DATE: 11-10-2009 FBI iorp. CLASSIFIED BY 65179 DMH/LSC REASON: 1.4 (C) DECLASSIFY ON: 11-10-2034

a acts Report Filter: Linked To Source(s): Interview 1" - 43 of 7911 (0,5%) Filtered

Case: FBI in Military Zones Created: 2/24/2009 12;20:04 PM

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Date & Tillie :Fact Tett. . • - , , . .. .. . Stinr.ce s :. — .1. ...:' • Sun I 'ays that before joining the Federal Bureau of Investigation he was in the - 10/01/1995 Army (1990 to 1995) and his E0Dis 10/1/1995. I-Es first office was the San Diego division,

in both the El Centro RA and main office. Starting after 9/11/2001, he began. working as part of the Joint Terrorism Task Force within the San Diego office. In 2003 he joined the

Interview 1 at 03:25-06:10

Fly Team, and that is. his current position. • 06/77/2003 - I hays that hil first deployment overseas was to Iraq in June thru September I 09/77/2003 2003. His OSC was Thomas V. Fuentes. He does not believe there was a deputy. * Interview 1 at 06:10-

07:40, 09:10-09:52 06/77/2003 - I--1,says that in Iraq he worked in the Baghdad area at Camp Cropper in I I 09/77/2003 Baghdad•International Airport, and be traveled to An Najaf, He. did not work at Abu Ohraib Interview 1 at 12:20-

Prison, but may have gone through there ofiee and did rio interviews there. He estimates that 14:30 - • he interviewed.about 10 detainees atCaro• Cro . :fr. *

06/77/2003 - - vs that in Iran hi did no joint interview 1 09/77/2003 --• "Interview i at 14:40-

had a small-temporary tamlity at Baghdad Internatohal Airport across the street from 16f00 Cropper, he DNR any name for it, and interviewed fewer than five detainees there..'

06/77/2003 - I 'says that he did more work on bombing investigations in Baghdad and in 09/77/2003 An Naja.f. than on detainee interviews during his first deployment in Iraq. ' Interview 1 at 17:00-

17 . 40 06/77/2003 - --Isar that during his first deployment to Iraq, when he interviewed detainees 09/77/2003 the military insisted on having one of its personnel in the interview room as a monitor. The Interview l•at 17:40-

Federal Bureau of Investigation preferred to do their own interviews, so they would always 20:05: try to make that happen, and usually but not always they succeeded. There may have also

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06/77/2003 - 09/77/2003

- 06/77/2003 09/77/2003

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who deferred to the more experienced Federal Bureau ofInvestigation agents. He.DNR any interviews where they were the lead or participated substantively. He always had to make arrangements with the MI's to bring the detainees to the interview room, because the military controlled them." He would also review the prior interview files kept by the Military Intelligence personnel for each the detainees with whomhe spoke. * !says that as to training in preparation for his first deployment'to Iraq, be received a military briefing and.check as to to medical and equipment issues at "CRC." He was also briefed by the Fly Team management -I I about whaikinds-of work he would be doing and where they would be going, "but at the time, it was relatively new terrain, [and] it [wa]s hard for the chain of command to accurately brief [him] . • and they had never been there, and they d[id] not necessarily understand what was going on so preparing them was difficult. He did understand before going over that he-would be doing detaine- intpruiPrrq and rinv¢ nni hodiPv that he expected that be would be working with

Interview 1 at 30 1.5- 32:50

military

nterrogators. In that respect, the mission changed.

I says that he believes-the original Federal Bureau of Investigation mission focus in Iran bat been to do Sensitive Site Exploitiitions at Irani intbllikerieefacilitieS

counter- intelligence, rather than counter-terrorism, With the Jordanian embassy mbing, the

ederal Bureau of Investigation mission in Iraq drastically changed to counter-terrorism.

007/2003 - I believes that he obServed a stress positions once at the Joint Special 09/77/2003

standing on one leg a as walking past the interview room, but did not hear anyone Operations CommandMrvduring his first deployment in Iraq. He saw a detainee

telling him to do that, nor did' ]feel that he was being physically abused. * 06/77/2003 - I Ihas heard about n Iraq being placed in the 09/77/2003

k of a Humvee and that he sustained bad burns as a-result o)being in contact with the hot

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' [e floor surface during transport. He attempted.tO interview] I who was in bad shape, whilel Was in the hospital.' bid not obtain any melon that the burns were deliberate, and did not talk to any of the soldiers whom he

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Interview 1 at 52:57-55;45

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assumes were in the back of the tfunivee with .' I He believes there was a military investigation into that incident, but DINIK what the results of it were. *

06P77/2003 - 081?112004

I 'ays that as to his first three deployments, he saw certait•kinds of detainee treatment that Federal Bureau of Investigation agents would not do, and were therefore . inappropriate by Federal Bureau ofInvestigation standards. These included hooding of detainees as a common practice usually during the transportation of detainees, but he did not see this in while the interrogation was occurring. He notes that his exposure to military practices was limited because he did not si•in on any of their interviews. *

Intervtew I at :1.0:- 45:20

06177/2003 - 08/??/2004

1 hays that in all of his first three deployments in. Iraq and Afghanistan, the FederalBureau of Investigation's.insistence in Afghanistan that they do their own interviews arose at the initiative of the agents in the field, rather than coming down from Cl'D mandgeme t. •

interview I at 45:20-46:05

0617M003 - 081??12004

I I says that he never saw anyone beating detainees or mocking them. He believeS that to the contrary they were doing the best they could M a war zone, where people were trying to kill one another, which•by definition was "horrific." *

interview l at 46:05-47:50

06/77/2003 - 007/2004

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I says that be did not observe nor did he hear from someone who did observe ethliil—Trie'9:10- any of the techniques described in the questionnaire, except that he heard fro

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I Ithat sleep deprivation was a common military.technique, but did not see it dne, heard - about the - use of loud music: He alSo heard in the news about waterlidarding in Mosul by-SEALS, and that some kinds of charges were brought against some of the SEALS there. He did not observe or hear about any throwing detainees against a wall or closing them up inside sleeping bags. He says that when they first got to Afghanistan in May 2004, he heard that the military had used temperature manipulation, military working dogs, as interrogation techniques, but that they had suspended that practice in-light of the scandal at Abu Ghraib Prison_ 1Thr the-duration of their deployment, the military basically followed the Federal Bureau of Investigation's direct-approach interview protocols. *

0617?/2003 - 08M/201)4

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1 says that he did'not see anything during his first three deployments to Iraq - and Afghanistan that he felt he needed to or should report to his OSC relating to detainee Interview 1 at

1:00:50-1:04:55 treatment. The standard thati used in deciding what to report was-using his own conscience based-on his experience as an Federal Bureau of Investigation agent in deciding whether or not it was appropriate. He does not think he-considered whether

reporting or not reporting would reflect badly on the Federal Bureau of Investigation. He says that he can see the problem for Federal BUreau of Investigation agents corning in to a place like Abu Ghraib Prison to interview a detainee, seeing the 'silliness" by soldiers that went on, not being in control at the facility, wondering whether or not this wAs allowed under military.rules, but talking to his detainee and leaving I 'did what he would have done in that situation, and says that whether to report and to whom 'would have been a struggle." By May 2004, however, they were told to go to the Federal rauLealLoLlavesligatioia chain.of command. * says that his second deployment was to Iraq from January to March 2004. His OSC was Edward H. LueckenhOff, and the D/OSC was'

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'gays that in his sera-mire deployment he also did interviews in which ersonnel sat in, under the same circumstances as

during s test Iraq deployment. He interviewed some detainees, up in Mosul at Forward Operating Base Freedom, who were detained there by the 101st Airborne at first and then by the.Striker Brigade. He estimates that the total .number of interviews he did there was less than 10, 1-{owever, the primary focus of his work up there were bombing investigations and efforts to obtain information about Abu.Musab a]-Zarqawi. They also assisted the military .

in debriefing sources. The arkarigeinerits for interviewing detainees were again made. through Military Intelligence and the MPs. At no time did the Federal Bureau of Investigation have control dyer the detainees; it was always Department of Defense. He did no detainee interviews at Abu Ghraib Prison during this second deployment. *

01/77/2004 -03n7/2004

that the second Iraq deployment wag much better organized, since was a very r anized person, anci met with him several times prior to the deployment. nderstood that he would be going to Mosul, and knew that he would be working wi [Ind met with him. He DNR any briefing or orientation for this deployment from CTD personnel. *

Interview l at 07:40- 07:57, 09:52-10:44

Interview I at 20:03-;4:30

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05/77/2004 not aware of any MOtJs or agreements between the Federal Bureau of Investigation the the military' (but read a unilateral SOCOM memorandum when he went to Ft. Bragg which in effect said that the Federal Bureau of Investigation personnel in Afghanistan do not work for Department of Defense,

Interview 1 at 1:28:46-1:30:02

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and were there on their own au thorities.working together on matters of mutual interest. He thinks the reason for it was so that Department of Defense did not have to pay Federal Bureati of Investigation agent salaries. He is not sure what the issue date was.

05177/2004 - says that he deployed to Afghanistan from May to August 2004. The OSC 08/77/2004 was Michael E. teinbach, the Deputy was Briart-F. McCauley, and then Brian F. McCauley Interview 1 at 67:57-

took over as OSC. After McCauley left, Warren T. Bamford. now in charge of Strategic 08:05, 10:44-11:45 Information Operations Center, took over as OSC and stayed for the rest oil I de lo. ment. 4` .

05M/2004 - ys that during his first Afghanistan deployment he interviewed detainees. 08IN/2004 and while it was not their focus it was part of the job. He says that pretty much everything Interview 1 at 25:50-

. he d id 'in Afghanistan isi IHe did detainee interviews at FOB Salerno 27:40 at what was in effect a temporary holding facility. He may also have done one or two interviews at the Joint Special Operations Command facility at Bagram He was also involved in the interviews of-art American citizen held by the Afghan authorities in Kabul. *

05177/2004 - V.ays that he interviewed approximately five to 10 detainees at Salerno. The I 0817?/2004 makeshift facility was such that it was not possible to be alone with the detainees. There Interview 1 at 27:40-

were military guards around all the time, and controlled all the detainees. Maybe once or twice a military interrogator sat in,. because the Federal Bureau of Investigation insisted on doing their interviews alone. There was a little resiStanee of a territorial or ego nature.from the younger, lower level military, •but there was no resistance on this point from the commanders. "

29:15 •

05/77/2004 - bays that he participated in a number of Sensitive Site Exploitations with I t9;15- 08/7'T/2004 military personnel based at Salerno, and this was a major part of his work During Sensitive Interview 1 at

Site Exploitations, he participated in a number ofstreet interviews to screen out those who should be detained further. "

30:10

1 1---- 05/77/.2004 - ays that he did not get a CTD orientation or briefing from CID personnel 081?7/2004 for his first Afghanistan deployment, in part because of the short amount of time available Interview i at 35:05-

between his return from Iraq and his departure to Afghanistan. He was asked illi. 38:40 of Weeks of.his -zeturn to go to Afghanistan with a - team of agents to support th mission. He and the other agents went to Ft. Bragg for a week and met with the Ili] Ataxy people they would be working with, read into the program and.given.access to mission -

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databases. The concept was that the Federal Bureau of Investigation would go over and do sit-down detainee interviews. However, at Salerno, they also did quite a bit of scene search

and other investigative work. He did not get a briefing or orientation information from CTD personnel for this mission. This was the first time they were going on such a mission with this Task Force, so there was no one who could tell them what they would b However, they did meet with Brian F. McCauley, Michael B. Steinbach and and they did brief them on who they would be working with and give them e est picture the could. *

F I Most of his information from interview I. at 38:40-

Terrorism Division - FBI personnel came from Michael B. ian F. 39:50 McCauley. He DNR much coming from his meeting with ince as Unit

Chief, this was One of-many things he was handling. Stein ac an• Me a ey told them that they would be woddrig with Joint Special Operations.Command personnel and doing detainee interviews and Sensitive Site Exploitations. By that time, they had improved their equipment and were well-prepared for the deployment.

says that before his first deployment to Afghanistan, they did discuss the ditterences-between military interrogation rules and Federal Bureau of Investigation Interview 1 at 39:50-

interview policieS. He recalls that an EC came out artnind this tune - Withih about a week of 41:55 the time they deployed - concerning detainee treatment and issues relating to working with non-FBI personnel, He recallsit.covering the instruction to continue following Federal Bureau of Investigation rules, and reporting non -FBI conduct. He DNR getting anything more detailed in terms of what they needed to report, either in writing or orally. He suggests that this was not needed, since after 10 years in the Federal Bureau of he

• t and wrong. ' • says that after three deployments be was aware that they were authorized to do more than Federal Bureau of Investigation agents, such as stre.ss-positiOns, but his Interview I at 41:55-

. observation had been that t ed to the detainees, as did the Federal Bureau.of 43:51 Investigation He says that as a great source of information as to what military practices were allowe , sin . d been a military interrogator. However, be does not believe there was any formal or official document or briefing so thatFecieral Bureau of

ys that lie went to Ft. Bragg and deployed to Afghanistan wi

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Investigation a eats were aware of these things. * 05/77/2004 - 08/77/2004

was aware o i oncerns relating to the first Afghanistan I deployment, and they are.old friendS from the Army. He DNR him raising such concerns at Ft Brags; hut the Abu Ghraib Prison story had just broken in the media, and he thinks that

Interview 1 at 1:10:00-1:11:45 -

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wondered whether abuse was occurring in Afghanistan as well, and was concerned about the liability of Federal Bureau of Investi ation agents for participating with military personnel in detainee interviews as in a supervisory role.'

lescribes his understanding o concerns as relating to failure to rimmEl. • - a : '.ns of mill conduct. *

05/7?/2004 - 08/77/2004

believes that concerns were "well- '" id" in 1 the sense of what are the parameters and what do we do. However, had Interview 1 at

1:11:45-1:13:00 been to Iraq twice and he did not see any of that sol 6elieved that u Ghraib Prison • was an aberration, and not the standard, so he was not afraid to go into these military facilities and work with the military personnel. He was not concern sibly seeing something that would put him in a-compromising position told at (bin (b1(71(0

knew right from wrong, and was not going to let something like Abu Gifraib Prison happen. Their debate was whether the responsibility for defining what to stop or report rested on the organization or on the individual agent. * ' _

05/77/2004 - 08/7•/2004

I did not observe any n ty while in Afghanistan that - - would have provided a specific basis fo oncerns. For example, when Interview 1 at

1:13:00-1:16:22

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went to Salerno ; he reported back to in Bagram either by phone or e-mail that conditions at Salerno were "austere" and that detainees were coining right off the battlefield with wounds, and kept in cells Made out of eight foot HESCO boxes, chain-link boxes that were lined and then filled with earth, which were placed on three sides and one stacked on top to provide a root and a moveable fence on one side for ingress and exit. He learned that shortly before his arrival there, the military had done a review of the facility and determined there was no abuse there, that this was the best the•military could do for the detainees under the circumstances, with adequate food, water and medical care. He felt based on his prior experience-that this was consistent with military standards, but also knew that Federal Bureau of Investioatio agents w ed to house prisoners in such dirt enclosures. When he told about thi as very concerned and said that the Federal

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Bureau of Investigation needed to leave Salerno. * 05M/2004 - 08/7T/2004

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I says that IvfichaelB. Steinbach was very angry about the' 1 situation because he was someone new coming into Afghanistan in Michael B. Steinbach's - environm 1 these terrible thin s and Steinbach was responsible for them. He

Interview 1 at 1:16:22-1:18:58

thinks tha lad left by the time et with Steinbach and'had to explain to Steinbach tha as hot the one saying these things. 'did not have any conversations ahoptl Concerns with anyone back in the US, but he did speak to

I by telephone, who tot hat he and the others should continue to . work, do what they.knew was right, andat Counter Terrorism Division - FBI was coming out to do an assessment. *

05/77/2004 - says that whe' n barime t1 0.8/77/2004 08/77/2004 Afghanistan to do the assessment, t ere was no real discussion oricems. Interview 1 at

He thinks there had been a meeting back in the US with' I and when he asked what • 1:18:58-1:19:35 had hal:opened, they did not want to discuss it. *

05/77/2004 - 1 says that the Federal Bureau of Investigation agents spoke to the head of 08/7T/2004 Military Intelligence there in Afghanistan, and made it very clear that here was how the Interview 1 at

Federal Bureau of Investigation did business, that we talk to people and do not do things like 1:20:00.1:21:05,. stress positions and we are going to talk to people here, and not participate in anything else. 1:23:00-1:23:20

(b)(3), 10 USC 130b; (b)(6 _ ) was the head of the Special Forces thing in country, bu

the issues with him, and did not discuss these issues-with Gary M. Bald. says that he told the military that if they ever saw anything they did not approve 9 ley would end theirparticipation and leave. *

05/77/2004 - 'says that he was once walking past an interrogation room in Afghanistan 08/7T/2004 and he looked in when he saw some military interrogators ; and they were yelling at him,

they did not have any chairs, and a detainee sitting on the floor or up on his knees. The Interview 1 at 1:23:20-1:24:15

interrogators sensed thatEIiid not like what he was seeing and one of them rushed out to . tellhim that the chair for the detainee was on the way. This suggests, he says that the Federal Bureau of Investigation's presence led to military personnel behaving themselves. *

05/7?/2004 - Says that at the initial military briefing when he and the others arrived in 08/7T/2004 stan, e recalls that there were military contract interrogators present and that while terview at

he.did not like their "screw you" attitude towards the military they had recently left, he had 1:25:33-1:27:40

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no othe•negative reaction towards them.. He DNR any stress positions being demonstrated during this briefing. *

'says that as to the e-mail from' Ito John F. Curren in Office of the General Counsel - FBI lid not tell thatl Peas "uncomfortable" with what he ha_ d seen in Afghanistan in treatment of detainees and any ethical dilemma. What! 'probably told he was uncomfortable with was the horrible injuries and destnictiori and living conditions in a war zone like that, I 'believes that these are bad places where bad people do bad things, but that does not.preclude the Federal Bureau of Investigation from being involved in those environments, as long as they know what their parameters are, and know right from wrong, and hold other people to those standards

Interview I at 1:33:00-1737:20

Thu ,12/23/2004 says that thee-mail he sent 12/23/2004 relates to extra-territorial sources.- paid human rote ligenceassets overseas - and not to detainees. He Us or MOM hatviWn'tba FM-al:a I Riiiwaii of Trivaati aidi1111 and thim-milita

Interview 1 at 110:02-1:32:25

05/77/2005 - 08/77/2005 •

Tue 11/01/2005

Tue 11/01/2005

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trays that h.n deninva41 to Atlhanistan a second time trom May to August 2005, The OSC was and Roderick Boward Dallas.ASAC) was the D/OSC. * •

!has not seen and is not aware of any photos or videos depicting, what could be considered mistreatment or inappropriate behavior by US persObnel toward detainees. No detainee that he interviewed complained to him about the-way they had been treated by US ersonnel•While in US custody, •

ys that he never heard information indicating that military personnel and• as an Bureau of Investigation agentwhether they wanted the military to do anything to a detainee to soften him up for his Federal Bureau of Investigation interview, and no information that an Federal Bureau of Investigation agent asked anyone in the

ething that an agent isnot allowed to do himself. * says that he has never had information that anyone in the military tried to

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11/01/2005 conceal or prevent the Federal Bureau of Investigation from observing what was occurring in a detainee interview. *

Interview 1 at 1:24:56-1:25:20

Tue says that he has never seen any impersonation of Federal Bureau of 11101/2005 investigation agents by personnel from other US agencies in any of his overseas - 1 - JIVE: .1

deployments. * 1:25:20-1:25:33 TUe ys that no one from Office of the General Counsel - FBI or Inspections 115747="13171:come

.. 11/01/2005 . . to him and asked him questions relating to his observations of tenriew at

detainee treatment overseas, and has Bever met with anyone from OGC to discuss whether 1:27:45-1:28:16, . there ought to be more detailed rules to . guide agents in these situations He is also not aware of any internal inquiry by either component on-agent observations or actions re detainees in

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