database integrity the issue for making rnav a real success

RNAV in Terminal Airspace Workshop

oint Aviation AuthoritiesEUROCONTROL

Lufhansa German Airlines, Capt. J.SchadtJAA - Eurocontrol - RNAV Workshop, Luxembourg 29.01. -31.01.01

Database Integrity

The issue for making RNAV a real success

Capt. Jürgen Schadt

Chief Technical Pilot

Capt. A-320

Lufthansa German Airlines

Chief Technical Pilot Office, FRA OY




Motivation• GPS/FMS equipment with accuracies better then

0,3 nm is standard today

• GPS/FMS-RNAV SIDs and STARs have positive impact in TMA-Ops in all aspects

• GPS-NPAs are the primary NPA-procedures over outdated (offset) NDB/VOR approaches

• Conventional Procedures are flown on regular basis with use of FMS/GPS („managed modes - VNAV“)




Motivation• GPS is the system for ermerging airports with

"problematic" infrastructure---> CIS: see Samara - UWWW

AFI: see Addis Abbeba

• Operators experience every AIRAC - Cycle Nav-database problems




The primary motivation for any

"Database controlled approach"

is - enhanced flight safety- enhanced flight safety

- economic benefits

- positive environmental impact

Motivation




Definition: Database Integrity

Database Integrity describes the probability for source data to be stored "correct" inside the FMC

---> after it ran through theprocess of final database-generation.




Database quality management

1. Plausibility checksProcess owner:Database supplier

2. internal Integrity checks Process owner: Database supplier

3. Integrity checks during "packing" Process owner: FMC - Manufacturer

4. "Fly the database"Process owner:AirlineMedium: Pilot report

Feedback loopto

Database supplier

„Reports“

Future Goal

Zero ReportsX




Problems of Database Integrity

• Navigational data are generated today and in short to medium future by unsecure/uncertified processes

• no "usable" standards exists for generation of databases with guranteed integrity---> RTCA DO-200A cannot be implemented today

(even if JAA TGL-9 is regulating implementation)

RTCA DO-200A

"The end-user is responsible for the integrity of the data" Section 1.4 - Application of Standard




Problems of Database Integrity• there will be no fully implementable procedures for

database integrity available for the next years by any non airline organisation.

• Even a mandate will not change the situation due to non compliance

Negative example: Implementation of WGS-84




Problems of Database Integrity• there will be no fully implementable procedures for

the implementation of GPS/FMS-RNAV procedures (or conventional procedures used with RNAV - equipment), which depend on the availabilty of procedures to ensure database integrity

---> the use of RNAV - equipment isthe business case of the future




Database process plus DbIT™

Database generation

1. AIP

2.Databse supplier

3. Database packer

3. User ---> Airline

"UNSECURE" PROCESS

Databaseintegrity check

DbIT™

non RTCA-178 Software

NEW

"UNSECURE" PROCESS

TogetherSecure Process




Database Integrity for OperatorsTo ensure a high level of database integrity ---> GPS - NPA, GPS/FMS-RNAV - (+ Overlay -) procedures.

---> 5 level integrity concept ("multilayered system")

1. Training for all pilotsTool: simulator, aircraft, training handoutsTime: permanent ---> all fleets

2. Check of NavDatabase prior effectivity to detect changes of “Ops - critical" dataincl. an immediate reaction schemeTool: DbIT™ (Database Integrity Tool) ---> inservice 08/2000Time: 2 - 5 days prior database effectivity




Database Integrity for Operators

3. Check of "critical" data prior starting the procedure (e.g. GPS-approach) by the flightcrewTool: charts, crew operating proceduresTime: 10 - 15 minutes prior starting approach

4. Plausibilty check during approachTool: charts, crew ops. procs., trainingTime: during approach

5. Administrative seperation of database integrity-checks and data handling ---> FlightopsTool: internal organisationTime: permanent ---> all fleets




JAA TGL - 3 ---> GPS Procs."Notification of certification and operations of GPS - receivers"

---> primary certification document for LBA

I.6.2 Use of GPS for NPA

Bullets (a) to (g) describe the requirements for GPS-NPA

Database integrity ---> (h):

"The approach procedures has to be used as stored inside the navdatabase. The database must contain the offical published procedure"




JAA TGL - 10 ---> PRNAV

10.6. Database Integrity

10.6.1: Database has to be obtained by RTCA DO-200A certifieddatabase supplier

10.6.2: If supplier not certified additional checks have to be carriedout through software or approved manual means (for allprocedures below MOCA) by the operator

10.6.4: Operators should consider additional checks even ifdatabase is obtained by certified supplier---> JAR Ops 1.035 Quality System

10.6.5: See Annex B for specification of database integritysoftware




RNAV(GPS)* - Procedures

Speciman

* also to be used in general with conventional procedures flown database controlled




Implementing Database Integrity1. Flight Crew Procedures

---> Databaserequirement according TGL-3, I.6.2 (h)

2. Additional Integritychecks ---> Softwaretool

---> Databasesintegritysoftware: DbIT™

TGL-10, Section 10.6.2

... the operator must implement navigation database integrity checks using appropriate software tools or approved manual procedures to verify data relating to waypoints below the applicable minimum obstacle clearance altitude...




DbIT™- (Database Integrity Tool)

Goal Ensure database integrity in regard of “Ops critical"data prior database effectivity (applicable to RNAV andnon RNAV procedures)

Way Implementation and maintenance of a reference-database, which will be run by flightops.All changes in comparison to the referencedatabasewill rated as "critical" or "non critical".

"Philosophy" Detected data changes of critical data will leadto immediate disauthorization of the applicableprocedures.Parallel the database supplier will be informedand required to present a solution.




DbIT™- Main Screen

www.database-integrity.com




DbIT™- Input Database

Input Database Screenshot

Lufthansa ProprietaryWebsite: www.database-integrity.com




DbIT™- Reference Database






DbIT™- Edit Ref Waypoint






DbIT™- Critical Data Report

Critical Data Report ---> CDR




Sum up ---> DbIT™

• automated check of any database against a reference database ---> database quality index

• reference database contains "flight critical" data

• check of RNAV and non RNAV procedures possible

• automated generation of "Critical Data Report"

• action scheme in terms of checklist augments DbIT™

• full encrypted log file for reference data control

DbITDbIT™™ is available for any operator is available for any operator




Conclusion - Operators are forced to act due to the increasing

number of published RNAV + Overlay Procedures and insufficient database integrity processes

- Operators even have to apply higher standardsin respect of less experience with RNAV procedures and database integrity issues

- Training in all respects for all involved personel isvital for the success of RNAV

- One incident or accident stops the whole „RNAVMovement“




Point of contact

Lufthansa German Airlines

Jürgen SchadtJürgen SchadtChief Technical Pilot, Capt. A-320

Chief Technical Pilot Office, FRA OYLufthansa German AirlinesPhone: +49-69-696-2360Fax: +49-69-696-7070E-Mail: [email protected]™ - Infos: www.database-integrity.comTGL - Infos: www.ecacnav.com

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database integrity the issue for making rnav a real success

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