composed of 85 per-cent Hutu, 14 percent Tutsi, and 1 percent Twa.French and Rundi are both official languages.About 62 percent of the population is RomanCatholic and 32 percent follow traditional reli-gions. Like Rwanda, Burundi has been the scene

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of violent ethnic conflict involving the Hutu andTutsi. Tutsi remain the ruling group in Burundidespite the fact that they are greatly outnum-bered by the Hutu. In 1972 an unsuccessful Hutuuprising (which itself claimed at least 2,000 Tutsilives) led to a Tutsi counterattack of mass pro-portions. Perhaps fearing the same fate as theTutsi in Rwanda and in order to consolidate theirpower in the postcolonial era, Burundi Tutsi sys-tematically killed off much of the educated orsemieducated strata of Hutu society, thereby less-ening the possibility of further challenges fromthe Hutu community. Some 150,000 Hutu fledtheir homeland and became refugees in Zaire,Rwanda, and Tanzania, where they were joinedby another 40,000 who fled following unrest in1988-1991. With only limited leadership, theHutu within Burundi were effectively silencedfor at least a generation. The Burundi govern-ment, led by the Tutsi, had killed nearly 100,000Hutu. From 1990 to 1992 a series of politicalreforms was instituted including the ratificationof a multiparty constitution, the granting of morerepresentation to the Hutu, and guaranteed safereturn and the promise of land for all returningrefugees. To date, some 57,000 Hutu refugees

have returned. In June 1993 in the first free elec-tions, a Hutu, Melchior Ndadaye, was electedpresident. He sought to encourage bicultural ruleby appointing 9 Tutsi to ministerial positions (theother 14 were Hutu) and a Tutsi as prime min-ister. However, his efforts to weaken Tutsi con-trol of the military and to repatriate refugee Hutuled to a military coup and his assassination inOctober 1993. The coup was followed by raidsdestroying villages, the killing of civilians by boththe Hutu and Tutsi, and the dislocation of some200,000 Tutsi. Despite efforts by the military towithdraw from the situation and allow the res-toration of civilian rule, full-scale Hutu-Tutsiwarfare remains a possibility.

Lemarchand, Rene. (1970) Rwanda andBurundi.

. (1974) Selective Genocide in Burundi.

Trouwborst, Albert. (1965) "Kinship and Geo-graphical Mobility in Burundi." InternationalJournal of Comparative Sociology 4:166—182.

U.S. Committee for Refugees. (1993) WorldRefugee Survey.

123h

INDIGENOUSPEOPLES

Indigenous peoples is aterm that has come intocommon usage in thelast few decades as a

generic label for ethnic groups who were, andsometimes continue to be, labeled tribal peoples,national minorities, native peoples, tribal minori-ties, scheduled tribes, autochthones, and theFourth World.

Despite its increasingly widespread use,there is no single agreed-upon definition of whatthe term indigenous people means and whatspecific groups should be so classified. The keyelements of the United Nations Working Defi-nition of Indigenous Peoples are:

Indigenous populations are composed of the ex-isting descendants of peoples who inhabited thepresent territory of a country wholly or partiallyat the time when persons of a different cultureor ethnic origin arrived there from other partsof the world, overcame them, and by conquest,settlement or other means, reduced them to anon-dominant or colonial situation; who todaylive more in conformity with their particular so-cial, economic and cultural customs and tradi-tions than with the institutions of the country

of which they now form a part, under a Statestructure which incorporates mainly the national,social and cultural characteristics of other seg-ments of the population which are predominant.

A composite definition, suggested by JulianBurger, combines elements from earlier defini-tions proposed by the U.N., World Bank, andthe World Council of Indigenous Peoples,among others. Burger's definition suggests thatpeople are indigenous if they display all or someof the following characteristics:

1. Are descended from the original inhabitantsof a territory who were conquered

2. Are nomadic or seminomadic

3. Have a subsistence-level economy

4. Have no political organization above thecommunity level

5. Share a common language, religion, andcustoms

6. Are subjugated by a dominant culture

7. Have a different worldview from the domi-nant culture

8. Consider themselves to be an indigenouspeople

Given the large variety of cultures in the worldand the change they are experiencing, this defi-nition does not neatly fit every culture that mightbe considered an indigenous one. However, itdoes provide a helpful framework for classifyingcultures as indigenous or not. In general, thecriteria considered most often are: descent fromthe original inhabitants of a region, conquest andcontinued domination by another group, andself-definition as indigenous.

With this definition in mind, the culturesfalling within the following categories (althoughnot necessarily all cultures in each category) areindigenous peoples.

North AmericaAleutian IslandersEskimo and Inuit Peoples

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Aboriginal people in Australia perform a traditional dance in 1992 to launch the International Year ofIndigenous Peoples.

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INDIGENOUS RIGHTS

North American Indian Nations

Central and South AmericaCentral American Indian NationsSouth American Indian Groups

Europe and RussiaEthnic MinoritiesLinguistic MinoritiesPeoples of the North

Middle EastBedouin

AfricaForagersNomadic Pastoralists

Oceania and AustraliaAboriginal PeoplesMaoriPacific Islanders

AsiaAboriginal PeoplesEthnic MinoritiesHill TribesNational MinoritiesNomadic PastoralistsScheduled Tribes

The number of indigenous people in theworld is estimated at between 200 and 300 mil-lion. The number of indigenous groups is un-known, but certainly is more than 1,000, andprobably several thousand. Consideration of themore than 500 American Indian nations in theNew World, the Scheduled Tribes of India, theHill Tribes elsewhere in Asia, and the dozens ofAustralian aboriginal groups makes an estimateof several thousand reasonable.

In the last two decades, as indigenouspeoples have been seeking to reclaim their rightsin the New World, Australia, New Zealand,

Norway, and Russia, the concept of indigenouspeople has become politically important. Froma political perspective, defining a people as in-digenous implies encapsulation within a domi-nant nation, awareness by the indigenous peopleof their unique identity, a peripheral place in thedominant society, moral opposition to contin-ued dominance by the nation, and dependenceon the good will of the nation to grant the in-digenous people their rights.

See also INDIGENOUS RIGHTS; MINORITY;PEOPLES OF THE NORTH; TRIBE.

Burger, Julian. (1987) Report from the Frontier:The State of the World's Indigenous Peoples.

Graburn, Nelson H. H. (1981) "1,2, 3, ̂ ..An-thropology and the Fourth World." Culture1: 66-70.

Paine, Robert. (1985) "The Claim of the FourthWorld." In Native Power, edited by JensBrostad, et al., 49-66.

Wilmer, Franke. (1993) The Indigenous Voice inWorld Politics: Since Time Immemorial.

World Bank. (1982) Tribal Peoples and EconomicDevelopment: Human Ecological Considerations.

The quest by indigenouspeoples around theworld to regain or estab-lish their rights is the

defining feature of the relationship between vari-ous national governments and indigenouspeoples in the 1990s. It is also an important mo-tivating force behind the increasingly strong tiesforged among indigenous peoples both withinand across regions in the last several decades.Indigenous rights are also a central concern ofthe international community, as reflected in the

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INDIGENOUS RIGHTS

United Nations (U.N.) declaration of 1993 asthe Year of Indigenous Peoples and the missionof protecting indigenous rights taken on by manynongovernmental organizations. Indigenousrights encompass two very general categories:(1) rights to which individual members of in-digenous nations are entitled because they arealso citizens or residents of a dominant nation-state within whose borders they reside (that is,the same rights enjoyed by other citizens of thenation) and (2) rights that accrue to both indig-enous nations and their individual members be-cause of their status as indigenous people or"First Nations" within the dominant nation-state. For example, the Taos Indians of NewMexico are entitled to the same rights as othercitizens of the state of New Mexico and theUnited States of America, and also to specialrights because of their status as an indigenouspeople in New Mexico and in the United States.This same dual status as regards rights pertainsto all indigenous peoples around the world. Overthe centuries of contact with dominant societ-ies, these rights have been ignored, done awaywith, or eroded. The current quest for indigenousrights is an effort to reverse this situation.

The topic of indigenous rights is a very broadand complex one involving numerous legal, po-litical, economic, cultural, social, and religiousconcepts, the definitions and applications ofwhich vary widely over place and time. Thus,the situation regarding their indigenous rightsdiffers for every indigenous people in the world.At the same time, there are some similaritiesacross peoples and nations—in how those rightswere lost, what the rights are, and how they arebeing regained.

Theoretically, the lack of, and efforts to re-gain, indigenous rights affects and is of concernto all indigenous peoples and the governmentsof the nations in which they reside. However, asa practical matter at this point in history, indig-enous rights as discussed here is of greater con-cern in democratic, highly industrialized nations

that are in a postcolonial stage, and thus are re-defining the relationship between indigenouspeoples and the nation-state. These includeCanada, Greenland, the United States, Austra-lia, New Zealand, and Norway. In other nations,such as those in Latin America and some inSoutheast Asia, rights are naturally of concernto indigenous peoples, but often more pressingare direct threats to their physical and culturalsurvival. In China and the former Soviet Union,indigenous rights are subordinate to the nationalagenda, although the breakup of the latter bringswith it the hope that the rights of indigenouspeople, mainly in Siberia and the Caucasus, aswell as minority groups will be established andprotected. In Oceania and Africa, where indig-enous peoples have taken power in many nations,indigenous rights are less of a concern; the rightsof nonindigenous minorities (such as Indo-Fijians) are perhaps a more crucial issue.

The loss of rights by indigenous peoplesaround the world is a direct result of Westerncolonization. Those nations whose indigenouspeoples are in the forefront of battles for indig-enous rights are primarily those with a historyof settlement colonization, such as Australia andthe United States, where most indigenouspeoples lost all or most of their land and otherrights as the result of settlement and politicaland economic domination by Europeans. How-ever, the philosophical and legal rationale forEuropean dominance and indigenous displace-ment predates settlement of the New World,dating to the early medieval period and the re-interpretation of the Roman legal principle ofterritorium (res) nullius to mean that "a discov-erer could legally occupy a territory that wasalready inhabited [by 'infidels'] and extendChristian sovereignty over it." Spanish and En-glish colonization policy and practice, althoughthe subjects of much debate in the home na-tions, proceeded in this way even though theyconflicted with other established legal principlessuch as the concept of immemorial possession.

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In general, economic goals outweighed legal andmoral concerns, and over time most indigenouspeoples lost all or most of their land base andother rights through treaties, agreements, laws,and various genocidal and ethnocidal policies,often backed or allowed by the colonial govern-ments, and later by the national governments inthe United States, Canada, Australia, and NewZealand.

The current battle for indigenous rightsaround the world is essentially a post-World WarII phenomenon. It has emerged following thedisintegration of colonial systems around theworld and has accompanied the emergence ofhuman rights as a major international issue. TheU.N., through its charter, declarations, reports,and agencies, has been a major force in first ex-posing the problems faced by indigenous peoplesand then providing a framework and mecha-nisms for securing indigenous rights. In both ageneral sense and in specific situations, the over-all U.N. effort has been augmented and some-times surpassed by the efforts of international,regional, and local organizations devoted to re-storing rights to indigenous peoples. In nearlyall cases, however, it is basically the efforts ofthe people themselves, and the moral and legalpressure they can exert on national and stategovernments, that determine whether or not theyachieve their goals. Encouraged by the CivilRights and Womens' Rights movements, amongothers in the United States, and depending onthe rights being sought and local circumstances,a very broad array of techniques has been used.These include attention gained by influentialleaders or spokesman; lobbying efforts by indig-enous organizations, acting both alone and inalliance with other indigenous or nonindigenousorganizations; support by nonindigenous advo-cacy organizations; alliances with other interestgroups, especially environmental groups; expo-sure through the national media and indigenousmedia outlets; protests such as hunger strikes andsit-ins; participation in the political process; liti-

gation; and appeals to international organiza-tions. At this point, about 30 percent of indig-enous peoples around the world have achievedrestoration of some rights.

As in political conflicts, both sides in theindigenous rights movement generally tend touse the resources available to them in ways thatare most likely to help their cause. The two sidesin the conflict are, on the one hand, the indig-enous peoples and their supporters, which in-clude various local, regional, and internationalnongovernmental organizations; various agen-cies of the U.N.; wealthy and/or influential in-dividuals; and sometimes government officialsor elected representatives. On the other side,from the viewpoint of indigenous peoples, arethe local, state/provincial, and national govern-ments; political parties; local landowners; andeconomic interests including developers andenergy companies. Within each group are nu-merous factions based on differing philosophies,goals, and tactics. One hurdle to resolving someindigenous rights situations has been the diffi-culty in sorting out who speaks for each side andwho will enforce any decisions made and agreedto by the parties.

The following section provides brief over-views of seven general categories of rights soughtby many indigenous peoples around the world.The issue of indigenous rights is extremely var-ied and complex, and no attempt is made hereto provide all the details, possibilities, or expla-nations, but instead to give a general introduc-tion to some of the most basic issues using a fewspecific examples.

Right to Recognition as an IndependentNation or Political Entity

Underlying the quest for indigenous rightsaround the world is a belief by indigenouspeoples that they are each an independent na-tion or political entity, and must be so recog-nized and dealt with by the nation withinwhich they now reside. For the Saami of Sweden,

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Finland, and Norway, this means recognition asa distinct minority within those nations, main-tenance of a separate cultural identity, and theright to use the Saami language. In Canada in1991, some degree of autonomy was achievedby Inuit peoples with the formal establishmentof a new political region in Arctic northeasternCanada called Nunavut ("our land" in the Inuitlanguage), which brought with it political au-tonomy, land, and economic rights. In theUnited States, the situation regarding the inde-pendent national status of various AmericanIndian peoples is being sorted out through ad-ministrative procedures and litigation. The is-sue is being monitored carefully by the worldcommunity as perhaps a model for other nationsbecause of a variety of factors that include U.S.international status, the recognition and impli-cation of national autonomy given or implied invarious treaties with American Indian peoples,and an already existing degree of self-rule on areservation land base by many of the AmericanIndian peoples.

Right to Self-Definition andAccurate Enumeration

The right of an indigenous people to set for it-self the criteria by which it recognizes its citi-zenry is vital for the survival of indigenouspeoples and for maintenance of their uniquecultural identities. In North America this rightwas traditionally held, and to some extent stillis, by the national governments. In the UnitedStates, for example, the "blood quantum" mea-sure of "Indianness" was established in the 1867General Allotment Act when persons of 50 per-cent or more "Indian blood" were allotted landand those with less than 50 percent were not soallotted. The usurpation of their right to deter-mine their own citizenry and the use of "bloodquantum" type criteria are seen by indigenouspeoples as inherently racist, and are widely be-lieved to be motivated by economic and politi-cal colonial interests. External rather than

self-designation is seen as a mechanism used bycolonial powers to take land from indigenouspeoples, to prevent them from regaining theland, to control the cost of material support andservices promised in treaties and laws, and togain access to natural resources. Politically, ex-ternal control creates conflict among differentindigenous groups as to who is and who is notindigenous, and can be used to define groupsout of existence or prevent them from gainingrecognition as an indigenous people.

Criteria commonly employed by indigenouspeoples themselves include degree of adherenceto traditional beliefs and practices, descent froma member of the group, socialization into thegroup, and a commitment to be a productivemember of the nation. For example, the Chero-kee of Oklahoma, who lacked a land base in the1970s, defined themselves as composed of indi-viduals who could trace descent along Cherokeelines. This caused their population to increasefrom 12,000 to 64,000 by 1985 and made thema politically powerful group in the region.

Right of Self-Determinationand Self-Governance

Prior to colonization, indigenous peoples wereself-governing and, from a cross-cultural per-spective, used a very wide range of governmen-tal institutions and political mechanisms tomanage their internal and external affairs. Thesetraditional systems were largely destroyed, weak-ened, or altered by colonization, assimilation,and ethnocide; by the twentieth century, indig-enous peoples around the world were almostentirely under the control of the nations in whichthey lived, and sometimes also under state/pro-vincial, county, and local control as well. Thiscondition is called internal colonialism.

The right of self-determination includes, formost peoples, the following:

1. Independent control of their affairs

2. Control of all material and financial assets

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3. Freedom to engage in foreign relations

4. Freedom to decide the extent of control theycede to outsiders

5. Freedom to choose their own form of self-government

6. Adherence to agreements between the in-digenous nation and other nations onlywhen those agreements are entered into byrecognized indigenous governmental bod-ies or individuals

In addition, the right of self-determination car-ries with it all other rights demanded by indig-enous peoples.

Achieving the right of self-determination,or progress toward that end, always requireslarge-scale change in the basis and nature of therelationship between the indigenous people andthe national government. In virtually all nationswhere indigenous rights are an issue today, tra-ditional indigenous-state relations were charac-terized by a genocidal-forced assimilation(ethnocide) policy and colonial/paternalisticpractices on the part of the national government.Governments typically acted as hosts in allow-ing indigenous peoples to live on government-controlled land, as patrons in providing materialsupport and services to the indigenous commu-nities, and as guardians in directing indig-enous affairs. For their part, indigenouspeoples existed mostly as wards and clients ofthe state.

Traditionally, state policy was usually car-ried out by government agencies charged withmanaging indigenous affairs—the Bureau ofIndian Affairs in the United States, the Depart-ment of Indian Affairs in Canada, and the MaoriAffairs Department in New Zealand, amongothers. In establishing policy and managing pro-grams, there was rarely any indigenous input.Typically, the advice and needs of groups whosegoals were in opposition to those of indigenouspeoples (such as land developers, farmers, ranch-

ers, and missionaries) were instead given con-siderable weight.

In nations where native peoples haveachieved some of the rights they seek, a shift inindigenous-government relations has been a keyelement in this process. In New Zealand, forexample, Maori demands for their rights even-tually resulted in a government policy shift fromassimilation of the Maori into white society tobiculturalism, where the Maori would be fullparticipants in white society, but would also beable to maintain their indigenous culture. Thispolicy shift was backed up by various practicalchanges, including recognition of Maori admin-istrative units, replacement of the assimilationistMaori Affairs Department with the Iwi Transi-tional Agency, creation of an Advisory Ministryof Maori Affairs, increased and more rapid re-sponse to Maori requests for public services, andan acceptance of the Treaty ofWaitanga (1840)as the framework for Maori-white relations.Similarly, in Canada, in 1867 the Departmentof Indian Affairs began managing AmericanIndian matters, including but not limited to de-ciding who was or was not an Indian, who couldvote as a Canadian citizen, how Indian land wasused, the form of government in Indian com-munities, and whether or not traditional religiousrituals could be practiced. In 1966 the Depart-ment of Indian Affairs was replaced with theDepartment of Indian Affairs and NorthernDevelopment, with a shift in policy from con-trol and assimilation to assistance in economicdevelopment and Indian community participa-tion in decision-making toward a goal of indig-enous self-sufficiency. While progress towardthe realization of full rights has been too slow forsome, programs such as community negotiationand block funding with limited local control aremarked departures from past government practices.

Land RightsFor many indigenous peoples, their attitudes andbeliefs about the land are different from those

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of nonindigenous peoples. People in manyindigenous cultures believe that the land has asacred quality; that it is a link to the past, thehistory of their people, and their unique iden-tity; and that it is their obligation to preservethe land for future generations. Thus, land is notjust a material object to be used, consumed, sold,or owned. For example, the Blue Lake area is ofsuch sacred importance to the Taos of northernNew Mexico that they spent nearly half a cen-tury attempting to regain ownership and con-trol from the federal government, which hadincorporated it into the Carson National Forestin 1906. In 1971 the Taos succeeded, the firsttime that American Indians had regained theirland on the basis of the right to religious ex-pression rather than as a financial settlement.

Outsiders have long assumed that indig-enous peoples have no concept of land owner-ship because of the views that many indigenouspeople hold about their relationship to the land.This is not the case; all cultures have rules andpractices about ownership and the use of natu-ral resources, land, and the products of the envi-ronment. The indigenous peoples of northernLuzon Island in the Philippines, such as theBontok and Kalinga, for example, distinguishamong the following types of natural resourcesthat can be owned or controlled: forest and for-est products, water from springs, rivers, land forhorticulture, pastureland, land with minerals,clay soil, terraced land for agriculture, and resi-dential land. Three types of land rights governthe use of these types of land and the extractionof raw materials from them: (1) communal landrights held by all members of a village commu-nity; (2) indigenous corporate rights, whichare rights to common land held by a specificfamily, kin group, or neighborhood, and (3)individual rights. It is not that indigenous peopledo not have concepts of land ownership, butrather that their concepts differ and are in con-flict with those of the dominant society, such asexclusive individual ownership, restricted or

specialized use, renting, leases, sales, and stateownership.

In a most general sense, indigenous peoplesare demanding

1. Ownership and control of the land and itsresources, which had been theirs at the timeof Western contact (their ancestral domain)

2. Return of land ownership or, in some cases,monetary or other compensation for landstaken from them illegally—that is, in viola-tion of treaties and agreements, and inter-national, national, or state/provincial laws

3. Control of access to and use of their land byoutsiders

4. The right to stop destruction of their landor natural resources

5. The establishment of public policies andprograms that prevent the destruction of theenvironment

6. The right to use the land in accord with theircultural traditions

Underlying these wishes is the belief of virtuallyall indigenous peoples that their very survivalrests on their ability to regain control of theirland and live on it as sovereign peoples. Posses-sion of their land affords indigenous peoples bothindependent status as a nation and an economicbase. For example, mining operations are a ma-jor threat to aboriginal freedom in Australia, andcontrol of their land would bring with it the rightto control environmental damage from miningand the right to extract fees and royalties frommining operations.

Most state/provincial and national govern-ments have generally resisted returning aborigi-nal lands or broadening indigenous control oftheir land. In the United States, where Ameri-can Indian land claims and court cases numberin the thousands, opposition rests on the beliefsthat there is not enough land to give back, non-Indian property owners will be damaged, andthat domestic natural resources will be removed

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for use by others. These arguments are seen asless than credible by indigenous peoples, whogenerally believe that compromises can bereached in which no one s interest is harmed andperhaps all gain by developing a deeper respectfor the land.

Right to Protection and Useof Natural Resources

Along with loss of land and political autonomy,indigenous people also lost control over naturalresources on their land, exclusive use of the land,and control over the use of their land by outsid-ers. Indigenous people are now seeking to re-gain these rights, which include water rights,ownership and control of mineral extraction ontheir land, and unlimited access to traditionalsources of food such as fishing, hunting, andherding.

The building of dams to create a source ofhydroelectric power in North America, SouthAmerica, Scandinavia, and elsewhere has haddamaging effects on both the environment andthe economic viability of indigenous peoples.These effects include land lost to lakes and floodplains, pollution of the waters, water shortages,and road and related construction that damagesthe environment. Mining has also had damag-ing effects, particularly in Australia and someparts of the western United States, where stripmining has destroyed the soil, hunting territo-ries, and sacred sites, and provided indigenouspeoples with little income from minerals takenfrom their ancestral lands. In order to regaincontrol of their natural resources, indigenouspeoples are seeking the rights to exclusive con-trol over outside use of their land, to developmeans to protect the land, and to sell rights tothe use of the land to outsiders for a fair marketprice.

Rights of Religious ExpressionPartly through government action and partlythrough the actions of missionaries who sought

to replace the traditional religion with their own,the religious systems of many indigenous peopleshave been altered or have nearly disappeared. Forexample, in Russian Siberia the shamanistic re-ligions of dozens of indigenous peoples weresuppressed by Russian and Soviet authorities,who preferred that people adopt Russian Or-thodoxy in the former case, and atheism in thelatter. Shamanistic belief and ritual were trans-mitted orally from generation to generation, andthere is now some doubt about the revival ofshamanism in the post-Soviet period becausemany shamans were killed in an effort to de-stroy the belief system. While the suppressionof shamanism may be extreme, it is typical ofmany colonial situations where native religiouspractices were outlawed and those who practicedthem were punished or even killed. Similarly, inmany places the taking of indigenous lands andtheir use by outsiders have led to native peoples'loss of the use of traditional sacred sites; in somecases, sacred sites have even been destroyed. Theturning of these sites into public-use sites, as wasthe case with Blue Lake in New Mexico, is par-ticularly offensive to native peoples; they viewthis act as no different from turning a cathedralinto a picnic area. To reverse this situation, in-digenous peoples are seeking full religious free-dom that includes not just the right to freedomof worship, but also the return and control ofsacred sites.

Right To Manage and RecoverCultural Resources

Cultural resources are material manifestationsof the beliefs and customs of a cultural group.They include sites of archaeological, historical,and ethnographic importance to both the peoplethemselves and outsiders, as well as specific ob-jects such as religious artifacts, clothing, weap-ons, tools, dwellings, and art. Also falling withinthe rubric of cultural resources are skeletal re-mains of ancestors, both those in situ and thoseremoved and stored elsewhere.

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One part of the vigorous study of indigenouspeoples by archaeologists, anthropologists, so-ciologists, historians, explorers, and others forwell over 100 years has been the identificationof indigenous sites and the collection and re-moval of items of cultural significance. Indig-enous peoples are now demanding a role incultural resource management; that is, in pro-tecting, preserving, and conserving sites. Spe-cifically, they desire a role in (1) designating asite and determining its importance, (2) control-ling the activities of the archaeologists who ex-cavate and study the site, and (3) determiningthe subsequent use of the site. Sites of concerninclude villages or dwellings occupied by ances-tral peoples, art sites containing pictographs orpetroglyphs, sites of historical importance suchas massacre scenes and the locales of missionsor forts, and sacred sites or places of mythical orceremonial importance. Places of sacred impor-tance maybe specific places, environmental fea-tures such as a marked tree, or places with nodiscernible physical features to an outsider, suchas the bosra sites of indigenous Australians.

As regards items of material culture nowdisplayed in museums or private collections, andskeletal remains (there are several thousandAmerican Indian skeletons stored for study inU.S. museums), indigenous peoples are seekingthe return of items of special importance to themas well as an active role in the display of objectsto ensure that their culture is portrayed accu-rately, with both the present situation and thetraditional culture described. Efforts to regainobjects have met with considerable resistancefrom scientists, who see them as objects of study;museum curators, who see them as both scien-tifically and aesthetically valuable; and collec-tors, who see them as economically valuable.Thus, for example, in an effort that began in1978, by 1992 the Zuni had repatriated 69Ahayu:da (twin gods or war gods) from muse-ums and private collectors. When the Zuni, inaccord with their beliefs, placed the objects in

the New Mexico desert to disintegrate slowly andreturn to the earth from which they came, someoutsiders bemoaned the loss to the art world, ig-noring the religious right of the Zuni to handlethese sacred objects in their traditional way.

See also ETHNOCIDE; GENOCIDE; INDIGENOUSPEOPLES; MIGRANT WORKERS; MINORITYRIGHTS; RACE AND RACISM.

Berndt, Ronald M., and Catherine H. Berndt,eds. (1984-1985) Collection of Essays on Ab-original Land Rights for the Guidance of theGovernment of Western Australia AboriginalLand Inquiry 1983-1984. AnthropologicalForum 5 (3).

Brosted, Jens, et al., eds. (1985) Native Power:The Quest for Autonomy and Nationhood of In-digenous Peoples.

Burger, Julian. (1987) Report from the Frontier:The State of the World's Indigenous Peoples.

Fleras, Augies, and Jean Leonard Elliott. (1992)The "Nations Within": Aboriginal-State Rela-tions in Canada, the United States, and NewZealand.

Jaimes, M. Annette, ed. (1992) The State of Na-tive America: Genocide, Colonization, andResistance.

Merrill, William L., Edmund J. Ladd, andT. J.Ferguson. (1993) "The Return of theAhayu:da." Current Anthropology 34: 523-567.

Olson, Paul A. (1989) The Struggle for the Land:Indigenous Insight and Industrial Empire in theSemiarid World.

Prill-Brett, June. (1988) Preliminary Perspectiveson Local Territorial Boundaries and ResourceControl. Cordillera Studies Center WorkingPaper 6.

Wilmer, Franke. (1993) The Indigenous Voice inWorld Politics: Since Time Immemorial.

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IRREDENTISM

Conflicting claims onterritory have alwaysbeen a major feature of

ethnic disputes around the world. Irredentismrefers to a specific type of territorial dispute, inwhich a nation seeks the return of usually adja-cent territory from another nation that is or washistorically controlled by members of the ethnicgroup who inhabit the first nation. Thus,irredentism concerns reestablishing ethnic na-tions through the linking of all adjacent territo-ries occupied by members of the ethnic group.Irredentism becomes an issue and a goal of eth-nic groups and governments when nationalboundaries do not follow ethnic ones, and is of-ten precipitated by strong ethnic, nationalisticsentiments. For example, Nazi Germany expan-sion was motivated in part by a desire for theGerman-occupied Sudetenland and German-speaking Austria. More recently, the ongoingviolent conflict among Serbs, Bosnians, andCroats in the former Yugoslavia is motivated bythe Serbs' and Croats' desire to amalgamate allterritories occupied by members of their groups,now or in the past. The mixing of the popula-tions over the past 50 years has distorted previ-ous ethnic boundaries, and because some of thoseboundaries were already disputed, both the Serbsand Croats have used violence to remove theother groups. By contrast, when Slovenia sepa-rated from Yugoslavia, there was little conflict,as most Slovenes already lived in the territory ofSlovenia and few lived in adjacent regions.

Irredentism around the world today ismainly a product of Western wars, colonialism,and treaties that created nations and nationalboundaries not in accord with the already-existing ethnic boundaries in the region. Cur-rent movements and conflicts that have this gen-esis include those involving Romania andMoldova (formerly the Moldavia Soviet Social-ist Republic); Hungarian interest in theTransylvania region of Romania, with its sizableHungarian population and former status as a

region of Hungary; Albanian interest in the ad-jacent Kosovo region of Serbia; Somalia inter-est in Somali-inhabited regions of Kenya andEthiopia; Pakistani interest in the heavily MuslimKashmiri region disputed with India; Armenianinterest in uniting communities in the former So-viet Union, Turkey, and Iran; and Navajo resis-tance to relocation from land that has been ruledpart of the Hopi Reservation in Arizona.

The situation regarding Romania andMoldova displays many elements typical ofirredentism. Moldovans and Romanians bothspeak Romanian and are culturally Romanian.The designation Romanian refers to both a na-tionality and an ethnic group. Moldovans, onthe other hand, are a nationality but not a dis-tinct ethnic group. Ethnic Romanians consti-tute 65 percent of the population of Moldovaand 75 percent of the population of Romania.After a long history of shifting borders anddomination by outsiders such as Turks and Rus-sians, what are now essentially Romania andMoldova were unified in 1918, although theSoviet Union kept a small strip that becamethe Moldavian Autonomous Republic. In1940, with German support, the Soviet Unionobtained more territory from Romania, andestablished the Moldavia Soviet Socialist Re-public. In 1947, Moldavia was again divided,with a segment added to the Ukraine and a smallstrip added to what remained of the MoldaviaSSR. With the demise of the USSR beginningin 1989, Moldova became an independent re-public and then one of the 18 members of theCommonwealth of Independent States (CIS)of the former Soviet Union. Since then, theLatin alphabet has been reintroduced, numer-ous publications have been printed in Romanian,the Romanian majority has achieved politicalcontrol, and cultural and economic ties havebeen established with Romania. While theRomanian majority population in Moldavaprefers unification with Romania, that wishhas not yet been achieved because of the

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threat of political and economic instability inRomania.

As with other forms of ethnic land disputessuch as ethnic separatist movements and effortsby indigenous peoples to regain their homelands,irredentism points to the central role played byland and beliefs about the homeland in ethnicidentity, solidarity, and conflict.

See also ETHNIC CONFLICT; TRANSNATIONALMIGRATION.

Dimi, Nicholas. (1991) From Moldavia toMoldova: The Soviet-Romanian TerritorialDispute.

Landau, Jacob. (1990) "Irredentism and Minori-ties in the Middle East." Immigrants and Mi-norities 9: 242-248.

The ongoing conflict between Israelis and Palestinians in the Mid-dle East is one of the

most—if not the most—complex of all ethnicconflicts. On the surface, it is a conflict aboutrival claims to the same homeland—the mod-ern state of Israel, formerly Palestine. However,the conflict also involves the displacement of Pal-estinians from Israel after 1948, Israeli controlof the Gaza and West Bank territories, Pales-tinian resistance to Israeli control, second-classstatus for Palestinians and other Islamic Arabsin Israel, the displacement of Jews from Arabnations, and the desire of Jews for a homeland.To complicate matters further, the conflict hastaken place in the context of considerable un-rest in the Middle East, including four Arab-Israeli wars (1948,1956,1967,1973), Cold Warpolitics, oil politics, sporadic efforts at forging

unity among the Arab nations of the region, therise of Islamic fundamentalism, anti-Westernsentiments, lingering effects of European colo-nialism, the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s, the GulfWar in 1991, and the ongoing conflict with theKurds in Turkey, Iraq, and Iran.

There are about 6 million Palestinians in theworld, with about 31 percent in Jordan, wherethey have been granted citizenship; 19 percenton the West Bank; 11 percent in Gaza; 12 per-cent in Israel; 18 percent in other Arab coun-tries, especially Syria and Lebanon; and 8 percentelsewhere in the world, mainly in Europe andthe United States. About a third of Palestinianson the West Bank and in Gaza commute to workin Israel, although the actual number fluctuatesgreatly depending on Israeli labor demands andadmission policies. Palestinians do not form anethnic group according to traditional criteria. Atthis time they are not a localized community;instead, they live in diaspora and share a com-mon language (Arabic) and religion (Islam) withthe majority of their Arab neighbors in theMiddle East. However, Islam and Arabic dodistinguish them from the Israelis and are im-portant components of Palestinian identity vis-a-vis the Israelis. The strong sense of solidarityand nationalism expressed by Palestinians todayis largely the result of the displacement and thecrises they have endured in the twentieth cen-tury, including British control of Palestine, theestablishment of the state of Israel in 1948, Is-raeli victories in the Arab-Israeli wars, the dis-persal of most Palestinians from their homeland,settlement in refugees camps, Israeli control ofthe West Bank and Gaza, second-class status inIsrael, and lack of full acceptance and supportby other Arab nations. Since 1948 various fac-tions have vied for and held power within thePalestinian community. The Palestinian Libera-tion Organization (PLO), which came into ex-istence in 1964, now serves as the Palestiniangovernment, providing services for its citizens,representing Palestinians in negotiations with

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Israel and other nations, and as an envoy to in-ternational organizations. Palestinian national-ism centers on their perceived rights to returnto their homeland and to establish an indepen-dent Palestinian state. Palestinian nationalismsolidified after the 1987 uprising (Intifada) inGaza and the West Bank. More recently, the goalhas focused on establishing an independent Pal-estinian state in Gaza and on the West Bank.

Israel is a nation of 5.8 million people andcomprises a territory of 8,020 square miles. Inaddition to Israel proper, Israel currently con-trols territory taken from Arab nations in theprevious wars—the West Bank of the JordanRiver, the Old City in Jerusalem, the GolanHeights, and the Gaza Strip. While Israel is asecular state and theoretically accepting of non-Jews, it is a Jewish state in that the population ismainly Jewish (82 percent), Jews consider it theJewish homeland, and all Jews are allowed toimmigrate to and settle in Israel. Before becom-

ISRAELIS AND PALESTINIANS

ing a state in 1948, what is now Israel was in-habited by a mixed population of Arab Pales-tinians and Jews, the majority of the latter fromeastern and central Europe, and about 25 per-cent from the Middle East. Postindependenceimmigration to Israel was from Europe, NorthAfrica, the Middle East, and India. More re-cently, immigrants have arrived from Ethiopia(Beta Israel) and Russia. Although the popula-tion is about evenly split between Jews of Euro-pean and non-European origin (mainly NorthAfrican and Middle Eastern), the European-ancestry Jews are politically and economicallydominant. Unity is formed amid this diversityof background by a number of factors: (1) ashared belief that Jews are "one people"; (2) abelief that Israel is the Jewish homeland; (3) useof Hebrew as the national language (it was notthe daily language of any of the constituentgroups); (4) the ideal of integration through in-termarriage within the Jewish community; and

Israeli soldiers in Jericho plead with Palestinian residents to clear the road for the visit of Police Minister MosheShahal, September 1993. Under the Jericho-Gaza peace plan, control has been transferred to the Palestinians.

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(5) adherence to generally accepted standards ofpublic behavior accompanied by acceptance ofindividuality.

Israeli Jews, and sometimes all Jews, are la-beled as Zionists, although not all Zionists areJews and not all Jews are Zionists. Zionism is anationalistic political philosophy that calls for aJewish homeland, and was an important moti-vating force in the establishment of Israel as anindependent state. Like all philosophies, it de-fies easy description and takes a variety of forms.Once labeled as a form of racism by the UnitedNations, it has now faded as an issue of impor-tance in Israeli-Palestinian relations. Zionismwas developed in Europe by Jewish intellectualsin the late 1880s in reaction to, and as a solutionto, the centuries of persecution Jews endured inEurope. The goal was a secular Jewish state thatwould use such modern principles as technol-ogy, rationality, socialism, and nationalism tobuild prosperity for itself and the entire region.Thus, the goal was not just a Jewish state, but amodern state that would create a way of life andopportunities that Jews had been denied in thepast. This goal was pursued through emigrationfrom Europe to Palestine beginning in the 1880s,and the establishment of Jewish settlements inthe region alongside the Arab population alreadyresident there.

The territory that is now Israel was the birth-place of both Judaism and Christianity, and isalso of importance to Islam. The Hebrews, theancestors of Jews today, inhabited the region asearly as several thousand years ago, and had es-tablished a kingdom there by 1000 B.C. that laterdivided into the kingdoms of Judea and Israel.Both were invaded and conquered in subsequentcenturies by various groups, and eventually theJewish population was expelled from the region,first by the Babylonians and later by the Ro-mans. This led to centuries of exile and Jews livedin other lands without a homeland of their own(a few remained in present-day Israel). The nameJew is derived from the region of Judea, in which

Jerusalem was located. The Arabs gained con-trol of the region from the Byzantine Empire inA.D. 640 and ruled until 1516, when it fell un-der Turkish (though still Islamic) rule. In 1917the British defeated the Turks and were given amandate to govern the region by the League ofNations in 1923. British rule was inconsistent(in international circles they backed Jewish con-trol, while in Palestine they supported the Arabpopulation). Various plans failed to either unitethe Jewish and Arab residents into one nationor create separate nations, and conflict betweenthe two groups deepened and often erupted intoviolence. World War II brought an increasednumber of Jews fleeing to the region from Eu-rope, and in 1946 they numbered 678,000 along-side 1.3 million Arabs. In 1947 the U.N. votedto partition the region, and when the Britishwithdrew in 1948, the Jews declared the estab-lishment of the state of Israel. The first of thefour Arab-Israeli wars ensued, ending in a cease-fire in 1949. It was the establishment of Israel,the war, and the expulsion of the majority of theArab population that ultimately led to the emer-gence of the Palestinians as a distinct groupin the region. By 1948 there were between550,000-800,000 Palestinian refugees living onthe West Bank of the Jordan River, in the GazaStrip, and in other Arab nations such as Syriaand Lebanon.

From then on, Israeli-Palestinian relationsexisted within the context of the broader Israel-Arab conflict. However, after Israel annexed theWest Bank and the Gaza Strip in 1967, hostili-ties with the Palestinian population escalatedinto a pattern of cyclical violence that persists tothis day. Because Israel refused to recognize thePalestinians and the PLO as political units, thePalestinians were left out of the various nego-tiations among the parties in the region. How-ever, in late 1993, direct negotiations led to anagreement that called for limited Palestinian ruleof the Gaza Strip and the city of Jericho on theWest Bank, steps implemented in 1994, and a

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timetable for negotiations to produce peace bythe end of the century.

Binur, Yoram. (1990) My Enemy, My Self.

Black, Eric. (1992) Parallel Realities: A Jewish/Arab History of Israel/Palestine.

Fuller, Graham E. (1989) The West Bank of Is-rael: Point of No Return.

Gerner, Deborah. (1991) One Land, Two Peoples:The Conflict over Palestine.

Goldschmidt, Arthur, Jr. (1991) A Concise His-tory of the Middle East. 4th ed.

Hertzberg, Arthur, ed. (1960) The Zionist Idea.

Lewis, Herbert S. (1993) Jewish Ethnicity inIsrael: Ideologies, Policies and Outcomes."In Ethnicity and the State, edited by JudithD. Toland, 201-230.

Muslih, Muhammad Y. (1988) The Origins ofPalestinian Nationalism.

Peretz, Don. (1990) Intifada: The PalestinianUprising.

Sahliyeh, Emile. (1993) "Ethnicity and State-Building: The Case of the Palestinians in theMiddle East." In Ethnicity and the State, ed-ited by Judith D. Toland, 177-200.

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KASHMIRIKashmiri are the inhab-itants of Jammu andKashmir, the only Mus-

lim-majority state in predominantly HinduIndia, as well as Azad Kashmir (the Pakistan-controlled portion of Kashmir). The estimatedpopulation in 1991 was 7.5 million in the222,236-square-kilometer Indian state of Jammuand Kashmir. In 1947 when the region was par-titioned by Great Britain into India (a secularnation) and Pakistan (a Muslim nation), 77.1percent of Kashmiris were Muslim. Only 20.1percent, including the former maharaja of Kash-mir, were Hindu. Of the groups currently resid-ing in Kashmir, Hindus were the first inhabitantsand ruled the region until the fourteenth cen-tury, although Hindu influence was somewhatmitigated by the influence of Buddhism. Islamcame to Kashmir in the fourteenth century fromcentral Asia, and the Hindu population declinedas many converted to Islam and others fled orwere killed. In the sixteenth century, Kashmircame under the control of the Islamic MughulEmpire, with many Hindus fleeing, creatingdiaspora communities in Indian cities that sur-

vive to this day. When the British displaced theMughuls, Kashmir became part of the BritishEmpire.

At the time of Indian and Pakistani inde-pendence, hundreds of thousands of civilians andsoldiers were killed in the fight between Indiaand Pakistan, both of whom laid claim to theKashmiri region. Since 1947 there have beenthree Indo-Pakistan wars (1948, 1965, 1971),at least two of which have been fought for con-trol of Kashmir. The current ethnic strife inKashmir remains a violent separatist orirredentist (depending on the viewpoint of theopposing sides) conflict, as Muslim Kashmiriscontinue to fight for independence from India.The current conflict dates to 1990 and centerson Muslim efforts in the Vale of Kashmir to pushthe Indian army out of Kashmir, and army ef-forts to eradicate the Muslim separatists throughtorture, rape, murder, and destruction of Mus-lim property. Since 1990 nearly 6,000 combat-ants and civilians have died in the struggle.

Although the traditional aim of such groupsas the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front andHezbol Mujahedeen has been to achieve inde-pendence and autonomy, most separatists wouldopt for mergence with Islamic Pakistan ratherthan remain part of India. India seeks to retaincontrol of the region partly because of its his-torical ties to India, and in part because of thetourist potential of the region, with its moun-tains, lush valleys, and the central Vale of Kash-mir. Violent conflict, including the abductionof tourists, has so far limited tourism and eco-nomic development in Kashmir. The situationhas been aggravated by Pakistan's (denied) in-volvement in arming militant separatist groupsand providing training in guerrilla warfare onthe Pakistani side of the border. Both India andPakistan have been criticized for their policiesin this situation, India for resorting to tortureand murder of suspected militant rebels. India'sgovernment officially denies the use of any un-necessary violence in attempting to suppress the

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rebellion. Pakistan likewise denies allegations offunding separatists.

The situation has become more critical inthis latest movement for independence. WhileIndian and Pakistani leaders have promised toavoid war, and thus far have done so, the factthat both countries have nuclear capabilityheightens the concern surrounding the conflict.Whatever Pakistan may be doing to assist themovement behind closed doors, its official stanceis to discourage militant efforts for independenceand such displays as mass marches across theborder. This is evidenced by the February 1992incident, in which Pakistani police opened fireon Pakistani Kashmiri marching into India.

Bamzai, P. N. K. (1962) A History of Kashmir.

Sender, Henry. (1988) The Kashmiri Pandits: AStudy of Cultural Choice in North India.

The Kurds have inhab-ited Kurdistan, the"Land of the Kurds," for

over 2,000 years. Kurdistan includes territorylocated in the modern nations of Turkey, Iran,Iraq, and Syria. In addition to Kurds inKurdistan proper, sizable populations can befound in Armenia, Azerbaijan (although manyhave fled the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict),central Asia, and western Turkey. There is also adiaspora community outside the Middle Eastnumbering at least 400,000. Never in the past,nor at this time, has Kurdistan been a unifiedpolitical entity. Rather, the image of a unifiedKurdistan as the homeland for all Kurds is a goalof some Kurds and Kurdish political organiza-tions, while others seek the end of political andcultural repression, and autonomy in the nations

where they live. Thus, the Kurds, numberingperhaps as many as 26 million, are the largestethnic group in the world without a nationalhomeland.

Because of the census policies in some na-tions (Turkey, for example, does not considerKurds a distinct ethnic group), inaccurate cen-sus figures, and the movement of large numbersof Kurds in recent years, the total Kurdish popu-lation and the percentage in any nation are dif-ficult to measure. Figures for 1990 suggest thefollowing:

Turkey 13.65 million (24.1 percent of thenational population)

Iran 6.60 million (6.6 percent of thenational population)

Iraq 4.40 million (23.5 percent of thenational population)

Syria 1.16 million (9.3 percent of thenational population)

Including those in the former Soviet Union, thetotal estimated Kurdish population in 1990 was26.15 million, representing a 37 percent popu-lation increase since 1980.

Shared ethnic identity among the Kurds isbased on common ancestry, a common history,economic cooperation (especially in the past),and a common homeland. There is also somecommonality based on religion (nearly all Kurdsare Muslim), and language, although religiousand language differences just as easily tend todivide the Kurds. Critics of Kurdish ethnicityquestion whether the Kurds of today are the sameas the people called Kurds in antiquity andwhether the label Kurd actually referred to a dis-tinct group in antiquity or simply meant "shep-herd." Critics also point to the absence of acommon language and unique religion, twomarkers of ethnic cohesiveness in many othergroups.

While there is little doubt that a Kurd eth-nic group exists (although some Kurds have as-similated into the non-Kurd populations of the

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nations where they live), there are significantcleavages within the Kurdish community that,in the past and today, make it difficult if notimpossible for the Kurds to organize as a singlepolitical entity. The most important cleavagesare those based on region, nation of residence,language, religion, economics, and political-party affiliation. Because of historical and geo-graphical factors, traditional Kurdistan could bedivided into five rather distinct regions—south-ern, central, eastern, northern, and western.Today, the urban-rural, herding-agriculture dis-tinctions among these regions are perhaps lessimportant than variation based on nation of resi-dence. While the Kurds remain, at best, a dis-criminated-against minority in all four nationsin which Kurdistan is located, their treatmentand status has varied over this century bothwithin and across these nations. For example,Kurdish culture is repressed in Turkey to thepoint where they are not identified as a distinctgroup, while in Iran, following a period of re-pression, public displays of Kurdish culture, in-cluding publications in Kurdish, are againpermitted. Nation of residence also determinesKurdish political-party affiliation, with differ-ent parties having different goals and espousingdifferent methods for achieving those goals.Major political parties by nation include: in Iran,Kurdish Democratic party (KDP) or KurdishDemocratic party of Iran (KDPI) and Komala;in Iraq, Kurdish Democratic party (KDP),Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), and theSocialist party of Kurdistan (SPK); in Turkey,Kurdish Democratic party (KDP-T), Workers'Party of Kurdistan (PKK), and Komkar; and inSyria, Kurdish Democratic Party of Syria (KDP-S). In September 1993, in a move toward unity,the two main Kurdish parties in northern Iraqunified in an attempt to solidify Kurdish con-trol of northern Iraq.

The Kurdish language is an Indo-Europeanlanguage with two major branches and a num-ber of dialects and subdialects, most of which

are mutually unintelligible. Language and dia-lect variation is, of course, closely related to re-gional and national population distributionpatterns. About 60 percent of Kurds are SunniMuslim. Shi'ite Muslim Kurds predominate onlyin Iran, itself a Shi'ite Muslim nation. Most non-Muslim Kurds are adherents of ancient religions,commonly called the Cult of Angels, includingYezidism, Alevism, and Yarsanism. Tradition-ally and today, Kurds have been involved in avariety of occupations including nomadic herd-ing, settled agriculture, trade, crafts, and serv-ing the kingdoms and nations under whose rulethey lived. This variation has been further broad-ened by growing gaps between urban and ruralresidents. Urban Kurds (there are, for example,about 3 million Kurds in Istanbul), on the onehand, are more readily exposed to assimilativepressures of the dominant national culture, buton the other hand, through easier contacts withother Kurd groups, international organiza-tions, and the media, are better able to work forautonomy.

A final factor influencing the failed effortsby the Kurds to establish a unified Kurdistan, oreven to achieve political autonomy within an-other nation, is Kurdish reliance on outside na-tions for assistance. In various times and placesduring the twentieth century, Kurds have lookedto the British, Soviets, and Americans for po-litical and/or military support, which has failedto materialize. Additionally, Kurds have some-times tried to use international situations, suchas the Iran-Iraq War from 1980-1987 and theGulf War in 1990-1991, to their advantage byrevolting or supporting one side in the war.However, all of these revolts have been harshlyrepressed. Currently, the large refugee popula-tion in northern Iraq is supported by the UnitedNations, and is protected to some extent by U.N.sanctions on Iraq and a prohibition on flightsabove the 36th parallel. Recent protests by Kurdsin France and Germany and attacks on overseasTurkish citizens, businesses, and consulates have

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led to crackdowns on suspected Kurd leaders inthose nations.

Recent and Current SituationIn the twentieth century, most developmentsrelevant to Kurd efforts to form an independentnation or autonomous regions have centered onthe nations of Turkey, Iran, and Iraq. All of thesenations reached independent status in their cur-rent form following the breakup of the Otto-man Empire, the end of British rule in theregion, and partitioning of the region into sepa-rate nations. These major events, as well as oth-ers such as World Wars I and II, the foundingof the state of Israel, and the Gulf War of 1990-1991, have had an enormous political and eco-nomic impact on the region and the nations init, and consequently on the Kurds and theirsearch for independence.

In Turkey, despite comprising nearly a quar-ter of the national population, Kurds do not en-joy the status of a protected official minority. TheTurkish constitution denies their claim to a sepa-rate political identity. The first half of the twen-tieth century, following the defeat of theOttoman Empire and during the period of Turk-ish development as an independent nation, wasone of generally severe repression for the Kurds,who were denied rights afforded other residents,displaced from their traditional territory and vil-lages, and killed when they resisted. After freeelections in 1950, the Kurds became more ac-tive and freer participants in Turkish society, thenumber of those living in cities increased, and aKurdish middle class active in business, educa-tion, and politics emerged. In the 1960s a move-ment for Kurdish autonomy gained strength, andbeginning in 1967 the government moved torepress these demands. A military coup in 1971marked the beginning of harsh repression ofKurdish demands for fuller rights and autonomy,and another coup in 1980 led to mass arrests ofKurd leaders and activists, and a formal policyof not only denying Kurd identity, but instead

officially defining them as Turks. In the late1970s the Workers' Party of Kurdistan (PKK)emerged as the major supporter of Kurd au-tonomy and resister of government repression,and the Turkish military government reactedwith mass arrests, illegal detention, torture, andexecution of alleged leaders and collaborators,and the stationing of Turkish army units in theKurd region. The government was able to relyon those in the Kurd community who opposedthe PKK to assist them in monitoring and con-trolling PKK activities, which, as they becamemore violent, included killing civilians and de-stroying villages. Government-PKK fightingcontinued through the 1980s and into the 1990s,and was complicated by the arrival of 60,000Iraqi Kurd refugees in 1988 and the relocationof some 400,000 Iraqi Kurds in 1991 during theGulf War to the Iraq-Turkey border, where manylived in refugee camps. In 1991 these Iraqi Kurds,motivated by a need to ensure a steady flow offood and heating fuel to their camps and settle-ments, joined the Turks in driving the PKK fromthe border region. From 1984 to 1992 the PKK-Turkish conflict produced over 3,500 deaths andat least 20,000 displaced persons in Turkey.Within Turkey, the Kurd desire for autonomy ismotivated by their experience of repression andtheir perception of themselves as second-classcitizens whose region is grossly underdevelopedin comparison to the rest of Turkey.

Prior to the twentieth century, Kurdish ex-perience in Iran was a combination of periodsof self-rule, service to various kingdoms andshahs, and separatist movements, usually involv-ing only a few Kurdish communities. In the po-litical confusion produced by World Wars I andII, the Kurds were able to establish the MahabadRepublic, an autonomous republic within Iran.The republic lasted one year, from December1945 to December 1946, when it was defeatedby the Iranian army. To control future autonomymovements, the Iranian government bannedpublic displays of Kurdish identity, quickly and

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Armenian Kurds protesting Iraq s policy against Kurds, April1991.

harshly put down any incipient revolts, arrestedand executed political leaders, and used the se-cret police to monitor Kurd activity. The replace-ment of the shah with an Islamic government in1979 encouraged the Iranian Kurds to believethat autonomy was a reachable goal. However,the fundamental principle of the new Iran—thatit be a unified Islamic state—meant that au-tonomy for the Islamic Kurds was impossible.The result was open warfare between the Kurdsand the Iranian government, beginning in 1979and effectively ending in 1984 with Iran in con-trol of nearly all of Iranian Kurdistan and some27,000 Kurds killed. Since then the region hasremained under military control, and politicalleaders have been imprisoned or executed. At-tempts at a negotiated settlement and a peace-ful redefining of Kurd-Iranian relations by thegovernment and the Kurdish Democratic party

of Iran have been hampered by political assassi-nations. Although political repression continues,there has been a relaxation of bans on expres-sions of Kurdish culture. A 1992 agreement be-tween Iran and Turkey was designed to controlthe border activities of the PKK in Turkey andthe Mojahedin-e Khalq in Iran; both groupswere seen as threats to the internal security ofthe two nations.

During the period of Iraq's transition to na-tionhood from 1918 to 1932, the Iraqi Kurdshad great hopes of establishing an independentnation or an autonomous region within what wasto become Iraq. However, there was a lack ofKurd unity; internal splits were based on urban-rural residence, agricultural-herding economy,political rivalries, and conflicting goals amongKurd leaders. Partly because of these divisions,neither independence nor autonomy was

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achieved, and instead the Kurdish region cameunder Iraqi control. This led to an unstable situ-ation that lasted until 1970, in which the Kurdsexisted as a fragmented political entity withinIraq. Various attempts at autonomy or separat-ism were put down by the government, and theKurdish Democratic party was established inIraq. It was during this period that MullaMustafa Barzini emerged (although not with-out continual rivalries in the community) as theKurd leader, a role he maintained both in Iraqand during exile until his death in the UnitedStates in 1979. Fighting between the Kurds andthe government in the 1960s produced perhapsas many as 60,000 deaths, destroyed over 700villages, and displaced 300,000 Kurds. In 1970the Iraqi government signed an agreement thatfor all practical purposes committed it to recog-nize and treat the Kurds as equals in a biculturalIraq, by far the broadest recognition of Kurdautonomy offered by any nation. However, dis-agreements quickly escalated over various detailsof the agreement, and in 1974 it was replaced bythe watered-down Autonomy Declaration. Thatwas followed by warfare between Kurdish andgovernment forces, which led to at least 40,000more deaths and 300,000 displaced persons, andended with a decisive government victory in1975. Since then, Kurd autonomy efforts havegenerally coincided with events that kept Iraqimilitary forces busy elsewhere. During the Iran-Iraq war, the five major political factions joinedforces as the Iraqi Kurdistan Front and were suc-

cessful enough in occupying Iraqi forces neededon the Iranian front that a cease-fire was nego-tiated in 1983, although never fully agreed tonor implemented. Desperate to end the Kurdmilitary activity, in 1983 the Iraqis began a six-year campaign called the Anfal, which includedrazing villages, mass deportation, the establish-ment of detention camps, mass executions, and,at its height in 1988 following the end of hos-tilities with Iran, an all-out assault on Kurd po-sitions and the use of chemical warfare. Theresult was mass Kurdish casualties and displace-ments, and the reduction of Kurd-controlledterritory by about 60 percent. In 1991, with Iraqoccupied by the Gulf War and then defeated bythe Allied forces, the Kurds again revolted. Therevolt was put down by the Iraqis, and approxi-mately 1.5 million Kurds fled to the Turkishborder, where many still live in camps under in-ternational protection. At this point, Kurdishseparatism in Iraq is extremely unlikely, and theKurds are attempting to coalesce and establishcontrol of the northern region above the 36thparallel, where many reside as displaced persons.

Chaliand, Gerard. (1980) People without a Coun-try: The Kurds and Kurdistan.

Izady, Mehrdad R. (1992) The Kurds: ConciseHandbook.

McDowall, David. (1992) The Kurds: A NationDenied.

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MARTIAL RACESThe term martial racesrefers to groups within anation who are defined

on the basis of their reputation as soldiers. Theyare not "races" in any sense of the word. Some-times they are distinct ethnic groups, such as theIban (known as the Sarawak Rangers) in Ma-laysia, or the Highland Scots. They can be drawnfrom a distinct cultural category, such as theBedouin nomadic pastoralists in Saudi Arabia,or they can be formed by members of a numberof ethnic groups, such as the Gurkha of Nepal.They may be members of the dominant ethnicgroup, such as the Cossacks in Russia, who wereprimarily of Russian and Ukrainian ancestry. So-called military races have essentially disappearedsince the end of World War II.

Political scientist Cynthia Enloe character-izes military race in terms of what she calls theGurkha Syndrome. That is, they are created asdistinct groups by the nation-state in order totake advantage of their military ability, and thenmade dependent on the state in order to main-tain their loyalty. For example, in India the Brit-

ish sought the services of the Gurkhas after 1815,when Britain took control of northern India andstopped incursions by the Gurkha Kingdomfrom Nepal to the north. The British were im-pressed by the Gurkha military performance, andrecruited men into Gurhka regiments whoserved British interests from the 1850s throughWorld War II. In fact, the Gurkha are neither aracial nor an ethnic group, but are Nepalese na-tionals (including Gurung, Magar,Tamang, andother ethnic groups) who formed the Gurkhamilitary units within the British army. Gurkhaloyalty to the British was based on their uniqueidentity and status within the British army, andtheir relatively high salaries and pensions, whichmade Gurkha soldiers and their families sociallyand economically powerful in their home vil-lages. Similarily, the Cossacks in Russia were atfirst social bandits who defended peasant inter-ests, then mercenaries, and finally military ir-regulars who defended the Russian Empire fromTurkish invasions from the south and internalpeasant uprisings. The Cossacks were mainlyethnic Russians and Ukrainians, although therewere also some Turkic and Kalmyk Cossackcommunities. Until the eighteenth century theCossacks were largely supported by the Russiangovernment, which supplied them with grain,ammunition, and liquor; paid them for their ser-vices; and allowed them to keep booty taken fromthe Turks. In later years, as the population in-creased, the Cossacks became essentially self-supporting.

Both the Gurkhas and Cossacks display an-other key feature of the Gurkha Syndrome—they are ethnically different from the enemiesof the state that they support. For the Cossacks,the primary enemy was the Turks, while theGurkhas served British interests in various placesoutside Nepal; some are still stationed in HongKong. Thus, the basic value of martial races mayreside in their willingness to more readily attackpeople of another ethnic group than are the

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members of the ethnic groups that retain theirservices.

Enloe, Cynthia. (1980) Ethnic Soldiers: State Se-curity in Divided Societies.

Longworth, Philip. (1969) The Cossacks.

Vansittart, Eden, and B. V. Nicolay. (1915)Gurkas.

MIDDLEMANMINORITIES

Middleman minoritiesis a label used for a so-cioeconomic categorycomposed of ethnic and

religious groups who occupy specialized eco-nomic niches in a society. The term is derivedfrom the economic role played by Jews in medi-eval Europe, where they specialized in media-tion activities between marketplace providersand consumers such as trading, peddling,moneylending, and pawnbroking—economicactivities generally not engaged in by non-Jews.The term middleman minorities was coined bysociologist Howard Becker in an attempt to ex-tend the discussion from Jews to other middle-man groups such as Scots, Overseas Chinese,and Armenians. Other labels now used for themiddleman minority phenomenon include pa-riahs (although this refers to nonmiddlemanoutcaste groups as well),pariah capitalism, trad-ing diaspora, marginal trading minorities, outcastetraders, and guest peoples.

The label middleman minorities summarizesthe two essential features of such groups that setthem apart from other groups in a society. First,they are middlemen in that they occupy economicniches that place them between those who pro-duce goods and services and those who consumethem. For example, for centuries in Europe

Jews were traders and moneylenders, Korean-Americans in New York and Los Angeles aregrocers, Chinese in Southeast Asia and the WestIndies are traders, and Asian Indians in EastAfrica were low- and mid-level government of-ficials. Second, they are nearly always numeri-cal and socioeconomic minorities in the nationsin which they live. With the exception of Chi-nese in some Asian nations such as Malaysia,they often number no more than 5 percent ofthe total population. Other major characteris-tics of middleman groups are: (1) they are notnative to the nation; (2) they have strong, patri-archal, extended families, with a high tendencyto marry within the group; (3) they usually liveapart from the general population in ghettos orin their own ethnic neighborhoods; (4) they tendto assimilate more slowly than do other groups;(5) though they do not display their wealth, theyare often better off financially than the popula-tion they serve.

The work performed by middleman minori-ties also has a number of distinct features com-mon to all middleman minority situations. Mostimportantly, the work they perform fills a statusor economic gap in the socioeconomic structureof the society. The gap is one that for varyingreasons is not filled by members of the wealthyor ruling segment of the society, nor by mem-bers of the general population. In agriculturalsocieties, the gap is usually between the wealthy-and-powerful and the poor-and-weak. For ex-ample, in medieval Europe the Christianpopulation was prohibited from engaging inmoneylending, so Jews occupied that niche. InSoutheast Asia, Chinese who immigrated fromthe north serve as store owners in villages andtowns, where they sell goods supplied by largercompanies to rural farmers. In nations undercolonial domination, the gap was created by theneed for local government officials and the re-luctance of the colonial government to use localpeoples for that purpose. Instead, outsiders wereemployed, such as Asian Indians in East Africa.

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In modern capitalist nations, the gap is oftenfound in rural areas and urban neighborhoodswhere large chain stores choose not to do busi-ness. This gap leaves a need for retail sales out-lets, often filled by recent immigrants such asKorean-Americans, who own and operate gro-cery and other markets. In socialist nations thegap is created by government inefficiency, cre-ating a product-supply gap filled by a gray orblack market, often managed by middlemanminorities. In the former Soviet Union, for ex-ample, black-market traders were often Geor-gians. Aside from the great advantage thatmiddleman businesses require little capital in-vestment, certain qualities enable minoritygroups to fill these gaps and perform these typesof work: The minority group members oftenpossess specialized skills (such as literacy inEnglish in colonial East Africa), are often hard-working, are willing to delay gratification, and havea network of kin or other group members withwhom to exchange products and services. The eco-nomic success of middleman minorities has beendescribed by sociologist Pierre van den Berghe as"nepotism in the service of capitalism. "This meansthat their success comes from the extensive use ofunpaid family labor, the extension of credit withinthe group, and their ability to maintain a supply ofgoods for the marketplace.

While middlemen minorities often experi-ence short-term financial success, and in somesituations many members of the group eventu-ally assimilate into the dominant society, theyare often in a weak and defenseless position inrelation to other groups in the society—they areseen as a necessary evil by the ruling class, whichis threatened by their economic success, and theyare often despised by the population they serveas aggressive outsiders who overcharge theircustomers and take jobs from economicallydisadvantaged members of the society. Recenttensions between and occasional violence di-rected at middleman groups in U.S. cities suchas New York and Los Angeles is a result of

this view of middleman minority businesslocated in African-American communities.

When the society is under stress from eco-nomic deterioration or war, middleman groupsare often scapegoated and victimized. The ex-pulsion of Jews from various European coun-tries and violence directed against them, theexpulsion of Asian Indians from Uganda, thegenocidal massacre of Armenians in Turkey, andthe expulsion of the Chinese ("boat people")from Vietnam are all examples of the victimiza-tion of middleman groups and suggest the tenu-ous position they often occupy in a society.However, middleman minorities do not alwayssuffer such a fate, and in nations that stress as-similation, groups will often assimilate intomainstream society, and few individuals will beinvolved in the traditional occupation.

Bonacich, Edna. (1973) "Theory of MiddlemanMinorities. "American Sociological Review 38:583-594.

van den Berghe, Pierre L. (1981) The EthnicPhenomenon.

Zenner, Walter. (1991) Minorities in the Middle:A Cross-CulturalAnalysis.

MIGRANTWORKERS

The exploitation of thelabor of the members ofone ethnic group by an-other ethnic group has a

long history in the human experience. Aroundthe world the labor of other ethnic groups hasalways been used to perform undesirable workor to augment the labor pool so as to enhanceproductivity and economic growth. Domesticslavery practiced by indigenous peoples in Asia,Africa, and the New World; the economic sla-very of colonial domination; contract laborers

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in Oceania; migrant farm workers in the UnitedStates; guest workers in Europe; and middlemanminorities are a few forms of this widespreadpattern. As stated by Max Frisch, the goal ofthe receiving nations in all of these activities hasbeen "acquiring workers but not human beings."

A wide variety of terms is used around theworld for peoples grouped here under the ge-neric label migrant workers. The governments ofreceiving nations, the citizens of these nations,social scientists who study them, organizationsthat assist them, and the people themselves allhave different labels. These terms include im-migrants, guest workers, migrant workers, seasonalworkers, illegal workers, denizens, native-born sec-ond generation, foreign workers, colonial workers,postcolonial migrants, economic refugees, refugees,contract laborers, foreigners, foreign labor, z.n& for-eigner fellow citizens. Definitions of some of themore inclusive terms are:

immigrant worker An individual, and of-ten his or her immediate family, who hasbeen granted resident status in the receiv-ing nation or who, because of the laws inthe receiving nation, has a reasonable expec-tation that such status will be granted.

year-round migrant worker An individualwho has been granted a one-year workpermit by the receiving nation, with thenation having the right to extend the per-mit indefinitely.

seasonal or circular labor migrant An indi-vidual under a labor contract that limits hisor her work to a specific time period or sea-son of the year. In some nations, the workermay be required to leave the host nationduring nonwork periods; in other nations,the migrant might move from region to re-gion in search of seasonal work.

commuting or frontier worker An individualwho crosses an international border on adaily basis to work in a country differentfrom that of residence.

asylum-seeker and refugee From the per-spective of labor migration, an individualfleeing his or her homeland who falselyclaims political persecution in order to settleand work in the receiving nation. These in-dividuals, now common around the world,are sometimes called economic refugees todistinguish them from political refugeeswho flee their homeland to escape politicalpersecution.

illegal immigrant An individual who en-ters or stays in a nation illegally, often insearch of work.

denizen An individual, whether or not acitizen of the receiving nation, who has es-tablished deep and long-standing ties withthat nation and is very likely to remain resi-dent in it.

transmigrant A term now used in thepopular press with considerable imprecisionthat refers to any person who has movedfrom one nation to another.

Whatever they are called, the primary distin-guishing features of these groups today are that(1) they are members of ethnic groups differentfrom the dominant ethnic groups in the nationsin which they have settled, either temporarily orpermanently; (2) they are numerical minorities;(3) many become or wish to become permanentresidents of the receiving nation, including a siz-able proportion born there who form the sec-ond and now third generations; (4) the receivingnation is not desirous of them being permanentresidents or citizens; (5) with the exception ofnations with an assimilation ideology such as theUnited States, few members of the groups dobecome citizens of the receiving nation; (6) mostwork at low-paying, low-skilled jobs that citi-zens of the receiving nation do not want to per-form; and (7) most are denied some rights thatare afforded citizens of the receiving nation. Inaddition to these seven characteristics, there areother difficulties. The expectations of many re-

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ceiving nations were that these people would notstay permanently; however, many have stayedand formed ethnic communities. The economicrepression and high unemployment from the late1980s into the mid-1990s, coupled with ethno-centrism, stereotyping, scapegoating, and rac-ism present in some nations, has led to conflictbetween migrant workers and the ethnic ma-jorities in the receiving nations, and difficulttimes for many migrant workers around theworld.

Migrant Workers around the WorldThe use of individuals from ethnic groups dif-ferent from that dominant in the host nation isa worldwide phenomenon. In the Middle East,a substantial percentage of the labor force in oil-rich nations such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, andBahrain is composed of those from other MiddleEast nations, Palestinians, and peoples from thePhilippines, South Korea, and Taiwan. Egyp-tians are now a major migrant-worker group inthe Middle East. In Saudi Arabia, approximately180,000 Egyptians are farmers, 150,000 Egyp-tians are skilled workers, 150,000 are unskilledworkers, and 110,000 are professional and cleri-cal employees. In the United States, many legalimmigrants from Asia, and legal and illegal im-migrants from Mexico and the Caribbean re-gion, form a sizable percentage of the work force.In Singapore, Malaysians and Indonesians fillmany low-level jobs on the Chinese-controlledisland. Nigeria formerly employed several mil-lion people from neighboring Benin and Ghanawho were expelled during the early 1980s in re-action to a serious internal economic crisis. In1992 Congo expelled several hundred thousandso-called illegal workers from Zaire. Althoughtechnically labeled illegal in Congo, the Zairianworkers held many low-level positions; many hadbeen long-time residents and had children bornin Congo. They were forced to return to Zairebecause of political unrest in Zaire, and theCongo government's fear that the unrest would

Filipino farm worker in Delano, California, 1970.

spread to Zairians in Congo and that moreZairians fleeing the conflict would enter Congo.In the last decade of the twentieth century, mi-grant workers in western Europe have become amajor focus of ethnic conflict.

The fall of communism in eastern Europeand the demand for workers in developing orexpanding South American industries havecombined to create a flow of eastern Europeanworkers to nations such as Venezuela, Chile,Argentina, and Uruguay. However, rather thanlow-paid, low-skilled workers, the demand is fortrained technicians, engineers, scientists, andother skilled occupations. Venezuela, for ex-ample, has been especially aggressive in recruit-ing eastern Europeans by providing laborcontracts with employers, paying the workers'

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airfares, offering Spanish-language education,and providing free housing for a short period.By contrast, Argentina's method of controllingthe type of worker who migrates there has beento restrict immigration to only those who canbring $20,000 with them—an impossibile re-quirement for virtually all eastern Europeanworkers. As in Argentina, much caution is ex-pressed in South American nations due to con-cerns about deflating wages in general, losingjobs to outsiders, creating multiethnic socities,and burdening the national and regional social-support systems.

Although the motivation for using ethni-cally different migrant workers varies from coun-try to country, a number of factors are often ofprimary importance. First, migrant workers fillan employment niche created when local work-ers refuse to do work that is low paid or danger-ous, such as service work, mining, andagriculture. Second, migrant workers are oftenless expensive to recruit, train, and terminatethan are local workers. Third, demographic fac-tors may create a labor shortage that can be filledonly by importing workers. For example, post-World War II Europe experienced a labor short-age caused by the low fertility rates of the 1930s,deaths during World War II, and rural-to-urban migration that shrank the pool of ruralworkers. In Saudia Arabia, a labor shortage wascaused by women not being permitted to work,and the small but wealthy population demand-ing many products and services. Fourth, migrantworkers traditionally have been viewed as a low-cost cure to what are perceived as temporary la-bor shortages, such as the post-World War IIsituation in Europe, the postindependence pe-riod in some African nations, and the 1973 oilboom in the Middle East. Fifth, the use of non-native workers is thought to encourage politicalstability in nations by reducing wealth differ-ences, since migrants take the bulk of low-paying jobs; by maintaining ethnic homogene-ity; and, because migrants often have no politi-

cal rights, by controlling threats to govern-ment stability.

Migrant Worker Crises in EuropeBefore 1945 Europe was a continent of emigra-tion; that is, far more people left Europe to settleelsewhere, particularly in the New World, thanmoved to Europe. After 1945 the collapse ofoverseas colonial empires and political realign-ment at the start of the Cold War era forced thereturn of many Europeans to their native coun-tries. Germans returned from the USSR andPoland, French from North Africa, Portuguesefrom Angola and Mozambique, British fromIndia, and Dutch from Indonesia, all of whomwere rapidly and easily absorbed into their re-spective homeland populations. In order to meetthe demand for labor caused by a labor short-age, rapid economic expansion, postwar recon-struction, and consumer demand, some westernEuropean nations began importing temporaryworkers from other European nations. However,the labor demand was so great that by the early1950s, workers were being brought in from out-side Europe—from North and Sub-SaharanAfrica, Turkey, Caribbean nations, south Asia,and in increased numbers from Greece and Italy.While in the early 1950s the non-Europeanpopulation in Europe was about 350,000, by theearly 1960s it had increased to around 4 mil-lion. Although these migrant workers providedcheap, low-level labor, western European nationswere ill equipped to handle the social, political,and legal challenges presented by the presenceof large, non-European populations in what hadbeen essentially ethnically or linguistically ho-mogeneous or pluralistic nations. The immigra-tion of non-European migrant workers in mostreceiving nations was halted by 1973-1974, andonly family members of resident migrants wereallowed entrance. Since then, the increase in thenumber of non-Europeans has been mostly theresult of children born in Europe and the arrivalof family members from the countries of origi-

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nation. The actual number of migrant workersand family members in Europe since 1945 isestimated at between 15 and 30 million, andpresently there are about 6 million migrant work-ers of non-European origin. Rather than returnto their homeland when their labor migrationwas halted, these migrants created permanentcommunities, thereby turning many western Eu-ropean nations into multiethnic societies. Themajor non-European communities and otherEuropean communities in the principal receiv-ing nations are:

Belgium Turks, Moroccans

Britain Irish, West Indians, Paki-stanis, Indians, Sri Lankans

France Algerians, Moroccans, Tuni-sians, Italians, Portuguese,Spanish, Vietnamese, Sub-Saharan Africans, Pakistanis

Germany Turks, Italians, Greeks,Spanish, Yugoslavians

Netherlands Turks, Moroccans, Spanish,Dutch Antillians, Indone-sians, Surinamese

Sweden Turks, Finns, Yugoslavians,Estonians, Poles

Switzerland Italians, Spanish

Particularly in France, Germany, and Britain,both non-European and European migrantsformed distinct ethnic communities by the1980s. The communities are composed prima-rily of families, with most of the children bornin the receiving nation. They differ in language,occupation, place of residence, homeland, andoften in religion and physical appearance fromthe native population. They are likely to oc-cupy poor inner-city or industrial neighbor-hoods characterized by substandard housingand high crime rates. Each ethnic group tendsto be segregated, not only from the dominantpopulation, but also from other migrant ethnicgroups.

The many ethnic voluntary associations arean important feature of ethnic migrant commu-nities; they create solidarity within the commu-nity, maintain ties to the homeland, provideassistance to migrants and migrant families, andassist in dealing with receiving-nation politicaland economic structures. Among these associa-tions are religious institutions, language schools,social clubs, banks, lending societies, newspa-pers, radio shows, advice centers, sports clubs,social clubs, housing associations, and politicalparties. During the 1980s, in London there were750 ethnic associations; in Sweden, there were1,200; in France, there were 770 ethnic associa-tions serving the Portuguese community, and 325associations for the Italian community; and inSwitzerland, there were 175 serving the Spanishcommunity. Community solidarity and ties to thehomeland are further strengthened in some eth-nic communities by extensive extended family andkinship networks, endogamous and arranged mar-riages, and chain migration from the same fami-lies, villages, or regions in the sending nation.

As these ethnic communities grew and be-came more visible—with residents demandingeducational, social, and health services and theirteenage children entering the labor market—re-sentment and hostility within the host societiesincreased—rising at an especially rapid rate inthe late 1980s in reaction to recession and highunemployment in western Europe and an influxof political refugees from eastern Europe—straining resources in countries such as Germanyand France.

Government responses to "overforeign-ization," "the foreigner problem," and "the so-cial time bomb" included restrictions on the re-newal of residence permits, restrictions onfurther immigration, and expulsion or repatria-tion programs. Responses of the European na-tions have varied, with Sweden and theNetherlands placing the least restrictions on mi-grants, while Germany and France have beenthe most restrictive. In France, for example, a

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strong antiforeigner sentiment has developedand there has been a rise in neo-Nazi politicalparties; animosities are directed mainly at NorthAfricans and especially toward Muslims, whohave shown little interest in assimilating intomainstream French society. Among actionstaken or attempted by the French governmentare a zero immigration policy enacted in 1993,tighter criteria for granting French citizenship,identity checks on persons appearing foreign, athree-month jail sentence for migrants whorefuse identity checks, a two-year waiting pe-riod for the immigration of migrant family mem-bers, a reversal of the law awarding citizenshipto those born in France, and the mass arrests ofthose thought to be supporters of Islamic fun-damentalist political movements.

Even in eastern Europe a migrant workerpopulation exists. In Bulgaria, for example, bothVietnamese and Turks have been the object ofantimigrant programs. Vietnamese were re-cruited to work on large construction projects,but as the economy declined in the 1980s manylost their jobs and were forced to live throughblack-market enterprises or to seek employmentin neighboring nations. With a complete halt toVietnamese immigration and all existing con-tracts expiring in 1992, Bulgaria was then ableto rid itself of the unwanted Vietnamese mi-grants. Turks (who form 15 percent of the popu-lation in Bulgaria) have been resident there formany generations, but beginning in 1989 sev-eral hundred thousand left for resettlement inTurkey. Bulgarian assimilation policies, whichincluded repression of Islam, a ban on speakingTurkish in public, and violent repression of Turk-ish protests, were perhaps motivated by a desireto force the Turks to leave, and were the mainfactor in the Turkish exodus.

Rights of MigrantsAs it has become apparent that the 6 million orso non-European migrant workers in westernEurope are permanent rather than temporary

residents, their status in the host nations hasbecome a difficult political issue. On the onehand, western European nations are all democ-racies, with very broad political and civil rightsafforded their citizens. Non-European residents,particularly in times of economic hardship, areseen as outsiders who at one point fit in, butwho now draw on already scarce resources. Inwestern Europe today, the rights afforded non-citizen migrants varies from nation to nation.The basic right from which all other rights flowis citizenship. Sweden, Great Britain, and theNetherlands have liberal citizenship policies,while Germany, France, Belgium, and Switzer-land have protectionist policies; not many mi-grants in these latter nations ever becomecitizens. Since noncitizens usually cannot vote,few migrants in these nations are allowed to vote,either; however, in the Nordic nations, the Neth-erlands, and Britain, certain categories of non-citizen migrants are allowed to vote. In Nordicnations, these are citizens of other Nordic na-tions, while in England, some voting rights areextended to citizens of other Commonwealthnations. Civil rights have been extended to for-eigners in Europe since the 1970s, and now mostcountries have liberal policies. However, in Ger-many, France, and Switzerland, some rights toassociation and opinion may be curtailed, espe-cially in times of national emergency. In gen-eral, the rights of migrant workers in westernEurope can be viewed as a continuum, with il-legal workers having the fewest rights, seasonaland temporary workers having a few rights, per-manent residents having many rights, and citi-zens having full rights.

The treatment of migrants in the MiddleEast is far more uniform and restrictive than inEurope. Migrant workers are essentially with-out rights. They may not become citizens, normay their children. They may not own property,and their work is carefully controlled by the gov-ernment. They are denied virtually all basic po-litical rights, including the right to due process,

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the right to vote, the right of assembly, and theright to form labor organizations. Non-Muslimsare forbidden to display religious symbols (a re-striction that was extended to American service-men and women serving in the Gulf War inSaudi Arabia). Migrant workers are also deniedaccess to the free education and health care of-fered citizens, and most unskilled and low-skilledworkers do not earn enough to bring their fami-lies with them.

See also FOREIGNERS IN GERMANY; MIDDLEMANMINORITIES; RACE AND RACISM; REFUGEES; SLA-VERY; TRANSNATIONAL MIGRATION.

Berger, John, and Jean Mohr. (1975) A SeventhMan.

Castles, Stephen, H. Booth, and T. Wallace.(1984) Here for Good.

Cross, Malcolm, ed. (1992) Ethnic Minoritiesand Industrial Change in Europe and NorthAmerica.

Extra, G., and L. Verhoeven, eds. (1993) Immi-grant Languages in Europe.

Layton-Henry, Zig, ed. (1990) The Rights ofMigrant Workers in Western Europe.

Miller, Judith. (1991) "Strangers at the Gate:Europe's Immigration Crisis." The New YorkTimes Magazine, 15 September: 32-37, 49,80-81.

Murphy, Dervla. (1987) Tales from Two Cities:Travel of Another Sort.

"The New Face of America: How ImmigrantsAre Shaping the World's First MulticulturalSociety. Special Issue of Time, Fall 1993.

Rex, John, D. Joly, and C. Wilpert, eds. (1988)Immigrant Associations in Europe.

Rogers, Rosemarie, ed. (1985) Guests Come ToStay: The Effects of European Labor Migrationon Sending and Receiving Nations.

Solomos, John, and John Wrench, eds. (1992)Racism and Migration in Contemporary Europe.

Weiner, Myron. (1986) "Labor Migrations asIncipient Diasporas." In Modern Diasporas inInternational Politics, edited by GabrielSheffer, 47-74.

MINORITYWithin the context ofethnic relations, a mi-nority or minority group

is a social category within a nation that has acollective, ascribed status in relation to othergroups, and is the object of differential treat-ment. This differential treatment may be theresult of government policy, social practice, orboth, and is usually negative, taking the form ofdiscrimination or persecution; it may also bepositive, as in affirmative-action programs meantto reverse the effects of previous negative treat-ment. Discrimination often includes denial ofaccess to jobs or certain categories of employ-ment, education, housing, medical care, the le-gal system, and other social and economic forms.Minority groups may be differentiated as socio-logical minorities, who are defined as such be-cause they are discriminated against, and eliteminorities who, though a numerical minority,comprise the ruling class. In general, minoritiesare usually numerical minorities, although in afew nations such as Burundi and South Africa,they are actually numerical majorities. InBurundi, the majority Tutsi are dominated bythe Hutu. In South Africa, under the formersystem of apartheid, Bantu-speaking Africanswere subordinate to the small population ofwhites.

In addition to differential treatment, crite-ria commonly employed in nations around theworld to indicate minority status include physi-cal features such as skin color, ethnicity, religion,

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language, occupational specialization, historicalstatus, region of residence, and degree of politi-cal autonomy. Political scientist Ted Gurr dis-tinguished among three categories of minoritygroups: ethnoclasses, militant sects, and com-munal contenders. Ethnoclasses are groups whoare physically, religiously, or culturally distinct,and who fill specialized economic niches in thedominant society, such as Muslims in France,Gypsies in Europe, and Koreans in Japan. Mili-tant sects are groups who are differentiated pri-marily on the basis of religion, such as Copts inEgypt, Druze in Lebanon, and Jews in Argen-tina. Communal contenders are groups inmulticultural nations who share or seek to sharepower. They are of two types: (1) disadvantagedcommunal contenders, which are groups who arediscriminated against, such as the Luo in Kenya,and (2) advantaged communal contenders, whichare groups who hold all or large shares of politi-cal power, such as Tutsi in Burundi or Maronites

in Lebanon. In this scheme, minority groups orpeoples who hold political power are distin-guished from national peoples, with the latterincluding ethnonationalists and indigenouspeoples whose defining feature is the desire forpolitical autonomy.

There is much variation across nations as towhat is officially considered a minority group.Thus, in the United States, African-Americansand Latinos in general are considered minori-ties, while others are not (the status of Asian-Americans is unclear). In the former SovietUnion, groups that would be considered minori-ties elsewhere were called nationalities. In China,the government has designated 55 official mi-norities, using a mix of criteria that do not al-ways conform to the people s own views as towhich groups are ethnically distinct. In Turkey,minorities do not exist because the governmenthas simply decreed that Turkey is ethnically andreligiously homogeneous. While minority sta-

Amish farmers hauling a load of corn from their farm in Bird in Hand, Pennsylvania, 1990.

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tus is often ascribed and by birth, many minor-ity groups prefer to maintain their unique iden-tity, sometimes through ethnic separatism (aswith the Basques in Spain and France), orthrough resisting assimilation (as with Croatsin the former Yugoslavia and Latinos in theUnited States), or by supporting a pluralisticpolitical system (as with the Walloons in Bel-gium). For individuals, their minority status isoften fluid and can change, depending on thesocial situation in which they are involved. Inaddition, one can hide or lose ethnic identitythrough migration and settlement elsewhere, orthrough intermarriage.

See also CASTE; INDIGENOUS PEOPLES; INDIG-ENOUS RIGHTS; MINORITY RIGHTS; RACE ANDRACISM.

Gurr,Ted R. (1993) Minorities at Risk: A GlobalView ofEthnopolitical Conflicts.

Gurr, Ted R., and James R. Scarritt. (1989)"Minorities at Risk: A Global Survey." Hu-man Rights Quarterly 11: 375-405.

Sigler, Jay A. (1983) Minority Rights: A Com-parative Analysis.

Wirsing, Robert G., ed. (1981) Protection of Eth-nic Minorities: Comparative Perspectives.

areMINORITY

RIGHTS

Minority rightsrights of minoritygroups, and accrue tothe group as a whole,

although individual members of the group canclaim those rights based on their status as mem-bers of the group. Underlying the concept ofminority rights are two general principles of thehuman condition shared by many nations in theworld community: All peoples have the right ofself-determination, and discrimination against

any category of people is wrong. Of course, ifthese principles were the basis of universal gov-ernment policy and action, minority rights wouldnot be a concern. Since these principles are sooften ignored, the denial or removal of suchrights to minority groups is a major human prob-lem in the world today. Because many minoritygroups are ethnic groups, it is also an importantaspect of ethnic relations. In a survey of 126larger nations, at least one minority group waswithout some rights in nearly 75 percent of thenations, and in 42 nations, at least 25 percentwere denied some rights.

Nations employ many different strategiesand policies to deal with the rights of minoritygroups within their society. In the United States,an assimilation policy is dominant; assimilationinto mainstream society and the assumption ofan American cultural and political identity isbelieved to be the route to equal status for allcitizens. At the same time, since 1968 the UnitedStates has employed timetables for increasingminority representation in employment.Canada's official bilingual/multicultural policysupports the use of both the English and Frenchlanguages and the cultural autonomy of all mi-nority groups; but, again, affirmative-action pro-grams for the benefit of French-Canadians havebeen instituted to alleviate past inequities. InIndia, the policy with regard to the thousandsof minority outcaste and tribal groups has beenone of compensatory group rights throughaffirmative-action programs that provide oppor-tunities in education and employment. In China,the 55 officially recognized national minoritiesenjoy limited cultural and religious autonomy,and some rights denied the majority Han Chi-nese, while living within the framework ofcentralized political and economic control.Palestinians in some Israeli-occupied territoriesare beginning to have some limited autonomyand self-rule, while need-based programs havebeen developed for Asian and Russian Jewsto ease their adjustment to Israeli society. In

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Muslims worship at a newly constructed mosque in theTatar village ofYenganaevo in the former Soviet

Union, 1990.

Sri Lanka, Sri Lankan Tamils lost many eco-nomic and educational rights and have beenengaged in war for political autonomy with themajority Sinhalese who, following the end ofBritish rule, instituted programs to benefit them-selves and exclude the Tamils. Finally, in theMauritius Islands, the four constituent ethno-linguistic groups share power through propor-tional political representation. One key issueabout reforms designed to improve the status ofminority groups is how effective they have beenacross nations. In nations that make a strongeffort to aid at least some groups, it seems thatsome groups do enhance their economic posi-

tion, although the members of the groups ben-efiting most are those who are already fairly welloff; it is not clear whether these gains are tem-porary or permanent. For example, groups suchas Asian-Americans and ethnic Canadians haveimproved their economic position, while otherssuch as African-Americans in the United Statesand the Maori in New Zealand have not.

Minority rights have been supported on aninternational level with the League of Nationssince the early twentieth century, and in thepost-World War II period, through the UnitedNations, although virtually all nations defineminority rights matters as an internal affair notsubject to intervention by other nations or in-ternational organizations. Thus, efforts by mi-norities to achieve self-determination throughpolitical separation are rarely effective, and moreoften are subject to harsh repressive actions bythe national government; in fact, ethnic sepa-ratism is the most common form of violent eth-nic conflict in the world today. Actions taken bygovernments to deny minority groups their rightsinclude expulsion of the group, prohibitionson emigration, forced resettlement, denial ofpolitical representation, denial of linguisticfreedom, restrictions on minority media, dis-crimination in economic and educational mat-ters, denial of equal access to health care andequal protection under the law, and denial oftheir identity as a minority group. In the formerSoviet Union, for example, various means wereused to deny religious groups such as Jews, Mus-lims, Jehovah s Witnesses, Eastern-Rite Catho-lics, Pentecostal, and Old Believers the right toreligious freedom. These included outlawingentire denominations; forcing denominations tomerge; closing or restricting access to places ofworship; killing, detaining, or imprisoning reli-gious leaders; defaming groups in the press; ban-ning traditional practices; and discriminatingagainst members of the groups in housing, edu-cation, and employment. Among means used bygroups and their supporters to gain rights are

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public opinion and education through interna-tional nongovernment organizations such asAmnesty International and the Minority RightsGroup, legislation, lawsuits, and the preparationand ratification by various bodies of internationaldocuments supporting minority rights such asThe Covenant on Civil and Political Rights andThe International Convention on the Eliminationof All Forms of Racial Discrimination. However,many of these documents, such as the Charterof the U.N., are often interpreted as pertainingto individual human rights, not to minoritygroup rights, and thus have limited applicabil-ity in many minority rights situations. There isa major difference between minority rights andindigenous rights. Indigenous peoples often canclaim special group rights based on their statusas the first inhabitants of the region or, as in theUnited States, on the basis of treaties that ac-knowledge indigenous nations as politically au-tonomous nations.

Minority rights take two major forms: (1)negative or common or human rights, whichgenerally involve freedom from discriminationand the same civil, cultural, political, and eco-nomic rights enjoyed by other citizens and (2)positive or identity rights, which have to do withthe preservation or revitalization of the minor-ity culture. Specific positive rights sought byminority peoples include the following.

1. Freedom to remain a member of the groupor voluntarily leave it, perhaps through in-termarriage or religious conversion

2. The right to be recognized as a distinct eth-nic group within a nation

3. The right to political participation andrepresentation

4. The right to use the group's own languagein private and public, and to perpetuate itsuse through education

5. Freedom to pursue economic, political, andcultural development

6. Freedom from genocide, ethnocide, forcedexpulsion, or involuntary populationtransfers

7. The right to protection so as to maintaincultural, linguistic, political, and economicautonomy

8. The right to self-determination

See also CASTE; INDIGENOUS RIGHTS; MINORITY.

Bourdeaux, Michael, Kathleen Matchett, andCornelia Gerstenmaier. (1970) Religious Mi-norities of the Soviet Union.

Fawcett, James. (1979) The International Protec-tion of Minorities. Report No. 41.

Grove, D. John. (1993) "Have the Post-ReformEthnic Gains Eroded? A Seven Nation Study."Ethnic and Racial Studies 16: 598-620.

Gurr, Ted R., and James R. Scarritt. (1989)"Minorities at Risk: A Global Survey." Hu-man Rights Quarterly 11: 375-405.

Palley, Claire. (1978) Constitutional Law andMinorities. Report No. 36.

Sigler, Jay A. (1983) Minority Rights: A Com-parative Analysis.

Van Dyke, Vernon. (1985) Human Rights,Ethnicity, and Discrimination.

Wirsing, Robert G., ed. (1981) Protection of Eth-nic Minorities: Comparative Perspectives.

MISSIONSAs applied to religiousactivity, the term missionhas a variety of mean-

ings. As used in reference to Christianity, andin its most general sense, it refers to the goal ofcreating a world in which all people are Chris-tian. In a more limited sense, it can also meana specific missionary initiative (such as the

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mission to the Huron), a specific site of mis-sionary activity (such as San Juan Mission), or aspecific missionary organization (such as theNew Tribes Mission). Christians today numberabout 1.8 billion out of a global population ofabout 5.4 billion. Muslims are the second larg-est group at about 970 million, followed by Hin-dus at 732 million.

Although often ignored and not perceivedas a form of ethnic relation, missionary activityhas been one of the major forms of ethnic rela-tion for nearly 2,000 years. Almost by defini-tion, because it requires contact between personsof different religions, and very often persons ofdifferent cultures, missionary activity is a formof ethnic relation. In addition, the Christianmission was a regular and major component ofthe Western colonization of much of the world.Since both settlement and exploitative colonial-ism always involved contact between Europe-ans and non-Western peoples, missionaries werealso in contact—often for long periods of time—with peoples from other cultures. In thepostcolonial world, missionary activity contin-ues to be a major form of contact between peoplefrom the Western world and people in LatinAmerica, Africa, and Asia.

Individuals who work toward convertingadherents of a religion different from their ownor nonbelievers are called missionaries ormissioners. In some religions such as Islam orPentecostal Christianity, all believers are alsomissionaries, as an expected activity of adher-ents of these religions is the conversion of non-believers. In most Christian denominations themissionary role is a special one occupied by reli-gious specialists such as ministers, priests, broth-ers, sisters, and lay missionaries. All missionarieshave a "calling" to do this work, and many re-ceive special education and training. Within thegeneral missionary role is further task special-ization, with some missionaries performing min-isterial work and others teaching, providingmedical care, assisting with community and eco-

nomic development, and doing administrativework. In some locales today, and more so in thepast, a missionary performs all or many of thesetasks by him or herself. Some missionaries op-erate independently, although the majority aresupported by a central church organization, afree-standing mission organization, or even asingle congregation. The majority of missionar-ies come from cultures different from the one inwhich they work. However, in recent years therehas been a trend toward using indigenous peopleas missionaries to their own society.

While all major religions seek converts tosome extent, interest in missionary activity andits effects has been centered mostly on the Chris-tian mission. This is mainly because the Chris-tian mission has been closely tied to Westerncolonial expansion for over 500 years. Interestin the missionary aspect of the spread of otherreligions, such as Buddhism from south Asia toeast Asia, and Islam from the Arabian Penin-sula to North Africa, central Asia, and South-east Asia, has been much less, although theirspread certainly resulted in part from mission-ary activities.

Missionaries are often in competition withone another. It is not unusual for Catholic, vari-ous Protestant denominations, Mormon, andother missions represented by missionaries towork in the same region or with the same cul-tural group. For example, in northern Nigeria inthe 1970s, Islamic, Catholic (Dominican), andProtestant (United Mission Society) missionersvied for converts among the local ethnic groups.The Muslims enjoyed a number of advantagesincluding residence among the local population,a lifestyle more like that of the local population,support of the Nigerian government, and sup-port of the Islamic Hausa, the dominant ethnicgroup in the region. Thus, conversion to Islamwas more common, with entire villages mostlikely to convert to Islam, while only extendedfamilies converted to Protestantism, and onlyindividuals to Catholicism. Similarly, in Alaska,

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the Russian Orthodox Church was the primarymission among the Tlingit until the sale ofAlaska to the United States in 1867 and the ar-rival of American missionaries. When the Rus-sian traders left the region, the Orthodox Churchwas the only Russian institution remaining. Itgradually lost influence, concentrating its effortson a few larger communities. It continues toexist, however, as a native Orthodox Church withTlingit clergy, liturgy in the Tlingit language,and local parishes operating to meet the needsof the communities they serve. A similar situa-tion pertains to Orthodox Eskimo and Aleutcommunities such as that of the Moravians,which have been more resistant to Americanmissions than the Tlingit. As in the Tlingit situ-ation, missionaries from different faiths or de-nominations not only work in one place at thesame time, but often follow one another overtime. For example, in colonial times, LatinAmerican groups were heavily missionized byRoman Catholics. In recent decades, as Catho-lic missionary activity has decreased, many con-verts have converted again, this time often toPentecostal Protestantism, whose expressivestyle, emphasis on miracles, and encouragementof lay ministers make it congruent with localcultural traditions.

As discussed below, while missions are foundaround the world, not all regions have beenequally responsive to Christian missionary ef-forts or even to the presence of missionaries. Thegoal of missionary work is the conversion of thetargets of the work to the religion of the mis-sionary. Thus, as a form of ethnic relation, mis-sionary work is characterized mainly by a desireof one group to change the culture of the other.Missionaries, of course, see this change as ben-eficial both to individual converts and to theculture as a whole, while critics of missionaryactivity regard such activity as mainly harmfulor destructive of indigenous cultures.

The strategies and techniques used by mis-sionaries vary widely over time and from situa-

tion to situation. Two strategies with major im-plications for ethnic relations are indigenizationand contextualization. Indigenization refers to anapproach in which the Gospel is presented in away that can be best understood by indigenouspeoples. One major aspect of indigenization isthe translation of the Bible into indigenous lan-guages, a task that dates to the beginnings ofChristianity. Today, the Bible, the Gospels, andother religious documents have been translatedinto several thousand languages. Another formof indigenization is to present elements of Chris-tianity in a way that fits with existing beliefs andsymbols in the indigenous culture. For example,in the 1660s Catholic missionaries to theTupi-Guarani in Paraguay and Brazil called the Chris-tian God Tupa, after the local supernaturalresponsible for thunder, lightning, and rain; andcalled the Devil Yurupari or Giropari, after thenames of harmful local forest spirits. Similarly,a common missionary practice is to incorporateindigenous dance and music into Christian cer-emonies. Contextualization is a rather new de-velopment, and is seen by missionaries as movingbeyond indigenization. Contextualization re-quires a consideration of the Bible, the indig-enous religion, the indigenous culture, and thena fitting of elements of the religious message toelements of the indigenous culture. It also takesinto consideration the reality that cultures varyboth internally and over time, and that much ofthe stimulus for cultural change is external tothe culture. Thus, a contextual approach mightinvolve the building of an impressive church foruse by a wealthy, powerful elite alongside theuse of biblical passages by other members ofthe same community in indigenous healingceremonies.

Missions and ColonialismThe worldwide nature of the Christian missionis a product of colonialism. Missionary activitywas an integral part of the colonizing efforts ofevery European colonial nation beginning in the

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1400s and extending throughout the colonial era.The predominance of missionaries today (seebelow) in regions of the most intense settlementcolonization (North and South America) andexploitative colonization (Oceania, Africa, andSoutheast Asia) is a direct result of the colonialexperience. In colonial settings, missionariesplayed a major role in politics, religion, health,and education. They were often among the firstreporters on indigenous cultures; and, therefore,some of the earliest, most complete, and per-haps most reliable descriptions of non-Westerncultures in the New World before extensive Eu-ropean contact are those written by missionar-ies. The Jesuit Relations, for example, contains73 volumes of letters, reports, and other docu-ments relevant to the Jesuit mission in the north-eastern United States and southeastern Canada,including much information on over a dozenindigenous peoples in the region.

As with the missionary endeavor in general,no all-encompassing generalizations can bemade about the relationship between missionactivity and colonialism, save for two. First, inaddition to converting or saving souls, mission-aries were interested in "civilizing" indigenouspeoples. Second, whether they meant to or not(and the evidence is that most meant to), mis-sionaries aided directly and indirectly the effortsof colonial officials, the military, land develop-ers, traders, and others to either take indigenousland and resources and/or exploit the labor ofindigenous peoples. The variation among mis-sionaries was in the actual impact they had andhow they pursued their goals. In South America,missionaries were an integral component ofmany pacification efforts, the first step in whatbecame the wide-scale exploitation of indigenouspeoples, the conquest of their territory, and thedisplacement and disappearance of many. InAfrica, where resource exploitation, not Euro-pean settlement, was the goal, missionaries wereparticipants in the indirect-rule strategy as re-cruiters and educators of indigenous peoples who

performed administrative and clerical work inthe colonial regimes. In North America, as else-where, the role of missionaries was determinedto a large extent by the goals and colonizationmethods of the nations that supported or allowedfor their work. Thus, there was considerablevariation in these matters. For example, Catho-lic missionaries from Spain in the Southwestwere part of the Spanish conquest in the region;they allowed and were themselves the victims oftorture and killing in the name of conquest andconversion. In southern California, many indig-enous peoples were forced to live at the localmissions, forced to wear European-style cloth-ing, forbidden to speak their native languages,and forced to perform labor. In New Mexico,the Spanish presence led to the establishmentof a Catholic church at nearly all pueblo com-munities, but conquest and conversion were of-ten incomplete, and today many Pueblo groups,such as the Taos, are both Catholics and adher-ents of their traditional kiva-based religion. Inthe Northeast, early missionaries often seemedas interested in civilizing the indigenous peoplesas in converting them, and many encouragedpermanent settlement, intensive agriculture, for-mal education, and trade with white settlers.Some missionaries, such as the Congregation-alist Samuel Kirkland at Oneida, sided with theColonists in the American Revolution, and en-couraged their parishioners to do so as well.

Mission Activity in the 1990sContemporary Christian missions fall into fivemajor categories. Evangelical missions cross-cutdenominational differences and institutionalstructures and include a wide range of mission-aries who all believe in the following: (1) accep-tance of the Scripture as the word of God; (2)belief in the atonement of Jesus Christ; (3) a sav-ing experience with the Holy Spirit; (4) properuse of the sacraments, and (5) a calling to con-vert non-Christians. Conciliar missions are mis-sionaries sent out by churches who are members

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of church councils such as the World Council ofChurches. Missionaries working in this tradi-tion stress an ecumenical perspective with anemphasis on building unity among the churches,missions to the poor and people in Western cul-tures, contact with non-Christians, and apply-ing the Gospel to everyday life. The RomanCatholic mission, as defined since the SecondVatican Council (1962-1965), emphasizes sal-vation in the context of human history and localculture, with an emphasis on work with the poor,the building of local communities, and an in-creased role for lay missionaries. Pentecostal andcharismatic missions are perhaps more personalthan the others in that adherents are empow-ered and guided directly by the Holy Spirit asevidenced by speaking in tongues or the receiv-ing of gifts. Spirit baptism enables each believerto act as a witness, minister, and missionary, andthus is one major factor in the widespread ap-peal of Pentecostalism. Finally, there are mis-sionaries from religions considered to benon-Christian (at least by mainstream Chris-tian missionaries), such as the Church of theLatter-Day Saints (Mormons), Jehovah's Wit-nesses, the Unification Church, and New Agechurches, who also seek adherents (often on alarge scale) throughout the world.

In terms of current goals, Christian mission-aries divide the world into three major regions:(1) "Those Who Call Themselves Christians"(the New World, western Europe, southwest-ern Africa, and Australia and most of Oceania);(2) "Have Heard, Limited Response" (the formerUSSR, China, east Asia, central and east Af-rica, and parts of south Asia); and (3) "Least-Evangelized World" (North Africa, MiddleEast, central Asia, south Asia, and China). Thus,those parts of the world with the fewest Chris-tians and a history of resistance to missionarywork are those where other religions such as Is-lam, Hinduism, or Buddhism are sufficientlyestablished to combat missionary activity, orwhere the national governments, such as those

in China and the former Soviet Union, bannedor restricted missionary activity. For this reason,the largest concentrations of missionaries todayare found in nations considered to be in theChristian world—Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador,France, Germany, Kenya, Mexico, and the Phil-ippines. At the same time, some nations in theunconverted world also have sizable missionaryactivity, including Japan, Indonesia, and PapuaNew Guinea.

The total number of missionaries in theworld is unknown, and because of the prolifera-tion of missionaries operating on their own orwith the support of a single congregation or edu-cational institution, they cannot be counted ac-curately. A recent count of what may be calledmainstream Protestant missionaries found thatthere were 41,142 institutionally supported mis-sionaries from the United States in 1992, downfrom 50,500 in 1988. In addition, there were5,210 Catholic missioners from the UnitedStates, including priests, brothers, sisters, andlay missioners. When we add to these figuresthe sizable numbers of Mormon, Jehovah's Wit-ness, Unification Church, and other missionar-ies overseas; missioners operating out of othernations such as Great Britain; and missionariesworking in the United States, it becomes obvi-ous why mission activity is a major form of eth-nic relation around the world. The majority ofmissionaries are engaged in evangelism, but siz-able numbers are also involved in health care,education, development projects, child care, andother activities.

One major issue facing missionaries todayis their relationship to indigenous peoples, someof whom had been the objects of missionary ac-tivities during colonial times. Some missionar-ies take the position that economic developmentwill inevitably impact these peoples, and willtherefore change the lives of indigenous peoplesaround the world. They argue that allowing mis-sionaries to arrive first and prepare the indig-enous peoples for Western contact and the

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changes it will bring is more humanitarian thanallowing the first Western contact to be withdevelopers, land speculators, miners, farmers,ranchers, and other business concerns, whoseinterests are in either taking the land or exploit-ing the labor of indigenous peoples. These mis-sionaries see themselves as cultural brokers whoassist in planned change. This view contrastswith that of others, who either question whetherlarge-scale change must always be the fate forindigenous peoples or see missionaries as par-ticipants in the development effort.

Other missionaries—seen as radical bymany—who work with previously colonizedpeoples see their role as righting the wrongs ofthe past, and protecting and advocating for in-digenous rights today. For example, in Brazil anew mass was celebrated in 1979 entitled "TheMass of the Land without Evil." The mass con-demns colonialism, depicts the traditional SouthAmerican Indian culture as damaged theologi-cally by missionary work, and presents indig-enous culture as a route to salvation and a betterworld. In some nations, not only missionariesbut also community religious leaders such aspriests and ministers are now among the lead-ing advocates of indigenous rights. They oftenfind themselves in conflict with the nationalgovernment, who had supported missionary andreligious activity in the past.

See also COLONIALISM; REVITALIZATIONMOVEMENTS.

Barrett, David B. (1994) "Annual StatisticalTable on Global Mission: 1994." Interna-tional Bulletin of Missionary Research 18:24-25.

Bowden, Henry W. (1981) American Indians andChristian Missions: Studies in Cultural Conflict.

Burridge, Kenelm. (1991) In the Way: A Study ofChristian Missionary Endeavours.

Neill, Stephen. (1986) A History of ChristianMissions. Revised for the second edition byOwen Chadwick.

Phillips, James M., and Robert T. Coote, eds.(1993) Toward the 21st Century in ChristianMissions.

Rathburn, Robert R. (1976) Processes ofRussian-Tlingit Acculturation in Southeastern Alaska.

Richardson, Don. (1988) "Do MissionariesDestroy Cultures?" In Tribal Peoples and De-velopment Issues: A Global Overview, editedby John H. Bodley, 116-121.

Salamone, Frank A. (1974) Gods and Goods inAfrica.

Shapiro, Judith. (1987) "FromTupa to the Landwithout Evil: The Christianization of Tupi-Guarani Cosmology." American Ethnologist14: 126-139.

Siewert, John A., and John A. Kenyon, eds.(1993) Mission Handbook: USA/CanadaChristian Ministries Overseas.

MIXED-ANCESTRYPEOPLES

Mixed-ancestry or mul-tiracial (racially mixed)peoples are socially rec-ognized groups whose

members trace their ancestry to men and womenof what are considered to be different racialgroups. Racial groups in this context meanspeople who are defined and categorized by thesociety as being members of different ethnicgroups because of differences in skin color andother physical characteristics. In most situations,the mixed-racial group is an artifact of Euro-pean colonialism and began through relation-ships between male European colonizers andwomen who were either indigenous to the landbeing colonized or were slaves imported by thecolonizers from Africa. Thus, in Louisiana,

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Black Creoles are mainly descendants of slavesor freed slaves and French colonists. In Labra-dor, people called Settlers are descendants ofnative Inuit women and English settlers. InSouth Africa, Cape Coloureds are descendantsof native peoples such as the Khoi and Englishand Dutch settlers.

One major exception to this general patternis the 200 or so groups found since the early eigh-teenth century in some areas of the eastern andsouthern United States, lumped under such la-bels as American Isolates, Tri-Racial Isolates,Middle Peoples, and Quasi-Indians. Thesegroups often formed through the offspring ofmale African slaves and white women andAmerican Indians and African or freed slaves.Since they were considered nonwhite by whites,non-Indian by American Indians, and them-selves chose to shun African identity, they weresocially and residentially isolated and tended toform small, rural communities. Their isolationwas also encouraged in some states by laws thatforbade multiracial children to attend publicschools, and stereotyping and discrimination thatdenied them legal and political rights and ac-cess to employment. Only in the last few de-cades have these groups been drawn intomainstream society and begun to disappear.However, some continue to exist as distinct com-munities, such as the Ramapo Mountain People(Jackson Whites) in New Jersey, who are ofDutch and African ancestry and who claimAmerican Indian ancestry, and the Lumbee In-dians in North Carolina and South Carolina(who deny African ancestry).

The defining characteristic of all multira-cial people is that they are physically differentfrom other groups in the population, as is thecase with these isolated groups. The most obvi-ous physical difference is skin color; these peopleare often lighter skinned than people of Africanancestry and darker skinned than people of Eu-ropean ancestry. Additional physical featuressuch as hair color and texture, size of the nose,

and body shape and size are also important mark-ers of multiracial status. Because of their physi-cal differences and lack of "racial purity," theywere often excluded by all ancestry groups, dis-criminated against, and in some places have livedin relative isolation within their own communi-ties, where they developed as distinct subcultureswithin the context of the dominant society. Thus,over time, some multiracial groups have cometo be defined as distinct by themselves, not juston the basis of physical differences but also oncultural differences.

In general, relations between multiracialgroups and other groups and society are deter-mined by a number of considerations includingthe number of multiracial individuals, societalattitudes about "racial purity," and the extent andnature of political and economic dominance bythe European colonizers. Cross-culturally, therehas been much variation in the nature of rela-tions between multiracial and other groups.Many of the groups classified as American Iso-lates represent one extreme in ethnic relations,in that for many generations they lived apartfrom mainstream American society with theirparticipation limited mainly to employment inlow-level service or manufacturing jobs. How-ever, the American Isolate pattern was only oneof a number in North America where contactamong various European colonizers, AmericanIndians, and African slaves produced a varietyof multiracial groups.

One of these groups is the Settlers, whoemerged through marriages between whites andLabrador Inuits in Canada in about 1763. Set-tlers were not considered to be Inuit by the pro-vincial and national governments because of theirpartial white ancestry, and therefore suffered lessdiscrimination than did the Inuit. In centralCanada, and later in western Canada, a categoryof peoples known collectively as metis (from theFrench meaning mixed) developed from mar-riages between European (French-Canadian,Scots, English) traders and American Indian

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women. The marriages were advantageous to thetraders as it gave them access to the AmericanIndian groups who provided furs and other goodsfor trade. Metis later served the governmentas guides, interpreters, and American Indianagents. Under Canadian rule, Metis groups lostinfluence and political rights and were largelyreduced to living in poverty on government land.In the twentieth century, the Metis have becomeincreasingly politically active and have succeededin establishing Metis colonies and associationsto ensure their survival as a distinct culturalgroup.

The situation of the Black Creoles of Loui-siana is considerably more complicated, becauseBlack Creole identity is based on a combinationof ancestry, language, and culture; an individualsethnic identity might shift, based on the socialsituation and identity of the individuals involvedin the social interaction. Black Creoles in Loui-siana can be traced to relationships betweenFrench men and African slave or free women inthe eighteenth century, with a strong Caribbeancultural influence added in the early nineteenthcentury by the arrival of African slaves and freepersons from Haiti, and also by intermarriagewith Spanish settlers. Today, Black Creole iden-tity is based mainly on African and French orSpanish ancestry, with cultural uniqueness moreimportant than physical features such as skincolor.

In many nations of Latin America, multi-racial groups do not take the form of relativelysmall, isolated groups as in North America, butinstead form a significant percentage of thepopulation. Throughout Middle and SouthAmerica are millions of people labeled mestizo.Nine of the 17 nations of Latin America havepopulations that are more than 50 percent mes-tizo: Chile, 70 percent; Colombia, 50 percent;El Salvador, 89 percent; Honduras, 92 percent;Mexico, 75 percent; Nicaragua, 76 percent;Panama, 67 percent; Paraguay, 76 percent; andVenezuela, 70 percent.

In its broadest sense, mestizo refers to peoplewith mixed American Indian and Spanish an-cestry, although today in many contexts culturalfeatures such as language, dress, food preferences,occupation, and house style, rather than ances-try, define a person or community as mestizo.Traditionally, mestizos occupied a middle placein the social stratification system—above theindigenous Indians and below the Europeans.Today, in nations with large mestizo populations,they are asserting considerable economic andpolitical influence.

The social nature of mestizo identity is in-dicated by the definitional system the YucatecMaya use in Mexico. The Maya refer to them-selves as indios, and to whites as dzul (white man)and xunan (white woman). However, they alsorecognize that most people are of mixed Indianand white ancestry. Thus, those identified asindios are people who have a Mayan surnameand live a Mayan lifestyle. Mayans who use aSpanish surname but live a Mayan lifestyle arecalled kaz dzul (mestizo), indicating that theyare not truly Mayan. There is a third category ofindividuals who have Spanish surnames, live awhite lifestyle, and have light skin who are calledgenuine dzuls, with the label dzul implying thehigher status that accrues to those with a Span-ish name, white lifestyle, and lighter skin color.

In northeastern Brazil there is a sizablemixed-ancestry population composed of peoplewho trace their ancestry to African slaves andthe Portuguese. Since colonial times, a varietyof factors has encouraged African-European re-lationships and the resulting large population ofpeople of mixed ancestry. These factors include:few white women in the early years of coloniza-tion, female slaves working as household help,conjugal unions outside marriage between whitemen and mixed-ancestry women, the desire inthe past of African women to produce "lighter"children by marrying and reproducing with whitemen, and fewer legal and social restrictions onintermarriage. In Bahia Brazil these factors pro-

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duced a population composed of three officiallyrecognized groups—pretos (blacks), pardos(browns), and brancos (whites)—and four inter-mediate groups: cobra (lighter skin color and hairless kinky than^re/oyj, Cabo Verde (very dark withwhite features and straight black hair), sarard(light skin color and red hair), and the moreno(tan skin color, white features, brown eyes, anddark hair). This complexity has yielded an equallycomplex social system, with "whiteness" pre-ferred by some, the morena (female) consideredideal by others, and a link between social statusand skin color, with higher status coupled withlighter color.

In South Africa the status of multiracialpeoples, called Cape Coloured*, is less ambigu-ous. Cape Coloureds are South Africans ofmixed ancestry usually including combinationsof Europeans, indigenous peoples such as theKhoi, and Asian Indians. Within the apartheidsystem, Cape Coloureds were distinguished fromthe indigenous peoples such as the Khoi, Zulu,and IXhosa, and the Europeans, who are mainlyof English and Dutch descent. In addition tothe Cape Coloureds, the system also placedMalays, Griqua, Chinese, Indians, and otherColoureds in the middle ground between Afri-cans and Europeans. Under the apartheidsystem, Cape Coloureds were residentially seg-regated, had fewer legal and political rights thanwhites, and were mainly semiskilled and un-skilled laborers. In the 1970s, the CapeColoureds began to affiliate with the Africannational movements and, with the end of apart-heid in 1994, have become a potent political forcenumbering about 3 million. Their support issought by both the white National party and theAfrican National Congress.

In India there are far fewer people of mixedEuropean and indigenous ancestry, with the twomost notable being the Anglo-Indians and theGoanese (Portuguese and Indian). Culturally,both groups have maintained a European iden-tity and the English language. The Anglo-

This child of a black American father and Vietnamese

mother was raised in a Vietnamese orphanage.

Indians have occupied a middleman minorityposition by taking administrative and service jobsrequiring fluency in English.

See also APARTHEID; INDIGENOUS RIGHTS; RACEAND RACISM; SlTUATIONAL ETHNICITY.

Berry, Brewton. (1963) Almost White.

Blu, Karen I. (1980) The Lumbee Problem: TheMaking of an Indian People.

Dominguez, Virginia R. (1986) White by Defini-tion: Social Classification in Creole Louisiana.

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Foster, John E., and Gerhard J. Ens. (1991)"Metis of Western Canada." In Encyclopediaof World Cultures. Volume 1, North America,edited by Timothy J. O'Leary and DavidLevinson, 226-229.

Greissman, B. Eugene, subed. (1972) "TheAmerican Isolates." American Anthropologist74: 693-734.

Pierson, Donald. (1942) Negroes in Brazil.

Redfield, Robert, and Alfonso Villa Rojas.(1934) Chan Kom: A Maya Village.

Saladin, d'Anglure, Bernard. (1984) "Inuit ofQuebec." In Handbook of North American In-dians. Volume 5, Arctic, edited by DavidDamas, 508-521.

Schermerhorn, Richard A. (1978) Ethnic Plu-rality in India.

Van der Ross, R. E. (1979) Myths and Attitudes:An Inside Look at the Coloured People.

Williamson, Joel. (1984) New People: Miscege-nation andMulattoes in the United States.

MOLDOVAThe conflict involvingRussians, Ukrainians,and Moldovans in the

Republic of Moldova is an ethnic separatistmovement in which the Russian and Ukrainianminorities in the Trans-Dniestr region seek toestablish an independent Trans-Dniestr Repub-lic. Called Moldavia during the Soviet era,Moldova is the smallest of the 15 constituentrepublics of the former USSR. After a long his-tory of shifting borders and domination by out-siders such as Turks and Russians, what are nowessentially Romania and Moldova were unifiedin 1918, although the Soviet Union kept a smallstrip that became the Moldavian AutonomousRepublic. In 1940 the Soviet Union, with Ger-man support, obtained more territory from Ro-

mania and established the Moldavia Soviet So-cialist Republic. In 1947 Moldavia was again di-vided; a segment was added to the Ukraine andanother small strip went to what remained ofthe Moldavia SSR. With the demise of theUSSR, beginning in 1989, Moldova became anindependent republic, and then one of the 18members of the Commonwealth of IndependentStates (CIS) of the former Soviet Union.Moldova has a population of about 4.3 million;65 percent are Romanian, 35 percent Ukrainian,13 percent Russian, and the remainder comprisessmaller minorities of Gagauz Turks, Jews (Rus-sian and Ukrainian), Armenians, Bulgarians, andGreeks, among others. Moldovan is a national,not ethnic, designation; persons identified as eth-nically Moldovan are actually Romanian inculture. The percentages of Russians and Ukrai-nians may now be less than given above; num-bers of both fled to Russia and the Ukraine toescape the fighting in Moldova in 1992.

One of the first and most significant acts ofthe Moldovan government to distance itself fromRussia and the Soviet Union was the reestab-lishment of the Romanian language written inthe Latin alphabet as the official language of therepublic on 30 August 1989, a date now cel-ebrated as a national holiday. Under Soviet rule,Russian, written in the Cyrillic alphabet, was theofficial language; many Russians and Ukraini-ans in Moldova have never learned to speak orwrite Romanian. Other steps were also taken toestablish closer cultural and physical links toRomania, including switching to the Romaniantime zone, regular air flights to and from Ro-mania, the adoption of an upside-down versionof the Romanian flag as the Moldovan flag, andthe importation of books and textbooks fromRomania. There were also discussions of unifi-cation with Romania, although political and eco-nomic difficulties in Romania left the majorityof Moldovans opposed to immediate unification.The Moldovan government was attentive tosome minority-group concerns, and moved to

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protect various rights, including the use of theRussian language for education in Russianschools and granting citizenship to Russian resi-dents. From the viewpoint of the RomanianMoldovans, they were seeking to establish amultiethnic republic with rights and culturalfreedoms guaranteed for all. Efforts towardRomanization were seen as reflecting the his-torical reality of ties to Romania and the Roma-nian culture of the Moldovan majoritypopulation.

Despite the Moldovans' intentions, thesemoves toward a Romanization of Moldova con-vinced members of other ethnic groups that theywere in danger of becoming a discriminated-against minority. (The one exception was thesmall Jewish community, which began to expe-rience far greater cultural and religious freedomsthan it had under Communist rule.) A separat-ist movement by the Gagauz Turks in 1989 wasresolved peacefully, but in the Trans-Dniestr re-gion, where Ukrainians and Russians comprised26 percent and 23 percent of the population,respectively, a full-scale separatist movementdeveloped. The conflict also has irredentist over-tones because the Trans-Dniestr region was his-torically part of the Ukraine, not Moldova, andtherefore the indigenous population was Slavicand not Romanian. The region is of consider-able economic importance. Although compris-ing only about 10 percent of the land mass ofMoldova, 20 percent of Moldova's industrialoutput flows from the Trans-Dniestr region, andmuch of the energy for the republic is producedthere as well.

In 1989 and early 1990, Moldovan Russiansprotested the change in language and other poli-cies, and in September 1990 created the Trans-Dniestr Republic as an autonomous republic. In1992, following continued unrest, mass protests,strikes, and full-scale violence broke out in theTrans-Dniestr region involving Russian separat-ist forces supported by Russian and UkrainianCossack mercenaries, some elements of the Rus-

sian Fourteenth Army stationed in the region,and the Moldovan police. Several hundredpeople were killed and thousands wounded;thousands of others fled to Russia and theUkraine. The Russian Trans-Dniestr Republicis supported by Russia, which argues that itshould be granted status as an independent re-public (a move that some see as a preliminarystep before annexation by Russia). Moldova iswilling to give the republic considerable au-tonomy, but not the right to maintain its ownpolice force and military, as requested by Rus-sia. At this time, the Trans-Dniestr region func-tions as a semi-independent republic with aSoviet-style, Russian-dominated governmentthat stresses centralized political and economiccontrol and Russification, including restrictionson the use of the Romanian language.

Dimi, Nicholas. (1991) From Moldavia toMoldova: The Soviet-Romanian TerritorialDispute.

Dunlop, John B. (1993) "Will a Large-ScaleMigration of Russians to the Russian Re-public Take Place over the Next Decade?"International Migration Review 27:605-629.

Gouboglu, Mikhail N. (1994) "Gaugauz." InEncyclopedia of World Cultures. Volume 6, Rus-sia/Eurasia and China, edited by PaulFriedrich and Norma Diamond, 124-126.

MYANMAR(BURMA)

The Union of Myanmar,formerly known asBurma, has an area of261,220 square miles

and is located between south and southeast Asiaon the Bay of Bengal. It is bordered byBangladesh and India on the west, and China,Laos, and Thailand on the north and east. In

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1993 the population of Myanmar was estimatedto be 43.5 million, composed of the majorityBurmans and several tribal groups including theKaren, Kachin, Shan, and Mon. Much of theMuslim population of several hundred thousandnow lives as refugees, mainly in Bangladesh. Ac-curate demographic information on these groupsis unavailable or badly out of date. Myanmaris currently ruled by a military governmentand is organized into seven states and seven di-visions. The official language is Burmese, al-though the various minority groups speak theirown languages.

Approximately 85 percent of the populationis Buddhist. Under the government s BurmeseWay of Socialism the economy has suffered enor-mously, because the price-control policy encour-ages citizens to sell their rice and other productsin black markets along the border for higherprices than the government will pay, and to tradefor foreign goods also available through the blackmarket. The large number of Burmese ethnic-minority-group members living in neighboringcountries as refugees contributes to the vitalityof the black market.

The distinction between the designationsBurman and Burmese is of significance. Burmanrefers to the specific ethnic group; Burmese re-fers to all the citizens of Myanmar, and to theirlanguage and culture. Burmese speakers makeup about 70 percent of the population. Morethan 95 percent of Burmans are Buddhists, andhave been since the eleventh century. The an-cestors of modern Burmans probably migratedto present-day Myanmar from China about3,000 years ago. From 1057 to the beginning ofBritish rule in 1826, Burma was first a kingdomthat, following incursions from the north, be-came a series of smaller principalities. After thearrival of the British, three Anglo-Burman warsfrom 1824-1884 eventually led to the subjuga-tion of Burma by the British, who ruled the areaas a province of India until nationalist fervor fi-nally led to independence in 1948. Independence

was gained with the assistance of the Japanese,who occupied Burma during World War II andgranted it independence from Britain. In fact,Burma saw Japanese, British, Chinese, andAmerican troops during World War II. Someof the tension between the Burmans and otherethnic groups that has fueled internal strife forthe past 45 years stemmed from the World WarII experience. Ethnic Burmans tended to viewthe war as a national independence uprising, butmany of the country's ethnic minorities foughtwith the British, and thus on the side oppositethe Burmans. Ethnic Burmans fought with theJapanese and formed the Burman IndependenceArmy (BIA). Leaders of this group trained inJapan and formed what became known as theThirty Comrades, who eventually led the na-tional liberation movement to independence in1948. The ethnic minorities, on the other hand,fought on the Allied side. Many remained loyalto the British, with whom they shared religiousand political interests.

The Karen (also called Kareang, Kariang,Kayin, Pwo, Sgaw, and Yang) mostly inhabiteastern Myanmar, though there are Karen inwestern Thailand as well, and are the largest eth-nic minority in Myanmar. Accurate census fig-ures are not available, but it is believed theynumber nearly 3 million, with an additional185,000 in Thailand, of whom 10,000-20,000live in refugee camps. The Karen group of lan-guages is believed to be a subfamily of theTibeto-Burman language family. Karen earlyhistory is poorly recorded, but certainly by theeighteenth century, Karen peoples had emigratedfrom central Asia to Southeast Asia, and wereliving in what is now Myanmar. They emergedas a significant group later in the eighteenth cen-tury when their increasing sense of oppressionled to a series of unsuccessful attempts to gainautonomy. Many Karen converted to Christian-ity (or at least incorporated aspects of it into theirown animistic religion) when British and Ameri-can missionaries worked actively in the region

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in the eighteenth century. Prior to World WarII, the Karen and the British had established anamicable relationship. The Karen desire for in-dependence is partly a result of education pro-vided by the British and the resulting majoradministrative role played by Karen in the Brit-ish colonial government. Karen-Burman ten-sions intensified during World War II as theyfought on opposite sides. The Karen NationalUnion agitated for autonomy when national in-dependence was on the horizon, and has foughtfor independence from Burmese rule since 1949.

The Kachin (also called Dashan, Jinghpaw,Khang, Singhpo, and Theinbaw) are primarilylocated in the Kachin state of Myanmar, as wellas in China and India. They number about 1million, although no accurate information isavailable. Their language is part of the Tibeto-Burman family, and almost all Kachin commu-nities are Christian. Recorded history of theKachin begins as early as the thirteenth century,but becomes much fuller toward the end of theeighteenth century. This more recent history issimilar to that of the Shan (who will be discussedbelow), with whom the Kachin have close ties.During the Anglo-Burman wars, the Kachinattempted to capitalize on the collapse of royalBurma to gain autonomy, but were unsuccess-ful. Since Burmese independence in 1948, theKachin state has been a constituent of the union,and the Kachin themselves have fought theMyanmar government for greater autonomy orindependence.

The Shan (also called Burmese Shan, Chi-nese Shan, Dai, Hkamti Shan, Ngiaw, Ngio, Pai-Iy Tai Khe, Tai Khun, Tal Long, Tai Lu, Tai Mao,TaiNu, and Thai Yai) refer to themselves as Tai.They mainly inhabit the mountain valleys ineastern Myanmar. Shan may account for as muchas 7 percent of Myanmar's population, althoughtheir actual number—which almost certainlyexceeds 1 million—is not known. They speakThai and identify themselves as Buddhists. Re-corded history begins around A.D. 1000, when

they migrated to northern Burma from south-ern China. Their history since the eighteenthcentury has been largely linked to that of theKachin in terms of autonomy movements.Divided into as many as 18 states before andduring the British period, the region was con-solidated into one Shan state following Burmeseindependence in 1948. Since the 1950s, andcontinuing to the present, the Shan have beenpart of the military struggle against the Burmese/Myanmar government to gain either indepen-dence or substantial autonomy.

There are approximately 1.3 million Mon(Mun, Peguan, Taking, andTaleng) in Myanmar,according to recent projections. They are be-lieved to have lived in what is now Myanmar forat least 1,000 years, and enjoyed political inde-pendence from the Burmese until 1757. Mostlive in southwestern Myanmar, and subsist byagriculture and fishing. Their economy has beenhurt by the Burmese government allowing Thaicommercial fishermen to exploit traditional Monfishing grounds. Many Mon are now bilingualin Mon and Burmese, reflecting a general pat-tern of assimilation into Burman society. Manyare also Buddhists, and are engaged in the inde-pendence struggle against the government.

Burmese Muslims, called Rohingya and wholive mainly in Arakan state, date to the ninthcentury. Until Burmese independence, theRohingya lived in relative harmony with theirBuddhist neighbors. After independence, aMuslim Mujahid separatist movement gainedcontrol of part of Arakan state, leading to gov-ernment reprisals and then a general harassmentof Muslims elsewhere in Myanmar. In 1978 gov-ernment violence led about 200,000 Muslims toflee to Bangladesh. Many eventually returned,but some still continue to leave in reaction togovernment repression, including efforts to denythem citizenship and economic rights, the re-naming of Muslim historic sites, and referringto them as Bengali or Kalas instead of the pre-ferred Rohingya. One motivation for government

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harassment is evidently to deter Muslims in ex-ile from returning to Myanmar. The Muslimseparatist movement has now been repressed,with Muslim resistance centered in the RohingyaPatriotic Front, the Rohingya Solidarity Orga-nization, the Arakan Liberation Organization,and the umbrella Arakan Rohingya IslamicFront.

Together these groups have formed amultiethnic insurgency against the military gov-ernment of Myanmar, with the latter officiallycalled the State Law and Order RestorationCouncil (SLORC). In fact, the internal war cur-rently being waged in Myanmar is now a com-bination of these groups, Burmese Communists,and prodemocracy Burman students. Afternearly 30 years of military dictatorship, pro-democracy demonstrations erupted in 1988.Thousands of people were killed when troopsfired into crowds of peaceful prodemocracy dem-onstrators. Mrs. Aung San Suu Kyi, who wonthe Nobel Peace Prize in 1991 and is the leaderof the National League for Democracy, wasplaced under house arrest, where she remains.However, as a result of demonstrations and in-ternational pressures, the military governmentheld the first free multiparty elections in May1990, and the National League for Democracyprevailed overwhelmingly. The military govern-ment refused to hand over power and the inter-national response was to withdraw aid programs.At the same time, the military has continued itsbattles against the multiethnic insurgency, whichincludes at least 7 million, throughout the coun-try. As of 1993 the fighting in Myanmar hasproduced over 330,000 refugees: 245,000 Mus-

lims in Bangladesh, 72,000 ethnic group mem-bers in Thailand and India, and 20,000 Kachinin China. The SLORC policy of destroying en-tire villages has also created tens of thousands ofinternally displaced peoples. SLORC has beenmuch criticized by the international communityfor human rights violations, including confisca-tion of citizens' property, torture, mass rapes,forced relocations, and using ethnic minoritiesfor forced labor. The city of Manerplaw, tradi-tionally home to the Karen, has become a strong-hold in the ongoing war in recent years, andopposition leaders of almost every major grouphave based their operations from there in theirattempts to oust the military government. Thefighting has become more intense in the pastthree years than for the past four decades. Theminority groups are seeking independence ormuch greater autonomy within a federal demo-cratic system.

"Burma in Search of Peace." Cultural SurvivalQuarterly 13(4): 1989.

Falla, Jonathan. (1991) True Love andBartholomew: Rebels on the Burmese Border.

Lintner, Bertil. (1990) Land of Jade: A Journeythrough Insurgent Burma.

Steinberg, David. (1980) Burma's Road towardDevelopment, Growth, and Ideology underMilitary Rule.

Yangwhe, ChaoTzang [Eugene Thaike]. (1987)The Shan of Burma: Memoirs of a Shan Exile,Local History and Memoirs.

172 M

NAGAS IN INDIAThe name Naga appliesto more than 14 relatedtribal groups who inhabit

the hill country along the border between Indiaand Myanmar. The derivation of the name isunknown; it is used today as their official nameby both the peoples themselves and outsiders.Its use by the Naga groups is motivated some-what by political considerations, as it allows theculturally diverse groups to present a united frontagainst the Indian government. Among majorNaga groups are the Kacha, Angami, Rengma,Lhote, Sema, Ao, Konyak, Chang, Sangtam,Yachumi, and Tukomi. These and other Nagagroups speak a total of 27 Naga dialects, withcommunication between groups possible viaNaga Pidgin. In 1981 the population in the In-dian state of Nagaland was estimated at 774,930,of which Nagas comprised approximately 75 per-cent, and does not include the many Nagas wholive elsewhere in India and Myanmar. Religiouspractice differs among the various tribes, butgenerally centers around supernatural forces andspirits that deal with the cycle of life. In someNaga tribes the British attempt at Christian con-

version was successful, but traditional religiousbeliefs remain the primary practice of mosttribes.

Although little is known for certain aboutthe origin of the Naga peoples, it is known thatthey migrated south, most likely from north-western China prior to the tenth century B.C.After the thirteenth century A.D. the variousNaga tribes had extensive contact with theAhoms, who ruled Assam from 1228 until 1826,when the British arrived. While the varioustribes had different relationships with theAhoms, including raiding, trade, and the pay-ment of tribute, even the most restrictive rela-tionships never resulted in total Assamese ruleover the Naga region. The British took controlof Nagaland after the annexation of both Indiaand Assam, and only after significant guerrillaresistance, which lasted for much of the nine-teenth century. Once under British rule, theNagas were treated paternally by the British, whocontrolled the settlement of non-Nagas in theregion and left local administration in British orNaga hands rather than use Indian officials aswas the practice elsewhere. The British also en-couraged Christian missionization. This differ-ential treatment and a relatively high literacy rate,combined with the cultural differences and geo-graphical isolation from India, enhanced theNagas' sense of ethnic solidarity.

In the early twentieth century, nationalisticsentiment manifested itself in the Naga NationalCouncil (NNC), which demanded regional in-dependence in 1947. After India emerged as anindependent secular nation, the Naga region wasgranted statehood within India (the state ofNagaland, in 1963) in an effort to satisfy de-mands for political freedom. Despite this smallconcession, conflict continued until the decla-ration of a cease-fire in 1964 between theNagaland Federal Government and the centralgovernment of India. Eight years later the cease-fire ended and the NNC was banned, followedby a three-year period of armed resistance by the

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NNC. In November 1975 the Shillong Ac-cord between the Indian government and theNagaland federal government was signed,which has effectively curbed violence sincethen. However, there are still sporadic out-breaks of violence, including a June 1993 Nagaguerrilla attack on an Indian army convoy,leaving 32 dead. Naga resistance to Indian rulenow centers around the National SocialistCouncil of Nagaland, which maintains anarmy of 2,000 guerrillas and seeks indepen-dence from India. It is one of a number ofsuch groups operating in the relatively isolatedregion of northeastern India.

Anand, V. K. (1969) Nagaland in Transition.

Horam, M. (1977) Social and Cultural Life ofNagas.

Maxwell, Neville G. A. (1980) India, the Nagas,and the North-East.

The government of thePeople's Republic ofChina recognizes 56ethnic groups calledminzu. About 96 per-

cent of the Chinese population is Han Chinese,who are not considered minzu. The remaining4 percent is classified into 55 national minoritygroups called shaoshuminzu. These range in sizefrom 15 or more groups that number over 1 mil-lion people each, such as the Zhuang (14 mil-lion), Hui (8 million), and Koreans (2 million),to those numbering several hundred thousand,such as the Lisu (500,000), Naxi (250,000), andTu (160,000), to smaller groups such as theBulang (70,000), Jing (12,000), and Loba(2,500). Several hundred groups have asked theChinese government for recognition as a nationalminority, but only 55 have received such recog-nition to date. The criteria used by the govern-ment to recognize groups are varied and often

174

Noted Muslim imam and mawla in a mosque in Xinjiang, China, 1985.

H

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applied arbitrarily. Criteria include non-Hanancestry, religion (the Hui, for example areMuslim), language, common territory, economy,and common culture. In fact, intermmarriage,ethnic contact, contact with the majority Hanpopulation, and efforts in the past to eradicateethnic variation have made these criteria less thancompletely appropriate as markers of unique eth-nic identity. In many regions or political subdi-visions, including those named after a nationalminority such as Ningxia Hui, ethnic variationis observable only in the rural villages, and eventhen there is considerable contact among dif-ferent groups. Today, most groups are identifiedby names they have chosen or approved of, andrecognition as a distinct group affords the groupsequal rights with other groups within the Chi-nese political structure that controls theeconomy, population movements, family policy,and naming practices. At the same time, mi-norities are now permitted by the governmentto practice their traditional religions, use theirnative languages, and engage in cultural activi-ties that do not counter government policies.

Chiao, Chien, and Nicolas Tapp. (1989)Ethnicity and Ethnic Groups in China.

Friedrich, Paul, and Norma Diamond, eds.(1993) Encyclopedia of World Cultures. Volume6, Russia/Eurasia and China.

Ma Yin, ed. (1989) Chinas Minority Nationalities.

reside in another nation. Such groups in Europetoday include Belarussians and Germans(Silesians) in Poland; Hungarians in the formerCzechoslovakia; Romanians and Slovaks inHungary; Hungarians in Romania; Albaniansin Serbia (part of the former Yugoslavia);Slovenes, Albanians, and Austrians in Italy;Slovenes and Croats in Austria; and Turks inBulgaria. Most of these national minorities arethe result of shifting political boundaries in thepast, which left a segment of one national popu-lation across the border in a neighboring nation.

The term is actually used with considerableimprecision. First, sometimes both Jews andMuslims are considered national minoritities,although Jews were never a nation in Europeand Muslim refers to followers of a religion andis not a political category. Second, the notion ofnational minority also excludes many regional orlinguistic groups in western Europe, such as theBretons in France or Catalans in Spain, and largenon-European national populations, such asTurks in Germany and Algerians and Moroc-cans in France. The breakup of the SovietUnion, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia; thereunification of Germany; efforts to establisha European Community; the fall of Commu-nist rule in eastern Europe; massive popula-tion shifts; and an influx of guest workers frominside and outside Europe since World WarII have made national minorities less of a con-cern in ethnic relations than in the past, withthe exception of Albanians in Serbia and Hun-garians in Romania.

See also ALBANIANS AND SERBS; HUNGARIANS INROMANIA (TRANSYLVANIA); MIGRANT WORKERS.

In the European con-text, national minorityrefers to a large popula-tion of people from onepolitical nation who

Horak, Stephan M. (1985) Eastern EuropeanNational Minorities 1919-19 80: A Handbook.

Krejci, Jaroslav, and Vitezslav Velimsky. (1981)Ethnic and Political Nations in Europe.

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NEPALESE IN BHUTAN

Bhutan is one of threeHimalayan kingdoms,the others being Nepaland Sikkim. It covers an

area of 47,182 square kilometers, is bordered onthe north by Tibet, on the south and east byIndia, and on the west by Nepal. A monarchy,the Bhutan king has near absolute authority. Es-timates of the Bhutan population vary from600,000 to 1.5 million. Bhutan is a rural na-tion—there are no cities and the economy isbased primarily on agriculture. Bhutanese aremainly Buddhists, with the Mahayana formdominant. Bhutanese is a national rather thanan ethnic designation, and the dominant ethnicgroup are the Drupka. Bhutanese make up about75 percent of the population, and speakTibetanor Sangla, with Nepalese comprising the other25 percent. The Nepalese population is com-posed of Rai, Gurung, and Limbu immigrants,and smaller numbers of high-caste NepaleseBrahmans and Chhetris, who moved to Bhutanin the 1960s and 1970s to work on infrastruc-ture development projects such as road and dambuilding. Nepalese speak Nepali and are Hindu;they live in southern Bhutan, as they are pro-hibited from living in the northern half of thecountry.

In 1991 and 1992 about 95,000 Nepalesefled Bhutan and sought protection in Nepal(75,000) and India (20,000). The Nepaleseclaim to have been driven out by the Drupka-dominated military following the orders of KingJigme Singye Wangchuck. They see themselvesas the victims of a forced assimilation and eth-nic cleansing effort designed to destroy Nepaleseculture in Bhutan and drive the Nepalese out,thereby reducing any threat to Drupka domi-nance. In the late 1980s, the government de-creed that the Nepalese wear Bhutanese-styleclothing, banned the use of Nepali in schools,and placed restrictions on Nepalese citizenshipand property rights. In 1990 the Nepalese pro-tested; the Bhutanese responded by burning

Nepalese homes, closing schools, and arrestingsuspected protest leaders. Nepalese refugees alsoclaim that the government engaged in a cam-paign of terrorism, including forced labor, rapes,beatings, forced relocation, and deportations.Evidently the terrorism campaign directly af-fected only a few individuals, but did achieve itspurpose of forcing others to leave.

The Bhutanese government views the situ-ation differently. To them the Nepalese aremainly illegal immigrants, and they cite censusdata that identified 113,000 illegal immigrants.In addition, they blame the protests and result-ing government actions on Nepalese rebels, whoare perceived as a threat to Bhutanese security.Underlying the Bhutanese position is their con-cern that the Nepalese will become numericallydominant and that Drupka control would beeroded, turning Bhutan into a Nepalese ratherthan Bhutanese nation. Their concern is moti-vated in part by the experience of Sikkim, wherethe indigenous population was outnumbered byNepalese. It is also fueled by Bhutanese worriesabout the rapid growth rate of the Nepalesepopulation, spurred, they believe, by Nepalesepolygymous marriage and large families.

In Nepal, the refugees live in six camps withpoor sanitation and housing facilities and a highrate of health problems. In India, they are notrecognized as refugees but are allowed to liveand work there, although there is some evidencethat some have been forcibly returned to Bhutan.Either rebels or criminal gangs operating out ofsome refugee camps have been attackingBhutanese officials and towns. Efforts by theNepalese and Bhutanese governments to nego-tiate a settlement to the crisis have not yet provedfruitful.

Chakrawarti, Balaram. (1980) A Cultural His-tory of Bhutan.

Jenkins, William M. (1963) The HimalayanKingdoms: Bhutan, Sikkim, and Nepal.

176 ^

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NIGERIA

U.S. Committe for Refugees. (1993) World Refu-gee Survey.

NIGERIAThe Federal Republic ofNigeria is located on thesouthern coast of West

Africa, east of Benin, south of Niger, and westof Chad and Cameroon. Nigeria encompasses356,667 square miles. As of 1991 the popula-tion was estimated at 88.5 million, making itAfrica's most populous nation. Nigeria is hometo more than 250 ethnolinguistic groups, withthe major ones being the Hausa (21 percent ofthe population), Yoruba (20 percent), Igbo (17percent), and Fulani (9 percent). The remainderincludes groups such as the Kanuri, Nupe, andTiv in the north. Islam is the dominant religionin most of northern Nigeria, but Christianity isdominant across much of the south. Nationwide,Muslims constitute 50 percent of the popula-tion and Christians make up 40 percent. Thecountry is currently ruled by a military govern-ment led by General Ibrahim Babangida, and isdivided into 21 states.

The Portuguese and the British began slavetrading from Africa during the fifteenth and six-teenth centuries, and in 1861 the British annexedLagos in southern Nigeria. At the Conferenceof Berlin in 1885, British supremacy over south-ern Nigeria was formally recognized, and in 1914northern and southern Nigeria were combinedinto the British colony of Nigeria. Nigeriaachieved independence on 1 October 1960 andwas proclaimed the Federal Republic of Nigeriathree years later. Although the British did takesome measures to prepare the Nigerians for self-government, years of exploiting ethnic rivalriesin order to rule through a divide-and-conquerstrategy, and failure to consider how these pat-terns would affect efforts at forming a national

government, hindered the possibility of a smoothtransition to self-rule.

Yoruba is the named used by outsiders for anumber of Yoruba-speaking groups who priorto British rule were never unified as a singlepeople. Yoruba-speaking peoples prefer to referto themselves by their subgroup names. Thereare about 20 million Yoruba in West Africa,mainly in southwestern Nigeria, Benin, andTogo, making them one of the largest groups inAfrica. The Yoruba are mainly farmers, grow-ing beans, maize, cassava, and yams for their ownuse, and kola nuts, cocoa, cotton, and tobaccofor sale. The Yoruba include both Christians andMuslims, with elements of their indigenous be-liefs intertwined with both. Under British rulethe Yoruba were heavily missionized and in-volved in business and government, and con-trolled most of the key government positions intheir region at the time of independence fromBritain.

The Hausa-Fulani are often discussed as asingle ethnic entity because of their interrela-tionship dating to the early 1800s. Prior to thenineteenth century the Hausa consisted of sevenstates, called the Habe states. The states wereconquered by the Muslim Fulani in a jihad thatplaced Fulani rulers in control of each Hausastate. Over time, the ruling Fulani adopted thelifestyle, customs, and language of the Hausa,and the term Hausa now covers those people whowere originally Hausa-speaking, assimilatedFulani, and other ethnic groups that have alsobeen assimilated by the Hausa. There are 25million Hausa in West Africa centered in north-ern Nigeria and adjacent Niger. The Hausa are90 percent Muslim and played a central role inspreading Islam to other West African groups.Primarily rural agriculturalists, they grow millet,maize, and rice for home use, and cotton and pea-nuts for home use and sale. The cattle-herdingFulani provide a source of meat and its by-products. Hausa concepts of government rest on thenotions of kinship, clientship, and titled offices.

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The Igbo are found mainly in southeasternNigeria and number about 9 million. Prior toBritish rule, the Igbo were not a unified people,and although the 200 or more Igbo communi-ties were similar culturally, they conducted theiraffairs as autonomous political units. Tradition-ally, these units were lumped into five generalcategories: Northern, Western, Southern, East-ern, and Northeastern Igbo. The Igbo are mainlyfarmers who grow yams, cocoyams, and cassavafor home use, and bananas, breadfruit, pears, kolanuts, and palm oil for trade. The Igbo are strongadvocates of secular rule; their effort to secede,leading to civil war from 1967 to 1970, is anindicator of the importance they attach to thisissue.

Ethnic, religious, and regional (north-south)rivalries have dominated Nigerian attempts sinceindependence to develop a secular, democraticform of government. Federal elections were heldin 1964, but proved unsuccessful in the face ofassassinations, voter intimidation, and ballot-boxstuffing. In the negotiations among regionalleaders that followed, northern Muslims domi-nated, which served only to intensify traditionalreligious, regional, and ethnic rivalries. In addi-tion, northern Nigeria has been the scene of fre-quent and deadly clashes between Muslims andChristians in the three decades since indepen-dence, fueled by conflicts over land ownershipand political control. Many Christians in Nige-ria regard the predominance of Islam in politicsas a threat to secular government. In fact, for allbut nine years since Nigeria gained independencefrom Britain in 1960, the country has been un-der military rule. Since that time there have beenseven successful coups, and three of the nation'seight leaders have been assassinated. In 1967 theeastern region (populated mainly by Igbos) se-ceded, proclaiming itself the Republic of Biafra,which resulted in a three-year civil war thatclaimed nearly 1 million lives. In 1970 the se-cessionists admitted defeat, and have since

been reintegrated into Nigerian society. In 1979Nigeria returned to civilian government, but thislasted only four years, when a coup put the na-tion back under military rule. In 1985 GeneralIbrahim Babangida seized power. GeneralBabangida has long claimed to be an advocateof return to civilian democratic rule, but hasmanaged to postpone such a return by cancel-ing elections four times since 1990.

Conflicts during the 1990s point to contin-ued instability in Nigeria and the interplay ofethnicity, religion, and regionalism in Nigerianpolitics. In October 1991 Muslims and Chris-tians clashed in the northern city of Kano, re-sulting in several hundred deaths. In January andAugust 1992 the oldTiv-Jakun (both groups areChristian) rivalry turned violent, with some2,000-2,500 killed. The violence was precipi-tated by Jakun claims that the more numerousTiv were intruding on their land. In May 1992Christians in Kaluna Province, which is abouthalf Christian and half Muslim, became con-cerned that the Muslims were attempting toundercut secular rule by restricting the buildingof churches and putting Christian schools un-der government control, yet allowing the build-ing of mosques. Fighting between the ChristianKataf and Muslim Hausa-Fulani left 500-800dead. In June 1993 free elections were held; threedays afterward, a commission appointed by themilitary government ruled the election invaliddue to alleged fraud and tampering, despite re-ports from outside observers that the electionsappeared free and open. The winner wasMoshood Abiola, a Muslim Yoruba from thesouth whose victory reversed a long pattern ofrulers coming from the Muslim Hausa-Fulanigroup in the north. Supporters of Abiola chargedthat the results were voided to prevent Abiolafrom taking power and rioted in protest, as wellas to demand an end to military rule. At thistime, the question of when new elections will beheld remains unresolved.

178 ?$

Hill, Polly. (1972) Rural Hama: A Village and a

Adzmu,M^di.(197S)TAeHausa Factor in West XT V*^' » ,

Nwankwo, Arthur A. (1991) Political DangerSignals: The Politics of Federalism, Census,

Anam-Ndu, Ekeng A. (1990) Consociational Blanket Ban, and National Integration.Democracy mN'igena: Agenda for the 1990s and Smith> R $ (1988) Kingdoms ofthe yoruba.

Uchendu, Victor C. (1965) The Igbo of SoutheastEades, J. S. (1980) The Yoruba Today. Nigeria.

FP 179

NIGERIA

African Histry

d

OSSETES ANDGEORGIANS

The Republic of Geor-gia encompasses 26,911square miles and is bor-dered by the Black Sea

on the west, Turkey and Armenia on the south,and Azerbaijan on the southeast. It is separatedfrom Russia on the northeast by the main rangeof the Caucasus Mountains. In 1993 Georgia'spopulation was estimated at 5.5 million, 70 per-cent of whom are ethnically Georgian. The re-mainder of the population is composed of smallpercentages of other ethnic groups, the largestbeing Armenian (7 percent) and Russian (6 per-cent); Ossetes account for approximately 3 per-cent. The official language is Georgian, and in1989,33 percent of the people considered Geor-gian their native language. Under the former So-viet Union, Russian was a mandatory schoolsubject, and approximately 33 percent of Geor-gians, primarily those in cities, speak it fluently.Most Georgians belong to the Georgian Ortho-dox Church.

Georgia was annexed by Russia in 1801 andentered the USSR in 1922. It became a con-

stituent republic in 1936. On 9 April 1991, fol-lowing the collapse of communism and a 99 per-cent approval vote on a Georgian independencereferendum, Georgia was declared a sovereignstate.

Ossetes inhabit both sides of the centralCaucasian mountain range that divides Russiaand Georgia. The whole region of Ossetia is di-vided between the two federal republics; theNorth Ossetic Republic is part of the RussianFederation and the South Ossetic AutonomousRegion belongs to the Republic of Georgia. Themountain range forms a natural border betweenthe two, and has led to separate and indepen-dent development within each part. NorthOssetia covers approximately 8,000 square kilo-meters; South Ossetia comprises approximately3,800 square kilometers. As of 1970 there wereapproximately 430,000 people in the SovietUnion who considered themselves Ossetes. TheOssete population is not expanding, due to theprevalence of small families in the cities and theassimilation of Ossetes into both Russian andGeorgian society. The Ossetic language is amember of the Iranian family of languages andhas two distinct major dialects. In North Ossetia,Russian is the official language, and Georgian isthe official language in the south. Most Ossetesare Christian, with a minority being Muslim,stemming from the seventeenth-century intro-duction of Islam to the area. Islam has never beena particularly widespread religion in the region,and the two religions have been able to coexistpeacefully.

It is believed that the Ossetes are descen-dants of the Alanic tribes of southern Russia whomigrated to the Ossetia region approximately600 years ago, with Ossetes resident in Georgialonger than in Russia. Annexed by Russia in thelate 1700s, the Ossetes never actually formedtheir own state until the beginning of the Sovietera, when the South and North Ossetia Autono-mous Regions were formed in Georgia and

181

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Destruction to an Ossete residence by Georgian forces inNovember 1991. Civilians are often victims in ethnic

conflict.

Russia (in 1922 and 1924, respectively). In 1936North Ossetia gained greater autonomy as anautonomous republic within Russia.

In the late 1980s, the era of glasnost anddecentralization, Ossetia, particularly South

Ossetia, began to push for greater independence,demanding greater freedom in politics, econom-ics, and culture. Georgian resistance to these callsfor autonomy have led to the ongoing conflict.Although Ossetian-Georgian relations havebeen difficult for centuries, fighting and tensionsescalated in 1990, when South Ossetia declareditself an independent republic within the SovietUnion. Georgia responded by abolishingOssetia's declaration and revoking its prior sta-tus as an autonomous region. The revocation wasoverturned by President Gorbachev, but that didnot prevent violence from breaking out, withseveral dozen deaths on both sides, several thou-sand Georgians fleeing south into Georgia, andseveral thousand Ossetes fleeing north intoNorth Ossetia. Georgia has accused Russia ofarming the separatists as a means of incorporat-ing aU of Ossetia into Russia; Russia officiallydenies these allegations. These charges andcountercharges by the Georgians and Russianshave escalated the crisis and reduced the chancesof a peaceful resolution.

Akiner, Shirin. (1986) Islamic Peoples of the So-viet Union: An Historical and StatisticalHandbook.

Fritz, Sonja. (1994) "Ossetes." In Encyclopediaof World Cultures. Volume 6, Russia/Eurasiaand China, edited by Paul Friedrich andNorma Diamond, 297-302.

182 9

Pacification refers bothto the process and theend result of that process

in which a culture is forced or chooses to "aban-don warfare and cede control over the use ofmilitary force to a group perceived as more pow-erful...." (Rodman 1983,1) Along with conquest,colonization, genocide, and ethnocide, pacifica-tion is a major strategy used by colonial powersand modern nations to subjugate indigenouspeoples and acquire ownership or control of thenatural resources in their traditional homelands.While the four other strategies involve culturalchange or disruption in a general sense, pacifi-cation usually refers to government action de-signed specifically by the national governmentor a colonial power to end warfare waged by in-digenous peoples. For example, pacification ef-forts in the twentieth century were undertakenon a broad scale by the British in Melanesia,Australians in New Guinea, and the Braziliangovernment in the Amazon region. However,pacification efforts are always only one compo-nent of a broader agenda ultimately designed totransfer control of local resources from the na-

tive cultures to the dominant (usually national)society and are also part of a broader pattern ofculture change that affects all aspects of nativelife. Pacification has been justified by colonistsas a humane and morally correct strategy; insome situations, as in early efforts in Brazil andby some missionaries in Melanesia, this was amajor motivation. However, economic and po-litical domination was always the primary goal,if not for those carrying out the pacification, thenfor the government officials and developers in-terested in political and economic control of theregion and its native peoples.

The term pacification is used somewhat in-consistently by social scientists and governmentofficials, and is appropriate only in reference tothose situations where the explicit governmentpolicy is to pacify indigenous cultures rather thanto conquer or destroy them. Thus, the term isused primarily in reference to one aspect ofnative-colonial or government relations inMelanesia and South America, and not in ref-erence to native-colonial or government relationsin North America or Africa. In North Americathe native peoples were conquered and displacedonto reservations, while in Africa they were ini-tially encouraged to raid for slaves, then colo-nized or exploited as a labor force, and eventuallyachieved political independence. Another con-fusion about the term is that warfare practicesthat are the target of pacification efforts may varyfrom one situation to another. Pacification ef-forts assume, of course, that the culture to bepacified is already warlike, an assumption thatmay not necessarily be true. Thus, one form ofwarfare to be controlled through pacification isindigenous peoples reacting in a warlike fashionto the encroaching dominant culture. For thisreason, pacification always precedes intensiveefforts to develop the resources in the territoriesof the pacified peoples. A second type of war-fare to be controlled by pacification is warfarebetween indigenous peoples. When the cultureor cultures to be pacified is known or strongly

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suspected of being warlike (which is often thesituation), the wars that are meant to be pre-vented are those between the culture and othernative peoples—wars that do not directlythreaten the colonists but are an impediment totheir controlling the region and governing thenative peoples.

The major arenas for pacification have beenSouth America—especially Brazil—and NewGuinea and the associated islands of Melanesiain the South Pacific. Comparison of pacifica-tion efforts in these two regions illustrates themajor objectives, causes, techniques, and out-comes of pacification around the world.

Pacification in BrazilAlthough localized efforts by traders, mission-aries, land agents, and government officers hadoccurred previously, full-scale pacification beganin Brazil in the early 1990s under the directionof the Indian Protection Service (IPS) for theexpress purpose of protecting the Indian culturesfrom traders, land developers, and others. TheIPS strategy was to make contact with hostiletribes and convince them to end hostilities di-rected at outsiders, trusting the government toprotect them and their interests. Beginning inthe early 1900s, teams of unarmed IPS agentswould approach an Indian village, leave gifts suchas beads, mirrors, and steel machetes at the en-trance, and then wait weeks or months for theIndians to accept the gifts. After again waitingsome period of time, the agents would enter thevillage with an interpreter to convince the Indi-ans to cease hostilities and trust the governmentagents to protect their interests. The agents werepacifist and patient, operating under the dictum:"Die if it be necessary, but never kill." (Davis1977,4) This approach to pacification is referredto as "classic pacification."

Such classic pacification was successful, andover 60 tribes were pacified, 67 Indian posts wereestablished in the region, and no Indians andonly a few agents were killed. However, the long-

term effects of this pacification effort were dev-astating to the Indians. Between 1900 and 1957,more than 80 tribes were destroyed by disease,and others fled to the interior or were placed onsmall resource-poor reservations (called parks).The traditional territories of the pacified groupsare now coffee plantations, rubber plantations,and the sites of towns, farms, factories, and min-eral extraction operations. In addition, many ofthe surviving groups exist on the margins of Bra-zilian society and have lost their native languages,beliefs, and customs.

Beginning in about 1950, pacification ef-forts became overtly linked to Brazilian devel-opment and economic policy, with protection ofIndians no longer a major consideration. Eco-nomic development of the Amazon Basin is thedriving force, with the emphasis on buildingroads, mining, farming, establishment of townsand industry, and settlement by non-Indians.Indian policy stressed pacification, followed byrelocation on small reservations isolated fromareas of development. However, when existingreservations were in the way of development,they were further reduced in size or divided byroads. As with the more humanely motivatedpacification of the early 1900s, the Indian tribeswere devastated. For example, the highway pro-gram that began in 1970 has resulted in the dis-appearance, relocation, fleeing, or deculturationof all 29 tribes living in the vicinity of the pro-posed roads. The policy today is a combinationof placement on reservations and integration intomainstream society through a combination ofpacification, genocide, and ethnocide.

Pacification in MelanesiaMelanesia is in the South Pacific Ocean, andincludes the large island of New Guinea andsmaller, adjacent islands and archipelagos, suchas the Solomon Islands. Pacification of insularMelanesia and the large island of New Guineatook different courses due to the nature of con-tact with European colonists. In the early 1800s,

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there was little interest in pacifying the localcultures. The islands were mainly a source of la-borers, supplied to European recruiters by coastalpeoples to work for three years on sugar planta-tions in Fiji and Queensland. Pacification be-gan after 1850 when the British sought tocolonize the islands, establish local plantations,and make the colonies self-sufficient. To do so,they attempted to end warfare among indigenouscultures and tried to prevent violent resistanceto British settlement. With the aid of mission-aries, who had previously been seeking pacifica-tion on their own, all native cultures were pacifiedeither peacefully or through the use or show offorce, and all came under British control. Un-like Brazil, pacification was encouraged and sup-ported, but not directly managed, by the colonialgovernment. Instead, it was managed by localcolonial officials, who used small European po-lice forces, sometimes supplemented by nativepolice, missionaries, influential local leaders, andthe imposition of taxes and other means to endindigenous warfare and limit resistance to Eu-ropean control.

On New Guinea, warfare was a ubiquitousfeature of life among many of the distinct andnumerous groups who lived in the highlands,although peaceful contact involving trade andmarriage was also common. As with the islands,early European contact was confined to the coast;pacification of the interior highlands did notbegin until after 1900, and was not achieved inmost places until between 1930 and the 1960s.In the highlands, pacification meant the cessa-tion of fighting among native cultures and theprevention of raids against the colonists, and wasmotivated by Australian interest in developingthe interior. As on the islands, pacification wasmanaged by local officials (although the processwas strongly supported by the Australian gov-ernment) who used military patrols and mili-tary posts in pacified regions to maintain peace.

The pacification process was accelerated andspread further to the interior during World War

Shavante tribesmen in Brazil's Matto Grosso aim

arrows at a low-flying Brazilian plane carrying apacification party.

II, motivated by the perceived need to securethe region and keep the local population undercontrol. In all locales, successful pacification wasfollowed by the establishment of plantations,military posts, towns, roads, airstrips, the intro-duction of a nationally administered legal sys-tem, and an economy based on wage labor.While most groups have remained pacified, be-ginning in about 1970 and continuing since NewGuinea independence in 1975, some groups haveresumed fighting with one another and have re-sisted government efforts to repacify them. It isunclear why fighting has resumed, but impor-tant causes include: (1) a weakening of peaceful

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PANETHNICITY

trade and marriage relations among groups thatmay have controlled warfare in the past, (2) newpolitical alliances among the groups, (3) the sur-vival of traditional warfare patterns and associ-ated beliefs such as political leadership based onthe achievement of military glory, (4) a doubt-ing of the ability of the national government tomanage local conflicts, and (5) the failure of thegovernment to replace warfare with other non-violent conflict-resolution mechanisms.

Unlike pacification in Brazil, pacification inMelanesia did not destroy many of the nativecultures, and also it has not been permanent inall regions. Of course, one of the major differ-ences between the two regions is the politicalindependence achieved by native peoples inMelanesia versus the political domination ordestruction of Indians in Brazil.

The Melanesian experience also points toanother important component of pacification—the need to replace indigenous warfare as a meansof settling conflicts with nonviolent conflict-resolution mechanisms. In New Guinea andelsewhere, new nonviolent mechanisms includethe use of village and regional courts; compet-ing for property, as among the Goodenough Is-landers in Melanesia or the Tlingit in NorthAmerica; and the institutionalization of a legalsystem based on individual property rights.

See also COLONIALISM; ETHNOCIDE; GENOCIDE.

Brown, Paula. (1986) "Simbu Aggression andthe Drive To Wm." Anthropological Quarterly59:165-170.

Davis, Shelton H. (1977) Victims of the Miracle:Development and the Indians of Brazil.

Podolefsky, Aaron. (1984) "Contemporary War-fare in the New Guinea Highlands." Eth-nology 23: 73-87.

Rodman, Margaret, and Matthew Cooper, eds.(1983) The Pacification of Melanesia.

Panethnicity refers tothe establishment oflinks between ethnic

groups or subgroups and the founding of orga-nizations that represent the collective or sharedinterests of these groups, who are seen as ethni-cally or racially homogenous by outsiders. Overthe last two decades in virtually all nations withindigenous populations, ethnic groups have beenforming political and economic panethnic links.The move toward panethnicity represents a newform of ethnic relation, in some nations sup-planting ethnic separatism and assimilation asthe primary form of ethnic relation. Panethnicmovements around the world today are the re-sult of a number of factors: (1) the social move-ments of the 1960s, especially those in theUnited States such as the Black Power andWomen's movements, proved that coalitions rep-resenting large blocs of voters could have a po-litical and economic impact on governmentpolicies and practices; (2) many nations are de-veloping democratic forms of government, end-ing political repression, and holding openelections; (3) a general worldwide redefinitionof the relationship between national govern-ments and indigenous peoples is under way, witha slow but steady movement toward indigenousrights; and (4) the political reality that, by group-ing together, otherwise small groups can formlarge voting blocs in regional and national elec-tions.

Panethnic movements take many forms andhave a variety of objectives. In Brazil, the BlackConsciousness movement involves nearly 600organizations, all working in various ways toteach younger generations the history of blacksin Brazil and to build a sense of black identity.These organizations include black Brazilians ofdifferent social classes, from all regions, and ofdifferent skin colors. They are composed ofchurch-affiliated groups, such as the Pastoral ofthe Negro in the Rio de Janeiro suburb of Duquede Caxias; research organizations, such as Afro-

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PANETHNICITY

PANETHNICITY

Brazilian Research Dance Company; state-sponsored agencies, such as the Center of Ne-gro Culture and Art; special-interest groups,such as the Group of Black Women; and politi-cal organizations, such as the United Negromovement. In addition to these organizations,black panethnicity in Brazil is reinforced by vari-ous unique cultural features such as music (soul,imported from North America, and samba) andthe black syncretic version of the umbanda reli-gion. For example, the following samba songpoints to the black struggle for freedom in Brazil:

Can it be...

The dawn of liberty,

Or was it all just illusion?

Can it be...

The dreamed of Golden Law

Signed so long ago,

Was not the end of slavery?

In the real world today,

Where is freedom?

Where see it? I don't see it.

I dreamed...

The Zumbi of Palmares returned.

The blacks' misery ended;

It was a new redemption.

In Ecuador, the Confederation of IndigenousNationalities of Ecuador (CONAIE) unitesAmerican Indian groups (constituting 40 per-cent of the population) from the highlands,Amazon, and coast who traditionally, and un-der colonial rule, had existed separately. TheConfederation has become a powerful force forsocial change and Indian rights, and works to-ward gaining 16 rights for all Indian groups, in-cluding the right to their traditional territory,water rights, and the right to cultural integrity.In Norway, Saami (Lapps) efforts to achieve apolitical voice were hampered by cultural differ-ences between the more traditional inland groupsand the more assimilated groups near the coast.

Outside interests were able to exploit this lackof cultural unity as well as the varying interestsof the different regional groups to thwart Saamiautonomy and rights. However, the formationof Saami panethnic organizations representingSaami groups across Scandinavia has resulted inan enhanced political voice for the Saami.

In the United States, panethnicity has in-volved both American Indians and immigrantgroups. Major pan-Indian groups include theAmerican Indian movement and the IndianYouth Council. Pan-Indian events include pow-wows, which are now organized in a formal year-round circuit. The powwows provide an arenafor Indians from different groups to meet, andhave become an important source of revenues.By showcasing modern forms of American In-dian culture, powwows help to correct the ste-reotypical view of American Indians held bymuch of the non-Indian population. As withindigenous panethnic organizations elsewhere,those in North America cooperate with othersin the region and around the world, creating amultilayered structure of indigenous panethnicassociations (national, regional, and interna-tional), such as the World Council of IndigenousPeoples. In the United States, immigrant groupshave also been involved in the panethnic move-ment. However, there is much variation fromone ethnic collective to another in the degree ofpanethnic development. Asian-Americans, in-cluding Japanese-, Chinese-, and Korean-Americans, have a long history of efforts todevelop pan-Asian organizations and institu-tions that represent all Asian-Americans. Theseinclude pan-Asian associations in all large cit-ies, the Amerasia Journal^ \htAsian Week news-paper, and local uniethnic groups, who alsoaddress concerns of all Asian groups. In com-parison, Latinos have formed relatively fewpanethnic links that join Puerto Ricans,Mexican-Americans, Cubans, and Hispanics inthe Southwest. Evidently, despite homogeneityin language (Spanish) and religion (Roman

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PEOPLES OF THE NORTH

Catholicism), Latinos form relatively few linksbecause of differences in social class and immi-gration history, different concerns, and the dis-persed nature of the population. This suggeststhat cultural factors such as religion and languageare perhaps less important than societal factorssuch as social class, geographical dispersion ofthe population, and the immigration history(much recent immigration tends to discouragepanethnic links) in creating a climate that per-mits the creation of panethnic linkages.

In the world today, panethnic organizations,especially those representing indigenous peoples,play a central role in shaping government andUnited Nations policies. Some are directly rec-ognized by the U.N., while others play a moreinformal role. The following list is a samplingof political panethnic organizations, and indi-cates the large number of indigenous peoples sorepresented.

American Indian Movement

Anti-Defamation League of the B'nai B rith

Asian American Political Alliance

Confederation of Indigenous Nationalitiesof Ecuador

Consejo Indio de Sud America

Cordillera Peoples Alliance

East African Pastoralists

Federation of Alaskan Natives

Four Directions Council

Grand Council of the Crees

Indian Council of Indigenous Population

Indian Law Resource Center

Indigenous World Association

International Indian Treaty Council

International Organization of IndigenousResources Development

Inuit Circumpolar Conference

Maori Unity Movement

National Aboriginal and Islander Legal Ser-vices Secretariat

National Association for the Advancementof Colored People (NAACP)

National Indian Youth Council

North American Indian Brotherhood

Saami Union

Unified Negro Movement

World Council of Indigenous Peoples

See also INDIGENOUS RIGHTS.

Brosted, Jens, et al., eds. (1985) Native Power:The Quest for Autonomy and Nationhood of In-digenous Peoples.

Espiritu, Yen Le. (1992) Asian American Panethnicity:Bridging Institutions and Identities.

Lopez, David, and Yen Espiritu. (1990)"Panethnicity in the United States: A Theo-retical Framework." Ethnic and Racial Stud-ies 13:198-224.

NACLA. (1992) "The Black Americas, 1492-1992." In Report on the Americas. Volume 25,no. 4.

Nageljoane. (1982) "The Poltical Mobilizationof Native Americans." The SocialScienceJour-nal'19: 37'-45.

Padilla, Felix. (1985) Latino Ethnic Consciousness.

Wilmer, Franke. (1993) The Indigenous Voice inWorld Politics: Since Time Immemorial.

The Peoples of theNorth, Small Peoples ofthe North, and Peoplesof the Soviet North are

all generic labels for the indigenous peoples ofSiberia and the Russian North. Depending on

^̂ •Sraml̂ l̂

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PEOPLES OF THE

NORTH

PIDGINS AND CREOLES

the criteria used to delineate these groups, thereare from 26 to over 30 Peoples of the North whovary in size from over 1 million to only a fewhundred, with 23 groups numbering less than30,000 people each. Linguistically, the groupsspeak different languages or dialects that fallwithin the Uralic, Altaic, and Paleosiberian lan-guage families. The region today is dominatednumerically, politically, and economically byRussians (known as Siberiaki) and other non-indigenous peoples such as Germans andKoreans.

Traditionally, the Peoples of the North, de-pending on their locale, subsisted by reindeerherding, trapping, hunting, and fishing. Therewas extensive contact between neighboringgroups, and sometimes contact with very dis-tant groups, in the form of trade, war, intermar-riage, and ceremonies. Siberia was conquered bythe Russians in the 1500s and colonization be-gan, with many indigenous groups drawn intothe fur trade and forced to pay tribute to thelocal and central authorities, often intermarry-ing with ethnic Russians and other Slavic set-tlers. During the Soviet Union era, many groupswere forced to live in permanent villages, workin low-level industrial jobs, and were preventedfrom using their native languages, required touse Russian instead. The traditional shamanis-tic religion of many Siberian groups was alsolargely eradicated or forced underground as sha-mans were killed. The current status of many ofthese groups is now unknown, although the fallof communism in the former Soviet Union hasled to efforts by many groups to revive the tra-ditional culture and, combined with participa-tion in local and national politics, to regain theirrights.

Levin, M. G., and L. P. Potapov, eds. (1964)The Peoples of Siberia.

McDonald, R. St. J., ed. (1966) The ArcticFrontier.

PIDGINS ANDCREOLES

Friedrich, Paul, and Norma Diamond, eds.(1993) Encylopedia of World Cultures. Volume6, Russia/Eurasia and China.

Pidgin is a form of spo-ken and (less commonly)written communicationbetween members of

different cultures who speak mutually unintelli-gible languages. It is often the primary meansof communication between the members of thetwo cultures (traditionally European colonizersand indigenous peoples), although pidgins havealso been developed by indigenous peoples who,for example, need to interact in order to tradewith one another. Compared to languages,pidgins have a smaller vocabulary, a simplifiedgrammar, and are often used only for specificpurposes. Most pidgins disappear rather quicklywhen there is no longer a reason for their use.Pidgins that survive and become the domesticlanguage of a cultural community are calledCreoles. Creoles are used every day for many pur-poses, and thus are a more complex and devel-oped form of language than pidgins.

Although many pidgins have disappeared,at least 100 pidgins and Creoles are spokenaround the world today, with those listed belowhaving the most speakers:

Bahasa Indonesia

Bazaar Malay

Belize Creole English

Bislama (Vanuatu)

Cape Verde Creole

Caribbean Creole English

Congo Pidgins

Crioulo (Guinea)

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PIDGINS AND CREOLES

French Guyana Creole

Gullah (Sea Islands)

Haitian French Creole

Hawaiian Pidgin/Creole

Krio (Sierra Leone)

Kru English (West Africa)

Lingua Geral (Brazil)

Louisiana Creole

Mauritian French Creole

Meskito Coast Creole (Middle America)

Papiamento (Dutch Antilles)

Reunionnais

Solomon Islands Pidgin

Sranan (Suriname)

Taal Dutch (South Africa)

Tok Pisin (Papua New Guinea)

An example of the key features of pidginsand Creoles is provided by the Gullah Creole lan-guage spoken by the Sea Islanders off the coastof Georgia. The Sea Islanders are African-American descendants of slaves brought to theislands to work the plantations. After the CivilWar, the white plantation owners fled, leavingthe Sea Islanders largely in control until the mid-twentieth century, when land development be-gan putting pressure on Sea Islander culture.Gullah developed in this context of relative iso-lation from the mainland, and is based largelyon English vocabulary and African grammati-cal forms, most likely from West African lan-guages such as Fanti, Ewe, Yoruba, Igbo, Twi,and Kongo. It differs considerably from stan-dard English, black English, and southern re-gional dialects of English.

As with many Creoles, early observers oftendescribed it in ethnocentrically negative terms,and it was viewed as a sign of the inferior natureof Sea Islander culture. In 1922 a journalist wroteof the language: "Slovenly and careless of speech,these Gullahs seized upon the peasant English

used by some of the early settlers and by thewhite servants of the wealthier colonists,wrapped their clumsy tongues around about itas well as they could, and enriched with certainexpressive African words, it issued through theirflat noses and thick lips." (Quoted in Jones-Jackson 1987, 135) Despite this description,Gullah is an established Creole language, al-though its use is declining. A number of inter-island variations in vocabulary, accent, stress, andintonation enable Gullah speakers to identify thehome communities of other speakers.

Gullah has a mainly English vocabulary(most Creoles are based on the vocabulary of co-lonial nations—Portuguese, Spanish, French,Dutch, and English), although with some struc-tural differences and localized meanings. Forexample, "dark the light" in Gullah means "thesun was set" in English, "this side" means "thisisland," and "the sun de red for down" means"sunset" in English. In addition, there aremarked grammatical differences between Gullahand English. First, in Gullah most verbs do notchange form to indicate tense. Second, the word

for has a greater variety of meanings, a commonone being to indicate must or should, as in: "Forsee, she could see em plain," which means inEnglish, "You (must) understand, she could seethem plainly." Third, adjectives are repeated toindicate degree or quantity, as in "small small"for "very small" and "small small small" for "ex-tremely small." Finally, in some forms of Gullah,pronouns do not indicate gender, and one pro-noun is used for both the feminine and mascu-line. Today, as with many other Creoles, Gullahis declining in use as the Sea Islanders are drawninto mainstream society through contact withwhites on the islands and education.

Crystal, David. (1987) The Cambridge Encyclo-pedia of Language.

Hancock, Ian F. (1971) "A Survey of the Pidginsand Creoles of the World." In Pidginization

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and Creolization of Languages, edited by DellHymes, 509-523.

Jones-Jackson, Patricia. (1987) When Roots Die:Endangered Traditions on the Sea Islands.

Todd, L. (1974) Pidgins and Creoles.

Pluralism is a form ofethnic relation within anation in which groups

differ from one another in important ways re-garding values, social organization, customs, andbehavior, but at the same time participate in andsupport societal institutions, and thus are allmembers of the same society. Pluralism comesin three primary forms. In cultural pluralism, eachgroup has its own basic cultural features, such asits own religion, marriage customs, value orien-tation, and lifestyle, that tend to be perpetuatedover time. At the same time, the groups are in-tegrated into a national collective through par-ticipation in shared institutions such as themarketplace, government agencies, or the edu-cation system. A key feature of cultural pluralismis that the groups are not ranked hierarchicallywithin the society, but are relatively equal inpower, or at least no one group is so powerfulthat it can dominate the others. The second formof pluralism is structural pluralism, a situation inwhich contact between members of the groupsis less frequent, less extensive, or more circum-scribed than in culturally pluralistic societies. Forexample, the historical relations between Afri-can-Americans and Mexican-Americans vis-a-vis white Americans were characterized by bothcultural distinctiveness and a lack of or restric-tion on the involvement of the former in the basicinstitutions of American society. A third formof pluralism is political pluralism, in which di-verse groups form and interact in the context ofcompetition for power or other societal resources.

These groups need not be ethnic; their exist-ence is tied largely to narrow self-interest, andthey are often impermanent.

Pluralism is sometimes used in a more lim-ited sense in reference to some aspect of culturethat varies among ethnic or regional groups thatcomprise a nation. For example, India can bedescribed as a linguistically plural society because(1) a number of different languages are officiallyrecognized in the constitution and (2) possibleconflict over the use of Hindi as the nationallanguage has been controlled in a pluralisticmanner. In addition to Hindi and English, whichare the official national languages, regional orstate languages are also officially recognized,widely spoken, and serve as the primary writtenlanguage and language of instruction in manyIndian states formed with linguistic criteriain mind. Among the major state or regionallanguages are Bengali, Gujarati, Kashmiri,Malayalam, Marathi, Oriya, Punjabi, Tamil,Telugu, Urdu, Kannada, Assamese, Sanskrit, andSindhi. Despite the official recognition of theselanguages, since independence India has beenplagued with a language controversy focused onthe states' concern that Hindi would replace thestate languages. This issue has been controlled,if not resolved, in a pluralistic manner. That is,by and large India has adopted a policy of bilin-gualism, with Hindi and English the official lan-guages and also the languages of communicationbetween the national government and the states.Either by design or preference, English is emerg-ing as the major language of national communi-cation, perhaps because, unlike Hindi or the statelanguages, it is not the native language of anyindigenous peoples in India. At the same time,the use of state languages in education and gov-ernment employment is protected by law.

Cultural pluralism is generally seen as char-acteristic of postcolonial multiethnic societies inAfrica, south Asia, and the West Indies. It isalso seen as a major underlying cause of ethnicand violent conflict in postcolonial Africa.

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PLURALISM

African nations are all multiethnic: In a sampleof 27 nations, 8 had less than 10 ethnic groups,6 had from 11-20,9 had from 21-50,3 had from51-100, and 1 (Nigeria) had over 100. Of these27 nations, 22 have experienced internal con-flict since independence, usually ethnic or reli-gious in nature. Additionally, the more ethnicgroups in a nation, the more likely that violentconflict has occurred. While pluralism under-lies ethnic conflict in many African nations,other factors are perhaps even more importantthan pluralism. These factors include preexist-ing ethnic rivalries, ethnic rivalries fermented bythe colonial governments, political instability,unfamiliarity with democracy, scarce economicresources, and regionalism.

In the contemporary world the concept ofpluralism is difficult to apply meaningfully be-cause it assumes a horizontal ordering of groupsand therefore ignores vertical or hierarchicalorderings based on social class distinctions. Per-haps the best example of a contemporary plu-ralistic society is Mauritius. Mauritius is an islandnation covering some 787 square miles in theIndian Ocean. In 1993 its population was anestimated 1.1 million. Mauritius is composedof four major ethnic categories: Hindus (52percent), Muslims (16 percent), Chinese-Mauritians (3 percent), and the general popula-tion (29 percent). The general populationcategory consists of a small number of Franco-Mauritians (2 percent), Christians, Coloureds,and Christian Tamils, and a larger number ofCreoles who are Catholics of mixed African-European, Indian, or Chinese ancestry. WhileHindus are the numerical majority, internal di-visions such as the distinctive groups of Tamils(7 percent) and Telugu, as well as those basedon caste, make them something less than a uni-fied group. Similarly, the Muslims are internallydifferentiated on the basis of religious belief intoSunni, Shi'ite, and Ahmadis. Thus, Mauritiusis both culturally and religiously pluralistic.

Mauritius pluralism is the product of bothcolonial policies that tended to encourage cul-tural autonomy, and conscious policies enactedsince independence to encourage cultural diver-sity. For example, Mauritians explain the peace-ful coexistence of four major religions with theexpression Each prays in his/her own way. Simi-larly, parliamentary representation is ensured byawarding seats to eight losers in general elec-tions. Symbolically, cultural diversity is expressedthrough multicultural events in which each groupperforms songs, dance, or poetry.

At the same time, as in any pluralistic soci-ety, there is the problem of building a sense ofnational identity and controlling conflicts be-tween the ethnic groups. Linguistically, Englishis the official language of Mauritius; as in India,it is a compromise that prevents any native lan-guage from being dominant. Additionally,newspapers are written in French, and manyMauritians speak Kreol, which is becoming thede facto national language. In terms of the in-stitutions of Mauritian life, all citizens are in-volved in the educational, political, legal, andeconomic institutions of society.

Alongside this national unity, members ofeach group feel a strong sense of ethnic identity.People tend to live near kin and interact sociallyeither with kin or members of their ethnic group.Other groups are often described in ethno-centrically negative terms. Mauritians are alsoaware in everyday interaction that Mauritius isa multiethnic society, and the ethnic differencesin belief, perception, and behavior can be asource of conflict. Still, Mauritius has beenpeaceful since 1968. This peace results from amix of factors:

1. Mauritius is small and is isolated from therest of the world

2. There is no one ethnic, political, or economicmajority group

3. All groups are immigrants, and therefore

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PLURALISM

none make homeland claims to territory, thecause of much ethnic conflict elsewhere

4. Involvement and power in the economic andpolitical arenas are shared

5. A shared language—Kreol—allows interac-tion and communication among the groups

6. All minorities have guaranteed constitu-tional rights

7. Virtually all Mauritians are participants inthe institutions of society

8. Performance and qualifications, rather thanethnicity, are prerequisites for career ad-vancement

9. Conflict among members of different groupsis often, though not always, characterizedby an avoidance of controversial topics, re-straint, and a focus on tasks or events ratherthan social interaction

See also ASSIMILATION; CONSOCIATIONALDEMOCRACY.

Brass, Paul R. (1991) Ethnicity and Nationalism.

Eriksen, Thomas H. (1992) "Containing Con-flict and Transcending Ethnicity in Mauri-tius." In Internal Conflict and Governance, editedby Kumar Rupesinghe, 103-129.

Furnivall,}. S. (1948) Colonial Policy and Practice.

Smith, M. G. (1965) The Plural Society of theBritish West Indies.

. (1986) "Pluralism, Race, and Ethnicityin Selected African Countries." In Theoriesof Race and Ethnic Relations, edited by JohnRex and David Mason, 187-225.

Wai, Dunstan M. (1978) "Sources of Commu-nal Conflicts and Secessionist Politics in Af-rica." Ethnic and Racial Studies 1: 286-305.

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RACK ANDRACISM

The universal fascina-tion with physical differ-ences between groups,and the use of those dif-

ferences to differentiate between us and them, isa result of the polytypic nature of Homo sapiens.That is, the human species contains a numberof physical types as a result of common biologi-cal descent and adaptation to the same environ-ment. Despite the routine use of the term race,and the frequent characterization of particulargroups as races and individuals as members ofspecific races, experts do not agree on what theconcept means, nor are there any generallyagreed upon criteria that allow us to decide whatgroups constitute a distinct race. Instead, racemeans different things to different people. Hu-man biologists and biological anthropologistssometimes use race or, in its place, subspecies tomean a subgroup of human beings character-ized by certain phenotypical (observable) and ge-notypical (genetic) traits. However, even thisscientific use of the term is falling into disusebecause it is too imprecise and because humanbiologists are now mainly interested in the study

of genotypical traits such as blood type and thegeographical and adaptive patterns of these traitsrather than in racial classification. The generalpublic uses race in two ways—as a label for Homosapiens, as in the human race, and as a label forvarious types of cultural groups, such as nation-alities (the British race), religious groups (the Jew-ish race), language groups (the Slavic race), ordistinct cultural groupings (the Gypsy race). Noneof these uses conforms to the scientific use ofthe term, and all confuse cultural factors withphysical characteristics. A third use of race is asa label for a type of social group that definesitself and/or is defined by other groups as dif-ferent because of innate and unchangeable physi-cal differences.

The second and third uses of the term racepoint to the problem involved in using the term,and the reason why many biological and socialscientists believe that it should no longer be used.In both of these uses, real or imagined physicaldifferences between groups are linked to real orimagined cultural and behavioral differencesbetween groups, with the physical differencesseen as the cause or, at a minimum, related tothe behavioral differences. Thus, biology ismerged with culture, often in a cause-effect re-lationship, ignoring the fact that much of hu-man culture and behavior is wholly or partlylearned, not inherited. Many early descriptionsof non-Western cultures reflect this thinking. Forexample, in what is now Malaysia, indigenouspeoples were described as follows:

The Kelantan man is taller, better built, andstronger than the true Malay. He is probably alsoof a temperament more easy-going, more openand less excitable than his cousins to the south.(Graham 1908,18)

Similarly, biological mixing through intermar-riage and reproduction was seen as influencingpersonality traits in Africa:

In spite of a very considerable mixture withWadschagga from nearby Kilimandscharo, they[the Wakuafl] have completely kept their

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original character traits. Their imperiousness, ra-pacity, and cunning equal that of the Masai; incourage, on the other hand, they even surpassthem. (Merker 1910, 9)

Again, racial features are linked to behavior:

The people of Gilgat, Astor and some of thecountries beyond are a race with features of theAryan type, and they claim to be of thatstock....They are an independent and bold race,more straightforward than the Kashmiris and lessbloodthirsty than the Pathan. (Gervis 1954,230)

This last example also mentions one of the mostmisunderstood racial stereotypes—the so-calledAryan race. In fact, there is no such thing as anAryan race. Aryan refers to speakers of VedicSanskrit, an Indo-European language, whosettled in what is now India about 3,500 yearsago. Their descendants now inhabit various partsof south Asia, but do not call themselves Ary-ans. In recent times, the label Aryan has beenused by linguists in reference to a subfamily ofIndo-European languages and was never meantas a racial or ethnic label. Its adoption by theNazis as a racial term for northern and centralEuropeans who were considered the purest ofthe Aryan race was a politically motivated mis-use of both the concept of race and the termAryan.

In addition to confusing biology and cul-ture, the concept of race has fallen into disusebecause so-called physical indicators of racialdifferences such as skin color, stature, head sizeand shape, and hair texture vary more within anyso-called race than between races. For mosttraits, there is more variation between males andfemales than between different races. This prob-lem has not, however, slowed attempts at racialclassification.

Scientific Racial ClassificationsThe word race was first used in reference to theclassification of human beings by the Frenchphysician Francois Bernier, who in 1684 dividedhumans into four racial categories: Europeans

(including western and southern Europeans),Asians, Africans, and Lapps. This first effort hasbeen followed by dozens of other schemes pub-lished over the next three centuries that countedfrom 3 to 37 different races. As with Bernier s,all were based on observable physical character-istics such as skin color, size of the skull, andhair texture. Other influential classifications in-clude those of Carrolus Linneaus, who listed theAmerican, European, Asiatic, and Negro races;Johann Blumenbach, who counted five races—Caucasoid, Mongoloid, Ethiopian, American,and Malayan; and biological anthropologistsCarleton Coon and Edward Hunt, who namedseven—Caucasoid, Mongolion, full-sizedAustraloid, dwarf Australoid, full-sizedCongoloid, dwarf Congoloid, and Capoids.

Blumenbach's scheme has been especiallyinfluential, as it is the basis of the still-popularmodel of white, yellow, red, and black races. Inaddition to these classifications that claim toaccount for all human forms, others have beensuggested for specific regions, for example, thestill-common one for Europe that divides thepopulation on a north-south gradient into Nor-dic, Alpine, and Mediterranean types.

All of these classification schemes are nowconsidered obsolete and of little use by studentsof human biological and cultural variation forthe same reasons that the concept of race is con-sidered of limited value.

National and Folk ClassificationsIn addition to these specieswide and now-little-used scientific schemes, some societies classifytheir inhabitants on the basis of race. In theUnited States, a clear distinction is made bymany Americans between whites and nonwhites;any individual with observable features that sug-gest wholly or partially nonwhite ancestry isconsidered to be nonwhite. This practice of clas-sifying all members of a society into one of tworacial categories is known as hypodescent. Addi-tionally, the U.S. government formally consid-

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ers race in its census-taking activities, althoughthe government makes no attempt to define theconcept. Instead, a self-identification approachis used, with members of the population askedto classify themselves into one of the followingcategories:

White

Black

American Indian

Eskimo

Aleut

Asian or Pacific Islander

Chinese

Filipino

Japanese

Asian Indian

Korean

Vietnamese

Hawaiian

Samoan

Guamanian

Other Asian or Pacific Islander

Other RaceIn addition, the Census Bureau also identifiespeople of Hispanic origin—Mexican, PuertoRican, Cuban, Spanish, and from elsewhere inLatin America—although the Census Bureauacknowledges that Hispanic origin and race aredistinct entities, and people of Hispanic origincan be of any race.

The South African apartheid system wasalso based on the principle of hypodescent, withall South Africans classified as either white ornonwhite. The white category comprises prima-rily people of Dutch and British ancestry, whileall others are classified as nonwhite, includingindigenous Africans such as the Khoi (Hotten-tot), Zulu, and !Xhosa; people of mixed ances-try such as Cape Coloureds and Bastars; AsianIndians; Chinese; and Malays.

In addition to scientific and governmentclassifications, in many nations and societies thepeople themselves develop and interact with oneanother on the basis of folk-classificationschemes. In the Bahia province of Brazil, forexample, there are three officially recognizedgroups—pretos (blacks), pardos (browns), andbrancos (whites) plus four intermediate types—cabra (lighter skin color and hair less kinky thanpretos), Cabo Verde (very dark with white featuresand straight black hair), sarara (light skin colorand red hair) and the moreno (tan skin color,white features, brown eyes, and dark hair). Thiscomplexity has yielded an equally complex so-cial system with "whiteness" preferred by some,the morena (female) considered ideal by others,and a link between social status and skin color(lighter color coupled with higher status).

Racial PurityThe notion of racial purity, and efforts by onegroup to maintain its purity by not intermarry-ing and reproducing with other groups, is animportant consideration in ethnic relations. Inthe contemporary world, Germany and Japanboth define citizenship along biological lines,and allow relatively few non-Germans and non-Japanese to gain citizenship. Thus, some 400,000Koreans resident in Japan—most of them bornthere—are not citizens, while in Germany onlyabout 17,000 of 1.5 million Turkish residentsare citizens. An ideology of racial purity and ef-forts to maintain purity concern some indigenouspeoples as well. In North America, for example,the concept of being pure-blooded is tied to cul-tural traditionalism, with those who are of fullAmerican Indian descent considered moreAmerican Indian by themselves and others thanthose of mixed ancestry. For example, among thePiegan Blackfoot of Montana, the full-bloodssee themselves as the descendants of the leadersand warriors of the preservation times, and thusthe carriers of true Blackfoot culture. One keymarker of full-blood status is the absence of an

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English, French, or American surname (itspresence would indicate marriage between aBlackfoot woman and white man). The impor-tance of fiill-bloodedness in maintaining tradi-tional beliefs and customs is suggested by theTaos of New Mexico who, with an average of95 percent American Indian ancestry, are bothone of the most biologically pure American In-dian groups and culturally one of the mosttraditional groups in North America. Taos op-position to intermarriage with other AmericanIndians and non-Indians and rules that prohibitnon-Taos from residing in the traditional pueblohave been major mechanisms for maintainingboth biological and cultural integrity.

In the United States there is often discus-sion of the percentage of American Indian an-cestry an individual can claim, for both legalreasons (in order to gain access to governmentservices) and because in some circles it is con-sidered prestigious to have some AmericanIndian ancestry. Among the Blackfoot, for ex-ample, one community was described as popu-lated by 53 percent full-bloods, 18 percenthalf-bloods, and 13 percent whites, with theother 16 percent being those who were one-fourth, one-eighth, five-eighths, three-eighths,and fifteen-sixteenths American Indian. Suchfiguring is notably imprecise because it assumesso-called racial purity for ancestors.

RacismRacism is the belief that one race (usually one'sown) is inherently superior to all other races. Alsoimplicit in racism is the attribution of achieve-ments of one race to its genetic superiority. Rac-ism is a belief system that exists at the societallevel and is passed on from one generation tothe next through the socialization and educa-tional institutions of the society. Racial preju-dice and discrimination are attitudinal andbehavioral manifestations of racism. Racism oc-curs in situations of cultural contact where cul-tural groups who differ in status and power also

differ from one another in physical appearance.Forms of culture contact that involve this situa-tion are military conquest, as in Africa in thelate 1800s; settlement colonization, as in theNew World and Australia; involuntary migra-tion, as in the importation of slaves from Africato the New World; and voluntary migration, asin the settlement of Latinos in the United Statesand Turks in Germany.

Racism is generally believed to be a productof Western civilization, and specifically of thesettlement and exploitation of non-Europeanlands and peoples. However, the seeds of racismwere clearly in place before colonization andEuropean control of the New World, much ofAfrica, and Oceania. The association of the colorblack with evil predates Christianity, and thusmay have helped create a worldview that encour-aged the negative evaluation of darker skinnedAfrican and American Indian peoples. In thesixteenth century, a line of thought emergedamong scholars that Homo sapiens was actually anumber of species, with the different races be-longing to different species. Additionally, thereports of early explorers, government agents,and missionaries were filled with false or half-true accounts of the indigenous cultures thatportrayed these peoples as less civilized thanEuropeans, and even less than human; that is,to list a few stereotypes, as cannibals, ritualsacrificers, and pagans.

Full-blown racism appeared in the colonialperiod, accompanying all forms of colonialism—slavery, serfdom, forced migrant labor, contractlabor, and middle minorities. Racism emergedas an ideology to justify the exploitation of non-Western peoples used in these capitalistic ven-tures. Racism as an ideology fit closely with otherideologies popular in Europe in the middle tolate 1880s. The most important among theseideologies were the Darwinian evolutionarytheory and the notion of survival of the fittest,but also included were permanent racial typesand stages of human evolution, with non-

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Western peoples considered survivors from ear-lier, less civilized periods.

Racism has also been frequently associatedwith immigration, and especially with the vol-untary immigration of people to a nation alreadyoccupied by others who are culturally different.In Australia, for example, there was a restrictionon settlement by Asians for many years. In theUnited States, Italian immigrants of the early1900s also experienced discrimination, and adisproportionate number were deported. Onejustification for discrimination against Italianswas the belief that southern Italians were partAfrican (their ancestors having bred with Afri-cans) and therefore inferior to Americans of cen-tral and northern European ancestry. Similarly,the so-called Yellow Peril of immigrant Japa-nese and Chinese workers was met by restric-tive immigration laws in 1921 and 1924requiring that 80 percent of immigrants be fromnorthern Europe. These laws were not repealeduntil 1965.

The vehemence with which racism is ex-pressed and the degree of suffering by the vic-tims of racism vary from society to society andcan fluctuate in degree over time. In South Af-rica, apartheid created a caste system with com-plete separation of whites and nonwhites, withall power and most wealth controlled by theminority white population. In Nicaragua, theracism of the mestizos, who constitute 90 per-cent of the population, against Indians and blacksis more subtle. It manifests itself in a variety ofways, including a belief that the color black isevil, use of the word negro (meaning a personwith black or very brown skin) as an insult, ex-pressing racist beliefs only to close friends andrelatives, and parents favoring their lightest-skinned child.

Race RelationsAnthropologist Pierre van den Berghe suggeststhat race relations throughout human history andaround the world can be characterized as either

paternalistic or competitive. The slave societiesin the New World and the hacienda system ofserfdom in parts of South America were pater-nalistic systems; the ruling group was a smallminority of Europeans, and the slaves and serfswere imported slaves or indigenous peoples.These societies were stratified along racial lines,with nonwhites locked into the lowest strata andkept socially, economically, and politically sepa-rate from whites. However, they often lived with(as servants) or near whites and interactedopenly, and sexual relations between white menand black or Indian women were permitted.There were often close emotional attachmentsbetween slave owners and some slaves, particu-larly household help and the women who raisedthe white children. In the paternalistic situation,whites saw themselves as benevolent rulers andtheir slaves or serfs as relatively harmless, child-like inferiors. Underlying most paternalistic sys-tems was an economic symbiosis in which thewhites were dependent on the work of slaves toproduce raw materials such as sugar and cotton,and the slaves were kept dependent on the whitesfor basic necessities such as housing, food, andclothing.

Competitive race relations are typical ofmodern, industrialized societies where differentrace or ethnic groups are not kept separate norin fixed superior-inferior statuses by law. Whileskin color or ethnic identity is still often a bar-rier to equal status and upward social mobility,it is not an absolute barrier, and upward socialmobility is possible for members of all groups.In these societies, skills and knowledge are thekey requirements in a highly competitive em-ployment market, and groups are in competi-tion for valued educational opportunities andjobs. This competition often takes an openlyracist form with hatred and suspicion betweengroups, residential and social segregation, vio-lence directed at smaller or weaker groups, andefforts by groups with control of the labor mar-ket to keep the other groups in their place.

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Examples of competitive situations include anti—African-American, Italian, Jewish, and Latinoattitudes and policies at various times in thetwentieth century in the United States, anti-Chinese attitudes in Fiji, and anti-Turk atti-tudes in Germany. In general, the degree ofracism exhibited in competitive situationstends to increase in difficult economic timeswhen the groups in control see their securitythreatened by others who are physically or cul-turally different.

See also ANTI-SEMITISM; APARTHEID; COLO-NIALISM; ETHNOCENTRISM; ETHNOCIDE; GENO-CIDE; MIXED-ANCESTRY PEOPLES; SLAVERY.

Banton, Michael, and Jonathan Harwood.(1975) The Race Concept.

Bodine, John J. (1991) "Taos." In Encyclopediaof World Cultures. Volume 1, North America,edited by Timothy J. O'Leary and DavidLevinson, 340-343.

Gervis, Pearce. (1954) This Is Kashmir.

Graham, Walter Armstrong. (1908) Kelantan:A State of the Malay Peninsula: A Handbook ofInformation.

Hacker, Andrew. (1992) Two Nations: Black andWhite> Separate, Hostile, Unequal.

Hockings, Paul. (1992) "Aryan." In Encylopediaof World Cultures. Volume 3, South Asia, ed-ited by Paul Hockings, 12-13.

Lancaster, Roger N. (1991) "Skin Color, Race,and Racism in Nicaragua." Ethnology 30:339-353.

McFee, Malcolm. (1963) Modern Elackfeet: Con-tinuing Patterns of Differential Acculturation.

Memmi, Albert. (1967) The Colonizer and theColonized.

Merker, Meritz. (1910) The Masai: EthnographicMonograph of an East African Semite People.

Translated from the German for the HumanRelations Area Files.

Molnar, Stephen. (1983) Human Variation:Races, Types, and Ethnic Groups. 2d ed.

Montagu, Ashley, ed. (1964) The Concept of Race.

Pierson, Donald. (1942) Negroes in Brazil.

Pozzetta, George, Jr. (1972) The Italians of NewYork City, 1890-1914.

Robbins, Lynn A. (1972) Elackfoot Families andHouseholds.

Terkel, Studs. (1992) Race: How Blacks andWhites Think and Feel about the American Ob-session.

van den Berghe, Pierre L. (1978) Race and Rac-ism: A Comparative Perspective. 2d ed.

According to the UnitedNations High Commis-sioner for Refugees,

there were 18,998,700 refugees in the world in1992. The table below lists the number of refu-gees by region, with the U.N. figures in the sec-ond column, and figures compiled by the U.S.Committee for Refugees in the third column.The discrepancy in the totals is due to the dif-ferent definitions of refugee used in the two sur-veys. The U.N. uses the definition acceptedunder international law and set forth in the 1951Convention and 1967 Protocol relating to theStatus of Refugees:

[Any person who]...owing to well-founded fearof being persecuted for reasons of race, religion,nationality, membership of particular socialgroup or political opinion, is outside the coun-try of his nationality and is unable to or, owingto such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of theprotection of that country; or who, not having anationality and being outside the country of hisformer habitual residence...is unable or, owingto such fear, is unwilling to return to it.

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REFUGEES

Muslim evacuees from Srebrenica ride truck to Tuzla under U.N. protection.

The U.S. Committee for Refugees count doesnot include refugees permanently settled in somenations, so its count is lower than the U.N. count.Neither count includes internal refugees or in-ternally displaced peoples—those forced to fleeto another region in their home nation. Majorethnic conflicts that have produced significantnumbers of internal refugees are those in SouthAfrica, the former Yugoslavia, Sri Lanka,Myanmar (Burma), Tajikistan, Rwanda, India,Cyprus, Azerbaijan, Kenya, Turkey, Moldova,and Georgia.

Refugee Populations by Region of Asylum (1992)

RegionAfricaAsiaEuropeLatin AmericaNorth AmericaOceaniaTotal

UNHCR5,393,2007,240,1004,379,100

885,5001,041,200

59,60018,998,700

USCR5,698,4508,299,3503,282,200

107,700141,40027,800

17,556,900

Refugees and Ethnic RelationsFrom the perspective of ethnic relations, ethnicconflict is both a cause and a consequence ofrefugee flows. The following table lists somemajor refugee flows resulting from recent orongoing ethnic conflicts. The two sets of ethnicconflicts that have produced the greatest num-bers of refugees are those following the break-ups of the former Yugoslavia and the formerSoviet Union. The conflicts in the former Yu-goslavia region have produced over 2 millionrefugees—1.8 million who fled from one formerrepublic to another, and at least 400,000 whofled to other nations in Europe. Probably thesingle largest ethnic refugee group is the Pales-tinians, who are usually not enumerated in refu-gee counts, but who now total some 2.7 millionindividuals worldwide.

Ethnic conflict can produce refugees in anumber of ways. First, in difficult economic orpolitical times, politicians often scapegoat eth-nic minority groups, who are then forced to flee.Middleman minorities, such as Jews in various

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places throughout history and Asian Indians inUganda in the 1970s, are examples of this pat-tern. Second, one group may be forced to fleewhen a more powerful group takes control ofthe national government and enacts oppressivepolicies against the smaller, weaker groups, suchas with the Iraqi government and the MarshArabs in southern Iraq, many of whom fled to

Iran. Third, a powerful group in a multiethnicnation may seek to expel minority groups in or-der to achieve ethnic purity, as is perhaps thecase with Greek Albanians, who are fleeing toGreece. Fourth, irredentist movements that in-volve the consolidation of all territories claimedby an ethnic group often include the displace-ment of other groups, as with the Bosnians or

Kthnic GroupTuaregHutuTutsiBurmese MuslimsKachinMon, KarenTibetansAtoniAcehneseBihariChakmaNepaleseSri Lankan TamilsNagasTajiksRussiansJewsUzbeksKurdsShi'ites (Marsh Arabs)Beta IsraelArmeniansAzerbaijaniBosnians

Croats

OssetesGeorgiansArmeniansRussians, UkrainiansMeskhetian Turks

Ethnic Refugees Resulting from ConflictsSource NationMali, NigerBurundiRwandaMyanmarMyanmarMyanmarChinaIndonesiaIndonesiaIndiaBangladeshBhutanSri LankaMyanmarTajikistanTajikistan, UzbekistanTajikistan, UzbekistanTajikistanIraqIraqEthiopiaAzerbaijanArmeniaBosnia/Herzegovina

Croatia

GeorgiaGeorgia (Ossetia)GeorgiaMoldovaUzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan

Asylum Nation NumberAlgeria 40,000-50,000Tanzania, Zaire, Rwanda 143,000Uganda, Burundi, Zaire, Tanzania 83,000Bangladesh, Malaysia 245,000China 10,000Thailand 70,000India, Nepal 128,000Portugal unknownMalaysia 200Bangladesh 238,000India 50,000Nepal, India 95,000India 181,000India 1,400Afghanistan 52,000Russia 300,000Israel 4,000Uzbekistan unknownIran, Turkey 72,000Iran 30,000Israel 50,000Armenia, Russia 300,000Azerbaijan 195,000Former Yugoslavia 1,045,000Western Europe unknownFormer Yugoslavia 350,000Europe 106,000Russia 100,000Georgia 15,000Russia 30,000Russia, Ukraine 100,000Russia 50,000

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REFUGEES

Croats in areas claimed by Serbia. Fifth, ethnicseparatist movements often lead to both inter-nal and external population relocations as civil-ians on both sides flee the fighting and involvedgroups seek shelter elsewhere. For example, inSri Lanka, the fighting between the Sinhaleseand Sri Lankan Tamils has produced refugeesin both groups as well as among the uninvolvedCatholic population.

Refugee flows can also lead to ethnic ten-sion and conflict in the nations in which the refu-gees seek asylum. Much of the antiforeignersentiment in Europe in the 1990s can be tracedto the arrival of ethnically different refugees andthe pressure their presence places on already weakeconomies. Many nations have reacted to theinflux of refugees by enacting more restrictivepolicies and practices because of perceived threatsto their economic well-being, internal peace,and—in some nations—ethnic or cultural pu-rity. One approach has been to make it difficultfor asylum-seekers to reach the nation's borders.For example, the United States accepts morerefugees than any other nation, but with opin-ion polls showing an increase in hostility to for-eigners, from 1992 on, the government hasturned Haitians back at sea to prevent them fromreaching the Florida coast. Or, for another ex-ample, Italy first admitted several thousand Al-banian refugees, then rounded them up andreturned them to Albania. Other nations havealso become more restrictive in accepting refu-gees. Hungary readily accepts European refu-gees, such as those from Bosnia, but now detainsand often denies entry to refugees from Asia andAfrica. The Greeks have resisted attempts bysome 6,000 ethnically Greek Albanians to settlein Greece. The Greek government claims thatAlbania is forcing the Greek minority to leavein order to free itself from a non-Albanian eth-nic minority. A second approach to controllingthe refugee flow is what is called humane deter-rence, which means less-than-adequate treatmentfor refugees. The United States has detained

Haitians in camps, Vietnamese boat people havebeen detained under inadequate living conditionsfor long periods of time in Hong Kong, BetaIsrael (Falasha) religious practices have not beenfully accepted in Israel, and identity checks onforeigners have been initiated in France. A thirdapproach has been to enact more restrictive defi-nitions of refugee status, which places the bur-den on the asylum-seeker to prove persecutionin their homeland, and to prove why he or shecannot seek asylum in another country. Ger-many, for example, has amended its constitu-tion to make its once very liberal immigrationpolicy more restrictive by allowing authoritiesto send asylum-seekers to other nations that areconsidered safe havens.

At the same time, some nations have takensteps to ease the arrival and acceptance of refu-gees. In the United States, an initiative is underway to grant citizenship to many resident for-eigners—that is, to make them Americans—asa way of reducing antiforeigner sentiment. Inother nations, new administrative procedures arebeing developed to make it easier to distinguishpolitical from economic refugees, and to pro-cess the former more quickly.

Once refugees are allowed to settle in a na-tion, there is the question of their adjustmentto life in the host nation, the degree to whichthey assimilate, and whether they exist peace-fully alongside resident citizens or only as adiscriminated-against minority. There is someindication that the experience of immigrants inthe past is not predictive of the current situationregarding refugees in Western nations like theUnited States; there is often considerable varia-tion in the nature of refugee communities. Laocommunities in the United States, for example,take a variety of forms: One is centered on aBuddhist temple in Virginia, another in Hous-ton lacks any central organization, and a thirdin Louisiana closely resembles a traditional vil-lage in Laos. A second feature of refugee com-munities is a lack of ethnic cohesion and

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Refugee from eastern Europe sleeps in an East Berlin railway station, 1990.

integration beyond the local level—that is, atleast in the early years of settlement, there arerelatively few organizations and mechanisms thatunite the entire refugee community. A third fea-ture is an often large and bureaucratic resettle-ment system that develops in the host nation toassist refugees. Over time, however, refugee com-munities are similar to immigrant communitiesin that the second and third generation rapidlyassimilate and identity themselves as membersof the host culture rather than the refugee culture.

See also ETHNIC CONFLICT; MIGRANT WORK-ERS; XENOPHOBIA.

United Nations High Commissioner for Refu-gees. (1993) The State of the World's Refugees:The Challenge of Protection.

U.S. Committee for Refugees. (1993) WorldRefugee Survey.

RELIGIOUSCONFLICT

See ETHNIC CONFLICT.

DeVoe, Pamela A., ed. (1992) Selected Papers onRefugee Issues.

Gold, Steven J. (1992) Refugee Communities.

Muntarbhorn, Vitit. (1992) The Status of Refu-gees in Asia.

REVITALIZATIONMOVEMENTS

The appearance of reli-gious cults or move-ments is a common andrecurring phenomena

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associated with contact between Western soci-eties and indigenous non-Western cultures. Al-though such movements occurred in medievalEurope, and were perhaps the way the worldreligions of Christianity, Buddhism, and Islambegan, they have been especially frequent overthe last few centuries in regions of Western colo-nization. Revitalization movements is the termintroduced by anthropologist Anthony Wallacein 1956 as a generic label for a number of differ-ent, though similar, types of social movements.Wallace defines a revitalization movement as "thedeliberate, conscious, organized efforts by mem-bers of a society to create a new and more satis-fying culture." (Wallace 1956, 279) While notall experts agree with this definition, it is theone most commonly followed today. A plausiblealternate term is justicating movement, whichsuggests that the common feature of these so-cial movements is that the people seek a moresatisfying life, to which they feel entitled. Theterm millenarian movement is also used fre-quently as well.

Under the label revitalization movement fallfour types of movements:

1. Crisis cults are group responses to a crisisinvolving activities of a cult

2. Nativistic movements involve efforts to re-vive elements of the indigenous culture

3. Messianic or prophet cults feature a mes-siah ushering in a new golden age

4. Millennial or chiliastic (Latin and Greek,respectively, meaning 1,000 years) move-ments, which foretell a period of social andspiritual bliss, not necessarily lasting 1,000years

As noted above, revitalization movementshave been especially common in regions of West-ern colonization where native peoples were sub-jugated and their traditional way of life repressed.This has been the case in Melanesia since WorldWar I. Melanesia is a region of the South Pa-cific that includes the cultures of the large is-

land of New Guinea, the Bismark Archipelago,the Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, and NewCaledonia. Revitalization movements inMelanesia are conventionally called cargo cultsin reference to the prominent theme in manythat Western goods will arrive for local consump-tion via Western ships and planes. This themereflects the personal and cultural disorientationthat often resulted from colonial contact withthe indigenous cultures of the region. AmongMelanesian movements are the Milne BayProphet Cult, the German Wislin movement,the Vailala Madness, the Taro Cult, the NakedCult, the Chair-and-Rule and Marching Rule(Masinga) movements, the Tuka Cult, theBaigona Cult, the Lontis Cult, the MarkhamCargo Cult, and the John Frum movement.Cargo cults were so common in New Guineathat they were reported to occur in remote areaswhere the people had never even met Western-ers. These people evidently learned of Western-ers and their material goods and the cultsthrough contact with people closer to the coast,who were in turn in contact with Westerners.Although many of these movements werequickly suppressed by the colonial governments(mainly English, French, German, and Japa-nese), some had broader impact. Most notableis the John Frum movement, which began onthe island of Tanna in Vanuatu in the 1930s andis still a powerful political force there, as well ason other islands.

Revitalization movements have also oc-curred elsewhere, though not with the same fre-quency. In Africa, the Congolese Kinbangu Culthas been described, although a more commonreligious response of African peoples to colonialdomination was the formation of separatistChristian churches that accommodated tradi-tional beliefs and customs. In the Caribbean, theRastafarian movement has spread far beyondJamaica where it originated. In the Amazon re-gion of South America, the Tupi-Guarani FreeLand movement has been described, as well as

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the nineteenth-century movements associatedwith Venancio Kamiko (Christu), a Baniwa In-dian. In North America, the American IndianGhost Dance, the Peyote Cult (incorporated in1918 as the Native American Church), and theHandsome Lake Religion of the Iroquois arewell documented. Revitalization movementsare no longer so common, probably becauseindigenous peoples now more often seek toachieve control over their futures through po-litical action.

The three descriptions that follow are oftypes of revitalization movements among cul-tures in different geographical regions. They il-lustrate the similarities as well as the variationsamong the movements.

The Rastafari MovementThe Rastafari is a black Jamaican religious move-ment that began in the early 1930s. Followers,called Rastafarians, Rastas, or Dreadlocks, nownumber over 100,000 in Jamaica and include anunknown number of others in the United States,Canada, most other Caribbean islands, manyAfrican nations, and Europe. Among the majorfeatures of Rastafari are the beliefs that HaileSelassie, the late emperor of Ethiopia, is the re-turned Jesus Christ; that God is black; that allAmericans of African ancestry must return toAfrica; that life in Jamaica is a life in exile; andthat marijuana (ganja) is a gift from a god and isto be smoked as part of religious rituals. Rastafarialso includes a strong condemnation of whiteoppression in the New World, referred to asBabylon. For nonbelievers, Rastafari is most of-ten associated with the dreadlock hairstyle andreggae music. Rastafari began in Jamaica shortlyafter the coronation of Haile Selassie as theemperor of Ethiopia in 1930. The local condi-tions setting the stage for the movement werewhite oppression, poverty, and the philosophyof Marcus Garvey, stressing black pride. Despitegovernment efforts to control the movement,including the imprisonment of some leaders, it

grew and expanded, and is now a firmly estab-lished global religion and political movement.

The Ghost DanceThe Ghost Dance is a well-described AmericanIndian revitalization movement that promisedthe revival of the traditional culture, the expul-sion of Europeans, and the return of deceasedancestors. The Ghost Dance actually occurredtwice. It began about 1870 in present-day Ne-vada when a Northern Paiute man, Wodziwobreported, through visions and dreams, that theGreat Spirit and the spirits of deceased ances-tors would return, that whites would vanish, andthat earth would become paradise. The majormanifestation of the movement was the danceitself, which would cause the visions to cometrue. The dance was conducted in a circle withan opening left through which the returningspirits could enter; the participants sang, paintedtheir bodies and faces, and wore white clothing.The movement spread west and led to othermovements such as the Earth Lodge Cult, WarmHouse Cult, and Bole-Maru Cult among groupsin Oregon and northern California. In about1886 the movement reappeared among thePaiute, this time through visions of a man namedWovoka. The message and dance were similarto the 1870 version, but this time it spread eastand was adopted by a number of Plains groupsbefore largely disappearing. Although the move-ment was clearly in response to encroachmentsby white missionaries, settlers, traders, and sol-diers, subsequent research has shown that manyof the beliefs and the dance itself reflected tra-ditional practices, with the visions about disap-pearing whites and some Christian elementssuch as a belief in salvation added later.

The Vailala MadnessThis movement is one of the first well-describedrevitalization movements, and is also a good ex-ample of a cargo cult. The Vailala Madness be-gan among the Orokolo people (a number of

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related groups) living on Orokolo Bay on thesouthern coast of New Guinea. The cult takesits name from the mass hysteria that began inabout 1919 and manifested itself in people act-ing giddy, reeling about, and losing control overtheir limbs. The origins of the cult are traced toan Orokolo man, Evara, who went into trance,experienced convulsions, and prophesied the ar-rival of a steamship carrying the bodies of de-ceased Orokolo ancestors along with Westerngoods such as rifles, flour, and tobacco. Follow-ers also experienced trances and had visions of anew world and a new supernatural order, inte-grating traditional Orokolo spirits and Chris-tian figures such as Mary, Noah, Adam, and Eve(the Orokolo had been in contact with mission-aries for several generations). Tall poles wereerected as radio towers to communicate with thesupernatural world, Western-style furniture wasset up in the villages, and traditional religiousobjects such as bull-roarers and masks wereburned. When the prophecies and varioussightings of arriving ships failed to prove true,the movement waned, and within a few yearstraditional practices largely resumed. While themovement itself disappeared, it did have thelong-term effect of integrating traditional reli-gious beliefs such as ancestor worship withChristianity, and served as a means for legiti-mizing the arrival and continued influence ofWestern culture.

The Causes of Revitalization MovementsSocial scientists have set forth at least 15 expla-nations for revitalization movements, both ingeneral and for specific types of movements;these explanations share a belief that revitaliza-tion movements occur in response to severe stressexperienced by members of a society. Among thepossible causes of this stress are colonial oppres-sion, the collapse of traditional values, naturaldisasters such as famine or floods, warfare, anda discrepancy between what people desire andwhat they can actually achieve. Revitalization

movements, in whatever form they take, do oc-cur following events likely to cause stress. Colo-nial oppression, wars, and famine, however, havebeen experienced in many cultures, yet only somedevelop revitalization movements. It seems clearthat stress alone does not cause revitalizationmovements; other factors must already be presentthat encourage or allow their development. Inher research using a worldwide sample of 60societies, Judith Justinger sorted through a vari-ety of these "predisposing" factors and examinedtheir relationship to the appearance of revital-ization movements. She found that revitaliza-tion movements are more likely to occur insocieties where people believe that life canchange for the better, that they can improve theirown life situation, and that the existing patternof distribution of wealth and power can be al-tered, as well as where the role for the prophetalready exists in the belief system. Thus, con-trary to what might be expected, revitalizationmovements tend to occur more often in cultureswith a secular rather than a religious orienta-tion. This, of course, raises the intriguing thoughyet unanswered question of why people with asecular orientation seek a religious solution totheir problems.

Barrett, Leonard. (1977) The Rastafarians: TheDreadlocks of Jamaica.

Carroll, Michael P. (1975) "Revitalization Move-ments and Social Structure: Some Quanti-tative Tests. "American Sociological Review 40:389-401.

Justinger, Judith M. (1979) Reaction to Change:A Holocultural Test of Some Theories of Reli-gious Movements.

Lessa, William A., and Evon Z. Vogt. (1965)Reader in Comparative Religion: An Anthro-pological Approach. 2d ed.

Mooney, James. (1965) The Ghost-Dance Reli-gion and the Sioux Outbreak of 1890. Edited

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and abridged by Anthony F. C. Wallace. Firstpublished, 1896.

Suttles, Wayne. (1957) "The Plateau ProphetDance among the Coast Salish." Southwest-ern Journal of Anthropology 13: 352-396.

Wallace, Anthony F. C. (1956) "RevitalizationMovements." American Anthropologist 58:264-281.

Williams, Francis E. (1923) The Vailala Mad-ness and the Destruction of Native Ceremoniesin the Gulf Division.

Worsley, Peter. (1957) The Trumpet Shall Sound.

Wright, Robin M., and Jonathan D. Hill. (1986)"History, Ritual, and Myth: NineteenthCentury Millenarian Movements in theNorthwest Amazon." Ethnohistory 33: 31-54.

RUSSIANS IN THEFORMER SOVIET

UNION

In 1989 there were3,305,000 ethnic Rus-sians living in the 15non-Russian republicsof the Soviet Union. In

many of these republics, relations between eth-nic Russian residents and the indigenous popu-lation have become hostile and conflictual sincethe breakup of the Soviet Union beginning in1989. The majority of Russians or their ances-tors had settled in the other republics either dur-ing the colonization that began in the 1600s andaccelerated during the era of the Russian Em-pire, or as part of the Russification process ofthe Communist era. During colonization, largenumbers of Russians settled in other republics,often displacing indigenous peoples and takingthe best land for themselves. For example, theover 6 million Russians in Kazakhstan live inthe fertile northern region, while the Kazakh livemainly in the south. Russification was the at-

tempt by the Soviet government to make theRussian culture dominant in the Soviet Union.It included the relocation of ethnic Russians toother republics; the placement of Russians in keyCommunist party and government positions; re-strictions on the use of non-Russian, particu-larly non-Slavic, languages; using the Russianlanguage for instruction in schools; bans on thepublic expression of religion; and the stationingof Russian troops in the other republics.

With the breakup of the Soviet Union andthe reorganization of the constituent republics,a central issue that has emerged is the status ofethnic Russians in the other republics and vari-ous forms of ethnic conflict involving Russiansin other republics, the indigenous cultures, andsometimes the Russian government as well. Thetable below lists the number of Russians in eachrepublic in 1989 and their percentage of the re-public population. (Since then, at least 1 mil-lion have migrated to Russia, primarily from thecentral Asian republics.)

Number of Russians and Their Percentage ofthe Population in Former Soviet Republics in

1989

Russian Percent ofRepublic Population PopulationArmenia 51,600 1.6Azerbaijan 392,300 5.6Belarus 1,342,100 13.2Estonia 474,800 30.3Georgia 341,200 6.3Kazakhstan 6,227,500 37.8Kyrgyzstan 916,600 21.5Latvia 905,500 34.0Lithuania 344,500 9.4Moldova 562,100 13.0Russia 119,865,900 81.5Tajikistan 395,100 7.6Turkmenistan 333,900 9.5Ukraine 11,355,600 22.1Uzbekistan 1,653,500 8.4

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The nature of the relationship between Rus-sians and the peoples of the non-Russian repub-lics is diverse and includes efforts toward peacefulintegration of the Russian minority, repressionof Russian culture, mass emigration by Russians,and ethnic separatist movements. In general,relations tend to be most peaceful in those re-publics where Russians form only a small per-centage of the population and where they arealready somewhat integrated into republic life,as indicated by their ability to speak the indig-enous language. Peaceful relations are the normin Lithuania, where all Russians who so desiredwere granted citizenship in 1989; in Belarus,where the two groups are culturally similar (bothare classified as Eastern Slavs), 25 percent ofRussians speak Belarussian and strong politicalties remain between Russia and Belarus; and inthe northern region of Kazakhstan, which isheavily populated by Russians.

In other regions, relations are less peacefuland, in general, seem to be the result of two fac-tors. First, the history of Russian dominance inmost regions and indigenous resentment of thatdominance and second, independence since 1989has led to political, social, and economic insta-bility and uncertainty across the former SovietUnion, and increased ethnic conflict often in-volving competition for land and political power.Although specific to the Kazakh in some ways,the history of Kazakh-Russian relations pointsto some common features of Russian dominancethat have created resentment in indigenous (now,national) groups and underlie contentious eth-nic relations today. The Kazakh are a centralAsian people whose ancestors lived in the re-gion for several thousand years and who emergedas a distinct ethnic group in the fourteenth andfifteenth centuries, with the cultural configura-tion traditionally identified as Kazakh in placeby the end of the seventeenth century. Keyoverarching elements of traditional Kazakh cul-ture included a seminomadic lifestyle based on

herding and adherence to Islam, combined withelements of their traditional religion. TheKazakh have always so referred to themselves,but the Russians refused to do so until the earlytwentieth century, choosing instead to call themKyrgyz, or variations thereof, to distinguish themfrom Russian Cossacks living in Siberia andnorthern Kazakhstan. (The Kyrgyz are a distinct,neighboring people.) Russian dominance beganin the early 1700s when the Kazakh turned toRussia for protection from invaders from theeast. By the 1730s some Kazakh had becomeRussian citizens, and by 1860 Russian controlwas solidified, with Russian Cossacks occupy-ing the northern Kazakh region to protect theRussian Empire; the tsar became the supremeauthority in place of Kazakh khans; the Kazakheconomy was shifted from herding to a combi-nation of herding, agriculture, trade, and indus-try; and Russian and other Slavic farmers settledthe rich farmlands. During this period, the Rus-sians consciously encouraged the practice of Is-lam as a way of gaining Kazakh allegiance. In1916 a revolt against Russian colonialism led tothe migration of several thousand Kazakh toChina and Mongolia. Following the BolshevikRevolution, the Kazakh were incorporated intothe Soviet state as an autonomous republic. Col-lectivization of the economy, famine, andforced relocations took millions of lives, andagain, many left to seek refuge in other regionsof central Asia, and most never returned. In the1930s the Kazakh, like other non-Russians, lostmany people through the purges, including theirmullahs, leaving many communities without Is-lamic religious leaders to this day. Both duringand following World War II, millions of Rus-sians and other Eastern Slavic peoples settled inthe northern region of Kazakhstan, where to-day they form the majority population, with lessthan 2 percent speaking Kazakh. With this his-tory of Russian dominance, typical of much ofthe former Soviet Union, hostile ethnic relations

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between indigenous peoples and Russians havebecome the norm following the breakup of theSoviet Union.

Mass outmigration of Russians has takenplace in Kyrgyzstan, where Russians are blamedfor the republic's economic problems; inAzerbaijan because of the Azerbaijani-Armenian conflict; and in the Chechen-Ingushregion because of the desire by these peoples forseparatism from Russia. Russians have experi-enced increased hostility and sometimes restric-tions in Georgia, where Russia is resented forsupporting the Abkhazian separatists; in Esto-nia and Latvia, where Russian troops are anirritant to the indigenous population; inKyrgyzstan, as noted above; and in westernUkraine, where the Russian minority is beingactively repressed through controls on the teach-ing of Russian and access to Russian-languageradio and television programs. Elsewhere in theUkraine, however, peaceful coexistence is morethe norm, and in the south, the influx of Rus-sians continues. In southern Kazakhstan, theKazakh are displacing the Russians from politi-cal office, and have reintroduced Kazakh as theofficial language of the republic (although Rus-sian has been retained for external relations). Theconcern about continued Russian control in re-publics with a large Russian population becameapparent in Estonia in late 1993, when Russianscaptured 27 of 64 seats in the Tallin city council.An Estonian law, supported by Russia, allowedRussians to vote in local, though not national, elec-tions and was partly responsible for the success ofRussians in local elections. While causing concernamong Estonians in Tallin, the election has less-ened international criticism of alleged Estoniananti-Russian activities.

The former Soviet Union is the scene of anumber of ethnic separatist movements, andRussians are involved in four of them. In Geor-gia, the Russians have been accused by the Geor-gians of supporting the Abkhazian separatists,presumably because Russia would like Abkhazia

to join Russia. In western Moldova, where Rus-sians and Ukrainians form the majority of thepopulation, Russian troops have supported theformation of theTrans-Dniestr Republic, a con-flict that has caused thousands of deaths. InSouth Ossetia, the Russians have supported theOssetes in their efforts to secede from Georgiaand affiliate with the North Ossetes and Russia.In the Chechen-Ingush region of the northernCaucasus, the Russians have reacted to Chechen-Ingush wishes for political autonomy by mili-tarily suppressing them.

While accepting at least 1 million migrantsfrom other republics in the last few years, mostof whom are housed in southern Russia, theRussian government of Boris Yeltsin is opposedto mass immigration on the grounds that it willcause further economic, political, and socialproblems. While accepting the reality that therewill be sizable migration from some republics inthe next few years, the Russian government isactively negotiating with some republics, suchas Latvia and Estonia, to allow Russian residentsto become citizens. In general, Russia favors re-public policies that allow Russian resident inthose republics to become citizens and remainthere.

See also ABKHAZIANS IN GEORGIA; CHECHEN-INGUSH IN RUSSIA; MOLDOVA; OSSETES ANDGEORGIANS.

Dunlop, John B. (1993) "Will a Large-ScaleMigration of Russians to the Russian Re-public Take Place over the Current Decade?"International Migration Review 27:605-629.

Friedrich, Paul, and Norma Diamond, eds.(1993) Encyclopedia of World Cultures. Volume6, Russia/Eurasia and China.

Murdock, George P. (1934) "The Kazakhs ofCentral Asia." In Our Primitive Contempo-raries, 135—153.

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ScAPl-XiOAT

A scapegoat is someonewho bears the blame foranother. The term is de-

rived from a Hebrew ritual sacrifice associatedwith the Day of Atonement. As described in theBook of Leviticus, chapter 16, the ritual requiredthe High Priest to designate one he-goat for Godand one for Azazel, with Azazel meaning theact of sending away, the place sent away to, ascapegoat, or the rugged mountain. The pur-pose of the ritual was to transfer the sins of theIsraelites to the goat and then remove the sinsby sacrificing the goat.

From the perspective of ethnic relations,scapegoated groups are often small, relativelydefenseless ethnic minorities who are singled outand blamed by the government or other mem-bers of society for economic, social, and politi-cal problems. Often it is the government thatdirectly blames an ethnic minority for nationalproblems as a way of shifting blame from itself.For example, following the end of colonial rulein a number of African nations, the governmenthas blamed minorities for various national prob-lems. In Rwanda in 1973, the ruling Tutsi (who

were actually a numerical minority) encouragedattacks on the Hutu to deflect attention fromwidespread corruption, unpopular policies, anda weak economy. In Ghana in 1969 and 1970,African migrants from other West African na-tions were blamed by the government for urbancrime, unemployment, and other social ills, andwere beaten, driven from the country, and theirbusinesses looted. In Uganda in 1972, all Asians(many of them born in Uganda) were forced toleave. In the 1990s, the policy has been reversed,and Asians are allowed to return to Uganda andreclaim their property. Asians in Uganda were amiddleman minority—an ethnic minority thatoccupies a specialized economic niche, usuallyinvolving a middleman role between the pro-ducers and consumers of goods and services.Because they are socially isolated from main-stream society, middleman minorities are oftenthe victims of scapegoating, with the two groupsmost frequently scapegoated—Jews and Gyp-sies—often serving a middleman role.

In other situations, scapegoating may de-velop among the members of the society, oftenamong those most threatened by societal prob-lems, and then be supported or allowed by thegovernment. For example, violence directedagainst Turkish migrant workers in Germany in1992 and 1993, while not instigated by the gov-ernment, was followed by a change in laws torestrict immigrants entering Germany.

A key component of scapegoating is stereo-typing: The ethnic minority is blamed as a groupfor the problems of the society with no consid-eration of individual differences within the groupor the forces actually producing the problems.In fact, the scapegoated group often suffers mostfrom the social ills for which it is blamed, andpunishing or expelling the group rarely solvesthe problem. In fact, in some cases such asUganda, the expulsion empties the nation of avaluable economic resource such as small busi-nesses or government workers, leading to fur-ther political unrest.

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Anti-Semitic signs in Behringersdorf Germany, 1935.

See also MIDDLEMAN MINORITIES; RACE ANDRACISM; STEREOTYPES.

Allport, Gordon W. (1954) The Nature ofPrejudice.

Weinstein, Warren. (1981) "Africa." In Protec-tion of Ethnic Minorities: Comparative Perspec-tives, edited by Robert G. Wirsing, 208-244.

Werblowsky, R. J. Zwi, and Geoffrey Wigoder,eds. (1965) The Encyclopedia of the JewishReligion.

SIKHS IN INDIASikhism is India'syoungest monotheisticreligion, centered around

a devotion to the Ten Gurus and their scripture.

The founder and first guru was Guru Nanak,who lived from 1469 until 1539; the last of thegurus died early in the eighteenth century. Or-thodox Sikhs observe a code of conduct and dis-cipline, including rules governing appearanceand diet. The Orthodox Sikhs have become morevisible and vocal, tending to dominate the pub-lic life of the community, but other Sikhs whoare not orthodox in appearance or other facetsof the code of conduct are accepted for their rev-erence of the Ten Gurus and their attendance atgurdwara, the Sikh places of worship. Since thelate 1880s, Sikhs have stressed their religious,cultural, and social differences from the Hindumajority in India and have sought to maintainadiminstrative and political control over PunjabState, where they are the majority population.While Sikh communities exist in SoutheastAsia, Africa, Europe, Great Britain, and NorthAmerica, the Sikh homeland is Punjab, a north-west Indian state bordering on Pakistan. Punjab

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is the site of most of the Sikh holy places andshrines, including the Golden Temple inAmritsar.

With a population estimated at 897 millionin 1993, India comprises mainly Hindus (83percent), Muslims (11 percent), Christians (3percent), and Sikhs (2 percent). Although theSikhs constitute only a small percentage of theoverall population of India, the nearly 18 mil-lion Sikhs reside almost exclusively in the stateof Punjab, where they make up approximately60 percent of the population, with Hindus com-prising 36 percent. Sikh identity and unity havebeen strong in the region even before the Brit-ish partitioning of its Indian colony into present-day India and Pakistan. In 1925 the SikhGurdwara Protection Committee was formed tomaintain control over the sacred shrines, and hassince been instrumental in Sikh politics. Al-though India is a federal republic that guaran-tees the rights of the different ethnic groupsunder the constitution, Sikhs and other minor-ity groups maintain that they have been discrimi-nated against by the central government. Theyalso fear assimilation into the Hindu majority.Being deprived of equal opportunity in jobs anddevelopment and having inadequate represen-tation in legislation are claims made not only bySikhs, but by other minority groups throughoutIndia as well.

Increased violence and a strengthened callfor separatism have resulted in demands forthe creation of a separate Sikh nation calledKhalistan. The current conflict dates to 1978,with Sikh concerns about autonomy and Indianefforts to develop and extract resources from theregion. The desire for Khalistan was strength-ened in 1984 when Indian prime minister IndiraGandhi, in an effort to dislodge an armed ex-tremist Sikh uprising, gave orders for an attackon the Sikhs' holiest shrine, the Golden Temple.In response to this attack, Prime MinisterGandhi was assassinated by her Sikh bodyguardsin October 1984. The assassination led to mas-

sive riots against Sikhs by Hindus, resulting inthe violent deaths of thousands of Sikhs, andtens of thousands left homeless. Since 1984 thenumber of deaths related to this separatist con-flict has been in the thousands every year. Fi-nally, in 1987, in response to the increasingviolence in the Punjab State, the central gov-ernment suspended the locally elected govern-ment and has kept the state under police rule.Even under the guard of Indian paramilitarytroops, thousands of Punjabis have been killed—the vast majority of them Sikhs.

Many Sikhs realize that the creation of aseparate Sikh nation—Khalistan—is not a po-litically or economically viable option, and thatin all likelihood the Sikh community will remaina part of India. While the Sikh extremists con-tinue to demand independence, the more main-stream goal among Sikhs is to achieve the statusof an autonomous state within India. The po-litical standoff now is one of strategy—neitherthe Sikh nor the Indian central government iswilling to make the first move. The presence ofthe Indian army has done little to weaken thedetermination of those fighting for relief of thefrustrations of their minority status, but the gov-ernment is unwilling to address political issuesuntil violent opposition has been controlled. Inthe past few years the Indian government hasattempted to hold elections for parliament andthe local legislature, but extremist groups havemanaged to thwart these efforts with threats ofviolence to those who participate. They claimthat the government is staging rigged electionsand, in general, even those Sikhs willing to par-ticipate have been dissuaded. In 1992 the In-dian government initated a more aggressivepolicy of military control of the region, makingthe police a visible force in Sikh communitiesand driving militant Sikh separatists under-ground. Sikhs see themselves as the victims ofstate terorism, claiming that the police routinelyharass women and children, rape women,murder innocent citizens, and imprison Sikhs

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without due process. The Indian government haseffectively restricted investigations by humanrights organizations, thus making it hard to judgethe situation, but also providing indirect sup-port for Sikh claims of human rights violations.

Brass, Paul. (1988) "The Punjab Crisis and theUnity of India." In India's Democracy: AnAnalysis of Changing State-Society Relations,edited by Atul Kohli, 169-213.

McLeod, W. H. (1990) The Sikhs.

O'Connell, Joseph, et al., eds. (1988) Sikh His-tory and Religion in the Twentieth Century.

SINHALESE ANDSRI LANKAN

TAMILS

Sri Lanka (formerlycalled Ceylon) is an is-land nation located offthe southeast coast ofIndia. In 1993 the popu-

lation was estimated to be 17.8 million. The capi-tal is Colombo, with a population of 1.2 mil-lion; Jaffna, in the north, has a population of270,000. The majority of the population is ru-ral, living in thousands of small villages acrossthe island and along the coasts. Formerly a Brit-ish colony, Sri Lanka became independentthrough a peaceful transition in 1948.

The population is composed of four majorethnic groups: Sinhalese, Sri Lankan Tamils,Indian Tamils, and Sri Lankan Moors or Mus-lims. A fifth group, the Vedda, numbering sev-eral thousand, are descendants of the originalinhabitants of the island. Their traditional cul-ture has largely disappeared through contact withthe Sinhalese and Tamil.

The Sinhalese constitute 75 percent of thepopulation and speak the Sinhala language;about 70 percent are Theravada Buddhist, andthe remainder are mostly Roman Catholic. They

live primarily in the western, central, and south-ern provinces, where they are politically and eco-nomically dominant. The Sinhalese evidentlyemigrated to Sri Lanka from nothern India andwere settled on the island by the third centuryB.C. By the first century B.C., a Buddhist Sinha-lese civilization was established in Sri Lanka,lasting until the thirteenth century A.D. In 1505the island came under European colonial con-trol (Portuguese, 1505-1658; Dutch, 1658-1796; British, 1796-1948). The colonistsintroduced Roman Catholicism and Protestant-ism and a plantation economy centered on cof-fee, tea, cotton, and tobacco. Today, the Sinhaleseare composed of two major subgroups, theKandayan Sinhalese in the central highlandsand the Low Country Sinhalese on the coasts.The Sinhalese today are mainly small farmers,service-industry workers, and civil servants.

The Sri Lankan Tamils comprise 11 per-cent of the population, and speak a dialect ofthe Tamil language spoken by Tamils in south-eastern India. The majority are Hindu, althoughthere are sizable minorities of Protestants andRoman Catholics. Sri Lankan Tamils are pri-marily located in the eastern and northern prov-inces, with cultural and political activity centeredon the Jaffna Peninsula. The exact date of Tamilsettlement on Sri Lanka is unknown, althoughTamils from south India were certainly presentduring the period of Sinhalese civilization fromthe third to the thirteenth centuries. Followingthe collapse of the Sinhalese civilization in thethirteenth century, a Sri Lankan Tamil kingdomdeveloped on the Jaffna Peninsula, with all ofSri Lanka coming under colonial control from1505 to 1948. Modern Sri Lankan Tamil cul-ture is a synthesis of Indian Tamil and Sinhaleseculture, with additional borrowing from othersouth Indian cultures such as those of peoplesin Kerala. Thus, Sri Lankan Tamils are cultur-ally distinct from Indian Tamils and from theSinhalese. Today, Sri Lankan Tamils subsist pri-marily as small farmers or wage laborers. Re-

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mittances from relatives living overseas are animportant source of income.

Indian Tamils are descendants of IndianTamils brought to Sri Lanka by the British inthe 1800s as laborers on tea plantations, andconstitute 8.5 percent of the current population.They also speak the Tamil language, although theyare culturally distinct from Sri Lankan Tamils. SriLankan Moors or Muslims comprise 7 percentof the population, and live in the southern andwestern provinces; most speak Tamil, althoughan increasing number speak Sinhala as well.

The current ethnic strife in Sri Lanka is aviolent ethnic separatist conflict that mainly in-volves the Sri Lankan Tamils and the Sinhalese.The Tamils seek political autonomy of some typefor the eastern and northern provinces as a Tamilhomeland, a desire opposed by the numericallyand politically dominant Sinhalese. Under co-lonial domination, relations between the Tamiland Sinhalese were relatively peaceful, and forthe first eight years of independence, Sri Lankawas ruled by a multiethnic coalition government.In 1956 Sinhalese politician S. W. R. D.Bandaranaike was elected prime minister, run-ning on a platform that promised the designa-tion of Sinhala as the official language. Hiselection and populist appeal reflected widespreadSinhalese resentment of the number of Tamilsholding government, professional, and businesspositions, and was an effort to shift power tothe numerically dominant Sinhalese. In 1958Sinhalese resentment turned bloody as someSinhalese rioted against Sri Lankan Tamils inthe south. Throughout the 1960s and into the1970s, the Sri Lankan economy deteriorated andunemployment rates soared. The political un-rest within the Sinhalese community that fol-lowed culminated in the emergence of a leftistyouth movement, the Janatha VimukthiPeramuna (JVP) or People's Liberation Army,as a powerful political force.

In the early 1970s the Sinhalese-dominatedgovernment set quotas on the number of Sri

Lankan Tamils who could be admitted to uni-versities or hold government jobs. In 1974, inresponse to Tamil exclusion from Sinhalese-dominated society, the Tamils asked that a SriLankan Tamil state be created in the northernand eastern provinces through peaceful negotia-tion. In 1978 Tamil was designated a nationallanguage, but when the Sinhalese were slow torespond to the Tamil request for autonomy,Tamil youths became violent and assassinated anumber of Tamil leaders accused of being sym-pathetic to the Sinhalese. In 1981 Sinhalese se-curity forces burned the central library in Jaffnaand terrorized the population, who turned to theyouths for protection. In 1987 Sinhalese riotedin Colombo and elsewhere in the south, destroy-ing Tamil businesses and homes, and forcingmany Tamils to flee north and east to safety.

The conflict has been violent since the early1980s, with occasional periods of short-livedpeace. The Tamil effort now rests on the activi-ties of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam(LTTE), the major Tamil guerrilla army, withthe Jaffna Peninsula their primary area of activ-ity. In the 1990s they have faced internal criti-cism and opposition, primarily from theUniversity Teachers of Human Rights, a SriLankan organization. Much criticism centers ontheir practice of demanding support paymentsof two gold sovereigns (about $260) from eachTamil family, and forcibly inducting boys intotheir units.

At various times, India has tried to broker asettlement, and in 1987, 60,000 Indian troopswere placed in Tamil regions to control the vio-lence. Before withdrawing in 1990 at the requestof the Sinhalese government, the Indian armyhelped to control the violence, but Indian sol-diers were also accused of killing thousands ofTamil civilians and destroying much property.The Indian army presence also led to politicalunrest in the south, where resentment led to JVPviolence against Sinhalese officials, resulting inseveral thousand Sinhalese deaths. In 1987

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former Indian prime minister Rajiv Gandhi wasassassinated, and in March 1993 bombings inBombay killed more than 250 people. TheTamils have been accused of both crimes, butdeny responsibility. In 1990 the Muslims weredrawn into the conflict when the Tamil Tigersdestroyed mosques and villages and killed hun-dreds of people in Muslim communities in theeast. Hundreds of thousands of Muslims subse-quently fled to safety in the western province.

Ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka in the form ofterrorism, riots, government-sanctioned attackson civilians, destruction of property, and assas-sinations has caused at least 20,000 deaths sincethe early 1980s, the forced relocation of hun-dreds of thousands ofTamils and Muslims (manyof whom have left Sri Lanka altogether), andbitterness among all involved. So far, the con-flict has also failed to yield a political or militarysolution to the issue of Sri Lankan Tamil au-tonomy. As of late 1993, the Sinhalese army waslargely in control of the situation, with Tamilseparatists mainly confined to the northernJaffna Peninsula, and the Sinhalese army a ma-jor presence in the region.

O'Ballance, Edgar. (1989) The Cyanide War:Tamil Insurrection in Sri Lanka.

Schwarz, Walter. (1988) The Tamils of Sri Lanka.

Tambiah, Stanley}. (1986) Sri Lanka—EthnicFratricide and the Dismantling of Democracy.

(1992) Buddhism Betrayed? Religion,Politics and Violence in Sri Lanka.

Situational ethnicity re-fers to the commonpractice in multiculturalsocieties of ethnic groups

or individuals shifting, hiding, or asserting

SITUATIONALETHNICITY

their ethnic identity as a strategy for achievingsome goal. Both groups and individuals are mo-tivated to alter their identity when they believethat the new identity is to their political or fi-nancial advantage. Situational ethnicity can takethe form of short-term shifts in identity toachieve limited goals. For example, people inMalaysia of various ethnic backgrounds all iden-tified themselves as Malay when such solidaritywas needed to resist incursions by developers.Or, situational ethnicity can take the form ofpermanent change designed to conceal one'sidentity, as among the Karaite Jews in Russia inthe 1800s and Crimean Jews (Krymchaks) in theSoviet Union in the 1950s, both of whom re-wrote their histories to prove that they were notJews so as to escape discrimination and perse-cution. Situational ethnicity can also take theform of a redefinition of the basis of one'sethnicity. For example, the shift in the genericlabel from black to African-American is in partan attempt to create cultural and group identitybased on a shared history, and discard an iden-tity based on a European model of identity byskin color and biological descent. Finally, situ-ational ethnicity can involve the revival orconstruction of a new identity. For example,beginning in the late 1960s, the opportunity forpolitical influence in local development decisionsand financial rewards for being a Chumash inCalifornia led a number of individuals (somewho could prove Chumash descent and otherswho could not) and groups to identity them-selves and receive official recognition asChumash, despite the fact that Chumash cul-ture and language were extinct.

For situational ethnicity to be successful, thenew identity of the group must be accepted bythe dominant group. Factors that influencedominant-group acceptance include the relativepolitical and socioeconomic statuses of thegroups, the distribution of resources among thegroups, group size, immediate prospects forchange, and perceived availability of limited

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resources. The Chumash, Karaites, andKrymchaks mentioned above were successfulbecause local business and political interests ac-cepted the Chumash claims, and the Russiansallowed the Jewish groups to redefine themselvesas non-Jews, exempting them from restrictivelaws applied selectively to Jews. In the case ofthe Chumash, the local political and economicinterests benefited by having access to legallyrequired involvement by Chumash in develop-ment projects on ancestral Chumash land.

However, sometimes the dominant groupswill resist ethnic identity changes, especiallywhen such changes are not in their interest orconflict with their interests. For example, theLumbee (a mixed-ancestry group in North andSouth Carolina) sought to improve their eco-nomic and political status by first defining them-selves as white, an effort that failed, and thendefining themselves as Indian, which provedmore successful. Their former identity as black,of course, was not to their advantage in the seg-regated South.

An example of strong resistance by thedominant group is the ongoing case of theGolden Hill Paugussett Indians in Connecticut.In 1992 and 1993, the Paugussett filed lawsuitsclaiming several thousand acres of residentialland in the city of Bridgeport and surroundingsuburban towns. Their primary goal was to se-cure enough land in Bridgeport to build andoperate a gambling casino. It was widely believedby the affected people and towns that the landclaims were nothing more than an effort to scaregovernment officials so that the Paugussettwould be granted some land, awarded federalstatus as an American Indian tribe (a require-ment for opening a casino), and licensed bythe state to operate a casino. The Paugussettwere motivated by the experience of theMashantucket Pequots in eastern Connecticutwho, a few years earlier, had opened what be-came an extremely successful casino. ThePaugussett claims have been resisted by the in-

dividuals and towns affected, by state officials,and by the two state senators. In addition, in1993 the state took action to halt the Paugussettpractice of selling cigarettes at a large discountto the public on their small reservation, reject-ing the Paugussett claim that as a state-recognized American Indian tribe they had noobligation to collect sales tax. What explains thesuccessful use of their American Indian identityby the Pequots in eastern Connecticut to gainthe right to develop and operate a casino (Con-necticut law does not allow casinos) and theso-far troubled and failed attempt by thePaugussett? The major factor has been the will-ingness of the dominant white population to al-low the Pequot casino, and its resistance to thePaugussett casino. Whites in eastern Connecti-cut either supported the Pequot right to buildthe casino or did not strongly resist for a num-ber of reasons: (1) The Pequot already were rec-ognized as an American Indian tribe and wereknown in the region as a distinct group with theirown reservation, although they were culturallyand physically indistinguishable from the localpopulation. Thus, they needed only to asserttheir ethnicity to achieve their goals. (2) Thecasino was built on reservation land the Pequotsalready owned, so non-Indians were not threat-ened with a loss of land. (3) Eastern Connecti-cut was an economically unstable region, and thecasino provided thousands of new jobs and aboost to the local economy, thus benefiting allresidents of the region.

For the Paugussett, the situation is the op-posite: (1) They are not well known as a distinctethnic group; (2) physically, they are defined byoutsiders as African-American rather than asAmerican Indian or white; (3) they are not rec-ognized by the federal government; and (4) theirreservation is too small for a viable casino op-eration. Thus, from the perspective of most arearesidents, they are not a distinct ethnic groupand have no ethnicity to assert; their need anddemand for additional land threatens the

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security of local property owners; and FairfieldCounty in western Connecticut is one of the fivewealthiest counties in the nation, with little in-centive to support economic development via agambling casino.

In addition to acquiescence by the dominantgroup, other physical, social, and psychologicalfactors also operate to constrain the use and ef-fectiveness of situational ethnicity. These includeskin color, the place of the group in the ethnicstratification system, the fluidity of ethnic iden-tity in multiethnic societies and the amount ofinformation one has about the new identity, andthe psychological capacity of members of thegroup to act differently.

Related to situational ethnicity is ethnic im-pression management, in which an individual orgroup selectively displays symbols of a specificethnic identity in order to influence members ofother ethnic groups. One form of such impres-sion management is the public display of non-threatening aspects of one s culture such as food,dress, jewelry, music, and dance, which can beappreciated by outsiders at an aesthetic level andthus require no knowledge of or involvement inthe culture. A special form of impression man-agement that generally occurs at the level of in-dividual behavior is called passing—that is,behaving in such a way that an individual willbe considered a member of a higher status orsituationally more beneficial ethnic group. InLatin American nations with white, AmericanIndian, and mixed-ancestry populations, defin-ing oneself as white often provides enhancedaccess to wealth and influence.

See also ETHNIC IDENTITY AND SOLIDARITY;ETHNOCENTRISM.

Keefe, Susan E., ed. (1989) Negotiating Eth-nicity: The Impact of Anthropological Theoryand Practice. NAPA Bulletin No. 8.

Lyman, Stanford M., and William A. Douglass.(1973) "Ethnicity: Strategies of Collectiveand Individual Impression Management."Social Research 40: 344-365.

Nagata, Judith A. (1974) "What Is a Malay?Situational Selection of Ethnic Identity in aPlural Society." American Ethnologist 1:1215-1230.

Okamura, Jonathan Y. (1981) "SituationalEthnicity." Ethnic and Racial Studies 4:452-463.

Royce, Anya Peterson. (1982) Ethnic Identity:Strategies of Diversity.

Blu, Karen I. (1980) The Lumbee Problem: TheMaking of an American Indian People.

Practices and institu-tions labeled as formsof slavery have varied

widely in form, content, and purpose through-out human history and across cultures. While itis impossible to provide a single definition thatfits all situations, slavery in its most general senseis characterized by (1) a denial of rights or ex-cessive restrictions or limitations on rights en-joyed by free persons, (2) forced labor withoutcompensation, and (3) status as an ethnic out-sider in the society where one is enslaved andcomplete separation from one's own ethnicgroup. Thus, throughout human history, slaveryhas been a major form of ethnic relations, withone group dominant over and exploiting the la-bor of members of another group who live intheir midst. Although some individuals in somecultures might place themselves into slavery intheir own society to pay a debt or as punish-ment for a crime, this form of internal slavery is

^^^^^m

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rare in comparison to other types where slavesare ethnic outsiders.

Slavery has a long history in the human ex-perience and was important in the developmentof both the Islamic and Western (Greek andRoman) civilizations and the European settle-ment of the New World. Slavery, primarily inthe forms of both domestic and productive sla-very, was also not uncommon in non-Western,nonindustrialized societies.

Slavery or related institutions are stillcommon around the world, and the long-termeffects of productive slavery are still beingexperienced by the descendants of slaves. Thedescendants of slaves are still a discriminated-against minority in the United States; in manySouth and Middle American nations, dark skincolor is an obstacle to increasing one's socioeco-nomic status; and, among the Ashanti of WestAfrica, those with a slave ancestry are consid-ered socially inferior. In a recent developmentthat could have major economic implications,the Organization of African Unity is pursuingthe possibility of asking the United Nations andother organizations to require European, NewWorld, and Middle Eastern nations who allowedslavery in the past to pay reparations to Africannations that were the source of slaves for thesenations.

The above definition distinguishes slaveryin its various forms from related institutions suchas serfdom, peonage, compulsory military ser-vice, pawning, and imprisonment, all of whichare forms of involuntary servitude.

From a historical and cross-cultural perspec-tive, slavery comes in two primary forms—do-mestic and productive.

Domestic SlaveryDomestic slavery (also known as household andpatriarchal slavery) was a form of slavery foundin small-scale, nonindustrial societies whoseeconomies were based on horticulture or simple

agriculture. According to two worldwide surveysof slavery, with samples of 186 and 60 nonin-dustrial societies respectively, domestic slaveryoccurred in 35 percent of societies. The label"domestic" indicates that slaves in these societ-ies performed mostly household work, includ-ing gardening, child care, wood and waterfetching, and concubinage. In many societiesthey also performed other chores outside thehousehold, such as accompanying their ownerson travels, soldiering, trading, and serving assacrificial victims. It is generally assumed by so-cial scientists that one key feature of domesticslavery is that the slaves or their offspring wereintegrated into the families who owned themand eventually into the society. Most domesticslaves were women or girls who were either pur-chased from other societies, were born into sla-very, or were taken in slave raids. Women werepreferred over men for a number of reasons: (1)Most of the work performed by domestic slavesis work traditionally performed by women inhorticultural societies; (2) women were moreeasily integrated into these societies because allwomen were exploited to some degree, and,through polygamous marriage or concubinage,female slaves could produce offspring for theirmasters; and (3) women were more easily con-trolled than male slaves, who might revolt or whoprovided sexual competition for their owners.

Although domestic slavery is distinguishedfrom productive slavery, in any given society thedistinction is often less than clear. Slaves mightbe used for a variety of purposes, their treatmentvaried widely, and the possibility of integrationinto society was not always certain. Perhaps thekey distinction between domestic and produc-tive slavery was that in the former, slaves playedonly a limited economic role, while in the latterthey were a major source of labor in the eco-nomic system.

A few examples from around the world in-dicate the variations found in domestic slavery.

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The Tlingit of the northwest coast of NorthAmerica enslaved both Tlingit from otherTlingit subgroups and neighboring peoples suchas the Flathead of Oregon. Only wealthy Tlingitowned slaves, who evidently performed domes-tic chores and perhaps helped hunt and fish, free-ing their wealthy owners to engage in ceremonialand social activities. Slaves were also sacrificedby the wealthy as a sign of their wealth. Tlingitslaves were ethnic outsiders who were not inte-grated into Tlingit clans, and while living in thesame houses as their owners were poorly treated;upon death, they were simply thrown into theocean without ceremony. Tlingit slavery wasended by the Russians in the nineteenth century.

In pre-Communist China, the Black Loloenslaved Han Chinese, who occupied the low-est status in Lolo society, beneath both theupper-class Black Lolo and lower-class WhiteLolo. Han slaves worked in the fields and in thehouseholds; they might also be enslaved by theWhite Lolo, but this was less common. Slaveswere acquired by kidnapping Han travelers, raid-ing Han villages, or stealing slaves from otherBlack Lolo villages. While children of Han slaveswere also slaves, over three or four generationsthey might establish their own households, dis-avow their Han ancestry, and assimilate intoLolo society as White Lolo, in which status theytoo could own Han slaves.

The Somali engaged in the slave trade astraders, but also used domestic slaves who ex-isted as a social category beneath the outcastesaby who performed most of the menial economiclabor as part of a patron-client relationship withthe Somali. Slaves, on the other hand, wereowned by their masters, although they might bepaid for their work, as those who traveled as trad-ers certainly were. Somali domestic slaves couldbe integrated into society through marriage orsexual relations. A slave woman who married asab remained a slave, but her children were sab;children of a slave woman and her master werefree and looked after by the master. Slaves could

also win their freedom through manumission,although as freemen they did not enjoy the samestatus as Somali and had no clan affiliation. Sinceslaves were often treated as members of the fam-ily, free status provided little benefit.

Productive SlaveryProductive slavery (also called chattel or eco-nomic slavery) is the most significant form ofslavery in terms of ethnic relations in the con-temporary world. Although productive slaveryhas essentially disappeared, its effects are stillfelt and influence ethnic relations in much ofthe New World. Productive slavery was an eco-nomic arrangement in which slave owners,driven by the profit motive, used slaves as theirlabor force to produce raw materials for process-ing. Slaves were the property of their owners,who could buy, sell, trade, and use them in anyway they chose and which market conditionspermitted. However, in no slave society wereslave owners given total control of all aspects ofthe lives of their slaves.

Productive slavery was justified by a Euro-pean racist ideology that characterized Africansand other non-Europeans as nonhuman or in-ferior to Europeans. Productive slavery usuallydeveloped in advanced, nonindustrialized, agri-cultural societies where other sources of labor,such as hired free labor, were not available. Whileslavery was usually an economic arrangement inwhich slave owners sought to make a profit, theenterprise could be quite costly, given the ex-pense of acquiring, transporting, and maintain-ing slaves. Another cost was frequent slaverevolts, although only one (in Haiti) actually ledto the overthrow of the government and the es-tablishment of a free nation.

From the viewpoint of ethnic relations, slaveowners had no interest in aiding slaves in main-taining their traditional cultures. Thus, slavesimported to the New World from various WestAfrican cultures were simply lumped as cultur-ally the same, despite the fact that they spoke

g220

different languages and had many other culturaldifferences. In New World slavery, much of thetraditional cultures was lost, although in somesituations syncretic cultures developed, basedon a mix of African, American Indian, andEuropean cultural traits. Only recently, theAfrocentric movement has stressed the Africanorigins of African-American culture in theAmericas.

Slavery in the New World is the major ex-ample of productive slavery in human history.Between 1500 and 1850, approximately 12 to15 million African slaves were imported to theNew World by the Dutch, Spanish, Portuguese,English, and French. An undetermined num-ber of American Indians were also enslaved,mainly by the Spanish and Portuguese in SouthAmerica. The trans-Atlantic slave trade andNew World plantation economy were a highlyprofitable economic arrangement for the Euro-pean colonists—slaves from West Africa werecaptured mainly by other Africans from differ-ent ethnic groups. This activity represented aEuropean-instigated expansion of traditionaldomestic slavery, and made raiding for slaves amajor economic activity. Attention also shifted

SLAVERY

from taking women to taking men, who weremore desirable for New World slavery. WestAfrica was, and remains today, a heavily popu-lated region—even centuries of slave trade hashad little effect on the overall population or onthe ability of West African societies to sustainthemselves. In the New World, the majority ofslaves went to large plantations in Brazil, north-ern South America, and the Caribbean, withsugarcane plantations taking the majority of theslaves. In North America there were relativelyfew large plantations, and most slaves workedon family farms, where cotton and tobacco werethe major crops. The slave trade and slaveryended in the 1800s. Britain outlawed slavery in1808 and freed slaves in its colonies in 1838; bythe 1870s nearly all slave societies had outlawedslavery. Brazil was the last New World societyto do so, in 1888. Under pressure from Euro-pean nations, slavery was alsd^banned in the Is-lamic world and Africa by the twentieth century,although the practice persisted in some placesuntil the middle of the century.

A variety of explanations has been offeredfor productive slavery. One suggests that slaveryis a step in the evolution of human society, an

A copper engraving portrays a slave dealer auctioning slaves on the coast of Africa.

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idea now dismissed, given that the majority ofhuman societies never had slavery. Another ex-planation stresses the economic rationality ofslavery, and suggests that slavery occurs whenthe costs of keeping slaves are less than the eco-nomic benefits reaped from their work. Thisexplanation also suggests that slavery ends whenthe costs exceed the benefits. The weakness ofthis explanation is that it ignores the social andpolitical costs and benefits of slavery that wereoften beyond the control of the slave owner. Themost compelling explanation for productive sla-very is the idea that, as in New World societies,when land is free or easily available and can beworked by the landowners, free labor will be dif-ficult to acquire for large agricultural enterprises;therefore, the only way help can be obtained isthrough subjugation, with slavery being one al-ternative. This explanation also assumes that astrong centralized government will enact andenforce laws that support slavery, and that theeconomic system is sufficiently developed to sup-port large-scale slave trading. All of these con-ditions were present in the New World duringthe slave era.

Islamic SlaveryDistinguished from both domestic and produc-tive slavery is Islamic slavery, occurring through-out the Islamic world from A.D. 650 well intothe twentieth century in some nations (slaverywas not banned in Saudi Arabia until 1962 andOman until 1970). The rules governing slaverywere carefully spelled out in the Quran (Koran)and subsequent interpretations. As in all formsof slavery, enslavement of members of one's ownethnic group (in this case, Muslims) was for-bidden. Slavery was of crucial importance in theOttoman Empire, with Slavic slaves importedfrom the Balkans and others imported from Af-rica. Numbering perhaps 20 percent of the popu-lation in Istanbul, slaves performed much of thephysical labor required to maintain the empire,serving as domestic help and as concubines un-

til the decline of slavery in the late 1800s. Is-lamic slavery, particularly in the Middle East,was both domestic and productive in purpose.About 18 million slaves were taken by Islamicnations in the 13 centuries from 650 to 1900.Many were used as household help, servants, andconcubines, and some were used as soldiers. Fe-male slaves, because of their worth as domesticsand concubines, were especially valued, as wereeunuchs for household service, and many boyswere castrated for this purpose. Slaves taken orpurchased in Africa were widely traded acrossthe Middle East and Southeast Asia, and insome places, such as East Africa, slaves workedin productive roles on plantations in addition totheir domestic duties. In Islamic slavery, therewas a deep tradition of manumission, and al-lowing one s slaves to buy their freedom broughthonor to the masters. Not all children of slavesbecame slaves; for example, children of concu-bines were considered free.

Contemporary Forms of SlaveryBoth domestic and productive slavery are nowmainly institutions of the past. Mauritania, thelast nation to practice productive slavery, hasessentially ended the institution, althoughformer slaves continue to live in poverty. How-ever, slavery or slaverylike practices in differentforms is still common around the world, andsome experts believe that there are now moreindividuals living in slavelike circumstances thanat any point in human history.

The three major forms of slavery today arechild labor, debt bondage, and forced labor.Other forms include servile marriage, in whichwomen have no choice in getting married; pros-titution; and the sale of human organs.

Perhaps as many as 100 million childrenworldwide are exploited for their labor. That is,they are forced to work, work long hours in un-healthy conditions, and are paid little or noth-ing for their labor. Some children are local orfrom the same nation as the exploiters, while in

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other cases they may be taken, with or withoutparental permission, and shipped elsewhere.Children so exploited maybe as young as 5 yearsof age, and most are under 12. Forms of childlabor include child carpet weavers in India, Pa-kistan, Nepal, and Morocco; child domestic ser-vants in many West African nations, Bangladesh,and elsewhere; street beggars in many ThirdWorld nations, especially in cities that drawmany Western tourists; prostitutes for the tour-ist trade in the Philippines and Thailand; andcamel jockeys in the Middle East. The sale ofchildren—by their parents and middlemen, of-ten with government sanction—from poor fami-lies in Third World nations to wealthier peoplein developed nations is also considered a formof child labor, particularly since it is not alwaysclear how much freedom the parents had inchoosing to sell their child. Until the end ofCommunist rule, Romania was a major sourceof adoptive children for the United States, withPeru now filling that role. Child labor is consid-ered desirable by employers because it is cheap,children are easy to control and replace, they canperform some tasks that require small fingers andmore dexterity better than adults, and they areless likely to revolt.

Debt bondage is an economic arrangementin which an individual pledges his labor againstdebts. Ideally, he will work off the debt and willthen be economically free. However, it rarelyworks this way, and most individuals and theirfamilies in debt bondage remain so for life. Insome nations, that obligation is passed on to theirchildren. In India alone there are an estimated6.5 million people living in debt bondage. Thissituation was created in part by the absence ofbankruptcy laws, which made it necessary for aperson to place himself in debt bondage in or-der to repay his debts. Although debt bondagewas banned by law in 1976, the practice contin-ues in many rural regions. Debt bondage is com-mon throughout all of South Asia, and is foundin Pakistan, Nepal, and Bangladesh as well as

India. Most of those in debt bondage performagricultural work.

Forced labor refers to a situation where in-dividuals are coerced into working in conditionsthat are often unsafe and usually for low wages.Recent examples of forced labor include the useof Brazilian Indians in forestry, mining, rubbertapping, and prostitution; forced prostitution inTurkey; Haitian sugarcane workers in the Do-minican Republic; and Peruvian and Salvador-ian domestic laborers in the United States. Thelatter are individuals who are in the country il-legally, and thus are sometimes exploited by theiremployers. Knowing that they have less recourseto the judicial and administrative protection thanwould legal immigrants or citizens, their em-ployers may pay them low wages and make themwork long hours.

Perhaps the primary cause of modern formsof slavery is the vast differences in wealth be-tween Western and some other nations andThird World nations, which leaves the residentsof the latter vulnerable as a source of cheap la-bor for products and services to be sold towealthy nations or their citizens. In addition,high levels of unemployment and poverty inmany nations leave many people no choice butto allow themselves to be exploited in slavelikesituations. A third factor is that in many nations,citizens are afforded more rights and protectionthan are noncitizens, making the latter vulner-able to exploitation. A final factor is ethnic andreligious discrimination in some nations, whichmeans that some groups will have less economicopportunity than others and are less likely to beprotected from discrimination by the government.

See also COLONIALISM; RACE AND RACISM; SYN-CRETIC CULTURES.

Centre for Human Rights. (1991) ContemporaryForms of Slavery. Fact Sheet No. 14.

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STEREOTYPES

Christensen, James. (1954) Double Descentamong the Fanti.

Gordon, Murray. (1989) Slavery In the ArabWorld.

Jordan, Winthrop. (1974) The White MansBurden.

Klein, Laura F. (1975) Tlingit Women and TownPolitics.

Lewis, I. M. (1955) Peoples of the Horn of Africa.

Lin, Yueh-hwa. (1947) The Lolo of Liang-Shan.Translated from the Chinese by Ju Shu Pan.

Miers, Suzanne, and Igor Kopytoff, eds. (1977)Slavery in Africa: Historical and Anthropologi-cal Perspectives.

Nieboer, Herman J. (1900) Slavery as an Indus-trial System.

Patterson, Orlando. (1982) Slavery and SocialDeath: A Comparative Study.

Pryor, Frederic L. (1977) The Origins of theEconomy.

Rubin, Vera, and Arthur Tuden, eds. (1977)Comparative Perspectives on Slavery in NewWorld Plantation Societies.

Sawyer, Roger. (1986) Slavery in the TwentiethCentury.

van den Berghe, Pierre L. (1981) The EthnicPhenomenon.

A stereotype is a beliefor image in which a fewattributes of a group are

exaggerated or simplified, and the group is de-scribed or evaluated in terms of these attributes.Stereotypes can be negative or positive, and arecommonly applied by members of an ethnicgroup to their own as well as to other ethnic

groups. Most stereotypes of other groups arenegative, while stereotypes of one s own groupare usually positive (although they may be seenas negative by outsiders). Stereotypes often havesome basis in reality, although they are oversim-plifications and ignore the complexity of thebehaviors described in stereotypical ways. Forexample, Jews in medieval Europe were widelybelieved to be dishonest and greedy because theywere moneylenders, and cowardly because theywere the frequent targets of physical abuse. Thecomplexity ignored by these stereotypes is thatJews were forced to be moneylenders by religiouslaws of the time, which barred Christians fromsuch activity, and that Jews were forbidden toown or carry weapons, thereby rendering themdefenseless. Similarly, in the United States inthe early twentieth century, Italian immigrantsfrom southern Italy were seen as able to per-form only hard, manual labor. While Italian menoften did take such work, it was because theywere prevented from finding work in the tradesand industries that were open to other immi-grants from central and northern Europe.

Stereotyping apparently occurs in all multi-cultural societies and evidently serves to sim-plify and help order a complex social world.This simplification becomes a cognitive modelof the world and thus enables individuals to in-teract with others from different groups. Overtime, the model is reinforced through the ob-servation of behaviors that support the stereo-type and the failure to observe behaviors thatcontradict it. Stereotyping is a key componentof ethnocentrism, racism, and derogatory eth-nic humor, as it provides the image of othergroups that is the basis of these practices. In situ-ations of open and prolonged ethnic conflict,what has been called a "mirror image" form ofstereotyping might occur, in which each groupholds a similar view of themselves that is thenear opposite of the view they have of the othergroup. For example, in the 1970s both Indians

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SYNCRETIC CULTURES

and Pakistanis saw themselves as peacful, reli-gious, kind, democratic, and friendly, while theysaw the other group as cruel, selfish, warlike, anddishonest.

See also ETHNIC HUMOR; ETHNOCENTRISM;RACE AND RACISM.

Allport, Gordon W. (1954) The Nature ofPrejudice.

Royce, Anya Peterson. (1982) Ethnic Identity:Strategies of Diversity.

Segall, Marshall H., et al. (1990) Human Be-havior in Global Perspective.

SYNCRETICCULTURES

Whenever two or morecultures come into con-tact, there is a mixing ofsome elements from each.

Syncretism is one specific type of cultural blend-ing that, in its most extreme form, results in thedevelopment of a new culture or ethnic groupcharacterized by numerous cultural traits andinstitutions that are an amalgam of traits drawnfrom different cultures. A less extreme exampleof syncretism involves the development of newforms of cultural institutions through a blend-ing of traits but not a transformation of the en-tire culture. Syncretism is most evident amongthe African-ancestry cultures of the Caribbeanregion, including those in Brazil, along thenorthern coast of South America, in easternMiddle America, and on the Caribbean islands.The various blendings involve the West Africancultures brought from Africa by slaves, Ameri-can Indian cultures (especially Carib culture),and the cultures of the European settlers—Span-ish, Portuguese, English, French, and Dutch.

African Brazilian Candomble, CubanSanteria, and Haitian Voudun (Voodoo) are allsyncretic religions formed through a combina-tion of theology and practices from African re-ligions brought by slaves and the RomanCatholicism of the European colonizers.Voudun, for example, is based on African ele-ments, primarily from the Fon of Benin, theYoruba of Nigeria, and the Kongo of Zaire andAngola, coupled with the form of Roman Ca-tholicism imposed by the French colonists. FromAfrican religions come various spirits, althoughthey are often redefined to fit the Haitian situa-tion, such as the Yoruba iron smithing spirit,Ogou, called Ogan in rural Haiti and seen asthe spirit of military power; the image of Africaitself as the homeland and the home of the spir-its; and African rites for serving the spirits.Added to this African base and merged with itare elements taken from Roman Catholicism,including specific rites such as baptism, Mass,and confession; Catholic prayers; the names ofsaints; and the role of the "bush priest," whosestatus is based on his ability to conduct Catholicrites in the original Latin. In Haitian Voudunand other syncretic religions, the elements donot simply exist side by side, but are often mergedin various ways. For example, the African godBondye, the "Good God," is linked with theChristian God while the Snake deity, Danbala,is linked to St. Patrick, who is depicted withsnakes around his neck. Earlier in the twentiethcentury, social scientists viewed syncretic ele-ments of a culture such the Voudun religion asan adaptive response to the colonial situation thatenabled oppressed peoples to live in both theirown and the world of the colonists. More re-cently, syncretism has become a mechanism ofresistance and revolt, through which African-ancestry communities in Brazil, Suriname, Haiti,and elsewhere developed their own sense of aunique ethnic consciousness and used that con-sciousness to seek recognition and political

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power. In Brazil, syncretic religions are an im-portant element in the black consciousnessmovement. In Haiti, Voudun played a role inthe overthrow of the Duvalier government in1986, as it had in the slave revolt of 1789-1804that ended French rule, the only such revolt thathas been successful in human history.

The label syncretic cultures is used for somepeoples of Middle America known as BlackCaribs or Garifima; they are descended fromAfrican slaves and American Indians, and theirmodern culture is a mix of African, AmericanIndian, and European elements. The BlackCaribs of Honduras are descendants of escapedslaves who settled on the island of St. Vincentbeginning in 1635 and the Carib Indians thenresident there. After 1796, when the British tookthe island from the French, these Black Caribsfled west, ultimately settling in Honduras. Aselsewhere, syncretism in Black Carib culture ismost noticeable in the religion, which combinesthe Catholic liturgy, saints, and the afterworldwith African ritual, theology, and spirits. Syn-cretism is also found in the economic system, inthe diet, in kinship, and in politics. The BlackCarib diet, for example, includes cassava breadand chili peppers (Carib Indian), fish stews andcooking in oil (African), and the growing ofcrops for sale (European) as well as for their ownconsumption.

Syncretism is a poorly understood phenom-enon, and little is known about how cultural el-ements become integrated or why some elementsof culture, such as religion, are more open tosyncretization than are other elements, such asthe kinship system, which is more likely to sim-ply change, with the traditional replaced by thenew. Additionally, the study of the developmentof syncretic cultures or cultural institutions is oneof historical and ethnohistorical reconstruction,the findings of which are open to various inter-pretations. To some extent, interest in NewWorld syncretism has waned in recent years;

interest has shifted to the unique features—bothpast and present—of indigenous and diasporacultures in the New World.

One factor that does seem to affect syncre-tism is the extent to which new elements fit withthe old. An ongoing worldwide syncretic phe-nomenon is the attraction of many Gypsypeoples (most of whom are Roman Catholic) toPentecostalism (both religions merged withsome uniquely Gypsy beliefs and practices) dueto the fit between aspects of Pentecostalism andthe Gypsy ethos. For example, the PiemonteseSinti of northern Italy have been drawn toPentecostalism by its use of miracle cures anddivine revelation, which fit Sinti interests; theease of becoming a minister (celibacy is not re-quired); the ease of ministering (which is allowedin the Sinti language); and the communal na-ture of the rites, which bring different commu-nities together.

See also ASSIMILATION; MIXED-ANCESTRYPEOPLES.

Apter, Andrew. (1991) "Herskovitss Heritage:Rethinking Syncretism in the AfricanDiaspora." Diaspora 1: 235-260.

Bastide, Roger. (1960) The African Religions ofBrazil: Toward a Sociology of Interpretation ofCivilizations. Translated by H. Sebba.

Coelho, Ruy G. (1955) The Black Carib of Hon-duras: A Study in Acculturation.

Courlander, H., and Remy Bastien, eds. (1966)Religion and Politics in Haiti.

Formoso, Bernard. (1992) "Piemontese Sinti."In Encyclopedia of World Cultures. Volume 4y

Europe, edited by Linda A. Bennett, 199-201.

Herskovits, Melville J. (1966) The New World Ne-gro: Selected Papers inAfroamerican Studies.

Murphy, Joseph M. (1988) Santeria: An AfricanReligion in America.

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An autonomous regionwithin the People's Re-public of China, Tibetcovers 470,000 square

miles. Tibet's average elevation above sea levelis approximately 12,000 feet; the region is bor-dered by the Himalayas on the south and theKunluns on the north. Tibetans refer to them-selves with names indicating geographicallocation or tribal group names. The Tibet Au-tonomous Region (its official name in China)borders India and Nepal; roads connect the re-gion to the rest of China. It is a vast area, thoughthinly populated. The 1990 Chinese census lists4.5 million Tibetans in China, about 2.25 mil-lion in Tibet, and the others in Qinghai, Gansu,Sichuan, and Yunnan provinces, where a num-ber of autonomous districts have been designatedfor them. More than 100,000 refugees live inIndia and about 14,000 in Nepal. It is likely thatmore Han Chinese than Tibetans now live inTibet, and in the plateau region they clearly out-number the Tibetans. Tibetans are Buddhists,and for over 300 years they have been ruled bythe Dalai Lama (the fourteenth Dalai Lama is

currently living in exile in India). The DalaiLama is a Buddhist monk believed upon deathto reincarnate as a small child who resumes lead-ership. Although accurate numbers are difficultto find, as many as one-fifth of the male popu-lation of Tibet have traditionally been Lamas,or monks. Tibetans are highly devoted to Bud-dhism and the Dalai Lama himself, and haveremained devout in their adherence despite 43years of Communist rule. The Tibetan languagebelongs to the Tibeto-Burma group, and iswidely spoken, although Chinese is encouragedand taught in schools.

Tibetan Himalayan kingdoms may haveappeared as early as the fourth century A.D. Re-corded history indicates their presence by theseventh century, about the time when Buddhismbecame established. Tibetan Buddhism is basedon a combination of beliefs and practices fromIndian Buddhism, Tantrism, and indigenousreligions. From A.D. 632 to 842, the TibetanEmpire ruled much of central Asia; it was dur-ing this period that Buddhism became a centralfeature of Tibetan culture and identity as a dis-tinct ethnic group in the region. From the 1300sto the middle 1600s, a series of secular and theo-cratic dynasties ruled, with the Yellow Hat sectof Tibetan Buddhism and the Dalai Lama gain-ing control in about 1642 and ruling for 300years. China claims that its sovereignty over theregion goes back 1,300 years. China controlledall of Tibet from at least the 1700s, although fora period of 38 years in the early twentieth cen-tury, Tibet essentially ruled itself and had littleadministrative contact with the rest of China.During this period, from 1912 to 1950, China'scentral government was weak and engaged incivil war for some time. As a result, the remoteand self-contained region of Tibet enjoyed defacto independence and self-rule. Several nationsdealt with Tibet as if it were independent, butthis was largely because of convenience and ease.It is important to note that no nation has everformally recognized Tibet as an independent

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nation, and international law has no clear pre-cedents that allow independence on the basis ofhistorical occupancy. For their part, Tibetans seetheir nation as illegally occupied by the Chinese;the Chinese, of course, consider it as part ofChina.

In October 1950 the Chinese People's Lib-eration Army began to move into Tibet. It wasnot technically an invasion, because Tibet wasofficially a part of China. The self-rule of theprevious 38 years, however, and the Tibetans'definition of themselves as ethnically distinct andpolitically separate from the Han Chinese ledthe Tibetans to feel that their nation had beeninvaded by an external force. In October of thatyear, Tibetan and Chinese forces faced each otherat Chamdo, and Tibet was crushed. In the yearssince the so-called peaceful liberation of Tibet,a series of uprisings against Chinese control hasbeen put down. The largest uprising occurred in1959 in Lhasa, the capital of Tibet, in which atleast 600 people were killed, according to Chi-nese sources. Tibetans estimated the death tollas much higher. The Dalai Lama fled to India,and nearly 100,000 Tibetans followed him. Thisexile community, centered in Dharamsala, hasbeen the source of much information regardingthe Tibetan point of view of the situation in Ti-bet. Although many consider Tibetan reports tobe exaggerated, they are used to balance Chi-nese government reports, which are also viewedwith some skepticism.

The Chinese Cultural Revolution, whichtook place from 1966 to 1979, was effective indamaging Tibetan culture. During the revolu-tion, nearly all Tibetan monasteries, scriptures,and other historical and cultural material weresystematically destroyed, and the practice ofBuddhism was widely suppressed. The policy ofthe Cultural Revolution was the destruction ofthe four "Olds:" old thought, old culture, old tra-ditions, old customs. In a land that was oncehome to between 3,000 and 4,000 monasteriesand religious monuments, only 13 survived the

revolution, and perhaps as few as 200 have beenrebuilt since then. The Chinese governmentclaimed that Tibetans themselves were activeparticipants in the destruction.

In April 1980 the Central Committee of theChinese Communist party held special meet-ings to determine new policies for Tibet. As aresult of the subsequent investigative visits to theregion, a series of six new policies were insti-tuted to develop a more prosperous and edu-cated Tibet Autonomous Region, including thelifting of taxes, a substantial loosening of therestrictions on religion, granting greater eco-nomic support to the region, allowing freer ex-pression of Tibetan culture, and giving greaterresponsibility to Tibetan administrators.

Today, the Chinese government claims tohave helped spur the economic development ofthe region. On a broad scale, much greater reli-gious freedom is allowed than ever before withinCommunist China, although in some regionspictures of the Dalai Lama are still forbidden inpublic places and many Han Chinese continueto regard Tibetan beliefs as primitive. The Ti-betans, for their part, tend to view the Chineseas overly materialistic, a perception supportedby Chinese control of industry and businessesin Tibet. Although Tibetans may enjoy a moremodern and prosperous existence, many still feelthat they are a separate culture and nation fromthe Chinese and should be independent. Publicdisplays of these sentiments have been swiftlyrepressed by the Chinese, who in 1989 imposedmartial law for 14 months in response to anti-Chinese protests by monks and nuns. The lift-ing of the martial law in 1990 was followed byan increase in the flow of Tibetan refugees toNepal and India. In May 1993 what began as arelatively small (125 people) protest against in-flation quickly grew in size and intensity, andshifted to a much more political agenda. Tibet-ans in exile are particularly critical of the Chi-nese practice of thamzing. Thamzing is a formof torture, confession, and public punishment

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in which a wrongdoer is confronted by familyand community members, who participate outof fear of enduring thamzing themselves. It isunclear what possible solution may be reached,as China is unlikely to relinquish control of Ti-bet, which it has officially controlled since theeighteenth century.

More than 100,000 Tibetans live in India, acommunity established more than 30 years ago.Since 1986 some 14,000 refugees have madetheir way to India via Nepal. The Indian gov-ernment allows them free entry and residence.Tibetan refugees in Nepal number 14,000, againdating to the 1959 exile. Many are permanentlysettled there and involved in the prosperouscarpet-weaving industry. Most refugees whoenter Nepal now only pass through on their wayto India. Discussions between the Tibetans andthe Chinese have not led to the Dalai Lamasreturn, even as a strictly religious leader, andthe Chinese are adamant in their refusal to dis-cuss the possibility of Tibetan independence orautonomy.

French, Rebecca. (1993) The Golden Yoke: TheLegal System of Buddhist Tibet.

Mullin, Chris, and Phuntsog Wangyal. (1983)The Tibetans: Two Perspectives on Tibetan-Chinese Relations.

Snellgrove, David, and Hugh Richardson.(1980) A Cultural History of Tibet.

TIMORESE ININDONESIA

The Atoni are the origi-nal inhabitants of the is-land of Timor, part ofthe Lesser Sundas archi-

pelago that runs east of Java. The population ofthe entire island of Timor is approximately 1.51million. Timor has been settled for thousands

of years, not falling under European coloniza-tion until around 1520, when the Portuguesearrived on a search for sandalwood. By the endof the sixteenth century, Timor was Portugueseterritory, the sandalwood export industry was es-tablished, and Christianity was gaining an in-creased number of converts.

Beginning in 1613 the Dutch waged a cam-paign to gain control of Timor and the surround-ing islands. This came to fruition in 1849, whenthey finally gained control of West Timor. In1949 West Timor was granted freedom from theNetherlands, with the exception of the smallenclave called Oecusse Ambeno, which re-mained under Portuguese rule. Approximately900,000 people now live in West Timor, and550,900 in East Timor, the majority of whomare Roman Catholic. However, accurate demo-graphic information has not been available forsome time.

Despite continued rebellions, East Timorremained under Portuguese control until 1974.At that time Portugal determined that maintain-ing its colonies was no longer in its best interest,the main consideration being the rising cost ofkeeping control over various principalities thatwere actively resisting Portuguese rule. Takingits cue from revolutionary African leaders,East Timor formed FRETILIN (Frente Revo-lucionaria do Timor Leste Independente, or theRevolutionary Front of East Timor). On 28November 1975 FRETILIN declared the colonyto be independent and renamed it the Demo-cratic Republic of East Timor. Though the Por-tuguese government and the government of EastTimor had undergone negotiations that wouldhave allowed for complete independence in 1978,civil war prevailed and FRETILIN became thede facto government. Portugal never formallyrecognized this early independence even thoughit was preparing to grant independence.

Independence did not last long. An Indo-nesian invasion of East Timor came almost im-mediately after the declaration of the Democratic

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Republic of East Timor. Indonesia was moti-vated by a number of considerations, the twokey ones being the difficulty it would face in in-vading East Timor later after it was accepted asan independent nation by the international com-munity, and Indonesia's desire to discourageother peoples from seeking independence. Thenations of the world did nothing to stop thisinvasion, perhaps because Western nations weremost interested in supporting the developmentof a stable, non-Communist government in In-donesia. In any case, there was no attempt tostop or punish Indonesia's blatant disregard forinternational law, although Indonesian rule ofEast Timor is not recognized by any of the mem-bers of the United Nations (U.N.). Despite per-sistent reports of human rights violationsincluding torture, execution, and religious per-secution of the Atoni, who continue to resistIndonesian control even 18 years later, little in-ternational action has been taken to reverse thesituation. Indonesians are predominantly Mus-lim, while Timorese are mainly Roman Catho-lic. Immediately prior to the invasion, populationestimates for East Timor averaged around650,000. In 1980 that number had been reducedto about 550,000 (according to Indonesian offi-cials), nearly 15 percent less. Other sources claimthe population has been reduced by as much as50 percent. These deaths are a result of fighting,executions, and famine: The Indonesian govern-ment has taken to the destruction of crops in aneffort to starve the people into submission.

Until recently, efforts to pass a U.N. resolu-tion criticizing Indonesia for its blatant and ex-treme violation of human rights had beenblocked by Australia and Japan, as well as theUnited States, all of whom have strong economicinterests in Indonesia. With a new administra-tion, the United States shifted its support to theEuropean Community's effort to pass such aresolution, and in March 1993 the first such reso-lution passed. International attention was drawnto the issue in November 1993, when Indone-

sian security forces opened fire on a crowd ofTimorese who had gathered at the funeral of asupporter of East Timorese independence. Atleast 50 people were killed, but death reportsranged up to 200. Also in 1993, Indonesia andPortugal agreed to hold talks to find a solutionacceptable to both countries. Having never for-mally relinquished control over East Timor, Por-tugal is now advocating self-determination, butIndonesia claims that the East Timorese havechosen to be part of Indonesia. Most observersbelieve it unlikely that the East Timorese wouldchoose to remain a part of a nation that has car-ried out a policy of intimidation, torture, and per-secution for the entire duration of its presence.

Ormeling, F. J. (1956) The Timor Problem: AGeographical Interpretation of an Underdevel-oped Island.

Sherlock, Kevin. (19%$) A Bibliography of Timor.

Suter, Keith. (1982) East Timor and West Irian.

More people travel toother nations and en-counter people from

other ethnic groups through tourism than by anyother means. Tourism is now the world s largesteconomic enterprise, generating some $400billion each year. While the largest number oftourists today come from the major industri-alized nations of the world—the United States,Canada, Great Britain, Germany, France,Scandinavia, Japan, Switzerland, and Italy—nonation is untouched by the effects of tourism. Atourist "is a temporarily leisured person whovoluntarily visits a place away from home for thepurpose of experiencing a change." (Smith 1989,1) Tourists and mass tourism are essentiallytwentieth-century phenomena, and tourism has

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become a major source of revenue in many na-tions since the end of World War II. Prior tothe twentieth century, tourism was mainly anactivity of the wealthy, who spent portions ofthe year at second residences located in a moredesirable climate. The recent growth of tourism,and especially travel to other regions of one s ownnation or other nations, is a product of indus-trial and postindustrial society. Among specificfactors that have facilitated tourism are theshorter work week, longer and paid vacationperiods each year, two-income families, con-sumer credit to finance vacations, early retire-ment, increased longevity, and a decrease in thedesire to save money. Rapid and relatively lowcost air travel and the internationalization of thehotel industry, which allows the provision ofhomelike accommodations virtually anywhere inthe world, have facilitated the rapid growth oftourism.

Types of TourismAnthropologist Valene Smith notes that tour-ism comes in five major forms: ethnic, cultural,historical, environmental, and recreational. Allforms bring members of different ethnic groupsinto contact and therefore all have potential im-plications for ethnic relations.

Ethnic tourism generally takes the form oforganized tours, often with a professional guidesuch as an anthropologist or a member of thehost group, that place the members of the tour-ist group in direct contact with members of thehost ethnic group. The purpose of ethnic tour-ism is to allow the tourists to experience a cul-ture that is markedly different from their own.The experience can take the form of observingceremonies and dances within their cultural con-text, visits to homes, shopping in stores ownedby members of the host group that sell art orhandcrafts manufactured by host artisans, andtours of the community. Ethnic tours may focuson one culture or cover a number of differentcultures; for example, some tours to the Ameri-

can Southwest include visits to both Apacheanand Pueblo communities. Depending on the lan-guages spoken and the inclinations and person-alities of the tourists and hosts, ethnic tourismmay provide the opportunity for informal face-to-face interaction between tourists and hosts.Ethnic tourism might involve the observationof many features of a culture, as in visits to Pueblocommunities in the southwestern United Stateswhere tourists can observe the daily public lifeof the community, or it may only involve theobservation of certain cultural features, such asthe architecture and funeral ceremonies of theToradja in Indonesia or initiation ceremonies ofthe Chambri in Papua New Guinea. Ethnictourists are a self-selected group, often with aninterest in learning about and understanding theculture they are visiting. However, as they oftenhave stereotypical (positive and negative) imagesof the culture and spend little time visiting, eth-nic tourism rarely produces any real long-termchange in knowledge or attitudes about othercultures.

Cultural tourism is similar to ethnic tour-ism, although the focus is on an often idealizedor reconstructed representation of a culture orcultural tradition. In both types of tourism, aprimary motivation for the tourist is a "searchfor authenticity," which, it has been suggested,is lacking in the industrialized and post-indus-trialized societies that produce most tourists.Cultural tourism has many different examples:powwows marketed to the general public,American Indian fairs, and rodeos; living re-creations of maritime, farming, rural commu-nities, and such diverse communities as theCajuns and Shakers; cultural centers, such asRotorua in New Zealand, the Polynesian Cul-tural Center in Hawaii, and the Indian PuebloCultural Center in New Mexico; as well as dance,music, and theater performances and art andhandcrafts produced for tourists. Depending onthe situation, contact between tourists and mem-bers of the host community may by limited or

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frequent. However, since the representation ofthe host culture is meant to attract and enter-tain the tourists, cultural tourism usually resultsin an oversimplification and standardization ofthe host culture. What is displayed of the cul-ture is mostly the material aspects, in the formof tools, weapons, clothing, boats, and houses,and expressive culture in the form of dance,music, and theater, which can be appreciated atan aesthetic level by tourists who may have noknowledge of the culture. Cultural tourism isextremely popular with tourists and often finan-cially beneficial to the host community.

Historical tourism is the veneration of thepast, largely through visits to important sites inWestern and other civilizations such as Rome,Athens, Jerusalem, the Yucatan Peninsula, andAngor Wat in Cambodia. Historical tourism isnearly always linked to a highly developed tour-ist industry in both the tourist and host nations.Interest in the host culture is usually incidentalor secondary, and contact between tourists andlocal people is mostly economic, with the formerpurchasing and the latter providing products andservices.

Environmental tourism, or ecotourism, istravel to usually distant and often remote placesto see and experience a different environment.For Western and East Asian tourists, these in-clude tropical rainforests in Southeast Asia andSouth America, savannah lands in Africa, andthe mountains of northern south Asia. Whenthe regions are also the home of non-Westerncultures, ethnic tourism is often combined withenvironmental tourism, and the indigenouspeoples are then brought into the tourist indus-try both as attractions and as providers of goodsand services.

Recreational tourism offers relaxation in anenvironment or enjoyment of activities that arenot available at home. Recreational tourism of-ten centers around warm, sunny locales withwater at hand for such activities as swimmingand boating, and also often involves the pursuit

of enjoyment through sports. Recreational tour-ism is seasonal, with the summer months andlong vacation periods drawing most tourists. Theeffect of recreational tourism on non-Westerncultures is unclear, and different observers oftenarrive at different conclusions regarding thepositive versus negative effects on the localcommunity.

Effects of TourismAll forms of tourism began expanding rapidlyin the non-Western world in the 1960s as po-litical leaders, developers, and the tourist in-dustry reacted to and helped to create a demandfor international tourism. Initially, tourism wasthought to be a relatively inexpensive form ofeconomic development in Third World nationsand economically struggling regions situated inwarm, sunny climates with interesting sites andindigenous peoples. Thus, various tourism de-velopment plans were enacted in New Zealand;many smaller Pacific islands such as Fiji andTonga; Indonesian islands such as Java, Bali, andSulawesi; Spain; the southwestern United States;both the Pacific and Caribbean coasts of Mexicoand Central America; and various locales inSouth America. While the effects of tourism arewidely discussed by experts, it is important toremember that tourism is usually but one com-ponent of a broader pattern of socioeconomicdevelopment, and as such may not be the cause,or perhaps may be only a partial cause, of effectsattributed to it.

In general, the economic effects of tourismhave not been as beneficial as originally believed.One major problem is that tourism is not ascheap or as reliable an income generator as origi-nally predicted. Seasonal fluctuations, naturaldisasters such as hurricanes, shifts in touristinterests, and the effects of recessions in tourist-providing nations all make tourism an unpre-dictable and uncontrollable economicinvestment for the host nation. Additionally, de-

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veloping a tourist industry and keeping it com-petitive with other nations requires considerableexpense to construct and expand airports, en-large ports, and build and maintain roads, all ofwhich are paid for by the host nation or withmoney borrowed from Western nations or in-ternational organizations, which must be repaidwith interest. Other tourist facilities such as ho-tels, casinos, and restaurants are often financedand owned by outsiders, who remove the profitsfrom the local economy. Some estimates sug-gest that 80 percent of tourist dollars spent inThird World nations are returned to the West-ern world.

For the people themselves, reliance on tour-ism often brings either a decline in, or an endto, the traditional economic system based onagriculture and the domestic production of food,and involves the people in the internationalmoney economy. This involvement often takesthe form of the sale of land to developers, em-ployment in low-wage service jobs (porters, wait-ers, and maids), and the commercialization ofaspects of the traditional culture; that is, the saleof dances, art, music, and religious practices totourists.

These economic changes are sometimes ac-companied by social changes, including an in-crease in prostitution, drug use, and crime;conflicts over political power; factionalism be-tween traditionalists and those who prefer toparticipate in the tourism; and the destructionof the traditional culture.

At the same time, it is obvious that the ef-fects of tourism are not always negative. Amongthe benefits are the retention of traditional cus-toms that might have otherwise disappeared ifnot for the tourist market, the re-creation ofpride in one's cultural heritage among indigenouspeoples who have suffered under colonialism, thecalling of attention to fragile or disappearing cul-tures or environments, and the creation of em-ployment, particularly for younger members ofthe community.

As regards the effect of tourism on ethnicrelations, the effect on individual tourists de-pends on the type of tourists they are. Thosewho seek only diversion or adventure may belittle influenced by contact with another culture,while those seeking authenticity, a learning ex-perience, or a new sense of their place in theworld may be profoundly affected by their cross-cultural encounter. In general, however, it ap-pears that no form of tourism seems to enhancerelations between Westerners and indigenouspeoples. Rather, because of the preconceivedideas with which tourists arrive, the performancenature of much ethnic and cultural tourism, andthe limited contact between the tourists andhosts, tourism has little direct effect on ethnicrelations. It is possible that in some cases theeffect is to increase hostility, especially inpostcolonial situations where the hosts see gov-ernment-imposed tourism as the continuationof colonial domination.

Experiences with tourism in three differentcultures point to the variety of effects it can haveon non-Western cultures. Tourism has been amostly positive experience for the MashantucketPequot of eastern Connecticut, who in 1991opened what has become an extraordinarily prof-itable gambling casino on their reservation. Thecasino has made the Pequot rich, provided thou-sands of jobs for their white neighbors in an eco-nomically depressed region, and has become amodel for other American Indian nations seek-ing to open or expand gambling operations.

For the Basques in a seacoast community innorthern Spain, the effects of tourism have beenmixed. Because of its location, the communityis an ideal tourist destination, offering an air-port, fishing, sailing, beaches, golf, restaurants,and quaint shops that attract over 40,000 peopleeach year to a village of 10,000. Tourism hasraised the value of local land, increased the stan-dard of living, created economic security, madefamilies into independent economic units, andincreased the size and upward mobility of the

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middle class. But it has also produced familybattles over the inheritance of family property,made the townsfolk dependent on tourism, iso-lated families and made them vulnerable to out-side developers, and left the aged without asocial-support network.

The experience of the African-AmericanSea Islanders of the Georgia and South Caro-lina coastal islands has been largely negative.Development of the islands for tourism beganin the early 1950s; developers bought up muchof the Sea Islanders' land on some islands suchas Hilton Head, and built hotels, condomini-ums, shopping centers, restaurants, golf courses,and other facilities for year-round retirees andseasonal tourists. As Sea Islanders say, "every-thing change up now," meaning that they ownless land, are a minority population on manymajor islands, pay higher taxes, face high un-employment, work mainly as low-paid serviceworkers, send their children to schools domi-nated by white values, are ridiculed for speakingtheir traditional Gullah language, and see thewildlife and marshlands threatened by pollutionand overdevelopment.

Tourism and Indigenous ArtsArt, produced and sold by host peoples, is oftena key component of ethnic, cultural, and envi-ronmental tourism. As with tourism in general,interest in indigenous art as an art form ratherthan as a cultural curiosity is a twentieth-century development. The demand for indig-enous art by outsiders, and outsiders' taste in artand ability to pay, has led to major changes inindigenous art forms. Anthropologist NelsonGraburn places these changes into seven broadcategories. First is the disappearance of a tradi-tional art form, an event that is actually quiterare. Second is the appearance of contact-influenced art, in which the basic form and cul-tural role of the art remains the same, althoughnew tools may be used or there may be smallchanges in technique. Third is the appearance

of commercial fine arts that are produced in thesame way as traditional art, but for sale to out-siders rather than for indigenous use. Fourth isthe appearance of souvenir art—items mass-produced cheaply with little or no concern fortraditional style or technique, and meant for saleto tourists. Fifth is a shift in art style to reinte-grated art forms that combine traditional styleswith introduced techniques or materials. Sixthis the development of assimilated fine arts whenan artist adapts the art form of outsiders. Sev-enth is the development of popular arts whenan artist uses outside forms to express traditionalthemes.

Brameld,T, and M. Matsuyama. (1977) Tour-ism as Cultural Learning: Two ControversialCase Studies in Educational Anthropology.

Cohen, Erik. (1979) "A Phenomenology ofTourist Experiences." Sociology 13:179-201.

Crick, Malcolm. (1989) "Representations ofInternational Tourism in the Social Sciences:Sun, Sex, Sights, Savings, and Servility." InAnnual Review of Anthropology, edited byBernard]. Siegel, 307-344.

Gewertz, Deborah, and Frederick Errington.(1991) Twisted Histories, Altered Contexts:Representing the Chambri in a World System.

Graburn, Nelson H. H., ed. (1976) Ethnic andTourist Arts: Cultural Expression from theThird World.

Graburn, Nelson H. H., and J. Jafari, eds. (1991)"Tourism Social Sciences." Special Issue ofAnnals of Tourism Research 18.

Greenwood, Davydd J. (1972) "Tourism as anAgent of Change: A Spanish Basque Case."Ethnology 11: 80-91.

Harrison, David, ed. (1992) Tourism and the LessDeveloped Countries.

Jones-Jackson, Patricia. (1987) When Roots Die:Endangered Traditions on the Sea Islands.

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MacCannell, Dean. (1992) Empty MeetingGrounds: The Tourist Papers.

Smith, Valene L., ed. (1989) Hosts and Guests:The Anthropology of Tourism. 2d ed.

Turner, L., and J. Ash. (1975) The GoldenHordes: International Tourism and the Plea-sure Periphery.

TRANSNATIONALMIGRATION

Transnational migrationrefers to the processthrough which migrantsmaintain ties to their

homeland, therefore implying that migrants livein a world in which they routinely cross nationaland cultural boundaries. Much of the boundarycrossing takes place through various ties withone's family, household, wider kinship network,and local community in one's nation of origin.Thus, from the transnational perspective, a mi-grant is not simply an isolated individual wholives and works in a new and distant land, butsomeone who remains intimately and regularlylinked to others in his or her homeland; in fact,it may be these ties that motivate or enable himor her to migrate. Transnational ties take a widevariety of forms, including the sending of re-mittances to family members; return to the na-tion of origin; regular contact through mail andphone calls; chain migration, in which individu-als from the same region, local community, orfamily follow earlier migrants; political tiesthrough political organizations in the host na-tion; economic support of political movementsin the homeland; the sending of clothes and foodfrom the homeland to immigrants; temporaryresidence with and other types of support fromearlier immigrants upon arrival in the host na-tion; the provision of child care in the home-land; and reverse remittances, among others.While the exact types of ties tend to vary from

situation to situation, in most situations theytend to form the basis for ongoing networks ofsocial interaction.

Transnational migration is but one of a widerange of transnational flows in the modernworld. Major types of flows include:

1. The flow of people through economic mi-gration, tourism, asylum, exile, etc.

2. The flow of technology and information tosupport the technology and its use, prima-rily through multinational corporations andinternational development projects

3. The flow of money, investments, and capi-tal investment

4. The flow of information, images, and sym-bols through magazines, newspapers, tele-vision, and film

5. The flow of ideas and values

A major and ongoing debate among social sci-entists about these flows is whether they are lead-ing to a world community or whether they areproducing cultural variation around the world.

Although transnational ties have character-ized virtually all immigrant situations through-out human history, they now appear to be a morecentral and ongoing feature of immigration thanin the past. To some extent this is due to therelative ease with which migrants today can com-municate with the homeland and travel back andforth via airplane. When we contrast the ease ofmodern communication and transportation withthat available to nineteenth- and early twenti-eth-century immigrants to the United States andCanada, it is understandable why transmigra-tion is a more common feature of immigrationtoday than in the past, and why it is easier formigrants to maintain a bicultural lifestyle and,over time, develop a bicultural identity thatenables them to function effectively and alter-natively in two cultures. At the same time, home-land ties were strong for earlier generations ofmigrants, and remain so for many today, as

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evidenced by political and economic support forindependence movements in the homeland, themaintenance of ethnic associations in the hostnation, and tourism to explore one s roots.

In a broader sense, assuming that transmi-gration represents a new type of migration pat-tern, it may also be due to changes in the worldeconomic system, the movement toward aworld order, and the involvement of far moreworkers at all levels of national economies inan expanding world system that crosses na-tional boundaries.

Traditional social-science explanations forthe flow of migrant workers generally em-phasized the push-pull, supply-demand, andassimilation aspects of the situation in which im-migrants cross national boundaries. Push-pullsuggests that higher wages in some nations at-tract workers who make lower wages or live inpoverty in other nations. Supply-demand sug-gests that a demand for workers or certain typesof workers, such as domestics or low-skilledworkers, in one nation is matched by a surplusof qualified workers in another nation. Follow-ing the European experience in the UnitedStates, it is assumed that many of these workersand their families will assimilate to the domi-nant culture in the host nation, and ties to thehomeland will weaken markedly. The trans-national approach provides a different interpre-tation in that it stresses the soft or fluid natureof many national boundaries and the economicand political linkages among nations and insti-tutions within them; while not ignoring thepush-pull and supply-demand elements, thisapproach also emphasizes the cross-cultural na-ture of immigration in the modern world.

One exceedingly common form of trans-nationalism is the flow of money from the im-migrant community to the homeland. This oftentakes the form of remittances, in which a por-tion of what is earned in the host nation is sentto family in the homeland. In many oceanic so-

cieties with large overseas populations, such asTonga and Samoa, remittances are now a majorelement of the local economy. Formerly subsis-tence economies have turned into consumereconomies, in which remittances returned fromrelatives in the West (Australia, New Zealand,the United States) allow those in the homelandto purchase goods produced in the West. Re-mittances are extremely common elsewhere aswell, and are a worldwide phenomenon.

Wealth flows from immigrant communitiesback to the homeland in other ways as well. Onepattern is for those who have lived and workedoverseas to return to the homeland, using moneysaved to purchase property or invest in a busi-ness in the homeland. For example, returnees tosouthern Italy from the United States often pur-chase small farms, while Yemenis who work inSaudi Arabia, upon their return to Yemen, of-ten invest in small shops and services, most ofwhich supply or service consumer goods pur-chased with remittances sent by migrants stilloutside Yemen. Thus, remittances and wealthbrought back upon return to the home commu-nity tend to involve the community in the inter-national marketplace as consumers of productsproduced elsewhere. This demand for consumergoods creates a demand for more money, whichin turn requires continued migration in searchof wage labor when such labor is unavailable orpoorly paid in the homeland. The return ofYemeni workers to the homeland also has a cul-tural dimension in that they must show that theyare loyal to the community and still adhere tolocal customs before they are completely reinte-grated into community life.

For Dominican immigrants to the UnitedStates, the accumulation of wealth is importantas a way of achieving middle-class social statusin the homeland. Upon return, their status isdemonstrated by the conspicuous consumptionof Western-produced consumer goods. Again,as in Yemen and elsewhere, a circular pattern is

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created at the local level in which family, kin-ship, and community ties mesh with patterns ofwealth distribution in the overarching contextof international business and the internationaldivision of labor.

Another form of economic tie to the home-land is capital investment in economic institu-tions in the homeland. Such investment, ofcourse, only takes place when the overseas com-munity amasses significant wealth. This patternprevails among post-1965 Indian immigrants tothe United States who, arriving as profession-als, have amassed much wealth (through work,two-income families, and frugality), which somehave invested in India. Some investments havegone to support the development of new busi-nesses, banks, and industries, while others havetaken the form of bonds or savings accounts. Theexperience of these immigrants, called Non-Resident Indians (NRIs) points to many of theinternational and human issues involved intransnational migration. The NRIs are torn be-tween their satisfactory life in the United Statesand loyalty to India, and maintain regular con-tact with friends and relatives, read the Indianpopular press, and inculcate their children withIndian beliefs and customs. The Indian govern-ment and business community use this loyaltyto India to encourage investment, although thereis also resentment that the nonresident commu-nity plays such an active role in Indian politicsand its economy. From the viewpoint of ethnicrelations, the role and status of the NRI com-munity raise basic questions about what it meansto be Indian and the ability of an individual tohave two cultural identities.

Beyond its economic effects listed above,transnational migration has major repercussionson the structure and processes of gender rela-tions, child rearing, the family, and the commu-nity, both in the homeland and overseas.However, these repercussions are dependent ona variety of factors beyond the immigrant expe-

rience, including the nature of the family or re-lationships before immigration, the type of im-migration, and generational changes in patternsof immigration, therefore showing no clear pat-tern across cultures.

See also ASSIMILATION; DIASPORA; ETHNICIDENTITY AND SOLIDARITY; ETHNIC MEDIA; MI-GRANT WORKERS; REFUGEES; TOURISM.

Appadurai, Arjun. (1990) "Disjuncture and Dif-ference in the Global Cultural Economy." InGlobal Culture: Nationalism, Globalizationand Modernity, edited by MichaelFeatherstone, 295-310.

Colton, Nora A. (1993) "Homeward Bound:Yemeni Return Migration." InternationalMigration Review 27: 870-882.

Grasmuck, Sherri, and Patricia R. Pessar. (1991)Between Two Islands:Dominican InternationalMigration.

Lessinger, Johanna. (1992) "Investing or GoingHome? A Transnational Strategy among In-dian Immigrants in the United States." InTowards a Transnational Perspective on Mi-gration: Race, Class, Ethnicity, and National-ism Reconsidered, edited by Nina G. Schiller,Linda Basch, and Cristina Blanc-Szanton.Annals of the New York Academy of Sci-ences 645: 53-80.

Fortes, Alejandro, and Jozsef Borocz. (1993)"Contemporary Immigration: TheoreticalPerspectives on Its Determinants and Modesof Incorporation." International ImmigrationReview 23: 606-630.

Schiller, Nina G., Linda Basch, and CristinaBlanc-Szanton, eds. (1992) Towards aTransnational Perspective on Migration: Race,Class, Ethnicity, and Nationalism Reconsidered.Annals of the New York Academy of Sci-ences 645.

237T

TRIBE

Tribe and tribalism aretwo terms used fre-quently and inconsis-

tently in reference to ethnic groups around theworld. The term tribe is used in four basic ways.

First, it has been used in cultural anthro-pology for about 100 years to refer to a specificcategory of society that displays a particular typeof sociopolitical organization. In this typology,the non-Western, nonindustrialized societies ofthe world are classified as either bands, tribes,chiefdoms, or states. Tribal societies, who priorto dramatic cultural change resulting from con-tact with industrialized societies numbered sev-eral thousand, are characterized by an economybased on horticulture and/or pastoralism, socialorganization centered on village communities orkinship groups such as lineages or clans, an ab-sence of social classes, little or only weak cen-tralized political leadership, and relativelyfrequent warfare among villages. Thus, from thisperspective, only some of the world's societiesare tribes, and it is incorrect to refer to a groupas a tribe unless it is of this sociopolitical type.Anthropologists have attempted to categorize allsocieties of the world (or at least all known, well-described societies—about 1,500 in all) using thisband-tribe-chiefdom-state typology. However,in reference to societies today, the typology isdifficult to apply because most cultures havechanged markedly in the last 50 years. This ty-pology also suggests an evolutionary progressionthroughout human history, for as one movesalong the scale, each type of society is larger, ismore complex, and exerts more control over itsnatural and social environment than the previ-ous type.

The second usage of tribe also involves ef-forts to produce a typology of cultural types.However, here the attempt is less fine and sub-ject to easier misinterpretation. In this sense,tribe refers to all so-called primitive cultures ofthe world, in contrast to all so-called civilizedcultures. When used objectively, the term primi-

tive cultures (small-scale, preliterate, nonliterate,nonindustrialized) refers to those at the low endof the scale of social, political, technological, andeconomic complexity, while civilized cultures areat the high end. For example, among the cul-tures of the indigenous New World at the timeof first contact with Europeans, most of the hun-dreds of American Indian cultures would be con-sidered tribal or primitive, while the Inca, Aztec,and Maya would be considered civilized. Whenused objectively in this way, such use of the con-cept of tribe is legitimate, although perhaps notvery enlightening. However, the use of tribe ortribal as an equivalent for primitive, and in op-position to civilized, often opens the door forethnocentric, simplistic, and sometimes racistinterpretations. These interpretations have ap-peared recently in the use of the concept of tribein discussions about the role and status ofindigenous peoples around the world andmulticultural education in the United States. Atone extreme are those who take an ethnocen-tric, judgmental view of tribal culture. An ex-ample is the view expressed by historian ArthurSchlesinger, Jr., in his The Disuniting of America.Early on, he quotes the Economist: "The virus oftribalism," says the Economist, "...risks becom-ing the AIDS of international politics—lyingdormant for years, then flaring up to destroycountries." (Schlesinger 1992, 11) His defini-tion of tribalism becomes clear later: "As for trib-alism, the word tribe hardly occurs in Afrocentriclexicon; but who can hope to understand Afri-can history without understanding the practices,loyalties, rituals, and blood-feuds of tribalism."(Schlesinger 1992, 78) This same view of trib-alism as basically divisive also appears regularlyin news reports of ethnic conflict in southeast-ern Europe in the early 1990s, despite the real-ity that none of the participants—Croats, BosnianMuslims, Serbs, and Albanians— are tribes, fol-lowing the definition discussed above.

At the other extreme are those who ignoresome of the realities of tribal-level societal or-

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TRIBE

ganization, and romanticize tribal life. For ex-ample, the July-August 1992 issue of the UtneReader devotes nearly 40 pages to so-called"tribal cultures" and how the tribal way of lifecan serve as a model for a better world. The firstparagraph of the article sums up this viewpoint:

The majority of humans have lived tribally forabout 495 of the last 500 generations, whichencompasses the roughly 10,000 years of re-corded history. Our ancestors lived in rovingbands, small villages, and extended families, de-veloping and refining the social graces necessaryto keep their communities viable. But many ofus in the West have wandered away from thecommunity in search of some personal vision,perhaps the Holy Grail or the AmericanDream.... Some of us still know how to live withone another and the environment—the last re-maining tribal peoples.

This view also has little to do with the conceptof tribe as it has been traditionally used by socialscientists.

Third, tribe has been used as a concept tomark cultures as distinct social entities. Thus, inthis usage, we refer to the Badaga tribe, the Kotatribe, the Kurumba tribe, and the Toda tribe,four neighboring groups of the Nilgiri Hills ofsouth India. The use of the word tribe indicatesthat each is a separate social entity, distinct fromother social entities. Thus, tribe is in some sensean equivalent concept to ethnic group, with tribeused more commonly for small non-Westerncultures, and ethnic group for the present-daydescendants of immigrants in new lands. Vari-ous attempts have been made to define the basicfeatures of a tribe as it is used in this way, focus-ing on factors such as common territory, name,language, sense of common identity, religion, andtechnology. In general, however, when tribe hasbeen used in this way, a group is usually identi-fied as a distinct group because it speaks a lan-guage different from its neighbors, occupies adefined territory, and has a distinct name (al-though the name may be given by outsiders

rather than by the group itself). In the 1960sand 1970s there was rigorous debate amongsome anthropologists about how to objectivelydefine and use tribe in this way. This issue wasnever resolved, and soon gave way to more im-mediate issues such as culture contact and cul-ture change. Today, most anthropologists andother social scientists are usually willing to con-sider a group a distinct group (whether or not itis labeled a tribe) if the people themselves be-lieve that they are a distinct group.

The fourth and final major usage of the termtribe involves specific legal and political arrange-ments that accrue to groups and the membersof those groups in specific nations. In the UnitedStates, the designation of over 300 AmericanIndian groups as tribes (or some related term suchas communities, towns, nations, bands, reservations,rancherias, colonies, or pueblos) defines the legaland political relationships between the group andfederal and state governments. Similarly, thedesignation of a group in India as a ScheduledTribe indicates that the government considers itto be "backward," and that its members areeligble for special benefits not available to oth-ers. Thus, the label tribe takes on a clearly de-fined legal meaning that may have major politicaland economic consequences for the tribe, itsmembers, and other members of the nation.

See also INDIGENOUS PEOPLES.

Ghurye, G. S. (1963) The Scheduled Tribes. 3d ed.

Native American Directory. (1982).

Sahlins, Marshall. (1968) Tribesman.

Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr. (1992) The Disunit-ing of America.

Service, Elman R. (1962) Primitive Social Or-ganization.

Winthrop, Robert H. (1991) Dictionary of Con-cepts in Cultural Anthropology.

239?

VIETNAMESE INCAMBODIA

Cambodia and Vietnamare neighboring nationsin Southeast Asia, shar-ing a common border

along the west of Vietnam and the east of Cam-bodia. From 1975 to 1989 Cambodia was offi-cially called Kampuchea. The primary ethnicgroup in Cambodia is the Khmer, while the Viet-namese predominate in Vietnam. The Khmer(who called themselves Khmae) constitutedabout 90 percent of the estimated 9 millionpeople in Cambodia in 1993. The remainder ofthe population is composed of Vietnamese,Chinese, Muslim Cham (also called Khmer Is-lam), and tribal peoples in the hill country ofthe north. The Khmer are mainly TheravadaBuddhists, although the incorporation of localtraditions places their religion outside main-stream Buddhism. The ethnic Vietnamese arethe majority population in Vietnam, with an es-timated national population of 71.8 million in1993. Vietnam is also the home of numerousother ethnic groups, including Chinese, Hmong,Khmer, and numerous tribal groups in the high-lands of both the north and south. The ethnic

Vietnamese population is heavily concentratedin the plains and along the coast, and efforts tosettle Vietnamese in the highlands have not beensuccessful. Vietnam is officially an atheistic na-tion, although actual religious belief reflects amixture of Buddhism, Confucianism, Taoism,ancestor worship, and animism.

The number of ethnic Vietnamese in Cam-bodia today is unknown, although in the early1970s they numbered several hundred thousand.Mass executions, deportations, and fleeing re-duced the population markedly in the late 1970s.The status of ethnic Vietnamese in Cambodiaand their relationship with the Khmer and thenational government need to be understood inthe context of European colonization and in-volvement in the region dating to the nineteenthcentury.

The Khmer kingdom existed from A.D. 802-1432; after a period of decline and Thai andVietnamese rule, it became a French colony(1864) and then, along with Laos and Vietnam,the Union of French Indochina (1884). Anti-Vietnamese sentiment among the Khmer datesto nineteenth-century Vietnamese efforts to takeCambodian territory and Cambodian percep-tions that the Vietnamese sought to "civilize"them. Such a notion is insulting to the Cambo-dian elite, who consider themselves culturallysuperior to the Vietnamese. The French admin-istration in Cambodia preferred to employ theVietnamese in low-level administrative positionsand also to import Vietnamese to work in craftindustries and on plantations. By the early twen-tieth century, Cambodian nationalists began touse anti-Vietnamese rhetoric as one means ofbuilding a national consciousness, although onlythe urban elite, and not the rural peasants, wereovertly anti-Vietnamese. Independence fromFrance was achieved in 1953, and from then until1970 Cambodia was ruled as a constitutionalmonarchy by Norodom Sihanouk. By the 1960s,if not earlier, an official policy had emerged inwhich Cambodian nationhood was linked to

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Khmer ethnicity, the Khmer language, andTheravada Buddhism. Obviously, such a policyexcluded the ethnic Vietnamese.

In 1970 Sihanouk was overthrown in a mili-tary coup, and Cambodia, now called the KhmerRepublic, was ruled by Lon Nol until 1975 whenthe Communists, known as the Khmer Rouge,triumphed in a civil war. During the VietnamWar in the 1960s, the Vietnamese ran a portionof the Ho Chi Minh trail through Cambodia,and the United States secretly bombed Cambo-dia, creating tensions between Vietnam andCambodia and, at least from the viewpoint ofthe Cambodian government, producing moreevidence that the Vietnamese were to blame forthe political and economic turmoil in Cambo-dia. Anti-Vietnamese sentiment continued as agovernment policy under Lon Nol, reaching new

extremes under the Khmer Rouge and theirleader Pol Pot, whose agenda was a massive re-structuring of Cambodian (called Kampuchea)society. This restructuring included relocatingpeople from cities to rural areas, forming collec-tivized work organizations, banning Buddhism,mass executions, and restricting the flow of food,clothing, and shelter, which led to hundreds ofthousands of deaths. As for the Vietnamese inCambodia, the Khmer Rouge expelled many inthe east near the Vietnamese border, killed thou-sands of others, and through harsh treatmentforced still others to flee to Vietnam. In addi-tion, Cambodians thought to be friendly withVietnamese were routinely killed as enemies ofthe state. In response to Cambodian raids intoVietnam, the Vietnamese invaded Cambodia in1978; within a year they had driven out the Khmer

Mass execution site in Cambodia near Phnom Penh, 1981, showing remains of victims of the Pol Pot regime.

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Rouge and installed a new Khmer governmentsupported by Vietnamese officials and troops.Under the new government, anti-Vietnamesesentiment declined, although they (along withthe Chinese) were still considered by some asethnic foreigners. Critics of the new governmentcharged that it was a puppet regime of Vietnamand that the Vietnamese were interested in de-stroying Cambodian culture.

By 1989 Vietnamese influence had waned,a new government was established, and Cam-bodia was renamed the state of Cambodia. How-ever, Sihanouk supporters, the Khmer Rouge,and other factions refused to cooperate, and in1991 a new coalition government was formedwith U.N. supervision. Today, Cambodia is againgoverned by Sihanouk in a coalition with the

victors of the 1993 election. The position of theVietnamese in Cambodia—now diminished innumber and influence—is still unsettled. Opendiscrimination has mostly disappeared, althoughnot all Vietnamese have been granted Cambo-dian citizenship, and the Vietnamese fear thatfuture political stability might lead to new at-tacks on their community.

Ablin, David, and Marlowe Hood, eds. (1984)Cambodian Agony.

Tarr, Chou Meng. (1992) "The Vietnamese Mi-nority in Cambodia." Race & Class 34:33-47.

Vickery, Michael. (1986) Kampuchea: Politics,Economics, and Society.

243*

WORLD SYSTEMAND ETHNICRELATIONS

The world system, as anentity different from aworld economy or worldempire, is the single,capitalist world economy

that has been evolving in Europe since the latefifteenth century. During that time Europe ex-perienced considerable unrest from peasant re-volts and wars, famine, depopulation, plagues,and a decline in economic productivity thatthreatened the control and security of the rulingfeudal lords. The feudal lords turned to the thenrelatively weak nations for protection, whichtended to strengthen the nations and open na-tional boundaries for trade, which was controlledby the merchant class. Colonization, settlement,slavery, expanded trade, and other manifestationsof European expansion continued the evolutionof the world system over the centuries.

The world system consists of three elementsor sets of components in continual relationwith one another—core, periphery, andsemiperiphery—which are economically linkedto form the world system. The core consists of

militarily strong, stable, bureaucratic nationswith large professional and skilled labor forcesand high productivity. Ethnic relations in theeconomic sphere of core nations are character-ized by a professional class dominated by mem-bers of the major ethnic group, a class of workersrepresenting a mix of groups, and a class of low-skilled workers consisting mainly of membersof ethnic minority groups. The core correspondsto what is called the First World, and includesnations such as the United States, Germany,Sweden, and Japan. The periphery consists ofweak, politically unstable nations, many of whichhave come into existence following the end ofcolonialism with inefficient, repressive govern-ments. Ethnic relations in these nations are char-acterized by a ruling and professional classdominated by ethnic groups favored by the Eu-ropean colonists, a working class of indigenouspeoples who have migrated from the rural re-gions to urban centers, and a subsistence- orsemisubsistence-level sector composed of rural,indigenous peoples. Sometimes these small, in-digenous cultures are thought to be outside theworld system; however, they are not, and onesurvey of 87 cultures shows that all were nega-tively influenced by the world system, with thebasic subsistence patterns changed or destroyedin 84 percent. The semi-periphery correspondsto what is called the Third and Fourth worlds(although some cultures in the Fourth World arealso found in the periphery), and includes na-tions such as Bolivia, Zaire, and Cambodia. Thesemiperiphery occupies an intermediary positionbetween the core and periphery, and in fact manyof the nations here were formerly in the core orin the periphery. Semiperipheral nations are na-tional middlemen, importing and exportingproducts from each of the other two sectors. Boththe ruling and professional classes are domi-nated by the major ethnic group, while indig-enous peoples or ethnic minorities formsomewhat separate communities. China,

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Canada, and Egypt are examples ofsemiperipheral nations. In addition to thesespheres (which are better seen as relations, asthey are in constant interaction with one an-other), the key features of the world system arethe component nations and capitalism.

A consideration of the world as a world sys-tem joined together through ongoing economicrelations (and also, to a lesser extent, politicalrelations) has implications for the nature andpatterning of ethnic relations around the world.In this view, ethnic relations are mainly the re-sult of the relative position of an ethnic group inthe world division of labor. Specific consider-ations that influence the status of any group andethnic relations are the nation s place in the worldsystem, its ethnic composition, the relationshipbetween social classes, and ethnic distinctions.Ethnic conflict is explained as beneficial to theworld system because ethnic groups in periph-eral nations provide an exploitable labor pool,and because ethnic conflict inhibits the devel-

opment of a broader class-based consciousnessthat would be a greater threat to the world system.

See also COLONIALISM; DIASPORA; MIGRANTWORKERS; REFUGEES; TRANSNATIONALMIGRATION.

Bradley, Candace, et al. (1990) "A Cross-CulturalHistorical Study of Subsistence Change/'American Anthropologist 92:447-457.

Thompson, Richard H. (1989) Theories ofEthnicity: A Critical Appraisal.

Wallerstein,Imanuel. (1974) The Modern World-System, I: Capitalist Agriculture and the Ori-gins of the European World-Economy in theSixteenth Century.

(1979) The Capitalist World-Economy.

Wolf, Eric. (1984) Europe and the People with-out a History.

246 W

Xenophobia is an emo-tional state characterizedby a fear, hatred, or aver-

sion to outsiders or foreigners. Xenophobia alsorefers to behaviors meant to harm or excludeoutsiders that presumably result from these feel-ings of hate and fear. In the context of ethnicrelations, foreigners or outsiders are members ofother ethnic, religious, racial, or national groups.Xenophobia is an individual psychological statein that it is individuals, rather than groups, whoexperience it. However, the concept is sometimesused in reference to alleged group sentiments andbehavior, such as descriptions of German orFrench efforts to restrict settlement by peoplefrom other nations and attacks by German neo-

Nazis on Turks and other foreigners in Germanyas xenophobic.

Little is known cross-culturally about whichemotions and behaviors are in fact xenophobic,whether or not xenophobia occurs in all indi-viduals and all cultures, whether it is rational orirrational, and its origins. Xenophobia is linkedto ethnocentrism, although not all forms of eth-nocentrism involve the extreme hatred and fearthat define xenophobia.

See also ETHNOCENTRISM.

Allport, Gordon W. (1954) The Nature ofPrejudice.

Shaw, Paul R., and Yuwa Wong. (1989) GeneticSeeds of Warfare: Evolution, Nationalism, andPatriotism.

Sluckin, M. (1979) Fear in Animals and Man.

German Skinhead rally, 1992.

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XXENOPHOBIA

DIRECTORY OFINTERNATIONALORGANIZATIONS

CONCERNEDWITH ETHNIC

RELATIONS

This section lists and describes some organiza-tions whose mission is relevant to ethnic rela-tions around the world today. Listed are onlyorganizations whose focus is worldwide. Orga-nizations whose focus is a particular ethnicgroup, nation, or region are not listed here. Manyof these can be found listed in Human Rights: AReference Handbook (ABC-CLIO, 1989) as wellas various directories of organizations. Organi-zations whose names are followed by an asterisk(*) submitted the descriptions provided here or theirdescriptions are based mainly on information sup-plied by the organization for use in this volume.

AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL*International Secretariat1 Easton StreetLondon WC1X8DJEngland

Amnesty International (AI) is a worldwidemovement independent of any government, po-litical grouping, ideology, economic interest, orreligious creed. It plays a specific role within the

overall spectrum of human rights work. The ac-tivities of the organization focus strictly on pris-oners. It seeks the release of men and womendetained anywhere for their beliefs, color, sex,ethnic origin, language, or religion, provided theyhave not used or advocated violence. These aretermed prisoners of conscience. It advocates fair andearly trials for all political prisoners and workson behalf of such persons detained withoutcharge or without trial. It opposes the death pen-alty and torture or other cruel, inhuman, or de-grading treatment or punishment of all prisoners,without reservation. Amnesty International alsoopposes abuses by opposition groups: hostagetaking, torture and killings of prisoners, andother arbitrary killings. Amnesty International,recognizing that human rights are indivisible andinterdependent, works to promote all the hu-man rights enshrined in the Universal Declara-tion of Human Rights and other internationalstandards, through human rights education pro-grams and campaigning for ratification of hu-man rights treaties.

Amnesty International is impartial. It is in-dependent of any government, political persua-sion or religious creed. It does not support oroppose any government or political system, nordoes it support or oppose the views of the vic-tims whose rights it seeks to protect. It is con-cerned solely with the protection of the humanrights involved in each case, regardless of theideology of the government, opposition forces,or the beliefs of the individual.

Amnesty International does not grade coun-tries according to their record on human rights;instead of attempting comparisons it concen-trates on trying to end the specific violations ofhuman rights in each case.

The organization visits countries to meetprisoners, interview government officials, inves-tigate allegations, and observe trials; it carriesout detailed research on violations of humanrights worldwide; and initiates national and in-ternational campaigns to publicize patterns of

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INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

human rights abuses. It has declared an annualAmnesty International Week. Cases of prison-ers and other victims are printed in its Interna-tional Newsletter each month so that concernedindividuals may organize appeals on their be-half and publicize each prisoner's situation. TheAmnesty International Report, published annu-ally, covers Amnesty International's concernsabout human rights violations in over 160 coun-tries. (Each year numerous specific reports onhuman rights violations are published in Ara-bic, English, French, and Spanish.)

Amnesty International has over 8,000 vol-unteer groups in over 70 countries, organizedsections in 51 countries, and individual mem-bers, subscribers, and supporters in over 150countries and territories. Each group works onbehalf of at least two prisoners of conscience incountries other than its own and participates inthe organizations global campaigns. The cur-rent Secretary General is Pierre Sane.

Amnesty International is governed by anine-member International Executive Commit-tee (IEC). It includes eight volunteer members,elected every two years by an InternationalCouncil comprising representatives of the world-wide movement, and an elected member of theInternational Secretariat.

Amnesty Internationals funding reflects themovement's independence and its reliance onbroad public support. No money is sought orreceived from governments. The hundreds ofthousands of donations that sustain theorganization's work come from the pockets ofits members and the public. Amnesty Interna-tional is financed by subscriptions and donationsfrom its worldwide membership. To safeguardthe independence of the organization, all con-tributions are strictly controlled by guidelines laiddown by the International Council.

Amnesty International has formal relationswith the United Nations Economic and SocialCouncil (ECOSOC); the United Nations Edu-cational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

(UNESCO); the Council of Europe; the Orga-nization of American States; the Organizationof African Unity; and the Inter-ParliamentaryUnion.

ANTI-SLAVERY INTERNATIONAL180 Brixton RoadLondon SW9 6ATEngland

Anti-Slavery International (ASI) is the world'soldest international human rights organization.It was founded in 1839 as the British and For-eign Anti-Slavery Society, five years after theemancipation of slaves in British colonies. In1909 it merged with the Aborigines ProtectionSociety, which was campaigning for the rightsof indigenous peoples.

The purposes of ASI, as stated in the Con-stitution, are the elimination of slave owning andslave trading, the abolition of all forms of forcedlabor approximating slavery, the protection andadvancement of peoples and groups who are notstrong enough to protect themselves, and thedefense of human rights in accordance with theprinciples of the Universal Declaration of Hu-man Rights of 1948.

ASI has an international membership andis supported by subscriptions and donations fromthe general public and by grants from variousorganizations such as trusts, foundations, andaid agencies for specific research projects. It hasconsultative status with the United Nations Eco-nomic and Social Council; it is also a nongov-ernmental organization in consultative status(Category C—mutual information) with theUnited Nations Educational, Scientific andCultural Organization (UNESCO); ASI is alsoon the International Labour Organization's(ILO) special list.

ASI was instrumental in setting up theUnited Nations Working Groups on Slavery

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(1957) and on Indigenous Peoples (1982), as wellas the United Nations Voluntary Fund for In-digenous Peoples (1985), and the United Na-tions Voluntary Trust Fund on ContemporaryForms of Slavery (1991). It has initiated researchin many countries on violations of human rightsand published the findings in its annual journal,The Anti-Slavery Reporter, or in separate reports.ASI is a major source of information on slaveryand indigenous peoples through its library anddocumentation.

To reach its objectives, ASI uses variousapproaches:

1. Research that establishes first the existenceof significant slavery-like conditions andidentifies specific cases to indicate degreesof severity and second the existence ofthreatened tribal groups, the impact of cur-rent development policies, and the possibil-ity of alternative development strategies. Inparticular, emphasis is on research to iden-tify factors in the systems of exploitation thatcan be changed in the short and mediumterms and how present development strate-gies help or hinder the elimination of ex-ploitative conditions.

2. Enhancing and facilitating the work of con-cerned individuals and organizations in thecountries mainly affected.

3. Recommendations to governments in par-ticular, but also to organizations within af-fected countries such as labor unions andinternational organizations such as UnitedNations Economic and Social Council. Rec-ommendations can take the form of suggest-ing new legislation, amendments to existinglegislation, better enforcement procedures,changes in the education system, and so on.

4. Publicity, through t\\t Anti-Slavery Reporterand Anti-Slavery Newsletter, special reports,bulletins, submissions to international moni-toring organizations, and facilitating mediacoverage.

5. Campaigning to encourage people to takeaction in the form of lobbying, letter-writing, mounting exhibitions, and talks toother organizations.

CULTURAL SURVIVAL*215 First StreetCambridge, MA 02142

Founded in 1972, Cultural Survival helps indig-enous peoples and ethnic minorities survive, bothphysically and culturally, the rapid changes thatcontact with expanding industrial society hasbrought. By supporting projects designed bytribal and ethnic peoples, Cultural Survival as-sists these groups to come to terms with nationaland international socioeconomic systems. Basicto Cultural Survival's work is the belief that cul-tural differences are inherent in humanity; pro-tecting this human diversity enriches ourcommon earth. The work of the organizationtraditionally focused on rainforest peoples ofSouth America but in recent years has expandedto assist peoples in Africa, Asia, and NorthAmerica, including Afghan refugees in Pakistan,refugees of the Balkan wars, and Solomon Is-landers in Melanesia. It has also been active indisseminating the results of scholarly researchon indigenous peoples.

Cultural Survival Enterprises (CSE) is thenot-for-profit trading division of the organiza-tion that helps native societies to market naturalproducts while preserving the natural ecosystem.CSE assists indigenous peoples living in fragileecosystems by helping them modify traditionalresource-management schemes and generateincome through processing and marketing prod-ucts in the international market. CSE sells rawmaterials to manufacturers at 5 percent abovethe U.S. wholesale price and negotiates profit-sharing agreements with companies purchasingraw materials. All the funds generated by theseagreements are returned to forest groups and

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support organizations. These funds promote thedevelopment and growth of new and existingorganizations, help fund additional projects, andhelp to build the infrastructures necessary to sup-port production within rainforest communities.

Cultural Survival also provides educationalresources for learning about the connections be-tween people and the environment. CulturalSurvival publishes the Cultural Survival Quar-terly and Cultural Survival Reports, a series ofbooks on indigenous and ethnic groups. Cul-tural survival is supported by individual mem-bership dues, sales of its products, fundraisingevents, and donations.

HUMAN RIGHTS ADVOCATES*P.O. Box 5675Berkeley, CA 94705Humans Rights Advocates (HRA) promotesand protects fundamental human rights in Cali-fornia, the United States, and worldwide,through the use of international human rightsand humanitarian law. Since 1978, HRA hasbeen helping to protect the fundamental humanrights of individuals and groups such as Tibet-ans, the peoples of the Caucasus, and gays andlesbians.

HRA has assisted migrant workers and asy-lum seekers in California, administrative detain-ees in Asia, and people without food in Ethiopia.HRAs innovative work in the law of armed con-flicts is instrumental in directing needed empha-sis to rights frequently neglected: the rights ofcivilian war victims and prisoners of war, andthe interrelationship between armed conflict andhuman rights violations. HRA has helped drawattention to the issue of population transfer as aviolation of human rights. It has examined na-tionalities conflicts as a source of human rightsabuses and has coordinated exploration of bilat-eral and multilateral responses to that problem.It has also sought to bring international atten-

tion to the growing problem of environmentalrefugees, persons displaced by widespread pol-lution of streams and lands, and by developmentprojects.

HRA focuses on three types of assistance:advocacy at the United Nations, Litigation, andEducation.

Advocacy at the United NationsAs a fully accredited Non-Governmental Orga-nization, HRA participates actively in the workof the United Nations Commission on HumanRights and its Sub-Commission on Preventionof Discrimination and Protection of Minorities.HRA testifies at the annual sessions of thosebodies.

LitigationHRA provides its expertise and assistance to law-yers involved in lawsuits in which internationalhuman rights law can be used effectively. In thepast, work has entailed filing amicus curiae briefs,providing expert witness on international lawquestions, giving strategic advice at the trial andappellate levels, and making its resource mate-rials available to other lawyers. HRA membershave testified before Congress and the Califor-nia Legislature on issues involving internationalhuman rights law.

EducationHRA organizes conferences and seminars toeducate lawyers, judges, and activists about howinternational human rights and humanitarianlaw can be used in U.S. courts and internationalfora to stop, protest, or seek relief from prac-tices that violate fundamental rights. HRAmembers also speak to community groups, lawclasses, and U.N. affiliated organizations.

HRA publishes a newsletter twice a year;maintains a resource library including U.N.documents, legal briefs, and other materials;prints and distributes articles and papers; andsupplements the U.N./Human Rights Collec-

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tion of the Law Library of the University ofCalifornia at Berkeley (Boalt Hall).

HRA is run by a board of directors, withthe assistance of a national advisory board.

HUMAN RIGHTS FUND FORINDIGENOUS PEOPLES*c/o International Work Group for IndigenousAffairsFiolstraede 10DK 1171 Copenhagen K.Denmark

Established in 1984, the Human Rights Fundfor Indigenous Peoples is a federated organiza-tion consisting of four human rights organiza-tions working on indigenous affairs:

Anti-Slavery International (ASI)180 Brixton Road, London SW9 6AT,England

Co-Ordinating Group on Indigenous Affairs(KWIA)Breugelstraat 31- 33, B-2018 Antwerp,Belgium

International Work Group for IndigenousAffairs (IWGIA)Fiolstraede 10, DK 1171 Copenhagen,Denmark

Working Group for Indigenous Peoples(WIP)PB 4098 Minahassastraat 1,1009 ABAmsterdam, The Netherlands

The main purpose of the fund is to promote in-digenous interests in an international context andto enable indigenous people and their represen-tatives to gain an expertise with internationaltreaty bodies. The primary activity of the fundis supporting indigenous peoples' participationat forums of the United Nations in Geneva, par-

ticularly at the Working Group on IndigenousPopulations (UNWGIP). A meeting of the fundtakes place each year (April/May) to assess ap-plications for assistance, taking into account thelist already approved by the United Nations Vol-untary Fund.

The UNWGIP was established in 1984under the Human Rights Commission in orderto draw up international standards for the rightsof indigenous peoples. It consists of five expertswho listen to the statements of indigenous rep-resentatives over a period of two weeks. In thesestatements indigenous peoples have an oppor-tunity to express their concerns, describe theproblems facing their communities, and influ-ence the creation of human rights standards. Themeeting is unique as it is the only internationalgathering of indigenous peoples on a regularbasis. It provides indigenous representatives withthe means to address governments, to meet eachother, talk to international lawyers, and estab-lish contacts. All of these activities are impor-tant for informing the international communityof violations of human rights.

In recent years the fund has also supportedparticipation at higher bodies of the UnitedNations, such as the Human Rights Commis-sion and the Sub-Commission on the Preven-tion of Discrimination and Protection ofMinorities.

The fund receives its money from nongov-ernmental organizations in Scandinavia, theUnited Kingdom, and the Netherlands. In 1992its budget was about $50,000. The grants to par-ticipants cover all or part of travel, accommoda-tion, and food. In 1992,22 participants from 19countries received assistance. The fund does notprovide any predetermined criteria of the natureof participation. Some participants deliver state-ments, some participate in the draftingprocess, some primarily observe the sessions.Several members of the HRFIP are usuallypresent to provide informal assistance. The fundpublishes an annual report.

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HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH485 Fifth AvenueNew York, NY 10017

Human Rights Watch is a nonpartisan, U.S.-based organization that monitors the humanrights practices of governments throughout theworld. Five regional organizations make up theHuman Rights Organization: Africa Watch,Americas Watch, Asia Watch, Helsinki Watch,and Middle East Watch, in addition to the FundFor Free Expression. Human Rights Watch be-came the umbrella organization for these re-gional divisions in 1987.

The largest such organization in the UnitedStates, Human Rights Watch investigates mur-ders, kidnapping, torture, psychiatric abuse, cen-sorship, deprivation of political freedom, anddestruction of ethnic identity. Human RightsWatch attempts to end these abuses by applyingpressure to monitored governments, most com-monly in the form of public exposure and em-barrassment. Specifically, the organizationdocuments and publicizes these abusive prac-tices. In the same fashion it also monitors viola-tions of laws of war and applies pressure ongovernments to force them to end such actions.Human Rights Watch maintains close contact withAmnesty International, with which the organiza-tion shares the same basic principals and goals.

Human Rights Watch accomplishes its goalsthrough a staff of lawyers, journalists, and re-gional experts that compiles information abouthuman rights practices and infringements there-upon. In the United States, Human RightsWatch has devoted itself to shaping U.S. for-eign policy. A chief goal is to harness the eco-nomic and moral power of the U.S. governmentand to use that power to promote human rights.

The organization is funded by private foun-dations and individuals; it does not accept gov-ernment funding. Human Rights Watch isgoverned by an executive committee, with sepa-

rate committees also governing the constituentorganizations. The organization publishes theHuman Rights Watch Newsletter, the HumanRights Watch World Report, Human Rights Watchin the News, and occasional special reports. Inthe United States, its offices are located in NewYork City and Washington, B.C.

THE INTERNATIONAL LEAGUEFOR HUMAN RIGHTS432 Park Avenue, SouthNew York, NY 10016

The International League for Human Rightstraces its origins to a French citizens' rights groupstarted in the early 1900s. It was officiallyfounded in the United States by Americans andEuropeans in 1941 under the leadership of RogerNash Baldwin. It was incorporated in New YorkState in 1942. The leagues mission is to fightfor the promotion and protection of humanrights around the world, particularly those guar-antees contained in the United Nations Univer-sal Declaration of Human Rights adopted in1948. The work of the league is supported bymembers' dues and donations and is carried outby a Board of Directors, a paid staff, and volun-teers. The league has consultative status with theECOSOC, ILO, and UNESCO, and ties toother nongovernmental organizations. Before hisdeath in 1989, the league had close ties withAndrei Sakharov, the exiled Soviet human rightsadvocate who served as Honorary President ofthe league.

To achieve it mission, the league helps frameinternational human rights documents, developmechanisms of enforcement, develops programsto end human rights abuses, marshalls publicopinion, lodges protests with governments, ne-gotiates on behalf of victims, protects humanrights advocates, and assists other human rightsorganizations. Among recent activities were the

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documentation of human rights abuses by bothArmenians and Azerbaijani Turks in their eth-nic conflict, protesting attacks on Turkish hu-man rights advocates, and a special projectfocusing on violence against women and genderdiscrimination.

The league publishes the Human Rights Bul-letin, the In Brief series, and the ILHR AnnualReview, as well as special reports.

INTERNATIONAL RESCUECOMMITTEE, INC.386 Park Avenue SouthNew York, NY 10016

The International Rescue Committee, Inc.(IRC) is a nonsectarian voluntary agency thathelps refugees who escape from political, reli-gious, and racial persecution, as well as uprootedvictims of war, civil strife, and famine. The IRCwas founded in 1933, at the request of AlbertEinstein, to assist anti-Nazis trapped in Hitler'sGermany. Today, IRC facilities in refugee campsand resettlement offices, staffed by IRC work-ers and volunteers, are located in Africa, Asia,the Middle East, Central America, Europe, andthe United States. The IRC's first concern is re-lief and medical aid to enable sick, hungry, andwounded refugees to survive. The IRC also pro-vides special feeding programs for malnourishedchildren, schooling, self-help and training pro-grams; it also reunites families, resettles refugeesin new countries, and helps facilitate their eco-nomic and social adjustment to their new home.Among refugees helped recently are Kurds inTurkey, Liberians in Guinea, Cambodians andBurmese in Thailand, Vietnamese boat people,and Nicaraguans in Costa Rica. The IRC pub-lishes an annual report and a newsletter, IRCField Reports. It is headquartered in New YorkCity, with other offices around the United Statesand in 16 other countries.

LAWYERS COMMITTEE FORHUMAN RIGHTS330 Seventh Ave.New York, NY 10001The mission of the Lawyers Committee forHuman Rights is to protect and promote fun-damental human rights. To achieve this mission,the Lawyers Committee focuses its efforts on:

1. Working with and supporting the work ofin-country indigenous and nongovernmen-tal organizations

2. Documenting human rights violations andconfronting the violating nations

3. Pressing for a consistent and principled ap-proach in U.S. foreign policy as regards hu-man rights

4. Pressing for stronger human rights policies atthe UN and other international organizations

The Lawyers Committee also has a com-plimentary but distinct Refugee Project thatserves an advocacy role in ensuring that refu-gees receive humane and dignified treatment andlegal protection.

The Lawyers Committee was founded in1978 and is headquartered in New York Citywith another office in Washington, D.C. It hasa staff of about 38 whose work is supplementedby the pro bono activities of volunteer lawyers.The Lawyers Committee is supported by a com-bination of grants, contributions from law firmsand individuals, and revenues from the sale ofpublications. Publications include the Reportsand Briefing Papers series.

MINORITY RIGHTS GROUP*379 Brixton RoadLondon, SW9 7DEEngland

Minority Rights Group (MRG) is an interna-tional nongovernmental organization working to

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secure justice for minorities suffering discrimi-nation and prejudice, and the peaceful coexist-ence of majority and minority communities. Itemphasizes ethnic, religious, and linguistic mi-norities and, particularly, communities who arewithout power in both the northern and south-ern hemispheres.

Founded in the 1960s, MRG informs andwarns governments, the international commu-nity, nongovernmental organizations, and thewider public about the situation of minoritiesworldwide. This work is based in three mainareas: research and analysis of minority groupsand issues, activism at the local level, and advo-cacy in the international arena.

Research and Analysis ofMinority Groups and Issues

During the last two decades MRG has publishedover 100 reports and in recent years has extendedits range to include a book series, conferencereports, and occasional papers. The reports aretranslated into many languages. To date 20 titleshave been published in 12 different languages,while the affiliate in France (GDM) has a list oftitles published in French. MRG has a policy ofseeking the highest caliber authors with minor-ity rights experience from the region in whichthe research is being carried out.

Activism at the Local LevelWorking with local partners to try to achieve abetter understanding of minority issues, MRGacts locally by challenging prejudice and promot-ing public understanding through informationand education activities. MRG has the policy ofchampioning minority rights rather than cam-paigning for any specific minorities, since it isfor minorities representing themselves. It workstowards empowering minority communities byinforming them of international standards andother models of practice.

Advocacy in the International ArenaMRG's main objective here is to inform andeducate policy makers and the wider public onminority issues. It promotes and distributes itsresearch reports and papers to a wide audience,from UN officials in Geneva and New York tominority organizations. In collaboration withlocal partners and local communities it alsomakes direct representations to decision mak-ers. This can achieve particular results for mi-norities in specific countries or lead to theimprovement and implementation of interna-tional standards on minorities.

MRG also has an Education Departmentthat provides not only information on minori-ties for young people, educators, and associatedprofessionals, but also materials that address theissues of discrimination and prejudice in Britain'smulticultural society. It pursues this work bymeans of its publications and through its infor-mation service to students and teachers. Oneexample of the department s publications is Voicesfrom Eritrea, Somalia and Kurdistan, a three vol-ume dual-language collection of autobiographi-cal writings by refugee children at school inLondon. The series raises the issues of humanrights and being a refugee.

MRG believes that the best hope for apeaceful world lies in identifying and monitor-ing potential conflict between communities, ad-vocating preventive measures to avoid theescalation of conflict, and encouraging positiveaction to build trust between majority and mi-nority communities; it is developing an interna-tional network of affiliates, like-mindedorganizations, and contacts within local com-munities to cooperate on these issues.

MRG has consultative status with theUnited Nations Economic and Social Council,and its international secretariat is in London.Legally it is registered both as a charity and as alimited company under United Kingdom law,with an international governing council.

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OXFAM*274 Banbury RoadOxford OX2 7DZEngland

Oxfam began life in 1942 as the Oxford Com-mittee for Famine Relief. Along with similargroups of volunteers across the United Kingdom,its concern was for the women, men, and chil-dren starving in Nazi-occupied Greece, wherefamine had killed 400,000 people during theAllied blockade. The groups protested againstthe British commitment to total blockade ofEurope, wanting to send "controlled relief" toGreece and Belgium. In early 1943, the OxfordCommittee registered as a charity, andfundraising began in earnest. Food and clothingwere sent to Europe and distributed by churchand voluntary groups. Shortages and the destruc-tion caused by the war continued to inflict suf-fering throughout Europe for several years afterthe end of the war. However, by the late 1940s,the pressing need for post-war relief aid for Eu-rope had declined, and many of the relief com-mittees closed down. The Oxford Committeedecided to extend its operations to include the"relief of suffering arising as a result of wars orof any other causes in any part of the world."

Today Oxfam has an annual income ofaround £80,00,000 raised in the United King-dom and Ireland for relief and development pro-grams in 71 countries around the world and isrun by paid, professional staff and a network ofvolunteers. Compared with the need, Oxfam hasonly small amounts of money to spend, so thefunding must be effective and, where possible,encourage processes of change on a wider scale.

Oxfam's programs throughout the develop-ing world are managed by staff teams operatingfrom some 40 centers and overseeing programsof emergency relief and development assistance.The teams base their work on an analysis of thecauses of poverty. They identify the poorest and

most marginal groups and draw up plans thatfocus on priority problems, addressing them inways that can be shared and repeated with aminimum of outside help.

In 1992-1993, Oxfam allocated £45.8 mil-lion to 2,900 projects in over 70 countries; 32percent was allocated for emergency relief.

The allocation of money was: Africa (southof the Sahara), 51 percent; Asia, 16 percent;Latin America and the Caribbean, 19 percent;Middle East, 9 percent; world general, UK, andeastern Europe, 5 percent.

Oxfam's work can be divided into threetypes—emergency relief, sustainable develop-ment, and advocacy and influencing.

Emergency ReliefOxfam is geared to react quickly in times of cri-sis. Whether dealing with the results of naturaldisasters, like floods and earthquakes, or of con-flict and war, Oxfam helps people meet theirbasic needs for food, water, shelter, and cloth-ing. Emergency relief has to be provided quickly,after careful on-the-spot assessment: listeningto what people say, and then supporting theirefforts. Oxfam staff coordinate their work withlocal government officials and other organiza-tions. The determination of people to do whatthey can for themselves is often best supportedby the provision of seeds and tools to enable themto grow their own food. Disaster preparednessis another important area of work: if people canbe helped to plan strategies for coping with pos-sible calamities, they will be in a stronger posi-tion to tackle them if and when they occur.

Sustainable DevelopmentOxfam supports small-scale development forpeople in villages, towns, and cities, to help themdevelop their potential and improve their livingstandards. For example, Oxfam may fund a grainbank organized by a village cooperative. Thebank buys surplus grain at fair prices from

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villagers after harvest when prices are low andresells it to them at times of shortage at equallyfair prices, to avoid the huge price swings in themarkets. The bank supplies seed at a reasonablecost for the next season, and some banks sell fer-tilizers and pesticides, also at fair prices. Grainbanks are just one example of sustainable devel-opment that makes the most of people s ownhard work by enabling them to become moreself-sufficient.

Advocacy and InfluencingOxfam helps local organizations working forchange in their own countries, at community ornational levels. This might involve them in urg-ing their own governments to look at ways ofchanging their own society. It could also meancommunicating in the northern hemisphere, totry to influence policies and behavior. Whetherin meetings with government, United Nations,and European Community officials, briefingjournalists, or taking part in conferences such asthe United Nations Earth Summit, Oxfam staffspeak from their experience of relief and devel-opment work.

The common element in all aspects ofOxfam's work is supporting poor people in theirefforts to gain more control over their lives andto achieve peaceful change. The most successfuldevelopment and relief programs are those inwhich people have been really involved.

Oxfam produces a range of materials aboutits work, both free and for sale, covering a rangeof countries and issues, for adults, children, andyoung people. Oxfam's Young People's Teamproduces materials for teachers and youth work-ers, designed to explore the issues raised byteaching and learning about world development.

Oxfam also publishes books, includingshort, illustrated "Country Profiles," setting itswork in context; briefing papers for researchersand journalists; practical and technical manualsfor development workers; and research reportsas a basis for advocacy on behalf of the poor.

REFUGEE POLICY GROUP1424 16th Street, N.W.Suite No. 401Washington, DC 20036

The Refugee Policy Group (RPG) is an indepen-dent policy research organization that focuses onthe interconnections between refugee and relatedhumanitarian problems, and the issues of peaceand security, development, and human rights.

RPG uses impartial research and evaluationapproaches. Having no operational or institu-tional stake in the outcome of policy decisions,it seeks advice from individuals with differingperspectives and incorporates these views intoits analyses. It spends considerable time in thefield acquiring first-hand information from refu-gees, those directly concerned with their assis-tance and protection, and local inhabitants whoare affected by their presence. Policy findingsare tested against the realities of program imple-mentation to ensure that they will have the maxi-mum impact on actual practice.

The RPG brings together representatives ofvarying responsible perspectives to increase un-derstanding of issues, and where possible, to pro-mote greater agreement on policies andencourage those who make policy and developprograms to use available research. It supportsthe research of others by providing advice onpriorities and by reviewing and commenting onpapers and maintains a repository of significantdocuments on refugee issues for their own andothers' use. Publications include the periodicRPG Review, an annual report, and books andpamphlets.

RPG work is supported by an advisory coun-cil of leading refugee program experts and aboard of trustees drawn from corporations, in-ternational organizations, government,academia, and private agencies.

RPG's recent priorities are to promote:

1. Greater awareness that international migra-tion will be an issue of paramount impor-

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tance in the 1990s. Major political and eco-nomic changes bring with them the pros-pects for dramatically increased movementsof people. How the challenges presented bythese movements of people are addressedwill have a powerful effect upon the direc-tion of further political and economicchange.

2. Recognition that civil conflicts displace mil-lions of people internally as well as exter-nally. The inadequacy of current legal,institutional, and program arrangements toaddress the situations of internally displacedpersons leaves these millions of people ex-posed to the dangers of war, famine, andhuman rights abuse.

3. The development of effective plans and pro-grams for the repatriation of refugees anddisplaced persons in the wake of the poten-tial settlement of longstanding conflicts suchas in the Horn of Africa, Cambodia, Af-ghanistan, Central America and Mozam-bique. How these repatriations are conductedwill have an enormous affect upon the pros-pects for rehabilitation, development, andsustained peace in these areas.

4. The incorporation of development conceptsand organizations into the handling of massmovements of people. Dependency is toooften a consequence of being a refugee. Massmovements of people typically continue tobe addressed as emergencies long after theemergency conditions have subsided andthere are opportunities for reconstructionand development to begin.

5. Understanding of the intimate connectionsbetween peace, development, human rights,and the resolution of refugee and displacedpersons problems. Refugee movements arecaused by persecution, human rights abuses,wars, and civil strife. These situations areoften compounded by poverty, famine, andenvironmental degradation. Refugees and

displaced persons are not merely the conse-quences of these problems, however. Theyare also active parties in determiningwhether peace and stability will come to theirhomelands.

6. Greater attention to the assistance and pro-tection needs of special refugee populations,such as women, children and the elderly. Themajority of the world's refugees and dis-placed persons are women and children. Thesystems in place for providing assistance andprotection to refugees are often not suffi-ciently attuned to the special needs and re-sources of these groups. As a result, majorissues such as the sexual assault of refugeewomen, their health needs, and educationfor refugee children go unaddressed.

REFUGEES INTERNATIONAL*21 DuPont Circle, N.W.Washington, DC 20036

Refugees International (RI) is a private, inde-pendent, nonprofit organization dedicated todefending and promoting the human rights ofpeople who have been forced to flee their home-land. RI provides an international voice thatspeaks on behalf of refugees for protection, care,and the opportunity to build productive lives.

RI was formed in 1979 by 30 individualsfrom eight countries as a response to the forcedrepatriation of Cambodian refugees from Thai-land. Pushed back at gunpoint into the countrythey had risked their lives to flee, thousands ofinnocent men, women, and children who hadsurvived four years of genocide, died fromlandmines, starvation and reprisals. Determinedto fight such injustice and tragedy, RI wasfounded to provide a voice for refugees thatwould focus the world's attention on their plightand prevent needless loss of life.

With a wide network of international part-ners, RI monitors and analyzes refugee crises.

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RI then prepares issue briefs, with recommen-dations, for policy makers to enable them topursue fair and compassionate refugee policy.Using a combination of quiet diplomacy and thepower of public opinion, RI presses governmentsand international organizations to improve pro-tection for refugees. RI works in coalition withother advocates to develop and promote effec-tive strategies and lasting solutions to addressthe needs of refugees.

RI has conducted fact-finding missions toAsia, Africa, Central America, and the formerYugoslavia to survey refugee situations. Trip re-ports outlining objective policy recommenda-tions are widely disseminated within theinternational community. Many of RTs policyproposals have been implemented by govern-ment agencies. RI intervenes on behalf of indi-viduals and groups of refugees who have not beenadequately cared for by the international system.As a result of RTs work, lives have been savedand families have been reunited.

RI is based in Washington, DC, and his-torically has concentrated on the refugee situa-tion in Southeast Asia. RI is now broadening itswork in Central America, Africa, and the formerYugoslavia.

RI is supported by the contributions of in-dividuals, private foundations, and private cor-porations. In order to maintain independenceand objectivity, however, RI neither solicits noraccepts government funding.

THE SAVE THE CHILDREN FUND*17 Grove LaneCamberwellLondon SE5 8RDEngland

Save the Children (SCF) works to achieve last-ing benefits for children within the communi-ties in which they live by influencing policy andpractice based on its experience and study in dif-

ferent parts of the world. In all of its work Savethe Children endeavors to make a reality ofchildren's rights.

Ultimate responsibility for Save the Chil-dren is vested in the Council, the trustees of theorganization. HRHThe Princess Royal has beenthe president of Save the Children since 1970and plays an active role in SCF affairs.

Save the Children's headquarters is based inLondon. There are six departments at SCF'sheadquarters: Overseas, UK and European pro-grams, Public Affairs, Personnel and Adminis-tration, Fundraising, and Finance. Eachdepartment is headed by a director who reportsto the director general. Directors are responsiblefor the day to day management of SCF.

In most overseas countries there is a fielddirector who is responsible for the administra-tion of SCF's work in that country. In the UKprojects are managed through a structure of di-visional management teams. There is a networkof approximately 800 fundraising branchesthroughout the UK. Branches are run by volun-teer members.

Save the Children works in partnership withgovernments, local communities, and other orga-nizations with the aim of providing lasting ben-efits for children. Save the Children supportsprojects in some 50 countries worldwide: inAfrica, Asia, the Middle East, Latin America,the Caribbean, eastern Europe, and through-out the UK.

Projects aim to provide health, education,and welfare opportunities that are appropriate,affordable, accessible, and sustainable. OverseasSave the Children works in areas including foodsecurity, sustainability in the health sector, refu-gees, alternatives to institutional care, AIDS, anddisability. Save the Children also provides emer-gency relief during major disasters and supportspeople's efforts to rebuild their lives. In the UKwork is based in the community and includesfamily centers, schemes to support children andyoung people, and work with the criminal jus-

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tice system, disabled children, prisoners' fami-lies, and Travellers.

Major publications are World's Children(quarterly), Annual Report, Annual Review, anda range of other publications, including educa-tional materials.

SURVIVAL INTERNATIONAL310 Edgeware RoadLondon W21YDEngland

Survival International is an international orga-nization whose major purpose is to assist indig-enous peoples in safeguarding their rights. Theorganization provides financial assistance to in-digenous peoples urgently in need of such assis-tance, seeks to inform the general public of thevalue of indigenous cultures, and strongly speaksout against and supports action designed to stopthe ethnocide or genocide of indigenous peoples.Survival International is supported by donationsand grants from non-governmental organiza-tions. It has consultative status with the UnitedNations Education, Scientific, and CulturalOrganization (UNESCO) and the United Na-tions Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC)and maintains relations with other organizationsinvolved in indigenous rights issues. The head-quarters is in London, with other offices inFrance, Italy, and Spain and local organizationsin over 60 other nations. Publications includethe Urgent Action Bulletin, Survival InternationalNews, and Survival International Annual Review.

THE UNITED NATIONS HIGHCOMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES*P.O. Box 25001211 Geneva 2 DepotSwitzerland

The mission of the United Nations High Com-missioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is to provide

assistance and protection to the world's nearly19 million refugees.

Based in Geneva, Switzerland, UNHCRwas created by the United Nations General As-sembly and began work in 1951 aiding millionsof European refugees in the aftermath of WorldWar II. Its founding mandate defines refugeesas those who have fled their countries becauseof a well-founded fear of persecution for rea-sons of their race, religion, nationality, politicalopinion, or membership in a particular socialgroup and who cannot or do not want to return.

Since its creation more than 40 years ago,UNHCR has helped more than 30 million refu-gees, earning two Nobel Peace Prizes in the pro-cess—but the refugee problem continues to grow,more than doubling over the past decade. Eachday in 1992, an average of 5,000 people fled theirhomes because of war, human rights abuses, andpersecution.

By mid-1993, there were 18.9 million refu-gees around the world and another 20 millionmen, women and children were displaced in theirown lands. One in every 134 people on Earthhas been forced into flight.

Protecting the right of these people to seekand enjoy asylum from persecution is not easy.Countries of first asylum, often poor themselves,sometimes grow weary of the needs of thosebeing given sanctuary. Occasionally, they try topush refugees back across the border; and peoplein rich countries, fearing that the influx of asy-lum-seekers is becoming unmanageable, some-times slam doors in their faces. UNHCR strivesto reopen those doors and to keep them open.

UNHCR's most important function isknown as international protection—trying to en-sure that no refugee is returned involuntarily toa country where he or she has reason to fear per-secution.

UNHCR also promotes adherence to inter-national agreements on refugees and monitorsthe behavior of individual states to ensure thatthey respect those agreements. When refugees

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are mistreated or forcibly repatriated, UNHCRprotests to governments at the highest level.

UNHCR traditionally helps those who havefled their homelands because of threats to theirlives or liberty. Sometimes these include massmovements of people fleeing civil conflict andother man-made disasters. Over the years,UNHCR also has been asked by the U.N. Sec-retary-General to assist people internally dis-placed in their own lands.

In addition to providing protection to refu-gees, UNHCR also provides food, water, shel-ter, medical care, and other emergency aid tothose fleeing.

In the longer term, UNHCR seeks durablesolutions for the plight of refugees. These possiblesolutions for refugees are of three categories:

1. Voluntary repatriation back to their origi-nal homes

2. Integration in the countries where they firstsought asylum

3. Resettlement to a third country.

The current High Commissioner for Refu-gees is Sadako Ogata, a former Japanese diplo-mat and academic who assumed her post inFebruary 1991. She reports annually to the U.N.General Assembly through the Economic andSocial Council.The High Commissioners mate-rial assistance programs are approved and super-vised by the UNHCR Executive Committee,composed of 46 member countries. The Execu-tive Committee also advises the High Commis-sioner at her request on the exercise of herfunctions.

UNHCR's expenditures are financed by avery limited subsidy from the regular budget ofthe United Nations (to be used exclusively foradministrative costs), as well as by voluntarycontributions from governments, nongovern-mental organizations and individuals. UNHCRstotal expenditures for 1993 are estimated at $1.37billion, up from $1.07 billion in 1992.

UNHCR currently has 2,445 staff membersworking in 176 offices in 110 countries. Amongthe major refugee assistance programs being car-ried out by UNHCR in early 1993 were Af-ghanistan, Armenia/Azerbaijan, Benin andGhana (refugees from Togo), the Cambodia re-patriation, the Comprehensive Plan of Actionfor Indo-Chinese refugees, Georgia, the Gua-temala repatriation, several programs in theHorn of Africa, the Mozambique repatriation,the Sri Lanka repatriation, Tajikistan, and theformer Yugoslavia.

UNHCR is the lead U.N. agency for hu-manitarian operations in former Yugoslavia,where it is providing assistance to nearly 3.5million people. At an estimated cost of $420million for 1993, the emergency humanitarianoperation in the former Yugoslavia is by far thelargest of UNHCRs worldwide programs.

Publications produced by UNHCR s Pub-lic Information Office include the quarterlyRefugees magazine, with a circulation of 200,000,in English, French, German, Italian, Japanese,and Spanish. The office also issues numerouspress releases, regular information bulletins giv-ing an in-depth look at ongoing emergency op-erations, brochures, posters, and calendars. ThePublic Information Office also has its own videounit, which provides footage of global refugeeoperations to television stations and networksaround the world. The video unit also producesnumerous films on a variety of UNHCR-relatedsubjects, ranging from children to specificoperations.

THE U.S. COMMITTEE FOR REFUGEES1025 Vermont Ave., N.W., Suite 920Washington, DC 20005

The U.S. Committee for Refugees, (USCR) isa public information program of the AmericanCouncil for Nationalities Service dedicated toproviding clear, objective information to thepublic and policy makers to assist and protect

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refugees and internally displaced persons aroundthe world. Through its publications, videos, themedia, and expert testimony, USCR seeks tomobilize the public and official awareness into amore humanitarian response to the uprootedvictims of persecution and war.

For over 30 years, the USCRs mission hasbeen to:

1. Defend the basic human rights of refugees,most fundamentally, the principle ofnonrefoulement: no forced return of a personwith a well-founded fear of persecution tohis or her homeland

2. To defend the rights of asylum seekers to a fairand impartial determination of their status;

3. To defend the right to decent and humani-tarian treatment for all internally displacedpersons.

The USCR meets this mission by observ-ing and documenting refugee emergencies; of-fering clear, objective information about thethese situations to the public and policy makers;and publishing and distributing information toa variety of audiences through the annual WorldRefugee Survey, the monthly Refugee Reports, andvideos.

The USCR is a private, not-for-profit or-ganization and is supported by contributions,income from the sale of publications, and sup-port from private foundations in the UnitedStates.

WORLD COUNCIL OFINDIGENOUS PEOPLES100 Argyle AvenueOttawa, OntarioCanada K2P 1B6

The World Council of Indigenous Peoples(WCIP) was founded in 1975 Mowing the FirstInternational Conference of Indigenous Peoplesin Port Alberni, British Colombia. The genesis

of the WCIP dates to the early 1960s and theefforts of George Manuel, then President of theIndian Brotherhood of Canada. The objectivesof the WCIP are to (1) promote unity amongindigenous peoples of the world; (2) strengthentheir organizations; (3) encourage the abolitionof any possibility of genocide or ethnocide; (4)combat racism; and (5) ensure political, eco-nomic, social, and cultural justice for indigenouspeoples based on the principle of equality amongthem and with the people of the countries whichsurround them. The WCIP acts to achieve thesegoals by generating a collective and unified re-sponse for indigenous peoples, and consolidat-ing their local, regional, and nationalorganizations.

WCIP programs and activities include:

Economic and Social Development. The pro-motion of social and economic improvementand development with indigenous partici-pation toward self-determination throughtraining programs, research, scholarships,exchange programs, and social programs.

Inter-Institutional Forums and Relations. Thepromotion and consolidation of efforts to-ward the recognition of indigenous rightsthrough the formulation of legislation, poli-cies, and instruments especially regardinghuman rights, indigenous rights, thestrengthening of indigenous organizations,and research.

Information and Documentation. To makeknown the situation of indigenous peoplesthrough documentaries, radio programs, andthe periodical WCIP Newsletter.

Special Programs. Initiatives toward specialissues such as the 500-Years-Beyond 1492project, peace and development, and resis-tance to the Human Genome Project.

The WCIP is governed by a general assem-bly composed of delegates from local organiza-tions in each of the member nations, an executive

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council of one president, two vice-presidents, andrepresentatives from each member region. Theactivities of the organization are carried out bythe general director and his or her staff in thecentral office in Ottawa and in regional offices.The WCIP has consultative status with the

Economic and Social Council of the UN,UNESCO, and the International Labor Orga-nization as well as cooperative relationships withother nongovernmental organizations and gov-ernments. It is funded by grants from govern-mental organizations and private organizations.

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ILLUSTRATIONCREDITS

4 ITAR-TASS/Sovfoto

7 AP/Wide World Photos

11 AP Newsfeatures Photo

16 New Zealand Tourism Board

25 AP28 TANJUGPHOTO/Eastfoto

36 UPI/Bettmann

45 AP57 San Francisco Visitors Bureau

68 Bettmann

76 TASS from Sovfoto

82 PJA-NOVOSTI/Sovfoto

95 AP

101 Courtesy Department of LibraryServices, American Museum ofNatural History, neg. no. 310391.

106 CTK/Eastfoto

112 AP

122 AP126 Reuters/Bettmann

137 AP Photo

145 Sovfoto/Eastfoto

151 AP Newsfeatures Photo

156 AP Laserphoto

158 ITAR-TASS/Sovfoto

167 AP

174 New China Pictures/Eastfoto

182 Sovfoto

185 UPI/Bettmann

201 AP

204 AP

212 AP/Wide World Photos

221 The Bettmann Archive

242 AP

247 AP/Wide World Photos

281

Abiola, Moshood, 178Abkhazians, 3-5, 69Aboriginal peoples of Australia, 18,100-101,127Acculturation, 15Acehnese, 202Advani, L. K., 112Affirmative action, 36,116Afghanistan, 86African-Americans

affirmative action, 116assimilation, 15, 17caste groups, 33ethnic humor, 71-73ghettos, 104Sea-Islanders, 190, 234self-name, 20

African diaspora, 56African homelands, 11African National Congress, 12Afrocentric movement, 221Afro-Colombians, 19, 75Albanians, 5-6, 29, 80-81,135,175, 203American Indians, 127

assimilation, 17Christian missions, 161,162collective rights, 115

ethnic humor, 71, 72ethnic media, 81extinct cultures, 102-103"fullbloodedness" status, 197-198genocides, 100Hopi-Navajo problem, 113-114land rights, 132material culture, 134mixed-race peoples, 165-166. See also Mestizosnational status of, 130panethnic movements, 187religious cults, 206self-names, 18-20situational ethnicity, 216-218slavery, 220Spanish colonialism, 48syncretic cultures, 226tourist industry, 233tribal designations, 239

Americanization, 16. See also AssimilationAmhara, 33Amish, 18, 77Amnesty International, 159Angami, 173Anglo conformity, 15,17Ao, 173Apartheid, 10-12,167,197,199Appalachian people, 72Arab ethnocentrism, 86Arawaks, 100Argentina, 17-18, 152,156Armenia, Russian population, 208Armenians, 3,12-14, 53, 61,135, 202

Armenian-Americans, 80in Georgia, 181Turkish massacre, 100, 149

Art, 234Aryan race, 196Ashkenazi, 55Asian-American panethnicity, 187Assamese, 14-15, 27Assimilation, 15-18, 69,157

ethnic media and, 80forced, 88

Asylum-seekers, 150, 203. See also RefugeesAtoni, 45, 202, 229Aussiedler, 94-95Austria, 49,175

283

INDEX

INDEX

Autonym, 18-20Azerbaijan, Russian population, 208, 210Azerbaijani, 12-14, 61, 202

Baba, 58Babangida, Ibrahim, 178Babism, 21Badaga, 85, 239Baha'i, 21-23, 66, 88Balinese, 45, 84Bangladesh, 41-43, 45

Assam immigration, 14Burmese refugees, 171

Barzini, Mustafa, 146Basques, 23-24, 64, 78, 233-234Becker, Howard, 148Belarus, 19, 208, 209Belarussians, 175Belgium, 49, 69, 153Bengalis, 14, 41-42, 171Benin, 225Beta Israel (Falasha), 17, 33,137, 202, 203Bharatiya Janata party (BJP), 112-113Bhutan, 176Bias crimes, 109-110Bihari, 202Bisayans, 85BJP, 112-113Black Caribs, 226Black consciousness movement, 226Black Creoles, 165,166Black Dutch, 74Black Lolo, 220Blackfoot, 197Boat people, 24-26,149Bodo, 27Bontok, 132Bosnia-Herzegovina, 5, 28-32, 61Bosnian Muslims, 5, 27-32, 61, 202Brahman, 34Brazil

Black Consciousness movement, 186-187, 226minorities, 166-167,197pacification, 183, 184slavery, 221syncretic religion, 226

Bretons, 84British colonialism

Bengal region, 42Burma, 170

Cyprus, 53Fiji, 91-92Gurkhas and, 147India, 47, 111, 173Nigeria, 77-78Northern Ireland, 39-41pacification, 183racism, 46

BuddhismBurmans, 170Chakma, 42Chinese in Thailand, 17Tibetans, 227

Bulang, 174Bulgaria, 154Bulgarian Gypsies, 105, 106Burakumin, 33Burger, Julian, 125Burma. See MyanmarBurman, 170. See also MyanmarBurmese, 170, 202. See also MyanmarBurundi, 46,121-123,155

Cambodia (Kampuchea), 19, 241-243Canada

assimilation, 17-18French Canadians, 69, 84, 96-97indigenous rights, 130minority rights, 157mixed-ancestry peoples, 165-166

Candomble, 225Cannibalism, 87Cape Coloureds, 15, 165,167Cargo cults, 205, 206-207Caribs, 100Caste, 33-36Catalans, 37-39Catholicism. See ChristianityCeylon. See Sri LankaChakma, 41-43, 202Chambri, 231Chang, 173Charismatic missions, 163Chattel slavery, 220-222Chechen-Ingush, 43-44, 210Cherokee, 130Child labor, 222-223Chile, 166China, People's Republic of

official minorities, 156, 157,174-175

284

INDEX

pre-Communist slavery practices, 220Tibet, 227-229

Chinese diaspora, 58-59Chinese immigrants (Overseas Chinese)

assimilation, 17in Fiji, 92middleman minorities, 102, 148in Vietnam, 25, 149

Christianityanti-Semitism, 8-9Copts, 50-51, 66,156Greek Cypriots, 53missions, 159-164Nigerians, 177Northern Ireland, 39-41syncretism, 225-226

Chumash, 216-217Circumstantialism, 77Colombia, 19, 75,166Colonialism, 44-48

Christian missions and, 160, 161-162ethnocide, 88genocide, 100indigenous rights and, 128mixed-race groups and, 164nationalism and, 82See also British colonialism

Commonwealth of Independent States, 13,135,168.See also Russians; specific ethnic groups

Communal contenders, 156Commuting workers, 150Competitive race relations, 199-200Conciliar missions, 162-163Condominas, Georges, 88Conflict management, 68-69Congo, 151Conquest, 64Consociational democracy, 49-50Contextualization, 161Copts, 50-51, 66,156Cossacks, 147Creole languages, 189-190Crisis cults, 205Croatian Gypsies, 105,106Croats, 5, 27-32, 61,135, 202, 203Cults, 204-207Cult of Angels, 143Cultural genocide, 88-89Cultural pluralism, 191Cultural relativism, 51-52

Cultural resource control, 133-134Cushites, 33Cyprus, 53-54Czech immigrants, 81

Dalai Lama, 227, 228, 229Debt bondage, 223Democracy, consociational, 49-50Denizen, 150Dharma, 35Diaspora, 55-59Dine (Navajo), 18-19, 20, 71,113-114Discrimination, 155Domestic slavery, 219-220Dominican immigrants, 236Doukhobors, 18Drupka, 176Druze, 156Dudayev, Djokhar, 44

Economic refugees, 150Economic slavery, 220-222Ecotourism, 232Ecuador, 74-75, 187Egypt, 67

Copts in, 50-51, 66,156Egyptian migrant workers, 151El Salvador, 166Elephant joke, 83Elite minorities, 155Encomienda, 48Environmental tourism, 232Eskimo, 20, 161. See also InuitEstonia, 208, 210ETA, 23-24Ethiopia, 33Ethiopian Jews. See Beta IsraelEthnic associations, 153Ethnic cleansing, 27, 30-31, 61, 176Ethnic conflict, 62-70

causes of, 67-68management and resolution of, 68-69refugees, 201types of, 63-66world system and, 246

Ethnic group designation, 18-20, 239Ethnic humor, 70-73, 83Ethnic identity, 73-75Ethnic impression management, 218Ethnic media, 79-81

285

INDEX

Ethnic nationalism, 81-84Ethnic separatism, 83-84. See also specific groups, na-

tionalities, nationsEthnic solidarity, 67, 69, 75-78Ethnic tourism, 231Ethnocentrism, 85-87

ethnic humor, 70-73human rights and, 116xenophobia, 247

Ethnocide, 17, 88-89Ethnoclasses, 156Evangelic missions, 162Exploitation colonialism, 44, 46

Federal Republic of Germany. See GermanyFederal Republic of Nigeria. See NigeriaFein, Helen, 99Fiji, 57-59, 86, 91-93First World, 245Five Pillars of Islam, 66, 111Forced assimilation, 17Forced labor, 223Foreign investment, 237Fourth World, 125France

Basques, 23-24Bretons, 84Catalans, 37Gypsies, 105migrant ethnic communities, 153-154Muslim communities, 154

Franco, Francisco, 38French Canadians (Quebecois), 69, 84, 96-97French colonialism, 47-48FRETILIN, 229Fulani, 77-78,177Fundamentalism, 67

Gandhi, Indira, 213Gandhi, Mahatma, 111Gandhi, Rajiv, 15,216Garifuna, 226Gaza, 136,137,138Geertz, Clifford, 76Genocide, 88, 89, 99-103,

extinct cultures, 102-103See also Ethnic cleansing

Georgia, 3-5Russian population, 208, 210

Georgians, 3-5, 69,149, 202

German colonialism, 46Germans in Poland (Silesians), 175Germany, 93-95,109-110,153,197, 211

anti-Semitism, 9asylum-seekers, 203Gypsies in, 106Nazi period, 9, 61, 93,101-102,105,135

Ghana, 211Ghettos, 8-9,104-105Ghost Dance, 206Goanese, 167Graburn, Nelson, 234Great Britain

Indian residents, 57migrant-ethnic communities, 153See also British colonialism

Greater Serbia, 30Greek Albanians, 202, 203Greek Cypriots, 53-54Guatemala, 48Guinea, 46, 47Gujaratis, 57Gullah, 190,234Gurkha, 147Gurr, Ted, 67-68,156Guyana, 57Gypsies, 73-74,105-106,109

caste groups, 33Nazi genocide, 101Pentecostalism, 226scapegoats, 211

Habyarimana, Juvenal, 122Hacienda system, 48Haiti, 56, 203, 225-226Han. See China, People s Republic of; Chinese

immigrantsHasidic Jews, 18,59Hate crimes, 109-110Hate groups, 94-95Hausa, 177Hausa-Fulani, 78, 84,178Hill people, 19,127

Indian Nagas, 173-174Hinduism

Assamese, 14British colonial administration and, 42caste system, 33-36Indian Muslims and, 111-113Kashmiri, 141

286

INDEX

Mauritius, 192tourism, 232

Holocaust, 93, 101-102Homeland, 59, 78Homosexuals, 110Honduras, 166, 226Hopi, 113-14,135Horowitz, Donald, 67-68Hos, 47Hui, 174Human Development Index, 52Human rights, 114-116,159Humane deterrence, 203Humor, 70-73Hungarians, 29,175

ethnic humor, 71Gypsies, 105,106in Romania, 119-120,135

Hustinger, Judith, 207Hutterites, 18Hutu, 46,121-123,155, 202, 211Hypodescent, 196-197

Iban, 147Igbo, 177-178Illegal immigrants, 150Ilocanos, 86Immigrant(s)

migrant workers, 149-155panethnicity, 187racism and, 199transnational migration, 235-237

Immigrant workers, 150India

Assamese, 14-15, 27Bodo, 27British colonialism, 47caste system, 33-36debt bondage, 223diaspora, 56-58Hindu-Moslem relations, 111-113Kashmiri, 141-142linguistic pluralism, 191mixed-ancestry populations, 167Nagas, 173-174Scheduled Tribes, 36, 47,127,239Sikhs, 57, 212-214Toda-Badaga-Kurumba trade network, 85

Indian immigrants, 237Indian Youth Council, 187

Indigenization, 161Indigenous arts, 234Indigenous peoples, 125-127

pacification of, 183-186religious missions and, 163-164rights of, 89,127-134,159self-names, 18-20

Indo-Fijians, 91-92Indonesia, 45, 58, 84, 229-230,231Inkatha Freedom Party, 12Internal colonialism, 44International laws, 115Inuit, 20, 79, 81,130,165Investment, 237Iran, 21-23, 66, 88,142-145Iraq, 66, 202,142-146Irian Java, 45Irish, 39-41Irish Republican Army (IRA), 40-41Irish Travelers, 74,105Irish-Americans, 63Irredentism, 64,135-136, 202Islam, Five Pillars of, 66, 111. See also MuslimsIslamic anti-Semitism, 8, 9Islamic fundamentalism, 66-67Islamic missionaries, 160Islamic slavery, 222Israel, Palestinians and, 136-139Italian immigrants, 199, 224

assimilation of, 16ethnic humor, 71-73

Italy, 175

Jackson Whites, 165Jajmani system, 34-35Jakun, 178Jamaica, 205, 206Japan, 33, 84, 109,197Javanese, 45, 84Jenischen, 105Jesuit missions, 162Jewish diaspora, 55-56Jewish ghetto, 104Jews

anti-Semitism, 6-9in Argentina, 18, 156caste groups, 33contemporary German persecution, 95ethnic identity, 75ethnic media, 79

287

INDEX

Jews (continued)ethnic solidarity, 78ethnocentrism, 86ethnocide in Spain, 88European national minorities, 175homeland, 59as middleman minorities, 102,148in Moldova, 169Nazi genocide (Holocaust), 93,101-102overseas support for Israel, 63Palestinians and, 136-139Russian refugees, 202as scapegoats, 149, 211situational ethnicity, 216Skinhead targeting, 110stereotypes, 224Zionism, 138

Jicarilla, 72Jing, 174John Frum movement, 205Jordan, 43, 67Jura autonomy movement, 69Justicating movement, 205

Kacha, 173Kachin, 170,171, 202Kalinga, 132Kampuchea (Cambodia), 241-243Kanak, 19Kapauku, 18Karen, 170, 202Karma, 35Kashmiri, 141-142Kataf, 178Kazakhs, 88, 208Kazakhstan, 89

Russian population, 208-210Khalistan, 213Khmers, 19, 241-243Khoi, 167Kinbangu Cult, 205Kongo, 225Konyak, 173Koreans

in America, 148,149in China, 174in Japan, 197

Kosovo, 5-6, 29, 135Kota, 239

Kreol, 192Krymchaks, 75, 216Kshatriya, 34Kurdistan, 142Kurds, 12, 64, 142-146, 202Kurumba, 85, 239Kwanzaa, 56Kyi, Aung San Suu, 172Kyrgyzstan, 208, 210

Lakota, 20Land rights, 131-133Lao, 203Lapps. See SaamiLatin America

migrant workers, 151-152mixed-ancestry population, 166Spanish colonialism, 48

Latin Americansethnic humor, 71ethnic media, 81panethnicity, 187-188

Latinos, 20Latvia, 208, 210Lebanon, 49, 156Lemkin, Raphael, 88, 99Lhote, 173Lijphart, Arend, 49Linguistic pluralism, 191Lisu, 174Lithuania, 89, 208, 209Loba, 174Lon Nol, 242Louisiana Black Creoles, 165,166Ludari, 74Lumbee, 165, 217

Macedonians, 19Macrosegregation, 11Madurese, 45Mahayana Buddhism, 17Malaysia, 57, 58,195Mandela, Nelson, 12Maori, 18,115Maronite Christians, 53Marsh Arabs, 66, 202Martial races, 147-148Mashantucket Pequot, 217,233Mass media, 79-81, 87

288

INDEX

Mauritania, 222-223Mauritius, 57, 69, 84, 158, 192Maya, 166Media, 79-81Melanesia

cargo cults, 205pacification, 183, 184-186See also New Guinea

Melting pot, 17Mennonites, 18Meshketian Turks, 202Mesosegregation, 11Messianic cults, 205Mestizos, 48, 75, 166, 199Metis, 165-166Mexico, 48

migrant workers, 151mixed-ancestry population, 166

Microsegregation, 10-11Middleman minorities, 102, 148-149, 201, 211Migrant workers, 149-155

European crises, 152-154rights of, 154-155

Migrationdiaspora, 55-59transnational, 235—237

Militant sects, 156Millenarian movement, 205Mingelians, 3Minority, 155-157. See also RaceMinority rights, 157-159Minority Rights Group, 159Miskito, 100Missions, 159-164Mixed-ancestry peoples, 46, 164-167

mestizos, 48, 75situational ethnicity, 218

Moldova, 89, 135, 168-169, 208Mon, 170, 171, 202Montagnards, 19Morocco, 33Mubarak, Hosni, 51Mundas, 47Muong, 19Muslims

Abkhazian, 4Albanian, 6anti-Semitism, 9Azerbaijani, 13

Baha'i and, 21-23Bangladesh Bengali, 41-42Bosnian, 5, 27, 29-30Burmese, 170-172, 202castelike categories, 34Chechen-Ingush, 43Copts and, 50-51European national minorities, 175French society, 154German xenophobia, 95human rights and, 116Indian Hindus and, 111-113Indonesian, 45Islamic fundamentalism, 66—67Kashmiri, 84, 141Kurdish, 143Mauritian, 192missionaries, 160Nigerian, 78, 177-178Palestinian, 136slavery practices, 222Soviet purges of, 88in Sri Lanka, 63Turkish Cypriot, 53

Myanmar, 15, 58, 169-172

Nagas, 173-174, 202Nagorno-Karabakh, 13-14Naroll, Raoul, 52Nation, 83National character, 8National culture, 83National minority

Chinese minzu, 174-175in Europe, 175

National sentiment, 83Nationalism, 81-84Nationalities, 156

anti-Semitism, 9Nation-states, 81-84Native American Church, 206Nativistic movements, 205Natural resources, 46, 133Navajo, 18-19, 20, 71,113-114,135Naxi, 174Nazi Germany, 9, 61, 93, 101-102,105,135Ndadaye, Melchior, 123Negro, 19Neocolonialism, 44-45

289

INDEX

Neo-Nazis, 9, 94-95,154Nepal, 57Nepalese, 202

in Bhutan, 176Gurkha, 147

Netherlands, 49,105,153New Guinea, 45

cargo cults, 205,206-207pacification, 183, 184-186tourism, 231

New Zealand, 18,115Newspapers and magazines, 79-81Nicaragua, 166,199Nigeria, 77-78, 84,151,160,177-178,225Non-Resident Indians (NRIs), 237Nootka, 19, 20Northern Ireland, 39-41, 63Norway, 187Norwegian-language newspapers, 79Nunavut, 130

Old Believers, 18, 88,158

Oppositionalism, 78Oraons, 47Orokolo, 206-207Ossetes, 43,181-182, 202, 210Overseas Chinese, 58-59,148. See also Chinese im-

migrants

Pacification, 183-186Pakistan, 141-142Pakistan Affairs, 79Palestinian, 136-139,157Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), 136-137Pampangans, 85Panama, 166Panethnicity, 186-188Papua New Guinea, 18. See also New GuineaParaguay, 166Pariahs, 148Passing, 218Paternalistic race relations, 199Pathans, 86Paugussett, 217-218Pawnee, 19Pentecostal missions, 163Pentecostalism, 226Peoples of the North, 188-189

Peoples Republic of China. See China, People's Re-public of

Pequot, 217, 233Peranakans, 58Peripatetics, 105Persistent identity systems, 78Peru, 223Peyote Cult, 206Philippines, 84, 85,132Pidgin languages, 189-190Pima, 20Pluralism, 191-193

consociational democracy, 49-50Pol Pot, 242Polish-Americans, 76Political pluralism, 191Portugal, and East Timor, 229-230Powwows, 187Primitive cultures, 238Primordialism, 76-77Productive slavery, 220-222Prostitution, 223Pueblo, 162, 231Punjab, 57, 212-213Push-pull, 236

Quebecois, 84, 96-97Quechuan, 20

Race, 195-200Brazilian Black Consciousness movement, 186-187passing, 218relations, 199-200situational ethnicity, 216-218See also Mixed-ancestry peoples

Racial anti-Semitism, 8Racial purity, 197-198Racism, 198-199

anti-Semitism, 6-9apartheid, 10-12exploitation colonialism, 46hate (bias) crimes, 109-110slavery, 218-223

Ramapo Mountain People, 165Rao, Narashima, 15Rastafari movement, 205, 206Raw materials, 46Recreational tourism, 232Refugees, 63,150, 200-204

290

INDEX

boat people, 24-26Burmese, 171Germany and, 94Kurds, 143-144

Relativistic perspectives, 51-52Religions. See Buddhism; Christianity; Hinduism;

Jews; MuslimsReligious anti-Semitism, 8Religious conflict and persecution, 64-67

Baha'i, 21-23contemporary German xenophobia, 93-95Cyprus, 53-54ethnocide, 88former Soviet Union, 158indigenous rights vs., 133militant sects, 156Northern Ireland, 39-41Sikhs in India, 212-214

Religious cults, 204-207Religious pluralism, 192Remittances, 236Rengma, 173Republic of Armenia, 12-14. See also ArmeniansRepublic of Azerbaijani, 13-14. See also AzerbaijaniRepublic of Georgia, 3-5. See also GeorgiansRepublic of Ireland, 40Reverse discrimination, 116Revitalization movements, 205-207Rightist crimes, 109Rights

human, 114-116,159indigenous, 127-134,159migrant workers, 154-155minority, 157-159

Rohingya, 171-172Rom, 74Roma, 105Roman Catholic Mission, 163Roman Catholicism. See ChristianityRomania, 135

Gypsies, 105,106Hungarians in, 119-120as source of children for adoption, 223

Romanians, 175Gypsies, 105,106,109Moldovans, 168-169

Rominchels, 74Russian Gypsies, 105Russian Jews, 9, 216

Russian Orthodox church, 161Russians, 3,12, 69,208-210

Chechen-Ingush and, 43-44Cossacks, 147ethnocidal acts, 88, 89Georgia, 181Peoples of the North, 189refugees, 202shamanism and, 133

Russification, 89, 208Rwanda, 46,121-123, 211

Saami, 129-130,187Samoa, 236Sangtam, 173Sanskritization, 35Santals, 47Santeria, 225Saraguro, 74-75Sarawak Rangers, 147Saudi Arabia, 67, 84,151,152Scapegoat, 8,149, 201, 211Scheduled Castes, 34, 36Scheduled Tribes, 36, 47,127, 239Schlesinger, Arthur, Jr., 238Scottish Travelers, 74Sea Islanders, 190, 234Seasonal labor, 150Segregation. See Apartheid; GhettosSelf-definition, 130Self-determination, 19,130-131,157Self-identity, 73-75Self-names, 18-20Sema, 173Semite, 6Separatist movements, 63. See also specific ethnic groupsSephardic Jews, 55Serbs and Serbia, 5-6, 27, 61, 135, 175Settlement colonization, 44, 88Settlers, 165Shamanism, 133Shan, 170,171Shanti, 219Shevardnadze, Eduard, 4Shi'ite Muslims, 13, 21,143Shiv Sena, 113Shluh, 33Siberian Peoples of the North, 188-189Sihanouk, Norodom, 241, 243

291

INDEX

Sikkim, 176Singapore, 58, 151Sinhalese, 58, 63, 158, 203, 214-216Sinn Fein, 41Sinti, 226Situational ethnicity, 77, 216-218Skinheads, 94-95, 110Slavery, 218-223Slovaks, 175

Gypsies, 105-106Slovenia, 135Smith, Valene, 231Sociobiology, 87Sociological minorities, 155Solidarity, 67, 69, 75-78Somalia, 87, 135, 220Sousse, 46, 48South Africa, 10-12, 155,199

mixed-ancestry peoples, 15, 165, 167racial classification system, 197

Soviet Union. See Commonwealth of IndependentStates; specific ethnic groups, nationalities

SpainBasques in, 23-24, 84Catalans, 37-39colonialism, 48Gypsies, 105Jewish ethnocide, 88

Spanish-language media, 81Sri Lanka, 57, 58, 63, 158, 202, 203, 214-216Stalin, Joseph, 4, 43State, 93Stereotypes, 224-225

ethnic humor, 70-71scapegoats, 211

Structural pluralism, 191Sudra, 34, 36Sunni Muslims, 13, 66, 143Supply-demand, 236Survival, 64Sweden, 129, 153Swedish-language publications, 81Switzerland, 49-50, 69, 84, 105,153Syncretic cultures, 226Syncretism, 225-226Syria, 43, 142,143

Tagalogs, 85Tai, 171Tajiks, 202

Tajikistan, 208Tamils, 58, 63, 158, 192, 202, 203, 214-216Taos, 71,128,132,162,198Tasmanians, 100-101Telugu, 192Terrorism

Basque nationalists, 23-24German xenophobia, 94in Northern Ireland, 40Tamil-Sinhalese conflict, 215-216

Teton, 20Thailand, 17Theravada Buddhism, 17Third World colonialism, 45Tibetans, 202, 227-229Timor, 45, 84, 229-230Tipai-Ipai, 19Tiv, 178Tlingit, 161, 220Toda, 85, 239Tohono O'Odham, 20Tonga, 236Toradja, 231Tourism, 230-234Trans-Dniestr, 168, 169, 210Transmigrant, 150Transnational migration, 235Transylvania, 119-120, 135Travelers, 74, 105-106Tribe, 238-239Trinidad and Tobago, 57, 58Tu, 174Tuareg, 202Tukomi, 173Tunisia, 67Tupi-Guarani Free Land movement, 205Turkey, 43

Armenian massacre, 100, 149Cyprus and, 53-54Kurds in, 142-145minorities in, 156

Turkishin Bulgaria, 154in Germany, 93, 94, 109, 197, 211refugees, 202

Turkmenistan, 208Tutsi, 46,121-123,155, 202, 211

Uganda, 202,211Ukraine, 208, 210

292

INDEX

Ukrainians, 3, 12, 147, 202Ulster Defense Association (UDA), 41United Liberation Front of Assam (UFLA), 15United Nations

conflict management efforts, 69Convention on Genocide, 99Cyprus intervention, 53-54Definition of Indigenous Peoples, 125Human Development Index, 52indigenous rights and, 128Kurds and, 143minority rights and, 158panethnic organizations, 177refugees, definition of, 200Rwanda conflict and, 122State of Israel and, 138

Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 115-119Universalist view, 52Untouchables, 34, 36,116Uzbekistan, 208Uzbeks, 202

Vailala Madness, 206-207Vaisya, 34van den Berghe, Pierre, 10-12, 149,199Varna system, 34-36Venezuela, 151-152, 166Vietnam, Chinese in, 149Vietnamese

boat people, 24-26in Cambodia, 241-243hill people, 19

migrant workers, 154Voudun (Voodoo), 56, 225-226

Wallace, Anthony, 205Wealth flows, 236West Bank, 136-138Westcoast People, 19, 20White power, 95Woonwagenbewoners, 105World community, 235World Council of Churches, 163World Council of Indigenous Peoples, 187World system, 245-246

Xenophobia, 247anti-Semitism, 9Germany, 93-95

IXhosa, 12,167

Yachumi, 173Yeltsin, Boris, 44, 210Yemenis, 236Yoruba, 84,177, 225Yugoslavia, 27-32, 61, 135, 201. See also specific

ethnic groups, nationalitiesYuma, 20

Zaire, 151, 225Zhuang, 174Zionism, 138Zulu, 12, 167Zuni, 134

293

The following maps show approximate locationsof the cultures mentioned in the text.

iBBi

Africa and the Middle East

1. Acholi2. Afrikaners3. Amhara4. Baha'i5. Bedouin6. Cape Coloureds7. Copts8. Cushites9. Druze

10. Hausa11. Herero12. Hutu13. Igbo14. Khoi

15. Kongo16. Kurds17. Lango18. Palestinians"19. Shluh20. Somali21. Soussou22. Tuareg23. Tutsi24. IXhosa25. Yemenis26. Yoruba27. Zulu

Central and South America

1. Ache2. Dominicans3. Garifima4. Haitians5. Miskito6. Rastafarians7. Yucatec Maya

Europe and Asia

1. Abkhaz2. Badaga3. Balkars4. Baluch5. Basques6. Bihari7. Bosnian Muslims8. Bretons9. Burakumin

10. Chakma11. Chinese in Thailand12. Cossacks13. Crimean Tatars14. Croats15. Danes16. Gurkha17. Kachin

18. Karachay19. Karen20. Lolo21. Luo22. Mauritians23. Meskhetian Turks24. Mon25. Muong26. Nagas27. Ossetes28. Pathan29. Saami30. Santal31. Serbs32. Slav Macedonians33. Tamils of Sri Lanka34. Toda

North America

1. Aleut2. Amish3. Black Creoles4. Blackfoot5. Cherokee (Oklahoma)6. Chumash7. Doukhobors8. Hasidicjews9. Hutterites

10. Jicarilla Apache11. Kumeyaay12. Lakota (Teton)13. Lumbee14. Metis

15. Navajo16. Nootka17. Old Believers18. Oneida19. Pawnee20. Pequots21. Quebecois22. Quechuan

23. Ramapo Mountain People24. Sea Islanders25. Settlers (Labrador)26. Taos27. Tlingit28. Tohono O'Odham29. Western Apache30. Zuni

Oceania

1. Acehnese2. Balinese3. Bontok4. Chambri5. Fijians6. Goodenough Islanders7. Javanese8. Kalinga9. Maori

10. Orokolo11. Tasmanians12. Timorese13. Toradja